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HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966-67

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. DAVID W. GROOS

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 17-24

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1967

Respecting

Bill C-243, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and other Acts in consequence thereof.


WITNESSES:

From the Tri-Service Identities Organization: Mr. Robert H. Hilborn, President; Mr. Robert I. Hendy, Vice-President; Mr. George Penfold, Secretary-Treasurer.

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STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. David W. Groos

Vice-Chairman: Hon. Marcel Lambert

Mr. Andras,
Mr. Brewin,
Mr. Churchill,
Mr. Deachman,
Mr. Fane,
Mr. Faulkner,
Mr. Forrestall,
Mr. Foy,
Mr. Harkness,
Mr. Langlois (*Chicoutimi*),
Mr. Laniel,
Mr. Latulippe,
[1]Mr. Legault,
Mr. Loiselle,
Mr. Macaluso,
Mr. McIntosh,
Mr. McNulty,
Mr. Nugent,
Mr. Rochon,
Mr. Rock,
Mr. Smith,
Mr. Winch—(24).

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

[1] Replaced Mr. Lessard on February 10, 1967

ORDER OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS
FRIDAY, February 10, 1967.

Ordered—That the name of Mr. Legault be substituted for that of Mr. Lessard on the Standing Committee on National Defence.

Attest.

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

25677--1½

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

FRIDAY, February 10, 1967.
(26)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 9:40 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Groos, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Brewin, Churchill, Deachman, Fane, Faulkner, Forrestall, Foy, Groos, Harkness, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laniel, Lessard, Loiselle, Macaluso, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon, Rock and Winch—(21).

Also present: Mr. Fulton and Mr. More (*Regina City*).

In attendance: From the Tri-Service Identities Organization: Mr. Robert H. Hilborn, President; Mr. Robert I. Hendy, Vice-President; Mr. George Penfold, Secretary-Treasurer. *From the Department of National Defence:* Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister; Honourable Léo Cadieux, Associate Minister; Air Marshal F. R. Sharp, Vice Chief Defence Staff and Air Marshal E. M. Reyno, Chief of Personnel.

The Chairman introduced the three witnesses from the Tri-Service Identities Organization. Messrs. Hilborn, Hendy and Penfold outlined their respective Service backgrounds and then proceeded to read a brief prepared by the Toronto Branch of TRIO, together with a precis and postscript to the brief. The Chairman read a telegram from the Hamilton and District Branch of TRIO which supported the brief as presented. Mr. Hilborn referred to thirty additional telegrams which he had received, supporting the brief presented by the witnesses.

The members of the Committee began their questioning of the witnesses and at 11:00 a.m. the Committee adjourned until 1:30 p.m. this day.

AFTERNOON SITTING
(27)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 1:40 p.m. this day, with the Chairman, Mr. Groos, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Brewin, Churchill, Deachman, Fane, Faulkner, Forrestall, Foy, Groos, Harkness, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laniel, Loiselle, Macaluso, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon, Rock, and Winch—(20).

Also present: Mr. Chatterton and Mr. Lessard.

In attendance: Same as the morning sitting.

The Committee members continued to question the witnesses from TRIO, on the various subjects contained in the brief which had been presented during the morning sitting.

The TRIO organization was thanked for its interest in the Committee's deliberations and the Chairman particularly thanked the witnesses for their presentation.

At approximately 4:50 p.m. the Committee adjourned until Monday, February 13, 1967 at 3:30 p.m., when the witnesses appearing will representing the Naval Officers' Associations of Canada, the Royal Canadian Naval Association and the Navy League of Canada.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(*Recorded by Electronic Apparatus*)

FRIDAY, February 10, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, there is a quorum.

We have before us today the representatives of TRIO, Mr. Robert Hilborn and Mr. Robert Hendy. I will ask Mr. Hilborn to start the presentation.

Mr. MACALUSO: May I have a copy of the brief?

The CHAIRMAN: It is being distributed now.

Mr. ROBERT H. HILBORN (*President of TRIO*): Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I and my colleagues in the Tri-Service Identities Organization (TRIO) appreciate this opportunity of appearing before you.

I assure you that we are here because of a sense of dedication and a particular interest in Canada's security through its defence forces.

We recognize the difficulties of the critic's role, but frankly we are deeply concerned with, and critical of, the proposed defence reorganization.

We hope that our brief and the supplementary statement that you have will provide a history against which we can develop a discussion.

Although TRIO does not necessarily cast itself in the role of expert we have gathered information both from within and outside the services, which, together with the knowledge of associates, enables us to make a well-informed appreciation justifying our position, and this position is appended to the brief.

Our suggestion of an independent inquiry implies no disrespect of this Committee. We are, and have been, anxious to maintain a non-political attitude in order to ensure objectivity and dispassionate analysis. We continue to be concerned that the issues involved seem to be being resolved along political lines to the point where a truly objective analysis or examination is difficult.

Mr. FANE: Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt to ask Mr. Hilborn to tell us exactly where he is reading from in this brief?

Mr. HILBORN: I am not reading from the brief. These are simply remarks introductory to the brief.

With me today are members of TRIO who have been active since its inception. All have substantial service backgrounds, combined with long interest in defence matters, qualifying them to express opinions in this debate.

I would like to introduce Mr. Robert I. Hendy, on my right, and Mr. George Penfold.

You might be interested in a very brief résumé of our service backgrounds and experience.

I have an Army background. I was commissioned thirty years ago, in 1937. I mobilized in the Highland Light Infantry of Canada in Galt in 1940, and went overseas in 1941. I served in England and took the staff course at Camberley. I

was in Italy with the 1st Corps Headquarters in various Grade 2 appointments, as brigade major of a brigade, and was discharged in 1946. Subsequently for three years, between 1960 and 1963, I commanded the Toronto Scottish Regiment.

Mr. Hendy, would you now comment on your service background?

Mr. Robert Hendy (*Vice-President of TRIO*): Mr. Chairman, I joined the Naval Reserve in 1936 and retired about five years ago. During that time I had six years on active service. I took a course in military studies at the University of Toronto. I was Commanding Officer of the naval reserve units in Toronto, and was senior naval officer in Toronto as a reserve officer.

I was instrumental in bringing the Navy and the Air Force into the Conference of Defence Associations about six or seven years ago, and served as its first non-Army chairman.

Mr. George Penfold (*Secretary Treasurer of TRIO*): My experience in the military dates back to 1940 when I qualified as a sergeant in a machine gun regiment, the 500-Sudbury Regiment.

I enlisted as an AC2 in the Air Force in 1941, graduated as a navigator-bombadier and served a term on Coastal Command out of Dartmouth, N.S. I was discharged in 1946.

In 1949 in Kitchener, through association with the Air Cadets, I became interested in the Air Force Association and served on the executive in Kitchener and Windsor. I then went back to Toronto and became a member of the Ontario Provincial Committee of the Air Cadet League. I served in various roles of the Air Force Association and became its National President in 1964. I have served on a defence committee of an Ontario group of the RCAF Association for several years.

Mr. Hilborn: Mr. Chairman, with your permission I will read our brief. To avoid monotony I will take the liberty of reading parts and of having other members carry on and read portions.

(*Translation*)

I would like to express to those members of the Committee who are French-speaking our very sincere apologies for not having been able to produce this brief in French. We had hoped to be able to do so, but the time at our disposal made it impossible to do so. It was impossible, too, for financial reasons.

(*English*)

The brief begins with a note:

> Note: Although this brief has been prepared by the Toronto Branch its essentials have been considered by other branches of TRIO in principal cities in Canada. The object of this brief is to focus attention on areas for examination and explanation in respect to the reorganization of the defence establishment to ensure that the military tasks required by the nation will be carried out efficiently and effectively.

1. *TRIO*—Its Origins and Concept

TRIO was organized in August, 1966, as a result of the widespread interest generated during the events of the summer in connection with the defence reorganization and as highlighted by the many releases of many senior officers of the armed forces under circumstances still unexplained but which indicated concern was justified respecting the reorganization of the Defence Department which had been carried forward since the White Paper of 1964. The TRIO position has been summarized and is attached to this brief as a schedule. It should be emphasized that TRIO has drawn support from all levels and varying political allegiances. A gratifying response to the establishment of TRIO was made by the Department of National Defence in a release to the press by the Executive Assistant to the Minister who was reported as follows: "The formation of TRIO is by all means a good thing...the Defence Department welcomes such organizations".

At the outset it should be emphasized that TRIO recognizes the need for changes in defence planning as in everything else and does not maintain a rigid approach. However it is apparent that both in the concept of the defence reorganization, which has been categorized under the words "integration and unification", and in its execution problems have developed which are seriously affecting the efficiency and operational effectiveness of the services. The principal evidence of this of course is the loss of personnel, and especially many senior, capable officers well before normal retirement age. It is noteworthy that many of these officers have expressed publicly their concern with what is happening to our defence establishment. It is for these reasons that TRIO felt that there was a need to provide some forum to present the views, in a rational and reasonable manner, of those concerned with problems in defence and as a counter for the almost two and a half years of unchallenged statements put out by the Defence Department extolling the achievements of its policies and programmes.

2. *The Premise of Canadian Defence Policy*

The Minister of National Defence reaffirmed on December 7th, 1966, the objectives and tasks of the armed forces which were set out in the White Paper of 1964. It is noteworthy that these objectives include support of our allies through NATO and other alliances, the exercise of sovereignty in our territorial waters, the maintenance of forces available to defend Canada as well as to contribute to international peacekeeping operations. Geographic factors related to Canadian defence problems, as outlined in the White Paper, confirm and strengthen the need to have units able to operate in all three environments and sometimes independent of each other. Thus the defence of North America from the air, which is done in conjunction with the U.S. through NORAD, requires a separate capability for the Air Force and the extensive territorial waters surrounding Canada require a separate capability peculiar to Naval forces. There is also the question of establishing a strong mobilization base. While opinions are held in some quarters that large numbers of troops will not be required in any possible future conflict, it is interesting to consider a comment from a book edited by the Russian Chief of General Staff from 1953 to 1960, Marshal Sokolovsky, entitled "Military Strategy—Soviet Doctrines and Concepts". This comment is "The advent of nuclear missiles and the growth of aviation and other

weapons revived . . . the notorious theory that it is possible to conduct war with small armies that are technically well equipped. The advocates of this theory do not take into account the fact that the new technology not only does not reduce, but, on the contrary, actually increases personnel requirements. . . Thus, mass armed forces, well trained in the use of modern combat equipment, will be required from the very first days of a war."

Further, as the defence of North America is a joint responsibility of Canada and the U.S. it is incumbent on Canada to bear its fair share of such responsibility. Even allowing for the fact that the U.S. has ten times the population of Canada and is, on a per capita basis, considerably more wealthy, it is interesting to compare the four million people, service and non-service, engaged in defence activities in the U.S. with the one hundred and forty thousand which Canada commits. Thus the U.S. has thirty times as many people directly engaged in defence as we have in Canada. It may be that we are doing as much as we should or could but the question may well be asked—should we be reducing our defence establishment at this time?

3. *Observations on Defence Planning and its Implementation since 1964*

(a) *Defence Council and Defence Staff*

The top policy-making group, the Defence Council, has been reorganized to now consist of six members. Of these only two are expected to have military qualifications. At the present time therefore the Council will be deprived of expert opinion from at least one of the environments—sea, land or air—that the forces must be capable of operating in. This would seem to be a major error as greater specialization and the increased technical knowledge that is required for modern weaponry would seem to place greater emphasis on expertise in the various elements rather than try to make senior military personnel proficient in all. This appears to be the result if only two military members are to sit on the Defence council to advise the two political members, a senior civil servant as Deputy Minister and the Chairman of the Defence Research Board. This appears to be a fundamental error at this level where proper advice is so important to assist the government to make decisions on defence policy.

Directly below the Defence Council is the Defence Staff which has now been unified. Thus one senior officer speaks for the entire armed forces, with a right of veto on the opinions of his subordinates. This step has been criticized as placing the Defence Staff in a position where under any disagreement with the government resignations would be forced. This has apparently already occurred.

(b) *Commands*

The reorganization of the commands of the armed forces has been accompanied by much fanfare. It is probably too early to make any conclusive assessment of certain of the steps which have been taken but the following remarks are germane and form a basis for further comment.

(i) *Training Command*—This command, situated at Winnipeg, is committed to the basic individual training of all the forces. It would seem that this step alone will seriously affect the professionalism that is required in all levels of the three services. Certain basic skills can of course

be taught on a common training basis. But economies may be difficult if geographic considerations related to cost of moving personnel are considered. However as men are required for units in the various environments the need for training to be sensitive to the requirement of such environments becomes paramount. Thus, for example, the taking away of the basic training of seamen from the direct aegis of the Maritime Commander would seem to be a questionable step resulting as it does in setting up lines of communication to Winnipeg to regulate Naval training and the allocation of staff to Winnipeg headquarters over and above commitments still existing in the Navy's training establishments on the coasts. Certainly the degree to which training administration has been rendered more complex is something which should be thoroughly gone into before further steps are taken to deprive each service of its own training functions. It might be questioned whether 19,000 people which was given as the number in training command for 7,500 persons under instruction is a ratio that should be permitted. Could any other educational organization tolerate, let alone afford, such a ratio?

(ii) *Mobile Command*—It is considered that the concept of this Command is useful and valuable insofar as it will ensure by its organization a greater degree of readiness of the Army and supporting Air Force units attached to it. However this only follows the same concept as the combined Maritime Command which was established in 1958 with Naval and Air units operating under an integrated command headquarters. This can be done without the panoply of "integration-unification".

(iii) *Maritime Command*—Notwithstanding the claims of the Department of Defence, Maritime Command has, as already indicated, been a combined command for several years under the concept of command being exercised by an officer from one service with a deputy from an officer of the other, both trained in the essentials of maritime warfare. Although this command appeared to be functioning smoothly and effectively, it is understood that under the revised organization which came into effect on the 1st January, 1966, that the administration in this command has been greatly increased to the point where operational efficiency is being affected. This should be thoroughly examined.

(iv) *Air Transport and Air Defence Commands*—These two commands are, of course, unaffected by the present policies in the broadest sense and remain RCAF commitments. Have there been any advantages here effected by unification?

(v) *Materiel Command*—It is probably too early to assess the effectiveness of this command under the reorganization. It is understood that the complexities of bringing into effect a system to supply all three services is proving more difficult than has been originally anticipated. Certain efficiencies in centralized storekeeping may be possible, although if the figure that only ten per cent of the stores and supplies used by the services are common to all three, the area of greater economy or efficiency is considerably restricted. This, however, is an area which would lend itself to the adoption of business principles and management and, provided it retains a capability of promptly supplying needs of the various forces in

the field, should be workable. However it is understood that an integrated supply system adopted by the U.S. forces for the Vietnam operations has not been successful and each service has been given back its logistic function. In this regard the experience of the U.S. in Vietnam might well prove to provide lessons which we in Canada should study and consider before proceeding any further.

(c) *Recruiting*

In the last two years recruiting for the services has not kept up to wastage. It is submitted, notwithstanding other factors, that a great deal of the responsibility in this regard must rest with a lack of acceptance of the defence reorganization as it has been outlined from time to time. To maintain our forces at the present wastage rate we need about 14,000 new recruits per year whereas something in the neighbourhood of only 10,000 per year for the last year or so have been obtained. The source of recruits should also be considered, important in these are the cadet services. Some hesitancy on the part of young men considering joining one of the existing services is becoming apparent as they are not willing to engage in a situation which might lead them to serve under incompatible circumstances. A further source of recruits are the children of not only presently serving but ex-service personnel. A reluctance is apparent by such people to advise enlistment in the services under the situation that has developed. Certainly the elements of attractiveness for the three separate services are factors to be considered to encourage recruits into a volunteer system. It is believed that this is one of the reasons some countries who have looked at the Canadian experiment have decided to maintain the present traditional elements of three services. The loss of support from such substantial groups cannot be afforded. How will we maintain our personnel strength if recruiting and re-engagements don't improve?

(d) *The Extent of the Acceptance of the Reorganization Plan*

This is the area of greatest concern. Mention has already been made of the large number of senior officers who have been retired or released prematurely. There are, of course, many people in the services continuing to participate in the reorganization plans. Many of these people are in fact "locked in" by reason of accumulated pension entitlement and are unable to ask for premature release for fear of the penalties to which they would be subject. Naturally these people will, so long as they are in the forces, work loyally, but this does not necessarily mean that they accept or support the programme. If the Department is confident of the wide acceptance of its programme in the forces then there should be no fear of permitting people to have a choice of whether they wish to join the new unified force should it come into effect. It is noteworthy that of the most senior officers who have retired within the last three years none appear to have come forward to support the programme with which they were intimately associated and on the contrary many have been publicly critical of both the military merit of the programme and the means by which it is being achieved. The number of these men who hold the rank of Major-General or equivalent in the other two services is an impressive one, especially when it is considered that not long ago many of them were being hailed as the best possible military minds in Canada, who were going to make the integration process work. A list of these includes such men as Miller, Walsh, Rayner, Moncel, Fleury, Annis, Dyer, Cameron,

Harvey, Hendrick, Orr, Stirling, Landymore, Welland, Piers, Kitching. These men are all competent to give opinions and should be called before any inquiry that takes place in respect to the Department's programmes and the legislation which is sought to be enacted. Others, whose opinions as respected military figures of other years, whose opinions should be respected are Lt. Gen. Simonds, Brig. R.S. Malone, Col. C. C. Merrit, Maj. Gen, H. A. Sparling.

(e) *Problems of leadership in relation to recent events and promotion policies.*

While it is popular to attack "the brass hats", the services cannot be run without leaders any more than any other organization. The release of officers with experience which has taken place in the last few months is not in the best interests of developing top direction in the services. No other organization could afford the loss of people who are in effect the top management or board of directors on the same scale as we have encountered in the armed forces in the last two years without seriously affecting efficiency. While the replacements are capable there is no doubt, were it not for the premature release of many of their superiors, these officers would have gained more experience before achieving the ranks they have now been suddenly granted. It would seem that we have paid a penalty in loss of experience that will be a long time being overcome. In any event the top management of the services as represented at the level of the Defence Staff and Commands should not be marked by passive acquiescence as it is in the give and take of discussion and examination by persons holding various views that the best possible results will be achieved. This must exist without threat of summary dismissal for divergent views. In this regard it is strongly urged that the degree of consultation between the Minister and his senior advisers should be thoroughly examined as it appears lack of planning and absence of a proper program, which has already been indicated in some of the criticism of the Department's activities over the last three years, were contributing factors to many of these men leaving early. Intelligent discussion and debate in relation to contrasting questions should not be characterized as bickering. Further it now appears that efforts are being made to ensure officers who are "reliable" in so far as the integration-unification process as presently conceived are being given preferment in promotion. This is a step which appears to put a premium on political loyalty rather than on military competence. This is a development which cannot be too strongly criticized and deplored. It creates a situation whereby such officers may be required to follow other policies by subsequent administrations which would bring them into direct conflict with the government. This is a position which for the good of the services and the country should not be permitted to develop. The "integration-unification" process is still an untried and untested program and we should not be creating an officer corps which is wedded to it by the means now being adopted. The result might well be a complete disintegration of our military effectiveness which has already been seriously impaired by the events of the last few years.

4. *The common uniform*

This is one of the elements of the defence reorganizaton which attracts the public eye to a very great extent and is probably next in popularity to the game

of attacking the "Brass Hats". It is, of course, incidental to both the merits and the methods of the defence program. The striving for better materials and improved design of uniform should be continuous in any event in the interests of morale. Yet this does not require a complete abolition of the traditional forms of dress to which the men in the three services are accustomed and in which they take great pride. Recently the newspapers reported details of the new uniform. Within twenty-four hours the accuracy of one of these articles was challenged by the Defence Department and shortly thereafter it was announced that a committee was being set up to consider this question. It was particularly noteworthy, however, that the description of the proposed uniform started with a basic pattern. However, every step indicated the great pains which were being employed to achieve separate identities for personnel serving in the three environments presently represented by the Navy, the Army and the Air Force. If this need to preserve identity is so strong, even with a so-called "common" uniform, the question might again be asked why the necessity for changing the traditional uniforms which are identified not only with the units and environments in which the men serve but have a relation to the forces of other countries with whom our people are continually coming in contact.

5. *Common Rank Structure*

There seems to be no rationale for this step. Apart from the obvious absurdity of having an officer of the rank of Brigadier General in command of a squadron of ships the concept of having the ranks enshrined in the legislation is not one which commends itself. At present the Minister can change ranks at will under present legislation. This situation should continue to remain as otherwise desirable changes in rank structure which may develop would be held up pending introduction of new legislation in parliament. Flexibility should be preserved. Surely the reason to have the details of the proposed rank structure set out in the legislation is not to obtain parliamentary sanction for a step which perhaps the Department has not the courage of its own convictions to adopt under its present powers. Can it be that the common rank structure is required for administrative purposes and this would presumably mean that the computer and other mechanical devices which are being adopted for service administration cannot handle rank structures of two or three services. In view of the state of the art in the computer field this would seem to be patently absurd. As the new rank structure has four "Generals" in it, it should be no more difficult to sort out the difference between a Captain in the Army and a Captain in the Navy by the sophisticated equipment available today than the problem posed by ensuring we don't get the "General" ranks mixed up. Certainly this part of the legislation should be withdrawn and the existing provisions of the National Defence Act be retained.

6. *Who Else Is Doing It?*

It has been widely heralded that the Canadian experiment is not only being watched but is being followed by other countries. What are the true facts? Just over two years ago under the Defence Department's frank a story was circulated that in 1965 two nations would adopt the Canadian organization. Who were they? To date there is no indication of any steps in this direction by anyone. Why? Notwithstanding this, the Department still maintains that the Cana-

dian plan is being widely considered. In the last three years three nations have produced White Papers on defence which have come to the attention of TRIO, namely United Kingdom, New Zealand and France. In all cases the preservation of the separate identities of the services is emphasized even though the overall plan of each country talks about unification. In essence unification stops at the command level. Recently, a former Secretary of the U.S. Air Force who had ten years in cabinet positions in the U.S. Defence Department expressed himself in the following way:

> "Unification of the United States military establishment has gone about as far as it should go—Looking at the big picture of service roles and missions, no reason for separate services seems more important than the freedom to apply many years of thinking and experience to operational concepts and weapon requirements.—It is in the areas of battle concepts and new equipment with the greatest stress upon the potential contribution of the individual service must be laid—From a purely management view retention of service identity is wholly consistent with the most sophisticated corporate organizations."

While it is always possible that one person may be right and prevail against a majority the chances of this happening are minimal. This is so especially in the light of the great weight of experience aligned against what is now being proposed for the Canadian forces, not only in Canada by our own best military brains, many of whom have been directly involved for varying periods in the last two and a half years, but also the others of the White Papers for the three countries mentioned. Surely this alone should give any prudent person pause to consider whether we are on the right track. The penalties of error are too great when weighed against any possible disadvantage of delaying our headlong rush for a period long enough to have a thorough examination of all aspects of our defence establishment, including the organization of our forces.

7. *Civilian or Military Control of Defence*

There has been injected in the debate on the defence reorganization the spectre of the assertion of civilian control over the military. Some writers have delighted in the apparent victory of the political heads of the services over "the military establishment". To any reasoned observer the ridiculousness of this approach is apparent. Canada is not an emergent nation with a strong military leader threatening the government by the support he derives from the armed services. Canadian history is not replete with instances of military coups, nor is one imminent at this stage. What is depressing, however, on this aspect of the debate is that the most experienced voices are being stilled from the councils of our service organizations by threats of termination of their careers with unacceptable finanical sacrifices. Canadian servicemen are acutely aware not only of their position in the hierarchy of our public life but are loyal and dedicated both to their country and the service at the same time. If these men are as good as political leaders of all complexions are wont to proclaim, then they have the right to be heard and to discuss objectively policies which affect their professional positions. Surely the plaudits of our politicians in respect to the calibre of our servicemen are not being mouthed purely for political reasons. Political expediency is a poor basis on which to establish a military organization.

However, there is no doubt that the Minister of Defence has unequivocally established civilian authority over the military by his wholesale release of those who have disagreed with him. Comment has already been made on the dangers inherent in the revised method of reporting on officers. In fact the substitution of one man rule of the military has greater potential danger to our system than could ever be the case with the committee system as exemplified by the joint Chiefs of Staff.

8. *The Plan—Fact or Fancy?*

In the Defence White Paper of 1964 the statement is made that "No attempt will be made to set up a theoretical establishment to replace the existing one, nor will the details be prescribed in advance". At the outset it must be ovserved that this is an extraordinary way to predicate the defence of the country and to determine the prospects and welfare of not only the uniformed personnel but the civilian employees and the dependents of all these people, which all told probably exceed 300,000. Recent events have indicated that at least to this extent the White Paper is being fulfilled in that it is becoming difficult to the point of impossible to ascertain whether any plan has been prepared so that the Canadian people can assess the merits of what is being done. Notwithstanding this, statements have been made—that the complete plan will not be promulgated until after Bill C-243 is enacted. In a widely circulated pro forma letter sent out by the Minister to persons who have written inquiring on the plans and policies being adopted by the Department in the last three years, it is stated that:

> "Had I documented in advance of this decision (to unify the forces) all of the implementation problems, these problems would have been held up as reasons for not proceeding."

After two and a half years of integration many of the problems expected apparently still remain and the wisdom of proceeding further with a completely new concept, and before the ground is firmly and fully prepared, would seem to be questionable.

Notwithstanding the questionable existence of a plan worked out in all the necessary details, one thing that is apparent is the determination to ignore and disregard the warnings which are being expressed as to the course being pursued. Two questions therefore become important. Firstly, what was the origin of the concept of a single force to which he is committed? A question asked at a hearing of the Defence Committee on this was not satisfactorily answered. In another part of the pro forma letter already referred to, it is stated:

> "I initiated studies to determine the advantages and disadvantages that might accrue from a single unified service."

It is considered absolutely material to any discussion of the proposed legislation that these studies and the persons entrusted with them should be disclosed. It appears that the Chiefs of Staff at the time (1964) had no part in such studies. Was this done by some such organization as the RAND Corporation in the United States? Were they done by any qualified group in the Defence Research Board, or other department of the government? Were they done by persons

outside the government—and if so, who were they and what were their qualifications, both from the point of view of advising on the management techniques and also on the military organization? In this regard there are statements made from outside the government where no responsibility rests for the decisions which will be made which categorize the defence policy as being something that "we" will do or "we" will not do. What is the status of such people? If the Chiefs of Staff were not consulted, is it possible that officers serving under their command were given directives to conduct the studies such as have been referred to without their knowledge? On a matter of such grave importance it seems incredible that the Chiefs of the services, who are the repositary of the services conscience and the custodians of their welfare and efficiency, should not have been apprised if officers serving under their command were engaged in such an important and far-reaching examination. While a Minister holding a portfolio is certainly responsible for his department in the broadest sense, yet in making decisions and determining policy the advice and knowledge of the most qualified senior officials of the department should be resorted to. After all senior military officers with twenty-five and thirty years service should not be lightly disregarded in matters of this nature any more than persons holding the appointment of Deputy Minister or Associate Deputy Minister in other departments should be. Again, even if the Chiefs of Staff in 1964 were not consulted as to the concept of the new force it is remarkable that two years later almost the entire defence staff and other senior commanders were released under still unexplained circumstances but presumably because they could not subscribe to what was transpiring in the department. To what extent was the advice of those men who had been heralded as the best military brains in Canada sought and, if given, accepted? Any program must be based on good advice, analysis and expert opinion. The extent that these factors are missing from the conception of our present defence programme will determine the validity and soundness of such programme.

Despite, however,the doubts as to the existence of a plan, to what extent can reliance be placed on statements by departmental spokesmen who have indicated that there is a plan? If this is so, where is it? Who has it? Why can't it be revealed now before the legislation is enacted? In fact why isn't there a plan after three years? If the plan is dependent on the legislation, surely the Canadian people should be allowed to see the end product before being asked to confirm, through their elected representatives, legislation which in effect will give the department a blank cheque to do whatever it might desire to our defence establishment. If the experience of the last three years is any indication, such a prospect is not reassuring to anyone interested in our security. Even after all the testimony that has gone before the Defence Committee it is apparent there was no examination of the military merits or the issues involved in "unification". Surely the tremendous responsibility which rests on those responsible, if it results in further reducation of the effectiveness of our forces, cannot be discharged without a higher level of understanding than now appears to exist.

Statements have been made to the effect that the process of reorganization will still take several years. We have been at it less than three years and there are a great many problems unresolved. Why is it necessary to carry forward if the reorganization that is now taking place should not prove to be founded on

sound principles? If, as has been stated, the legislation is only permissive then why not wait until it is required before enacting it? Would one year—or even two years—delay make any difference? Even if there is a good plan, there are enough problems still to be dealt with to demand the best efforts and attention of those who are left in the services without adding to them by the tremendous additional administrative burden that will be imposed through revision of forms, procedures and other matters consequent on the elimination of the three separate services as presently provided for. This, at least, is a case where haste makes waste.

9. *Financial*

It has not been possible to make a detailed financial analysis of savings and economies claimed as a result in the last three years by the Defence Department. However, as much has been made of the savings that have been and will be achieved, this in itself would justify thorough analysis before proceeding further to ascertain what has been accomplished. It is obvious that there should be lower personnel costs by reason of the drop in personnel, both service and civilian, amounting to some 33,000. The issue on this aspect however is to ensure that the reductions have not been at the expense of the strengths of combat elements. It has not yet been proven what, if any, economies will result from establishing one service with common ranks and uniforms. This is a step which of course can have serious consequences on efficiency in relation to morale and esprit de corps which cannot be bought with dollars alone.

10. *Management and morale*

The reorganization has been predicated on introducing modern management methods into the forces. While there is no doubt that there are improvements possible in this regard, it is submitted that some basic management principles will be violated.

Firstly, there is no "line" system which ensures that personnel at the bottom have a head or chief to whom they can look for guidance and support. This, of course, is related to the three environments in which "line" operations are conducted in the services, and which must be related to the combat duties in such environments.

Secondly, the element of competition will be reduced. Interservice rivalry is often used as an excuse for the present unification concept. However authorities on corporate management recognize that competition is required and such sophisticated organizations as are found in the automobile industry are established on the basis of competing divisions. The following quotation is especially relevant in this regard:

> "General Motors system is so well thought out that you could run almost any business in any field successfully... 'the System'—a unique blending of centralized policy-making and decentralized execution in which the key decisions are always collective judgements made in committee...

The new organization instead of being more flexible will undoubtedly become more rigid by reason of the absence of competition based on professionalism developed through specialized knowledge of each form of warfare. The oppor-

tunities for dissent, discussion, debate and deliberation for various force requirements, both personnel and materiel, will become more restricted. This might not be as serious if the role of the services is to change to an international police force but will be very serous if we are to maintain the tasks outlined in the White Paper.

It is also contended that the manner in which the reorganization has been carried through to date has ignored the most important management responsibilities associated with a fighting force. This has been described as follows:

> "One important emphasis in management theory and practice long recognized in the military but initially under-estimated in other fields of management, is the importance of human relations, morale, esprit de corps and leadership—management must be as concerned about the human side of the organization as about its financial and technical sides."

The serious loss of personnel, the unsettlement in the services which has been permitted to develop due to failure to communicate plans or programmes, spell out career opportunities and force into retirement men who have earned the respect of those who served under them is testimony to the breakdown of personnel relations and the failure to observe the precepts just quoted.

If the new organization is in fact based on sound management practice, it may be asked whether any independent studies have been made in this field and by whom. Such a study should be undertaken in view of the concern which is held as to the efficacy of the proposed organization. In any event we should avoid the "new broom sweeps clean" philosophy or a fetish for reorganization which has been summed up by a United States Army officer this way:

> "Perhaps because we are so good at organizing, we tend as a nation to meet any new situation by reorganizing; and what a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency and demoralization."

If the reorganization has, as contended, so far proceeded without regard to proper management principles, should it go further? The errors may be compounded.

11. *Reserves*

A recent announcement indicated that serious consideration was being given to the place of the reserves in the defence establishment. This is welcome as the importance of the reserves, especially insofar as a potential mobilization base is concerned, should be assured. Insofar as the militia is concerned the strength of the reserve organization rests on the regimental system for the combat arms and assurances should be given that this will be undisturbed. This comment is made as it is understood there will be some immediate reduction in requirements of combat units which will affect the existence of existing units and also a suggestion which has been made that the long-run objective of the defence reorganization is the elimination of the regimental system. If there is substance to this it is to be deprecated.

12. *External Policy and Defence*

It is axiomatic that the defence establishment must reflect the needs of external policy as well as internal security. It is not apparent that there has been any shift in our external policy which would warrant the type of force which is now widely being assumed to be in the process of formation, i.e. a force designed primarily for peacekeeping tasks. If our policies have been changed then this should be made clear. In view of the reaffirmation of the purposes for which the defence establishment exists which was made in the House on the 7th December, 1966, by the Defence Minister, Canadians must assume that we have not made a major change in our external policy. If we have this should be made clear, but the impetus should not come from the Defence Department.

There is nothing wrong with peacekeeping. Especially if this means keeping the peace for Canada which is our first concern, but if our forces are designed merely as a police force for such tasks as Cyprus or the Congo we are ignoring the needs of our own defence. There is nothing that the forces as presently organized cannot do in the peacekeeping field with suitable allocation of the various arms to a unified command than could be done better by the projected organization. However the projected organization will not meet the demands across the broad spectrum of our defence needs. It is predicted that the forces under the proposed reorganization will in time become more rigid and inflexible in their approach than the critics of the present three service system now charge against it. We will lose the give and take of discussions between equals in their professional capacities and deprive the non-experts on such groups as the Defence Council from the benefit of reasoned debate and argument. A man cannot really argue with himself and the CDS should not be expected to be in this position, vis-a-vis his advice to the government.

Canada's proposals for UN peacekeeping forces have been rejected by that body and if this is so then we should be looking to our own defences and alliances to serve our needs but also remaining ready to provide assistance as we have done in the past in the international field. But even keeping the peace can call for specialized forces. Consider such divergent force requirements as were employed for the Cuban missile crisis, Rhodesian air lift and Korea.

13. *The Canadian Forces Reorganization Act—Bill C-243*

In view of the fears which were expressed with respect to the organization which established the new Defence Staff by replacing the Chiefs of Staff which have now been realized, it was hoped that when new legislation was presented that efforts would be made to rectify this error. This would seem to have been the one purpose in bringing forward more legislation as in other respects the reorganization of the forces to achieve economies and efficiencies is entirely possible under existing legislation. In brief, insofar as the new legislation abolishes the identities of the three services and incorporates a rank structure it is not necessary. These being the principal purposes of the new legislation, other provisions are ancillary. In the one case the loss of identities has not been shown as capable of producing any gains in efficiency or economies and in the second case having ranks established by legislation is unnecessarily rigid. As flexibility has been proclaimed as one of the keynotes of the reorganization, this departure

from long established flexible practice is questionable. If the achievement of greater interchangeability between personnel is needed or desirable this could be achieved by making provisions to facilitate transfers between the services in a manner similar to that which now exists for the Active Service Force. In fact this might be the best way to ascertain whether there was any real desire for interchange before we take the conclusive step of destroying the identities of the three services. It is submitted this legislation should not be proceeded with.

14. *Why is the Proposed Form of Unification Necessary?*

There is yet to be advanced a cogent military reason for the proposed form of the forces. In fact the more the plan is revealed the more it appears that recognition is being given to the need to preserve those factors which create esprit de corps and morale in a fighting force which spring from the identities as presently established. It should be noted that none of the recently retired responsible officers have spoken out in favour of the programmes being followed by the Department. Notwithstanding predictions made over two years ago that others would do it, no one else has. The opponents of unification have been accused of being motivated by emotion and adherence to obsolete tradition. Yet the forces are being assured that worthwhile traditions will be preserved. Who decides this? In most elements this has relationship to dress or uniform. Guarantees given in this regard now appear to be going into discard.

The Minister of Defence in speaking to the House on the 7th December, 1966, concluded that he was "confident that the establishment of a single unified force for Canada is right". The destruction of the confidence of senior advisers of the programme for its first two years created a situation without precedent in Canadian military history. The wholesale dismissals which have taken place in senior ranks makes this confidence difficult to credit if it is to be judged by performance. It should therefore be asked—is the concept now being advanced either necessary or prudent? The record of the last few years would generate something less than confidence on this point. The new legislation has been characterized as permissive, then why must it be enacted now?

As stated, there is no resistance to change in this submission. We only ask that a pause is made long enough to ensure we are on the right track and in the meantime the complete plan and all its ramifications, including the external policy on which it should be based, shall be impartially studied before we destroy a system that has served Canada well despite some isolated foibles and failings. No organization is perfect but no harm will be done if we live a little longer with the devil (if it is) we know than the one we don't as the consequences of error are so great.

If the sponsors of this brief are mistaken, misguided or misinformed the consequences will not be serious for the nation if they cause a delay in the unification process by an examination and assessment of all the factors involved and it then continues after the best advice available is considered. On the other hand if the legislators in their determination to enact this bill are wrong and the programme continues to falter to the point of failure in our defence then the trust of the Canadian people has been betrayed. Of all the years in our history we should not perpetrate anything of which we should not be proud.

THE TRIO POSITION

TRIO is a Canada-wide non-political group of Canadian citizens who are deeply concerned about the future effectiveness of Canada's Armed Forces. We do not understand the ultimate intent of the reorganization process that is now in progress because it has not been explained. We feel that, in a matter so important to Canadians, changes of the magnitude of those contemplated should be explained and fully examined in terms of their consequences before being implemented. This has not been done and we consider that it should be done before any further steps are taken towards the creation of a single military force for Canada.

We are confused as to the future role that the architects of the single service concept envisage for Canadian Defence Forces. Are Canadian Defence Forces to perform only a peacekeeping and policing role and have limited combat capacity? Or are Canadian Forces intended to have a full combat capability for the direct defence of Canada or within the NATO and NORAD alliances. The nature of the Armed Forces required for each of these roles is vastly different. Thus a clear definition of the future role of each of these Canadian Force is required before any sensible examination of the best organizational structure for the forces could be undertaken.

TRIO wholeheartedly supports the integration of command and control systems that commenced in World War Two and has been progressing since; and Trio believes that some supporting services that are common to the Navy, Army and Air Force (such as pay, some items of supply, medical, construction, some facets of transportation and others) could be converted to a single system to support the three existing services without lowering their combat effectiveness and with modest savings. This is a clear-cut proposition that is manageable if carefully planned and its purpose is understandable.

But the purpose of unification or amalgamation of Canada's Armed Forces that is proposed under the Forces Reorganization Bill is not understandable because it has not been clearly explained. We have asked the Minister to explain the purpose and the plan underlying this intended action and for assurance that all possible consequences have been studied and provided for in terms of the future soundness of Canada's defence. No satisfactory explanation or assurance has been given.

We are left with doubts and imponderable questions. We feel that the following questions are fundamental but unanswered:

What is to be the future role of Canada's Defence Forces in terms of specific military tasks?

Is Canada going to rely for its defence in the future on alliances such as NATO and NORAD? If so, what type of military contribution is Canada going to make to these alliances?

How is a requirement for mobilization to meet an emergency and up to a tenfold expansion in the numerical strength of Canada's Forces provided for in the single service concept?

What are the specific advantages in a single military service that are not attainable under an integrated three service system?

What are the criteria for militarily effective forces and could these criteria be met to the same degree in a single force as in a three service system?

Would a single military force be as capable of operating in concert with military forces of our Allies (none of which have a single military force) as a Navy, Army and Air Force?

There might well be satisfactory answers to the foregoing questions, in which case the reorganization into a single service would have our complete support. But we maintain strongly that a course of action that leaves so many imponderables as to its soundness should not be taken until all pitfalls have been identified and provided for. We feel that this can only be done by a thorough enquiry and assessment of Canada's present defence situation and a clear-cut determination of Canada's future defence policy and the role of Canadian Defence Forces. With this spelled out, the type of forces that are required and the manner in which they should be organized will be easier to comprehend and decide.

The determination of the future direction of Canada's defence effort is a serious matter which affects all Canadians. Political partisanship, emotionalism and obstinance should not be permitted to replace objective analysis leading to understanding. Trio feels that the consequences of the radical changes proposed in the Reorganization Bill have not been adequately studied and are therefore unknown. There is unacceptable and unnecessary risk for Canada's future well-being involved in proceeding in this manner.

Gentlemen, that brief was in the course of preparation for some time, and following on, and in order to summarize it, we have distributed the following document which with your leave, Mr. Chairman, I would like to read:

A precis of and postscript to the TRIO brief to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Defence, February, 1967, in respect to Bill 243 and the reorganization of the Armed Forces.

TRIO is a non-politically oriented group of Canadians, concerned with the direction and effects of the policies and programme introduced, implemented and projected by the Department of National Defence since the White Paper of March, 1964.

The objectives of Canadian defence policy as contained in the White Paper are concurred in, but are being rendered incapable of achievement under the integration-unification concept which is being developed.

Basic errors in the higher levels of the Defence Department policy-making and command organizations were committed in 1964. These have already resulted in serious upheavals in the senior ranks of the services. A full explanation of the causes and reasons behind these incidents must be given in order to properly evaluate and rectify the faults which have already taken place. Those concerned in these incidents should be called before the Committee on Defence.

Recruiting is not keeping up with requirements and the loss in manpower will pose problems if not rectified. How will manpower requirements be met if strengths are not brought to the needed level? Are we going to reduce commitments?

Efforts to ensure adherence to unification through selective promotion of officers cannot be too emphatically deplored.

A case has not been made for the loss of service identity as now proposed. The military merit for this step has not been established and there is no indication that other countries intend to emulate the Canadian experiment.

There never was any question of military dictatorship to civilian authority. The problem is to what extent are plans to implement military policy, as determined by the government, to be formulated on the advice and expertise of experienced professional military personnel. It is alarming, however, to hear senior members of the defence staff expressing impatience with the Parliamentary process in respect to Bill No. C-243.

The introduction of a common rank structure and common uniform is unnecessary for the creation of effective military forces.

The abolition of the three distinct services will lead to a reduction in professional competence and may well lead to Canada doing less for its own defence. This would mean greater dependence on our allies, notably the United States of America.

The claims that corporate management principles are being adopted in the defence organization are not supported and, on the contrary, programs followed have shown a disregard for some of the essentials of good military management.

There is a need for rationalizing our external policy and our defence program. At present, they appear in conflict, unless some decision has been made which has not been disclosed.

The savings claimed for integration-unification have not been established. A thorough examination and accounting is required to assess them. In any event, there does not appear to be any savings to be achieved in the changes which will be permitted under Bill No. C-243.

The soundness must be questionable of any program which has proceeded against the advice of so many experienced personnel and caused such widespread unrest and dissatisfaction. This has happened with the re-organization to date—the errors must not be compounded.

If there is a plan, the failure to reveal the details of it to the public and the services themselves has contributed to a loss of confidence and a reduction in morale. Communication is an essential of good management.

There seem to be an emphasis on identity for the Reserves and Cadets, which should reflect the regular force organization. Why then must present identities be eliminated?

As there has not been a full and complete consideration of the implications of unification, an immediate halt should be made to any further steps toward unification, and an inquiry set up to see what has gone wrong, any recommended inquiry should include present and former serving personnel, as well as knowledgeable civilians.

The roles the services are to perform must be emphatically and unequivocally clarified.

There is no justification for trying to rationalize unification on the basis of greater service loyalty to the country. There has never been any question of the

loyalty of Canadian servicemen but other factors must be considered, e.g. family, or even political ties. The one force concept will stultify development by forming of monolithic structure, which will eventually become more inflexible.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I received a telegram this morning from Burlington, Ontario, addressed to the Chairman.

> On behalf of the Hamilton and District Branch of TRIO request Defence Committee give most thoughtful consideration to the non-political brief to be submitted Friday.
>
> Signed, W. J. Riddiford

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Would you say it is non-political?

The CHAIRMAN: I will now ask for the names of those who wish to question the witness. I have Mr. Andras on my list. I may have missed someone.

An hon. MEMBER: Would you read off the names you have?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes; I have Mr. Andras, Mr. Brewin, Mr. Harkness, Mr. Forrestall, Mr. McIntosh and Mr. Laniel. Have I missed anyone?

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, I would like to raise a point of order such as the Minister did last night. He made an impassioned plea to the press of the country to give full notice to his statement last night. I, now, make the same impassioned plea to the press of the country to give full coverage to this document which has been so well presented to us today.

Mr. MACALUSO: We should wait until we have had questioning on it to see how well it was presented.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, I notice most of it has already been said by the Tories on second reading.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Andras.

Mr. ANDRAS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

After that impassioned beginning, gentlemen, I am not sure to which of the three of you I should address my questions.

The CHAIRMAN: I think Mr. Hilborn is the main spokesman for the group.

Mr. ANDRAS: Fine; and if any of the others want to answer that will be all right.

Although I may not agree with much of the things you have said, I want to begin by saying that I commend you for the very great interest you are taking in this matter. I think it is very, very healthy.

Would you give us a little bit more detail about the formation of TRIO? When was it formed?

Mr. HILBORN: It was formed in August of 1966.

Mr. ANDRAS: After what considerations was it formed?

Mr. HILBORN: It really began in Toronto with a group of us who felt strongly that something like it should be provided by way of a focus on the problem. We had several meetings. We had some indications from across the country that if something was started, some sort of pattern set, other areas would follow. It

really began with quite informal discussions and then developed until, I think there were six from each of the three services who were interested, all with former service backgrounds but none presently serving.

We formed a steering committee and began to contact other cities. The Toronto TRIO has never set itself up as being a sort of central organization. It operates its facilities only to co-ordinate the efforts of people doing the same things in other cities. They are completely autonomous, for instance, in Vancouver, Victoria, Montreal and Halifax.

Mr. ANDRAS: Those are the other places that have branches of TRIO?

Mr. HILBORN: Yes; they are in almost every major city.

Mr. ANDRAS: What is the size of the membership of TRIO, Mr. Hilborn?

Mr. HILBORN: It would be a pure guess because we have never kept any central registry. We have never had lists coming in from other cities about what their membership is. Of course, some of them have not been particularly effective in signing people up, and this sort of thing.

It was felt that the organization existed, that people of interest and concern were involved in it and that it might be influential in talking to other people who were interested in this legislation. It did not set out to obtain a large number of card-carrying members, so that there is just no way of knowing what the membership is.

Mr. ANDRAS: Is it primarily ex-officers of the three services?

Mr. HILBORN: Yes, I would say it is, primarily. It is pretty obvious that those are the people who are going to be most interested, because they have been thinking, reading and talking about this problem. However, after it began to get members there were some very active people in it who were other than commissioned ranks.

Mr. ANDRAS: Do you have many other ranks or ex other ranks in your membership?

Mr. HILBORN: Not a high proportion, but there are some.

Mr. ANDRAS: How many would there be? Would it be about 5 per cent, or 10 per cent?

Mr. HILBORN: I do not know what the membership is so I do not know what the percentage is. But knowing the Toronto situation where people send cards and so on, I would just take a guess—

Mr. ANDRAS: In Toronto, for instance, with which you will be most familiar?

Mr. HILBORN: I would guess about 20 to 25 per cent, approximately, are other than commissioned ranks. This includes people who, as far as we know, have no service history.

Mr. ANDRAS: Strictly civilians, in the sense of your total membership.

Mr. HILBORN: We do not know if they are "Mr.", "Mrs." or "Miss". On the question of the extent, we have about 30 telegrams here in support of the brief, which were sent to us today and last night from all across the country.

Mr. MACALUSO: But you do not know whether or not they are members.

Mr. HILBORN: No; those are the branches of TRIO and other people who support the concept of TRIO, which basically is one of examination.

Mr. MACALUSO: Are they signed by individuals?

Mr. HILBORN: In some cases they are signed by individuals and in other cases by a branch of an organization. There are various groups represented. Certainly there are some individual ones but they are also speaking for the groups they represent.

The CHAIRMAN: Should we pass these around, or do you feel that they should be part of the record?

Mr. HILBORN: There they are.

Mr. ANDRAS: Did you contact these people?

Mr. HILBORN: I will, if that is your wish.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Hilborn, are these spontaneous telegrams? Did you have any contact before this meeting with the individuals, or some of the individuals, who sent them?

Mr. BREWIN: Pass them around, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. HANDY: The branches were told that we were appearing and would be glad to have their support.

Mr. ANDRAS: Going through your brief, there is a great deal which is of interest and there are many, many points which will, I imagine, raise many interesting questions.

We have had three documents distributed. I do not know how to identify this one, but it is headed "A Precis of and Postcript to the TRIO Brief—" The third paragraph states in part,

> Basic errors in the higher levels of the Defence Department policy-making and command organizations were committed in 1964.

Could you be more specific about what you consider those errors to be?

Mr. HENDY: These were outlined to your Committee by Brigadier Malone from Winnipeg. He has since written articles on them.

We might say, as we do in our brief, that we, as members of TRIO sitting here, do not consider ourselves experts in the field. We are trying to correlate opinions and we can advise you from where the opinions come.

One of the basic errors, as pointed out by Brigadier Malone to your Committee, was that we were destroying the opportunity of interchange of views. He compared the present system to the one that was introduced in England and found to be defective.

I have a copy of this pamphlet. Perhaps you would like to have it, Mr. Andras. It sets them forth more clearly than I can. I am sure you are familiar with his evidence before this Committee.

Mr. ANDRAS: I have read Brigadier Malone's pamphlet.

One of my reasons for asking that is that elsewhere in your presentation this morning you have indicated a reasonably favourable attitude towards the

process of command integration; at least, that is what I inferred from certain portions of your brief.

It seems to me that in 1964 the procedures were certainly directed toward integration of command organizations which, basically, at this stage, is all that has taken place and is all for which legislative authority has been given. I find the possibility of a conflict between your saying that basic errors were made and your suggestion that you do in fact seem to favour at least command integration. I have some difficulty in indentifying the specific basic errors that you are talking about.

Mr. Hendy: Command integration was possible even before Bill C-90. We had it in the Maritime Command. We had the navy and the air force producing a maritime operational force. Under the circumstances, I do not feel that Bill C-90 was absolutely essential, although there are certain administrative functions, such as pay, which are integratable and which presumably were made possible under that legislation.

However, in the operational field I cannot see—and I think this was the basis of Brigadier Malone's representation—how we could integrate, whatever that may mean. It is all a matter of semantics. I would prefer to categorize it as defence reorganization, and we should see what the reorganization involves.

There was no law before Bill C-90 that prohibited the combining of the three forces in an integrated unified command, whatever that might mean, and, from the point of view of operational effectiveness, the bringing of them together to discharge a certain job or perform a certain function.

Mr. Andras: Given the situation where the government had to be responsible, in terms of financial answers, for a budget of about a billion and a half dollars, and recognizing that for many valid reasons the actual cost of operation and maintenance and so forth was increasing in proportion to that fixed ceiling budget, to the extent—whether or not the details are arguable—that the trend very definitely indicated that more and more of that budget was going into areas that would not produce new weaponry, new capital equipment and so forth, do you not agree that there definitely had to be some change—some reorganization—in order to have an effective Canadian defence force within reasonable financial limits? Do you agree that something had to be done?

Mr. Penfold: Yes. We have always stated that the integration of certain support forces was indeed desirable and workable. Economy certainly has always been shown as being the real motivation for this reorganization, and we were assured that immediate capital would be available for the purchase of new hardware and new equipment.

I would merely point out—

Mr. Andras: I missed that last comment. What were you assured?

Mr. Penfold: We were assured that new equipment would be available.

Mr. Andras: You were assured that new equipment would be available?

Mr. Penfold: That the purpose of the reorganization was to make more of the defence budget available for the purchase of new equipment for the armed forces; that, in fact, the percentage—the amount actually acquired—would be larger under reorganization than it had been previously.

I might point out to you that the figures for the actual expenditures since 1963 do not substantiate this. Capital expenditures for military equipment in 1963-1964 were $252 million; in 1964-65, $209 million; in 1965-1966, $193 million; and the provision in estimates for 1966-67, they are $270 million: but already we know that the pay raise for the armed forces, which amounted to $62 million, will be absorbed within the defence department. This means that we are already down from this figure and very close to, or perhaps even lower than, the figure for the previous year. This means in fact, that reorganization has not produced more capital equipment than previously.

Mr. ANDRAS: Where did you get those figures?

Mr. PENFOLD: The source is government accounts as reproduced in the *Financial Post* of September 10, 1966.

Mr. MACALUSO: You will pardon us if it has a familiar ring.

Mr. ANDRAS: I want to return to the point that you all agree that some major reorganization had to take place in the light of the very obvious financial trend. I do not think anybody would disagree, regardless of who was in power, that there had to be some reorganization to provide more modern weaponry to make our force one of the most modern and effective in the world. Do you agree with that premise?

Mr. PENFOLD: Yes.

Mr. ANDRAS: Why, specifically, do you say that integration and unification, as programmed, as discussed in this Committee, as presented in the White Paper, as presented by the Minister's speech on second reading and as presented by Air Marshals Sharp and Reyno, will not work? I do not know whether you have had an opportunity to review the presentations of Air Marshal Sharp and Air Marshal Reyno, but this Committee has, and there were some very, very interesting and reassuring comments in them. Basically, you have taken the position that it will not work. Specifically, why will it not work?

An hon. MEMBER: We can have the whole brief read back.

Mr. PENFOLD: Well, we would have to go back over it again.

Mr. ANDRAS: I do not agree that—

Mr. DEACHMAN: Let them answer. They have got all your figures anyway.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order. In view of what Mr. Deachman has just said and in view of some of the other confused remarks made a moment ago—

The CHAIRMAN: In the confusion I did not hear what he said.

Mr. HARKNESS: He has just said that they got these figures from me or that I got the figures from them. This is the implication that has been made. I would like to state right now that as far as any figures quoted by Mr. Penfold and the figures quoted by me yesterday are concerned, we have had no communication or co-operation regarding them whatever. The implication in the statement made by Mr. Deachman and by other people before him has absolutely no foundation.

The CHAIRMAN: If I may comment on that, I am glad I did not hear it.

Would you continue, Mr. Andras.

M. ANDRAS: I have a question before the witness. I would like again to hear even admitting, as has been the interjection, that you have done so, your reasons for saying that unification will not work, and what you would substitute for it?

Mr. HILBORN: I think that probably we would think in terms of not substituting anything for the present separate identity of the three services at that level. We do not see that it necessarily follows that these are one and indivisible, because obviously other countries have found it possible to integrate without unifying, if you like. We probably would answer the question by suggesting that the Committee ask those whom we would categorize as experts, those serving staff officers of the former senior staff, whom we mention in the brief. We like to think that they are the expert witnesses, and we think that they should be asked what, in their view, are the obstacles to its working.

I do not think that TRIO ever set itself out to say, "This is our plan, This is what we think should happen.

Mr. MACALUSO: Of course you have. You have just to look at your brief, Mr. Hilborn.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Andras has the floor, Mr. Macaluso.

An hon. MEMBER: How long has he had it?

Mr. MCINTOSH: He has had it for 15 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, 15 minutes. It sounds as though he is coming to the end of his questioning.

Mr. ANDRAS: I have many, many more questions. If I have now gone past my time limit, would you put me down again for whatever further opportunity we may have?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, I think I will, in this case. I will move on to Mr. Brewin.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, are we adjourning? I see it is two minutes to 11 o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN: Yes; inasmuch as the bells are going to ring in a few moments, I think we should establish now what our next move is going to be. These gentlemen have come a long way. It was the suggestion of the Steering Committee, and approved by the Committee itself, that perhaps we could continue after orders of the day. Would it suit the members of the Committee to meet after orders of the day?

Mr. CHURCHILL: It was approved by the Steering Committee, but will you please add that it was a majority report of the Steering Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: I do not think it was on that subject.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Yes, it was; because I remember that I objected.

I object to the dictatorial way in which things are being conducted here.

Mr. ROCK: What do you object to?

Mr. CHURCHILL: All the—

The CHAIRMAN: Shall we reconvene after orders of the day? What is the general feeling of the Committee?

An hon. MEMBER: No; we should reconvene at one o'clock.

An hon. MEMBER: I think we should reconvene after orders of the day.

An hon. MEMBER: I think that one o'clock would be more convenient for everyone.

The CHAIRMAN: Is this the general feeling—

Mr. FOY: Mr. Chairman, before we decide on whether or not to reconvene at one o'clock, you should be made aware of the fact that after orders of the day it will already be around a quarter after 12 or perhaps 12.30 and that you would have only half an hour for lunch.

An hon. MEMBER: Well, that is ample time.

The CHAIRMAN: We will adjourn until one o'clock.

Mr. CHURCHILL: This is the juggernaut operating again. Under what circumstances is this going to happen? Surely to goodness we—

The CHAIRMAN: If I sense the feeling of the Committee correctly the majority is agreeable that, since these gentlemen have come so far, we should carry on with the hearing today as early as possible. Would you disagree with that?

Mr. CHURCHILL: I think that one o'clock is ridiculous.

Mr. MACALUSO: I am prepared to put a motion to that effect.

The CHAIRMAN: I would like to get concurrence of the Committee. I do not think we have to have a motion.

Mr. CHURCHILL: May I suggest, as a compromise, that we meet at 1.30? I think this would allow a little more for orders of the day and to enjoy a quiet lunch.

The CHAIRMAN: We will adjourn until 1.30.

AFTERNOON SITTING

FRIDAY, February 10, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we have a quorum. Mr. Brewin was just commencing his questioning when we recessed.

Mr. WINCH: May I say first, Mr. Chairman, that I am very proud to be a member of this Committee and for four years this Committee has done a wonderful job without politics and without antagonism. I just express my own personal opinion, as we are now dealing with a most important matter, that what developed last night and a little bit today, snapping and snarling from anyone, should stop so that we can maintain what I think is a brilliant record in the past. I say that without any implication. It means so much to me.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, of course, Mr. Winch, anything such as that really is a reflection on the capability of the Chairman.

Mr. WINCH: No, I am not suggesting that you are doing this, but I would just—

Mr. CHURCHILL: Sir, I rise on a point of order. Mr. Winch is casting a reflection on the work of this Committee. Let him be specific and let him name names. He talks about four years of everything being so wonderful. I was on the Committee in 1963. What is he referring to?

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Churchill, perhaps I could say that I have also been on the Committee without interruption since it started and that no one appreciates the shortcomings of the present Chairman more than I, but so far I have been able to lean upon the understanding of the members of the Committee, both old and new. I think it is essential that the meeting maintain decorum and that it also make progress. It is my duty to protect the rights of all the members of this Committee, and I am doing my very best to do so, and to divide the time evenly between them. I hope I can rely on your continued co-operation. I do not have any complaints, but I have overheard some banter from both sides. I hope this will no longer be necessary and that we can press on and do what is expected of us here.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, as a new member of this Committee, I do not like the reflection cast by Mr. Winch's remark, either. I do not think, under any consideration, that this Committee was supposed to be a mutual admiration society. I am here to do a job and I intend to do it in my way. If Mr. Winch does not like it, it is quite all right. It is his privilege. I do not want him, however, to dictate to me the type of questions I ask or why I ask them. I have a purpose in doing it.

Mr. ROCK: Mr. Chairman, I should like to add my remarks. This is also a question of privilege. Mr. Winch mentioned politics and in the same breath he was playing politics by trying to show that the Liberal party, possibly, and the Conservative party are not so pure as his party. I regret to have to say this, but this is my attitude with regard to his remarks.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, I did not say a word about the questioning. I was referring to the attitude of cross-fire that is unfortunately developing and which I think is completely unnecessary. We could advance a lot quicker if there is a recognition of—

The CHAIRMAN: I appreciate the help and advice from the members on putting out this fire. I now call on Mr. Brewin.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, I am a little nervous lest I reveal a horrible partisan cloven hoof somewhere, but I will proceed at any rate.

Mr. Hillborn, I want to refer to the statement with respect to the TRIO position at the end of your brief and put a few questions to you. I think this is from a statement that was prepared some time ago and sent out by you to various people, including myself, as being a statement of your organization.

Mr. HILBORN: And the position it favours.

Mr. BREWIN: You list a number of questions about which you feel doubts, starting at the foot of the page, and going on to page 2 and then you state:

> There might well be satisfactory answers to the foregoing questions, in which case the reorganization into a single service would have our complete support.

I take from that statement that your organization is not unalterably opposed to reorganization into a single service, but only in the absence of what you would regard as satisfactory answers to these questions.

Mr. HILBORN: That is right.

Mr. BREWIN: With respect to the questions, the first two I think relate almost entirely to the future role of the Canadian forces. A little farther up in the statement you say:

> We are confused as to the future role that the architects of the single service concept envisage for Canadian Defence Forces.

You then ask these two questions:

> Are Canadian Forces to perform only a peacekeeping and policing role and have limited combat capacity? Or are Canadian Forces intended to have a full combat capability for the direct defence of Canada or within the NATO and NORAD alliances. The nature of the Armed Forces required for each of these roles is vastly different.

I want to ask you whether, in your view, the government has not now answered the question of what is the role of Canada's defence forces in terms of specific military tasks. Have they not made it clear that they are continuing all the main roles in which they are now taking part?

Mr. HILBORN: I think many of us—and I am sure Mr. Hendy agrees with me—are not clear that there is an intention to maintain all the roles that are envisaged. I think our concern is that, if this is the case, what seems to be proposed under this unified concept would not, in fact enable them to fulfil these roles, particularly with regard to NATO and NORAD.

Mr. BREWIN: Am I interpreting correctly what perhaps you had in mind in putting these questions, that if we are to maintain an isolated—that is, isolated from other Canadian services—army brigade in NATO, an air division which is largely an airforce, anti-submarines, and air defences which—although perhaps more than one service has some part but which basically is allotted to separate services—then unification does not seem to make too much sense?

Mr. HILBORN: I think that is our position.

Mr. HENDY: I think it is a matter of shifting the emphasis. As we have said, Mr. Brewin, the roles as spelled out basically in the White Paper appear to be satisfactory, but consciously or unconsciously there seems to be a shifting of emphasis away from many of these roles which would support and require use of the three separate services into a concept which is limited, as we have said, in a police force capacity. I know there is argument on this, but this seems to be what is happening, and it seems to be in line with this development. The unified force will, in our opinion, become very rigid in this approach and in a few years time the other functions, such as anti-submarines and air defence which you mentioned, will wither away, whether it is conscious or not. You are going to get a very inflexible approach on the police force concept which is what we are worried about.

Mr. BREWIN: That is precisely what I want to ask you about. The converse of my question was that if we are carrying out the different roles that we now have, then unification does not make too much sense. Let us suppose for a minute you accept the fact that we are going to confine ourselves to a single unified type of operation. In your view, then, would unification lose at least some of its objections and perhaps gain some advantages?

Mr. HENDY: Yes, but I do not think this has been decided, and it is not for the defence department to decide on the shape of a force to do something that has not yet become external policy. I am not aware that there has been a declared change of external policy. We accept the premises of the White Paper on which our forces are organized, but there is this shifting and, as we said in our brief—or to put it another way—the defence tail should not wag the external affairs dog. We should have our external policy formed and then say, these are the forces we need to implement it.

Mr. BREWIN: If I understand you then, I think there is a very strong coincidence of views between what you are expressing and what I think is correct, namely, if we decide as a measure of over-all policy that the best contribution we could make would be in a mobile force with intervention role, then this type of force might well be unified.

Mr. HENDY: Yes, but do you not think this would make future changes in defence policy difficult to accomplish? You may be throwing away the structure that can do everything in order to do one thing. You may find that this one thing is not what you want to do in a few years time and you would then have to build from scratch on these other things that you have thrown away. Our concern is that that we may be destroying the very fabric of the three services on which we may have to build the defence of the country in the future if we get away from peace-keeping.

Mr. BREWIN: Yes, I want to get to that point. You mention in the second paragraph of your TRIO position two contrasted roles. I wonder if you have stated them properly or accurately? You have divided the roles into two; one you call peace-keeping and police role, having a limited combat capacity, and the other Canadian forces with a full combat capacity for the direct defence of Canada within the NATO and NORAD alliances. It is quite conceivable to have a highly mobile force relatively lightly armed and available in Canada that would be highly useful for the direct defence of Canada against anything except, perhaps, all-out invasion by a major power.

Mr. HENDY: The mobile force, as I see it Mr. Brewin, is basically a ground force with tactical air support. At the present time we devote a great deal of our defence effort and concentration to the sea defence as well as air defence. The mobile force does not take part in that aspect. We have not been able to change the facts of geography. We have a far greater responsibility for our sea approaches now than we did at the time of confederation because we have added so much coast line, if you want to look at it that way. We contend that if you throw away this base on which to build or maintain the sea and air surveillance to concentrate on a mobile ground force for police purposes, you may be depriving the country of two elements in which you must defend it.

Mr. BREWIN: Are you not overstating it when you call it merely a peace-keeping and police force? Would not a mobile force have a naval or maritime component which would be available for transport or defence against submarine attack? Are you not narrowing it in referring to it here as a peace-keeping and police role, a function which could be performed by a relatively lightly armed but mobile tri-service force?

Mr. HENDY: Yes, this is exactly what we say. You will then become inflexible on peace-keeping and the effort will be concentrated there to the detriment of the other functions which are important. We hear a lot about interservice rivalry and bickering, but how can you guarantee, under this one-man operation that has been criticized, that you are going to get the requirements of defence in all three elements presented at the top with equal voice if you throw away the services from which that expertise and professional competence develops?

Mr. BREWIN: I think I will avoid getting into a discussion with you on that particular point. I would like, however, to extend the point I was putting to you a little further. You imply here that peace-keeping and NATO are two opposite concepts, and I want to suggest to you that there is a role within NATO—we are playing it, in part, at the present moment—for a mobile reserve and that might be a very useful contribution to peace-keeping. Do you agree with that?

Mr. HILBORN: I think, Mr. Brewin, you might have expanded the questions. We were asking questions and could have conceivably expanded and asked another question such as, "was this envisaged?" which is the very thing you are talking about. I think we still go back to the thought many of us have, that we are having the wrong argument. We should first decide on what our role and posture is.

Mr. BREWIN: I could not agree with you more, Mr. Hilborn, but the point is that we are faced with a situation now about which we have to make up our minds, whether you or I are responsible for it or not. We are faced with it and I want to ask you, and get your thinking on whether, when you separated peace-keeping on the one side and NATO on the other, you do not recognize the fact that assistance of a mobile reserve of the type contemplated under a unified force might be extremely valuable to NATO? Do you agree with that?

Mr. HENDY: Yes, I would agree with that.

But we had that even before the present reorganization. Perhaps it was not as well defined, but we did have a battalion ready.

Mr. BREWIN: It was not all that mobile, was it?

Mr. HENDY: No, but this was a problem of equipment. The Canadians did not invent the heavy transport, but those transports were on order and they made the possibility of mobility greater. That is an equipment problem, and not an organization problem.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Brewin, may I ask a supplementary question?

Mr. BREWIN: Yes, I guess so.

Mr. MCINTOSH: In regard to your statement, Mr. Brewin, with respect to united type of operations, I should like to ask the witness whether we could have

the united type of operation and still keep our commitments to the collective defence such as NORAD and NATO. Was not Mr. Brewin asking you a hypothetical question?

Mr. BREWIN: That question is directed to me and I can give you the answer very briefly.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, can we consider such a commitment of a unified type of operation without opting out of those commitments we already have? Is this the intention of the present government policy—opting out of the commitments we have at the present time?

Mr. HILBORN: We are asking the question too, really.

An hon. MEMBER: I happen to know we are not.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, I will take Mr. McIntosh aside and explain the commitment to him some other time.

Mr. ROCK: Mr. Brewin, may I ask a supplementary question which relates to your discussion with the gentleman just before—

Mr. BREWIN: Yes, as long as it does not count against my time.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall take careful note that it does not take too long.

Mr. ROCK: It is a short question. On page 4 of your brief you state:

> However it is understood that an integrated supply system adopted by the United States forces for the Vietnam operations has not been successful and each service has been given back its logistic function. In this regard the experience of the United States in Vietnam might well prove to provide lessons which we in Canada should study and consider before proceeding any further.

Do you not agree that we do not want to have this type of complicated effort and it would be better to unify and integrate the forces so that we will not have different supply bases from three services? Perhaps this is the problem in the United States. If they had a united force they would not have those problems in Viet Nam.

Mr. HENDY: They had it and they found it was not working because the three forces were operating in their own environment. They had a unified command, but one logistic service for all three apparently just did not work out. Perhaps they did not have it in operation long enough; I do not know, but this is what I understand.

Mr. ROCK: Do you not think that the statement you have made is contrary to your own position?

Mr. HENDY: No.

Mr. ROCK: You have given us proof that it would be better for integration and for unification.

Mr. HENDY: No. Perhaps our statement is not clear, but what we are saying is that the Americans did endeavour to integrate logistic support, but found that when they were faced with the problem they have in Viet Nam, it did not work.

The services put their logistic support back on a service basis. Therefore, they had some experience, and under combat conditions apparently it did not work out. I do not know the reasons, but I think this is something we should look at.

Mr. ROCK: But do you not believe—

The CHAIRMAN: Excuse me, Mr. Rock, but I think it is unfair to Mr. Brewin who started this—

Mr. ROCK: I was following it up with the same questioning—

The CHAIRMAN: Well, perhaps, but I would like Mr. Brewin to get back to—

Mr. BREWIN: Sir, I do not have many more questions. I would like to whether or not the Committee has considered—perhaps it is not part of their function—some of the roles we are carrying out, namely the maintenance of an army brigade and an air division in Europe are appropriate at the present time.

Mr. HILBORN: I think, Mr. Brewin, that we really did not consider this as part of the terms of reference, if you like, of TRIO.

Mr. BREWIN: Let me put it to you that you have regarded it as part of your terms of reference, in the questions you have asked—

Mr. HILBORN: Yes; right, we have asked questions—

Mr. BREWIN: —to say that the determination of what we should be doing is fundamental to the type of organization we ought to have, and you have assumed in your brief, as I take it, that the government have opted to maintain a second role and you have found in that situation unification unsatisfactory. Am I summarizing your position correctly?

Mr. HILBORN: That is correct.

Mr. BREWIN: And on the other side of the picture, if you did consider some of these roles and you thought they were no longer necessary and we needed different roles then, perhaps, at least you might take a different view—

Mr. HILBORN: That is correct.

Mr. BREWIN: —but you have not really gone into that because you do not regard that as the situation. Is that correct?

Mr. HILBORN: That is correct.

Mr. BREWIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, that is all.

Mr. HARKNESS: You have recommended that an independent inquiry of the defence reorganization be held and that no further steps be taken until this inquiry has had an opportunity to look at the present situation and to report with regard to any further steps towards unification. Why did you make this recommendation and what membership would you suggest it should have, or who should carry on an inquiry of this kind?

Mr. PENFOLD: The original thought was, perhaps, a royal commission which would be empowered to look into the broad aspects of it, calling suitable witnesses to find out the ramifications, the probable course it would take and the results thereof, but certainly an inquiry with broad terms of reference so that they could get all aspects.

Mr. HARKNESS: Was one of your ideas to have this on a completely impartial basis—

Mr. PENFOLD: Yes, it was.

Mr. HARKNESS: —and not, we will say, interfered with by anything along the lines Mr. Winch was talking about earlier, that is to say, partisan attitudes such as you have on a Committee of this kind?

Mr. PENFOLD: Oh, indeed.

Mr. HENDY: This is our hope.

Mr. HARKNESS: What type of membership would you recommend for a commission or committee of that kind, if it was set up?

An hon. MEMBER: How long would they take to report?

Mr. HENDY: As far as membership is concerned it should be drawn from ex-officers, not necessarily present officers. We have done this before—we had the precedent of the Mainguy commission with Mr. Brockington. It should be chaired by someone of the calibre of, say, a Mr. Brockington. It is difficult to say. I would not suggest a judge, necessarily, but there are lots of eminent people in the country who are interested in military affairs. I can think of several who would do. We have had this before with General Letson with the militia. I do not class myself with General Letson but I did a report for the Minister of Defence three years ago for the naval reserve as chairman of a committee.

An hon. MEMBER: You do not include yourself?

Mr. HENDY: I do not include myself in the calibre of General Letson but that is an example of what has been done. What you need is an impartial examination which will not get divided on any sort of political lines. We have done this in banking, taxation and immigration. It is not an unusual thing.

Mr. HARKNESS: I would agree with you thoroughly in this regard. I think the whole situation does need an impartial investigation.

You state in your pricing postscript at the top of page 2:

> The abolition of the three distinct services will lead to a reduction in profession competence—

Would you give your views of how this is likely to happen?

Mr. HENDY: On the one hand, we hear that warfare is becoming more complex because the equipment and the weapons are becoming more sophisticated and more difficult to operate, and the need to assess the consequences of operational requirements in the light of these new equipments. Our feeling is that if you do not have a man making a career through one of the three services and going to the top, when you get above a certain level—I know that the question of jack-of-all-trades comes into it—of, say, regimental commander or brigade commander, if he is still not going to go ahead in that field he may reduce his professional competence. Let us take the example of a man who has commanded a destroyer as commander, if he goes across the field into other areas and then goes up, by the time he gets back to consider maritime matters he will be, in my opinion, out of date because technical advances move very quickly.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes.

Mr. HENDY: I do not see how, if the tasks and understanding and professional knowledge are greater, how you can expect them to do more. I understand this is appreciated even by some junior officers who recently were exposed to all three services. They indicated that they did not feel they would be competent to become expertise in the three fields at the higher staff level. In other words, they felt the one force concept was going to be very difficult as far as their careers were concerned.

Mr. HARKNESS: In other words, the maintenance of the three separate forces will lead to a higher degree of professional competence in each of those environments and thus to a greater efficiency in effectiveness of the defence forces, rather than trying to combine them into one and moving people around to a considerable extent.

Mr. HENDY: Yes, I think that is true. Then at the top you have that interchange of professional experience in the three services to ensure that you develop and do not become inflexible. One of the criticisms has been that rivalry is bad in the three services and the example that was given to me the other day was the problem in the United Kingdom when they were considering the deterrents, and the fight between the Royal Air Force for the Blue Streak missile and the Royal Navy for the Polaris. The Royal Navy happened to win that battle, and the Polaris is it. I would submit, Mr. Harkness, that if we had a single, unified, one-force concept we might have solidified in the wrong weapon because no interplay or interchange, if you like, of competent professional service recommendations were brought to bear on the problem. There will always be rivalry. This chamber is an example of it. We would not suggest one political party in this country.

Mr. HARKNESS: In other words competition, instead of being a disadvantage in any field, including the military, is an advantage.

Mr. HENDY: Well, that is what the best speakers of corporate management say, and this is the doctrine taught at the Air Force College.

Mr. MACALUSO: May I be allowed one question, Mr. Chairman?

The evidence that you have given us is considerably contradicted by the Vice Chief of Staff, Air Marshal Sharp, in his presentation to this Committee. The evidence before this Committee last summer and the last few days is that Training Command can and will maintain professional competence. Therefore, I suggest that your submission is contrary to the "best evidence" rule which I am sure you are aware of.

Mr. HENDY: How can it be the best evidence if we have not found out yet? Training Command is relatively new and we do not know that it is. In fact, there was a report in the paper the other day that Mobile Command was getting concerned because they wanted to take the training of people for Mobile Command away from Training Command. Maritime Command have already expressed—

Mr. MACALUSO: Commodore, what I am saying to you is—

Mr. HENDY: We do not know if—

Mr. MACALUSO: —that the Vice Chief of Staff came before this Committee and gave definite evidence that is contrary to what you are submitting here today. I direct you to his brief.

Mr. HENDY: Well, I have read his brief and I would be very delighted to make some comments on it. I have every respect for Air Marshal Sharp.

Mr. MACALUSO: I just want a small question answered.

Mr. HENDY: We are in an opinion area here. Our position is that until our opinions can be confirmed, let us not throw out the baby with the bath water.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, May I ask if you people are—no I will wait.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, I will just comment on what Mr. Macaluso has said. I think he was misinterpreting the brief. I think the Air Marshal expressed the hope that this would be the result, and confidence that it would be the result, rather than stating definitely that it would be, because nobody can state definitely that it will result, as you say until it has been tried.

Mr. ANDRAS: May I ask another supplementary, Mr. Harkness?

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Hendy, I believe you have made several references to good corporate management. I notice with great interest your quotation about General Motors on page 11 of your brief.

Mr. HENDY: Yes.

Mr. ANDRAS: You use it as an argument against integration and unification. This may be in the area of opinion, but I think it germane to the argument: General Motors does have competition within divisions—no doubt about it—but anybody who shows the competence to run well a division within General Motors quite often graduates into overall management. He may have been an engineer, or he may have been a marketing expert or any of the many specialties that go into industrial management, but then he goes on into overall management. The general concept that has been presented to us is that within the fighting units—the combat forces themselves—there will be these specialists, but if they show management talent beyond the limits of their promotion and responsibility within one fighting arm, they will go on into staff work and be integrated. That seems to me to be an application of corporate management in all large organizations. And furthermore, you apply that General Motors illustration to indicate that they do not integrate; they do not have unification, if you want. I suggest one distinct difference is that they are completely transferable; an employee from Chevrolet division to Pontiac division, and so forth. Further, I would even go so far as to say they almost all wear the same uniform, which is a grey flannel suit.

Mr. HENDY: I do not know that here in Ottawa they would let you change them over that easily. Basically, that is true, but as far as the management is concerned let us take another example here in Canada—Canadian Pacific Railway. This is one of the things that comes closer to what we are talking about. They have separate units with separate identifiable uniforms. The steamship company dresses their men and makes them look like sailors. The railroad

company dresses them and they operate trains. They are not interchangeable. We are talking about the identities in the combat area as opposed to integrating command structure at the top, which is all right, but you still have to make sure that at the top you have someone who is brought up in that field. We are still expressing opinions and saying, something has gone wrong; let us find out. There is an article by a former secretary of the United States Air Force, Mr. Zuckert, which you may be familiar with, which is quoted in the brief and which states quite categorically that the General Motors type of organization is reflected in the services, and he also said that the size of the service does not make for unification. He says it is not a matter of size, it is a matter of the combat capabilities and expertise in the development of them in their particular environments. I have the quote if you would like it, Mr. Andras.

Mr. ANDRAS: My point is that—

Mr. WINCH: Donald Gordon—if you go to the CNR—also said that he did not know a damn thing about running a railroad.

Mr. HARKNESS: I would just like to observe on what has been said. In my own experience, and that of anyone else in the army, it was always quite clear—and I think the same situation is bound to continue to have to prevail —that a brigade commander had to have an artillery adviser and an engineer adviser; a divisional commander the same thing; a corps commander the same and an army commander the same. In other words, you have to have experts in their own particular fields as advisers to the overall commander of any formation, running right from a brigade up to an army group. This, I think, is the essential thing as far as continuing to maintain a high degree of expert proficiency in any particular arm of the service is concerned.

I would like to turn to the next paragraph at the top of page 2 in which you say:

> The claims that corporate management principles are being adopted in the defence organization are not supported and on the contrary programs followed have shown a disregard for some of the essentials of good military management.

What are some of these essentials of good military management which have been disregarded, in your view?

Mr. HENDY: Well, we quoted this and I would like, with your permission, to repeat it.

> One important emphasis in management theory and practice long recognized in the military but initally underestimated in other fields of management, is the importance of human relations, morale, esprit de corps and leadership—

It is my submission that there has been an absence of those principles as evidenced by the fact that morale has dropped. We have not paid enough attention to it and I think morale has dropped.

We have lost many of our good leaders. From the point of view of the lower ranks of any organization you cannot suddenly release men who have earned respect by reason of their service and expect that this is not going to have an

effect down below. I say this is getting away from the principle of leadership and human relations. We have had the release of men before their careers were completed. Whether they wanted to go or not, I do not know, but there was an enforced retirement which in effect has contributed to the reduction in morale. There is also the matter of communications. There has been a lack of communication. This is being rectified, I hope, but there seems to be uncertainty about what is happening. The servicemen are restless and steps have been taken to rectify it. This quote goes on to say:

> "management must be as concerned about the human side of the organization as about its financial and technical sides."

We have heard a great deal about the role of the computer in the reorganization of the department. I notice that there is a study on the financial aspects, but I think we are ignoring the basic asset of a fighting force, that is, men who are trained to go out and fight in places like Viet Nam. A computer is not going to help you very much when you are on that end of the organization. I feel that what has happened is that there has been an ignoring—that may be too strong a word—but there has not been proper consideration given to the men down below while we have been going through this very elaborate reorganization.

Mr. ANDRAS: Well, Mr. Hendy, you completely contradict the evidence that Air Marshal Sharp gave the other day in his brief which you say you have read.

Mr. HENDY: No. I say that Air Marshal Sharp was dealing with what I would call the financial aspect more than with the human relations side.

Mr. ANDRAS: Page 33.

Mr. HENDY: Now, this is a matter of opinion, but I am quoting from a series of articles that have been used in the courses in psychology in Toronto for some years, and this is the doctrine that is being taught there. I do not think it is being followed.

Mr. ANDRAS: Well, I just want to refer you—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Andras, I gather that these interjections are going to be supplementary questions but we have to keep some sort of sequence. Mr. Harkness has the floor and unless he is willing to yield for more and more supplementary questions I must ask you to refrain from interjecting.

Mr. HARKNESS: You have just mentioned the matter of morale. What is your view about the state of morale in the services from the contacts that you gentlemen have with both service and ex-service personnel?

Mr. HILBORN: Well, we feel that it is somewhat less than satisfactory, sir, from the contacts we have had. Obviously, I suppose, it could be argued that we are more inclined to attract that sort of opinion, if you like, and that we tend to hear from people who are unhappy in the service. Our concern is largely because of the levels from which we hear these complaints.

Mr. ANDRAS: All levels?

Mr. HILBORN: Yes, at all levels; most emphatically at fairly senior staff levels.

Mr. ANDRAS: But from junior officers, and—

Mr. HILBORN: Yes, indeed.

Mr. HARKNESS: Do you find any difference among the three services in the state of morale and the degree of dissatisfaction that exist?

Mr. PENHOLD: Each of us, sir, naturally has contact in the various services because of our associations with the various services. It is very hard to pin down whether there is more in one than the others.

I think, perhaps, at this particular time, if I may state my opinion, that the navy and the air force are particularly concerned about their roles because of the lack of possible combat roles in the future. The air force for instance, are concerned that there is no interceptor role other than that of ground support for the CF 5. They regret very much the loss of skill which will ensue, of course, over the years.

I am sure the navy people feel that their loss will be the same.

In my opinion, probably those two are the most concerned.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, I have gone on for quite a while. I had better let somebody else have an opportunity.

The CHAIRMAN: I was allowing you extra time because of the interjections. You still have a minute or so, if you would like to continue.

Mr. HARKNESS: No; I can come back later.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Laniel, you are the next on my list.

Mr. LANIEL: Sir, at page 16 of your brief, where you state the position of TRIO on unification, you define TRIO as being a Canada-wide, non-political group of Canadian citizens who are deeply concerned about the future effectiveness of Canada's armed forces. This means, I imagine, that you are all men of goodwill and that you would not get yourself involved, or directly associated, with any kind of individual revolt or rebellion of ex-service men. This means that what you do you do with a good heart.

Going back to the formation of TRIO last August, as you said, did Admiral Landymore go to Toronto and hold secret meetings with some of you, and was it subsequent to these meetings that TRIO was formed?

Mr. HENDY: No.

Mr. LANIEL: Did any one of you meet Admiral Landymore in July?

Mr. HENDY: Yes; I did.

Mr. HILBORN: I did.

Mr. LANIEL: The two of you met him in July. That was a month before the formation of TRIO.

I presume that one of you three was primarily responsible for the brief presented this morning. Could you indicate which one is the principal author?

Mr. HENDY: I was chairman of the brief committee.

Mr. HILBORN: I was commissioned to help.

Mr. LANIEL: How many people saw that brief afterwards?

Mr. HENDY: In its initial draft it was sent to five different cities. It has been seen by about a dozen people in its final form.

Mr. HILBORN: Including Air Marshal Curtis.

Mr. WINCH: May I ask a supplementary here?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, you may.

Mr. WINCH: Was there any redrafting of the original brief after the content matter of the bill was before the House of Commons?

Mr. HILBORN: It was drafted after the bill.

Mr. HENDY: It was formally drafted after the bill.

Mr. LANIEL: You have stated in your brief and later that you are not military experts. Is this correct?

Mr. HILBORN: Yes; I would say so, personally.

Mr. LANIEL: Then can we assume that the views which you have expressed in your brief have been gleaned from public declarations, from individuals, from newspapers, from miscellaneous briefs, from hearsay information and, perhaps mainly from retired officers?

Mr. HENDY: Well, as the Minister of Defence told you a couple of years ago, we also do a lot of reading.

Mr. LANIEL: No, no; I am asking the question because from your attitude it seems that you have great confidence in the senior officers who headed the defence staff from the summer of 1964 to the summer of 1966.

Mr. HENDY: Well, with respect, there was confidence expressed by the department of defence in these officers. They said that they were the best military brains available in the summer of 1964.

Mr. LANIEL: And you have the same opinion?

Mr. HENDY: I do not say that they were the best, but they were certainly at the top, and they were good enough for the department to make that statement. Certainly, if you get a group of people like that they are not all going to be the best. They were the top of the services at that time, and of the type that the services attract certainly they were the leaders.

Mr. LANIEL: Just as good as the ones we have now?

Mr. HENDY: If you like, yes.

Mr. LANIEL: If they were as expert as you suggest can you explain why, as you say in your brief, there were basic errors made in 1964, in the decision-making?

Mr. HILBORN: Well, I wonder if these officers—

Mr. LANIEL: They were there when the decisions were taken.

Mr. HENDY: We question whether they participated in these decisions. That is why the really basic thing in our brief—at least we hope that is how it appears to you gentlemen—is our feeling that these men should be heard from, to find out whether in fact they were in on the decision-making.

Mr. WINCH: You maintain that they were not heard in 1964 when they were on the staff?

Mr. HENDY: They were not.

Mr. LANIEL: Are you trying to give the impression that some of them did not participate at all at any level in this reorganization, or in the planning of it? Or would you have a tendency to say that they would have different opinions at different levels on some points?

Mr. HENDY: I would differentiate between participation in the making of the policy, or the concept of the policy, and having to implement it when they were told what was to be done.

You have the evidence of one chief of staff at that time that he was not consulted on the integration-unification concept. The chiefs of staff were consulted on what might be called the roles and the preliminary part of the White Paper; but the single unified force concept, or the integration process, was not a matter on which they were given any opportunity to give advice, as we understand it; and you will recall that at the time the Bill No. C-90 was presented, the chiefs of staff were not called upon to give their assessment.

Mr. LANIEL: But what you have said gives me the impression that all this was not done behind their backs, as you mention in your brief.

Mr. HENDY: I do not think they want to say it was behind their back. They just say that they were not consulted.

Mr. LANIEL: Well, that is the impression that I get from your brief.

Mr. HENDY: Well, all right; but—

Mr. MACALUSO: They say that? Would you care to name them?

Mr. HENDY: Admiral Raynor said he was not consulted.

An hon. MEMBER: Which others?

Mr. HENDY: Mr. Raynor further said that, as far as he knew, none of them were; but I suggest—

Mr. MACALUSO: Admiral Raynor told you that he was not consulted. Do you know that of your own personal knowledge?

Mr. HENDY: No; but we know from Admiral Raynor's statement.

Mr. LANIEL: I have one last question, Mr. Chairman. In outlinging TRIO's position at page 16, you say the following in the third paragraph:

> TRIO believes that some supporting services that are common to the navy, army and air force, (such as pay, some items of supply medical, construction, some facets of transportation and others) could be converted to a single system to support the three existing services without lowering their combat effectiveness and with modest savings.

Would you give the Committee the precise details of how this could be accomplished, if the other plan is impossible?

Mr. HENDY: This is why we want to study it. I would not lay it down now. As I say, we do not consider that we are experts in the field, but there are obviously areas where that can be done. We say, "Let us see what can be done" and that is where the exmination comes into it.

Mr. LANIEL: You mean that you make this statement without a precise plan and study, although you are inclined, as are some others, to try to create the

impression that the projects of integration and unification have not been well-planned.

Mr. HENDY: Well, these are statements that have been made by the department itself: because originally they were not going to have any plan. There would be no advance plan. This was the whole premise on which the project was presented.

Mr. LANIEL: How would you suggest that this be done? How would you unify the services? Would there be a fourth service? For example, will all the doctors be in the army, all the nurses in the navy and transportation allocated to the Air Force, and so on. What uniform will they wear? How can you do it without complete unification?

Mr. HENDY: Nobody else is doing it and they are all getting along pretty well. That is not a complete answer, I agree, but we say we should find out.

Air Marshal Sharp, at the conclusion of his comments, talked about a Canadian forces supply service. This may be the answer. I know this is one of the alternatives that the Minister has said was considered—a fourth supply service. This has been adopted, I believe, in the German military establishment. They have a logistics supply service as a fourth service.

Mr. LANIEL: Would you support a fourth supply service?

Mr. HENDY: If it is the best thing to do, certainly.

Mr. LANIEL: Do you think the armed forces would support it, too?

Mr. HENDY: They gave it serious consideration.

Mr. LANIEL: But they did not seem to support it, though.

Mr. PENFOLD: Well, Air Marshal Sharp said that, in fact, it was seriously considered that there should be a fourth force to do the jobs which were common.

Mr. MACALUSO: It was considered and rejected.

Mr. PENFOLD: It was considered and rejected, yes; that is right. It must have had merit, though. I am sure the Air Marshal would not just waste his time.

Mr. MACALUSO: Why did he reject it?

Mr. MCINTOSH: I am wondering how far I am down on the list?

The CHAIRMAN: You are after Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. CHURCHILL: How are you going to restrain the former president of the transport commission?

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, could I ask a supplementary of these witnesses in this regard?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, go ahead.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You stated to the members of the Committee a few moments ago that you were not military experts. Would you tell us who, in your estimation, are military experts?

Mr. PENFOLD: Sir, may I be given a few minutes to elaborate on that? I certainly do not lay any personal claim to being an expert so far as military

matters are concerned. As I outlined, in my brief career in the Air Force I achieved the rank of flying officer, as a navigator, and the limit of my ability was to get from point A to point B and that leg back again, which was more important! In this I was successful.

However, through my cadet work, and so on, and the Air Force Association, I was fortunate in being associated with some extremely able people for a period going back to 1949. I was continually amazed at the calibre of the people who were in the services at that time, and who gave of so many hours beyond what I, in business, would expect of military men. I was so impressed that I have had an extreme respect for all military people, particularly at senior levels, ever since.

My background in business, by the way, is that I was a manager for Household Finance for 29 years—

Mr. McIntosh: Before you continue, I would like to have a brief explanation. Mr. Hilborn, I think, shook his head and said that he did not consider himself to be a military expert. I would like him to tell us who he does consider is a military expert?

Mr. Penfold: I was just going to do that.

Mr. McIntosh: I am going to follow up with one other question. Do you think that military experts can make mistakes, or are they infallible?

Mr. Laniel: Even the retired ones?

Mr. Penfold: When this came out, sir, we had to inquire, we had to find out and we had to ask people concerning integration. We went to the people whom we knew and respected.

As I am sure that your are aware, in 1964, when the White Paper was published, there were very few people who really had any idea about the specifics of it. These were very general and capable of many interpretations. As a lot of people did we expected that integration woud be limited to the support forces, because this seemed logical at the time. I think many of the senior officers at this time also came to this conclusion. It had not been spelled out.

Because of my own background and experience my job was to pick out people of whom I had to inquire personally to find out the expert point of view, just as, if I wanted a medical opinion, I would go to a doctor. Therefore, although not an expert myself, I had to make a summary, and through my associations I had access to these people.

Mr. Winch: Did you inquire only of retired or fired personnel?

Mr. Penfold: No; serving and retired.

Mr. Laniel: And from the judgment of these people whom you consulted you came to the conclusion that we can have unification in small units—in small islands—and that this would permit the Canadian forces to reach their objective; but that we cannot reach the same objective with complete unification. Is this your basic argument?

Mr. Penfold: I am sorry, sir; I am not too clear on your premise.

Mr. Laniel: Well, you consulted people, you assembled information and you made up your mind based on the average of their opinion. You now come before

us and you have reservations about unification, but you will go as far as the unification of different trades, or of different groups of servicemen, and you think that this, in the whole scope of our armed forces—with the three services—will improve the situation and will permit us to fulfill our responsibility and engagements all over the world?

Mr. PENFOLD: Absolutely.

Mr. LANIEL: But that with complete unification we would not be able to do it?

Mr. PENFOLD: The military people whom we have talked to refused to commit themselves to this extent, because there has not been sufficient evidence produced anywhere. They can point to quite a number of cases where indeed there was unification. They point to the Japanese home defence forces. As you know, these were put out of business right after the war. Then they were given small forces and they built up to the point where the home defence forces had to specialize to cope with their environment; and they now have an army, navy and air force.

We have every reason to believe that certainly for economy and efficiency there is plenty of room, if you will, for integration of these support forces, but the people whose opinions we respect most strongly say that there should be a pause to assess this, to see where we go from here; that unification may very well jeopardize the gains and advances that have been made up until now.

Mr. ROCK: I thought there were no gains and advances, according to your brief?

Mr. HENDY: As I see it, in Bill C-243 the main issue is: Do we take everybody and put them into one service which I call, if you like, the one-suit concept.

Mr. LANIEL: Not a melting pot.

Mr. HENDY: Yes, a melting pot.

Mr. LANIEL: Oh, come, now.

Mr. HENDY: Well, a melting pot in one sense and probably not in another. That it is a question depending on the definition of what you do.

I have an article here that was published last month, or two months ago, headed "Unification—The Russians Had It First, of Course". In it there is a picture of Russian sailors in a sailor uniform and when you read this article they talk about the "unified" staff, the "unified" forces, "single," powerful ministry of defence, and "unification" is used throughout. Yet the Russians retain the three identifiable services. That is one of the big problems.

In the British White Paper, which was written under the aegis of Lord Louis Mountbatten, then Chief of Defence Staff, it is said:

> The Services must preserve their separate identities. In action they are increasingly interdependent. This interdependence must be expected to increase. Nevertheless all experience shows that the fighting spirit of the individual man in battle derives largely from his loyalty to his ship, his unit, or his squadron. The traditions and battle honours of individual Services are a vital factor in morale and fighting efficiency. This must be preserved.

This is the British approach in 1963.

Mr. LANIEL: Was there not an article lately about the British policy on defence, reconsidering the principles involved in their defence in general?

Mr. HENDY: Do you mean a further one, since this one in 1963?

Mr. LANIEL: No, no; not from the White Paper; but some defence writer.

Mr. HARKNESS: I think you are referring to Mr. Mayhew, who resigned as minister in charge of the navy in the British Labour government about a year ago. He has just written a book and there has been a considerable amount of comment about it.

Mr. LANIEL: Probably.

The CHAIRMAN: Your time has expired, Mr. Laniel. Mr. Forrestall is next on my list; then Mr. Macaluso and Mr. McIntosh.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Mr. Chairman, before I start I would like to apologize to the members of TRIO fo some of the action that has been going on around the table. I am not very happy with it.

Mr. MACALUSO: I think Mr. Forrestall should be responsible only for his own particular actions. He should not be speaking for the other members of this Committee.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I am apologizing for my particular participation in this Committee.

An hon. MEMBER: You can leave.

Mr. FORRESTALL: It is worse than a snake pit. These gentlemen have come before us and have stated a position that has been laughed at and criticized. They are entitled to a little bit of respect. Were I come from we happen, as a matter of course, to respect people and their opinions and views.

I was wondering if, perhaps, Mr. Hilborn, or Mr. Hendy, could give us a summary? In your precis and in the brief itself, in parts, you have dealt, as near as I can gather, with about five areas upon which you base certain of your premises. I wonder if you could summarize them just briefly. You have dealt with morale and professional competence. Are there probably five or six areas that could be summarized and put into specific terms that would form the basis of the conclusions you have arrived at, or the criteria, or perhaps the areas of concern, such as morale, professional competence, and so on?

Mr. HILBORN: Is not the precis, or the postscript which is attached, sufficient?

Mr. FORRESTALL: Let us put it this way: am I right in saying that the effects of total unification are on professional competence; in what would happen by removal of the natural competition; in the removal, from what is presently our unified command level, of direct line communication, the line concept of which, I gather, serves two or three particular areas, and one of them happens to be morale. Are there any others, or would that summarize them fairly briefly?

Mr. HENDY: I think that is it. There is the overriding factor of what we can afford in our military posture, and the military organization must do it as efficiently as possible; but to produce fighting men those qualities of profes-

sional competence, morale and esprit de corps are essential. Without those any amount of good organization and a million dollars worth of computers will come to naught.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I will preface any next question with a remark. One of the premises that the Minister and the Department of National Defence have proceeded on is that this will provide the most economic base, I would gather, in light of the defence budget's having been frozen to a certain degree.

Are you of the opinion that the amount of money we are spending under our present system is too much; that our economy perhaps could not stand greater participation and the expenditure of dollars and cents in the defence posture?

Mr. HENDY: Mr. Forrestall, that really goes beyond what we should be dealing with, because the determination of how much to spend on defence is certainly a decision that the government has made.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I am not asking you to comment on it. I am asking you, as respected Canadians and certainly, if nothing else, as voters and I can reassure my honorable friends over there, that I do not have the vaguest idea how you vote—whether you think we are spending too much money on defence?

Mr. HENDY: No, certainly not; and in comparison to our allies, whether you relate it to population or gross national product, or what you will, we are well down on the scale.

I have the latest summary of the military balance from the January issue of Aero Space International which summarizes the military efforts of all countries.

Mr. FORRESTALL: That would be a very recent one. Where does Canada stand?

Mr. HENDY: These figures are for 1965-66; and Canada is spending three per cent of its gross national product; the Americans are spending eight per cent; and the only NATO country, outside of Iceland which has no military force, that is lower in these terms is Luxembourg, which is 1.4 per cent. All the other NATO countries are above.

Mr. FORRESTALL: We are the third lowest, then, apart from Iceland, which makes no real contribution.

Mr. LANIEL: May I ask a supplementary question?

Are you suggesting that we should increase our participation? Do you think the taxpayer would enjoy that?

Mr. HENDY: The question was whether I objected to what we are spending, and I said No. I was then asked where do we stood and these are the figures.

Who knows how much should be spent? Defence is like insurance. You may get away for years without any and then suddenly you need it and you regret that you do not have it. If you destroy your military organization, or economies, at one point, it may be very expensive to overcome that lag when you are faced with problems. I do not know what you should spend. This is just a matter of what the government says it can afford. It may be wrong; it may be right. Perhaps we could spend half as much; and if we organize a police force and this becomes policy maybe we could cut our expenses in half; but would you, sir, as a Canadian, want to cut our defence in half in the face of those statements?

Mr. LANIEL: To that question I say No; but there is the possibility that you might be able to get better use of the same dollar.

Mr. HENDY: Yes; you might put it into aid to under-privileged countries; I quite agree.

Mr. LANIEL: No, no, no; in defence.

Mr. PENFOLD: Mr. Chairman, I think we are beyond arguing on the terms of reference. We are talking as individuals. To my knowledge, in none of the meetings held across the country has TRIO ever got into this. We have not ourselves, except to say that we think that Canada, in order to fulfill its obligations, should have the best equipment and the best forces; and I think the general consensus would be, that if more money was needed—the Canadian taxpayer would support it. I think that that is about all the generality I have heard.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Yes; that seems to confirm some comment that I have had too. Admittedly, I come from a prejudiced area.

Perhaps anyone of you might care to comment on this: In your brief you have dealt to some extent, in support of your basic argument about the retention of the identity of the services, with the dollars and cents that are being spent on capital equipment. Who did this research for you? Did you do it yourselves?

Mr. HENDY: Yes, we did it ourselves.

Mr. FORRESTALL: And that information came from what documents?

Mr. HENDY: Well, the financial part is from the Canadian Tax Foundation annual publication called "The National Finances". It has a good analysis of defence expenditures; and the Financial Post, of course, as the watch dog of the public purse, has periodic articles.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Could we elaborate on that a little bit? You have very obviously done a lot of homework and a lot of ground work. Do you agree that the tendency towards this apparent disparity between overheads and monies expended for capital purposes would necessarily have continued under the present system, or could it have been reversed, or might it have been reversed?

Mr. HILBORN: Well, I think myself that there were economies. I think that there is a great deal to be said for the steps that have been taken in the area of integration. I do not think our position really quarrels with this at all.

Mr. FORRESTALL: No, of course; but that is not what I was asking you, Mr. Hilborn. I think possibly we all agree with you that there is some necessity for a unified command at the top level and possibly at the field level for certain operations. In your opinion, from the studies that you have made and from conversations you have had, are you convinced that, under the present system, the graph that we had before us, which was presented by Air Marshal Sharp, and which I understand you have seen, would indeed have continued its projected line down to the point in the next couple of years where no money whatsoever was being spent on capital equipment because of our present situation?

Mr. HENDY: That is difficult to say. Projecting a line on a chart is not necessarily an exact science. There has been a change made. We are faced with the fact that we have far fewer people to pay. Apparently equipment expendi-

tures have not gone up appreciably. Now we have got an inflationary factor, and I am quite satisfied, again as a taxpayer, that you must allow for this in your defence budget just as you do for other things as the prices go up. Therefore, you may be faced with an increased dollar vote every year just to keep abreast of this.

What would have happened had we gone on is difficult to say. We might have had another Korean situation; we might have got entangled in Viet Nam had it not been for our presence in the International Control Commission; and that might have required a completely different approach to our defence and increased it. I do not think anybody knows.

Undoubtedly, management requires an examination and an overhaul, and, as Mr. Hilborn says, to the extent that this has effected economies, that is fine; but they are not apparent at this point. For instance, there was a project to build ships for the Navy, which was cancelled four years ago. Presumably they were going to be paid for. I am on dangerous ground here, with the presence of two former ministers who had something to do with that program, but I cannot imagine that any government would be so irresponsible as to say that they were going to build ships and not be able to pay for them when they were delivered. We all know that in any big organization or in any bureaucracy, to use a not so nice term, there is always room for improvement and that you must keep looking and reviewing. Probably this was the time. I know that Mr. Claxton wanted to look at it very closely, but he got caught in the Korean situation and there was no opportunity. It came about that Mr. Hellyer had the opportunity to do it, and to the extent that there has been streamlining and efficiency, yes; but there are many things that go to the organization of the services that we feel are not being done properly, as evidenced by what has happened.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Did you have an opportunity to review the presentation made to us yesterday by the Deputy Chief of the Reserves in Canada, Brigadier Dare?

Mr. HENDY: No; I just heard about it.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Then, we will not get into that. I will pass for the time being.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You said a few moments ago that I followed Mr. Forrestall.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, when you get a rush of names like this, it is not a matter of just...an

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, I will show my courteousness and yield to Mr. McIntosh.

The CHAIRMAN: No, I would like to raise a point here. I understand Mr. McIntosh's concern. I did try to write the names down all at once but that is a little difficult even for a chairman. I am doing my best to divide the questioning between one side and the other, if Mr. Macaluso wishes to yield to Mr. McIntosh I will call on him.

Mr. MCINTOSH: First of all, Mr. Chairman, I would like to direct my question to Mr. Hilborn.

For clarification, Mr. Hilborn, what do you understand by the term "unification of the armed forces"?

Mr. HILBORN: I think we understand "unification" to mean basically what Mr. Hendy referred to as the one-suit concept—one force; one identification, by uniform and by rank structure, and the loss of the identity of the Royal Canadian Navy and the Royal Canadian Air Force.

Mr. MCINTOSH: How do you differentiate between the terms "integration" and "unification"?

You say on page 7:

In essence unification stops at the command level.

I would suggest that this is integration rather than unification, but I would like you to define the difference between the two.

Mr. HILBORN: Well, I think our feeling on the distinction—and a distinction has been made between "integration" and "unification"—is that "integration," as we understand it, is roughly the integration of commands and service supply functions, etc. In other words, it is everything but the sharp end, if you like, of the combat forces. And when you put them all together then you have unification.

Mr. MCINTOSH: In other words, you do not believe that with the application of unification we could still carry out our roles below command level except in certain services, as you have outlined in your brief?

This brings us back to the question that was asked of you previously: Who, in your opinion, are military experts?

Mr. HILBORN: Well, we have listed the names of some people for whom we have a high regard and who obviously were highly thought of when they were serving. On page 5 we have suggested a list of people who, as mentioned before, had been hailed as having the best possible military minds in Canada, some of whom were actually at work on the unification process. We have listed, Miller, Walsh, Rayner, Moncel, Fleury, Annis, Dyer, Cameron, Harvey, Hendrick, Orr, Stirling, Landymore, Welland, Piers, Kitching and so on. We feel that these men are competent to give opinions if you gentlemen would be interested in hearing from them. In some cases they have not been in a position to speak up until this time. In many cases I certainly do not have any idea what they will say when they are asked questions. We just feel that their opinions should be considered and that they are worth hearing from.

Mr. MCINTOSH: When this question was asked of you on an earlier occasion, there was an interjection from the other side to the effect that they also can make mistakes. Do you agree?

Mr. HILBORN: I would agree, yes.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Would you also agree that the military experts now advising the Minister can make mistakes?

Mr. HILBORN: Yes; I think, with all due respect to you, sir, that it might be possible that you could make a mistake, or that I could make a mistake.

Mr. McINTOSH: I just wanted to be clear on that.

I would now like to proceed, Mr. Chairman, to the supplement to the brief, where the witnesses make this statement:

> Basic errors in the higher levels of the Defence Department policy-making and command organizations were committed in 1964. Could you tell us what those basic errors were that you refer to?

Mr. HENDY: Mr. Andras asked that question. This was dealt with, as I mentioned, by Brigadier Malone when he appeared before you a couple of years ago and I have his testimony before the Defence Committee on June 4, 1964, and he says this on page 150:

> There is one principle which might jeopardize your whole program, and that is the setting up for control by one man... I would be much happier if you had a council answering to the minister.

Since then he has also stated that the concept of the one uniform for combat elements is also an error, and that although he has used the words "unified force" he does not mean them in that context. That is one area. The other area is of course the possibility that we will not have, at the top of the defence establishment, experts in all three environments because of this, in a sense, interchange as you get to the higher levels which, I believe, is an underlying cause. On the Defence Council, if you have only two military members, they can be expert only in two fields, and you have one field that must be out. If, by accident, there had been two admirals there, which could have happened by appointments, you would be without advice on the Defence Council from the ground and air elements. Even as an ex-sailor, I would not agree to having two admirals running it.

Mr. McINTOSH: Mr. Hilborn, I will continue with my questioning. For your understanding of the term "unification" do you believe that Canada can carry out her commitments to the alliance policies which she has at the present time?

Mr. HILBORN: I think we probably need more men than we have today—the forces are in a weakened condition—but I cannot see how you are going to solve the problem by denying two of the forces their identities and by calling what was the Royal Canadian Navy the sea environment and what was the Royal Canadian Air Force the air environment, and that by just simply doing that, and putting everybody in the same uniform and using the army rank structure, you get any inherent savings or are somehow better able to meet your commitments.

Mr. McINTOSH: Did you wish to say something on this, Mr. Penfold?

Mr. PENFOLD: Obviously, if we are going to take our position in NATO, NORAD and so on, which is the premise, we have to co-operate with other forces—the British, the Americans and so on—and if they are built on the structure of the three environments as they are—and we have stated no intention of changing—it may be difficult for us to weld our people into a cohesive group to work together in that situation. I can see where this would be an added difficulty in co-operating with our allies.

Mr. FAULKNER: Specifically what difficulties can you foresee?

Mr. PENFOLD: The idea of the job being done, the identification of the man, the background, and so on.

Mr. FAULKNER: They are not losing their identity.

Mr. PENFOLD: Of course they are.

Mr. FAULKNER: No, they are not. As individuals they will be identifiable. Their identity may change, but there is certainly no loss of it as such.

I think it might be worthwhile for you to elaborate on the difficulties that we might encounter in working with others in NATO.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh has the floor, and I think he has a line of questioning which he wishes to follow. I will put you down on the list, Mr. Faulkner.

Mr. MCINTOSH: My next question, Mr. Hilborn is on a statement made by one of my colleagues on the other side, who interjected and said that some of the evidence you have given contradicted statements made by a former witness. It is quite obvious, as these questions develop, that there is going to be a difference of opinion on which presentation we are going to accept, or which side is going to accept. Now, I understood you to say, Mr. Hilborn, that you had taken a staff course; is that correct?

Mr. HILBORN: Yes; a good many years ago.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Do you still remember some of it?

Mr. HILBORN: Yes; I always remember a paper I did on a quotation of Stonewall Jackson's: "always mystify the state and surprise the enemy". It is about the only thing I can remember.

Mr. MCINTOSH: What would you say about an appreciation of a situation that was made on a false premise?

Mr. HILBORN: If you have a faulty appreciation you cannot come to a reasonable conclusion.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You cannot come to a conclusion?

Mr. HILBORN: Right.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You said that you had read this presentation. I will ask you what you think of this statement: "Assuming that one wishes to maintain modern military forces there are only two possible courses of action—increase the budget, or reduce the operating and maintenance costs". Do you think that there are only two possible courses open to the Canadian government when they want to change their defence structure?

Mr. HILBORN: I suppose that in that area there are only two alternatives; or reduce the commitments.

Mr. MCINTOSH In what area do you mean?

Mr. HILBORN: I have not got the quotation. What page—

Mr. MCINTOSH: I submit to you, Mr. Hilborn, that there are more than two courses, but I do not want to go into that now. However, if there are more than two, and they have been accepted, would you say that this is a faulty appreciation that we have been studying.

Mr. HILBORN: Yes, I would say so, if it has not assessed all the factors that affect it.

Mr. McINTOSH: That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, I first of all want to ask Mr. Hendy about the matter of no communication with the services. I want to bring your attention, sir, to the brief presented to this Committee by the Vice-Chief of Staff, Air Marshal Sharp, on Tuesday, February 7 last, and commencing at Page 21 to the bottom of Page 23, where it says "third example is the study of DND communications" I would urge you to read the last paragraph on Page 23 if you have not done so, because your thesis that there is lack of communication is completely contradicted there by the Vice-Chief of Staff.

Mr. Penfold, you are Secretary-Treasurer of this organization, are you not?

Mr. PENFOLD: Yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: You say that you do not know how many members you have, but you do have a mailing list, do you not?

Mr. PENFOLD: Yes; we have a local one.

Mr. MACALUSO: How many people would be on your mailing list throughout the country, if it is throughout the country, or in Toronto. Where is it?

Mr. PENFOLD: You mean our own particular group's mailing list?

Mr. MACALUSO: TRIO's mailing list, yes.

Mr. HILBORN: I would say between twelve and fifteen hundred, of Toronto TRIO; and then we mail the branches. We do not mail individual members beyond those on the Toronto list.

Mr. MACALUSO: How do you get this mailing list? Where does it come from? Where do the names come from?

Mr. PENFOLD: People who have written in; and we had cards printed asking people to join TRIO, which were distributed by individuals to friends and so on.

Mr. MACALUSO: On the Veterans' Day march at the CNE? They came back from there? Mr. Hilborn says twelve hundred to fifteen hundred in Toronto?

Mr. PENFOLD: I would be glad to give it to you, but I do not know.

Mr. MACALUSO: I do not have to be definite. I am just wondering. I am very surprised at some comments that have been made in your brief. Mr. Hendy stated, on Mr. Laniel's questioning, that TRIO believes in some supporting services, etc., but it was elicited that you had no precise plan, and your only answer was—and I quote "Nobody else is doing it, and they seem to be getting along very well". That seems to be your only answer to that particular question.

I want to bring to your attention the fact that there may be reasons for some other countries not having gone into this. I will submit to you, first of all, that it is perhaps inertia on their part; and, secondly, that it may be political timidity. Would you comment on that?

Mr. HENDY: I do not know. We can only take the facts as they are. I would like to read to you from the New Zealand White Paper of 1966, which is two years after our plan had been announced. They talk about a combined national force of three service contributions. Here again we find the word "unification" being used in this English-speaking country but when you analyse it it really is what we call integration.

As a matter of fact, in the United States "integration" of the forces relates to the assimilation of the non-white members of the forces. There is an article entitled "Integration in the U.S. Army".

Mr. MACALUSO: Would you let me have the New Zealand example, Mr. Hendy, please?

Mr. HENDY: Yes. I am just trying to give the background of the terminology. This is where a lot of the confusion has arisen.

Mr. MACALUSO: There is confusion about the terminology?

Mr. HENDY: This is paragraph 19 of the New Zealand paper.

> The force of this type which New Zealand could afford to maintain in peacetime would never be large enough to give a truly independent role in limited war—the major contingency we have to face—and would be wasteful in men and materials if tailored to meet all forseeable situations, as it would have to be. Because of the "separateness" of the three services, of all our principal allies, a combined New Zealand force would have to be logistically self-contained or largely so and this could be expensive. Moreover, the narrow use of air and naval forces in support of one small land force element is contrary to the well-established principle of flexibility in the employment of naval and air power, viz., concentration of force—

—which is a principle of war.

> These arguments apply to limited war; in a lesser situation, the extraction of certain elements of a combined force to meet a particular contingency would leave the remainder "out of balance" and thus ineffective for employment whether on an ad hoc basis with allied forces, or for purely national purposes.

They sum up their position under the heading "Unification of National Defence" and Paragraph 52:

> The Government's general approach to the greater integration of the Services is that the three Services should retain their separate indentities and the opportunities for closer unification lie in the supporting areas of supply, personnel administration, etc., rather than in the actual operational activities of the Services. Developments overseas, particularly those in other Commonwealth countries, are also being followed with great interest in New Zealand.

That is two years after we were at it.

Mr. MACALUSO: I think that is sufficient from the—

Mr. HENDY:

> The size of New Zealand forces places limitations on the material and financial benefits which can be expected for development of particular integration measures.

Mr. MACALUSO: I hope that does not come off my time, Mr. Chairman.

New Zealand had a history of combining some of their forces with Australia's forces, I believe, in the past. I do not want any great dissertation on that, but that is a fact, is it not?

Mr. HENDY: I am not sure; but we have combined with British and American forces.

Mr. MACALUSO: I believe Mr. Penfold stated that in the U.K. they have said definitely that they have no intention of changing. I want to bring to your attention evidence that thoughtful people around the world are seriously questioning the military organizations in their particular countries. I bring to your attention, first of all, an article in the Sydney, Australia, *Morning Herald* of Monday, January 23, 1967. The heading is "Too Many Chiefs?" and it reads:

> The pressure in Britain for radical structural changes in the organization of the Armed Forces and Canada's bold unification experiment are bound to give new life to arguments for "rationalizing" the Australian Services. An increasing number of critics in Britain feel that the reforms designed to centralize control in the Defence Ministry have failed to achieve much, that administration remains top-heavy, that efficiency is still impaired by inter-Service competition and that the only practical solution is the unification of the three Services.

Then it goes on:

> The arguments for unification advanced in Britain and Canada apply with equal strength to Australia, where, despite the smallness of our defence forces, there has been a notable reluctance to make any effective reductions in top-heavy administrations.

I assume they are talking of integration there.

> Because of the size of our Services there are many who think it absurd that we should maintain not only three Service hierarchies but also three Service Ministries as well as the Defence Ministry, and who maintain that the proportion of administrative personnel to actual combat forces is unnecessarily high. There is no doubt that inter-Service rivalries and competition for funds and weapons frequently produce duplication and inefficiency.

Now I will bring your attention to another article.

Mr. CHURCHILL: What are you reading from?

Mr. MACALUSO: The Sydney *Morning Herald*; there is one by-line.

Mr. CHURCHILL: That is one man's opinion.

Mr. MACALUSO: Like your own, Mr. Churchill, only a little better, and more foundation to it. Mr. Chairman, may I direct to the gentlemen's attention, another article from T. S. Monks in the Sydney Austra'ia *Morning Herald* of January 23, 1967. The heading is "New Demand in U.K. for One Armed Service".

Mr. CHURCHILL: I could read quite a number of newspaper articles too, statements made by the Minister and so on. Are we not supposed to be asking questions?

The CHAIRMAN: We have heard a number of lengthy preambles to questions, and Mr. Macaluso knows he has only 15 minutes.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, I am using these to refute the argument that nobody else is doing it or considering it. This is London, from T. S. Monks, January 23, 1967, Sydney Australia, a great dissertation which I if you like, I

will table, about the unification of Britain's Navy, Army, and Air Force into a single service and in which abolition of separate administrative systems are being increasingly urged—and there is quite a dissertation on that. Also, I believe that David Devine, the chief military writer for the London *Times* says that the U.K.'s military organization is not workable and he is urging a single force.

I only bring this forward to show that there is discussion going on and that reconsideration is being given to the White Paper in England and to the situation in Australia.

Mr. Hendy and gentlemen, may I draw to your attention to page 5 of your brief in which you seem to be casting very serious reflections on the present military leaders and the defence staff. You have really given a carte blanche generalization account of these men who are leading the defence staff at the present time; I think this is unfair not only to everyone there but to every man serving in the armed services at the present time. With due respect, I consider it very insulting.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Where is this to be found?

Mr. MACALUSO: At page 5: (e) Problems of leadership in relation to recent events and promotion policies—and it goes on to page 6. I would like to know who are the officers presently serving who are not, in your opinion, sufficiently experienced, or are not competent. You use the words, "They are not competent in the planning that is going on".

Mr. HENDY: No, I said they need more experience. We lost several officers at the age of 49 or 50 who had another 5 years to go. There were replacements—

Mr. MACALUSO: I will get to that, Mr. Hendy.

The CHAIRMAN: Let him answer the question.

Mr. MACALUSO: I will come to that later and I will give him the opportunity to answer it.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, I think when he asks the question he ought to have the courtesy to let the man answer, surely.

Mr. MACALUSO: I am trying to get my time in.

The CHAIRMAN: I think we should have an answer to this question as a courtesy to the witness.

Mr. HENDY: My contention here, Mr. Macaluso, is simply that there is nothing the matter, basically, if you like, with the officers who were promoted, but they would not have filled those positions as soon. We lost the most experienced officers, who gave up their last five years which should have been the most productive in bringing their experience and their weight of knowledge to the Department of Defence; we lost them early. The present officers have been promoted too fast.

Mr. MACALUSO: Which ones, Mr. Hendy would you say you lost too early?

Mr. HENDY: We lost General Moncel, Admiral Landymore, Admiral Welland, General Fleury, Admiral Dyer, Air Marshal Annis—those are the ones that come to mind.

Mr. MACALUSO: I am looking at page 5 where you have them set out, and I suggest to you that of the names you have listed who have left: Miller, Walsh, Rayner, Annis, Cameron, Harvey, Hendrick, Orr, Piers, and Kitching retired at their normal compulsory retirement age.

Mr. HENDY: I do not quarrel with that, but the fact remains that they were the men who are concerned and, we say, have had dealings with this program.

Mr. MACALUSO: But they would not have been there, Mr. Hendy, and these men would have advanced anyway. Except for five or six whom you have named, they would have retired at their normal retirement age. Would you not agree?

Mr. HENDY: But nearly all of them have expressed their concern with the policies of programs that were going on.

Mr. MACALUSO: That is not relative to your statement.

Mr. HENDY: Air Marshal Cameron has been writing continuously on this problem; Air Vice-Marshal Hendrick has written on it; Admiral Landymore needs no mention; Air Marshal Annis has expressed his concern, and in the press, and Admiral Dyer as well.

I am only saying that if these men were good—and they were the top leaders—and were supported by the department two and a half years ago in this capacity, and now have expressed misgivings, then the Canadian public is entitled to hear their opinions as military experts.

Mr. MACALUSO: That is not relative to what you are saying in (e), Mr. Hendy; I feel you are casting a cloud on the reputation of these men who are now in the Defence Staff. I again put to you: Would you class General Allard, Air Marshal Sharp, Air Marshal Reyno, General Lilley, Vice-Admiral Hennessy, and Brigadier Dare as men who should not be in their positions now and are you saying that they were advanced prematurely?

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Brewin?

Mr. BREWIN: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman. I know the witnesses can take care of themselves, but it seems to me to be a most unfair sort of question. The statement made here is a perfectly clear and natural one, that certain people have retired early and as a generality they feel that there has been some loss. I do not think it is fair, reasonable or warranted by the evidence given by the organization, to press individuals to criticize those who are still serving.

The CHAIRMAN: I think that as the question has been asked, and the witness is anxious to answer it, he should be allowed to do so.

Mr. HENDY: Mr. Chairman, I appreciate Mr. Brewin's remarks, and I want to make it very clear to Mr. Macaluso that many of the officers in the Defence Staff and who are now commanding, are, or have been at least, personal friends of mine, and I have admiration for their capabilities. What I am concerned with is that we lost other men of great capability too early, and these men who are now in these jobs have got them faster than they should have. The country has lost the experience of the retired officers, and they are drawing faster on the capabilities and experience of the officers who have been promoted because they were junior. Admiral O'Brien and Admiral Charles have both been friends of

mine for 25 years, and I know they are officers of great capability. Admiral Landymore and Admiral Stirling were men of great capability and they went out because of differences of opinion, but that does not lessen their capabilities as Naval officers in my eyes; I say it is a shame that the country lost those men prematurely.

Mr. MACALUSO: I am not arguing with that point Mr. Hendy; I am arguing with the statements in the brief which cast a reflection on the present staff members. Now, at the bottom of page 10—and this is part of it—it says:

> We have been at it less than three years and there are a great many problems unresolved.

Do you not admit that there were many unresolved problems under the old system: unequal promotional opportunities, unequal commissioning from the rank opportunities, unequal educational opportunities, unequal pay for similar work, and unequal retirement ages. Is this an equitable system which this program, as one of its stated aims, wants to remove?

Mr. HENDY: Well, you will never resolve all the difficulties no matter how fast you work at it because there will always be problems as you progress. The way you avoid your problems is to go to a South Sea island and get away from it all.

Mr. MACALUSO: You are not prepared to admit that our present policy removes these inequities?

Mr. HENDY: To the extent that they do, yes, but it does not mean that the present policy is all right just because it is doing some things. In some of the basics we feel that there are areas which are not right and require examination. As I said this morning, I have not been against working with the other forces; I have encouraged it. I have made suggestions to the Minister, and some of them he was gracious enough to indicate had some merit. But that does not mean and I cannot be concerned if the over-all picture does not seem to be developing in a way that it is going to provide us with the best defence for our dollar.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso, you have already had your time.

Mr. MACALUSO: One last question.

The CHAIRMAN: Is it short?

Mr. MACALUSO: Yes, it is short. This arises out of Mr. Laniel's questioning about the great regard—which is understandable, at least by those who were old enough to serve—for the senior officers who were in the Defence Staff from 1964 to 1966. You said, regarding two basic errors made in 1964, which are in Brigadier R. S. Malone's statements and writings, that the senior officers were not at fault because they were not consulted, and the only name which came forward was Rayner. Being men of high principles, as they naturally must have been and are, would these officers compromise their principles to remain at the head of such a structure if they did not believe in it because they were there in 1964 when Malone referred to these two basic errors: one commander in chief and the unification of a single force. Should they not have left at that time?

Mr. HENDY: Not at all, because it is the duty of a responsible officer to put forward his views. Never before in Canadian history has a man been fired for not believing in a policy; he has been, for speaking against it.

Mr. MACALUSO: The statement you are making has been answered in the House, and has been answered here, and will be answered again. I agree with you; it is the job of the military officer to state his views and to give his advice to the Minister in charge. Is that correct?

Mr. HENDY: That is right.

Mr. MACALUSO: Then, if his advice is not taken, it is also his duty to loyally follow the orders he is given, and if he does not agree with them to resign. Is that not correct?

Mr. HENDY: We have never indicated anything—

Mr. MACALUSO: Do you agree with me, sir?

An hon. MEMBER: Let the witness answer.

Mr. CHURCHILL: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, the member who is asking questions is now casting a reflection with regard to the loyalty of the men who have resigned.

Mr. MACALUSO: No I am not, Mr. Churchill.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Let me continue my point of order. I wonder if the member has any further material, supplied by the ministerial office, to present to us.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, we are very used to Mr. Churchill's arguments, like the great Butterworth letter that he presented one day; I just ignore that nonsense.

The CHAIRMAN: Order, please.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, I am not going to have any insulting remarks by this young squirt. What is your accusation with regard to the Butterworth letter?

Mr. MACALUSO: What is your accusation, sir, with regard to my getting these notes—and substantiate them.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I am asking you—

Mr. MACALUSO: Substantiate your remarks, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I am asking you if you have any further material from the ministerial office.

Mr. MACALUSO: Do you have a charge to make? Then substantiate it and make the charge. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman doe not have such a charge, I suggest that he just withdraw and let me finish my questioning. I wonder if you agree if that is not the policy of military officers, sir?

Mr. PENFOLD: Mr. Chairman, I submit that the question is the same as "answer yes or no if you have stopped beating your wife". If I may have the privilege of answering—

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, by all means.

Mr. PENFOLD: —I submit that any officer has the duty and responsibility of advancing his best opinion to his Minister—

Mr. MACALUSO: Agreed.

Mr. PENFOLD: —at any time; and, indeed, making every effort to advance the knowledge which he has which, indeed, the Minister has to call on if he does not have that knowledge.

Mr. MACALUSO: That is right.

Mr. PENFOLD: Then, if the Minister decides that this is the policy, he absolutely shall be required to put forth his best efforts to see that that policy is implemented.

Mr. MACALUSO: That is right.

Mr. PENFOLD: He does not have the right to speak against that policy.

Mr. MACALUSO: As has been done.

Mr. PENFOLD: May I continue, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: I am sorry, Mr. Penfold; go ahead.

Mr. PENFOLD: As a responsible officer he will do everything in his power to implement that policy. Indeed, we have had no suggestion, to my knowledge, that any officer did less than that, as far as implementing that policy.

Mr. MACALUSO: There may be evidence produced to satisfy you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Winch?

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, having asked three supplementary questions, I will be very brief. In reading the brief I noted on more than one occasion that TRIO representatives quoted documents emanating from the Minister or from his department. Mr. Chairman, will you endeavour to obtain for this Committee the full documentation for us from the Department of National Defence, particularly in respect of page 9 where there are two, one-sentence quotations from what is called the pro forma letter. Alternatively perhaps the TRIO would be good enough to supply the Committee with the full material.

Then, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a very brief question on what appears at page 5, where the TRIO representatives have recommended the names of some 20 whom they feel could be of great use to our Committee on this most important matter that we are now dealing with. As a member of this Committee since it was first formed, I was advised by even former defence ministers that one of the greatest soldiers ever produced in Canada was General Foulkes. Was there any particular reason why his name was left out?

Mr. HILBORN: No, there are a lot of names we might have added to that list.

Mr. WINCH: I ask this because I was informed by a former minister of the Department of Defence that he was perhaps one of the greatest who ever came out of Canada; I just wondered why his name was not among the 20 suggested.

Mr. Chairman, I have only one question left. It may seem a little bit trite, but in view of having listened to and having read the brief twice which I think was very well produced, expressing the views of TRIO, I would like to put a blunt question, and I hope I get a blunt answer. When you concentrate policies down to a final decision, in the opinion of TRIO whose decision should be accepted, the military who may not agree, or the government which represents,

always, a majority party in the House of Commons—bearing in mind that through parliament a majority vote expresses the will of the elected members?

Mr. HILBORN: The government.

Mr. WINCH: Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Faulkner?

Mr. FAULKNER: Mr. Chairman, a lot of the ground has been covered so I will deal only with a few points. If I may, I would like to preface my remarks by commenting on a brief experience I had while visiting a base of our air division in Europe. The story about morale in the services always struck me as somewhat incredible. I am not speaking for the services here; I can only speak from my experience in Europe—I was at Marville and Baden Solingen. For a noviciate in the field, one of the two really striking features of the visit was that the morale in my judgment was not low, if it was in any way lower than it should have been it would seem to be attributable more to the difficulty of maintaining a meaningful role in a general atmosphere of detent in Europe; in other words, it was related to the military position in a political atmosphere which was moving gradually away from the atmosphere of the cold war. It was never a question of it being related to the defence bill or the defence re-organization; it never appeared, at least in my questioning, to be terribly important.

The other thing, of course, that struck me and which strikes most Europeans, I think, is the high level of professionalism of our air division over there, which is not just confirmed by parliamentarians visiting the place but is also borne out by NATO exercises. I must say that I somehow take exception to the general allegation which very often is not substantiated. It may be said that it cannot really be substantiated because it is a difficult thing to substantiate. There is an alternative case on morale—and this is a matter of opinion again—which I think can be stated with as much conviction as the case that you gentlemen and others in your group on the other side are putting.

The other thing that came out today is that so much of what is said is a matter of opinion; Mr. McIntosh got into it a bit. I think this is one of the difficulties in trying to take a strong hard line with a proposal which is novel, which to some of us is exciting, and to a lot of us is progressive. There is an opposite position, as you can see, expressed by those brilliant military experts across the way.

The point is that so much of what you said is exclusively a matter of opinion, and very often is not being substantiated by anything more than further opinion and support.

Getting to your brief, there are just one or two points I want to raise. In your brief you discuss the Defence Council on page 2, and at 3(a) you make this point, referring to the changes:

> This would seem to be a major error as greater specialization and the increased technical knowledge that is required for modern weaponry would seem to place greater emphasis on expertise in the various elements rather than try to make senior military personnel proficient in all.

This is one of the few places where you actually declare an error to be made. If you refer to the Minister's speech at second reading, I wonder whether you

have been absolutely fair with the re-organization in this particular area. I would just like to read briefly what he did say, and then ask you whether you feel that this is still a fair statement. He discusses the changes, and then he goes on to say:

> It has become the practice to have the branch heads attend meetings of Defence Council regularly as well as some Assistant Deputy Ministers. The deliberations, therefore, of members and those in attendance provide a valuable blending of military, scientific and financial advice.
>
> The elements for a more co-ordinated, inter-departmental approach to defence problems exist in the Defence Council and consequently arrangements have been made for participation by representatives of other government departments on issues of interest to them. A senior officer of the Department of External Affairs attends regularly and this has proved to be a valuable link with that department. It is also a clear indication of our determination to ensure that Canadian defence policy is based upon and is designed to support Canadian foreign policy.

Mr. McINTOSH: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman. I submit that the member should be asking questions of the witnesses. Is this not the procedure we are to follow?

Mr. FAULKNER: Can we make statements on defence here?

The CHAIRMAN: If that is the way you want to use up your 15 minutes, that is your right.

Mr. FAULKNER: The point I was going to make, Mr. Chairman, was that it seems to me that the point raised in the brief is not a fair reflection of the facts, and I would cite the Minister's statement on second reading as evidence in support of the position I am trying to raise. If I have a question it is simply this: In light of the Minister's statement would the gentlemen not agree that the suggestion that there is not enough expertise is probably an overstatement of their case?

Mr. HENDY: The point we are making here is that it is not, if you like, constitutionally a requirement to get that advice. There is no one sitting on the Defence Council as of right. Under the former chiefs of staff system the three chiefs had to be there, or at least they were there legally by virtue of the composition of the Committee. Now, certainly any additional consultation and seeking of advice is to be encouraged and is salutary, but you must build in a safeguard to make sure that, at the very least, you have all that is there represented by right. In other words, you cannot say "General Smith, you cannot come to this meeting", no matter what you think if General Smith is not on the Defence Council. The point we are trying to make is that the organization—the bones of it—as laid down can perpetuate this problem, notwithstanding the inherent wisdom, which I hope will always prevail, that we will consult. However, we must establish some basic ground rules constitutionally.

Mr. FAULKNER: Then your point actually is a very limited one, and is far narrower than the point you make in your brief. The only point you really want to make then is that, constitutionally, there is not provision for what you call three experts from the three environments, even though the Minister has made quite clear in his statement that this is provided.

Mr. HENDY: Well, let me be hypothetical. Suppose you got a Minister who was not going to take that view, and he said No, and he would not go beyond the present members of the Defence Council? I would hope again that that would never happen, but you do not have the safeguards.

Mr. FAULKNER: It is a very unlikely eventuality.

Mr. HENDY: I think the essence of it is that the men should be there as of right in the Committee system. This has been commented on in the way in which the British Chiefs of Staff Committee worked under Sir Winston Churchill. He dealt with them and he recognized their capabilities and advice, but they were advising as a Committee, and he never got—as Brigadier Malone has described—in an eyeball to eyeball consultation in which one side or the other had to give to the detriment of one or the other, and possibly the country, if the decisions made were wrong.

Mr. FAULKNER: I turn now to recruitment on page 4. You say right at the start of the section on recruiting:

> It is submitted, notwithstanding other factors, that a great deal of the responsibility in this regard—

That is the problem that you raised about recruitment.

> —must rest with a lack of acceptance of the defence reorganization as it has been outlined from time to time.

Would you be more specific on this point; what, specifically, do you know? How could you specifically document this particular allegation, or is it just a matter of your personal opinion?

Mr. HENDY: No, it is not a personal opinion. It is a result of discussions that I have had, and I think all of us have had—other members of TRIO, if you like, or other people concerned who not necessarily subscribe to TRIO as a group but who do agree with the basic philosophy behind it, namely, that something has gone wrong and we ought to take a look.

I know, and people have said to me, "I am not going to tell my son to go into the services; it is too uncertain, I do not know what is going on". Having sat on the management board of the Ontario Navy League for 15 years, I know that 22 per cent of the Navy's recruits used to come from the Navy League; I do not know what the latest figure is, but many sea cadets are turning away from it because they are not sure that they can join the Navy. This also is why one country, I believe, turned away from this meeting; they said, "We need the attraction and competition of the three services to attract people with different aspirations, and to put them all in one removes this."

Mr. FAULKNER: Would you not admit that the people you are discussing are in the first instance, a fairly narrow proportion in terms of the numbers who are going into the service, the numbers who are in the service and the numbers which constitute the population of Canada. Your cross section on this particular point is very narrow and it seems to be largely limited to those who in principle oppose or seem to oppose reorganization. Therefore, it is a likely attitude of mind.

Mr. HENDY: But the numbers in the forces in relation to the population is small. The intake is only 10,000 a year and at the present time it should be higher. If we lost a further 22 per cent of the navy recruits because the sea

cadets did not want to join the navy, our manpower situation would probably be more serious than it is—and 22 per cent of the navy's intake is about 3,000.

Mr. FAULKNER: The point I am trying to make is this: This statement in the brief today is being spread around the country and in my particular area by your organization, and I am suggesting the grounds for it are narrow and have a built-in bias in favour of this being a reasonable proposition. What I would suggest furthermore is that the very allegation itself tends to probably contribute to confusion and uncertainty.

Mr. HENDY: But TRIO did not create a problem. Those sitting before you today were not involved in a campaign to last two years on this thing. Something happened last July which focused attention on the defence department and the country became interested in it. Since then we have had a great deal of discussion with people who lead us to believe that this statement is quite valid. My telephone rang the other day and it was a sergeant in the air force. He had heard me on the radio and he said: "I hope that you are successful in what you are trying to do." I said: "This is interesting; and thank you." I do not know his name, Mr. Chairman. I will swear to the statement, but I cannot give you his name. I said: "This is interesting. I, of course, have been concerned with the navy more particularly. How do you feel the rest of your associates in the air force feel?" He said: "Ninety per cent of us would be with you." And I have had officers in the regular force say: "I am not going to have my son go into the service."

Mr. FAULKNER: This worries me, but we really do not know. You really do not know.

Mr. HENDY: Nor do you.

Mr. FAULKNER: That is true, but the point is that it is a statement in itself which in turn can contribute to the very problem that you are raising. What worries me about this sort of statement and other like statements is that they are so exclusively a matter of personal opinion derived from a rather narrow group who must be considered to be prejudiced witnesses in so far as they are opposed to the principle in the first instance.

Mr. HENDY: Why then do these people volunteer statements?

Mr. FAULKNER: I have no doubt that you have members; we can see the division that exists right here. However, I said at the beginning that this is a move which is not in the normal tradition a narrow and marginal step forward; it is a fairly basic and imaginative, and most of us on this side certainly feel it is a progressive move. Now it is bound to engender a certain amount of criticism, but what worries me is that organizations like yours make statements like this which cannot be substantiated other than by conversations with others like you who are opposed to the move in the first instance.

Mr. HENDY: But as a politician, do you not get a grass roots feeling of what policies you should employ by talking to people? You form your opinions on the basis of what people say, and we are forming ours on the basis of what people volunteer to us. What else can we do?

Mr. FAULKNER: Yes, but I am just suggesting that it is a rather narrow base.

Mr. PENFOLD: I do not think we can argue the fact that you think we have a narrow base; you feel that way but we do not.

Mr. FAULKNER: We are only judging by the numbers.

I want to get back to the questioning by Mr. McIntosh of Mr. Penfold when it was alleged that this integration and unification would create problems for the Canadian armed forces in their relationship with NATO and their NATO allies, and I would like Mr. Penfold to elaborate on that.

Mr. PENFOLD: It was answered in that Mr. Hendy read a quote from the New Zealand forces. The opinion of their White Paper was explicitly that. Did you get that?

Mr. FAULKNER: I did not remember it being asked.

Mr. HENDY: This is the conclusion of the New Zealand government and just on that point.

Mr. PENFOLD: What is it based on?

Mr. FAULKNER: Mr. Penfold made the statement and I wanted him to elaborate on it.

Mr. PENFOLD: It is based on the findings.

Mr. FAULKNER: But specifically what do you feel will be the problems for our people in their relationship with NATO allies?

Mr. HENDY: I think we are going to have trouble integrating a brigadier into the organization as Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic.

Mr. FAULKNER: Is that the extent of the problem?

Mr. HENDY: No, but this is one of the things.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, my name was brought up and to put the record straight, I first of all asked the opinion or the definition as understood by the witness and I said: "With that understanding could there be—"

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nugent.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, I am afraid that my military experience is not such that I am qualified as an expert either and I would like the witnesses to know that. In fact my four years in the army probably did not qualify me as an expert any more than it did for the Minister of Defence when he was in the army. However, I am approaching this from the basic viewpoint of a member of Parliament interested in getting the basic impression of your fears and doubts about the present government's policy, as mentioned in your brief. I thought you had expressed it quite well when you said, in effect, that the tail of defence is wagging the external affairs' donkey. I gathered that you have the feeling that, first, the government policy on external affairs must be clearly expressed and clearly understood as a prequisite to defence planning, and that defence planning must be secondary to that. Is that the general feeling of your organization?

Mr. HILBORN: I think I commented on it before in saying that we felt they were having the wrong debate. I think I said this to Mr. Brewin.

Mr. NUGENT: You carried on by saying that you were a little afraid that the unification structure would lead to rigidity which might inhibit flexibility in policy.

Mr. HILBORN: Right.

Mr. NUGENT: I want to follow up a bit on this question of flexibility and planning and how far we are going. In that regard I was very interested in your remark that Admiral Rayner said that he was not consulted with regard to part of this program, and that the information he gave you was that others were not consulted either, which leads me right into the question of planning.

Mr. HENDY: We have a statement on that. It is a reprint from the *Ottawa Citizen* of November 9.

Mr. NUGENT: Yes; we have others suggesting the same thing.

Is the concept of unification, in your opinion, likely to have such serious consequences that it would require great caution, a great deal of planning and much consultation with the best brains available as to all of the consequences?

Mr. HENDY: Definitely.

Mr. NUGENT: You gentlemen are not opposed to any innovations in integration which lead to money savings just because it is new?

Mr. HENDY: Right.

Mr. NUGENT: How much evidence or information did you get as to lack of planning or whether there was in fact any well thought out plan for unification?

Mr. HENDY: The White Paper said there would be no plan in advance.

Mr. PENFOLD: May I answer that. From a personal point of view, I inquired into that directly from May of 1963 until the White Paper was produced on December 23. As you know, it was published in March, but I am informed it was ready and on the Prime Minister's desk on December 23. I personally was appalled at the production of a document which advocated the turning upside down of the defence forces within six months.

At that time, as you know, defence was the largest part of our budget. Therefore, I personally went to Air Marshal Campbell and asked him if during his tenure of office the air force was asked to prepare an estimate of the over-all results of such a plan in the air force. He told me they had not been asked to prepare such a plan. I then asked him: "To your knowledge, has this been done since?" and he said "No". I said: "What then?" He told me that the Defence Committee reports the Defence Committee hearings and the testimony of expert witnesses, but in so far as the forces were concerned—at least the Air Force—the general impression was that no plan was prepared by the air force at least as to the effects on the air force.

Mr. NUGENT: I have some information too. Would that be one of the reasons that you gentlemen have suggested that this Committee should hear some witnesses with regard to that question of planning?

Mr. HENDY: That is correct.

Mr. NUGENT: Does your information indicate that there was a general feeling among those in responsible positions, who naturally would be the first to know and take part in the planning, that this plan of unification caught them by surprise?

Mr. HENDY: Yes, apparently it was a surprise to the chiefs of staff.

Mr. NUGENT: Therefore in a relatively short time we find that the whole defence set up is being pitch-forked into a turmoil on a plan of unification which is completely unknown perhaps to the most responsible people in the top echelons of the armed services?

Mr. HENDY: Mr. Nugent, I think you will have to go back a bit. The pattern is becoming clearer, but I do not know whether that makes it any better now. In the introductory stages there was certainly not enough knowledge. Undoubtedly the last few days have filled in some blanks, but I do not say that we are necessarily on the right track. There is more knowledge now than there was a year ago and the officers who left in July left with less knowledge than exists now.

Mr. NUGENT: This has something to do with the suggestion made by Mr. Macaluso, I believe it was, who asked the question: Would you be suggesting that the people who stayed in would be compromising their principles when they did not believe in the policy?

Mr. MACALUSO: No.

Mr. NUGENT: That was your suggestion. I think you told us whether they believed in a policy or not, once the government enunciated a policy, then it was their duty to try to implement it.

Mr. HENDY: That is correct.

Mr. NUGENT: What about the position where they find that part of their duty is to assist in planning and give advice to the government on formulating policy, where policy is announced that they know nothing about. What position does that put them in? Would this be the reason so many left or found themselves forced to resign. Have you had any information on this?

Mr. HILBORN: I think this is one of the reasons that we suggested to this Committee in our brief that this, and I quote "most appropriately be answered by these gentlemen."

Mr. NUGENT: Can you gentlemen think of any reason why the government who had faith in its policies would not consult with any of these people in the most responsible positions and sound them out before proceeding with such a plan?

Mr. HENDY: I would hope this would be done in line with what has been said earlier. We are now in the position that if that was done and then they did not agree with it as military men, and they are gone, or they were not consulted and they were suddenly told to do it, and having been told what to do they did not like it and left. We get into an awfully funny problem here because if a service officer speaks out while he is in the service, he is accused of disloyalty and leaves himself open to grave consequences. If he leaves the services and takes his retirement leave and then asks what was wrong in the department, someone will say: "Well, why did you not fix it when you were there?" He is damned if he does and he is damned if he does not. It is a most difficult problem. We did have something, an upheaval if you like, in the defence organization and something happened.

Mr. WINCH: An M.P. faces that every week.

Mr NUGENT: I gather from your brief then that while here and there you express grave fears about things, you suggest that if the facts will substantiate the savings in money, that if it will in fact result in a more efficient force, then you are not going to be opposed to it?

Mr. HENDY: That is correct.

Mr. NUGENT: You are from Missouri; you want to be shown.

Mr. HENDY: Correct.

Mr. NUGENT: You gentlemen have told us that you have done a good deal of study and reading, that you have talked to those in position to know and you are not satisfied that that evidence is available?

Mr. PENFOLD: Right.

Mr. HILBORN: I think it might be available, but it has not been presented.

Mr. NUGENT: It has not been presented. I just wanted to get the record straight as to whether you are here digging in your heels and fighting against unification or you are here digging in your heels and fighting against a basic change which might be so dangerous to the country until it has been studied further.

Mr. HILBORN: I think what we are digging in our heels about—to use your expression—is that we feel it needs further examination and study.

Mr. NUGENT: I think the basis of your application or suggestion to this Committee is that the government has not made a sufficient appraisal of the results of the steps taken toward integration in the last year or two; that it should take more time to appraise and find out how far its policy is correct before going further with steps even in that line; that unification is quite a radical departure and no evidence of proof has been presented yet that there are any advantages to be gained compared with the risks to justify us going further at this time without more complete investigation. Is that correct?

Mr. HILBORN: That is correct.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, may I ask a supplementary question. In view of what was just said a moment ago on examination, do you firmly believe that any government would make such a radical change as is now being suggested in our armed forces set up without a full examination?

Mr. HILBORN: We can only go on the evidence to date.

Mr. NUGENT: The evidence to date is that there has not been that examination and you are suggesting that certainly this Committee should check the government up to that extent by calling these other witnesses who should have been in on the planning stage, and who should have known, to find out exactly how much planning there was. It that a fair summation?

Mr. HILBORN: Absolutely.

Mr. MACALUSO: Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, you should give Mr. Nugent the list of witnesses who are coming next week.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we have four more questioners and one more supplementary. I do not know if it is your wish to press on right now. Perhaps

you would like a two or three minute break. That did not seem to find much support so I will call on Mr. McNulty.

Mr. McNULTY: Mr. Chairman, all my questions have been answered with the exception of one that has to do with the brief at the bottom of page three and the top of page 4 which refers to the Maritime Command. I put this question principally because the Defence Committee has visited the Maritime Command and I am not too sure that this statement is a sound one. It states:

> (iii) *Maritime Command*—Notwithstanding the claims of the Department of Defence, Maritime Command has, as already indicated, been a combined command for several years under the concept of command being exercised by an officer from one service with a deputy from an officer of the other, both trained in the essentials of maritime warfare. Although this command appeared to be functioning smoothly and effectively, it is understood that under the revised organization which came into effect on January 1, 1966, that the administration in this command has been greatly increased to the point where operational efficiency is being affected.

Previous to January, 1966, could one of the witnesses tell the Committee if, indeed, Admiral Brock or Admiral Landymore had a deputy and, if so, was he an officer of the air force.

Mr. HENDY: Yes, it was an air commodore who was the deputy of Maritime Command. I believe Air Commodore Carpenter was the deputy commander. He was commander, Maritime Air Command of the RCAF. I am not sure of the exact terminology but he was the deputy of the Maritime Command. It has been a combined navy-air force operation for about eight or nine years.

Mr. McNULTY: He was deputy to which maritime commander?

Mr. HENDY: Both Admiral Brock and Admiral Landymore.

Mr. LANIEL: Mr. Chairman, I want to intervene because I consider this a false statement. I have the impression that Mr. Carpenter was the Chief of Air Operations but he was not the deputy. It was the feeling of many members of the Committee, when we went to Halifax, that the air force was quite unhappy working under a single command which was the Maritime Command. Everything was decided by the chief and the deputy of Maritime Command.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I just have one point of order today. I have seen the roundel flying over the command headquarters and the dockyard on at least three separate occasions in the last seven or eight years. I am saying that when the roundel was there there was an air force officer in charge.

Mr. LANIEL: You did not hear the briefing of Mr. Carpenter when we were there?

Mr. FORRESTALL: No, I was not a member of the team.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, might I just say a word? There is no question on this at all. I think the Minister, Air Marshal Sharp or anybody else who is here will confirm that there has been an admiral in command on the east coast and the deputy commander was the commander of the RCAF on the east coast. In other words, both of them wore two hats. In fact, the admiral wore three hats. One of the admiral's jobs was to be in command of the naval components that

were there and the air commodore's job was to be in command of the air components that are there. However, when it came to Maritime Command as a combined operation of the navy, the RCAF and anti-submarine operations and so forth, the senior naval man was the commander and the air force man was the deputy commander—and if the admiral was away the deputy commander was in command.

Mr. McNULTY: Mr. Chairman, am I to understand that these were two separate commands or one integrated command at this time.

Mr. HENDY: My understanding was that they were two separate commands for, if you like, the administration of their respective services. However, they were integrated as an operational command. The main purpose of a military force is to engage in operations, and it was an integrated operational command.

The CHAIRMAN: If that finishes your questioning Mr. McNulty, Mr. Fane is next.

Mr. FANE: Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief. First, I want to say that if any of the questions I have to put were asked while I was out, I am sorry to be repetitious and, second, I want to say that my first question to Commodore Hendy precedes the questioning by Mr. Nugent and his follows on from that. He asked most of the questions that I would like to have follow my regular questions.

Commodore Hendy, if my memory serves me right, you were the chairman of a committee of fairly senior officers that reported to this Committee on the reserve army a couple of years ago.

Mr. HENDY: No, I have not been integrated that far; it was the reserve navy.

Mr. FANE: You were the chairman of that committee of brigadiers.

Mr. HENDY: If you are referring to Brigadier Suttie, that is the militia commission; I was chairman of the naval reserve committee and I did report to this Committee. Then I appeared before you as chairman of the Conference of Defence Associations in connection with general discussions regarding the implementation of the Suttie Report, my own report and the one prepared by Group Captain Draper on the air force auxiliary.

Mr. FANE: I think you were sitting in when Brigadier Suttie submitted the report of the committee that investigated the reserves.

Mr. HENDY: Not on his committee, just on the naval reserve; there was a separate committee for each of the three components.

Mr. FANE: When you were a member of that committee did you have any inkling that your efforts were going to be in some way related to integration and unification of the services.

Mr. HENDY: No. If you are suggesting that I knew about the contents of the White Paper which came out about a month after my report, the answer is no, I did not know.

Mr. FANE: You did not know that your findings were perhaps going to be used in connection with unification?

Mr. HENDY: I made my report as I saw the situation for the naval reserve, and I still adhere to the basics of it in so far as what the reserves should

do—certainly its continuation as identifiable support for the regular navy which remained to be a separate service.

Mr. FANE: You never have been consulted about your feelings toward the unification that we face now—I mean officially.

Mr. HENDY: No. There is no reason in a sense that I should because I do not pretend to be an expert.

Mr. FANE: But you ability was so highly regarded that you were given the opportunity to investigate the naval reserves. Was not this a government appointment?

Mr. HENDY: I would rather answer that by saying I happened to be there and I was acceptable. There was no competition for the position that I am aware of.

Mr. FANE: I did not say there was a competition; I said you were appointed.

Mr. HENDY: It was suggested that I do it by the Conference of Defence Associations after the Minister agreed that he might review the decision to change the structure—the strength and organization of the naval reserve. I happened to be there.

Mr. FANE: I was under a misapprehension; I thought that it was the Minister who had appointed you to perform this service.

Mr. HENDY: Well, he did, but under the circumstances maybe he did not have a choice. He is here; maybe you would like to ask him that question.

Mr. FANE: It seems strange to me that one who was entrusted with a review of the reserves was not asked for his opinion about integration and unification. I realize that you do not have to answer that. I was just making a remark. From that point, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Nugent's questions to the witnesses cover the remainder of the points I was going to put forward.

The CHAIRMAN: You are next, Mr. Churchill.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was invited to make a speech in the House this afternoon but because I thought that the Committee would prefer me to stay here, I have remained.

May I preface my remarks by expressing my regret that I used a term with regard to Mr. Macaluso which might be called "unparliamentary." However, I excuse myself on the ground that I had three other epithets in mind which I did not use. Mr. Macaluso has a good sense of humour, and one of our jobs here—as those of us who have been around a long time know—is to bring along new members and instruct them as to how they should conduct themselves in Committee.

I would like to compliment the TRIO group for the very admirable brief they have presented. I think it is a really worth-while piece of effort because what we require here is summaries of that nature in order to guide a Committee of this sort. It deals with a subject which is of considerable magnitude and which involves quite a bit of controversy. The Committee will have noticed that the Defence Committee at times is a little lively but although we are all friends, there is a political difference sometimes which emerges. There is a grave difference of opinion here with regard to certain military matters—at least on a

number of factors. Some here have more experience on military matters than others, and the expressions of opinion of those who have military experience is not always accepted as being very helpful. So the work of your committee, I think, will be a guide to this committee. You have assembled expressions of opinion, which you have summarized, from a great segment of the population, and no matter what one may think of the proposal of the present government, this is so vital a matter to Canada that all interested Canadians should play a part in a discussion of the present proposals.

I do not want to make a speech, Mr. Chairman, following the example set by Mr. Faulkner, but I will criticize his remarks with regard to morale. I think there is a misunderstanding with regard to morale. I do not know what Mr. Faulkner's experience has been with any of the armed services, but morale is rated as a very high factor by people who have been on active service, when they are faced with some of the problems that confront people in danger, and that is why several of us stress the importance of morale. Any time that I have ever spoken of it I have always thought of it in terms of the actual fighting troops and the problems that they may be called upon to face on the battle field. That is why the morale factor ranks very high with those who have been engaged in certain military activities. So Mr. Faulker's remarks with regard to morale, on a casual visit to an airforce base, should be put in the proper perspective.

I want to ask about three questions, none of them very vital, for clarification. Earlier in the meeting this afternoon the committee was asked if it had met with Admiral Landymore. I do not know what the motive or the significance of the question was, but that was answered. I would like to ask the committee if they, at any time, met with the minister and had an opportunity of reviewing with him the propositions that appear in the brief that has been presented to us.

Mr. HILBORN: Yes; we did have a meeting with the minister. The minister kindly brought along the very senior officers with him. There were five of us from our organization; two from Toronto, two from Montreal, one from Vancouver. We spent some hours discussing this. We were there really in the role of asking questions, but we did leave the meeting feeling that our basic questions were generally unanswered, although we did form some impressions.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Did that meeting take place some time ago or recently?

Mr. HILBORN: No; it took place, I believe, on October 17.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Has TRIO had an opportunity of meeting with the Prime Minister to present your views to him?

Mr. HILBORN: No we have not.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Are you considering making that request?

Mr. HILBORN: We have made a request, but it has been denied.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Do you not consider that the final responsibility for the defence of Canada rests with the Prime Minister?

Mr. HILBORN: I would say so, yes sir, as head of the government.

Mr. CHURCHILL: In the course of the remarks that were made this afternoon, one of the members of the committee spoke about an experience in England—a conflict of interests and controversy concerning a weapons system that was being

introduced there. From your knowledge of that, would you consider that the services involved were sacrificing their loyalty to their country for the advantage of their own personal service?

Mr. HILBORN: Well I made the statement Mr. Churchill. I would say no, because this would be a very grave allegation to make to a service officer who has sworn loyalty to his country. Certainly, in the heat of debate, as you are well aware, you are going to advance your position as hard and as firmly as you can see it and as you can, but once a decision is made, that is the end of it. But if you honestly feel sincerely, as we do in TRIO, about this whole operation, then it is your right and duty to express it. I say that if we are going to lose this possibility under the new organization as I see it, maybe members of the air force still think the Blue Streak was the better weapon. However, there was a choice, and the protagonists on both sides had their chance, in court as it were, to make their case to a government, which then judged the merits and a decision was made. But if you have only one person coming up with it, how do you know you are going to discuss it thoroughly and present the arguments? You cannot argue both sides of a case in court. There is always counsel on both sides. This is really what it is here, presenting a case for a particular concept, if you like, whether it is a weapons system or who is at fault in an automobile accident.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I raised the question because last night, when you were not here, the minister gave this as an instance of divided loyalties and accused the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force of putting loyalty to the service above that of its country.

In the brief that was given to us by Air Marshal Sharp, the other day, there were statements with regard to a higher loyalty, and without reading the exact words, my recollection is that the minister of the Department of Education or those people who are in charge of the proposed reorganization, see a need for developing what they call a higher loyalty to our country and to the service as a whole, and they create the impression that, say, regimental loyalty or loyalty to a service, conflicts with loyalty to one's country. What is your opinion on that?

Mr. HENDY: My opinion on that sir, would be it contributes—this quite escapes me. I think it is one opinion that this higher loyalty is something that is sort of by itself, and that if you have other loyalties they do not make the greatest possible contribution to this loyalty to the country. I think you or anyone serving know where the loyalties of the serviceman lie. They lie in the regimental system; they lie within his regiment because that is his family, but this has nothing to do with being other than loyal to this country.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I entertained the same opinion. I always thought that the Fort Garry Horse Regiment was superior to other regiments in the army—

An hon. MEMBER: Do you want to start another argument?

Mr. CHURCHILL: —and the armoured corps a bit of a cut above the artillery but we were all Canadians as I recall it.

My final question has to do with what you are suggesting here, that there should be a pause to re-assess the proposal for unification. I take it that, like some of the rest of us here, you are willing to accept certain aspects of integration but you would like to see them tried out over a period of years before

the next step is taken toward the single force. I was impressed with your arguments up to that point. I take it that your basic proposal at the present time is that there should be a pause, re-examination, and consultation with as many experts as can be called in; and then, if the decision is made to go ahead with a single unified force, you are prepared to accept that?

Mr. HILBORN: That is right sir. I also remember one other bit, the one about always operating from a firm base, and I think this bears on it.

Mr. HENDY: I would like to make a post-script to your question on loyalty. One of the reasons that more has not been heard, I submit, on this—this is certainly the experience we have had—is that many men in the service are loyal to their families, and are concerned with the consequence if they did express opinions contrary to the policies which are being formed. I agree, that this gets into a dangerous area but I am afraid that this is so. A man has a lot of loyalties. He has loyalty to his country, his service, his regiment, his family, his city or town.

An hon. MEMBER: And if he is in the service, to his minister.

Mr. HENDY: Which loyalty is first? You might say that if these men feel very badly, why should not the loyalty to their country override any inhibitions or any problems in respect of family, but unfortunately we do not find that this is necessarily so.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I think it is only proper that there should be controversy between the services for attention, and when one service is preferred before another, naturally you get a conflict of interests. I had a little controversy like that—long before I became a politician—over in Europe. I asked for machine guns for my regiment, and was told that they had to go to the brigades which were not even fighting the Germans, although my regiment was. So I was right, I think, in presenting my case with some vigour; and nobody accused me then of being disloyal to my country. That is a small example, but I think it is related to these various services. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN: We have two more questioners. Mr. Langlois, will you proceed.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Mr. Chairman, first I would like to thank the people from TRIO who have worked on this presentation. I do not believe everything in their brief, but they do have the right to their own opinion. On the other hand, I think, in respect of briefs that we receive, that it is easy to say that this is right or that is wrong, this is good or that is bad. I do not see very much evidence of proof in regard to some of the things mentioned in this brief. The second paragraph of page 1 reads:

> At the outset it should be emphasized that TRIO recognizes the need for changes in defence planning as in everything else and does not maintain a rigid approach.

I agree with that.

> However it is apparent that both in the concept of the defence reorganization, which has been categorized under the words "integration and unification", and in its execution problems have developed which are seriously affecting the efficiency and operational effectiveness of the services.

And then you go on to say:

The principal evidence of this of course is the loss of personnel...

What proof have you that integration and unification has brought about a loss of personnel?

Mr. HILBORN: Well we do go on in the same sentence and make the point:

—and especially many senior, capable officers well before normal retirement age.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Out of which only six were not of retirement age. That accounts for six persons in Canada. I think that it is an awfully big statement to make to protect six persons, if that is what you were trying to do.

Mr. HENDY: I believe the figures which were presented to the House showed 39 officers of brigadier rank and above who had retired earlier.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): On page 5 of your brief you state a certain number of them.

Mr. HENDY: Oh, those are just a few of the gentlemen's names. Do you want the whole 39?

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Well let us get something straight then. Does the whole of this paragraph refer then to only 39 persons?

Mr. HENDY: No, because there has been a lot of personnel—

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Well, that is what I want to know. Give me some proof that this is the cause of loss of personnel?

Mr. HENDY: The figures speak for themselves. The forces are below the target strength. There were early compulsory retirements.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): All right, I understand that, but I need proof that this is due to integration and unification.

Mr. HENDY: Well let me put it this way: It is due to the policy of reorganization. Now that has been categorized as integration.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): You do not think that there is an economic factor in that?

Mr. HENDY: Yes, we agree to some extent that this is so, but I do not know; I think that can be overhead—

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): So it is not only because of the fact that we are integrating and unifying?

Mr. HENDY: Not wholly, no.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): There are many factors?

Mr. HENDY: There are a couple extra—

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): I think you are throwing up a smoke screen here on page 12, where you say:

—which has been summed up by a United States Army officer this way:—

And then you go on to say:

Perhaps because we are so good at organizing, we tend as a nation to meet—

Now, was this American officer referring to Canadian reorganization, or not?

Mr. HENDY: Oh no.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): So it is a smoke screen. Thank you sir.

Mr. HENDY: He was philosophizing generally on the disadvantages of reorganization per se. That is the way I interpreted it.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Yes, but he was re-organizing at that time a different army in a different country—and a lot larger and more complex army.

Mr. HENDY: Oh yes.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Do you not think it would be more difficult to integrate in Canada than it would be in the States, and more difficult to unify here than in the States.

Mr. HENDY: No, it would be more difficult to do it in the United States because of the bigger establishment. But Mr. Zuckert said that the size of the force did not make any difference in New Zealand, which has a force about one quarter the size of ours, and also found that they do not want unification. So I do not know where you go.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Do the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia have the same thoughts or different thoughts?

Mr. HENDY: Well, I have read the United Kingdom's White Paper—

Mr. MACALUSO: I have tabled my comments on it.

Mr. HENDY: —which is the government line, it is not a speculation in the press.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): All right. You mentioned at one time that you would like a Royal Commission, and if I am not mistaken, you said that it should be composed of impartial men. You went on to mention that a Mr. Brock should preside over it.

Mr. HENDY: No, I did not, I said the late Mr. Leonard Brockington.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Oh, I am sorry.

Mr. MACALUSO: You can understand the name "Brock" causing a flurry.

Mr. HENDY: I would not mind Admiral Brock presiding over us, but I know what the result would be.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): At another time you said that you had had a telephone call from one airman saying that he was for you and against the government policy. I would like to inform you that in my constituency of Chicoutimi there is the Bagotville base with 1,200 airmen, and as their member, I did not receive at any time a phone call, letter, or a visit saying that they were against even one little aspect of Bill No. C-243. I personally was on the base on four occasions in the last two months. I had the pleasure of meeting personally, let us say, around a hundred officers and men. I talked about unification with them, and they were all enthused about it. I like to have that statement put on record.

Mr. HARKNESS: I regret to inform you that I have two letters from people on that base and they are very much against it.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Well, you should have referred them to me.

An hon. MEMBER: They must have been Conservative members.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Well I always suspected that there were two Conservative members in my constituency, and now I know for sure.

In respect of Mr. Churchill's questioning about loyalties to the regiment, to the service, and to the country, I got lost somewhat because you went into family loyalty and so on, which of course I understand. However, I would like to have a straight answer to a straight question. Do you think that an officer should be first loyal to his service or to his country?

Mr. HENDY: First loyal to his country, sir.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Are you all agreeable to that?

Mr. HENDY: Absolutely.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Thank you sir.

Mr. LANIEL: Mr. Chairman, I just have one single question concerning the experienced and capable senior officers that we supposedly lost because of integration and unification. I want to ask Mr. Hilborn what he thinks of this. When the Minister of Defence and the First Sea Lord resigned because the United Kingdom government decided to buy planes instead of carriers, do you think the United Kingdom government should have changed its mind in order to retain these very learned people, which you seem to pretend should have been done in Canada?

Mr. HILBORN: No, no. However, I think that their views should have been well aired, as they were; and, by the same token, that the views of those people who were mentioned here should be well aired before this committee.

Mr. LANIEL: But they did not stay in; they preferred to get out.

Mr. HILBORN: But their points of view are well known. Now we have many gentlemen whose points of view are well known—

Mr. LANIEL: Not very many while they were in there.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, whether we agree or not, I do think that I as a member of this committee, would like to express—and I know that you will back me up—our appreciation for the thought that went into this brief.

The CHAIRMAN: We are not finished yet.

Mr. WINCH: Well, the sentiment is just as well expressed now as later.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, I raise this matter with some trepidation—Mr. Hilborn, you are president of TRIO—and I only raise it because of your answer to Mr. Churchill with respect to the meeting of the minister and the defence staff in Ottawa with the representatives of TRIO. I want you to understand that I do not mean anything by this question—

An hon. MEMBER: Why ask it.

Mr. MACALUSO: I feel that it should be brought out because talk gets around, and to me it is hearsay. I put this question because of your answer to Mr. Churchill, expressing your dissatisfaction as a result of the meeting, which were on for some time, with the defence staff. Did you, the morning after your

meeting in Toronto, tell someone that after your meeting with the Minister and with the defence staff you were very impressed by the meeting, that perhaps your representatives were not completely aware of all the facts behind the preparation or the knowledge that went into this plan, and that you were considering resigning as president of this organization?

Mr. HILBORN: No.

Mr. MACALUSO: Let me finish sir. As I say, I bring it forward because of your answer; otherwise it would not have come forward. However, you did not want to let your newly acquired, I think it is, naval colleagues down. Now, the question is put to you with a great deal of regard, and I hope you will accept it as such.

Mr. HILBORN: I look forward to answering the question because I have never heard the question before, and certainly I can categorically deny that any such question—I would like to expand on it.

Mr. MACALUSO: Do you deny that there was ever a meeting the morning after a breakfast meeting or a discussion?

Mr. HILBORN: The first word I had that suggested—

Mr. MACALUSO: I would like to know.

Mr. HILBORN: —and it was put to me; I made no such statement—but I received a call, I think it was a week later—it was some time prior to our putting on any sort of release on the meeting—from a reporter who said that he had a story and he wanted to check to see if there was any truth in it because it would make an interesting story. The story was that I had resigned as president of TRIO because I was satisfied that the army was all right. I was flabbergasted; I certainly had not made any such statement.

Mr. MACALUSO: Flabbergasted at news reports.

Mr. HILBORN: This particular reporter knew that I felt strongly; he reminded me of that, and I said I feel even more strongly now. I checked and discovered his source.

Mr. MACALUSO: Would you deny that there was any discussion over breakfast the morning after the meeting you had with the defence staff? I mean, you did deny it.

Mr. HILBORN: There was no meeting. I can tell you who I had breakfast with the next morning, if it would be of interest to you.

Mr. MACALUSO: I do not know who you did eat breakfast with, and I am not interested. I am just bringing this point forward.

Mr. HILBORN: I had breakfast, quite by accident, with Mr. Joseph Pott the next morning in the Chateau.

An hon. MEMBER: Now you know how often we get misreported too.

Mr. HILBORN: And I made no such statement to Mr. Joseph Pott.

Mr. CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I would be doing less than my duty on your behalf if I did not thank these gentlemen who have prepared this brief for us. I thank them for having taken the time to come down here to appear before us and to inspire this lively discussion today.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966-67

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. DAVID W. GROOS

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 18

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 1967

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Respecting

Bill C-243, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and other Acts in consequence thereof.

WITNESSES:

Mr. Robert I. Hendy, Chairman of Committee on the Maritime Component of the Canadian Defence Forces; Mr. Robert G. Bundy, President of The Naval Officers' Associations of Canada; Mr. R. C. G. Wilson, President, Ontario Division of the Navy League of Canada; Mr. J. E. Koyl, Vice-President, Ontario Division of the Navy League of Canada; Mr. Richard Gaunt, Executive Committee, Navy League of Canada, Montreal Branch, RCN(R); Mr. Frank C. Manchee, President, Toronto Branch, The Naval Officers' Associations of Canada.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1967

25679—1

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. David W. Groos

Vice-Chairman: Hon. Marcel Lambert

Mr. Andras,	Mr. Foy,	Mr. McIntosh,
Mr. Brewin,	Mr. Harkness,	Mr. McNulty,
Mr. Churchill,	Mr. Langlois	Mr. Nugent,
Mr. Deachman,	(*Chicoutimi*),	Mr. Rochon,
[1]Mr. Éthier,	Mr. Laniel,	Mr. Smith,
Mr. Fane,	Mr. Latulippe,	[1]Mr. Stafford,
Mr. Faulkner,	[1]Mr. Lessard,	Mr. Winch—(24).
Mr. Forrestall,	Mr. Loiselle,	

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

[1] Replaced Messrs. Legault, Macaluso and Rock, on February 13, 1967.

ORDER OF REFERENCE

House of Commons
Monday, February 13, 1967.

Ordered,—That the names of Messrs. Stafford, Lessard and Éthier be substituted for those of Messrs. Macaluso, Legault and Rock on the Standing Committee on National Defence.

Attest.

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

25679—1½

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

MONDAY, February 13, 1967.
(28)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 3:50 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Groos, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Churchill, Deachman, Fane, Faulkner, Forrestall, Foy, Groos, Harkness, Lambert, Langlois *(Chicoutimi)*, Laniel, Latulippe, Legault, Loiselle, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon, Smith, Stafford,—(21)

In attendance: Mr. Robert I. Hendy, Chairman of Committee on the Maritime Component of the Canadian Defence Forces; Mr. Robert G. Bundy, President of the Naval Officers' Association of Canada; Mr. R. C. G. Wilson, President, Ontario Division of the Navy League of Canada; Mr. J. E. Koyl, Vice President, Ontario Division of the Navy League of Canada; Mr. Herbert A. Maynard, President, Royal Canadian Naval Association; Mr. Richard Gaunt, Executive Committee, Navy League of Canada, Montreal Branch, RCN(R); Mr. Frank C. Manchee, President, Toronto Branch, The Naval Officers' Association of Canada. *From the Department of National Defence:* Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister; Honourable Léo Cadieux, Associate Minister; Air Marshal F. R. Sharp, Vice Chief Defence Staff; Air Marshal E. M. Reyno, Chief of Personnel.

Mr. Lambert read a telegram received from the Vancouver Branch of the Tri-Service Identities Organization (TRIO).

The brief, dated September 1966, from the Committee on the Maritime Component of the Canadian Defence Force was taken as read and it was agreed to include the brief in this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (*see Appendix "D"*).

Mr. Hendy introduced the witnesses and read into the record a statement dated February, 1967, from the Committee on the Maritime Component of the Maritime Defence Forces.

It was agreed to distribute copies to the members of the Committee, of the pro forma letter referred to on page 9 of the TRIO brief presented on Friday, February 10, 1967 *(see Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence No. 17)*. The Chairman read a statement concerning recruitment figures, prepared by the Department in answer to questions asked by Mr. Harkness and Mr. Forrestall.

Messrs. Hendy, Bundy, Wilson and Gaunt were questioned by the members of the Committee on various points mentioned in the joint brief, and on related defence matters.

At 6:00 p.m., with the questioning of the witnesses continuing, the Committee adjourned until 8:00 p.m. this day.

EVENING SITTING
(29)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 8:05 p.m. this day with the Chairman, Mr. Groos, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Churchill, Deachman, Fane, Faulkner, Forrestall, Foy, Groos, Harkness, Lambert, Langlois, *(Chicoutimi)*, Laniel, Loiselle, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon, Smith (18).

Also present: Mr. Legault, Mr. McLelland and Mr. Rock.

In attendance: (Same as the afternoon sitting).

The Committee completed the questioning of the witnesses which began during the afternoon sitting.

Mr. Frank C. Manchee read a brief prepared by the Toronto Branch of the Naval Officers' Associations of Canada, which had been concurred in by the National Executive of the Organization. Mr. Manchee answered questions relating to the brief that he presented.

The Committee adjourned at 10:30 p.m. until Tuesday, February 14, 1967 at 10:00., when the witness will be Rear Admiral Jeffry Brock.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

Recorded by Electronic Apparatus

MONDAY February, 13 1967

The CHAIRMAN: Well, gentlemen, we have a quorum and I would like to call the meeting to order. Mr. Lambert, did you have something you wanted to say?

Mr. LAMBERT: This is supplementary to a matter which came up on Friday. If I may, I would like your permission to read into the record a telegram that I received from the TRIO organization in Vancouver, who directly asked that the telegram be drawn to the attention of the members.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, we have had a number of letters and telegrams submitted to the Committee, and I wonder on what basis this telegram is being quoted to the Committee and whether, as has been done with other, zhis could not be photastated and passed around and we could then move on to an examination of the witnesses' brief. Apparently it is a very big one.

The CHAIRMAN: Well it is not a lengthy telegram. Does anyone have any objection to its being read into the record?

Mr. LAMBERT: It reads, Mr. Chairman, as follows:

> The Vancouver branch of TRIO which have a preponderance of Liberal supporters in its membership strongly supports submission made by Robert Hendy. The question of unification of armed forces should not be a matter of political partisanship but rather a question of determining objectively what is the best in the national CDN interest. As responsible citizens who have served this country in war and peace we ask that all senior officers who have left the armed forces since April 1964 be called upon to testify without any penalty whatever. Stop. The Commons defence Committee should judiciously consider the evidence before it rather than degenerating the hearing into a political dogfight. Unification of the services, which we believe to be a wrong decision will be injurious to Canada—and ultimately fatal to its sovereignty request this telegram be read into the record.
>
> Vancouver Branch Tri Services
> Indentities Organization

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Lambert. Now, we have with us today the representatives from the Naval Officers Association of Canada, the Navy League and the Royal Canadian Naval Association. Mr. Hendy is here representing the Naval Officers Association.

Mr. HENDY (*Chairman of the Committee of the Maritime Component of the Canadian Defence Forces*): I am really the chairman of the committee of the three groups.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Hendy is the chairman of the three groups just mentioned, and they have prepared a joint brief. I think we should ask them if they

would care to either present their brief, which I believe members of the Committee received some time ago, or did you say that you had a supplementary brief which you would like to read?

Mr. HENDY: Yes.

The CHAIRMAN: With your permission, gentlemen, I will ask Mr. Hendy to introduce the members of his group and then proceed with the supplementary statements.

Mr. HENDY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am here today in my capacity as chairman of the Committee on the Maritime Component of the Canadian Defence Forces, which was established in June of last year and which is composed of the three national organizations which are concerned in varying degrees with naval matters ranging from cadets to veterans, and which are the Navy League of Canada, the Naval Officers Association of Canada and the Royal Canadian Naval Association.

I have with me today Mr. Robert G. Bundy of Toronto, who is national president of the Naval Officers Association. He is directly on my right. Next, Mr. R. C. G. Wilson, Q.C., president of the Ontario division of the Navy League of Canada; Mr. Herbert A. Maynard, who is national president of the R.C.N. Association and Mr. J. E. Koyl who is national chairman of Navy League Cadets for the Navy League of Canada. We also have with us, although he did not participate in the original deliberations of this committee, Mr. Richard Gaunt of Montreal who is on the executive of the Navy League of Montreal. He is a former Naval Reserve officer, a former lecturer at the College Militaire Royal and he has had a long interest in naval affairs.

With the exception of Mr. Gaunt, the other gentlemen I have introduced were members of the committee that prepared a brief in September of last year which was sent to yourself, sir, as Chairman of this Committee, and it was also circulated to all members of Parliament and members of the Senate. This brief has been redistributed today and rather than take the time to read it—unless you wish it—I thought I would not do this in the hope that it has already been read. We have a supplementary statement which I would like to read into the record, if this is your wish, Mr. Chairman, which will give us more time for questions. If the members would like the brief read we would be delighted to comply with their wishes.

Mr. CHAIRMAN: What are your wishes, gentlemen? I think perhaps we should ask Mr. Hendy to read the supplementary statement. Is there anyone who does not have a copy of the original brief? It seems to be the wish of the Committee that you proceed with your statement.

Mr. HENDY: The statement of the Committee on the Maritime Component of the Maritime—

Mr. FORRESTALL: Excuse me. Mr. Chairman, even if this is done, is it understood that this will be made part of the record?

The CHAIRMAN: I would certainly assume so, yes. The brief itself as well as the statement will be made part of the record.

Mr. SMITH: So long as that is clear.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Just one further question. Are there any copies of the supplementary statement?

The CHAIRMAN: Would you continue, Mr. Hendy?

Mr. HENDY: Before I start reading the supplementary statement I would with respect, like to remind the Committee that we sent a telegram on June 23 and a further letter on June 29 announcing the establishment of the Maritime Committee and expressing certain concern with respect to the state of our naval forces at that time, and both the letter and the telegram from part of the brief.

I would now like to read the statement of the committee on the Maritime component of the Maritime Defence Forces on the presentation of their brief to the Special Committee of the House of Commons of Matters relating to defence:

Since the Committee—and this is the one I represent—was formed and expressed its alarm with the state of the Royal Canadian Navy, as set out in its letter to the Chairman of the Defence Committee on the 29th June, 1966, the developments with respect to the effectiveness of our maritime force have continued to be watched with grave concern. Since that date there has taken place a wholesale retirement of practically every officer of flag rank in the Navy who was then serving. While some of these have been in ordinary course of retirement, the majority have been well before compulsory retirement age.

The Committee on Defence has heard that the naval component of the Maritime Command is short of personnel and grave doubts continue to be expressed as to our capability to fully man all ships which otherwise should be available for operations, i.e. omitting those required to do periodic refit.

The assumptions on which the Committee's brief was predicated still appear ostensibly to be valid as the Minister of Defence reaffirmed to the House on the 7th December, 1966, that the basic conclusions contained in our White Paper regarding defence policy were still valid. This is interpreted to mean briefly that we continue to contribute to the anti-submarine warfare capability for the defence of not only Canadian waters but in co-operation with our allies through NATO, and especially with the United States in both the Atlantic and Pacific. Therefore we are still not convinced we will continue to meet our commitments in this regard and expect the results of the present defence policy will unfortunately justify our concern.

THE PURPOSE OF DEFENCE REORGANIZATION

It has been stated that this is to provide a more flexible force yet as the organization is unfolded it becomes apparent that the concepts of establishing forces specialized in the three elements must continue. It is submitted that rather than achieve flexibility through what is now being termed the step of "unification" that a greater rigidity will in fact result. This will be demonstrated by the lack of professional heads of each of the three services in a position to espouse their viewpoints to the government. The withering away of a combat effectiveness of the Navy will be an inevitable result of this monolithic structure. This would have happened in 1935 under the proposals being advanced then and the present scheme is really the same concept with different terminology.

The Committee feels that before any further steps are taken to eliminate the Navy as a separate force that the full implications of this should be examined.

In passing it should be noted that the Committee can still find no evidence of any other country that is adopting a similar programme to that indicated by the proposed legislation presented as Bill C243. In fact it would seem that any country who looked with interest on the Canadian experiment has turned its back on it.

COMMENTS ON BILL C243 AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE NAVAL SERVICE

As indicated in the Committee's original brief, in Sec. 6(a), additional legislation to eliminate the three services did not appear to be projected when the National Defence Act was amended in 1964. Although many of the steps carried out under the reorganization following that Bill are acceptable, one prediction has unfortunately come true and that is that when there is a confrontation between the Minister and senior officers that the absence of the former Chiefs of Staff Committee system would require one or the other party to go. From a consideration of what has taken place in the last six months it would seem that this has happened as no other rational explanation would seem possible in respect to the retirement of so many senior military advisers. As Bill C243 would not appear to correct this problem it is submitted that at the very least some consideration should be given, if further amendments are to be presented, to provisions which would avoid further occurrence of this nature. From the Navy's point of view Bill C243, apart from its omission to make any such provision, will result in the eventual running down of our maritime combat capability.

It has been stated that the continued reorganization rests on the enactment of Bill C243. Apart from the grievous omission to rectify the situation that was predicted two years ago when Bill C90, especially as it affects the policy-making body of the Department, i.e. the Defence Council, the following further comments on this permissive legislation and the steps to be taken after its enactment are important:

(a) *Professional Competence*

The reorganization of the forces seems to be proceeding without regard to the fact that all men who serve at sea must have a competence as seamen in addition to any other qualification. While this may be recognized in what might be regarded as strictly combat functions, e.g. operators of A/S weapons, and must be required in certain technical fields, e.g. ships engine room personnel, it is disregarding the importance of this factor in many of the other trades required for a warship. As already stated in the Committee's brief, at least as many men are required ashore as replacements for sea-going personnel and this leaves no room for allocating these men into other environmental fields. To do so will increase training problems and the accompanying expense as well as spreading the professional knowledge thinner over a large number to the detriment of effective operation. On this ground alone the need for identifiable sea force is unchallengable if we are to maintain the type of force proclaimed in the Defence White Paper of 1964.

(b) *Identity*

Whether it is comprehended or not, sailors as a whole identify themselves with other sailors. This makes them no less loyal to their particular service or their country. But it is considered no greater loyalties will be generated, in fact the reverse will occur if Canadian sailors cannot identfy with those of other countries. It is of interest to note the efforts being made in any proposed new dress to indicate sea-going affiliation. If this is a worthwhile objective then there would seem to be no need to eliminate the present identifiable service in all its aspects. Otherwise it would seem to be change for changes sake.

(c) *Uniforms*

Much has been said, especially since the Committee's brief was prepared, on this subject. The previous paragraph on identity is relevant. If better material can be devised for the dress of the forces it should be introduced without delay. This is not a problem of reorganization. Certain changes in uniform pattern might be dictated, but from knowledge available to this Committee there is no overwhelming desire in the Navy to abandon a dress with characteristics similar to those of other sea-farers. The fact that aspersions have been cast on the present uniforms is without justification to either its origin or pattern as the same remarks, if valid, would apply to all navies. No tendency towards a change in this regard would appear to be contemplated elsewhere. If the announced purpose of the new uniform is to make the services more democratic (whatever that may mean)—why not have a contest for a new uniform and let the men decide?

(d) *Rank Structure*

Again while this is not a matter which need be enshrined in legislation, the purpose of establishing a rank structure in Bill C-243 is therefore not clear. It will certainly make future changes difficult, as it will require an Act of Parliament. It is submitted that this should be removed from the Bill and the former provision of the National Defence Act retained. While this would not guarantee the retention of naval ranks it would be hoped that common sense would prevail and sailors not be saddled with a rank structure completely at variance with that adopted in other navies with whom they come in contact. In fact, due to the nature of our present commitments, the Navy probably encounters its "opposite numbers" from other nations to a greater extent than the other services. Consideration for at least the feelings of personnel in the fleet should dictate reason in this matter.

(e) *Management Principles*

As already stated, it is disappointing that Bill C-243 does not correct the errors in organization created by Bill C-90, the gloomy predictions for which were unfortunately substantiated by recent events. The principles now being adopted would seem to violate good management principles both on the basis of good corporate organization and the position of senior management in respect to consulting and advising. It has been stated that the armed forces in their respective environmental requirements are not unlike an organization such as General Motors where competition between various divisions is encouraged. A Canadian example would be the Canadian Pacific Railway Company where separate divisions are established for separate functions related to both environment and equipment. If senior officers cannot give advice without threat of discharge this will lead to stultifying of military thought and will not encourage innovation or initiative. This is apart from establishing any military merit in what is now proposed, which has never been established. It is remarkable that not one recently retired responsible officer has come out in favour of the new plan.

(f) *Sovereignty*

Canadians are becoming increasingly jealous of Canadian sovereignty. It is submitted that this present plan will serve to decrease our position in the

military councils of our allies and will make us more dependent on others for defence than heretofore. If we have only a force designed for peacekeeping under a United Nations concept, the nucleus of our basic defence organization, on which mobilization must be established, will disappear. As a by-product of the diluting of our professionalism we may find our senior officers will be unacceptable in the higher echelons of allied commands, e.g. NORAD and SACLANT. One of the purposes of a standing military force is to provide the greatest competence possible in peacetime to afford a sound basis for possible mobilization. The proposed organization leads away from this as certainly in the event of war we will need three service organizations and not a bigger police force.

In summary, therefore, if the main purposes sought to be gained by Bill C-243 are greater interchangeability and elimination of service loyalties and identities then it would be this Committee's submission that the Bill should not be adopted as these are not advantages. Certainly much greater examination of the Bill's consequences is required in view of the problems that have arisen to date, to say nothing of what the future may bring to the effectiveness of our naval force. There have been suggestions in some quarters that the Navy is obsolete. The extent of Canada's territorial waters should give the lie to any such suggestion. They are as extensive as in the first year of Confederation. I might add that they are far more extensive by the addition of British Columbia and Prince Edward Island shortly after Confederation and Newfoundland nearly twenty years ago. And require even more expertise to be exercised to preserve Canadian sovereignty in respect to them in the face of a greater threat. Why do The Russians want charts of our seabords areas? Will the new Bill discharge federal responsibilities under Sec. 91(7) of the B.N.A. Act in relation to provision of a naval service?

P.S. When the Chairman of this Committee appeared before the Standing Committee on Defence on the 13th August, 1964, he stated, at Page 459 of the Minutes of that date: "I am confident from reading the White Paper that Canada's naval capability is to be continued in about the same manner as at present." Events of the last nearly two and a half years have served to dissipate the confidence expressed on that occasion. The assurances contained in the White Paper in respect to the naval force have not been fulfilled. The force is weaker in both ships and men, to say nothing of the loss of its most experienced officers at the peaks of their careers and usefulness. All this was not contemplated two and a half years ago. While the results are there, those concerned with the defence of the country should not be able to view them with equanimity. It is not too late to restore the confidence of our fighting sailors if the recommendations in the brief already presented and in this statement are given full weight and consideration.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I might add that the brief received the full support of the National Council of the Navy League of Canada at its meeting in Winnipeg in September, and a resolution was passed supporting the original brief. It has also been fully supported by the national executives of the other two organizations.

I would like to say a word about reserves. The subject of the naval reserve in particular was raised on Friday. It is not mentioned in the supplementary brief but because it was mentioned, Mr. Chairman, have you any objection to my

dealing with it now or would you prefer to wait? It is really the naval reserve organization.

The CHAIRMAN: It seems to be in line. These are naval reserve organizations of the sort that we are dealing with now. If you wish to proceed I do not think anyone will object.

Mr. HENDY: I just want to make a statement because I was asked if I had read General Dare's statement and I had not only read it. However, I have read it now and there is something on the subject of the naval reserve on which I would like to comment.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, this brief has been very short so far. I suggest you go ahead and make your comments.

Mr. HENDY: Mr. Chairman, on page 5 of the brief that was presented to you on Thursday evening by Major General Dare regarding the reorganization of reserves he talks about the individual manpower needs of maritime command and the roles of the naval reserve, and this statement is made:

> —fleet augmentation—falls outside the task of the RCNR as stated by the Naval Board in 1960, and accepted by the Hendy Committee in 1964. Despite this we consider the 1,600 personnel required for fleet augmentation represents a valid commitment.

I brought with me the report that we presented to this Committee in August of 1964, in which the role of the reserves as laid down was:

> To provide personnel who will be readily available to activate or augment facilities as required by the defence plans of the senior officers in chief command, including the following—

It is my submission that both roles are comparable. Fleet augmentation and providing personnel available to activate or augment facilities is exactly the same concept, and General Dare and I obviously have the same thing in mind. But what is interesting is that at that time the Committee that was formed on the direction of the Minister brought in its report and it said that we must have a naval reserve of 3,700 men. This was in the face of a directive that the naval reserve was to be cut to about 2,400 or 2,500 men. As a result of the Committee's report the reserve was established at 3,000 but five divisions, which comprises some 600 to 700 trained personnel, were disbanded. The target now is almost exactly the figure we recommended three years ago, but we have lost those men and we have lost the bases from which they were trained and it is unfortunate to find that we are now going to have to catch up with the recommendation in this regard. That is my main comment on the naval reserve problem that was raised. There seems to be no problem with what we have to do; our problem is what we are going to have to do it with. That was the point I wanted to make.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, Commodore Hendy and the other gentlemen who are present and who helped to prepare this brief are ready to answer any questions.

Mr. LOISELLE: Mr. Chairman, may I put a question to Commodore Hendy. I am not an expert—I have never been in the navy or anything like that—but from reading the Minister's White Paper on defence it is obvious that our role in anti-submarine warfare will be kept in good shape and will even improve. I do

not wish to repeat what was said in the White Paper but it does state quite clearly that:

> It is planned to continue in the anti-submarine role. Canada has a large capital investment in this capacity and special skills and training as well—

Well, Commodore, do you believe in this policy as issued by the government?

Mr. HENDY: I believe that should be the policy, yes, but we must have the instrument to fulfil the policy. The basis of my submission is that unfortunately we are going down. This may be the policy which it is declared we should adopt but in my opinion I am afraid that we are not going to fulfil it if we are losing men and we are not replacing ships.

Mr. LOISELLE: In his "Address on The Canadian Forces Reorganization Act" the Minister—and I will not read the full text—said the following:

> The Naval share of the current 5-year equipment and equipment development program, ending 31 March, 1971, is approximately $460 million. This represents a 23 per cent increase in the Navy's share in equipment and equipment development over that spent in the previous five years.

That appears at about the middle of page 21.

If you will recall the testimony of Admiral Landymore when he appeared as a witness on the Defence Committee last June—I think it is on page 315—he outlined all the equipement which the anti-submarine squadrons will get. He stated:

> This slide shows the strength of forces currently assigned to Maritime Command. One aircraft carrier; nine D.D.H.'s of the St. Laurent and Nipigon classes and not shown on this slide, 4 D.D.H.'s of the new class programmed for construction—32 Argus aircraft and 21 Neptune Maritime patrol aircraft; 71 Tracker aircraft; 25 Sea King helicopters and 16 more building, for a total program of 41:—
>
> —The seven ships of the Restigouche class are scheduled for extensive modernization and conversion commencing early next year.

This means the beginning of 1967. Commodore, surely you will agree that the ASROC, the quick reaction for anti-submarine warfare weapon system, the Jezebel sub detecting system, the Sea sparrow missile and the Hedgehog depth charge are most postively anti-submarine warfare, so how can you possibly think that we are opting out of that program?

Mr. HENDY: I think we are opting out on the basis that we do not have the people to man them. The ships are undermanned now; the Navy has lost nearly 4,000 people in the last few years and, as I understand the latest figures, it is still dropping.

Mr. LOISELLE: You base your judgment on the Minister's White Paper in 1964 and again on his speech in the House of Commons in December of 1966, which established the rules of the future anti-submarine program.

Mr. HENDY: With respect, I say there is a difference between saying what you are going to do and then actually doing it.

Mr. LOISELLE: Do you mean that you are not ready to take the word of the Minister and the government, or is it that in your opinion you do not believe in that?

Mr. CHURCHILL: Actions speak louder than words.

Mr. LOISELLE: I am not speaking to you, I am speaking to the Commodore. He may know that sphere better than you.

Mr. HENDY: I accept the statements as being a desirable policy for our naval force but, with respect, I say that we are losing men. We had no trouble manning 60 ships a few years ago but now we are having difficulty manning a far smaller number of ships. If it were irrespective of the value of the individual ships as units, we could do this but, as I understand it, we are now having difficulty. Admiral Landymore also said that he would need 2,500 men next year. I do not know whether those men have been found or not but the strength of the Navy even from last June is down.

Mr. LOISELLE: Yes, but it is only your opinion that the government or the Minister will not go that far, but it is stated in black and white in the defence paper—

Mr. HENDY: I am only saying that those are the facts. What you want to do and what you actually do may not be the same. I certainly agree we should stay in the anti-submarine warfare, but some people are saying we should get out of it.

Mr. LOISELLE: The main thing is what the government and the Minister of Defence says. They say that we are going to stay in there and we will even increase our forces. Do you not think that you should start by believing that and going ahead with that?

Mr. HENDY: I do not agree that there has been an increase.

Mr. LOISELLE: You do not believe in the Minister's word?

Mr. HENDY: I did not say that. I say that I believe that the policy of anti-submarine warfare should be retained, but there is no point in having ships if you do not have men in them. The ships that we had in World War II that have worn out in the last little while have been paid off and the replacement program which was introduced four years ago has not yet been implemented.

Certainly, ship for ship, what we build now is better than what was left over from World War II, there is no question about that.

Mr. LOISELLE: Yes, but are you going to have the equipment?

Mr. HENDY: Are we going to have the equipment? We will put the men in it?

Mr. LOISELLE: We will get the men, too. That is the intention of the government; if they put up some equipment there they will have to get the men to put on it, and they will get the men.

Mr. HENDY: I do not know, and this is what bothers me. The feeling of the Navy is that they are being lost sight of and the men are not coming forward for the Navy at this point. The Navy's strength is dropping, and this is not just opinion. You argue the point but the facts are there; there are fewer people in the Navy today than there were last June.

Mr. LOISELLE: Yes, but it may be that some men are afraid because a person of experience like yourself or Admiral Landymore has expressed a certain

opinion quite openly. I read somewhere—I do not recall where—that Admiral Landymore, before he resigned, called together his 300 and something officers under him and stated in front of them that he was against the government policy on integration and he asked those officers if they were thinking about that. Surely you can expect when an admiral tells his officers that he is against something that all his men will have to agree even if they are not in favour of it. I do not think of that as positive action. Perhaps what frightens the people in the Navy is the action which has been taken by Admiral Landymore and yourself.

Mr. HENDY: Perhaps I should ask for the protection afforded by the Canada Evidence Act. The Judge Advocate is here today. Are you suggesting that I am subversive?

Mr. LOISELLE: No, no, I am not going that far. Excuse me, please.

Mr. HENDY: I am entitled to express an opinion in the light of the facts as I, and a great many other people, see them.

Mr. LOISELLE: That is your opinion, but White Paper on defence states quite clearly what they are doing with respect to anti-submarine warfare, and after the speech in the House of Commons in December of 1966 the Minister again explained quite clearly what is going to happen and I think we should give him the chance to prove it. If he does not prove it, all right, but let him prove it if the can.

Mr. HENDY: How long do we wait? How long do we have to wait before it can be proved? Suppose it does not—

Mr. LOISELLE: I will return the question to you: why do you not also wait a little while to see if he will not succeed in that?

Mr. HENDY: Well, up until July of 1966 there was no basic criticism that I ever detected. Perhaps it was because I was not reading the right journals. I think it took two and one half years for the integration-unification program to develop, and then we suddenly find ourselves in a rather unsatisfactory position in so far as numbers and disquiet in the services is concerned. I did not start it; I was busy doing something else up until that time. However, the fact remains that is what happened and in the last six months the situation has not changed. If you are attacking the freedom of speech and expression of opinion of the people that are associated with me here on this situation, I cannot counter that.

Mr. LOISELLE: I am not too fluent in English but I did not intend to prevent you from stating your opinion. You have given the opinion that the personnel in the navy is decreasing. I am just suggesting that possibly the reason for this is because of some opposition here and there. I am not blaming you for giving your opinion, I am merely saying this may be the reason.

Mr. HENDY: I believe Mr. Gaunt, who is associated with me, has some figures on that. Would you entertain a reply from him? My understanding is that they are decreasing, but he has more detailed knowledge.

Mr. RICHARD GAUNT (*Executive Committee, Navy League of Canada, Montreal Branch, RCN(R)*): Could I perhaps try to answer your question?

Mr. LOISELLE: Are you going to compare the number of people who were in the Navy in 1964 with today?

Mr. GAUNT: No, I would just like to comment on what you have been saying to Mr. Hendy. I was serving as a reserve officer in the Navy this summer and I

was very disturbed at the morale in the Navy and I attribute this entirely to the present policy of the Minister of Defence. I think the Navy's role in anti-submarine activity is an excellent one, but I do not think we are going to have the officers or men in the future to fulfil this role.

Mr. LOISELLE: The question always turns on the same thing. This is the same information Commodore Hendy gave last week when the TRIO organization presented their brief. We had some comments last week from Air Marshal Sharp and Air Marshal Reyno to the effect that they had the men for the anti-submarine role.

The CHAIRMAN: Where were you serving, Mr. Gaunt? This might be of interest to the Committee.

Mr. GAUNT: I was serving on HMCS *Annapolis* this summer, sir.

The CHAIRMAN: On the east coast?

Mr. GAUNT: On the east coast. In Halifax.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Do you have any more questions, Mr. Loiselle?

Mr. LOISELLE: No, sir.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, I have a supplementary question along that line. I believe the Minister was going to see if it would be possible to table the latest recruiting figures. Have you received anything of that nature yet?

The CHAIRMAN: We do not have those yet. We do have something else that I will bring before the Committees it has nothing to do with figures, though. I will ask the Clerk to find out about this.

Mr. LANIEL: Mr. Chairman, I have a supplementary question. Taking into account the fact that the Minister is going to supply us with some recruiting figures which will at least show us the trend or the progress—or the decrease—perhaps we could also get figures from these people. It was mentioned that you base your argument on figures showing loss of personnel, and things like that. These must be in your documentation. Could we have them on the record?

Mr. HENDY: The figures that were available when the brief was prepared appear at page 6. The latest figures I have seen are for the end of November. I think that was the time of the last release. I do not believe there are any later than that. However, there is no improvement as far as the navy is concerned. On June 30, 1966 there were 18,182 men, and I think the figure in November was approximately the same.

Mr. HARKNESS: Actually, the return that the Minister was producing for me, and which I think should have been filed in the house today—I do not have a copy of it but he gave this advance copy the other day—showed that the strength of the RCN at the end of 1966 was 18,055 men, and in addition to that there were 504 in the process of discharge, so that the actual strength was about 17,500.

Mr. HENDY: It is 600 lower than the figure we had for June 1966. We said in that brief that we were losing men at the rate of 100 a month, so that is right on the estimate.

Mr. MCNULTY: Mr. Chairman, on page 7 of Commodore Hendy's statement, the last sentence in the first paragraph at the top of the page reads:

> It is remarkable that not one recently retired responsible officer has come out in favour of the new plan.

With respect, Mr. Chairman, I would like to read into the record this statement of Commodore B. A. Fraser-Harris of the Royal Canadian Navy, who retired in August, 1964, after completing 35 years of distinguished naval service. Commodore Fraser-Harris commanded the Nootka in the Korean war, he had a distinguished record in World War II and actually won the Distinguished Service Cross. He also commanded the aircraft carrier H.M.C.S. *Magnificent* for some time, and his last position before retirement was Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for Air and Weapons at National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa. This is not a very long statement. It reads:

> Heard from abroad the traditionalist uproar against service unification. At a time when enlightened people throughout the world are learning at last that the pigment of human skin is not a mark of quality, local concern over the colour of a uniform or the title of a man appears singularly unimpressive.
>
> Let us always be willing to learn from history and be strengthened by tradition but let us never forget that history is made by the actions of men and that men create tradition and pride of title and not vice versa.
>
> Unification of the three services is undoubtedly sound and timely. Let interservice jealousy, personal rivalry and the extravagance of triplication give way to a single, effective and streamlined service in which Canadians can build future history and new tradition in the service of Canada, whether the land, sea, air or space.
>
> Surely we are sufficiently sophisticated to understand service to our country and humanity. Do we really need the support of such old symbols as flags, kilts, or bell-bottomed trousers?
>
> After 35 years service at sea, in the air and sometimes on the ground, I am convinced that the existence of three services in a relatively small country now creates more problems than it solves. Given loyalty and unselfish co-operation of all hands, I believe the Government can create a single service with a common purpose that will more effectively support what I believe should be future Canadian international policies. Let us look forward not back.

An hon. MEMBER: Where was that published?

Mr. MCNULTY: It is actually a newspaper release which appeared last fall.

An hon. MEMBER: What newspaper?

Mr. MCNULTY: I am not sure right now but I can check my files and find out.

The CHAIRMAN: I have just received a copy of this and it was evidently addressed to the Canadian Press in Toronto. Do you have any further questions, Mr. McNulty?

Mr. MCNULTY: No. I just wanted to say that I regarded Commodore Fraser-Harris as a retired and responsible officer.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Hendy, I noticed that one of my colleagues on the other side said that the anti-submarine role was quite clear in the White Paper. I am rather confused about the conclusion of the White Paper. At page 30 it says:

> In this paper no attempt has been made to set down hard and fast rules for future policy and development.

In your interpretation of the White Paper did you feel that it set down a hard and fast defence policy?

Mr. HENDY: Well, one often reads a document and naturally interprets it in his own way. As I said before, I have no quarrel with the first part of the White Paper in so far as it defines the roles, missions and the type of forces, particularly the type of operations in which the navy will continue, but I certainly felt from the conclusion you read that it indicated that there would be a flexible approach in the planning, although the planning itself was not very definitive. Now, having come to a point where we find that something is going wrong—and I still suggest that you have to look somewhere to find out why fewer people are still in the navy—then the plan, as afar as the Navy is concerned, does not seem to be working out and this is where some flexible planning or a change should have been adopted. However, it is awfully hard to criticize a plan when you do not see it all. This is one of the problems that the people in the forces are encountering and they are not sure what they are going to do.

I mentioned communications the other day and one of the members suggested that Air Marshal Sharp had covered this matter, but he dealt with the mechanics of passing messages and I am talking about actually telling people what to do. That is what I mean by communications and management. Maybe this is fine, but the people down below do not like it and they are unhappy in the service.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You mention the White Paper on page 4 of the brief which you read to us today, and under the heading "Professional Competence" the brief states:

> On this ground alone the need for identifiable sea force is unchallengable if we are to maintain the type of force proclaimed in the Defence White Paper of 1964.

Could you tell me what type of force you felt was proclaimed in the White Paper?

Mr. HENDY: Basically an anti-submarine force.

Mr. MCINTOSH: For the Navy?

Mr. HENDY: Yes.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I am having some difficulty in understanding this term "unification". As you mentioned, Air Marshal Sharp said at page 10 of his brief:

> What would the Forces look like if we stopped at integration and did not proceed to unification?

Can you give me your interpretation of what they would look like if we stopped at integration?

Mr. HENDY: Well, it comes down to the old problem of what is meant by these words. They have been interchanged and I think someone in the department said we should have used the word "unigration". I now use "unification" in the sense that it means the green suit concept and everybody in one force. I believe the approach is that this will not come to pass immediately but that Bill C-243 will enable this to happen, but as there are still so many problems leading up to the reorganization that have not been solved I feel most strongly that we should not enact Bill C-243 and throw away the three identities of the services unless we know it is going to work. I do not think you can draw a line and say

that this is what integration means, because it has never been fully defined and until you see the whole plan from top to bottom you cannot tell where to stop. With the greatest respect, I do not think that if you stopped now with Bill C-243 the reorganization would be any worse off. There are plenty of solutions to problems that can be carried out even without legislation. There is a great deal of the reorganization that could have been carried on even without Bill C-90 two and a half years ago just on a straight basis of housecleaning, if you like.

Mr. McINTOSH: Has your understanding of the "unification" changed since the first time you heard of it? You said it—

Mr. HENDY: I call it the "green suit concept" now.

Mr. McINTOSH: —was a force made up of the same uniform. That is your interpretation of it.

Mr. HENDY: Yes.

Mr. McINTOSH: Have you always had that idea as the definition of unification?

Mr. HENDY: No.

Mr. McINTOSH: Do you think your understanding of this term now is the same as the Minister's understanding?

Mr. HENDY: Yes, I think on that basis, in so far as Bill C-243 is concerned that, I could now divine what it means, but on reading the policy of other countries—not only England or other countries that have produced White Papers recently—the word "unification" has always meant combining at the top levels and putting together certain supply systems. This is the way it is used in England, United States, France, New Zealand and Russia. It is not what you call it, it is what it is. Unification has to be fully defined and laid out as a plan.

Mr. McINTOSH: Did the Minister not do that when he said that unification is the end objective of a logical and evolutionary progression?

Mr. HENDY: He said that but I did not know what it meant. Also, the use of the words "single unified force" has been misinterpreted. You had evidence on that from R. S. Malone two years ago. He used the words "single unified force" but he did not mean what I call the green suit concept.

Mr. McINTOSH: My colleague on the other side also mentioned the words used by Admiral Landymore to his officers. I think he said that he was against integration. I do not know where this statement came from; I do not think it ever appeared in any press articles which I read that Admiral Landymore was against integration, although it may have been stated that he was against unification. I am trying to determine a definition of the word "unification" that we can all understand. I take it from what you have said that you are as confused as I about the difference between integration and unification. If we could get it laid down or get some interpretation of the Minister's definition, then we would all know what we are talking about. At the present time I think we are talking at cross-purposes.

Certainly I agree with integration and I think Admiral Landymore and my colleague across the table agrees with integration, but that is not what we are trying to determine in this Committee. We are trying to determine what unification is and how to apply it to our forces. I would like you to tell me, Mr. Hendy, where, in your understanding, you disagree with the term "unification"?

Mr. HENDY: I disagree with putting the three services together and eliminating them as separate identifiable services. Seamen must look like seamen and go to sea as seamen. As I said, you have to have so many committed to a sea-going force anyway and you should not have any left over to go anywhere else, other than to staff your naval shore support. With respect to the question raised about Admiral Landymore, I have a clipping which I received on circulation some time ago from the Victoria *Colonist* of March 27, 1964, headed "Service Chiefs Agree Merger Good Thing". It reads:

> 'I welcome the fact that we now have a clear-cut, long-term policy', said Rear-Admiral W. M. Landymore, flag officer Pacific Coast. 'I don't expect to find any reluctance anywhere in fulfilling the government directive.
>
> 'Its main advantage,' he said, 'is likely to be that a great deal of committee work necessary for close liaison will in fact be reduced so that decision-making will be simplified and be more rapid.'

The article goes on:

> Admiral Landymore said he did not think there would be any rapid changes but the services would be put to better use where feasible.
>
> 'And I don't think we'll lose our traditions,' he said.

This was written in March of 1964 and I guess subsequent events speak for themselves. I do not know whether he would still make that statement.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, do you have any doubt about this after reading the Minister's statement when he introduced Bill C-243 in the house? He said, as reported at page 10834 of *Hansard*:

> A unified personnel management system will be introduced, the separate units and elements of naval, field and air forces will continue to exist.

He goes on further to say:

> That is to say, while the barriers to movement of personnel between the forces will be removed, personnel in combat forces will continue to be identified as sailors, soldiers and airmen...

Would you take that as a commitment by the Minister that there will be no change in the three forces?

Mr. HENDY: Well, I would like to think that, but I do not think it is a fact because we are going to change the three forces. What the exercise is all about is whether these combat elements are going to be retained. In the navy, and to an even greater extent in the other services, everybody is in a combat force. When you go to sea you are literally, if you will excuse the expression, all in the same boat whether you are an admiral or a cook. I should not be speaking so authoritatively before the Chairman of this Committee because he knows more about this aspect than I do, but when you are at sea in a ship you are all in the combat area and there is no rear echelon in a sea fight. That is why I say the Navy, as a combat group, is the regiment, and this is what I understood would be preserved.

Mr. MCINTOSH: The minister said:

> —naval, field and air forces will continue to exist.

But then he closes off the sentence by saying, and this is what has confused me with respect to the meaning of the word "unification":

—until the force structure within the unified force is developed.

What does he mean by that?

Mr. HENDY: I do not know. I would have to refer that question to the minister. Perhaps it means if the full plan is disclosed people could see where they fit in. Maybe if the full plan were disclosed and it is good, it would be all right.

I think this is the problem. There is great uncertainty. For example, on Friday while we were going to Montreal on the train my wife asked a young private in the Army what it was all about and he replied that he did not know, he could not find out.

Mr. MCINTOSH: In your opinion is there any difference between integration and unification?

Mr. HENDY: I think there is now. During the past few years the use of these words has been interchangeable but for purposes of my argument, if you like, I would say that integration is the reorganization of commands and staff, and although in other countries it is called unification we speak of it as the elimination of the three separate identifiable services and the common uniform, which is not being done. That is the way I rationalize it.

Mr. MCINTOSH: In other words, you cannot accept the Minister's statement that the three forces will not be done away with?

Mr. HENDY: Well, they will be because the act eliminates them. There is no Royal Canadian Navy in the new act.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Where in the act is it eliminated?

Mr. HENDY: The present act states that the Canadian forces will be the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force. The new act states that the forces will be the Canadian Armed Forces.

Mr. MCINTOSH: And this is the part in the act to which you strongly object?

Mr. HENDY: Yes.

Mr. MCNULTY: Mr. Chairman, may I ask a short supplementary question on this?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr. McNulty.

Mr. MCNULTY: It relates to the last answer given by Commodore Hendy. Would you agree, Commodore Hendy, that the three services should go on forever in a headless state, because the result of integration Bill C-90 was that there were the three services but we required the unification bill to put them under the one head.

Mr. HENDY: But if it is not working out now, this is where I cannot reconcile what is going on. If there seems to be some problem, why do we want to go further if it is going to compound that problem? In other words, what is the rush? Why do we not develop the plan and lay it out?

Mr. MCNULTY: Well, this again is personal opinion. We feel the plan is developing—

Mr. HENDY: We are not dealing with a situation where you can merely say that you want 500 men on a draft this week. We have to maintain the services

continuously so that they are attractive. Maybe this is something which will develop over the years, I do not know, but certainly right now it is not working out under our system.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I have to perform just a moment's housekeeping here, if you do not mind. Mr. Hendy gave the Secretary a copy of the DND pro forma letter which is mentioned on page 9 of the TRIO brief, a copy of which was requested by Mr. Winch. I will instruct the Secretary to have copies made and sent to Mr. Winch and all the members. The Secretary has also reminded me that the strength and recruiting figures for certain months which were asked for by Mr. Forrestall, and I think Mr. Harkness also referred to them just now, and I have been given a copy of this and with your permission I will read it into the record because I think it has a bearing on the matters which are now before us. It is from the Department of National Defence Information Services and it reads:

> Armed Forces recruiting for 1966 totalled 10,822 an increase of 939 over the recruiting total of 9,883 for the year 1965 and an increase of 283 over the recruiting total of 10,539 for 1964.
>
> Recruiting for December 1966 totalled 676; with 155 in the Navy; 235 in the Army; and 286 in the Air Force.
>
> The strength of the armed forces at the end of December 1966 levelled off at the mid-1966 strength of just under 105,000. The strength on Dec. 31 was 104,957 compared to a strength figure of 104,766 on August 31.
>
> The breakdown of the strength at Dec. 31 shows 18,055 in the Navy; 42,766 in the Army; 44,136 in the Air Force. The last reported strength figures effective Nov. 30, 1966 were: total strength 105,366; navy 18,060; army 43,059; and air force 44,247.

Mr. CHURCHILL: What date is this?

The CHAIRMAN: It is dated February. I cannot read it because someone signed their initials over it, but it looks like the 9th.

Mr. HARKNESS: The figures were supposed to be for December 31, 1966, is that right?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, do you have the figures I asked for at our first meeting of the establishment and the present strength?

The CHAIRMAN: I do not have those at the moment. Perhaps the clerk will make a note of that.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It was for the three services.

Mr. HARKNESS: In connection with those figures, the figure which was not put in and which was on the return supplied to me on Thursday or Friday last is the number of discharges from the forces in the same period, which was 14,792 or, in other words, nearly 4,000 more than were recruited. In addition to that, at that time 1,733 more were in the process of being discharged, which gives a totally different picture.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, what are the enlistment figures? I presume what we have there is the sum of the parade statements at that time.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, we have—

Mr. DEACHMAN: We have to take these into account.

The CHAIRMAN: We have here—

An hon. MEMBER: Mr. Chairman, if it will clarify—

Mr. HARKNESS: The figures I am reading from are the ones which were given to me in this return, which I believe was filed in the House of Commons today.

The CHAIRMAN: There seems to be an inclination on the part of the Committee to get at these figures, and we are fortunate in having Air Marshal Reyno here. Air Marshal Reyno, could you give us an explanation of these figures that have just been introduced?

Mr. SMITH: Before Air Marshal Reyno answers I would like to point out that all these figures are coming at us in bits and pieces. I would not like to suggest that they are being presented to us in that form deliberately, but it seems to me that it would be a fairly simple matter to get the strength of recruitments and discharges for last year all at one time month by month in a single return and to get it all in our record in the same place.

Mr. FORRESTALL: We have those figures, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order. If a witness speaks without coming forward to the mike we will not have it on the record.

The CHAIRMAN: I really do not wish to interrupt the testimony of the witnesses who are before us, but this matter has come up and it seems to have a bearing on the discussion. Perhaps you could sit in Mr. Gaunt's seat.

Air Marshal E. M. REYNO (*Chief of Personnel*): You will recall during the presentation of my brief the other day that I said I could provide on about 20 minutes' notice a complete briefing on recruiting if this was the wish of the Committee. All I can add to what has already been said is that I am most encouraged—and I say this with absolute dispassion—by the net recruiting increases for 1966. We had an over-all increase of 71 people in the Navy, an increase in the Army of 476 and an increase in the R.C.A.F. of 392, for a total net increase of 939 people in 1966.

Mr. SMITH: This is exactly my point, Mr. Chairman, we are getting it all by bits and pieces and I could only come to the conclusion that it is being slanted. It is all very well for Air Marshal Reyno to be encouraged, we would all be encouraged to hear that recruiting is up, but I think we want the figures in a comparative way all at one time and in one place where they will go in the record in that form rather than saying, "Well, we are 91 up in the Navy and then we are 41 down here".

Mr. FORRESTALL: This is not quite the point, Mr. Chairman. Something is very sadly askew in the figures that have been given to us. Discharges from the R.C.N. last year totalled 3,198 and recruitments were 2,363. How do you get a net gain out of that? Army discharges totalled 6,472 and recruitments were 4,870. R.C.A.F. discharges totalled 5,122 and recruitments were 3,589, for a net of 14,792 discharges—not counting the ones in the process of discharge—and a net recruitment of 10,822. How do you get a net gain out of that?

The CHAIRMAN: Obviously we need someone to explain these figures, as Mr. Smith has suggested. I suggest at this moment that we leave this point and return to the questioning of the witness. Have you finished, Mr. McIntosh?

Mr. MCINTOSH: Yes, I have.

The CHAIRMAN: The next questioner is Mr. Deachman.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, I want to refer to some questions asked by Mr. Loiselle and the answers which were given by Commodore Hendy. I think, Commodore Hendy, you said that some people say we are getting out of the anti-submarine role. Is that correct?

Mr. HENDY: Yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Can you tell us who those people are who say we are getting out of the antisubmarine role? From where does that information come? What statement has been made in that regard?

Mr. HENDY: Well, if you go back some years, the Minister said this when he was in opposition; he said we should get out of it. I do not know whether he still feels that way.

Mr. DEACHMAN: That would be in what year?

Mr. HENDY: In 1962.

Mr. DEACHMAN: In 1962. Five years ago, yes.

Mr. HENDY: The Chief of Defence Staff has indicated that he thinks it is not something we ought to pursue. Goup Captain Patrick, who is writing articles, has also indicated the same thing. These are some of the people; I do not know how many others have indicated this feeling.

Mr. DEACHMAN: With reference to the Minister's statement on second reading of the bill in the printed text, which I think has already been referred to, on pages 19, 20 and 21 you will find a considerable statement—

An hon. MEMBER: Are you reading from *Hansard*?

Mr. DEACHMAN: No, sir, I am reading from a reprint of *Hansard*—

An hon. MEMBER: Oh, the red book.

Mr. CHURCHILL: That is a Liberal handbook. I think you should read from *Hansard*.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Well, I do not think there is any evidence that this is not an exact transcript from *Hansard*.

Mr. CHURCHILL: My interjections are left out. It is not a transcript.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Churchill, one could find your interjections everywhere.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Well, they throw light on the subject.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, I feel quite sure that if I quote from this Mr. Churchill will indeed interject and throw some light or some mud on the subject, as the case may be. I refer now to pages 19, 20 and 21 of the statement in which the Minister has gone to some considerable length to describe the anti-submarine role. If my layman assessment of it is correct, it shows an extension of the anti-submarine role rather than a diminution of that role. I call your attention particularly to his statement at the foot of page 19:

> While the prime role of Maritime Command will continue to be anti-submarine warfare, planning is under way to increase its capability for general-purpose tasks.

Surely, Mr. Hendy, that is not the statement of a man whose intention is to withdraw from an anti-submarine role. He says that the:

—prime role—will continue to be anti-submarine warfare—

Is that the statement of a man whose intentions are to withdraw from an anti-submarine role?

Mr. HENDY: Your question, Mr. Deachman, was to the effect that there are some people who say it, and this was a statement that was made some time ago. The other side of it—

Mr. DEACHMAN: But, sir, you are deviating now from—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Deachman, you asked the witness a question, and I think we should allow him to answer before you carry on.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Excuse my interrupting, but I do not seem to be getting an answer. I asked him who had said this and he replied that it was a minister in 1962, which is five years ago. Here is the point of my question. Does this seem to be the remark of a minister of the Crown who is withdrawing from an anti-submarine role? I wonder if I could get a specific yes or no answer to that.

Mr. NUGENT: Let the witness answer if he is going to, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HENDY: The statement is certainly there, but we are going to get out of it by default because we will not have enough people to man the ships.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I know, but just coming to the statement itself, is it a statement of an intention of continuing in the anti-submarine role or of not continuing in the anti-submarine role? What kind of a statement is it? Is it a statement for continuing in the anti-submarine role or for not continuing in the anti-submarine role?

Mr. HENDY: There is no question about what the statement says, Mr. Deachman.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Well what is it, if there is no—

Mr. HENDY: I am saying there are statements that would indicate that we should not be going on with it, and—

Mr. DEACHMAN: If there is no question as to what it says, I wonder if you could tell us what it says? You have already stated that five years ago the Minister, in your opinion, stated that it was not an anti-submarine role, that we were getting out of the anti-submarine role. What is the Minister stating now, in the light of the paragraph we have before us? I just want you to give me a simple answer.

Mr. HENDY: The statement speaks for itself, Mr. Deachman.

Mr. DEACHMAN: In other words, you are not prepared to give me a definitive answer to what this says. He says:

> The prime role of Maritime Command will continue to be anti-submarine warfare.

My question to you, sir, is this: is that the statement of a person withdrawing from an anti-submarine role?

Mr. HENDY: No.

Mr. DEACHMAN: All right. Now, let me turn—

Mr. NUGENT: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman. There is only a certain length of time for each of us to ask questions and we do not all want to go over the same ground, and I do not want to go over that same ground again. It seemed to me that the witness wanted to give a complete answer to the statement concerning: withdrawing by default. No matter what he said, his actions certain-

ly count, too, and I think when a question is asked by a member such as Mr. Deachman, that he should be prepared to let the witness tell us exactly what he means in his own words.

The CHAIRMAN: I got the impression, having spoken to Mr. Deachman, that the witness was then allowed to give an answer, but it was not the answer that perhaps Mr. Deachman was anticipating.

Mr. NUGENT: With all due respect, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Deachman ignored your warning and your ruling and he continued to say, "No, this is the way I want it", and the witness never was allowed to finish that answer in the way he wanted.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I think the witness had ample time to answer the question and, with respect, I think the witness and I both understand what Mr. Hellyer said at the time. I want to refer to the last paragraph of the statement on Maritime Command, which appears at page 21 of the printed text, in which he says:

> The Naval share of the current 5-year equipment and equipment development program, ending 31 March, 1971, is approximately $460 million. This represents a 23 per cent increase in the Navy's share in equipment and equipment development over that spent in the previous five years.

I want to ask again if that is the statement of a Minister of the Crown, committed to expenditures on behalf of his government, who is in the process of withdrawing from an anti-submarine role or of expanding an anti-submarine role?

Mr. HENDY: But it says "the Navy's share in equipment and equipment development", it does not say "anti-submarine" equipment. The precepts that have been laid down in the last year cover supply vessels with a sea lift capacity for the Army. I do not say they do not have a support role for the anti-submarine forces, they have, but they are not basically anti-submarine. You must realize Mr. Deachman, that the Navy has not spent much on ships in the last few years because its replacement program was cancelled four years ago. It would have spent more in the last four years but these ships have not been built. Once they start, if they start to build replacements, they are going to have to go a little faster, they will have to spend that money.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Well, sir, I shared your concern over this very question, and when the Vice Chief of Staff was before us I reviewed with him the Naval estimates for 1966-1967. In each case I put the question to him whether or not we were going to continue in the programs which are shown in the estimate, and he gave me his assurance that we were. This shows the construction program for the four modern ASW ships—the DDH's—on which $4,100,000 is being spent in 1966-1967. There are the St. Laurent class conversions, and that is anti-submarine. There are the operational support ships and I think you will agree, with respect, that one of the functions of the operational support ships is to keep the ASW ships at sea and operating at peak efficiency. There is the Restigouche conversion program; there is the New Oberon submarine program, and that is an anti-submarine program as well; there is a Naval research vessel, I presume some part of which will be used for expanding this very field; there is a program for up-dating the ASW gear of the Tracker aircraft; there is a program for the

Sea Kings helicopters; there is a program for Sonobuoys of two or three kinds and there are various programs for the provision of torpedoes for the Oberon submarines and other craft.

Looking at the general nature of the program before us—and you made the remark a moment ago that this was an equipment program but not necessarily an ASW equipment program—item by item, does that not convey to you the idea that this is indeed an ASW equipment program?

Mr. HENDY: There is certainly a lot of AS in it, Mr. Deachman.

Mr. DEACHMAN: There is certainly a lot of AS in it. Well, this is just what I wanted to call to your attention. We have looked at the estimates for equipment; let us now take a look at what is being spent on Maritime Command, Mr. Hendy.

I have before me the estimates for 1966-1967 which show the total spending for personnel, operation, maintenance and capital by Maritime Command to be $267 million. That is the second largest item of expenditure among all the commands in the armed forces. The largest item on here is Mobile Command, which is just slightly larger at $280 million. Then we drop down to the next largest, which is Training Command, at approximately $180 million. The next one down under that is Materiel Command at $120 million.

Now, looking at the proportions of funds being spent in these areas, would you not say that a preponderance of money in the fighting services is going directly into the Maritime Command, which is where the ASW role takes place on our two coasts. This is the second largest sum which is spent in the fighting commands.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order. In order that our records are correct, I wonder if Mr. Deachman would tell us the source of the material he is reading from so that we can be sure. Is that the estimate?

Mr. DEACHMAN: The 1966-1967 estimates.

Mr. HENDY: In that Maritime estimate, because there are three services, I assume the Air Force share is included at the present time?

Mr. DEACHMAN: That is right.

Mr. HENDY: What I am concerned with is the state of the Navy itself.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Of the Navy itself.

Mr. HENDY: I have not seen the estimates and I do not know the breakdown, Mr. Deachman, but if it is by Maritime Command it must be both services. In any event, the area that I am most concerned with is our Maritime defences. If our personnel policies are not going to produce the men, the equipment may not be used. As I see it, this is the root of the whole problem. It is not what you say; it is what you are able to do.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Commodore Hendy—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Deachman, I must warn you that you have just about used up the maximum time we are allowing today. If you wish me to put your name down for the second round of questioning, I will do so.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I wonder if I can finish off with one question to Commodore Hendy; it will not be a very long one, sir. You are in agreement with the Committee that the integration of command into a Maritime Command is a justifiable step because the nature of our coastal defences is an air-sea role, not just a sea role. The question that I put to you is that the air-sea defensive role

on our coasts is an ASW role that is receiving the second largest sum—over a quarter of a billion dollars—which is being spent on this role for this one integrated command, and I put it to you that you cannot have a sea role unless you have an air role along with it; the two are integrated and they are one thing as far as this government is concerned.

In the United States, it is already one thing—one uniform, one command; unified.

Some hon MEMBERS: Where?

Mr. DEACHMAN: In the United States. The United States Navy flies its own ASW aircraft. They are not like us; we have two air forces on the Atlantic coast. They have one air force on the Atlantic coast. They operate with one uniform and one command; they are a unified outfit.

An hon. MEMBER: It is the Navy that you are talking about.

Mr. DEACHMAN: That is right, it is the Navy.

An hon. MEMBER: They have their own air force.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Yes, one unified force. We operate on the coast with two air forces and one navy. I submit to you that if we were comparing the proportion of Canada's Maritime Command expenditures with the American command expenditures you would have to take the Navy alone and a unified command on the United States side and you would have to take the two forces, the Air Force and the Navy, on the Canadian side in order to get those figures. I am finished, sir.

Mr. HENDY: There was a suggestion that that was going to be done some time ago; that there would be one Naval force for Maritime purposes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Pardon me, sir?

Mr. HENDY: There was a suggestion that that was what was going to be done. It was put out in a special issue of Crowsnest of 1964 or 1965 that we would have one force for the sea force.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I would agree—

Mr. SMITH: On a point of order.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Smith has a point of order.

Mr. SMITH: Mr. Chairman, this seems to me to be the day that we are getting half figures. It reminds me of the old saw that figures do not lie but liars can figure. Mr. Deachman has read in a long recital of the estimates which, if taken by themselves, run to quite a total. I think if he wanted to do that he ought to have read in the total cost of these programs and how much of them we were accomplishing in 1964.

Now, I am not going to bore the Committee with the whole list but, for example, he made a great stew a few minutes ago about the DDH class construction program. Even the no doubt modest national defence estimates are $160 million for the whole program, and if past experiences hold true that will come to well over $200 million for our DDH program, although the estimate of $4,100,000 is not even 5 per cent of that program. So, if you are going to take the figures that he used, I think in fairness you should have them against the total program cost in each of these cases.

Mr. DEACHMAN: No, sir—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Smith, I will put you down on the list and you can read those in.

Mr. SMITH: I am finished.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Deachman, your time has expired. Mr. Forrestall?

Mr. FORRESTALL: Commodore Hendy, if I can perhaps bring you back a little bit more to the subject, I will make an observation and ask if you will agree with it. Perhaps you might say that the road to hell was paved with good intentions. Mr. Hendy and gentlemen, I wonder if first, because of the similarity between your brief and the TRIO brief, you could confirm what I have gathered from having read it over the last few weeks that we have had it that indeed the conclusions you are trying to reach are fairly similar to and compatible with TRIO's brief in that in both briefs you support the position of pause at this time. Is that a correct assumption?

Mr. HENDY: Yes.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Nothing that I have read here is particularly designed to attack either integration or unification, but rather to support that position, that is, the position of "stop now and reflect and look in great depth" at what it is that has taken place to date.

Mr. HENDY: Yes, or putting it another way, we would like to be convinced that the concept of unification as it is now developing is the right thing to do.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Yes, but you make that observation in the context of your conclusions. The recommendation that TRIO made in this brief was that first there should be a pause and, secondly, TRIO went so far as to suggest that it should be referred to a special committee. Perhaps I should ask here does this special committee recommend as well that this be referred to a special committee?

Mr. HENDY: Yes, that was the basis of our original letter, Mr. Forrestall. Our conclusions at page 39 are:

> That a full, complete and independent inquiry be instituted to assess the results and effects of steps already taken and to consider plans yet unannounced but contemplated in the re-organization of the defence establishment.

That was the wording of our original brief and our original letter to this Committee in June indicated that that was what we felt.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Then I am correct in assuming that the points in arguments you have brought up are not necessarily points in arguments in opposition to unification and integration nearly as much as they are put forward in support of your failure to comprehend the full intent of the act, and you would now like to stop and look at it. I am trying to differentiate between the two. The point has been made in the last three or four days that you people are prejudiced, that you have, indeed, political leanings, and we have gathered this from the Minister's press comments on Friday night among other things. I would like you to clarify for the Committee and for the people of Canada that this indeed is not a launched attack on integration or unification at this particular time. I think you have stated, have you not, that if you can be convinced of this that indeed you are prepared to support much of what is contained in the bill. Is that a correct assumption?

Mr. HENDY: Yes.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Then my understanding of your position, both today and as put forth in the TRIO brief, is that at this stage you are not attacking integration and unification, you are simply using these arguments to bolster and support your position that we should re-examine?

Mr. HENDY: Mr. Bundy would like to comment.

Mr. Robert G. BUNDY (*President, Naval Officers Association of Canada*): If I may, Mr. Chairman. Back in 1964 and 1965 the Toronto Branch of the Naval Officers Association, which numbers in excess of 700 members, and the National body of the Naval Officers Association presented a resolution to the Minister in which they said they supported the principle of integration and, of course, reserved the right to comment at a future date, so that we are not here to attack the principle of either integration or unification. It is a matter of stopping and assessing and making an analysis of what has gone on up to the present time with respect to whatever blueprint has been produced and to analyze whatever program is being presented to see whether or not we should continue on this particular road.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Mr. Bundy, that is exactly the point that I wanted clarified, thank you. Could I ask any one of you gentlemen for the total number of members in the Navy League of Canada, the Naval Officers Association and the Royal Canadian Naval Association. Do you have those approximate figures?

Mr. BUNDY: I believe in our brief we have a figure which indicates we represent 45,000 people but I do not think this is members, this is relations and people directly connected.

Mr. FORRESTALL: In the preparation of this brief none of your member associations across the country—

Mr. BUNDY: If I may interject, Mr. Wilson has just informed me that the Navy League has a membership of 98,000 across the country.

Mr. FORRESTALL: This is what I am getting at. I accepted the 45,000—I read that in the brief—but I thought there must be more than that. You are not suggesting are you, that you are representing here only half of your membership?

Mr. BUNDY: This is a combined—

Mr. FORRESTALL: What would the total be?

Mr. BUNDY: The Naval Officers Association has somewhere in the vicinity of 2,400.

Mr. FORRESTALL: And the Navy League of Canada?

Mr. BUNDY: The Navy League has 98,000.

Mr. FORRESTALL: And the Sea Cadet League?

An hon. MEMBER: The RCN Association.

Mr. BUNDY: That is included in the 98,000.

Mr. FORRESTALL: So, we are talking about the representative views of over 100,000 people, a very small percentage of whom are presently serving in any of the forces.

Mr. R. C. G. WILSON (*President, Ontario division, The Navy League of Canada*): Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, speaking on behalf of the Navy League, I think I should dispel any suggestion that we are political. We are not now and

never have been. Our interest in our maritime affairs goes far beyond the military concept that we are dealing with here today. We are quite prepared to take the advice of military and naval people with experience and sound judgment, but we are also the nursery of the Royal Canadian Navy.

Over the last 10 years at least 30 per cent of the young men who enter both the RCN and the reserves come from the Navy League. It is on that account that we feel very strongly about retaining an identity for the Canadian Navy. We do not quarrel with the Minister, we think he has done a good job. There is a lot to be said for unification. I think the torch we carry for the Navy is simply that the Navy be allowed to keep its identity. It means something to a sailor to look like a sailor. I think the Navy today is having trouble getting recruits. Certainly it did two years ago, and we came into this brief long before I had ever heard of Admiral Landymore. We were concerned two years ago when it became apparent to us that the boys who had entered the Navy were very much disillusioned.

We were equally concerned with the number of men who were not re-enlisting, despite bonuses and other incentives to stay in. So, the source of our information is not the press, it is not the department—we work very closely with the department—but the source of our information is from the young men themselves and their families.

As far as complete unification is concerned, I notice that Mr. Deachman made some reference to the fact that the United States Navy, particularly on the east coast, had a separate command. Well, this is so, but I just put it to you, sir, that you defeat your own argument. On the east coast the United States Navy, with its task force and with its air component, operates completely independently of the United States Army Air Corps, the Marine Corps and the United States Air Force. In 1943 the then secretary of the United States Navy, Mr. Forrestal —no relation to our friend over here, I am told—was equally concerned and outside consultants were brought in to decide whether there should not be complete unification in the United States forces, and it was turned down and that report is available. I just appeal to you not to tamper with the dark blue lightly. We are the first to admit that there is room for improvement. The bell bottom trousers and the sweater can probably go, but when this is finished let us have a Navy that we can be proud of, and that you will not be back here every year wondering about the enlistment rate or the re-enlistment rate. Speaking for the Navy, it is my assessment if I can put it in the vernacular—that we do not mind going steady but we are a little bit reticent about getting engaged to the other two forces and we have no desire to get married to them. It is that simple. We want an identity and it is an intensely loyal type of service. That is all I have to say, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I want to ask a couple of questions for purposes of clarification, and I will be very brief.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Please, Mr. Chairman, I want to pursue this and I do not want to break the thread of it. If it is on a point of order, let him make it, but if it is questions I have the floor.

The CHAIRMAN: Are you asking a question, Mr. Deachman? I did not hear you.

Mr. DEACHMAN: A remark was directed to me by the witness and I just wondered if I might ask one brief question for clarification.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, Mr. Forrestall has the floor.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Forrestall has the floor and I certainly do not want to impede the onrush of Mr. Forrestall's questions.

The CHAIRMAN: Then, Mr. Forrestall, would you like to continue?

Mr. FORRESTALL: I just want to pursue this, Mr. Deachman, before we get away from the cadet angle of it, and then you can come in and take five or ten minutes if you wish. You spoke meaningfully about the cadets and you suggested—do I have it right?—that some 30 per cent of the recruiting strength in the RCN evolved from the sea cadet corps.

Mr. WILSON: That is the absolute minimum, it is probably higher than that.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Do you feel that the loss of the separate identity of the Navy might impair the interest in the sea cadets of Canada?

Mr. WILSON: There is no doubt about it in my view, sir.

Mr. FORRESTALL: With a subsequent effect on recruitment?

Mr. WILSON: I think our young men join a service; they do not acquire a job.

Mr. SMITH: You do not think they will join an environment?

Mr. WILSON: Well, I cannot comment on that, sir.

Mr. FORRESTALL: That is fine, I just wanted to make that point. Now, if Mr. Deachman wants to lead us astray somewhere, he can go ahead.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Laniel?

Mr. FORRESTALL: Mr. Chairman, I had not finished.

The CHAIRMAN: I am sorry.

Mr. FORRESTALL: The only reason I objected was that I did not want him to break the thread of the discussion on the cadets.

I was afraid he was going to get on some kind of a—

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, I have thought of a great many more questions which I would like to ask. This is a very interesting discussion and perhaps you could put me down for the second round and I will ask them all at that time.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Could I ask you to stay with the sea cadets for another moment or two. Do they have a sea cadet league, for example, in the United Kingdom?

Mr. WILSON: Yes, very definitely.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Is there a distinct relationship between the sea cadets and subsequent recruitment in the RN?

Mr. WILSON: Yes. It is the main source of their recruits in both the permanent force and the reserve.

Mr. FORRESTALL: In the reserve as well. They either pass up through both or sometimes by a straight line, perhaps.

Is this true in other countries?

Mr. WILSON: I can only speak from a modest knowledge of the United States. The American Navy is now in the process of attempting to copy our sea cadet movement.

Mr. FORRESTALL: That is very interesting. I did not know that.

Let us now go back to my first question. The brief speaks of 45,000 people, and perhaps I should direct this question to the chairman of your committee, Mr. Hendy.

Mr. WILSON: I can answer that because I sat in on the meeting and that was intended to be the membership in Ontario. I happened to be there when this came up. This is the Ontario membership.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I see. But it cannot be construed that the 45,000 which is suggested here represents the proposition that only half of the collective associations that you are representing are not in agreement with you?

Mr. WILSON: No.

Mr. FORRESTALL: We have had no advice which is contrary to this brief whatsoever.

Mr. HENDY: This brief has been circulated to 280 league branches, 28 Naval Officer Association branches and an equal number of RCAF Association branches.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Do you guarantee those will all vote Conservative the next time around?

Mr. HENDY: This has been reaffirmed and the brief has been reaffirmed, as I said earlier, by the national groups of all three organizations.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Thank you.

Mr. LAMBERT: I found it a little difficult to follow the replies when you were answering Mr. Forrestall.

It seemed to me that there was once again the confusion between integration and unification. If you say that you are in favour of integration and unification, then I find a great deal of difficulty in understanding the summary of your brief today because the points that you make are all against unification, which is the single service concept. To that extent, then, I must also say, with regard to the representative from the Navy League, that you cannot agree with unification, "unification" meaning—as determined by the Minister in his speech in December—the single service concept and therefore that includes the single rank structure and the one uniform—possibly with a few frills, we do not know yet—for the identification of sailors, land forces and airmen.

When you come to your conclusions at page 7 you say:

> In summary, therefore, if the main purposes sought to be gained by Bill C-243 are greater interchangeability

And this was one of the main points made by the Minister in his speech:

> and elimination of service loyalties

Again a main point made by the Minister, that is, an elimination of service prejudices, perhaps he would call it, and I certainly think this is what Air Marshal Sharp would think about it:

> and identities then it would be this Committee's submission that the Bill should not be adopted as these are not advantages.

Well, gentlemen, interpreting your language, this can only mean that you are against unification in Bill C-243.

I make the clear distinction between integration, and I agree with Commodore Hendy's definition that it is concerned with the command structure and the supply and administrative services, but when we come down to the definition given by the Minister in his speech on December 7 that unification is a single service concept, then you are opposed to it. Am I correct in my summary?

Mr. BUNDY: If I may say so, Mr. Chairman, I do not believe I said that we sent a resolution to the Minister endorsing the principle of unification. I said integration, did I not?

Mr. LAMBERT: No. The remarks here were, "we approve of unification", and I must say that red lights blinked—

Mr. BUNDY: Well, I cannot remember that. I do not believe that we did say that we approved of unification.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, I got the same impression, a red light flashed in front of me when you made the statement.

Mr. HENDY: Does this not show, Mr. Chairman, just how much confusion there is in these terms and why we should talk about a reorganization plan and what the plan will be. Everybody has a different definition.

Mr. LANIEL: Gentlemen, I understand your concern, and the concern of the Naval Association, about what will happen to the Navy, and perhaps especially with regard to the personnel erosion in the Navy as related to the other services. I do not think we should take it for granted that everything was spic and span before 1964. I went to Halifax in 1964 with the Committee on Defence and at that time there was talk about unification—perhaps not unification it was mostly integration—and the problems that were put in front of the Committee then were much more questions of housing facilities, pay, schools, families and of the absence from the land and going to sea, and so on. Is there not a link here between personnel erosion and the lack on the part of the Navy in bringing forward changes that would attract young men to the service or retain them in the service, because when you speak of so many presently leaving the service and so many that will be leaving the service in the next few months, I have my own opinion about this. I have never been in the Navy, I was never attracted to the Navy, I was attracted to the Air Force, but there were all kinds of reasons. Technology attracts all the young men these days towards the Air Force and electronics, things like that. It is natural. So, the Navy has to fight against that; it has to prepare a program, it has to offer advantages, and there are many things that have to be improved in Halifax.

I was also concerned when I was in Halifax about the speech by Admiral Brock, who was perhaps trying more, in my view, to make points about the multi-purpose frigate than about all the things that should be changed in the Navy. So, I am wondering if you would not admit that part of that loss of personnel is caused by the fact that the Navy has not progressed in that sense?

Mr. BUNDY: I am afraid that I cannot agree or disagree with you because I rather lost part of your question. It was a bit of a speech, if I may say so.

Mr. LANIEL: Well, I will ask a question. What were the housing facilities like in Halifax in 1964?

The CHAIRMAN: I do not know whether the witnesses are qualified to comment on this.

Mr. LANIEL: Maybe not. Well, this is perhaps why, Mr. Chairman, my remark was more of a statement than a question, but I just wanted the Committee to get another view of the problem of loss of personnel in the Navy.

Mr. HENDY: Well, housing has always been a problem in Halifax.

Mr. LANIEL: Also leaves, family problems, schools and pay. You are speaking of loss of personnel but you do not speak about it since there has been an increase in the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, it happens that Mr. Gaunt, who is sitting behind me, was in Halifax, and he is a member of this group that has come here and has prepared this brief, so perhaps we could ask him if he has any knowledge of this.

Mr. GAUNT: Yes, I would like to answer that. I think there was hope about these conditions in the late 1950's and early 1960's. Certainly the service conditions were not as good as they should be and this, I think, is the direct fault of the Navy itself. I would say that the present attitude in Halifax has changed immensely since 1961, 1962, 1963 and 1964. The attitude of a great number of the officers at present is military disappointment and this has been brought about entirely by the proposed unification—and correct me if I use the wrong word because I may slip on it, too—plans that we now have before us. I think morale is at an all-time low in the Canadian Navy in Halifax. I cannot speak of the west coast, but I was in Halifax for a number of I, for one, would be very disappointed and very worried if this situation continued, and I feel that if we do go forward with unification the situation can only become worse.

The CHAIRMAN: Could I ask you when you were in Halifax?

Mr. GAUNT: I believe the dates for naval training were between July 4 and July 18, but I am not too certain.

The CHAIRMAN: July 4 to July 18?

Mr. GAUNT: Approximately, yes. I was in a very happy frame of mind because at the time I was engaged to become married in August, so I do not think my personal views coloured the situation. I was personally very happy when I was there.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Laniel, have you finished your questioning?

Mr. LANIEL: Well, this is the point I wanted to make. I have another question but I will delay it until later.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Churchill?

Mr. CHURCHILL: Well, I would like to ask about three questions.

First, did your organization, Mr. Hendy,—or anyone who wants to answer—see the Minister and present this brief to him and have a discussion with him with regard to his proposed plans?

Mr. HENDY: No.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Did you make the effort?

Mr. HENDY: Not to the Minister, I asked to present it to the Prime Minister.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Did the Prime Minister see you with regard to this?

Mr. HENDY: No, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: The man who is chiefly responsible for the defence of our country has not taken the opportunity of discussing these matters with you, then?

Mr. HENDY: No, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: This is most unfortunate.

May I ask you this question. When you were reading the White Paper—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Churchill, Mr. Wilson would like to offer a point of clarification.

Mr. WILSON: Mr. Chairman and Mr. Churchill, I would like to say for the record that as far as the Navy League is concerned we did approach the Minister, and without any hesitation at all he accommodated our request. Indeed, we have had meetings with him in Toronto and with sea cadet officers, and we got a pretty clear picture of what he had in mind, even though we did not perhaps find it too palatable. I would not want to leave the impression that we had never been able to get any help from the Minister. On the contrary, in some areas it has been otherwise.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Well, you are luckier than the rest of us if you have been able to find out what is on his mind.

I would now like to ask a question with regard to the White Paper. On page 23, under the heading "NATO Maritime", it reads:

> It is planned to continue in the anti-submarine role.

Then, at the bottom of the paragraph it states:

> To this end, a modern and well-equipped fleet of appropriate size is to be maintained.

Did you have occasion to discover what was meant by "appropriate size"?

Mr. HENDY: Did we discover what was meant by that?

Mr. CHURCHILL: Yes.

Mr. HENDY: No. I do not know what would be an appropriate size, Mr. Churchill. The forecasts are laid out as roughly one carrier, 23 destroyer escorts and other auxiliary vessels. This comes into the concept of how much defence you are going to pay for. No military establishment ever has as much as it wants and you have to balance the requirements. I do not say that that is appropriate. It sounds about right. The problem is going to be can we manage. From a personal point of view, I think it should be greater because the Maritime commitment is increasing.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You are in the same position as I. I tried to find out what was meant by "appropriate size" and I had no success.

The other question I want to ask is with regard to a matter that was drawn to our attention by Mr. Deachman, but I do not have that red Liberal handbook. I have *Hansard,* this is much better.

An hon. MEMBER: I will loan Mr. Churchill mine, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I will give you the proper reference. It is *Hansard* for December 7, page 10824. This is the paragraph he was reading:

> While the prime role of maritime command will continue to be anti-submarine warfare, planning is under way to increase its capability for general purpose tasks.

I take it that "general purpose tasks" have nothing to do with anti-submarine warfare, and that brings in transport vessels and matters of that nature. Is it

your understanding that if general purpose tasks are to be increased, there would have to be a reduction in the effective fighting force of Maritime Command in anti-submarine warfare?

Mr. HENDY: Well, it depends on what proportion of the budget is going to be spent on anti-submarine as opposed to these other functions, and I have not seen a breakdown of that. I do not think anti-submarine should suffer as a result of it. If we are going to take on something else, then you should increase your force to deal with these other commitments, because I think the anti-submarine force, as projected, is the minimum for our requirement.

Mr. CHURCHILL: As I understand it, the AS force has decreased very materially in the number of ships.

Mr. HENDY: Yes.

Mr. CHURCHILL: We are still not certain whether those ships can be manned effectively at the present time.

I would think from that paragraph which the Minister read that unless his budget is enlarged there would be a decrease in the anti-submarine aspect and an increase in general purpose tasks. That is the conclusion that I drew from that but, as is the case with most of the material that the Minister has supplied us, it is rather confusing.

I have one final question which has to do with the problem of unification. This is an extract from the Minister's speech. The *Hansard* reference is page 10834. This is the sentence that continues to be confusing:

> —while the barriers to movement of personnel between the forces will be removed,

which cannot mean anything other than that there will be an interchange of people from one service to the other:

> personnel in the combat forces will continue to be identified as sailors, soldiers and airmen

and then note this:

> until the force structure within the unified force is developed.

Now, to my mind, and I ask if you concur, that means that the combat forces will continue temporarily to be identified as sailors, soldiers and airmen, but by the time the force structure is developed that identity will cease and therefore the Navy will lose its identity. Is that the meaning that you drew from that?

Mr. HENDY: Well, until you see what the force structure is composed of it is difficult to say. I think the enactment of Bill C-243 clinches that. It removes the Navy as a separate force and, subject to the logistic problems of re-equipping, uniforms and things like that, the Navy as a separate force has ceased to exist. For instance, I would assume that your recruiting, once Bill C-243 is passed, will be for the Canadian Armed Forces, not for the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army or the RCAF, as we have it now.

Mr. CHURCHILL: The sentence reads:

> —until the force structure within the unified force is developed.

I consider that means that the identity of the Navy will disappear, and yet just before that the minister had said:

> —the separate units and elements of naval, field and air forces will continue to exist.

Perhaps when Mr. Deachman comes along he will be able to explain this.

The CHAIRMAN: Is that the end of your questioning?

Mr. CHURCHILL: Yes. I regret that the Prime Minister has not given his attention to this problem of national defence.

Mr. LANIEL: Mr. Chairman, could I ask a supplementary question that arises from the last remark of Mr. Churchill?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes.

Mr. LANIEL: Could you tell me if the Navy League in the days of Mr. Churchill satisfied itself by just seeing the Minister occasionally, that is, when presenting briefs or otherwise?

Mr. Churchill seems to reproach the Prime Minister for not being more concerned with this problem, but I do not think that in his day the man that had the responsibility was put aside by the minister. The people concerned with the problems always wanted to see the Prime Minister.

Mr. WILSON: I can say this quite honestly, sir, that the door to the office of the Minister of National Defence, regardless of his political affiliation, has always been open to the Navy.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, I want to start first, if I might, where we started this afternoon, which is with a suggestion by Mr. Loiselle dealing with the attitude of officers in the Navy and the other services towards integration and unification. I am not sure whether Mr. Loiselle meant to give this impression, but I gathered from some of his remarks that his suggestion was that the reason for the unrest in connection with the program was because certain senior officers started to fight it and stirred up trouble about it. Now, is that how you people became interested in this, because certain officers came to you and started to stir up trouble?

Mr. BUNDY: No, I would say not. We actually became involved as three groups. We were asked through the Minister's office to collect together the various naval support groups, the ex-service groups, and we did this at the annual meeting of the Naval Officers Association in June of 1966. It was during this gathering that we sat down and had a meeting in Toronto and talked it over and came up with the idea of presenting a brief.

Mr. NUGENT: Now, relating to the question that Mr. Hendy was asked by Mr. Deachman, I think Mr. Deachman had his bible with him and he quoted a statement by the Minister and then he said that this was the statement of a man who was withdrawing from the naval concept concerning anti-submarine warfare and I wanted to follow that up. I am sorry to go back to this to clarify it, but I believe Mr. Hendy made some remark that we could lose by default if we did not have the personnel. Now, Mr. Hendy, do you make a distinction between the good intentions of a minister, and even his plans, and the concrete evidence of what effect his actions are having? Is there a difference?

Mr. HENDY: Well, we do not have the number of men which, in my submission, I think we need because the ships are not fully manned and there are a lot of things we would like to do, but if you do not have the wherewithal whether it is men or equipment or money, your greatest aspiration will come to naught. In the anti-submarine business we can see even with two ships that we are still in it. Is this the posture that we should have? We have good ships but there is something wrong in that we have not been able to maintain the numbers

required for them. You can say all you like about what you want to do but if you do not have the people to do it with, then you are out of luck.

Mr. NUGENT: Your committee is expressing alarm because in looking at the actual evidence of what is happening to our services and their potential, you feel that no matter how well intentioned the Minister's remarks are, the fact is that the way we are going our capability of fulfilling his expectations is just not there or will not be there.

Mr. HENDY: Well, that is the danger that we see. I do not know whether we have reached that point yet, but there is certainly plenty of evidence that we should be concerned about it.

Mr. NUGENT: I just have one last question. To make sure that we nail down this whole statement, that this trouble is a revolt of the admirals, you are telling us, really, that the instigation came from the Minister's office rather than that you are some secret group plotting with the admirals to bring about the downfall of the Minister?

Mr. BUNDY: When you ask a question you ask a good one. I would not put it exactly that way. It was through the Minister's office that the three groups did have a meeting. It was certainly not through the Minister's office that this particular brief originated from that group. Actually, out of concern for the defence of the country.

Mr. NUGENT: Thank you.

Mr. HARKNESS: I was particularly interested in some of the evidence that we have had from you this afternoon in regard to recruiting and morale. I would like to ask you when, as a result of your extensive connections with people in the service, as well as people who are now ex-naval personnel, you first become aware of the fact that morale was declining?

Mr. HENDY: I think the Naval Officers Association are in a better position to answer this question.

Mr. BUNDY: Mr. Manchee, the President of the Naval Officers Association, Toronto Branch, is here and he has a brief which touches on that, in that the Toronto branch has conducted a survey, and he wishes to present that brief and I believe, Mr. Chairman, that you are allowing him to present it.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, this was not brought to my attention before. I understood this was a joint brief by the Naval Officers Association, the Navy League and the RCN associates.

Mr. SMITH: Well, I am sure we are seeking facts and I do not think anyone would not want to allow it to be presented.

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, we made a ruling that we were going to hear national groups. Is this a representation by a national group headquarters or is it the representation of one group within a national organization?

Mr. BUNDY: The national group of naval officers have endorsed it and, in fact, it was the national body that submitted this on behalf of a national body, although it was prepared by the Toronto group.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, I think we should hear this, but before we do, I would just like to get your personal views, Mr. Wilson, in regard to when, as far as you can recall, this became a matter of concern to you?

Mr. WILSON: As far as the Navy League is concerned, Mr. Chairman, we were concerned in 1964 with a diminishing interest in the sea cadet movement and also its resulting effect on young men leaving the sea cadet movement and going into the naval reserve and the permanent Navy, the RCN. We did very little about it until May of last year, when we decided we would canvass our membership, and then, of course, this whole problem broke out. I was here on June 23, but I was locked outside. Our concern has nothing to do with the committee meeting in June of last year.

Mr. HARKNESS: This is one of the things I am getting at. I think it is rather important for us to establish when you people in the naval associations began to be concerned about decreasing morale in the Navy. I believe it was in 1964 when you began to get evidence of this and it began to worry you.

The next question I would like to go on to is how widespread this decrease of morale was and what effect, in your opinion, it has had on recruiting. However, I see it is now past 6 o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN: Could we make a decision now on Mr. Manchee's brief? I believe we have copies here. We did make a ruling that we would hear national groups so that we would not be hearing unlimited briefs, but as Mr. Manchee is here with this group perhaps we could state that we do not wish to establish a precedent by hearing this but I believe it is fairly short, it consists of only 6 pages, and if you wish we can hear Mr. Manchee's brief when we resume at 8 o'clock. Is that agreeable to the Committee?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

EVENING SITTING

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, when we finished at 6 o'clock, Mr. Harkness had the floor.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, my understanding, when we adjourned was that Mr. Manchee was going to read his brief.

The CHAIRMAN: I though we were going to finish off this particular line of questioning, but it is immaterial to me.

Mr. HARKNESS: My understanding was that this brief bore particularly on the line of question that I was following; but I do not care, I am quite prepared to wait.

The CHAIRMAN: It may do. Would the Committee now wish to hear Mr. Manchee's brief?

Mr. NUGENT: On that point, Mr. Chairman, I think that this brief evolved from the question of morale. It has been prepared by the national group and that is why we are hearing it. It would clarify this question of morale and perhaps we could include it at this point. I suggest we hear him now because it is one aspect only of the general problem they are dealing with and one specialized bit of evidence on their general evidence.

The CHAIRMAN: We are in the middle of a question now and the witness would like to answer it. If I have your approval, we will continue with this question at least and then get on with the rest.

Mr. HARKNESS: The question I asked, out of which this arose was: When did the witnesses become aware that there was a morale problem and when was it brought to their attention through their members and their contacts with people still in the services that this morale was decreasing, thereby affecting recruiting. I think their answer to that was in 1964.

My next question would be: You have a considerable amount of evidence from your membership and your contacts within the service that the morale situation was getting worse from that time onward?

Mr. HENDY: Mr. Koyl might deal with this. He has a lot to do with the sea cadet movement.

Mr. J. E. KOYL (*Vice-President, Ontario Division, the Navy League of Canada*): May I explain, gentlemen, that my function in the Navy League is a vice-president of the sea cadets and national chairman of the navy league cadet organization and as such it has been mentioned that we contribute a great number of boys to the recruiting of the Royal Canadian Navy. In my position I see a lot of them who come back to their homes and cadet corps to visit and we get the thought from them that although they have joined up for three years, they are not going back because of the indecision as to their future life in the services. Others express the opinion that they like the sea, they joined to be sailors—some are radar operators—and they do not want to be sent up on the DEW line as a radar operator, but want to be in the sea service. I think that perhaps will contribute to what you are thinking about sir.

Mr. HARKNESS: I think the figures that are in your main brief on page 6 illustrate what you have said pretty definitely; it shows the numbers of personnel in the navy going down steadily from 1963, when it was 21,541, to 18,182 and, based on the last returns under 18,000. We have heard all kinds of reasons given for this very material reduction. A matter of housing was mentioned this afternoon; competition of industry, and so on. I think that probably all these factors have some bearing on the matter but, in your opinion, is there any material difference now and two or three years ago in respect of what existed as far as the housing situation is concerned which would explain this large reduction in the numbers

Mr. BUNDY: Mr. Chairman, may I answer this question. We—and I am speaking for the NOAC—do not profess to be naval experts. The question you are asking could be better answered by serving or recently retired officers. Our association is primarily as civilian one. We have been out of naval uniform for over 20 years—that is a vast majority of us—and even when we were in naval uniform, we were junior officers. We are now civilians and for fear of appearing somewhat egotistical, our membership has reasonable positions in our society as businessmen, professional men, public servants, and we have become concerned with reports which we have obtained, reports which have been given to us, and word of mouth reports about declining morale in the service. We have become concerned about the fact that top management has been changing very rapidly; we are concerned that the Minister may not be able to do what he wants to do, what he has outlined in his White Paper and in his speeches, and as reasonable

people we feel that if unification is as good as its proponents say it is, then there should be no objection to a factual, analytical analysis by a public inquiry—from our point of view a royal commission preferably, but certainly a public inquiry—to bring it up-to-date and let the public know what this is all about. We do not profess to be naval experts, and I do not think that we can be expected to be.

Now getting documentary evidence—and I think this is what you really want—is something that, certainly, our association does not have the staff to do; it must be available from recently retired officers.

Mr. HARKNESS: I do not think this is a matter of documentary evidence. I think it is really a matter of the evidence that you have received from members of your association and presently-serving officers with whom you are friends and with whom you are in contact, and those who have recently retired.

Mr. BUNDY: This is what I said. We have had verbal reports that have made us wonder very seriously with respect to just what is wrong because there are conflicting reports.

Mr. HARKNESS: On the basis of this type of evidence, would it be your view that the reduction in the strength of the navy, the difficulty in getting recruits and the very high non-engagement rate, is primarily due to morale factors rather than some of these other factors which have been mentioned?

Mr. BUNDY: I think they all tie in together.

Mr. HARKNESS: I myself said a while ago that I thought every factor had some significance. Would it be your view that the morale factor was probably the most important?

Mr. BUNDY: Certainly.

Mr. GAUNT: I have no doubt about that. I might try and answer this because I think the navy is the one service which in peacetime is trying to operate under probable wartime conditions. I have been at sea for 27 consecutive days without really seeing land and I think this as near a wartime condition as you can find. I think the navy will always have this hardship in peacetime; therefore, it will have a higher turnover rate than either of the other two armed forces. I think the morale problem is much harder in the Canadian navy than in the air force or the army. However, I think the low point was reached when the officer corps realized that the navy, as they knew it, was about to be demolished; I believe this happened some time last summer and ever since then I think the officer corps of the Canadian navy has lost faith in the Minister, and that this will lead to a large exodus of officers if they are given the opportunity to leave the service with their pensions. If they speak up at present they stand a chance of losing their pensions. I helped a number of officers in the Canadian navy to leave the navy when I served in Ottawa for six months as Assistant to the Director of Naval Manning. It is very hard to place naval officers in civilian careers, and they realize this. Any military officer finds it difficult. It is to their advantage to stay in the service, accepting conditions they totally disagree with and to make the best job possible. Knowing a great number of naval officers, they will endeavour to do this. But if they speak honestly to someone—and they will speak honestly to me, I believe, in a way that it is very difficult for them to speak to the Minister or to the Chief of the Naval Staff, to use his former title—when

they go to the coast they will not be given the true picture. I do not see any chance of improvement for morale in the navy under the existing legislation which is on the books.

Mr. ANDRAS: May I ask a supplementary question emanating from that comment, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Harkness has the floor.

Mr. HARKNESS: That is all right.

Mr. ANDRAS: The gentleman has stated that there was an evident loss of morale last summer and he further said that this seemed to develop from the indication that the officer corps had lost confidence in the plan or the Minister or the program that was in progress. How did this loss of confidence of the officer corps manifest itself? How was it conveyed to the sailors, to the men in the navy?

Mr. GAUNT: Is that question addressed to me?

Mr. ANDRAS: Yes.

Mr. GAUNT: How was their loss of confidence manifested to the sailors?

Mr. ANDRAS: Yes.

Mr. GAUNT: I would say that their attitude was that they were serving officers, that they must try to do the best job they can, even if they disagree completely with the directives, which were very misleading, in their opinion, which they were receiving, because the efficiency of the navy is their prime concern.

Mr. ANDRAS: They did express the opinion that the program was improper and incorrect?

Mr. GAUNT: I would say that amongst themselves this program was completely discussed; amongst the chiefs and petty officers it was equally fully discussed and on the lower deck they knew a lot about it as well.

Mr. ANDRAS: Yes, but you related this back to the—

Mr. GAUNT: I would say that there was confidence in the higher officers and that none of their misgivings were passed on to the ratings.

Mr. ANDRAS: Thank you.

Mr. HARKNESS: I would now like to turn to another matter. On page 8 of this brief you read today, you state:

> Will the new Bill discharge federal responsibilities under Section 91(7) of the B.N.A. Act in relation to provision of a naval service?

Will you just elaborate on that, please?

Mr. HENDY: I do not profess to be a Constitutional legal expert, Mr. Harkness, and I do not mean to be flippant, but we ask the question. Section 91(7) of the B.N.A. Act gives federal responsibility to the militia, military and naval services so it is an exclusive area for federal power. If we do not have a naval service, the present act will not provide in the legislation for a naval service, although we are told that a naval component will remain. However, unless you have it enshrined in the legislation, which is our concern, it is another reason why it can disappear. As we all know, prior to 1910, even though that section was in the act, we made a contribution to Great Britain for naval protection. We then constituted our own navy and have carried on. This view has

been expressed to me by some one who is a little more authoritative on this field, but we asked the question and we think it should be considered.

In other words, this bill should provide the guarantees that the federal government will stay in the naval service business, which is its prerogative with the power granted to it.

Mr. HARKNESS: That is all I have.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Hendy you expressed on several occasions this afternoon a great concern about the effectiveness of the anti-submarine role of Maritime Command and I certainly got the impression that you feel it is deteriorating or has deteriorated. Is that correct?

Mr. HENDY: This is in the very broadest sense, Mr. Andras. I do not mean to say that those people who are in it are not good and are not professionals. In other words, I am talking about what force you are bringing to bear. We might have the best single AS ship in the world but we need more than one. My concern is whether we are going to meet our commitments. We committed some 40 odd ships to NATO a few years ago; now we are committing something well under that. There is no question that there is some improvement in the type of vessel; we have replaced the older ships with newer ones and some of the newer ones have been given an increased capability, but there is more—in my humble submission—to naval power than just building one ship that will do the best job. Several ships are necessary; ships are not as mobile as aircraft. It is very difficult to measure the effectiveness of, say, 20 older ships against two or three very new ones. Those are extreme figures and this, of course, gets into the realm of the expert—and I subscribe to Mr. Bundy's comments in this regard. However, we have the ships there, we have made the commitments but we are not manning as many ships as we did and, therefore, our overall effectiveness should be decreasing because we are not manning what we expected to man.

Mr. ANDRAS: I am really attempting to be very sincere on this because the question of the effectiveness of this particular aspect of our defence forces is a matter of some concern. As I interpret it then, you are basing your argument on a quantity approach, generally speaking—the number of ships and the number of personnel in the Maritime Command? I am confining this to the Maritime Command because that was the opinion you expressed this afternoon. So you are basically leaning to the quantitative approach to this?

Mr. HENDY: Numbers are not everything; we realize that, but you must strike a balance between the numbers that will do the job and—

Mr. ANDRAS: You are basing your argument on the fact that you claim there are less men and less ships available for an operational role today than there were at some given time in the past. This is, in effect, the substance of your concern—your very genuine and sincere concern?

Mr. HENDY: This is exactly right, Mr. Andras, and we are concerned that if we do not get the men in the navy again, the ships we have will not be manned and, therefore, while we may have the hardware, if we do not have the personnel, the ships will not be of any use.

Mr. ANDRAS: I just want to go further into this delicate balance between what in older times would be numbers versus what would now, perhaps, be quality or fire power. I have been informed, and I want to know whether you agree or disagree with this information—and I am certainly no expert in this

field as it has been a long time since I was involved with military affairs—that, for instance, our current modern operational destroyers committed to NATO or to any other role are considerably faster, say, than the old World War II destroyers. This would be one qualitative measure. Is that correct?

Mr. HENDY: No; as a matter of fact the World War II destroyers were a lot faster than the ones we have now, but they were of a different type. They were what we called a fleet destroyer. You can get more expert advice on this from the Chairman than you can from me.

Mr. ANDRAS: You are volunteering the opinion that the old World War II destroyers were faster than the modern destroyers now?

Mr. HENDY: They were faster than what we have now.

Mr. ANDRAS: In terms of knots and so forth?

Mr. HENDY: Yes. That is the way you measure the speed.

Mr. ANDRAS: What about the new introduction of better logistics, operational support ships and so on? I am told, for instance, that taking a straight line out from Halifax about 1,000 miles, under the old system, say, a few years ago you could keep about three destroyers going at one time out of, say, 18 destroyers but now, with one of the new support ships, you could keep ten out there.

Mr. HENDY: I have seen that chart that was presented to the Committee some time ago.

Mr. ANDRAS: And this makes sense to you?

Mr. HENDY: Yes, because refuelling and restoring at sea is certainly a field that has been developing ever since the war.

Mr. ANDRAS: So this would be a qualitative answer to a quantity—the number of ships and number of personnel involved?

Mr. HENDY: Yes, if you want—

Mr. ANDRAS: In other words, one ship can do a great deal more than it used to do on that basis.

Mr. HENDY: If you have five ships without a support vessel, they cannot do as much as with one. So that one support vessel may be worth one or two extra ships in a group because they all have to come back to refuel instead of staying at sea longer and refuelling on the spot and re-storing on the spot. Mr. Gaunt has had some pretty recent experience and maybe he would like to deal with this in a little more detail.

Mr. GAUNT: I would like to answer one or two of your questions. Perhaps I should say that I am qualified to be second in command of a destroyer at the present time. I have taken the long tactical course in England and I have studied naval history at the Royal Naval College, Greenwhich, so this is a field in which I am very interested.

I think we are sadly lacking in some of the equipment we have on our ships. I do not want to go into details because this is a public meeting and I would rather do this in camera, if necessary. I will back this up with facts and figures, if required, in the future.

There are certain concepts which we are employing in anti-submarine warfare in which the United States and the Royal Navy do not believe. We have certainly improved our capability in many respects and I think the Minister deserves great credit and praise for the fact that he has improved our equipment

more, I think, than any other defence minister in the last 10 or 15 years. However, this does not answer the whole question and I do feel that the key of it is the trained manpower. I think there is one ship in our operation fleet at present which is 75 men under its peacetime complement. I would not like to have to go to sea for two or three weeks in that ship. One or two of the ships I was in this summer were so lacking in key personnel they could not have operated at full efficiency. This is what we are concerned about.

Mr. ANDRAS: You were at sea on that ship for how long this summer?

Mr. GAUNT: Fourteen days.

Mr. ANDRAS: But generally speaking, both of you would agree, I think, that the fire power, the mobility, the support techniques of today and modern technology would mean that any one modern ship would do the work of more than one of the older ships—maybe two, maybe three, maybe some multiplying factor?

Mr. HENDY: Perhaps in isolation, but if you have two jobs to do, you may need two ships and one ship cannot do it because it is not that mobile.

Mr. ANDRAS: I am no expert but I am searching for answers. Obviously, I have certain information to which I want to get your reaction. Has the mobility of each ship, for instance, not been increased tremendously by such things as helicopters? Did they not used to have to sail or steam a pattern in order to cover certain areas which helicopters now cover?

Mr. HENDY: The helicopters have extended greatly the search capabilities for ASW.

Mr. ANDRAS: By dropping lines and listening devices and so forth?

Mr. HENDY: By carrying the sonar out with it, it has immeasurably increased the area a single ship can serve.

Mr. ANDRAS: So this would reduce the requirement for any given job by some number of ships. You would not need the same number of ships to do that particular job as you needed before by virtue of extending their mobility by helicopters?

Mr. HENDY: I do not think it is as simple as that because the modern submarine is—

Mr. ANDRAS: But is it not right that any one ship can cover a much increased area of search and find?

Mr. HENDY: The modern ship can, in fact, search a greater area in less time with modern equipment. There is no question about that.

Mr. ANDRAS: Can these new gas turbine engine destroyers not operate with less men than the old ones?

Mr. HENDY: We do not have the ships yet.

Mr. ANDRAS: No, but they are in the making; they are coming now; they are in the plan.

Mr. HENDY: I have not seen the figures on that; I do not know. I know there are advantages to the gas turbine—there is no question about that—but I do not think integration can take the credit for that.

Mr. ANDRAS: I am just going back to what concerns me very much, your statement that the anti-submarine warfare role of Maritime Command by virtue

of things that have happened has been much reduced and is losing its effectiveness and, in fact, is going to become ineffective if the trend continues, according to your expressed concern. Whether it is there or not, if a gas turbine engine destroyer comes into the picture, with new equipment, it will take less men. Is that right?

Mr. HENDY: I do not know.

Mr. ANDRAS: Is modern technology not reducing the need for more people and more ships?

Mr. HENDY: I do not know whether in this particular case it will. I do not know the answer to that. The point is that gas turbine ships are four years away, I would say. The hulls have not been laid down although they have been projected for some time. Maybe by then, if the personnel continues to drop, we will not be able to man them either. We are thinking of some of the present vessels that are in service and which are committed under the long range program to be in service. The navy of 1970 has been described as the carrier, 24 escorts and the auxiliary vessels. Now, if that includes the four new DDH's, we may man those when they come in, but will some of the other vessels that we expected to also man to maintain that 24 AS vessels be manned or will we have to put them away the way we are doing now? In other words, certain targets, as I see it, have been established for the ships that we can now envisage and, as far as I am aware, we are not able to man them all yet—and if we keep on losing people the problem will be compounded and technological advances will not keep abreast of that.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Gaunt seems to have something he wants to say.

Mr. GAUNT: I would like to say that new equipment does not necessarily mean higher efficiency, sir. I have been at sea in one of the new destroyer escorts, it was very new at the time and not one of its 3-inch 50 calibre guns could fire.

Mr. ANDRAS: For how long had it been commissioned?

An hon. MEMBER: Why?

Mr. GAUNT: Because of technological changes. When they were changing the calibre of the gun it had not been worked out and for approximately two to three years these faults were inherent in every gun of this calibre in the fleet, and they were not reliable. On this occasion the armourers were working on them but not one gun was serviceable. We could not have fired at a submarine on the surface with our guns.

Mr. ANDRAS: I do not think anybody would argue with you that while new equipment has certain bugs to be worked out—

Mr. GAUNT: I think you are answering your own question, sir. If you introduce this new equipment you may have a temporary efficiency drop in the fleet.

Mr. ANDRAS: That is right, and at any given time you certainly would not suggest that because of the pattern in the past, that when highly technological new equipment is introduced you are going to have some bugs and some problems, that you had better stick with the old equipment. You certainly would not suggest that?

Mr. GAUNT: No one has.

Mr. ANDRAS: So your point about these weapons not firing when you were there could be nothing more or less than a bug to be worked out?

Mr. GAUNT: Yes, but it was over several years.

Mr. ANDRAS: But you would not suggest that they abandon that program of updating equipment because you ran into a disappointing experience?

Mr. GAUNT: Certain experts had recommended we abandon this particular item of equipment.

Mr. ANDRAS: All right. Generally speaking, all I am trying to establish, Mr. Hendy, is the fact that the number of ships and the number of men to man those larger number of ships is not necessarily indicative of the effectiveness of any marine force or any other force, given the same application to a situation. In other words, it is not, in modern day 1967 weaponry, fire power and so forth, the number of people or the number of ships in this case that can measure effectiveness compared with the old World War II destroyer and so forth. Surely, you cannot, with utter conviction say that because of the reduction in manpower and because of the reduction in the number of ships today, that the effectiveness of the Maritime Command's anti-submarine warfare role has gone down. You cannot say that—or would you still stick with that?

Mr. HENDY: At least I would leave that to somebody who know far more about it than I do. However, I will say that we are not dealing with a World War II submarine either, and that the problem of ASW has not stood still. While we improve our capabilities on the surface the people in the submarines are not sitting there with equipment that will go only eight or nine knots under water. So you have to have better ships in order to cope with the tougher target, and as you increase your capability to hunt the submarine, the submarine is increasing its capability to escape. And this is true in land warfare; we increase our fire power by improved weapons but the enemy is not standing still either. So it is a technological battle; there is no doubt about that.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Andras, I think your time is up.

Mr. ANDRAS: May I take one more approach to this just to complete my point of view.

Do you agree with this statement which is from the evidence given before the Defence Committee last year, on the same subject of quantity versus quality. It says:

> Therefore, any figure you might take through the 50's or through the 60's and try to number by number value one against the other, I think would lead to a very false picture of a NATO commitment or, in fact, the NATO support requirement.

Which could apply to the Maritime Command situation, too.

> I think that the best way to look at it is that as ships are kept in the modern state, and the ships we are building—in our force, that it will never be possible, under the economics as I see them, to maintain number for number ships that have been allocated in the past. Therefore, what we have to assess in our own minds is whether the total effort that we are able to make, the total operational value of our force to NATO, is going downhill or whether it is going uphill. For my money, I would say that the force of ships that we have available now to offer NATO are infinitely

more valuable than the larger number of ships which we offered to NATO in, say, in 1954. I do not see any way to add and subtract numbers and come up with an answer on a NATO commitment.

Then, this same gentleman—

An hon. MEMBER: Who is it?

Mr. ANDRAS: This is Admiral Landymore. In answer to this question:

Are you satisfied that we will fully carry out our commitments in so far as effectiveness, the commitments, say, to 1972, are concerned?

He replied:

The answer to that is yes, I am well satisfied.

That is the end of my questioning, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GAUNT: Was that a question, Mr. Chairman? Should the witness answer that?

The CHAIRMAN: That was not a question.

Mr. HENDY: He put it in the form of a question.

Mr. ANDRAS: I asked him if he agreed or disagreed with it.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Gaunt, do you want the witness to agree or disagree?

Mr. GAUNT: I thought it was a very interesting speech but I would not like to comment on it.

Mr. ANDRAS: It is Admiral Landymore's speech.

Mr. GAUNT: I think if you are trying to comment on efficiency and you are commenting on the efficiency of the ships in 1954 with the potential enemy threat, that is one thing; if you are talking about the efficiency of our ships today you have to equate it with the potential enemy threat today and I know of no common factor to make a correlation between the two.

Mr. ANDRAS: I have just one comment. This comment made by Admiral Landymore was in 1966, which is fairly recent.

Mr. HARKNESS: I would point out that a comparison between 1954 and 1966 is a very different thing than a comparison between 1963 and 1966 because in 1954 we did not have any of the new destroyers whereas in 1963 we had practically all of the new destroyers, and I think there have only been two or three that have come into service since then.

Mr. ANDRAS: Landymore gave us testimony in 1966, from which I was quoting.

He seemed satisfied then that the effectiveness was being maintained by quality not quantity.

Mr. HARKNESS: The base that was mentioned for comparison was 1954 before any of the new destroyers came into service.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, I have a supplementary question arising out of the brief on this same matter. In the brief that they presented which you did not read, it says:

On the outbreak of the Cuban crisis in October 1962 the RCN had 29 fully operational ships at sea in the Atlantic within 48 hours.

Then you go on to say:

> It is believed that as this brief is submitted the number of ships available on both coasts, manned at all times to operational requirements, is only in the vicinity of 30.

Now, in 1962 you had 29 on the high seas in 48 hours. What is the significance of these two, because on both coasts now you have 30?

Mr. HENDY: We could put 29 to sea on the Atlantic alone now. The 30 was a combined figure and there are figures available as to what is actually manned and operational now and could be within 48 hours. I do not have them—undoubtedly the department has—but it is substantially less than the 29 we put out for the Cuban crisis.

I think that there is this other aspect, that while more sophisticated equipment will always be developed, there are still a lot of jobs for ships with something less than the technical capabilities of the new destroyers. In other words, there is a case for smaller ships to increase numbers for a thing like fishery patrols, surveillance survey, and all this sort of thing, all of which goes toward the composition of your maritime force in varying degrees. You do not build up the whole thing around a few highly specialized vessels. It is uneconomical to build a forty or forty five million dollar ship to do a job that can be done by something much less sophisticated. This may be another area where we are concentrating in small numbers of very expensive ships; perhaps we ought to have more of the others for various reasons and for various functions that can be done by them quite capably.

Mr. ANDRAS: In place of the more sophisticated more expensive ships?

Mr. HENDY: Either in place of or in additional to.

Mr. ANDRAS: Well "in additional to", means a raise in the total defence commitment financially, does it not?

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I would remind you that the bells are going to ring in an hour. We have another brief to hear, and one more questioner, Mr. Langlois, before we get round to the second round.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, will you put me down for the second round; then I will continue my question on this one point.

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, I will.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Commodore Hendy, I have a personal question, to start with. Did you have anything to do with writing this brief?

Mr. HENDY: This brief?

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Yes.

Mr. HENDY: Oh yes; I was chairman of the committee.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): And you did most of the writing on the TRIO brief too?

Mr. HENDY: I did most of the writing on the TRIO brief, but this one was done by all the people that are here with the exception of Mr. Gaunt. It was compiled at the Navy League headquarters.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Coming into the room this afternoon, I was astounded to see you here again today, because for 10 days in November and

December the opposition in the House told us that there was a very big file of people who were going to protest against this thing. It seems to be reduced to a very few people.

An hon MEMBER: That is a limited opinion.

Mr. HENDY: I do not know the answer to that. This committee was formed in June.

An hon. MEMBER: Quality not quantity.

Mr. HENDY: Maybe Mr. Andras has the answer, but I do not think that is the one in this case certainly. The Maritime Committee was formed and registered its concern to this committee. When TRIO came along people of all services got concerned with it. Air Marshal Curtis is the honorary chairman. We decided on certain ideas, I picked up the brief, and that was all. However, I consulted with several retired officers of distinction; the TRIO brief, as I said on Friday, was sent to six different cities for consultation, and we have had complete unanimity of support. Now somebody is compiling it; I bought the baby on this occasion, but—

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): But you did most of the writing in the two briefs?

Mr. HENDY: No, I did most of the writing on the TRIO brief, but this was done by five people; we all put our ideas in, and it was actually compiled in the Navy League headquarters.

Mr. LAMBERT (*Chicoutimi*): It occurs to me that you must have had a lot to do with it because you are the one who is answering our questions all the time.

An hon. MEMBER: Mr. Chairman, really what has this got to do with it.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): We are getting to that.

An hon. MEMBER: Stop your politics.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): You should be talking about politics. That is a joke. You said a while ago that in the Naval Officers Associations of Canada there were, if I remember correctly, 2,400 members. Is that correct?

Mr. HENDY: Mr. Bundy is their national President.

Mr. BUNDY: I said approximately that, about 2,400.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): How many of those 2,400 saw the actual brief you presented this afternoon?

Mr. BUNDY: The Board of Directors and all branches were sent a copy; how many members of each branch saw and read it, I do not know. We have had no objections to it from any one member.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): But maybe only a few of these people eventually saw it.

Mr. BUNDY: I do not know. I know that it was sent to all branches and to all the board of directors.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): All right. Mr. Wilson said that there were 98,000 Navy League members in Canada. How many, do you think, of those saw the brief before it was presented today?

Mr. BUNDY: I am sorry; what was your question?

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Of the 98,000 members of the Navy League, how many would have seen the brief before it was presented today.

Mr. WILSON: I can answer your question this way. I would say the Navy League brief is contrasted with the other two briefs. It was based on representations made to the Navy League by members.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): But they did not actually see the brief that you presented today?

Mr. WILSON: No. I would far sooner have it the other way. We put into the brief what Navy League members wrote in.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Individual members?

Mr. WILSON: Yes, and their branches—and there are over 200 branches from coast to coast.

Mr. HENDY: This brief has gone to 200 branches.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Oh that I realize.

Mr. WILSON: In addition sir, every branch was invited to make comments. For this brief, in the course of preparation. Many of the comments are in this brief.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Mr. Wilson, you said this afternoon that at one time you were in accord with integration and unification, and the only thing that you were very much opposed to was the three services actually being made into one, with the one uniform. However, you said at the same time that you did not mind if the bell-bottomed trousers or the white sweaters disappeared.

Mr. WILSON: No, I never said that sir. I never mentioned white sweaters. I said that there is a lot to be said for integration: a common intelligence service, common recruiting, purchasing, medical—you name it. However, I think the Navy League draws a line somewhere at the combat level; we think the best man to run a warship is a navy man, not an army colonel from a camp school, let us say, at Camp Borden.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): You mean that the best man to run a ship is a man who knows about a ship.

Mr. WILSON: A man who not just knows the ship, but a man who has lived at sea, a sailor.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Well I doubt very much if that is going to be changed. We do not want to have tank operators manning a ship.

Mr. WILSON: I understand that we are going to put colonels in charge of war ships.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): If that is your worry, I think the bill is passed.

Mr. WILSON: Well, this is the effect it is going to have on the men. They are going to have some misgivings if the rank of a man who comes to command a ship is colonel.

An hon. MEMBER: They will still call him shipper.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Before you decided to submit a brief, did you receive a visit from one or more retired admirals—

Mr. WILSON: No.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): —as in the case of TRIO.

Mr. HENDY: No. As far as TRIO was concerned there were already people talking about doing something about this—just to settle that problem that came up on Friday.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Following a question this afternoon by Mr. Harkness to Mr. Wilson, Mr. Wilson said that the morale in the Navy attracted his attention in 1964. In 1964 there might have been people talking of integration but nobody was talking too much of unification. What was their big worry in 1964?

Mr. WILSON: Our big worry in the Navy League was simply that we could not get young boys to maintain the same rate of interest in the Navy; they just were not interested in joining the Navy. The situation was aggravated by comments in the press that ships were being tied up for want of adequate crews, and this had its effect.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): But what was the cause of that in 1964?

Mr. WILSON: Do not ask me; I had nothing to do with that—

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): There was no confusion then; even the Conservative party was going along with integration.

An hon. MEMBER: The admiral too.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): I know; so where was the confusion?

Mr. Chairman, we are now studying in this committee Bill No. C-243. The witnesses keep speaking of the loss of personnel and so on. Do you feel that the lack of personnel, if such a lack exists, is due to integration and unification?

Mr. HENDY: Yes; certainly that is the major factor. As has been said earlier, there are a lot of factors, but I look at it this way: These other things were there—I am referring to the arguments about increased opportunities in civil life and other factors perhaps being there, but I am firmly of the opinion, from what I have seen and heard, that unification concept is aggravating this at a time when we should not be doing anything to upset what might be a delicate balance. In other words, if we have not solved the other problems, we should not put in something which the men in the service are not prepared to accept.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Yes, but already you were saying that in 1964 there was a morale problem and nobody was talking of unification then.

Mr. HENDY: Oh yes, sure.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): But apparently nobody, even the official opposition, knew about the position. They spoke of that two or three months ago for 10 days in the House, that nobody knew about unification before, and all of a sudden witnesses come here saying they heard of it two or three years ago. Who is right and who is wrong.

An hon. MEMBER: You were not there; you were not even listed.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): No, but I can read. I am not much of an army man, but what is stated at page 5 of the brief does not sound right to me. You say here:

> If, the announced purpose of the new uniform is to make the services more democratic (whatever this may mean)—why not have a contest for a new uniform and let the men decide?

I am amazed at that. I thought the first thing someone learned on joining the services was to obey, and now they want to have a gallup poll or whatever it is. Are we running a fan club or are we running the services here?

Mr. HENDY: As you well recall, in 1945 we asked the services to vote whether they would fight, and the result of that was—and I think the sailors were pulling the government's leg frankly—that the sailors in one ship that was busily bombarding the Japanese as part of the Pacific fleet, voted to come home because they did not want to fight in Japan, although they were busy doing it—and we pulled the ship out. I will say that there is a certain amount of tongue in cheek in respect of that sentence, but I am quite serious that if we say that there is overwhelming acceptance and if we are going to ask sailors to vote, or at least soldiers and airmen to vote as to whether they will keep on fighting during the war, you do not have to stretch it very far and say, well then why do you not ask them if they really believe in joining a fourth service over and above what they joined. These men joined the Navy, the Army or the Airforce, and you are asking to put them into something that did not exist when they signed their contract of service with the government.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Yes, but did they not sign their contract because they wanted to be in a plane or around a plane, or on a ship or around a ship, or something like that?

Mr. HENDY: Yes, I submit quite definitely.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Then they did not sign for the name. They did not sign for the navy per se; they signed because they wanted something to do with ships.

Mr. HENDY: I am convinced that the men are in the Navy because they wanted to be around ships, as you say. They joined the air force because they wanted to be in the air force and they wanted to be assured—

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): If they join the new unified forces they still will be around ships. What is wrong with that?

Mr. HENDY: Well, that is your new recruiting problem. I am saying that it has been represented that there is a wide spread support for this concept in the services, and I am afraid I do not agree with that statement.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Langlois your time is almost up now.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): We have heard a lot in the last few months about tradition. Do you believe there is a Canadian Navy tradition?

Mr. HENDY: Yes, I do.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): It is not British tradition; it is Canadian tradition.

Mr. HENDY: There is a great deal of British tradition in it, but there is a great deal of tradition, which is justified with regard to anyone who goes to sea. It is a sea-faring tradition and it applies to the navies or merchant service of every nation and every country in the world.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): That is what I mean, it is not a Canadian tradition.

Mr. HENDY: There is a lot of Canadian tradition in it too. We are very proud of the traditions which we have built up as a small-ship navy during the war.

We had a first-class record and Canadians are proud of that. Canadians have created a tradition at sea, great numbers of our men having given up their lives under the Canadian flag.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): That I do believe. Do you not believe that with the new unified force we could create a real Canadian tradition?

Mr. HENDY: But we have a Canadian tradition.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): No, it is a British tradition as far as the navy is concerned.

Mr. HENDY: Oh no; that is extreme. The United States navy has a British tradition as far as its navy is concerned; they look at the British with a great deal of respect for what the British navy has done, but they are still Americans. The Canadians are the same. I have seen Canadian sailors go after people who called them "limeys" and take a poke at them. I am sure your Chairman has too. Do not ever get the idea that Canadian sailors are not proud of their Canadian tradition, because they are.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): But do you not think that they would be proud to be in a unified force?

Mr. ROCK: I was accused of being a "limey" too during the war.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): One last question, Mr. Chairman, if I may be permitted. I will address this one to Mr. Gaunt. He said that he was in Halifax last summer and that there was a lot of trouble as far as morale was concerned. He told us that he was there from July 4 to July 18. Was that not the time Admiral Landymore made a great fuss about censorship in respect of his brief?

Mr. GAUNT: It was very close to that time, but I do not know the exact dates.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Do you not think that created an effect on the morale of the navy at that time?

Mr. GAUNT: Undoubtedly it did.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Thank you sir.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, if I understood you correctly, we were going to stand over this second round of questioning until we have heard Mr. Manchee's brief. He is here now.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Mr. Chairman, mine was not really a second round of questioning, it was just a supplementary to an earlier question that had to do with ships and ship recruiting and it is only one question.

We were told by the Minister and I believe the Air Marshal, or it was confirmed in any event one day last week, that the RCN are in the process of moving its ships from the east coast to the west coast. Because of your association with the reserves and sea cadets, and your knowledge of our defence activities, can you confirm the fact that these ships have not been moved? Is it your understanding that these ships have not been moved because there are not adequate crews, that the Department of National Defence has been trying to recruit from the reserve strength certain key personnel to move them, and in addition to that it has set about to try to round up a number of sea cadets to help move these ships. Have any of you gentlemen heard anything of this?

Mr. HENDY: I think you have hit a blank on that. The Navy League of course are offered cruises for the sea cadets from time to time, but I am not sure whether one has been offered on this occasion.

Mr. FORRESTALL: During the summer months?

Mr. HENDY: I am afraid no one in this group has this knowledge, although Mr. Wilson may be able to answer this.

Mr. WILSON: I am not aware of this, although it is quite conceivable that on a movement like that there might be extra billets available. Certainly the sea cadets would not be manning the vessel or come anywhere near doing so.

Mr. FORRESTALL: It is my understanding that the reserve squadrons have been asked to select cadets to help fill them in, and I was wondering if you could shed any light on this.

Mr. WILSON: This could be so, but they would have to be qualified.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Would it be normal for them to go in the off season, not in the summertime?

Mr. WILSON: Yes, it is done all the time, increasingly so—

Mr. FORRESTALL: In winter?

Mr. WILSON: —and we are glad of these cruises.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Thank you.

Mr. GAUNT: I believe there are a number of ships in the ready reserve groups of which three are projected to move from the east coast to the west coast and there are very definite manning problems to send them from one coast to the other.

The CHAIRMAN: We are not going to get around to Mr. Manchee's brief, if we do not do it soon.

Mr. MCNULTY: Mr. Hendy has mentioned that he had observed or heard of Canadian sailors being poked on the nose for being classified as limeys.

Mr. HENDY: No, it was the other way around. They have taken a swing at someone who called them limeys.

Mr. MCNULTY: That is better still. Would it not be better for them if they had a distinct uniform and then there would be no doubt at all?

Mr. HENDY: As we have said before, there is no resistance to improving a uniform, but make it look like a sailor's uniform and not a bus driver's uniform.

Mr. ROCK: The army and the air force have bus-driver uniforms.

Mr. HENDY: I am thinking of the drawing of the new uniform that was in the papers not long ago, and that is the way it was described by all three services.

Mr. ROCK: There was criticism Mr. Chairman, to the adoption of the potato sack, after World War I. I am referring to the British army uniform, the long pants with putties on the bottom, and criticism was levied by Canadians at that time too.

An hon. MEMBER: There is always criticism of things like uniforms.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Manchee would you come forward and present your brief please. Gentlemen, Mr. Manchee as you know is the president of the Toronto Branch of the Naval Officers Associations of Canada and I understand this brief which he has prepared has been approved by the Naval Officers Associations of Canada.

Mr. Frank C. Mancuse (*President, Toronto Branch, Naval Officers Associations of Canada*): Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I would like to carry a couple of things before I read this brief.

The Toronto Branch of the Naval Officers Associations has been interested in unification since 1964 and it followed a pleasant visit of the Minister of National Defence to the annual meeting of the Toronto Branch. I might say that we have files and files and files of information which we have gathered, but because this problem seemed to reduce itself to two basic things, our brief is only 6 pages, double spaced, long.

I am not a politician; I am just a mere civilian. We do not pretend in any way to be knowledgeable about what weapons are the proper weapons and other matters pertinent thereto. However, in our respective fields of endeavour in civilian life we are not without some knowledge of organization and some knowledge of finance. One of the first things that we tried to do—I might say that we tried to get definitions from the Department of National Defence, unsuccessfully—was to try in our own way to define what integration meant, what unification meant, and what identity meant. We did this in 1965, and where these words appear in our brief, our interpretation of integration was and is the integration of headquarters forces and senior command forces. Our interpretation unification is unification—and may I note that this is as far as we go—of what we choose to term in civilian terms, servicing forces—in other words, the medical corps, the boys in works and bricks; there is no difference between the barracks in the navy, army or air force on shore and such other servicing functions.

We reserved the inclusion of combat troops within this term, because we did not know, and we do not think the Department of National Defence did know or does know to this day, what the combat troops are. I may say that we are a little sick and tired of hearing about what officers think notwithstanding the fact that we are the Naval Officers Association of Canada. If you have not troops what good is an officer? This will come out in the point that we are trying to make.

I am going to say something else that will make me highly unpopular. As a civilian coming up here on my time—and I mean my time—I am astounded at some of the questions, the retorts, the information and the discourse that I have been a witness to today by a group of gentlemen who are the defence specialists in this country. Excuse me, but I have been offered this opportunity and I want to complete this.

One last point: We have, I hope, offered constructive changes or suggestions. We have had communications with the Department of National Defence at various times prior to this brief; we have made suggestions in the past and some of these have been implemented. I do not mean that we were the only ones who made them necessarily, but we were glad to see that some changes have taken place. Now if I may, sir, I would like to read this.

There have been some changes of course since this was submitted. This brief was prepared in this form on September 20, 1966. It was referred to the National Directors of the Naval Officers Associations of Canada who concurred with its content, and it was submitted to this Committee by the national organization.

PREFACE

The vast majority of the membership (and all present Officers and Directors) of *Toronto Branch* of the Naval Officers Associations of Canada is composed of former naval officers whose ranks did *not* exceed that of Lieutenant Commander, and a number of whom have had the responsibilities of command. However, over the course of the twenty odd years since World War II, many of these *former junior* officers of both war time, and post war periods, have become not unsuccessful citizens in almost every field of vocational endeavour, including internationally known surgeons, lawyers, educators, chartered accountants and other professional specialists, bank presidents, senators, and very many senior executives in industry and commerce.

Our committee has been and is decidedly interested in why the public's return on its investment in so many of the senior officers of all three present branches of the service has been terminated by recent early retirements, the net losses in personnel, traditions, morale, and the economics of The Department of National Defence, which latter subject is being studied by a special sub-committee. From personal experiences, we know that an *unmistakeable* branch identity was very important to combat forces when "*walking out*", and we believe it is still of importance. Although we recommend consideration of its importance to today's equivalent forces, we also believe that in the final analysis each combat man of today should be given the opportunity of contributing his opinion to a decision of such importance. However, we understand that other groups or organizations will be submitting detailed briefs or comments on the above matters whereas, we are *more* interested in obtaining and assessing the basic *facts* that *caused* the current controversies.

Our findings indicate that there were other prime reasons (e.g. long past examples of poor planning and administration) in addition to unification problems that contributed to the current regrettable situation.

From studies of the White Paper on Defence, *Hansard*, published statements of authorized D.N.D. personnel, the Blue Books (Estimates and Expenditures), and Defence Committe reports, we believe it is essential to state *our* understanding of basic defence policies relative to our comments.

1. *Defence Policy*:

1.1 According to the White Paper, the government considers that "nuclear war" is unlikely, and in order to defend against modern "conventional warfare" has adopted a policy of "collective security" through military association with other nations. These are stated to be NATO, NORAD, and the U.N., and in addition to these, the government is committed to maintain a surveillance of sovereignty over Canadian territory.

1.2 Forces for specific service on land, sea, and in the air will *continue* to be required.

1.3 Canadian governments have been traditionally committed to a policy of voluntary, rather than compulsory military service.

1.4 Integration/Unification—Canadian Forces are to be integrated and unified.

2 *Toronto Branch - N.O.A.C. Position:*

The approach of our own committee to defence policy and the integration/unification situation is just this:

2.1 *Re:—Overall Policy* (1.1)

We support government policy regarding collective security, but as to the surveillance of Canadian territory we have no facts to convince us that movement of reserve and/or active forces ex-Canada against commitments will not leave Canada devoid of adequate surveillance. Similarly, we are quite interested as to *what protective plans there are for our Canadian Arctic borders.*

2.2 *Re:—Canada's Naval Role* (1.2)

Privately, from "foreign" (allied) Senior Naval Officers, we have learned that at least up to fifteen months ago, R.C.N. anti-submarine forces were considered to be the most efficient in the "free world", and disproportionately more effective than others in relation to size of force. This is what other people thought of it. Yet, there seems to be some indication that *despite indicated current manning problems,* a new standard function of transporting troops, weapons, and material, may have been added to, or replaced in part Canada's anti-submarine responsibilities.

2.3 *Re:—Voluntary/Compulsory Service* (1.3)

2.3.1 We support voluntary service so long as such a policy will provide the *combat forces* (as compared with our definition of "servicing personnel") required to meet our commitments to not only collective security operations, but also to the degree of activity necessary to protect Canadian sovereignty. In this connection the White Paper spells out our *Army* and *Air Force* commitments in personnel, etc., to NATO, but does not spell out our Naval commitments to NATO, or Air Force commitments to NORAD. Perhaps the conditions of these treaties and the sizes of component units are as [illegible] that if the government chose to put only one ship into NATO and one squadron into NORAD we might well be meeting our commitments. However, this does not seem to be particularly realistic and if part of our collective security commitments are unclassified, (White Paper) why aren't the others.

2.3.2 If for whatever practical or political reasons, we might be unable to meet our collective security commitments without depleting our requirements for the surveillance of Canadian territory, then *we believe that* compulsory service will become essential.

2.4 *Re:—Integration/Unification* (1.4)

2.4.1 The integration of senior administrative staff and the unification of forces that provide services to the *combat troops* has been met with general approval, but the interested public has had little opportunity, if any, to contribute useful comments on subsequent details that have been implemented. Various future unification details are, of course, still unknown to the public and as of this September 1st, apparently several of them have not been completed in terms of a final plan.

2.4.2 We were the first veterans' organization in Canada to publicly support "in principle" the integration of the most effective administrative talents, and unification of "servicing" functions.

2.4.3 At our annual meeting at the Royal York Hotel, Toronto, in 1964, the Minister of National Defence committed himself to affording us the opportunity of considering and commenting upon planning details as they were developed. With the exceptions of the questions of identity and uniforms, etc., unfortunately, subsequent details were an accomplished fact when we first heard about them. In no way have we ever sought or commented on "classified" highly technical or strategic information. However, in our studies of official sources of information, as referred to previously, we have been singularly *unsuccessful* in *establishing* specific *facts* concerning "how" some aspects of unification are to be handled. Therefore, it has been *hopeless* to comment on details *already* implemented, and it is *impossible* to offer intelligent comment on details that have *yet* to be worked out by the planners.

2.4.4 In the above regard we find it virtually impossible to imagine that any of Canada's largest industries (but still small in dollar spending volume in relation to the defence budget) would announce a *complete* change in their operating policies without *first* having planned the changes and effects right down to the last detail. Even in detailed planning, they would run into unexpected problems. However, the unification programme has not only been announced, but it is proceeding *without benefit* of a complete, detailed plan, which action usually *adds* to the *normal risk* of unexpected *future problems.*

2.4.5 *The keys to meeting our defence commitments are* (i) *combat personnel,* and (ii) up-to-date equipment, etc., to enable the forces to "defend". Therefore, we feel that it is the possible *effect* of unification on our *combat* forces that is most pertinent in assessing the practical results of the application of such an overall unification policy.

2.4.6 *Complete and reliable* studies of how favourably or unfavourably unification would effect our combat strength and effectiveness should be made, and should be made before any "unification" plan is finalized. In this connection, we understand that final plans for unification of other than officer ranks in combat forces have not been completed—this was as of the 22nd of September.

3. *Criticism and Recommendations*:

3.1. *Criticism*

It appears that if warranted, DND lost an earlier opportunity to have enlisted the active support of the so-called veterans' organizations. Some suggested reasons why support did not fully develop, are as follows:

3.1.1 Lack of specifically defining the three following words:

(a) integration

(b) unification

(c) identity.

3.1.2 Lack of communication between DND and the public, and the serving forces in terms of providing all unclassified unification information in simple terms pertinent to not only *what* was to happen, but also *how* it was to happen.

3.1.3 The unusual haste that appears to be present in announcing and implementing the integration/unification arrangement.

3.1.4 Lack of earlier and regular attention to differentials between armed forces and civilian pay.

3.2 *Recommendations*—and we have to qualify these.

3.2.1 *Qualifications*:

As a preface to our recommendations, we recognize that politically the Minister may obtain approval of his Defence Organization policy for these reasons:

(i) The Cabinet and caucus will probably support him.

(ii) 80% of the voting public appears to be indifferent to the whole matter.

(iii) The veterans who at most over the period of the war represented less than 10% of the population at that time, and for the sake of an assessment, assuming that they are still alive, would now represent less than 5% of the population, and are therefore of minor importance in terms of votes relative to the condition obtaining in (ii) immediately above.

(iv) Of the total Armed Forces personnel, it would seem that those that are in the "servicing" branches (one DND estimate of at least 50% of the total) would appear to be in favour of unification so long as the monetary rewards, social amenities and vocational opportunities are satisfactory.

These are the general non-combatants. Undoubtedly some of the "combat" personnel are in favour of unification, but what is of *considerable concern* to us is the matter of the feelings of those combat personnel who consider that *any* aspect of unification would inhibit their continuing service at the present time, (or over at least the next five years) to such an extent that our country would be *short of combat personnel* until such time as new recruits, voluntary or compulsory, are *trained and experienced* under the proposed new concept.

In the above connection, we have been conducting a survey since the spring of this year with the following results:

Only 25.3% have been "combat" types (those that were interviewed) but 95.1% of these men wanted to be quickly recognized as "air crew" or "sea going" or "land fighters". A distinctive cap and arm insignia did *not* appear to be considered as a distintive uniform by Naval and Air Force men. About all that can be said for the results of the survey, and our other similar enquiries to date is that in view of the lack of availability—I want to stress this: the lack of availability—of reliable data elsewhere, the results are interesting, and suggest that a properly complete survey might well be usefully informative to all concerned.

We recommend that:

So that there will be *no* question of further misunderstanding, The Department of National Defence should very clearly and publicly define the *meaning* and *application* to DND policy of the following words:

(a) unification

(b) integration

(c) identity.

3.2.3 Further steps to effect unification be halted *now*, and that consideration of any further implementations should await *completion* and *evaluation* of detailed planning and programming.

3.2.4 A factual and full survey of *combat* forces (all ranks) be undertaken to determine the importance or lack of importance of unification (including rank structure, uniforms, etc.) in relation to their continuing service. Such a survey should be in the form of straightforward questions designed to provide the *true* opinion of the respondents, rather than one designed to provide a desired answer.

3.2.5 If not possible by the Defence Committee, a *special* Parliamentary Committee be appointed with terms of reference that would permit making pertinent enquiries concerning unification of both Armed Forces personnel (including "other ranks") and civilians.

3.2.6 DND's communications with both the public and serving forces provide sequentially, *pertinent* and *clear cut* information without embellishments that cloud the issues.

3.2.7 Further to unification of *"servicing"* personnel, and "risk of death" factors inherent in volunteering for *combat* service, studies should be continued and appropriate action taken as and when required to provide the forces with adequate remuneration in relation to national living costs.

4. *Conclusion*:

The unification programme may very well be approved now "as is", but it would be indeed regrettable if two years from now we had a *full* complement of *"servicing"* personnel, but an *inadequate* number of *"combat"* types. Perhaps it would be inaccurate to apply the old adage in its entirety "for want of a nail, etc." to the possibility of a future deficiency of combat personnel, but it would be a *very serious situation* if in launching a "new product line" now when it is still in part in the "research and development" stage, it failed to meet "advertised" performance.

We in Toronto Branch supported the initial principles of integration, but we are opposed to writing a "blank cheque" of approval covering those unsubstantiated or unfinished aspects of the plan that as citizens we are permitted to know. Possibly some of the talents in our Branch might be offered to assist in obtaining the facts pertinent to points that we have raised. It is not to be construed that we are presumptively *asking* to help, or be privy to "classified" information. Rather, we hope that the suggestion would be considered as a further constructive effort on our part, wherein, if DND felt that we might be of assistance, we would welcome the opportunity to comply with such a request.

Mr. Chairman, if I may, I have two short comments to make which will perhaps clarify and therefore eliminate some questions.

Listening to the discussions today it is my feeling that this difference of opinion—I do not mean to over simplify it—resolves itself into the loss of uniform identity in some form to the air force and the navy and, to a lesser extent, the army, and the imposition of standard rank structures which might not be entirely acceptable to perhaps—let us deal with the navy specifically. We do not know this and my purpose in being here is to see if I can make some contribution to constructively bring about some amelioration of the differences that exist.

If I may interject a very short story, a chap, who had been an employee all his life, was fed up with it, so he decided to go into business himself. He had no money been in business when he could not sleep because of worrying about making enough money to pay for his supplies, his help and so on. He went to his doctor and asked for something to make him sleep and the doctor said, "Well I will give you a pill". The fellow said, "Oh no, I do not want any pills doctor; I am against pills".

The CHAIRMAN: Is this story going to be in line with the decorum being maintained in this Committee?

Mr. MANCHEE: I think so. So the doctor said, "Have you heard of twilight sleep?" and the patient said, "Oh yes, doctor but that is for labour; I need something for management". The analogy here is not labour and management, but responsibility. May I suggest that the responsibility of coming to a conclusion on this rests with you gentlemen, and anything I can contribute to assist you, I will be glad to do so. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, would you like to continue with your questions? Mr. Deachman was first on my list for continuing on with questions but now, of course, those being questioned will naturally include Mr. Manchee, on his brief.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, first I would certainly like to congratulate Mr. Manchee on producing a short and concise brief and also to compliment him on bringing before us a brief which has not appended to it some editorials from the Toronto Telegram.

On the question, sir, of our being specialists I do not think we can claim that honour, we are just members of one of the 21 Standing Committees of the House and, at one time or another, we all try to do our bit. I would not want to be labeled a specialist on this committee. I am quite sure that you were astounded at some of the things you heard, and I know for our part we have been astounded at some of the things that we have heard from you and your colleagues.

Could you tell us sir, when this brief was written? I cannot find a date on the covering letter by Mr. Bundy or on the brief itself.

Mr. MANCHEE: I could not tell you how many drafts were made, probably 15, commencing in 1965. It finally appeared in this form—it is on the front page of our copy; I am sorry if yours does not have it—on September 20, 1966, and I think it was submitted to this Committee on October 3.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Yes, somebody has now given me a brief with the covering letter of October 3. So the brief is not written in the light of the bill, the first

reading of which was November 4; and it is not written then in the light, of course, of the Minister's address on second reading, but deals with matters and information which would be in your hands up to that time?

Mr. MANCHEE: Correct.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I have a couple of comments here, and I will not be too long. I think, sir, if you were to look at the brief and the bill, and particularly at the explanatory notes in the bill, you would see notes on the definitions of "integration", "unification" and, in particular, on the subject of "identification". I think if you start at page 1, and read the explanatory notes to the bill, these all turn up.

On the subject of NATO or the naval commitments to NATO, is it not right to say that Maritime Command is in itself a commitment to NATO? Are we not committed in our military alliance with NATO to the surveillance of an area of the Atlantic? Do we not maintain Maritime Command not only for the defence of Canada but in conjunction with our allies under NATO for the surveillance of an area of the sea? Therefore, is not Maritime Command itself a NATO commitment in the event of the NATO treaty being invoked?

Mr. MANCHEE: I have not been privy to some of these details. It is my understanding that part of the proposed or now existing Maritime Command is committed, but to what extent. I do not know. It is not set out in the White Paper. You have not even detailed it here, have you sir?

Mr. DEACHMAN: I do not detail it except to say that in all our briefings in Halifax and here by senior officers of the department, the impression that I have been left with is that Canada has a NATO commitment, in conjunction with our allies, for surveillance of an area of the sea. When you go to Halifax and are shown the operations room, you have the opportunity of looking at that area of the sea. I understand that if the NATO treaty were invoked in the event of a war and the NATO allies found themselves in that war, that is the area over which we would have surveillance.

Mr. MANCHEE: Well, you are aware of information that we do not have. We are in no position to get into the technicalities of the number of ships or the amount of fire power because we are just not informed.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Are these not dealt with in NATO force goals, and is it not a part of the NATO allies arrangement that force goals are set from time to time by negotiation among the NATO allies? I think that is how it is done.

Mr. MANCHEE: I read the White Paper rather carefully and neither I nor my colleagues in the branch arrived at any such conclusion that there was anything definitive in the White Paper as to what they were committed to. It stated, for example, the number of brigades and squadrons that were to go to Europe but it did not state how many ships, of what type, or where and so on.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I think certainly I would interpret our NORAD commitment to mean, from a reading for instance of the Minister's address on second reading, that this would include the air defence command. He says in his address on second reading, "In recognition of our commitment to North American Air Defence Comand (NORAD), the role of Air Defence Command is to contribute to defence of our continent in concert with forces of the United States." I think that is a fairly clear definition of a commitment to NORAD.

Mr. MANCHEE: It depends, I suppose, on one's interpretation or application of the word "clear", and I am sorry but it is not clear to me as to what the actual commitment is.

Mr. DEACHMAN: He goes on to describe at some length—and I do not want to take up the time of the Committee—the components of Air Defence Command which he has described in his first sentence "to contribute to the defence of our continent in concert with forces of the United States".

Mr. MANCHEE: Might I ask the member a question?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: By all means.

Mr. MANCHEE: Would you agree with me that the discourse that has taken place today, through devious routes, still comes back to this basic question of identity in one form or another, whether it is uniform, rank, or whatever it is. One gentleman made the remark a few minutes ago that it is the serviceman's responsibility to obey. I think this is true, but the word "democratic" appears in several releases, and various speakers for the Department of National Defence have accentuated the essentiality of a higher degree of education and a greater development of intelligence to man the more sophisticated weapons and so on, than we have had in the past, and with the rapid communications that we have today people are certainly much better informed. I have five children and I know very well that my children are much more knowledgeable about things than I ever was at their ages.

If these "chaps" are more intelligent, or are required to be more intelligent, and if we are striving for a more democratic system, I do not think that it is unreasonable, not to poll the other ranks, but to ask: "Look, how many of you fellows would pack it up if you lose your naval identity or your air force identity?" Perhaps there will be only a few. We do not know.

Our survey was extremely limited, but nobody else had done anything about it; and it was a very limited scope that we had within which to work. It was interesting; that is all it was. It was sufficiently interesting that we would go on record and suggest that it might be worth while to examine it.

As far as our position is concerned it is not what we thought as of 22 years ago. They could not care less what we thought. The question is really what does a man think today. If he wants to wear a sky-blue uniform, and he is going to fight and that will give him the added moral support, or whatever you want to call it—esprit de corps and so on—within groups, or if he wants a purple uniform, we will supply it; but let us not get into a position of losing a very important part of our combat strength.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Well, Mr. Manchee—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Deachman, I think that the second round of questioning should be limited to 10 minutes if we want to get anywhere. We can have a third round. You have had your 10 minutes. The next person I have on my list here—

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Manchee put a question to me and if I may make a very short reply that would complete it. He put the question to me that this uniform should have been the result of putting questions to the men. I wondered whether or not he had read the statement of the Minister that the

uniform will be introduced over a considerable time on the basis of users' test and will not suddenly descend on men all at once. I would consider that to be a pretty fair method of introducing a new uniform into the service.

Moreover, he said some other things about uniforms which I think you and I both know. He has said, for instance, that unit badges are not going to be disturbed and he has guaranteed the identity of units and the names of units. He has guaranteed such things as the kilt and the band and the customs of the regiments and of the battalions. These questions were all carefully put to Air Vice Marshal Sharp before this Committee only a few days ago and much of this has already been hammered out in this Committee.

I am satisfied that no man in a unit today is suddenly going to find himself jarred by the sudden and unexplained introduction of new customs and new uniforms and new rules which will upset his entire military life. I just do not share this belief with you and others who have appeared before us, and I say this on the cognizance of men whom we have had before this committee from the department—both military men and the minister—and whom we have examined at length on these questions.

Mr. MANCHEE: Were these senior officers?

Mr. DEACHMAN: An Air Marshal; I do not know how many ranks there are above that.

Mr. MANCHEE: I am asking you whether you have had an AC2 or whatever you call them today, or an ordinary seaman?

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Manchee, I have to go to the man who makes the rules, and we have asked the Minister these questions. We have asked Air Marshal Sharp these questions. These are the people who are in charge of making the rules. Those are the fellows we should ask—the fellows who are out to protect the AC2—the man who, we want to make sure, is not jarred in such a way that he is driven from the forces and his morale destroyed; and my questions do not lead me to any belief that that is going to happen.

The CHAIRMAN: I do not know whether that was a question or not; it did not sound like a question to me. The next questioner I have on my list is Mr. Lambert.

Mr. DEACHMAN: It was a long question. The question mark was rather delayed there!

Mr. LAMBERT: My question is for Mr. Hendy rather than to Mr. Manchee because it follows from their brief.

A great deal of emphasis was placed by the Minister in his speech on December 7 at page 10,829, and by Air Marshal Sharp, on the elimination of what they call "single service bias"; that because of the fact that servicemen would be in one uniform and in one service they would not be subject to their own particular service bias. Much was made of what we would call objective study of the big picture. I think you will have noted this in the Minister's statement. If I may, briefly, put it on the record again, it states:

> Therefore it has become imperative that there be a higher loyalty beyond that which is given to a particular service.
>
> Modern operations analysis seeks to compare the potential effectiveness of different techniques in relation to the resources available. In order to get the best results from this kind of analysis, however, it is

necessary to employ the most objective judgment, first in setting our criteria for the analysis and secondly in interpreting the results of the analysis.

This is one area where a single service bias can produce, and historically has often produced, a result which is not the most effective in relation to the cost. The more objectivity that can be applied to the studies the better the chances of the right solution. It would be impossible to eliminate all bias because individuals will naturally be influenced by their own specialized training and background.

Do you feel that this is a legitimate observation or conclusion?

Mr. Hendy: I do not agree with this. From my knowledge of service organization, I do not know whether the evidence of others who have been Minister of Defence would support the statement that service bias leads to what is called service bickering. Mr. Lambert is this the area that you are concerned with?

I have always felt that the chiefs of staff under our system certainly presented arguments and discussions with respect to the particular form of warfare in which they were trained and brought up in, but that once there was a consensus that became the policy and it was adopted.

This is a system that other military powers are adopting. At the top they have experts in the various fields. Service bias is purely and simply the exercise of various professional knowledges. You get this in management in business. You have your sales people, your production people and everybody else, and you also have competition amongst the units.

I do not think that "service bias" is the right way to describe it if I have the correct interpretation of what is meant by that I do not think it is bias. I think it is a matter of somebody who spends his entire career in a certain forum and learning how to fight in a particular environment and who, when he gets to the top, is in the best position to argue that particular case. It is not just a matter of black or white in this area. You do not want the situation where there is just one person in the advisory capacity. You have to bring all expert opinions to bear so that a good decision can be made.

I hope I have interpreted your—

Mr. Lambert: In part; but my reference to this is not only for those at the very top but any of those on staff above combat formation, because this was the point which was emphasized. It is not just at the top that one looks at operations analyses and weapons requirements and so on. This is done right down to the combat formations.

Mr. Hendy: You will be hearing this week from witnesses who are far more expert in this field than I am; particularly the last two maritime commanders. We have had an integrated command for seven or eight years and I am not aware that the two services concerned in that command did not get along well; on the other hand, I am not aware, either, that there is any desire that they should all be in the same service just because they were integrated command-wise in maritime command.

I cannot speak from experience but you are going to hear other people who can. I do not think it necessarily follows. You get—if you like to call it—friendly

rivalry and a spirit of competition, but I do not think you get an over-all bias that upsets the organization.

Mr. LAMBERT: This is my last question. Is this friendly rivalry, or particular service bias, going to be any less because a man is in one uniform, bearing in mind that up to the time that he reaches this staff position he has been trained as a specialist either on land, at sea, or in the air, and that he will suddenly lose this particular bias, shall we call it, simply because he is in a single uniform?

Mr. HENDY: I do not know. You are still going to bring him up, as it were in a particular environment in the lower levels; therefore, you are going to carry that original professional knowledge right through. If, when you get to the higher levels, you then overlap too much, your professionalism in the field in which you were brought up will be reduced. This is the essence of the problem.

I cannot see that there is any advantage to be gained by eliminating the present identifiable services. As far as I can see it is not going to achieve any more, in the type of situation that you are outlining.

The CHAIRMAN: It is almost 10 o'clock, gentlemen. The witnesses have been here for some time, and we obviously cannot go on with them tomorrow because we have a full day. Some of them have expressed their willingness to return, if that is the wish of the Committee.

I rather expected that by now we would have been called back to the House, but I understand there is no need for that.

What is your wish? We have four on the second round of questioning. Mr. Laniel, Mr. McIntosh, Mr. Rock and Mr. Andras.

Mr. MCNULTY: Mr. Chairman, rather than having the witnesses going to all the trouble of coming back again could we not continue for 10 or 15 minutes if that will not cause too much inconvenience?

The CHAIRMAN: Shall we carry on and see what happens?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Yes.

Mr. LANIEL: My point has been dealt with by someone else.

Mr. ROCK: Mr. Manchee, from your brief it appears that you feel that there is some dissatisfaction amongst the ranked and not among the people below decks. I do not seem to have heard from any of these former naval officers the concern of the people below deck so much as the officers themselves. This, I presume, because of the change of rank. Would you say that it was because of the change of rank?

Mr. MANCHEE: I am not too clear on what you mean.

Mr. ROCK: The change from the naval ranks to the ranks that are proposed in Bill No. C-243?

Mr. MANCHEE: Yes; perhaps I should quote what our question was to these "chaps". "Would a standard uniform, with no immediately identifiable marks, of light blue air force colour, or a navy sort of thing, and if you were called "sergeant", would this have any effect on your continuing interest?" To those who were non-combat types it made no difference whatsoever. I think I tried to bring that out.

Mr. ROCK: I am talking particularly about the fellows aboard ship.

Mr. MANCHEE: Fellows aboard ship, yes.

Mr. ROCK: Below deck?

Mr. MANCHEE: Yes.

Mr. ROCK: These are the officers?

Mr. MANCHEE: No; these are the ratings.

Mr. ROCK: The ratings usually have more respect for the first—and second-in-command of a ship. What do they usually call these people? Are they called by their rank, or are there other names that they are usually called?

An hon. MEMBER: They are called lots of names!

Mr. ROCK: What do the ratings usually call the first-in-command of a ship?

Mr. MANCHEE: "The old man".

Mr. ROCK: "The old man," or "the skipper". It does not make any difference whether he is a lieutenant commander, a commander or what have you, they still call him "skipper"; and the first lieutenant, whether he is a commander or a lieutenant commander, they will call "the first lieutenant". No matter what rank the engineering officer is, they still call him "the E.O.". Do you think that the ratings worry very much about what their ranks are? They will still be called "skipper", "the first lieutenant" and "the E.O.".

Mr. MANCHEE: Yes; but you started your question, if I understood you correctly, by asking about the ratings. We are interested in officers, too, but we are also very much interested in how the ratings feel.

As I have pointed out, this was a very small and limited survey and involved only a few hundred men of all three services. This is what the men themselves felt about their ranks, not what they thought of the officers, on whether to call him "the chief", "the chief engineer", or "the Jimmy" or anything else. It is what they thought.

Mr. ROCK: In other words, being called "corporal" rather than "leading seaman", and "sergeant" rather than "petty officer"?

Mr. MANCHEE: Yes.

Mr. ROCK: The petty officer first class, I guess, would be very happy to be called a warrant officer, because that seems to be higher in rank, in a sense, as compared to the past.

Mr. NUGENT: Surely they are concerned less with what they are called than with what their service is?

Mr. ROCK: I do not understand you, Mr. Nugent.

Mr. NUGENT: It is the identity of service, not whether they are addressed as of equivalent rank or anything else. Their concern is that all ranks will be in the navy and be known as sailors and navymen—

Mr. ROCK: I think that they will still be considered to be sailors, on the ships, at any rate, and that there will still be a navy.

From your survey you feel there is some concern, but that so far as the men are concerned they do not think that, as it affects commissioned officers, it makes any difference?

Mr. MANCHEE: The question was not asked of the men and therefore I cannot factually answer it. I can answer only in the terms of what we asked, which was how did the men themselves feel about their own rank or title.

Mr. McINTOSH: Mr. Manchee, I take it from your brief that you are having the same difficulty that many members from the opposition are having in defining certain words, namely, "integration", "unification" and "identity"?

Mr. MANCHEE: We were; and therefore we made our own definitions. We got several during our exploration and we finally arrived at our own.

Unfortunately I have not, read the definitions in Bill No. C-243, which were referred to by someone; but we had to establish at least what we meant by these words.

Mr. McINTOSH: In one of the questions asked of you about when this brief was prepared it was brought out that it was before the Minister introduced his bill into the House. Have you read the Minister's statement?

Mr. MANCHEE: No, I have not.

Mr. McINTOSH: I have read a press report of it, but I have not read Hansard.

In his red book—as some people call it—the Minister defined "unification", and this is what he says:

> "Unification" is the end objective of a logical and evolutionary progression.

Does that clear up in your mind what "unification" is?

Mr. MANCHEE: It is very simple. Is there no qualification there?

Mr. McINTOSH: There is none, except that it was possibly qualified later on by the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff when he said: "Unification is not legislative."

Mr. MANCHEE: As business and professional people, we welcome—as does everyone, I think, from what I hear—the minister's idea of unification, up to the point that I have stipulated. Here we have a question mark, as have other people.

Mr. McINTOSH: But you have defined "unification" in your own terms and you make that statement qualifying it, saying that this is your understanding of "unification".

Mr. MANCHEE: Yes.

Mr. McINTOSH: But can you assure us that "unification" as you define it is what the Minister means? This is what we have to decide.

An hon. MEMBER: No, no.

An hon. MEMBER: May I ask a supplementary question?

Mr. McINTOSH: Just one moment. Another point which was put to you in questioning by our colleagues was that the Minister had made a guarantee, or a commitment, that certain things would not come to pass, such as the changing of badges, the kilt, or the bagpipes, or what have you, and also that there would be no interruption of the three services known as the army, air force and the navy. Do you accept that statement, which was made by a member of this Committee, that this is what the Minister meant?

Mr. MANCHEE: I do not see in itself how it could result in anything but a change. In the case of badge identification, and so on—and I am talking about cap badges, because I am not familar with, and have not seen, these arm badges—I would say that a sailor's cap is identification, as a badge. Heraldry is a bit of a hobby of mine, and technically speaking it is a form of badge as is the

helmet in the coat of arms of Canada. I would say that to remove the cap in its present form, then, would be the removal of a badge of identification.

Mr. McIntosh: Mr. Deachman suggested to you that the Minister had guaranteed that there would be no change in these different identification badges, of units and so on, with the exception of a change in uniform. What I want to know is if you accepted that statement by Mr. Deachman, because I am going to ask you—

Mr. Manchee: No, I cannot accept it; and I thought I indicated that.

Mr. McIntosh: I do not think you remarked on it.

Mr. Manchee: I am sorry.

Mr. McIntosh: Accepting that there was a guarantee by the Minister, or a commitment made by the Minister—and I can see numerous places where he appears to do that in his speech, he always ends up with a sentence such as: "Until the force structure within the unified force is developed." I want you to give us your interpretation of that. Is it that the guarantee is just for a certain period, or is it indefinite, or is it until the plan is changed?

I am asking the witness, because he seemed to accept the statement that was made that there was a guarantee in the Minister's words.

Mr. Manchee: I do not know to what extent Mr. Deachman quoted the Minister verbatim, but so far as what Mr. Deachman said I accept that he said it was a guarantee, and I also state that in my very personal opinion a standard uniform is a change of identification.

Mr. Deachman: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, in my statement I said that these were replies made to me by Air Marshal Sharp in response to questions regarding identity. It was not the Minister. It was Air Marshal Sharp, the vice chief of staff; and he replied to me at considerable length. I stated this quite clearly, I think.

Mr. McIntosh: I am quite sure I heard him say "the Minister", but in the transcript of evidence—

Mr. Deachman: The Minister has also made these statements; but I am referring to the testimony of Air Marshal Sharp in the record of the Committee in answer to these questions.

Mr. Manchee: I am sorry; I have not read Air Marshal Sharp's testimony and therefore I am not competent to comment on it.

May I come back to your question and try to answer it? Will you repeat it, please?

Mr. McIntosh: My question was on a guarantee, which I assumed you had accepted, that there would be no change in the badges of the three forces and so on—a guarantee, or definite commitment, by the Minister that there would be no change. If you had accepted it, I was going to ask you to explain to me what you understood by the words with which the Minister always ends up: "Until the force structure within the unified force is developed." Is that a limit on the guarantee or commitment?

Mr. Manchee: Mr. McIntosh, I am not a politician and therefore I would not try to interpret for you gentlemen what that means in terms of politics. I can tell

you what it means in business, and professionally. It is a hedge clause. The utilization of it, I would guess, would be at the discretion of the principal involved.

Mr. McINTOSH: One writer made this statement: "Many of Mr. Hellyer's arguments in support of unification have an improvised air about them as though he had dreamed up unification first and then devised the evidence in support of it afterwards." Is that your interpretation of the term "unification" as the Minister has defined it?

Mr. MANCHEE: This is very interesting. First, I did not presume to speak to the Minister, and, secondly—

Mr. McINTOSH: I want your interpretation of what the Minister has said.

Mr. MANCHEE: —I think that our brief answers that question. It was our opinion at that time—and I have to qualify this only to the extent that I have not read these last two things officially—that he was going too fast; that, in a sense, the whole program was not planned to the last detail, which is the normal thing for business organizations to do. They have a plan or a guide to measure where they are at any one time. In this particular plan—in terms of implementing through programming—the principles were set out, but the details were not completed, and as we went down the line we found that many of the details which must be worked out in order to implement the program and the plan were missing at various stages. To what extent they are missing now, I do not know, but at the time of preparing this brief the planning was not complete in detail. The Chief of Staff advises to that effect.

Mr. McINTOSH: You have also said in your brief that you were in favour of integration of all servicing of units or corps, or whatever you want to call them. Have you any idea what the common factor is in, say, one service servicing the navy and the air force—what percentage of the material that they use is common to both?

Mr. MANCHEE: It is not very high, as it exists now. I presume it would be higher, of course, if there was one single uniform; but it would still not be very high. Does that answer your question, or does it not?

Mr. McINTOSH: No; I was thinking of—

Mr. MANCHEE: If you want a percentage figure, it would be a guess.

Mr. McINTOSH: The gentlemen are whispering in my ear "Ten per cent". This is the figure that I have.

Mr. MANCHEE: I will check that. I do not have it here. I have an idea that, at most, it would be 15 per cent, according to our checks. When I say that I mean that I am going back over the estimates of what was navy, what was army and what was air force. We went back for about five years.

Mr. McINTOSH: Then it was too low a percentage of common material to take too much advantage of integrating the services?

Mr. MANCHEE: Oh, yes. Let us get our words correct. I am talking about unification of servicing. This is what you started out with.

Mr. McINTOSH: No. I do not understand the term "unification".

Mr. MANCHEE: Would you accept my definition of it so that at least we have a common denominator?

Mr. McINTOSH: Yes, I can accept that.

Mr. MANCHEE: All right then; I would disagree with that statement as you have put it. It is true that in terms of supply—and I was referring to supply with the 10-15 per cent figure—I think that would be true, but, my gracious, I do not think it would be at all true in terms of, say, the dental units such as were standard in the last war, or medical services, probably; postal services; and pay and allowances. I am thinking in business terms here; in these things, to me, it would have a lot of merit.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Relating that to services, I think what you are talking about is integration, not unification.

Mr. MANCHEE: You agreed to use my definition. I am talking about unification of certain forces, or service personnel, who, again in our term, service the combat troops.

Mr. MCINTOSH: That is the end of my questions.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Manchee, you have expressed, among other things, concern about two major points: one is on the depth of the study that has gone into this, and, particularly pertaining to the consultation with servicemen, I think you are quite concerned about getting below the rank of officer in those consultations. You did mention earlier that you did not have the opportunity to review Air Marshal Sharp's evidence. In that case, I doubt if you would be aware of some of the detail of the depth of study that has gone into it. I will quote, from page 6 of Air Marshal Sharp's evidence, three very major items.

1. We are now in the middle of a pilot study, assisted by a Canadian consultant firm, on financial management.

2. A comprehensive job analysis program has been initiated by a full time staff of service experts.

3. An increasing number of management engineering studies have been performed—a total in 1965 and 1966 of some 530 different studies.

Now, coming to the very important question of consultation with service staff, are you aware then, for instance, that—and let me quote Air Marshal Sharp—

> —many of these (studies and programs which I have just referred to) affect the conditions of service of our servicemen. It is important that they be given an opportunity to contribute as the programs evolve and develop.

Let me give you some examples of the consultation that has taken place. Are you aware, for instance, that some 6,000 different people at 21 different bases were involved in the revision of the trade specifications and structure? That in the pay procedure studies, some 5,500 people at 14 different locations were interviewed during the study, which lasted from February till mid-August 1966, and that the full range of subjects dealing with pay and allowances, service conditions, remuneration in general, re-engagement bonuses were discussed; and that, in addition—and this is the point of our bringing other ranks into the picture—in the pay structure studies six or seven warrant officers from the three services were brought in to take part in the study as full-time members and to inject the views of servicemen?

Are you aware that two studies were conducted on service conditions; the Mobile Command; that the Milroy Study introduced some 630 personnel at all ranks?

Are you aware that the MacFadden study in training command was conducted between February and June 1966 and that information was submitted from nine Training Command bases; that in addition, some 1,200 people of all ranks were interviewed formally and others at their place of work; that the subject covered the entire range of pay and allowances, promotion policies, rank structure, job security, retirement policies and pensions, release policies, career management, the entire range of the subject of service conditions and service dress; and that Wing Commander MacFadden is now, in the Directorate at CFHQ, responsible for service conditions so that he can inject into the decisions the results of his and other studies?

Are you aware that when considering rank badges, for example, over 200 NCO's and warrant officer equivalents gave their opinions on the proposed rank badges and that there was better than 90 per cent agreement on the proposals? There I quote Air Marshal Sharp as saying:

> It might be pertinent to note that no pressure was exerted on these personnel.

Are you aware, sir, that, in addition to these examples, the Minister's two manpower studies interviewed hundreds of personnel? I could go on with several examples, but it ends by saying that

> —the views of our servicemen are being sought and considered—their views are valuable and we use them.

I would think, sir, had you had the opportunity to read that—and I quite understand why you did not—that it surely would have given you some reassurance on the subject of consultation with the servicemen and the depth of study that has gone into this.

Mr. MANCHEE: Mr. Andras, are you making a statement, or are you asking me a question?

Mr. ANDRAS: I am asking you, really, because this reassured me. I would think that had you had that opportunity you would be reassured to a certain degree. Is that not the case?

Mr. MANCHEE: No, I am not reassured; and I will tell you why: I do not know what questions were asked, I do not know how the questions were phrased and I do not know whether the sampling was high enough. That is my answer.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I have one short question. I do not want to prolong it, because I wanted to be out of here earlier.

Mr. Manchee, in addition to the work that you will be doing in trying to define "integration" and "unification", will you also have a look at *Hansard* for December 7, 1966, where the Minister made his celebrated speech? There he used the word "amalgamation" of the navy, army and air force. So that you now have another word to worry about.

Mr. MANCHEE: Mr. Churchill, I do not know whether that is a question, but I am beginning to learn a little about the form of these questions.

I would like to say this, and repeat what I said before, that as a private citizen I am interested in contributing whatever I can and whatever our branch

can may I point out that what I have presented to you is not the work of one man? There are a number of people who have worked pretty hard on this. May I also point out that they have done it voluntarily, not only at some considerable cost in time but also in personal expense of which there was no hope of any recovery, and that this was known?

Our purpose, if we have one, is to make a useful contribution in reconciling this difference. Everybody could talk from now until after centennial year about their own interpretations of "unification" and so on. May I suggest that, notwithstanding what has occurred since the date of the submission of our brief, the basic points which we bring out there are still valid? All I have to do is listen to the comments from both sides of this table to recognize that there are still differences of opinion.

In the best interest of our country, do you not think that it would make sense to come to some compromise somewhere? Perhaps these studies which Mr. Andras referred to are excellent. I do not know; and in my professional capacity I would not dare to agree or disagree, not knowing the conditions under which they were made; but it would seem to me that somewhere along the line something has to be done about this. Granted, it is law, and you cannot change the structure of the regulations and so on, but laws can be changed, and perhaps some trials can be undertaken. I do not have a specific. I wish I had. I thought I had before I came here, but after this discourse I have not.

I can assure you that we can give some further thought to it, and if we can offer any suggestion that makes sense it would be our pleasure to do so. We are not going to waste your time, or ours, on something that does not make sense, I hope.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, that seems to conclude the questioning of these witnesses.

I know that you would not want me to release them without again expressing our gratitude to everyone who has come here at our request for the work that they have put in on their brief and for the personal arrangements that they have had to make in order to be here.

I might mention that some of the witnesses have no place to stay tonight. We will have the committee's officials working on that immediately.

I would like to express my own thanks as well as those of all the members of the Committee.

The meeting is adjourned.

Appendix D

NAVY LEAGUE OF CANADA
NAVAL OFFICERS ASSOCIATIONS OF CANADA
ROYAL CANADIAN NAVAL ASSOCIATION

Committee on the Maritime Component
of the Canadian Defence Force

36 Prince Arthur Avenue,
Toronto 5, Ontario

26th September, 1966.

To Members of the Senate and
Members of the House of Commons,
of Canada.

Enclosed herewith is a copy of a brief prepared by the Committee formed by the organizations noted on the letterhead hereof. Although the brief is specifically directed to the standing Committee on defence of the House of Commons, because of the widespread interest that has developed in the last few months in respect to matters affecting the defence of Canada it has been thought that all members of the Senate and House of Commons would be interested in receiving a copy of the brief. This is especially so as it is not known when the defence Committee will be convened. Therefore, notwithstanding the manner of address which has been adopted, all those to whom this brief is being forwarded will regard the act of submitting it as constituting a request that the material set forth therein, and particularly the recommendations, receive the widest consideration of both Houses of Parliament.

It might be said in support of a review of Canada's defence establishment by independent inquiry that no precedent would be created by accepting this recommendation. Recently in the fields of banking, transportation and taxation, we have had Royal Commissions considering the implications of these three important aspects of our economic life. In the past few years committees or commissions have been established for examining certain aspects of our Military organization although their terms of reference did not extend to a consideration of the entire defence establishment. Thus apart from the substantial monies spent on defence every year, which makes the subject of vital importance to every Canadian as a taxpayer, the efficiency and effectiveness of our Military forces, and especially the Navy's role therein in contributing to the preservation of our independence and sovereignty, constitutes ample justification for this Committee's recommendations on this point. It is on this basic therefore that we put before you the enclosed brief with the earnest plea that it receive the attention which its subject matter deserves.

Respectfully,

Robert D. Hendy

(Robert D. Hendy)
Chairman.

NAVY LEAGUE OF CANADA
NAVAL OFFICERS ASSOCIATIONS OF CANADA
ROYAL CANADIAN NAVAL ASSOCIATION

Committee on the Maritime Component
of the Canadian Defence Force

36 Prince Arthur Avenue,
Toronto, Ontario.
September 1966.

The Chairman,
Standing Committee on National Defence,
Parliament Buildings,
Ottawa, Ontario.

Dear Sir:

Further to our telegram of 23rd June and letter of 29th June we now present herewith the brief of this Committee for consideration by the members of your Committee. It is our desire to present this formally before a meeting of your Committee and we will be prepared, within the extent of our knowledge and experience, to discuss the contents and any collateral matter arising thereout on such occasion.

You may rest assured that notwithstanding certain areas of criticism which are apparent on a full reading of this brief, our concern is in ensuring that all ramifications of the Defence programme are brouht under the degree of scrutiny necessary to provide the best possible form of organization for the Nation's defence.

Since the Committee was formed there has been widespread interest aroused on the whole question of Canada's defence organization. It can be said that never before in peace, with the possible exception of the controversy over naval defence in 1910 and the birth of Royal Canadian Navy, has the Canadian public been more interested in hearing the facts and requiring an objective and dispassionate examination of the defence programme.

With this in mind and appaisal has been taken in this brief through the raising of questions to which response should be considered which in turn will be suggested areas for examination of inquiry.

Copies of this letter and the brief are being sent to all Members of Parliament, branches of the organizations represented on the Committee and other interested groups and individuals.

Yours respectfully,

(Robert I. Hendy)
Chairman.

B R I E F

TO THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS

BY

THE COMMITTEE ON THE MARITIME COMPONENT

OF THE CANADIAN DEFENCE FORCES

formed by

THE NAVY LEAGUE OF CANADA

THE NAVAL OFFICERS ASSOCIATIONS OF CANADA

THE ROYAL CANADIAN NAVAL ASSOCIATION

SEPTEMBER 1966

36 PRINCE ARTHUR AVENUE,
TORONTO.

CONTENTS

	Page
1. Statement of Purpose	1
2. The Committee	2
3. Assumptions	4
4. Background	6
5. Special Considerations Relating to a Maritime Force	11
6. Comments on Recent Defence Issues and Programmes	14
(a) Developments Since March 1964	14
(b) Some Ramifications of the Defence Re-organization	15
(i) Basic Observations	15
(ii) Personnel Erosion	17
(iii) Command Organization	19
(c) Possible Consequences of Steps Implemented or Planned	21
(i) Financial	21
(ii) The Defence Council and Armed Forces Council	23
(iii) Recruiting and Re-engagement	24
(iv) Common Uniform	28
(d) Some Observations on Historical and Traditional Factors	29
7. Comments on Efforts to Influence Public Opinion in Respect to the Defence Re-organization	33
8. Conclusions	35
9. Recommendations	38

Schedules: - "A" Letter to Chairman of Committee on Defence of 29th June 1966.

- "B" Compendium of Articles for the Press.

1.

1. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

This Committee's purpose is to ensure that whatever final form the Canadian Defence establishment takes, it will provide the most effective Maritime Force for the tasks it will be required to perform in the interests of Canada.

This brief has been prepared for the purpose of bringing before the Parliamentary Committee on Defence the reasoning that prompted this Committee to recommend a pause in the unification process so that a full public evaluation of the program can be made.

2. THE COMMITTEE

The Committee presenting this brief is comprised of officials of each of the named organizations. The composition of the Committee is as follows.

Mr. R.G. Bundy, President of the Naval Officers Associations of Canada; Mr J.E. Koyl, Member of the Board of Management and National Chairman of Navy League Cadets of the Navy League of Canada; Commodore R.I. Hendy, RCNR (Retired), Honourary President of the Royal Canadian Naval Association and Member of the Board of Management, Ontario Division of the Navy League of Canada; Mr. H.A. Maynard, President of the Royal Canadian Naval Association; Mr. R.C.G. Wilson, Q.C., President of the Ontario Division and Member of National Council, Navy League of Canada.

Arising out of discussions and correspondence extending over several years, the Committee was formed at a meeting held at 36 Prince Arthur Avenue, Toronto, Ontario, on the 20th day of June 1966, at which the National Presidents of all three organizations were present in addition to other senior officials, and at this meeting Commodore Hendy was appointed the Chairman and Mr. H.R. Gillard, the National Secretary of the Navy League of Canada, was appointed Secretary. The discussions were for the purpose of bringing together the three National Organizations to consider how they might have a closer working relationship particularly with respect to matters affecting the state of the RCN and our Maritime potential.

It should be pointed out that the Charters of all three National Organizations embody objectives relating to the support of the Navy as a component of the Canadian Defence Forces and a need to maintain a public interest in Naval and Maritime affairs

It may be said at the outset that these three National Organizations subscribe to the tenets contained in their Charters relating to Maritime affairs and do not feel that there has been any diminishing or lessening of a requirement for an adequate Naval Force for Canada under present World conditions and in light of Canada's foreign policy and commitments Accordingly, as a result of the discussions referred to, the Committee determined that the first step was to prepare and submit a brief for presentation to the Commons Standing Committee on Defence

It might appear from the organizations concerned in this Committee that perhaps some title would have been adopted such as "Save the Navy" The members of the Committee and the associations concerned are well aware that changes in the organization of the defence forces may be required, and to avoid any indication of a prejudging of the merits of any proposals in respect to such reorganization, it was felt the Committee should adopt a style which in itself would not suggest the taking of an inflexible position

It might be added that the organizations supporting the Committee embrace membership and persons interested in their activities of some 45,000 persons including 15,000 cadets in some 200 centres in Canada.

The Committee assumes that there is no change in the basic premise on which a Canadian Defence Policy is predicated in relation to Maritime matters and in particular reference is made to the White Paper on Defence of March, 1964, which is set out therein as follows:

1. "the objectives of Canadian defence policy ..... are to provide for the protection and surveillance of our coastal waters" - Page 5.

2. "One can define the defence of Canada as those aspects of North American defence which must, for reasons based upon Canadian National interests, be subject to Canadian control. The minimum requirements for the defence of Canada are: the ability to maintain surveillance of Canadian territorial waters; the ability to deal with incidents in the oceans off the Canadian coasts" - Page 13.

3. "Since 1939 Canadian Maritime programs have been heavily concentrated upon the defence of North Atlantic Sea communications against submarine attack. This concentration is being based on the importance of these communications to the entire North Atlantic community. It has had the effect of establishing a strong Canadian presence in the approaches to the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the waters off the Atlantic Coast. At the same time an adequate anti-submarine warfare capability is being maintained on the Pacific Coast" - Page 14.

4. "it is planned to continue in the anti-submarine role" - Page 23.

5. "The choice of priorities is based on the following assessment:

3. Maritime forces -in-being as a contribution to the deterrent" - Page 24.

If these statements of policy are still valid, there does not appear to be any lessening of the importance of an effective maritime arm of the Defence Forces, especially in view of Canada's participation in NATO and involvement in peace-keeping activities throughout the World.

The foregoing is predicated on having ships not only of good design but well maintained and manned ready for emergency on short notice. In this regard it should be pointed out that ships of the RCN have on three occasions been the first Canadian forces to be able to react positively to war or emergency conditions and we refer in this regard to the availability of the RCN, small as it then was in September 1939, to take immediate steps for the protection of shipping and the fact that Canadian destroyers were the first Canadian Forces to take an active part in the operations in Korea. On the outbreak of the Cuban crisis in October 1962 the RCN had 29 fully operational ships at sea in the Atlantic within 48 hours.

It is believed that as this brief is submitted the number of ships available on both coasts, manned at all times to operational requirements, is only in the vicinity of 30.

4. BACKGROUND

One of the objectives of the re-organization of the Forces is to improve the capability for instant response. As far as this concept is concerned it is one that has always been at the root or foundation of Naval policy, as Warships are traditionally ready to go into action on short notice. This has been demonstrated time and time again, not only in the history of the RCN but other Navies.

It is interesting to note that one of the prime advantages to be derived from the integration policy and the establishment of Mobile Command, which will have components of the Canadian Army and RCAF, is to give to land warfare the same capability of instant response which has been traditional in the sea service. Unfortunately it appears the Navy's capability of instant response is being lost in that the number of fully-manned ships available is being reduced. Thus, the following figures of ship and personnel strengths over the last few years are of interest.

	YEAR	PERSONNEL	NO. OF SHIPS (1)
1st Jan.	1962	21,151	62
	1963	21,541	60
	1964	21,260	47
	1965	20,133	42
	1966	18,902	43
30th June	1966	18,182	--

(1) Figures from "Crowsnest", "Canadian Shipping" and "Marine Engineering News".

In 1966, 8 of the 43 ships were in a new category of Ready Reserve, a category not reported in other years and 4 are loaned to other government departments.

If the declining trend in numbers of personnel continues, this time next year there will be a further reduction in the number of ships operational. The Committee foresees when the Carrier BONAVENTURE completes her $6,000,000 re-fit there will be a great deal of difficulty in finding adequate personnel to man her. It is believed that ships that have been built in the last ten years are now being laid up for want of crews and, at present rates of attrition in the Navy, this situation will be accentuated rather than alleviated.

The net yearly loss indicated in the foregoing table is equal to 100 men per month and in a year is more than the equivalent of four destroyer crews.

The Committee concludes that either the re-enlistment rate must be down, notwithstanding the re-engagement bonus, or else recruiting is decreasing. These elements can't all be at satisfactory levels if the net strength figures are off.

New ship construction has not replaced many ships of World War II vintage which have been disposed of recently.

Number of ships is not the only criterion of maritime potential, but it is surely one of the most important. Also while the modern ships are undoubtedly superior to the World War II vessels being paid off, it would seem that almost halving the number of ships must impair the potential of the seagoing force.

The decrease in the number of ships also curtails the opportunities for junior officers to gain the responsibilities of command and acquire the dexterities associated with running and navigating a ship. In this regard the disposal of minesweepers a few years ago is considered to have been a retrograde step, observing that these vessels were fairly new post-war construction. Even allocating them to Reserve units would have provided valuable facilities for training as well as ensuring their availability

The waters off our coasts have not changed in extent and even a vessel similar to the Frigates (recently classified as Ocean Escorts) of 20 years ago would have a capability adequate to watch and probably deal with hostile vessels such as the fishing trawler type appearing in increasing numbers off our coasts.

The value of a "presence" or "showing the flag" in such instances is important. It would seem that a thorough study of the relationship between such factors as numbers, fighting capabilities and areas to be patrolled, controlled and surveyed, should be undertaken to assess our needs. The fact that a Helicopter Destroyer (D D H) is considerably more effective than a Frigate for A S W does not necessarily tell the whole story.

There has of course been no change in the extent of our Territorial Waters, nor, as far as has been made known, have our international commitments been reduced.

In its publication, The National Finances 1965-1966, the Canadian Tax Foundation forecasts (p.66) a fleet in the early 1970's of an air-

craft carrier, 24 Destroyers, 3 support ships and 4 submarines with training vessels or a total of some 35 vessels. On the basis that these will be ships now in commission or projected, their manning requirements appears to be about 8,000 personnel. As men cannot be kept on sea duty continuously, and basing the manning of the fleet on a 40-60 sea/shore ratio, the maritime force will require about 20,000 men. These are men who must be oriented toward sea service and trained as seamen as well as technicians in order to cope with the ordinary problems related to navigation on, under or over the sea and can't be suddenly drawn from a pool of personnel who lack the inclination, desire or capability to work in the environment of the sea. At one time the R.C.N.'s sea/shore ration was about 60/40 but this is understood to have been found impossible of continuous achievement if for no other reason than the need to assure men of a spell at home with their families. This of course applied particularly to senior personnel who are the backbone of the service. It might be added that the sea/shore rations of other Navys such as the U.S.N. and Royal Navy are well below that of the R.C.N.

On the foregoing basis therefore, if we need a body of men, trained, prepared in all respects and identifiable for manning the fleet, of a figure in excess of what is even now available, no great advantage can be foreseen in trying to amalgamate the sea-force into another component which will not be able to support it. Are we to build $35,000,000 vessels so they may be idle?

The present losses of senior personnel are being rationalized by saying there are many capable younger personnel available. Of

course there are. But have they the necessary background and experience? Perhaps every ordinary seaman may have an Admiral's flag in his kit (to paraphrase Napoleon), what is missing is the years of experience required to develop the necessary qualities of leadership. In any event why should we be pensioning off men before their time - men who are reaching the peak of their careers - and replacing them with others - surely this is uneconomical?

11.

5. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO A MARITIME FORCE

A ship is both barracks and fighting unit. Even persons whose roie in combat might seem ancillary, e.g. cooks, by virtue of such personnel being part of the ship community, must have something more than the basic capability of preparation of food. This other technique may be referred]o as a "sea sense" or seamanship or ship knowledge. It is the thing that makes for not only efficiency but is essential to the well being of a warship. A senior technical man who has never before been exposed to the environment of a ship would, notwithstanding his technical qualifications, find it not only awkward but perhaps embarrassing to assume command of junior ranks possessed of the qualities of seamanship, when he came to deal with the problems beyond the narrow confines of his technical capabilities. In contrast to the combat situation which exists in the army when for instance infantry and armour may combine together in operations; when the operations are concluded they separate into their respective corps or administrative units. This does not happen in a ship where the complement not only fights together but works together over long periods at sea and develops an esprit-de-corps which is fostered and maintained through the knowledge that all members of the ship's company belong to the sea-going force. This is not to say that certain supporting service can not be satisfactorily incorporated into the life of a ship but these units are usually restricted to the larger vessels and the size of each unit is small in itself, for example, dental units, chaplains.

Thus the feelings of comradeship and brotherhood of the sea, which are strong factors in moulding an effective sea-going force are developed through the personnel of the force living, working and fighting together as part of a continuing group and developing confidence in each other's abilities and knowledge.

Sea-sense is strong! History has shown that fleets without it lose battles and inferior fleets with it have overcome numberically superior fleets led and manned by personnel who lacked the training and experience to develop confidence in themselves as seamen.

Larger ships of the Imperial German Navy of World War I were designed for relatively short sea endurance with the result that accommodation was retricted and men were largely billetted ashore when in home ports. The result was a failure to instil a proper appreciation of a seagoing capability in the personnel of such ships which affected their fighting capability.

The post World War II expansion of the Soviet Navy, which remains a separate identifiable force in that country's defence organization, was conditioned by the realization that to be effective the personnel must first of all be 'at home at sea'. The vast Soviet merchant and trawler fleets add greatly to the pool of seamen who would be useful in War.

While there has been much progress in the scientific field which affects naval strategy and tactics, the underlying need to cope effectively with the environment of the sea must be first established. This is a job for seamen.

13.

To say sailors identify themselves with the sea and all those engaged in the same element does not in a national navy make them any less loyal to their country, but it is necessary to recognize the characteristics of the ties that bind seamen together as an essential part of developing a sea-going force.

6. COMMENTS ON RECENT DEFENCE ISSUES

(a) DEVELOPMENTS SINCE MARCH 1964

The promulgation of the government's white paper on defence in March 1964 was welcomed as an indication that serious thought was being given to the form that Canada's defence forces should take in the light of changing world conditions. Noting that the complexity of administration has been prone to increase at the expense of operational capabilities, with a tendency to over-emphasize or over- expand the non-combatant role, a need arises for restraint and periodic review in this field. On this aspect of the white paper there was undoubtedly no disagreement.

Later in 1964, the bill to amend the National Defence Act was introduced and the Chiefs of Staff Committee was replaced by the integrated defence staff comprised of officers of all three services. This was not a step which, if found to be unworkable or impracticable, could not be altered or adjusted. At that time there was no indication that any subsequent legislation would abolish the identities of the Navy, Army and Air Force. Thus while words such as "integration" and "unification" were being used there was no precise definition of what these words indicated as related to the final form of the forces. In fact, as recently as October 1965 a press report contained a denial that there was any plan for a single uniform for all three services.

(b) SOME RAMIFICATIONS OF THE DEFENCE RE-ORGANIZATION

(i) Basic Observations

As far as Maritime Command is concerned, it has been an integrated operational command for about eight years under a senior naval officer in command with an air force officer as deputy commander. The operational staff in the headquarters in Halifax has been comprised of Naval and Air Force personnel who have worked together over the years and produced an efficient and effective operational Maritime force. Parenthetically it should be observed that, as reported in the press, one of the issues in the recent controversy surrounding Maritime command was that administration had increased under integration despite the fact the number of ships and personnel in the Command has decreased.

It might also be pointed out that in so far as the senior policy making group in the Department of Defence is concerned, i.e. the Defence Council, through two complete changes in the military members, there is still no representative from the sea component on this powerful body. Thus the Integrated Defence Plan (I.D.P.) is to be examined by this council which comprises the minister and associate minister, the deputy minister, the head of the research board and the chief and vice chief of defence staff. The first two are of course the political directors of the services but military experience is not a requirement for such appointments. The deputy minister will have had years of experience in administration of the Defence Department but this is limited principally to financial and administrative matters. The head of the Defence Research Board is also not necessarily some-

one with a background of military experience in the field notwithstanding his undoubted qualifications in the scientific field. As this brief is prepared therefore the only two members of this group of six with military experience will be senior officers of the Army and the Air Force. In view of the fact that the I.D.P. is to be concerned with problems affecting all the elements in which the forces operate the absence of a senior naval advisor would seem to be a serious omission. Certainly, apart from anything else, the fact that there are senior officers of the navy who have had experience in the operation of integrated operational command for upward of eight years, their counsel and participation in the deliberations of the Defence Council as a matter of right, should be established. The same observation would be made if the present situation had resulted in a senior naval and air force officer as the only military officers on the Defence Council. In such event a senior army officer should obviously be included. Under the chiefs of staff system the highest policy-making committee of the Department of National Defence could not be deprived of expert advice from at least one of, and conceivably two of, the three components of the armed forces.

6(b)(ii) Personnel Erosion

One of the initial objectives proclaimed at the beginning of the re-organization programme was to reduce the total strength of the forces from about 123,000 to 110,000 ... the 13,000 difference being represented as excess administrative personnel. No figures have been seen by our committee as to the proportion the Navy was to bear of this cut. However, certain observations can be appropriately made. Prior to the abolition of the Chiefs of Staff system in 1964 the Navy, as the smallest service numerically, had fewer personnel at Defence Headquarters yet was called upon to provide a member for each of the myriad of committees which had been established. This threw a heavier burden on the smaller group of naval personnel available in contrast to the numerically stronger Army and R.C.A.F. It would be of interest to know therefore what was the planned reduction in naval personnel employed on administrative duties in line with the re-organization of the administration of the forces and more specifically the numbers stationed at Defence H.Q.'s on say 1st June, 1963 and 1st August, 1966

Further the reduction to about 110,000 personnel for all three armed forces required a cut of about 10% from the strength in 1962. The number is now below this and in fact it appears that the Navy has been reduced by almost half as much again as this proportion, or about 15%. It is assumed (although this should bear examination) that the Navy's headquarters personnel should not have been reduced in either

absolute numbers or in percentages to the same extent as the other two services if a proper mix or proportion of Naval presence is to be preserved at H.Q. to present the sailors' views. Thus the loss to the Navy's operational potential in terms of manpower is probably of greater severity than the other services, expecially as it did not have the extensive command system of the Army which presumably surrendered a proportionately greater number of men in the cutting down process.

This raises the question - what are our targets in strength for each of the forces? We should have some idea of the numbers we will need to employ the equipment which we expect to deploy.

.19

6(b)(iii) Command Organization

Under the integrated Maritime Command as it existed prior to August, 1965, the training of sailors for the fleet was carried on in establishments which came, for the most part, under the surveillance and command of the Flag Officers on the Atlantic and Pacific. As a result training requirements were directly sensitive to the needs of the fleet. With the new organization whereby a separate "tri-environmental" training concept has been established in Winnipeg, the Maritime Commander must now go through another command - concerned for the greater part with other elements - to make his needs known. Can this horizontal structure be justified as an improvement on the vertical concept which existed previously, on grounds of either economy or efficiency? It would be of interest to know how many people are required to supervise the training needs of the Navy under the new plan as compared with the old. Apart from anything else the distance factor must make additional demands not only on personnel but also on communications and possibly redundant correspondence. The fleet schools, whose officers-in-charge could make and execute training policy under the former Maritime Command, are primarily on the coasts yet the new Training Command has also had to be staffed with Naval personnel, presumably to consider the needs of sea training. Is there not the possibility of overlap or duplication here?

In Maritime Command itself, it would be of interest to have figures for R.C.N. and R.C.A.F. personnel, allocated as well as actually on strength, to the Maritime Command (separate as to Atlantic and Pacific areas) on say the 1st June, 1963 and 1st August, 1966, observing that this has been an integrated command for eight years. This would appear to be particularly significant as one of the complaints of the former Maritime Commander has been the increase in administrative functions and costs with the consequent additional "red tape". If there has been a shifting of personnel out of Ottawa to other places, are we not simply realigning rather than effecting any overall economies in this area? Army personnel now allocated to Maritime Command for such services as Provost and Motor Transport, should of course be included in figures for 1st August 1966, to the extent that they now provide services formerly found from Naval or Air Force resources.

It would also be of interest to compare the lines of authority and chain of command organization in Maritime Command as now constituted and as it existed as an integrated operational command in 1962.

6 (c) POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF STEPS IMPLEMENTED OR PLANNED

(i) Financial

The Committee has not been able to conduct an exhaustive analysis of the estimates of the Defence Department so as to make any firm findings in respect to whether the reorganization of the department to date has effected significant savings in costs without affecting operational potential i.e. not only efficiency but numbers of men, ships, aircraft and other weapons deployed. This is an area which, it is suggested, should be thoroughly explored.

It can be observed, however, that one of the objectives of the programme originally outlined by the DND was to increase the amount to be spent on equipment to 25% of the Budget (White Paper p.19); the savings to come from reduced pay and administrative efficiency. In the past several years (and prior to 1962) the Navy appears to have been spending 20 - 25% of its budget on equipment; well above the proportion of the other two services and close to the present targets for all services.

The Department's budget has been increased slightly in each of the fiscal years ending 31st March 1965, 1966, 1967, yet there are fewer men in all services. Whether the following figures published recently constitute a trend their significance related to future projections bear examination.

Year	Budget	Expended on Pay & Allowances	Civil Service	Total
1965	$1,536 Million	$643 Million	$180 Million	$823 Million
1966	1,548 Million	663 Million	189 Million	852 Million
1967	1,573 Million	609 Million	188 Million	797 Million

22

Surely these figures prompt the question whether there are significant savings in pay to make the predicted material increase in moneys available for equipment. It is believed that the cyclical pay increase to come into effect on October ist, 1966 (and this was due in any event, irrespective of Departmental re-organization) had been taken into account for the 1966-67 budget. Thus if personnel costs leave little room for saving for increased equipment expenditures more examination is required as to the relationship between operational potential, operating costs and funds available for equipment.

It is noted that there are now suggestions that the DND will require additional funds if it is to carry out all that has been promised such as a pay increase and additional equipment purchases. This would apparently indicate that the savings, to the extent they exist, obtained from the present re-organization are not going to be adequate. Also there is the factor of devaluation which amounted to about 3% last year. The Committee is not opposed to increases in defence expenditures, if justified. We feel however, that a thorough analysis of what has been saved through steps taken to-date is required. This should establish to what extent savings are related to the re-organization of the past 2-3 years, apart from the attrition in strength of some 15%. Have we now got as many ships, planes, weapons and men in an operational posture as we had three years ago and are they effectively supported?

.23

6(c)(ii) The Defence Council and Armed Forces Council

Reference has already been made to the constitution of the Defence Council which has been proclaimed the top policy making body of the Defence Department. It was also pointed out that the Council lacked a member qualified to advise on matters relating to sea-going forces and that conversely neither the land nor the air components should be satisfied with the possibility of being similarly organized into silence by not having a representative on the Defence Council through the fortunes of appointments.

The formation was recently announced of the Armed Forces Council to be made up of senior officers at C.F.H.Q. and the 6 commands. While the exact composition of the Council has not been announced, it is presumed it will consist of twelve officers, the six most senior members of the Defence Staff, e.g. C.D.S., V.C.D.S., C. of Personnel, Plans, etc., plus the six officers in charge of Commands. If this is so, only two of the present twelve seats on the Council would go to Naval Officers. The C.D.S. as Chairman is to exercise a veto on what goes to the Minister and the Government from the Council. It would seem that the combination of insufficient representation and a possible veto by the Chairman, will do little to ensure that the sailors' or any other contrary viewpoints will get beyond the new Council. This could serve to isolate the Minister and the Government from the views of what should be an important committee.

6(c)(iii) Recruiting and Re-engagement

It is recognized that the present relatively high employment rate is a factor which on one hand may reduce the numbers available for enlistment and on the other encourage those in the services to leave. However, the attractiveness of a service career is not predicated on economic advantage alone. While a measure of security may be a factor to the young person considering the armed forces another significant factor is the type of environment in which he will find himself, including the belonging to an organization in which he can take pride and one that provides opportunities for advancement and adventure.

At the present time about 22% of the Navy's recruits come from the Cadet movements of the Navy League of Canada. The training, distinctive Naval uniform and general approach to Sea Cadet activities is based on the fascination and spirit which creates the desire and motivation to embark on a career at sea. The result is that many of these young people eventually choose to enlist in the Navy. In this regard some assurance has been given that the Sea Cadet uniforms will be unaffected under present plans. However, the long range possibilities associated with a common uniform for the forces as recently rumoured, will perhaps cause a review of this policy. From the reaction of branches of the Navy League which operates in almost 200 centres across Canada it is apparent that the uncertainties of the form which the forces may take are giving pause to many young men visiting recruiting offices.

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The Committee is apprehensive that the elimination of the separate Naval Service identity, with a distinctive uniform, will result in a drastic reduction in recruiting for Maritime Service from Sea Cadet personnel. Under our voluntary recruiting system the cutting off of a potential recruiting pool of the magnitude of the Sea Cadets is not considered a viable policy. The Cadet services themselves may well be adversely affected if the present civilian support and interest wane.

With the anticipated loss of many of the distinctive characteristics of service at sea, it is expected that recruiting for a sea component will be more difficult. No matter what our National aspirations may be in this direction they are not likely to be fulfilled under a one Service system.

While the foregoing might apply to recruiting for all ranks, there are further factors which enter into the obtaining of officers. Unlike the lower ranks who can sign on for 3 years and get out, the officer candidate is looking toward long service, a career, a professional life. By and large he is or will be of University, or equivalent, educational standard. He weights the attractiveness of service life with other opportunities. Undoubtedly acceptance, regard, prestige, status are determinants in his decision. How do these fit in with what is going on at present?Senior officers, who should be, and in most instances undoubtedly are, looked up to and respected by their juniors, are being prematurely retired, sometimes accompanied by some vilification and reflection on their characters and abilities. This appears

so merely because they have expressed views, developed over years of experience and service, which run counter to untried, untested, undefined and unsanctioned policies that have been suddenly thrust upon them.

If the purposes of a university education include the development of abilities to think and act independently and form opinions, then it should not be surprising if officers in the service with such qualifications exercise them. While a Military Force obviously cannot be run as a debating society, it is contrary to the thinking of most Canadians that a man should be penalized for honestly expressing his opinions.

There are unfortunate elements which have arisen in the present controversy which will do little to encourage recruiting and may well take some time to eradicate. The spectre of military disregard of civilian authority is not one that really impresses many Canadians. The important consideration is to determine the facts and assess the merits so that a proper atmosphere is created which will be conducive to attracting the right types of Canadians to the Armed Services - and retaining them.

On the question of retention it is noted that assurances are now being given that all presently serving personnel will be given an opportunity to say which environment they wish to serve in, i.e. Sea, Land, or Air, and no one will be compelled to serve in an element not of his choosing. However, these assurances do not state, unequivocally, that men now enlisted in, say, the Navy will not be forcibly transferred to a new force, which is not yet in existence and for which they did not engage. The National Defence Act

.27

does provide under Active Service conditions, for compulsory transfer, but the Canadian Forces are not on active service now and it is contrary to the principles and precepts of the manner in which our forces are being raised to arbitrarily negate the freedom of choice which now exists. It is further to be hoped that no influence, direct or indirect, will be brought to bear which will affect such freedom - either through inducements of economic benefit or restriction on advancement.

A further factor affecting recruiting will be a reluctance for men in the service to encourage others to join, whether brothers, sons or friends, if they themselves are "not happy in the service".

6(c)(iv) Common Uniform

One of the most widely rumoured probable steps to be taken in the defence re-organization is the introduction of a new common uniform for all servicemen. The rumours generated on this topic are contradictory and confusing. If this step is to be taken, what will be the cost? What stocks of uniform are presently on hand which will become redundant and how long would they last and what do they represent in money? Are the existing distinctive uniforms now worn to be withdrawn? If not, has the sailor room in his restricted locker space for such additional kit? As the Committee considers that this issue is probably one which excites more general interest, the department's intentions in this regard should be disclosed in details supported by an analysis of the financial implications. While some modification in uniform design may be desirable, on the whole, as far as the Navy is concerned the main issue is not re-design but retention of a dress that distinguishes and identifies its personnel as belonging to the sea-service.

With cost problems becoming more acute, is a step such as a new uniform really necessary at this time especially if it impairs such vital considerations as morale which in turn will affect strength and efficiency? Observing that one of the objectives of the defence re-organization is to save money for fighting equipment this would make it seem that sartorial elegance is to prevail at the expense of weapon acquisition.

.29

6 (d) SOME OBSERVATIONS ON HISTORICAL AND TRADITIONAL FACTORS

The Committee feels that the case for the Navy as a separate identifiable force can be substantiated on logical pragmatic grounds. It is felt however that some comment is required on certain more intangible, but nonetheless important factors especially as these have been the subject of discussion by others.

Historically the Navy's position in the defence establishment in Canada has been insecure. Unfortunately political factors were prominent in its establishment in 1910 and twice since in 1923 and again in 1933, its existence has been threatened, possibly on the theory that being small and located away from the economic (and perhaps political) heart of the country its disappearance would not evoke any strong resistance. Yet the country can be thankful that these efforts were not successful as the R.C.N. has proven itself in both war and peace.

Had the Navy not had a separate identity as a service, it is probable that by 1939 the country would have been without even the small sea force of 10 ships and less than 2,000 men that were available on the outbreak of hostilities, but which nonetheless formed the nucleus for the tremendous expansion of World War II. The Committee is confident that had the voice of the Navy in the defence councils of those times been stilled by submergence in a single force it would not have survived. Is the nation prepared to disregard this lesson of history?

The white paper mentions that there will always be sailors pressing for more ships, and that morale and esprit de corps are associated with ships. This of course presupposes there will be sailors in a position to press. While certainly there are positive morale factors in a well-run and efficient ship, sailors look on the Navy in the way a soldier looks on his regiment. If the regiments are to remain, shouldn't the same principles apply to the sea-going force? The Navy is the "regiment" to a sailor and this is the component which commands his loyalties and which forms the basis for his service outlook.

Thus when the prisoners of the "Graf Spee" were released by the men of H.M.S. COSSACK in a Norwegion fjord in 1940--the cry was "The Navy's here". It is doubtful if any thought was given to an announcement such as "The Cossacks are coming". Perhaps the political situation at the time ruled this out! If a similar event should transpire in the future are Canadians to be greeted with something like "Thank goodness for the Maritime Component"? The pride and confidence evoked by the expressions "The guns" and "The pipes" by artillerymen and kilted regiments are comparable to that felt by sailors in the term "the Navy". Is there any basis in logic or reason for abolishing this, especially if no economy is to result and it will make the maintenance of an effective sea-force more difficult? It has been said that morale and esprit de corps are associated with ships companies and regiments. This

comparison is not entirely valid especially in peace-time. A man may stay with his regiment for most of his service career and it is always in his service background, but a man in the Navy will serve in many ships and while some will be better than others -- in the broad sense a sailor's allegiance is to the Naval service as his ship allegiance is transitory.

Certainly the Navy is proud of its traditions--it has every right to be. The R.C.N. rising from virtually nothing became the fourth largest navy on the allied side in World War II and carried the burden of the North Atlantic convoys in the latter stages of the war.

There has been criticism that some of the Navy's traditions are British. Is this bad? While the British Navy has had its vicissitudes, it has had a fairly successful history as a fighting force, if victory in battle is any criterion. Why shouldn't Canadian sailors strive for the same spirit that conquered at Trafalgar? However, if anyone thinks Canadian seamen are not proud of their country and Canadian service let him remember the Maple Leaf which was proudly worn on the little ships in the North Atlantic in World War II. Let him also take cover if he ever suggests to Canadian sailors by some remark carrying with it the suggestion they are members of another Commonwealth navy. After all if the Canadian House of Commons cherishes the principles, precepts and traditions of Westminster--why is it a matter of criticism that Canada'a Navy should take inspiration and example from the Royal Navy?

Since World War II the Canadian Navy has designed and produced in Canada vessels which have gained universal respect for their capabilities and have manned them with an efficiency that has been envied by our allies. These ships, the St. Laurent and succeeding classes of Destroyer Escorts, pioneered new techniques in construction and equipment, and have been employed by Canadian seamen in ways which have been emulated by other Navies. Surely these are not the characteristics of an inward-looking reactionary organization bound by useless and impractical tradition! In this vein, wouldn't it be of significance to ascertain the Canadian content of the weaponry and equipment in use by each of the Canadian services?

7. COMMENTS ON EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC OPINION IN RESPECT TO THE DEFENCE RE-ORGANIZATION

To indicate some of the thinking that has been generated in the almost continuous debate that has taken place on Defence issues since mid-July of this year, the Committee has included in Schedule "B" to this brief a selection of editorials and other material which have appeared in the press.

For the most part the views expressed support those of this Committee and especially its principal recommendation. This is justified on two grounds. Firstly to indicate the widespread support that has appeared for the opinions and conclusions set forth herein and also, in some way, to counter the image which has been built up over the last two years in respect to the programme for the re-organization of the forces which it now appears may not have been wholly justified. Thus, for example, one of the stories that has been given great prominance is to the effect that many countries have special observers watching the re-organization programme with the inference that these constitute special steps. It has never been pointed out that most foreign missions in Ottawa have military attaches whose whole purpose is to watch - both covertly and overtly - and report on the activities of the Canadian defence establishment in all its aspects. There has been no release by D.N.D. commenting on the New Zealand Government's White Paper of 1966 which has been produced with at least some of the Canadian experiences available. In many respects New Zealand's problems are comparable to ours. e.g. it is a member of SEATO and hence an ally of the U.S., yet in its

White Paper the N.Z. Government unequivocally states in a section headed "Unification of National Defence" that there is no intention of the three services losing their separate identities. This points up the difficulty of assessing the Canadian intention as in the Canadian White Paper which omits to define unification.

The Committee is satisfied that other countries who have examined our experience will also reject the concept of one force in one uniform distinct from the present organization of three identifiable services oriented to their respective environments of sea, land and air. Is it not significant that of the scores of new countries that have emerged since World War II, many of whom have been at pains to reject Western or European concepts and have had an opportunity to make a fresh start in their defence organization, none have evolved a system comparable to that which now appears to be contemplated for the Canadian forces? Yet the whole tenor of the releases from the D.N.D. continues to emphasize that others will soon be following our lead. Comparison has been made with the Swiss defence organization. This holds little weight in considering the needs of a Maritime force for Canada.

8. CONCLUSIONS

As already stated one of the problems of the groups represented by this Committee is the obtaining of basic factual information. Experience has shown that the releases and statements emanating from the Department often require amplification and further explanation in the light of circumstances. However, with this handicap in mind the Committee is of the opinion that only by an impartial, independent study of the whole defence establishment can a proper organization for the Armed Forces be evolved. While establishing policy by commission or inquiry may be somewhat cumbersome, it at least ensures all views are heard.

The recent discussions and debates on defence have, in the Committee's opinion, been healthy insofar as they have brought out problems resulting from the plans introduced to date in the reorganization of the Armed Forces. On the whole subject of what the future form of the Forces should be, the Committee draws attention to the thoughts embodied in the White Paper on Defence - March 1964 - under the heading "Conclusion" at Page 30 where it is stated:

> "In this paper no attempt has been made to set down hard and fast rules -- Flexibility has been the keynote. The paper is a Charter -- not a detailed and final blueprint. The policy outlined is not immutable. It can be altered"

If this is a true indication of the Department's approach, then surely a pause, re-assessment and rationalisation of what is to come or should come is clearly indicated before proceeding further. When those words were written there was no plan or blueprint down to the last detail, the absence of which may well have been the cause of most of the present uncertainty which in turn has adversely affected morale.

It is of paramount importance to determine if there has been any change in the underlying principles on which our forces are established. Is it the intention to abandon the concept of forces organized to protect the sovereignity of Canadian waters, fields and skies and replace them with a new kind of police force designed for dispatch overseas and leaving Canada to be protected by others?

The Committee is of the opinion that if Canada is to have an effective Maritime Force, coincident with its obligations and responsibilities, not only in respect to its own requirements and the dictates of its geography as well as its alliances, then such will best be provided by a separate identificable force as basically now comprised in the Royal Canadian Navy. There appears to be no advantage of a change in this regard, although certainly a unifying of the approach to many problems of an administrative nature can be seen as not only possible but desirable and practicable. Even before 1964 such steps as a comparable format for Regulations and Service Discipline had been adopted and some ancillary services had been combined - e.g. medical and chaplain services. Like any large

Governmental activity -- and the Armed Services have, in addition to men in uniform, some 39,000 civil servants, change is slow. But is a rigid time-table required for re-organizing the forces without regard to dislocations and disruptions and their effect on efficiency which are inherent in moving too fast, too soon, even without regard to the penalties for error?

The Navy programme in recent years has resulted in a high proportion of its budget being spent on new equipment; with a high proportion of its personnel at sea, its administrative organization well within the bounds of reason, the force well equipped, effectively trained and as efficient - ship for ship - as the navy of any other nation. Yet after almost three years of integration the number of ships has been cut almost in half, difficulties in manpower are increasingly manifest, new construction of ships of a type originally planned to be laid down in 1963 have not yet been laid down and all of its seamen admirals either released or resigned well in advance of the usual retirement age. It is difficult to characterize this as progress.

58

9. RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee makes the following recommendations as a result of its enquiries and the facts and arguments presented herein:

1 The constitution of the Defence Council be revised so that at all times it shall include at least one officer from each of the Navy, Army and Air Force as a full member, and such persons be designated as principal advisers in their respective professional fields.

2. The Defence Advisory Committee be reconstituted so that not less than one-third of its members shall at any time be from each of the three services and that the chairman's right to veto matters to be referred to the Minister of Defence or the government as may be discussed by the Committee be abolished.

3. That the policy with respect to the role, commitments and utilization of the Navy, Army and Air Force be clearly defined and in addition to indicate any change in the principles outlined in the Defence White Paper of 1964 In this regard commitments should be translated into operational potential for each service as related to numbers of ships, aircraft, tanks, other weapons and personnel required.

4. That a full, complete and independent inquiry be instituted to assess the results and effects of steps already taken and to consider plans yet unannounced but contemplated in the re-organization of the defence establishment. Pending the outcome of such inquiry, no measures be introduced which will prejudice or affect the separate identity of the Royal Canadian Navy as a separate service in the Canadian defence establishment as presently constituted with its distinctive and identifiable uniform which is of a type associated with the sea service.

5. That pay and conditions of service for Naval personnel be reviewed from time to time to ensure that anomalies and discrepancies between service and civilian employment shall be minimized.

Schedule "A"

NAVY LEAGUE OF CANADA
NAVAL OFFICERS ASSOCIATIONS OF CANADA
ROYAL CANADIAN NAVAL ASSOCIATION

Committee on the Maritime Component
of the Canadian Defence Force

June 29, 196

David W. Groos, Esq., M.P.,
House of Commons,
Ottawa, Ontario.

Dear Mr. Groos:

This will confirm the telegram which was sent to you last week on behalf of the Committee referred to on this letterhead as follows:

"Joint committee formed by national executives of Navy League, N.O.A.C. and RCN Associations to consider implications of present and indicated policies of Defence Department on matters relating to maritime force. Propose presenting brief at later date covering inter alia statements of Minister of National Defence as reported in Winnipeg Tribune of 10th June, 1966, on unification of services and common uniform. We will suggest independent, impartial examination of defence establishment. Mr. R.C.G. Wilson of the joint Committee will be present to observe, leaving Thursday, 23rd June."

While the composition and the activities of the Committee will be expanded on at a later date, especially as part of the material which is to be forwarded now under consideration, some further back-ground is perhaps material at this time.

The Committee arose out of meetings involving several officials of the three organizations named. These meetings were originally called to consider how all three groups could give effect to their common purpose of bringing under review and considering matters affecting Naval aspects of Canada's defence forces. Arising out of the discussions it was apparent that there was considerable disquietude as to the state of the Naval service at the present time after almost three years of the policy which has been briefly described as integration. As indicated in our telegram the Committee has arrived at a preliminary conclusion that before matters progress further along the lines of "integration" or "unification" that a complete and searching enquiry should be made into the question of the organization of the defence forces and before steps are taken which to reverse would not only be difficult but lead to a reduction of the effectiveness of the forces to an extent not tolerable if Canada is to continue its external responsibilities and policies, apart from the needs of purely domestic defence. We feel there is ample precedent for this and one need only refer to the Mainguy Commission, Kennedy Commission and Suttie Commission. It is also felt that this examination should not be done within the Defence Department itself if a truly independent approach is to be achieved

The Committee is fully cognizant of the difficulties of a body such as ours to make enquiries in a field which has many security aspects and about which a great deal of information is classified, especially as the principal source of information emanates from the

Department itself, which quite naturally would be expected to minimize the problems and emphasize the progress.

The Committee is concerned with the suggestions which are becoming more prevalent that the next step is a common uniform and common service and we feel that before the present identities of the three services are lost, perhaps irretrievably, that an enquiry such as indicated above should be carried out. We realize that this is not within the power of the Committee which you head to direct, but would hope that the strongest representations could be made to the cabinet and to parliament to this end in the interests of not only the forces themselves but Canada as a responsible member of the world community.

In considering what has taken place in the past and trying to assess what is to take place in the future, it was realized that there has never been a comprehensive programme or plan submitted as to previsely what could be expected in the defence organization and "integration of the forces" seems to be somewhat a matter of doing what is opportune and ascertaining its effect without a definite blue print being promulgated. This is leading to uncertainty amongst the personnel in the forces. The Committee feels that a postive statement in this regard is required and the consequences of this should be examined by the type of enquiry suggested.

You may rest assured that the objective of the Committee is a sincere desire to be of assistance and to promote responsible discussion and investigation on a matter of great importance. Everyone appreciates the need for change and certainly there is no suggestion that much of what has already taken place has not been salutary. Yet it can be stated from the experiences of not only members of the Committee but many others with whom these matters have been discussed, indicate a concern in the state of the Naval services in particular. The most recent evidence of this in respect to the forces generally is the report in Time Magazine of 1st July, 1966, in the Canadian section.

A copy of this letter is being sent to the Minister of Defence, as will the brief when prepared. In the meantime, on behalf of the Committee, it is earnestly requested that the common service concept at the very least should not be proceeded with until the suggestions made herein are implemented. After all, we have gone many years under the present organization and it would seem reasonable that little would be lost by examining the whole plan, past and prospective, to ensure that the right policies are being adopted.

In conclusion, on behalf of the Committee I wish to express our appreciation for your courtesy and attention to Mr. R.C.G. Wilson last week while in Ottawa.

Yours sincerely

(sgd.) R.I. Hendy,
Chairman.

Soviet Union's Blue Belt Traced To Naval Power

MOSCOW — (AP) — The Soviet Union's vaunted "Blue Belt" of defence is being traced to its naval power which, by the best available yardsticks, includes the world's largest fleet of submarines with an increasing number of them powered by nuclear energy.

The subs presumably can launch missiles under water, multiplying the West's defence problems in the same way that American Polaris subs complicate Soviet defences.

Information now available on the mysterious "Blue Belt" indicates that it includes other elements besides submarines. One is possibly the expanding Soviet naval air force for long-range defence against Western navies.

Defence Minister Marshal Rodion Y. Malinovsky started the "Blue Belt" mystery in a speech April 1. "The creation of the Blue Belt for defence of our state has been completed," he said without explanation.

Soviet admirals said privately later that nuclear submarines are part of the belt.

Then on May 25 Gen. Heinz Hoffmann, East German defence minister, described the striking power of Soviet land-based missiles and said: "To this are added the atomic submarines of the Blue Defence Belt, which can operate in every sea in the world."

This is the clearest statement on public record that the "Blue Belt" involves submarines. Its context indicates that Malinovsky was using the word "defence" in a general sense that includes offensive power.

The worldwide offensive capability was demonstrated by a six-week submerged cruise around the world in February and March by two or three Soviet nuclear submarines.

The director of the U.S. Navy's anti-submarine warfare program, Vice Admiral Charles B. Martell, said last October that Soviet subs are operating all over the world.

He estimated that some $3,000,000,000 is being spent by the Kremlin every year on sub marine warfare. The underwater fleet then numbered around 400, Martell said.

Other sources estimate the number of nuclear subs in the fleet at from 35 to 60, with perhaps as many as 10 being built every year. With the launching of the Will Rogers last month the United States has a fleet of 41 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines.

The authoritative book Jane's Fighting Ships, which estimates the Soviet Union had 35 nuclear subs at the end of 1965, says some of them are designed to attack shipping and some to launch missiles at land targets.

Halifax Chronicle-Herald
4 October, 1965

THE CHRONICLE-HERALD
Monday, October 4, 1965

No Official Talks On Uniform

National Defence Minister Paul Hellyer told a press conference here yesterday that there had been "no formal consideration" given to a uniform to serve the integrated forces.

And he added that if a uniform were developed to serve the proposed integrated force, it could conceivably come from "a grass roots movement" within the services.

He said there were "indications" a common uniform was already being discussed in the forces.

Mr. Hellyer outlined steps taken to integrate the three forces.

He said so far there had been developed a "more cohesive" force. Already the defence headquarters in Ottawa had undergone plans for integration. The work done so far in this is a "tribute to the officers involved," he said.

By mid-year next year Mr. Hellyer said defence headquarters should be "working effectively."

The other point in the chain of the services which has undergone integration so far was the command structure, he said.

This is several months ahead of schedule, and preceded the defence headquarters set up for "we had to know the interrela-

-Please Turn To Page 3, Col. 1-

(Continued From Page One)

tionships" there would be between the two.

Mr. Hellyer said other countries were watching the Canadian integration plan with interest and would probably follow the lead of "the Canadian initiative of integration."

Mr. Hellyer held a press conference yesterday afternoon, previous to his returning to Ottawa .He was in Halifax to speak at the 70th anniversary of the Navy League Saturday night.

Mr. Hellyer outlined savings in personnel and money apparant through integration

From the integration of the information services of the three forces, there was a 60 per cent saving of personnel, which resulted in an annual saving of $1,000,000.

In construction and engineering personnel there has been a 30 per cent saving in personnel

By initiating a single pay system, which would come into being over a three year period, 650 in administrative personnel would be saved.

Trades offered would be reduced from the present 332, to 119 basic trades under the proposed integrated set up. But, Mr. Hellyer affirmed that within these 119, there would be ample opportunity to "specialize" within the structure of that trade.

"This will mean a better employment of man power," he said.

In cataloguing service equipment there would be a resulting saving in 41 per cent of personnel, plus space.

He said the NATO cataloguing system would be used, and when completely introduced, one standard of cataloguing would be used in the Canadian armed force

"The aim of our program, first and foremost is to build a more responsive force . . . a force which is more united strategically. To do this there is a necessity for a cohesive plan at the top."

Mr. Hellyer pointed out that so far there has been a considerable reduction in the committee system of administration by the overhaul of the command structure.

Integration has offered a reduction in the "unproductive fustrating committee management," he said And added:

"Now a decision can be reached before the value of the decision has been lost."

Mr. Hellyer said there had been no "blueprint" for integration, and because of this, each step had to be carefully studied as to possible effects. Defence staffs were co-operating in this, the minister said.

But with cutbacks in personnel due to projected integration, Mr. Hellyer said the economic conditions of an area would be taken into account, before such programs were introduced.

"This is especially true when an area is very dependent on the economy of the armed forces there, Mr. Hellyer said .

He disagreed with statements made in Halifax a week previous, by Opposition Leader John Diefenbaker, who claimed that the morale of the armed forces was "at its lowest ebb."

"I don't think the Diefenbaker record of understanding the armed forces, and their problems, is too well established," Mr Hellyer said He claimed that morale in the armed forces was "at its lowest" two and one-half years ago when Mr. Diefenbaker's government was toppled

"The morale of the armed forces is very high in the operational units such as Cyprus, the Middle East and the brigade and air divisions of Europe," Mr. Hellyer said

To a question on who might suffer in cutbacks due to integration Mr. Hellyer said "those below the rank of (army) captain, equivalent ranks and below, are secure."

THE CHRONICLE-HERALD Saturday, June 11, 1966

Integration Of Defence Forces Unfavorable For New Zealand

By J. C. GRAHAM
Canadian Press Correspondent

WELLINGTON (CP) New Zealand has decided against establishing a unified defence force combining all three services on the Canadian model. The Canadian system has been studied by senior New Zealand defence officials in recent years and at one time it was thought that aspects of it would be adopted here.

For several years, New Zealand has moved toward integration of some functions of the forces, especially for civilian staff and supply.

However, a white paper just issued covering defence policy up to 1970 explains why complete integration is not favored. It said:

" . . Examination has led the government to conclude that such a combined force would not make sense in terms of our principal aim, to gain maximum effect from the level of contribution which New Zealand can make.

"The force of this type which New Zealand could afford to maintain in peacetime would never be large enough to give a truly independent role in limited war. Because of the 'separateness' of the three services of all our principal Allies, a combined New Zealand force would have to be logistically self-contained or largely so.

"The government has concluded that New Zealand can make a larger, more flexible, and more effective contribution to collective defence and to the demands of the cold war, in the form of three separate service elements, than with a combined balanced 'national force.' "

BASED ON POLICY

The white paper says planning is based on the assumption that New Zealand will continue to reject neutralism or isolationism as a basis of national policy.

Changes in the world scene have been to New Zealand's disadvantage, the review says. Two of the most dangerous situations in the world today, in Indonesia and Viet Nam, closely involve New Zealand.

Strategic assessments are based on the belief that Southeast Asia will continue to be a disturbed and unstable area throughout the 1970s, with threats arising from China's active role as an "exporter of revolution" throughout the area.

In the longer term, the white paper says, the greatest threat to New Zealand's interests and security comes from the growing power of an uncompromising China.

Taking these considerations into account, the government has concluded that New Zealand defence can only be based on a system of collective security.

ROLES OUTLINED

The government has decided in the period up to 1970 to base the roles of the various services on the following:

Navy—A modern force of fast frigates designed for anti-submarine warfare, shipping escort and general purpose tasks. Four such frigates will be maintained

Army—A ground contribution to Allied forces in Southeast Asia will be maintained (at present an infantry battalion and paratroop detachment are in Malaysia and an artillery battery is in Viet Nam). A field force consisting of a combat brigade group and logistic support will be available in New Zealand as a contribution to major hostilities in Southeast Asia. The territorial force will be strengthened by increased conscription intakes under the existing selective national service scheme, and a reserve of ex-regulars will be set up for rapid reinforcement of units in emergency.

Air force—The primary combat role will be close air support operations (ground attack). Existing Canberra bombers will be replaced by 1970 by new aircraft now being evaluated. The other air force roles will be replaced by 1970 by new aircraft now being evaluated. The other air force roles will be transport and maritime surveillance and anti-submarine operations. C-130 Hercules aircraft have been sought for transport backing for forces deployed in Southeast Asia. Five Orion maritime aircraft have been ordered for anti-submarine work and helicopters are also on order or in service.

The government estimates the cost of implementing its program will mean a defence budget for 1966-67 of $144,000,000, an increase of $23,000,000 on the previous year and more than double the expenditure in 1961-62.

Halifax Chronicle-Herald
11 Jun '66

Toronto Globe & Mail
6 Aug '66

But we still await the facts

In the dispute over integration and unification of the armed forces, it has become clear that problems have arisen due to poor communications between headquarters and the six military commands. This was a major complaint of Rear-Admiral William Landymore, who was dismissed last month as sea operations chief after his public criticism of Government policy.

The Government has, therefore, taken a wise move in creating an armed forces council, to include senior officers at headquarters in Ottawa and the heads of all six commands. According to General Jean Allard, chief of the defense staff, the council will have largely an advisory capacity and will make recommendations on all aspects of military policy, including integration and unification. Meeting once a month, the council should be a useful channel for airing grievances and preventing misunderstandings; significantly, it is welcomed by Admiral Landymore.

But if one channel of communication has been created, another already exists that has been sadly neglected: that between the Government and the people. After weeks of charges and counter-charges, the public is still confused about how much integration has taken place, what more lies ahead, and what are the real implications of unification. These are questions of widespread concern, and Defense Minister Paul Hellyer should give the nation a clear and comprehensive account of his program.

The Gazette ★ MONDAY, JULY 18, 1966 EDITORIAL

Storm Over The Armed Forces

THE TEMPEST which has broken around the Defence Department in the last few days may appear to have come up suddenly and unexpectedly. In fact, the storm has been building for several weeks and months. The issues involved may appear to be simple and the consequences of no importance. In fact, the issues are not simple and the consequences are far-reaching and serious.

In the last few weeks seven senior navy and army officers have either been asked to leave, have left or have requested to be retired from their jobs before the age of 55, the compulsory age of retirement. In several cases these men are five and six years away from retirement. In all cases they are experienced officers the armed forces can ill afford to lose.

The build-up started early last week with the announcement that two lieutenant generals and one vice- admiral were leaving by "mutual understanding." One of the officers was the vice-chief of the defence staff. Others held key positions to which they were appointed only last autumn. Then, late last week four rear admirals announced they were seeking early retirement—in fact, one of them, Rear Admiral William Landymore later confirmed he had refused to resign and was fired.

Mr. Hellyer said in Edmonton on the weekend that the issue was civil control over the military. It was "whether a minister can set policy or a small group of military can dictate policy."

But it appears that the disagreement is not so much over the policy of integration itself, as it is over the implementation of that policy. It is less over ends that it is over means. And in this area Mr. Hellyer has left himself open to criticism.

The program for integration of the armed forces was announced about two years ago. Since that time much has been done to implement the program. The defence hierarchy has been unified, mobile commands have been set up, coordinating navy, air force and army units. A great deal of the program has been carried out.

But in some areas the program has not lived up to expectations and in other areas, things have happened which were unexpected. In the first place, at least in the first few years, there was little in the way of saving in defence expenditures. One of the main reasons for the program of integration was to effect savings in administration and maintenance, which had been rising, and raise the percentage of the budget spent on new equipment. The last two budgets show that this has not come about.

The unexpected—and perhaps more serious—result of the program is that morale in the services, and especially the navy, has deteriorated.

In 1961-62 the strength of the armed forces was 124,000. Mr. Hellyer announced when the program was started he wanted to reduce the strength to a minimum of 110,000. It is now at 107,000 and, taking into account those in retirement but still technically in the services, the figure is probably closer to 104,000.

A tacit admission that morale is a central problem — confirmed by the latest retirements — came from the new defence chief Lt.-Gen. J. V. Allard. He said in an interview last week that his first job as head of the armed forces was to sell the integration program. The first task now that he has assumed office he said "is to make the services happy."

The job is going to be made more difficult by the resignations last week. Morale in the armed services is a key to efficiency and effectiveness; it is at the very root of a trained and disciplined armed force. This was brought out by former Conservative defence minister Douglas Harkness in a speech in the House of Commons last February 17. "Everyone with any military experience . . . knows that the most important single requirement for efficient and effective individual fighting men, units and formations is high morale." This is something which Mr. Hellyer, in his zeal to carry out his program to the very end, has overlooked.

The criticism which has been made of the integration program should be taken seriously. It has been evident for some time that all was not well with Mr. Hellyer's program. It is clear now that this is so. And the criticisms are serious enough that they should make defence planners, as they certainly will make Canadians generally, look again.

Feb. 13, 1967 NATIONAL DEFENCE 929

The Daily Star net paid circulation for the month of June, 1966, was: 362,458
Member of the Audit Bureau of Circulations
WEDNESDAY, JULY 20, 1966

Tell us what unification means, Mr. Hellyer

Defence Minister Paul Hellyer will not dampen the storm over the government's policy of unifying the armed services simply by firing rebellious admirals. He owes both the services and the country a clear and complete statement of the manner in which unification is to be achieved and how the army, navy and air force will be constituted when it is complete.

Mr. Hellyer can be counted on to enforce the civilian authority that a democratic nation must always assert over the armed services. Rear-Admiral William Landymore has been relieved of his command as chief of sea operations for his public criticism of the unification process. Other high-ranking dissenters will be appropriately dealt with as necessary, Mr. Hellyer has indicated.

There have been too many forced (or requested) early retirements of admirals and generals, and too many charges of disintegrating morale, for Mr. Hellyer to maintain, as he did in a long statement during the February debate on defence department estimates, that all is going well. Nor in that statement did he clearly define what he means by unification.

The closed session of the Commons' all-party standing committee on defence last month gave dissidents such as Rear-Admiral Landymore a chance to air their criticisms. But this committee itself is not as effective a sounding-board as it ought to be. Speaking of earlier sessions of the committee, J. A. Horner, a Conservative member of it, told the House on Feb. 21:

"At no time is the committee allowed to determine or even look at the forward policy of the government or what the forward policy of this country should be in regard to defence."

This echoed a similar complaint by another committee member, Harold E. Winch of the NDP: "The minister does not ask the advice of the members of that committee. He does not take us into his confidence."

The fact of the matter is that though the White Paper on defence, published in March, 1964, set out the principles of the government's defence program and was pretty explicit about the first organizational steps toward integration (now completed), it only mentioned the final stage—unification of the three armed services into one body.

Most serving officers, most military theorists and defence critics in the Commons, agree that integration is desirable—to achieve administrative economies, efficiency in combat teams, clarity in command, and flexibility for the mobile role Canadian forces may be called on to perform. But there is no concensus that complete unity is required. (Critics say it won't achieve further economy nor efficiency, and will destroy morale and unit fighting efficiency.) Nor is it at all clear how far Mr. Hellyer means to take unification. That's the eye of the present tempest.

Gordon Churchill, Conservative front-bencher, put the matter sharply: "The minister has not dealt with the subject of unification. Is there anybody in the country who knows what he means by unification? He has never answered that question. Is he going to put everybody into the same uniform? Is he going to cut out the traditions behind the fighting men of this country?"

During the last year the Ottawa press gallery ferreted out some of Mr. Hellyer's intentions. But what is required is an official, comprehensive public statement on unification.

It's a measure never before attempted by a western power. Apart from the present furor, the radical concept and its application warrant an adequate presentation to the public. Various reforms that Mr. Hellyer has already put through have brought credit to him. He should not hesitate to put his unification policy to the test of public knowledge and debate.

Daily Packet and Times

J. B. Lamb, Editor and Publisher
35 Peter St., S., Orillia, Ont.

July 23, 1966

The Proud Canadians; Are We To Fade Away?

Is there no room for pride in Canada?

Certainly there's no provision for it in the blueprints being drawn by Mr. Hellyer for Canada's new fighting forces. Administrative facility, flexibility, economy; they're all there in black and white in the plans for Canada's unified service, but pride is not considered and tradition is to be deliberately rooted out as an act of policy. Yet tradition engenders pride, and in any fighting service pride is the name of the game. Pride prompts enlistment, pride inspires men to rise above themselves, to transcend the normal bounds of human endurance. Why then no pride for Canada?

It's pride that makes the Guards magnificent, that makes the U.S. Marines the cream of American fighting men, that fills the ranks of the Highland regiments and invests the Royal Navy with such aplomb. It was pride that made the Tenth Legion Caesar's favorite shock troops, that took Napoleon's Old Guard to Moscow and back and made Wellington's infantry the wonder of the world. All these were mortal men, walking on two feet and as vulnerable and susceptible as other men, but the fierce pride founded on traditions of a glorious past made their units infinitely more formidable than the anonymous formations of lesser troops.

Pride, and the discipline and spirit it engenders, is the single most important quality in fighting men, the distillation of bygone triumphs that intoxicates whole armies and leads them on to victory. So long as men fight, with clubs or rockets it will always be so; to foster such pride was the first concern of all great commanders, from Hannibal to Montgomery. They did it by little things with great associations; with legionary eagles, with kilts and bell-bottoms, with banners and battle honors and martial music, and with it they moved the world. It was pride that won the last war, in the teeth of the Wehrmacht and the "wave of the future" and all the apparent superiority of massed might, and it is pride that will win any future wars, too. Yet Mr. Hellyer says that pride must go, and all the confident young men in horn-rims and tight trousers who run our country today have set about to root out any vestige of tradition, any lingering association with past glories. Not that this represents an economy; blue cloth costs no more than brown, and calling an admiral a brigadier yields no dividend to the taxpayer, but it soothes the bureaucratic brow to have everything all the same; a bland, drab, uniform body of men, like so many postmen, for there's to be no room for pride in the new Canada.

They are wrong, of course; be they never so expert about other matters, the true test of a fighting force is war, and the real authorities on war are not the white-smocked scientists nor the PR men nor the politicians, but the middle-aged veterans across Canada who still weep a little at old newsreels of the Canadians marching back into Dieppe in 1945, all those tall young men swinging past, grim-faced and silent behind the massed pipes and drums. It is not just for the vindication of past humiliation that these men weep, for the torn bodies of the South Saskatchewans washing in the shallows, but for all the proud and poignant memories: of the Van Doos, magnificent on parade; of the 48th Highlanders, home from the wars, marching up Bay St. in the rain; of the battered grey corvettes of the Barber Pole group dropping down the Foyle toward the wild winter wastes of the North Atlantic.

It is pride that makes these Canadians weep; pride that wins battles and builds nations, and a fighting service or a country that has no pride, be it never so streamlined and efficient and transistorized, is but a hollow reed.

For God's sake, is there to be no room for pride in Canada?

Toronto Globe & Mail 25 Jul '66

Mr. Hellyer's two-pronged argument for turning three services into one

By GEORGE BAIN

OTTAWA

THE CASE for joining the three services in one has not been strongly made up to now, a fault which Defense Minister Paul Hellyer can be expected to do his best to remedy between now and the fall.

That is when the Government's legislation to permit integration to be carried that final step is supposed to be put before the House of Commons. If Mr. Hellyer at any time thought that it might slide through quietly, last week should have destroyed the illusion.

Opposition Leader John Diefenbaker declared, predictably perhaps, that what Mr. Hellyer was promoting was not integration but disintegration. But more interestingly, T. C. Douglas, the New Democratic Leader, who would find himself in unusual company joining cause with dissident admirals, indicated that he still had to be persuaded.

If arguments for turning the navy, army and air force into one big, all-purpose service have had little exposure so far, it is not because Mr. Hellyer has not been able to find any. He believes that it is the only policy which makes sense for Canada, and he defends it with vigor — particularly against the charge that it will be destructive of morale.

He doesn't pretend to believe that people who have made a career of the navy (or the army or the air force) should not experience some emotional wrench at the thought of giving up the uniform and the customs that they have been used to.

He expresses sympathy. But he makes a two-pronged argument. One prong is that unit loyalties will not be disturbed — pride in squadron, ship or regiment — and therefore esprit de corps should not suffer at that level. And the other is that the new service, the Canadian Armed Forces, or whatever it is to be called, will soon develop its own traditions.

Here he makes what seems a strained analogy with persons who change their political party, or even their religion, and, having gone through the wrench of doing so, become even more fiercely loyal and devoted to the successor than to the thing which they left. Those, however, are actions usually taken voluntarily and with reason; the result may be as the Minister predicts, but the circumstances are hardly the same.

The true fact seems to be that the Defense Minister recognizes that making the three services into one is going to be upsetting, but that he believes that better pay, better housing, and a better uniform — he considers the present summer walking-out uniform a shame — will more than offset any temporary damage to morale.

The point upon which members of Parliament in the end will have to decide about unification is whether or not Canada's defense forces will work better that way. Obviously, since unification is the end to which the Minister has been committed since integration began in August, 1964 (it was forecast in the White Paper of that March), he strongly believes that to be the case.

But why, since integration has been achieved at the top, where the planning is done and control is exercised, is it necessary to put the three services into one uniform? There will continue to be sailors, soldiers and airmen, whatever they are called, and they will be equipped and directed as the Minister, on the advice of an integrated staff, sees fit.

What the matter comes down to on this point is that, integrated or not, so long as there are three sets of people in three sorts of uniform and with three sets of loyalties, there will be rivalries. So long as there are three services, some semblance of balance will have to be maintained in appointing staff; merit cannot rule absolutely.

The Minister is likely to argue that, so long as his military advisers are sailors, soldiers and airmen, they will be inclined to advise him as sailors, soldiers and airmen. Undoubtedly there is something in this; complete objectivity, where the choice is between this piece of major new equipment for the one service and that piece for the other, is perhaps too much to expect of people who think of themselves as belonging to one service and the other.

The Minister has also cases to cite, here and elsewhere, in which one service has resorted to make-work projects to keep specialists busy (or has let them go back to civilian life), while another service has been crying for just such people. If the Minister can prove his point, this may be the best argument of all for unification. How he is going to square this idea of shifting specialists from one place to another with the promise that no one will be moved against his wishes from one environment to another — land to sea, for instance — is another matter.

Toronto Daily Star
20 Jul '99

Voice Of The People

'If the army can keep its kilts, navy should keep wide pants'

You are completely missing the point of Rear-Admiral Landymore's protest as indicated in your editorial of July 16. The admiral is not opposed to integration: as he stated he is opposed to the loss of identity and tradition which will be inevitable if rank terminology and uniforms are to be identical for all services. This to me is the nub of his objections.

As an individual Canadian I think his point is well taken. There is no question but that morale in the navy will suffer if its traditions and distinctiveness are swept away. Surely if Highland battalions are to be allowed to keep their distinctive dress then the same principles apply to the navy.

So don't let's have a lot of high-sounding phrases about the military trying to dictate policy. But let's examine carefully whether there is any substance to the admiral's objections. After all, if, as he says, the morale and efficiency of the service are being affected then it is a very serious matter—especially in these unsettled times.

JOHN CAMPBELL
Windsor, Ont.

Why destroy identity?

While unification at the top has saved money and so far has been popular politically, it does not follow that destroying identity of the three forces will be popular or money-saving.

I think Defence Minister Paul Hellyer should explain thoroughly to the public exactly what it means and how he expects the latter part of integration to save money or to be more efficient, or how he could unify them in time of war with fighting forces of allied countries which haven't integration.

I would assume we will still have ships, still have an army and still have an air force. Why, then, destroy the *esprit de corps* by destroying the identity of the three services—when in reality they still exist? Why destroy the uniforms as they are now known which arouse pride in all of us—especially the naval uniform which is so traditional and recognizable everywhere in the world?

I do see how the morale in the services is slipping alarmingly.

As your editorial of July 16 says, "disgruntled rear-admirals can retire without endangering the security of nation.

So can a defence minister along with his threats of "do it my way or I quit."

Toronto 3 L. THOMSON

Integration, unification

May I congratulate you for a job well done on your full-page treatment of Canada's "integration-unification" problem (Aug. 1). A question such as this with its potential repercussions on the defense, and thus very existence, of our country should certainly be presented by the responsible press to the people.

Your articles pointed out with great clarity and emphasis the confusion that exists in each service as to the ultimate ramifications of this sorry integration-unification muddle. Indeed, most of your correspondents seemed equally confused and never really probed beyond integration to the root of the present problem, i.e., unification. For example, I somehow feel that "the nation's largest army training ground" deserves a more thorough and more operational coverage than a conversation with a tradesman and an administrative clerk in an "always busy bar"! On the other hand, Mr. Stevens' article grasped the essentials of the problem and presented them clearly and simply, particularly with regard to the tremendous differences between integration and unification.

I think your reporters captured very well the feeling of frustration and futility felt in the navy by the West Coast comment that the army was laughing because it had nothing to lose. This, of course, was reinforced by the interview with the Royal 22nd Regiment (despite the fact that the differences between integration and unification were not made clear by your reporter, and in fact the words were used synonymously). The colonel's assurance that there was no danger of

Toronto Globe & Mail
5 Aug '66

Letters to the editor

the regiment's losing its identity is simply confusing beyond measure. Are we to be so naive as to believe that Mr. Hellyer intends to sink the entire 19,000-man navy without trace, but, at the same time, allow a small army formation of regimental size to continue to retain its distinction and identity? Or is the colonel perhaps just trying to bolster the morale of his own troops?

As in any other decision-making process, the pros and cons must be carefully and publicly examined. The services and the people must be told why integration is not enough and why unification is necessary. We must be told what we have to give up and what we stand to gain. Admiral Landymore has alerted us that esprit de corps and pride of service must suffer. What, then, is Mr. Hellyer giving the services and the nation to fill the emptiness? Promises and petulance are shoddy substitutes for forthrightness and facts. The services and the people have a right to an explanation for the necessity of this dangerous political experiment. Parliament must ensure that this right is honored.

H. C. Mecredy
(former naval person)
University of Waterloo

Each has job

smoldering resentment among all ranks in the RCN at the prospect of integration of the three services is now likely to burst into a bright consuming flame, fanned by the courageous attitude taken by Rear Admiral Landymore.

The apathy of the general public to what is going on in Ottawa has undoubtedly well suited Defense Minister Hellyer, and one can readily understand how nettled he is that at last a senior officer — in fact, more than one — rises to oppose his stupidity, not in anger, but in well reasoned terms.

Each of the three services has a valuable job to perform, and while there are areas where greater co-operation is both possible and desirable between the services, the melding of them into one service, so mishmash in its concept that no one can think of a suitable name for it, will contribute nothing, and detract much from the efficiency of all three branches.

The RCN is justly proud of its traditions, the traditions not only of Canada, but the traditions of Nelson, Rodney and Howe. It would seem that the present Government is doing its utmost to strangle any affiliation with that past. The abandonment of the White Ensign was bad enough, but the prospect of a chocolate brown or olive green battle dress is likely to be almost the last straw.

These admirals are no choleric and senile Colonel Blimps. They are men at the peak of their distinguished careers, highly trained and efficient, and above all, they have their fingers on the pulse of the morale of the ranks under their command. To warn the Minister of Defense of the effect on morale of integration was Admiral Landymore's duty. He did his duty, and all honor to him. His dismissal brings dishonor, not to him, but to the Minister and the Government behind him.

JOHN W. WATSON
Oakville, Ont.

Toronto Telegram
21 Jul '66

Professionals

Senior naval personnel who have spoken out against integration of the Canadian armed forces deserve the attention, respect and full support of the Canadian people.

These men, and others like them, are true professionals in their field. They have given many years to their profession and to the service of their country, and know better than any others, including the armchair privates in Ottawa, the true and necessary requirements for effective and efficient defense of this country. Yet they are prevented by arbitrary measures from contributing from their vast store of knowledge and experience to those essential requirements.

E. A. LANCASTER
Pickering, Ont.

Toronto Telegram
26 Jul '66

A wise move

THE GOVERNMENT'S decision to proceed cautiously toward complete unification of the armed services, until Parliament has had an opportunity to debate the issue, is wise.

It is apparent that Rear Admiral William Landymore and other senior navy and army officers, who believed Defense Minister Paul Hellyer was implementing his policy too quickly, have been able to sway the Government to their point of view.

Many of them were firmly convinced that Mr. Hellyer was perhaps confusing "integration" with unification.

The announcement by General Jean V. Allard, and approved by Mr. Hellyer, that there will be no unification without a new mandate from Parliament, will be welcomed by Canadians.

This will assure a full-dress debate on the question, something that the officers concerned and other opponents of unification have wanted. The views of the servicemen on this question will also be heard by the Government.

The decision taken demonstrates that in the face of strong service objections, Mr. Hellyer was prepared to amend his plans. He is to be commended for the course he is following.

More facts wanted

Mr. Hellyer is also to be commended for his restraint in dealing with Admiral Landymore, who precipitated the current storm by publicly criticizing the Government for its unification policy. The former chief of sea operations and head of the Maritime Command was let off with an honorable discharge and full pension.

Admiral Landymore's record of long service to the navy, and to the country, will not be blotted by a reprimand for his outspoken criticism.

Mr. Hellyer acted wisely and generously in this regard.

On the much larger issue, however, of the effect his policy will have on the armed forces and on the country, Mr. Hellyer has not handled the matter well. He must reveal more facts.

When the policy of integration was first announced, public reaction was one of disinterest — a normal reaction of Canadians to military matters except in time of war. This is no longer the case.

The impression had been left with Canadians that Mr. Hellyer intended to bring the general staff more closely together through one integrated body in Ottawa. This would result in commands across Canada being integrated in time.

Fate of regiments

Very few Canadians understood that Mr. Hellyer meant to erase the three existing services, and bring them together in a common integrated force. They had little, or no, conception that this force would have new uniforms, new ranks and presumably its personnel would be interchangeable and trained to navy, army and air force duties, whenever and wherever required.

There will be great relief not only within the armed services, but across the country generally, that this policy is not to be implemented now. Indeed, it may never be proceeded with, as the Chief of the Defense Staff says no serviceman will serve except in his own branch, unless he volunteers to transfer elsewhere.

Pride of service, of ship, of regiment, of squadron or flight is a basic and integral part of the morale on which depends military efficiency and capability.

If there is to be complete unification, what happens to all the proud regiments in Canada which, in two world wars, formed the basis for recruitment?

The Telegram believes there is merit in integration, but not in unification with the subsequent loss of pride in service that has been built up over the years.

Cash and carry foreign policies cheat Hellyer



OTTAWA — Much has been said in the current uproar over defense policy about the morale of our armed forces. What it all boils down to is a charge that the integration program, and especially the prospect of its culmination in a unified force, has played havoc with the morale of the troops.

The vision of some strange new uniform, coupled with the uncertainties of the necessarily experimental implementation of the integration scheme, is said to have all but destroyed the traditionally excellent *esprit de corps* of our soldiers, sailors and airmen.

Inept timing

While the drastic integration changes, which apparently have not been adequately explained to the hierarchy of servicemen below the highest level, have undoubtedly stunned and outraged the military mind, it seems to me that the alleged slump in the morale of the three services stems from a deeper root than the current public discussion of the subject suggests. Large as the question of uniforms, ranks, insignia and unit traditions looms on the surface, I suspect that what really scares the gloomily rebelling top brass is the foreign policy philosophy behind Defense Minister Hellyer's integration program.

If so, no further explanation need be sought for the otherwise unfathomably inept timing of the uproar. It simply seems to have taken the brass hats over two years from the publication of Hellyer's white paper on defense to realize that the integration program was primarily designed to change the purpose of our military establishment from a potential fighting force to a glorified police unit.

This, of course, is quite different from the external trappings of integration and unification. It's a fundamental change which has far-reaching implications that concern the basic concept of defense as an expressive tool of foreign policy. If, as Hellyer's critics maintain, our servicemen's morale is slipping, it is this change of role, dimly perceived as it may be, that is causing it.

Throughout history nations have kept armed forces for one of two purposes—attack or defense. In either case the soldier's training, both in the mechanical and psychological sense, has always been geared to combat. No matter how hypothetical in what now passes for peacetime, this is still the ultimate purpose of any army. Take this away from it and you destroy the *raison d'etre* which sustains its morale.

Even such long-standing neutrals as Sweden (which, incidentally, maintains a superb armed force of 700,000 men) train their servicemen for combat against potential aggressors. In short, to be efficient and to maintain high morale, every serviceman must know that he may be called upon to use his weapon in earnest.

Though never required to defend their homeland against direct aggression, Canada's armed forces have been used in collective defense of freedom. They fought with distinction in two world wars and in Korea. Although a fraction of their peacetime nucleus has acquired a new function with the policing of the U-N settlement of the 1956 Suez crisis, their basic role in collective defense of democracy remained unchanged until the 1962 East-West confrontation in Cuba.

Unrealistic policy

It was during the detente euphoria which followed that our policymakers down-graded the probability of the use of Canada's armed forces in actual combat. Geared to the concept of an eventual U-N peacekeeping police force, this switch in assessment of the international scene found its practical expression in Mr. Hellyer's unification program for the three traditional services.

Based on what is proving to be an unrealistic foreign policy, the idea behind the integration scheme was to create a compact, highly mobile force which would be used "for peaceful purposes only." In other words, our soldiers, sailors and airmen were indirectly told that from a potential combat force they were being transformed into a military police unit. It seems to have taken them over two years to realize the full meaning of the change.

While the slowness of this realization may be surprising, it is not surprising that it was the navy which started voicing objections to the transformation, for the emerging mobile police force has practically no use for the sailor.

Since the post-Cuban premise of a sweeping East-West detente, on which the whole idea was based, appears to be a self-deluding product of our increasingly pocketbook-oriented foreign policy, Parliament must re-examine the novel but possibly premature and harmful concepts it has spawned.

FOOTNOTE: Due to a typographical error, my column on NATO from Paris last Thursday listed the strength of American forces in Germany as 22,500 men. The correct figure is 225,000. The current size of Britain's army on the Rhine is 51,000 men.

Toronto Telegram 3 Aug '66

Hellyer's officer switch complete

OTTAWA — (CP) — Appointment of two veteran combat officers to senior posts overseas, announced today, completes a wholesale change in the top command of the armed forces within the last month.

BOMBER PILOT

Brig. E. A. C. Amy, a World War II tank officer, will take command of the 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade in West Germany in September. He will succeed Brig. A. J. Tedlie, who will become deputy chief of the training command at Winnipeg.

Air Commodore R. J. Lane of Victoria, a World War II bomber pilot, will be promoted to Air Vice-Marshall and take immediate command of the RCAF air division in Europe, succeeding D. A. R. Bradshaw of Ottawa, who is retiring.

Of the 13 most senior officers in the armed forces, only two have held their present appointments for more than a month. They are Lt.-Gen. Robert Rothschild, chief of material command, and Air Commodore G. G. Diamond, chief of transport command. They were appointed in January.

Defence Minister Hellyer fired Rear-Admiral William Landymore, former chief of Maritime Command, and demanded-and-got-the resignation of at least three other senior officers. Lt.-Gen. Frank Fleury, comptroller-general; Vice-Admiral Kenneth Dyer, Chief of Personnel; and Lt.-Gen. Robert Moncel, vice-chief of Staff.

1st MEETING

Four recently retired senior officers have criticized Mr. Hellyer's unification policy.

The new armed forces council met here today for the first time under the new Chief of Defense Staff, Gen. Jean V. Allard. Under him is a completely new staff.

All six field commanders except two have been appointed within the last month as opposition to unification cleaned out the top command.

Toronto Telegram 10 Aug '66

Toronto Daily Star
10 Aug '66

Hellyer in money bind

STAR - AUGUST 10/66

Bigger defence spending hinted

OTTAWA (CP)—Defence Minister Paul Hellyer has indicated he will seek cabinet approval for a bigger defence budget in 1967-68.

He told the Commons defence committee June 23—a transcript of the evidence was made public yesterday—that his department has made savings through integration and will make more.

"But," he added, "these savings can be eaten up in a very short time through increased costs unless we can get enough extra money to offset the devaluation of purchasing power."

When Hellyer took over the defence portfolio in 1963, he got cabinet approval for a budget of some $1,550 million a year for five years with an annual two per cent increase to cover increasing costs.

FACES CRISIS

The current 1966-67 budget is $1,573,000,000.

Informants said Hellyer is facing a financial crisis in his department.

The original plan—and it has not changed—is that savings made in administration, personnel and operations would go for more new weapons, not, as it is sometimes assumed, for a smaller defence budget.

But in 1965-66, administration, personnel and operations costs went up about $21 million to $1,150 million while expenditures on new weapons, equipment and construction went down by $35 million to $204,500,000.

In the current fiscal year, Hellyer has forecast weapons expenditure of about $300 million and an outlay of $1,097,500,000 on personnel, operations and maintenance.

PAY INCREASE DUE

This would represent a cut of more than $50 million on the personnel, operations and maintenance side of the ledger.

But this does not take into account a big pay increase promised for the armed forces in October.

Meanwhile, equipment costs are going up. For instance, development and production costs of the Buffalo transport plane are now estimated at $41 million against an estimate of $36 million a year ago.

Construction of four new destroyers does not start until 1968 but already the estimated cost has shot up to $160,440,000 from the originally estimated $142,000,000.

The Defence Department originally estimated it could buy 125 CF-5 attack planes for $215 million. Now it estimates it can obtain only 115 for this amount.

Three new submarines were to cost some $33 million. Now the estimated cost is nearly $50 million.

Toronto Globe
& Mail
12 Aug '66

Armed forces lose 920 men in two months

OTTAWA (CP) — Strength of the armed forces sagged to 106,186 at the end of June, a loss of 920 servicemen in two months.

The Defense Department said yesterday that on June 30, latest date for which figures are available, the strength of the navy was 18,182, of the army, 43,330, and of the RCAF, 44,674.

The loss since April 30 has been 193 in the navy, 394 in the army and 33 in the RCAF.

The strength has continued to decline despite slightly improved recruiting, re-engagement bonuses announced in February and a substantial pay increase promised for Oct. 1.

The department attributed the continuing decline mainly to the increasing number of Second World War veterans who are reaching retirement age. This exodus will increase in the next few years, the department said.

Number of recruits in the first six months of this year was 4,340 compared with 4,135 in the same period last year.

Informed sources said the decline in manpower has been felt particularly in the technical services.

One highly qualified source said the drain from the technical services has become so serious that there would be extreme difficulty in supporting field operations in event of an emergency.

Other informants said doubts about unification have led some officers to decline promotions because in accepting them they would have to agree to serve for another five years.

Rear-Admiral William Landymore, former chief of Maritime Command, told the Commons defense committee on June 23 that the navy needs 2,600 recruits in the next 12 months but expects to obtain only half that number.

Toronto Telegram
25 Aug '66

Armed services row

Malone says 2 errors may ruin integration

WINNIPEG (CP) — R. S. Malone, publisher of the Winnipeg Free Press and a wartime Canadian army brigadier, says there are "two cardinal errors" in Defense Minister Paul Hellyer's armed forces integration that could destroy "this very important and worth-while Canadian experiment."

The first is the creation of an over-all chief of defense staff with authority exceeding that of the various staff chiefs comprising the Defense Council.

The second is extending integration below the level of ships' companies, regiments and equivalent combat units.

Mr. Malone gives his views in a three-part series in the Free Press. He writes that in both cases, Mr. Hellyer "disregards the clear and repeated lessons of all military history and the practical knowledge and advice of top British, American and Canadian commanders of proven ability in battle."

Mr. Malone's war service included assignments as liaison officer to Field Marshal Montgomery in Italy and chief of the Canadian mission at General Douglas MacArthur's headquarters in the Pacific.

Since the time of Queen Anne's reign, he says, military history indicates the need of a council of staff chiefs with equal voices and equal access to the defense minister. This principle was spelled out in the 1963 British White Paper on Defense, which required the chief of defense staff to submit alternatives to the minister in cases of disagreement.

"The heads of services thus participated in and became party to any decisions and their views could be presented to the government. Such was not the case in Mr. Hellyer's recent row with his generals and admirals. They were not party to many decisions and they could not make their voices heard without resigning from the service."

Absence of this collective principle "can only result in further 'eyeball to eyeball' confrontations at some future date and trap the government into mistakes which by the law of averages are bound to happen with a one-man adviser."

While there is no argument about integration of personnel in purely service formations, Mr. Malone writes, integration below the ship's company or regimental level could well destroy their "all-important factors of morale, pride and family spirit." A single uniform is a silly economy, he adds.

Hold fire

FOLLOWING last week end's stirring celebration in Toronto of the 75th anniversary of the famous 48th Highlanders of Canada, a report from Ottawa stated that the proposed unified forces of the country may be known as the Canadian Rangers.

This coincidence simplifies understanding of the dismay felt by past and present service men over Defense Minister Hellyer's plans.

The identity of the 48th and of other distinguished regiments — the Queen's Own Rifles, the Royal 22e, (Van Doos), the Royal Regiment of Canada, the Royal Regiment of Artillery, the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, to name a few, as well as the Royal Canadian Navy and the Royal Canadian Air Force — is to disappear under some such amorphous and somewhat corn roast name of Canadian Rangers.

Challenging mottoes, honored colors, honorable and cherished traditions, morale and pride are inseparable from regimental identity. As R. S. Malone, publisher of the Winnipeg Free Press and a wartime colonel, states, these all-important elements of the forces may be destroyed by the loss of identity.

Many will agree with Mr. Malone that there is no argument against the integration of supply formations and non-combat personnel. This is the position taken by the recently formed Tri-Services Identities Organization (TRIO), composed of veterans of the Navy, Army and Air Force.

No quarrel exists, of course, with Mr. Hellyer's chief objective — the maintenance of an efficient, mobile, flexible defense establishment. The difference of opinion plainly lies in approach, epitomized in the homogenized name the Canadian Rangers.

TRIO asks for a pause, for clearer definition of methods, for further study and examination. In such a vital matter affecting the security of the nation, this is not an unreasonable request.

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Why the rush?

THERE APPEARS to be no valid reason for the Government to push ahead so hurriedly with its program for the complete unification of Canada's three armed services.

If there is, Defense Minister Paul Hellyer has not revealed it.

Why the rush?

It is not to help recruiting. Hundreds have left the services since the new policy was announced. The Defense Department has not been able to keep the forces up to the required strength.

There have been suggestions that Mr. Hellyer has set July 1, 1967, as the target date for unification for political reasons. This probably is the real reason.

Prime Minister Pearson is expected to step down as Liberal leader after the Centennial celebrations next year. Mr. Hellyer has been mentioned as a potential successor.

If unification is completed before next July 1, and is generally acceptable to Canadians, it would enhance Mr. Hellyer's position.

Merit in integration

There is no question that he is acting in high-handed manner when he rejects Opposition demands for a parliamentary study of unification, before amendments to the National Defense Act are introduced in the House of Commons.

After the furor over unification in July, the Government promised that its policy would not be implemented without a new mandate from Parliament. The announcement was widely welcomed by Canadians, because many of them were confusing integration with unification.

There is merit in integration. But it hasn't yet been clearly explained why complete unification is necessary so soon.

The proper course for Mr. Hellyer to follow is to submit the proposed changes in the National Defense Act to the Commons Defense Committee for study. After this is done, the amendments could then be presented to the House of Commons for approval.

Mr. Hellyer wants no part of such a suggestion.

He is insisting that the House of Commons must first approve the amendments which, in effect, will legalize the final act of unification. Once this is done, the way will be cleared for the three services to be placed in a single uniform.

It would be far better if the committee study were held first. If this were done, witnesses such as Rear Admiral William Landymore, who precipitated the storm over unification, and other senior navy and army officers could be called on to give evidence.

It is essential that the views of the servicemen on this controversial question be heard before the Government proceeds with unification.

Opposition MPs are not alone in urging the Government to permit the Defense Committee to study the proposed changes before they are referred to the House of Commons. A similar request has been made by the Triservice Identities Organization (TRIO).

This is an important defense body. Its wishes should not be ignored.

Unjustified attack

While Opposition MPs were right in criticizing Mr. Hellyer for rejecting demands for a Committee study of unification before the bill is placed before Parliament, their attack on General Jean Allard for a speech he made at a CNE dinner last Friday was hardly justified.

General Allard, chief of the defense staff, urged civilians and servicemen alike to help make unification of the forces a reality.

As chief of the defense staff, General Allard, in advocating unification, was upholding Government policy. If he didn't, he would be holding his high post under false pretenses.

Some Opposition MPs questioned why it was all right for General Allard to speak publicly about unification, but it was wrong for Admiral Landymore to do so.

There is a difference. General Allard was supporting unification; Admiral Landymore was criticizing it and, in turn, attacking the Government for introducing it.

As chief of the defense staff, General Allard is also charged with the responsibility of deciding who under his control makes public statements in defense matters. Admiral Landymore had no such right.

Ottawa to increase payments to veterans

Toronto Globe & Mail
9 Sept '66

OTTAWA (CP) — Finance Minister Mitchell Sharp announced yesterday in the Commons that war veterans' disability pensions and allowances will be increased.

He did not say when this will occur or how big the increase will be.

The last increase in veterans' pensions came in November, 1964. The increase amounted to some 10 per cent against the 38 per cent requested by the Royal Canadian Legion.

The pension for a totally disabled veteran who is single now is $2,400 a year; for a married pensioner it is $3,168.

Veterans' pensions and allowances now cost the federal treasury about $288,000,000 a year.

Mr. Sharp also confirmed that there will be an increase in pay for the armed forces.

Again, he did not say how big the increase will be. The armed forces annual pay bill now is $530,000,000.

The increase is expected about Oct. 1 and there has been speculation it would be in the neighborhood of 14 per cent.

William M. Lee, executive assistant to Defense Minister Paul Hellyer, has said the pay increase will be substantial.

Mr. Sharp said:

"We are seeking to hold down the size of the defense budget despite the inescapable increases in pay and in the prices of what we have to buy."

Informants said Mr. Sharp's statement means that Mr. Hellyer will have to give up his goal of reducing expenditures on housekeeping and increasing them for new weapons and equipment.

Last year expenditures on weapons and equipment fell to their lowest point since the defense buildup began in 1950.

How defence costs have fared

Here's why the defence-spending situation is getting critical. Even in the original estimates for the current fiscal year, increased costs were eating up savings resulting from streamlining of the organizational setup. Since the estimates were drafted, there have been sharp increases in many areas and next month's promised pay increases will increase the estimated personnel costs.

Five-year financial and manpower summary

	1966-67 Provision in estimates	1965-66 Provision in estimates	1965-66 Actual expenditure	1964-65 Actual expenditure	1963-64 Actual expenditure	1962-63 Actual expenditure
			$ million			
Military personnel costs	609	633	663	643	660	631
Operation and maintenance (O&M)						
Civil salaries and wages (a)	188	178	189	180	188	186
Military pensions, etc.	80	67	81	81	146	72
Other O&M costs (net)	338	350	336	335	357	335
Total O&M costs	606	595	606	596	691	593
Total PO&M costs	1,215	1,228	1,269	1,239	1,351	1,224
Capital expenditures						
Military equipment	270	238	193	209	252	233
Military construction	28	25	27	31	31	77
Development	25	31	31	18	12	10
Other (c)	35	39	28	39	37	31
Total capital expenditures	358	333	279	297	332	351
Total DND expenditures	1,573	1,561	1,548	1,536	1,683	1,575
			'000			
Personnel strengths						
Military personnel	106.9	114.4	110.2	117.6	122.7	125.8
Continuing civilians (a)	38.8	40.6	39.4	40.8	43.7	45.1

(a) Relates to employees in continuing positions, including Command Pools.
(b) Includes special contribution re 1966 pay increase, estimated at $25 million.
(c) Includes DRB (equipment, construction and special research) and Mutual Aid.

Source: Government Accounts

OFFICIAL REPORT OF MINUTES

OF

PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

This edition contains the English deliberations and/or a translation into English of the French.

Copies and complete sets are available to the public by subscription to the Queen's Printer. Cost varies according to Committees.

Translated by the General Bureau for Translation, Secretary of State.

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,
The Clerk of the House.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966-67

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. DAVID W. GROOS

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 19

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 1967

Respecting

Bill C-243, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and other Acts in consequence thereof.

WITNESSES:

Rear-Admiral Jeffry V. Brock, D.S.O., D.S.C., C.D., RCN and Rear-Admiral C. J. Dillon, RCN.

MAR 1 5 1967

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1967

25766—1

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. David W. Groos

Vice-Chairman: Hon. Marcel Lambert

Mr. Andras,
Mr. Brewin,
Mr. Churchill,
Mr. Deachman,
Mr. Éthier,
Mr. Fane,
Mr. Faulkner,
Mr. Forrestall,
Mr. Foy,
Mr. Harkness,
Mr. Langlois, (*Chicoutimi*),
Mr. Laniel,
Mr. Latulippe,
Mr. Lessard,
Mr. Loiselle,
Mr. McIntosh,
Mr. McNulty,
Mr. Nugent,
Mr. Rochon,
Mr. Smith,
Mr. Stafford,
Mr. Winch—(24).

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

ORDER OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS

TUESDAY, February 14, 1967.

Ordered,—That the name of Mr. Macaluso be substituted for that of Mr. Faulkner on the Standing Committee on National Defence.

Attest.

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

25766—1½

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, February 14, 1967.
(30)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 10:10 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Groos, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Brewin, Churchill, Deachman, Éthier, Fane, Faulkner, Forrestall, Foy, Groos, Harkness, Lambert, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laniel, Lessard, Loiselle, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon, Smith, Stafford and Mr. Winch—(23).

Also present: Mr. Legault.

In attendance: Rear-Admiral Jeffry V. Brock; *From the Department of National Defence*: Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister; Honourable Léo Cadieux, Associate Minister; Air Marshal F. R. Sharp, Vice Chief Defence Staff; Air Marshal E. M. Reyno, Chief of Personnel.

Rear-Admiral Jeffry V. Brock appeared during this sitting of the Committee to answer questions put by the members. He discussed details of his career, his views on integration and unification and the implications of *Bill C-243*.

It was agreed to distribute copies to the members, of correspondence received to date from any individuals or organizations, by either the Chairman or the Clerk, on the subject matter of *Bill C-243*.

At 12:45 p.m., with the questioning of the witness continuing, the Committee adjourned until 3:30 p.m. this day.

AFTERNOON SITTING

TUESDAY, February 14, 1967.
(31)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 3:40 p.m. this day with the Chairman, Mr. Groos, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Brewin, Churchill, Deachman, Éthier, Fane, Faulkner, Forrestall, Foy, Groos, Harkness, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laniel, Latulippe, Lessard, Loiselle, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon, Smith, Stafford, and Mr. Winch—(23).

Also present: Mr. MacRae, Mr. McLelland and Mr. Watson (*Assiniboia*).

In attendance: (same as the morning sitting).

The Committee continued its examination of the witness, Rear-Admiral Jeffry V. Brock, during the whole of this afternoon sitting.

On motion of Mr. Forrestall, seconded by Mr. Foy,

Resolved,—That the Committee authorize payment of reasonable living and travelling expenses to out-of-town witnesses (excluding departmental officials) who appear before the Committee, during its current hearings in connection with *Bill C-243*.

The Chairman thanked Rear-Admiral Brock on the members' behalf and the Committee adjourned until 8:15 p.m. this day, when the witness will be Rear-Admiral C. J. Dillon.

EVENING SITTING

TUESDAY, February 14, 1967.
(32)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 8:20 p.m. this day, the Chairman, Mr. Groos, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Churchill, Deachman, Éthier, Fane, Faulkner, Forrestall, Foy, Groos, Harkness, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laniel, Lessard, Loiselle, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon, Smith, Stafford, and Mr. Winch—(21).

Also present: Mr. MacRae, Mr. Nasserden, Mr. Rock.

In attendance: Rear-Admiral C. J. Dillon and those in attendance at the morning sitting.

Rear-Admiral C. J. Dillon appeared during this sitting of the Committee to answer questions put by the members. He discussed his Service background and his views on the proposed unification of the Services, with special reference to financial and materiel functions.

On behalf of the members, the Chairman thanked Rear-Admiral Dillon for his appearance before the Committee. The Committee adjourned at 9:55 p.m. until Wednesday, February 15, 1967, when the witness will be Rear-Admiral W. M. Landymore.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(*Recorded by Electronic Apparatus*)

TUESDAY, February 14, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I will now call the meeting to order. Our witness this morning is Rear-Admiral Brock.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, before you call the witness I would like to raise a question with regard to the number of daily meetings. I raised this same question last week, when I said that I objected to meeting three times a day. I objected to meeting on Friday, and I raise the same objection this week. I question the authority of the Chairman to arbitrarily and autocratically set out the times for meetings. I have every objection in the world to this dictatorial method of operating. I suggest to you, sir, that you discontinue calling meetings three times a day, and I see no reason for calling meetings on Friday.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Churchill, as you know, we have to make some progress. The number of meetings that we hold a day depends very much upon the number of questions there are. Today, for example, I do not think I would have been doing my duty if I had not reserved the room at least for eight o'clock tonight. We have two witnesses appearing before us, one this morning and one this afternoon. It is quite conceivable that the questioning of both of these witnesses could be over by six o'clock tonight in which case we would not be needing the room but, in the off chance that the room would be required, I booked it and made arrangements with the translation staff to be there if needed. As for the number of meetings, it is very difficult to fit in—and I am sure you would appreciate this as much as any one—the number of witnesses put forth by the steering committee. Witnesses cannot always come in the right order and I, working with the Clerk, merely set down a series of meetings, using names from the available list provided by the steering committee. I think this has generally been accepted by the Committee, and I see nothing secret about it. I read out a list of the meetings we had been able to arrange and I said there were others who were still waiting to hear from, and this is still the case today.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, I do not think that we are deriving value by having the witnesses follow one another so quickly. We are not getting the transcript of evidence. In order to ask intelligent questions we have to review what the former witnesses have said. You are pushing these meetings at us so fast—and maybe it is intentional; I am not saying it is not—that I do not think that we are doing justice to the subject before us or that we are doing our duty as members of parliament to the public. I think there would be much more value derived from the evidence of the witnesses if you would give us a chance to look it over. You talked about our asking questions; the reason that we ask questions is that we do not have the evidence before us and we cannot be expected to remember everything that was said. Some of the questions may be repetitious, but I think you can understand one of the reasons for this. I agree with Mr.

Churchill. I think that you are shoving this at us too fast to get the full value out of it.

Mr. WINCH: You and I, Mr. Chairman, may have differences upon occasions but I personally want to register my objection to the statement of Mr. Churchill about you being dictatorial and autocratic. We do have meetings in the steering committee and I do not think that I have missed one. I want to say very definitely that I object to the terms "autocratic" and "dictatorial" when referring to the Chairman despite the fact that we have the odd difference of opinion—we can resolve them. Although the steering committee may have not been completely unanimous in this connection, the majority were in favour, and I believe in democracy and majority decision. We had hoped to have not more than two, but because of necessity we may have on occasion three meetings a day.

Mr. Churchill has raised objections every time when it has been decided that we may have to have three meetings a day. I would like to suggest—we have to give consideration where witnesses come from long distances as to whether or not the meeting can be held over—that if it is necessary to hold more than two meetings a day, while agreeing to the room being reserved for three, that after the second meeting you ask members of the steering committee to meet with you on those occasions. This perhaps might meet part of the objection raised by Mr. Churchill.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, this is an urgent bill. Other government bills going through committee in the current session have required similar hours for committee sittings. It is not as if we are proceeding in a unique way. The Finance Committee is meeting as often; the Transport Committee is meeting as often, and both of those over a much longer period, I would think, than we will be required to sit on this bill. Friday and Monday are working days of the House of Commons and we are here to perform our duties as members of parliament. We are not asked to exceed the hours of the House sittings when we are in this committee. I submit that we are not being taxed beyond the normal sitting hours of the House nor are we being asked to do anything in this Committee that is not being asked of other committees which are now sitting.

Mr. LAMBERT: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Deachman is way off base. The finance Committee does not sit five days a week. The only reason there were additional sittings last week was the Westbank controversy. We have duties with respect to that committee even if some of the members here feel they have nothing else to do. There are a number of people who are involved in House business, which is just as important as this. The fact that this bill is now before us near the end of the session is because of government determination only. I share with Mr. Churchill some—

An hon. MEMBER: Naturally.

Mr. LAMBERT: All right; I recognize what the hon. Member said. I remember that last June there was a great gang-up against the recommendations of the steering committee and the members of the steering committee on that occasion ate themselves because they accepted a suggestion from the hon. Member from Vancouver Quadra who said that all we had gone through would be cold porridge. I cannot agree with five days a week meetings. There is also a sense of responsibility involved. I realize that for the convenience of witnesses it is necessary to extend our hours, and this is done willingly. However, the question

is scheduling and I will say right here that the matter of scheduling of the witnesses was not referred to the steering committee.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, may I direct, through you, a question to anyone who will be a spokesman for the official Opposition in the House and, therefore, in their position here on this Committee? Will they advise this Committee whether or not they want the matter which is before us now considered, reported and dealt with in the House of Commons at this session, or is their position that it shall not be done at this session and shall come in as a new bill for new consideration at the next session? May I ask a spokesman for the official Opposition to answer that?

Mr. LAMBERT: It is an entirely hypothetical question. We are dealing with the business at hand.

The CHAIRMAN: Order, order!

Mr. LAMBERT: Mr. Chairman, the platoon can laugh but I will say that we are prepared to do what is necessary with regard to this bill.

Mr. WINCH: In order to have it through this session?

Mr. LAMBERT: Not at the end of February.

Mr. LANIEL: Mr. Chairman, in connection with Mr. McIntosh's point about having to wait for the evidence, if it is that way it is then French-speaking members should also have the privilege to read the evidence in French—but we will not get it for three or four months. This is silly. We cannot wait that long; Committees cannot wait that long.

Mr. NUGENT: Committee sittings three times a day every day of the week is unique, in my parliamentary experience. I would hate to think, after some of the important pieces of legislation that have been handled by other committees that we were slow or dilettante in the manner we perform our duties. The question of whether committees should sit while the House is sitting because of conflicting duties, has been raised in great length in the House, but to suggest that our normal duties just do not exist at all, that we can just carte blanche forget the House and concentrate on a committee to this extent, is self-defeating and does not make sense. I cannot believe that the witnesses who are appearing before us have so little to offer that there should be no time for appreciation of any evidence. We are just piling evidence on evidence day in and day out. I cannot think of a court which operates that way and—I cannot think of any other committee which has operated that way. Obviously those who suggest that we rush through the evidence feel that there is nothing to be gained from the witnesses; they are not prepared to listen or consider the evidence. I think this question of repetition cannot be over-emphasized. If there is no appreciation of what has been given, no time for reflection and understanding of it and no copies of evidence from previous weeks then it is that much more difficult to efficiently conduct a proper examination. We are going to end up doing the same thing over and over and over again whereas if we handled it in a more reasonable manner we could sit fewer hours just as well. This question by Mr. Winch is a question for each person and his own conscience. I could care less whether or not the bill gets through but I do care that we get the information. Perhaps I am a little hipped on the subject, but to suggest that we have a deadline to meet, and that

is it, is nonsense. I think we have a duty to look into the subject and I do not care how long it takes. I think we should look into it fully and completely.

The CHAIRMAN: If I could comment on the remarks that have been made already I would point out, first of all, that we met for four days last week; the fifth day was a steering committee day. This week the number of days we sit will depend very much upon when the witnesses can appear. At this moment there is some doubt as to what witnesses, if any, will be able to appear on Friday; I am trying to get them to appear on Thursday. But be that as it may, I would not want to feel that we could not get the approval of the Committee to meet on the fifth day if it were found to be necessary. The matter has not arisen yet.

As for moving too fast, all I can say is that within my limited experience in parliament, I have sat on a number of committees, one of them the Columbia River Treaty and its protocol which met, if my memory is correct, about as often if not more frequently than the Committee.

The printed report is a problem and I understand the difficulties of the members of this Committee. We have done our best to get them out speedily. The first one should be in our hands today. It has been delayed, but this is really nothing new; I have never known it to hold up the giving of evidence by witnesses before Committees.

I do not know whether I really could accept the suggestion that one of the members has made, that we are not prepared to listen to evidence. It seems to me that the very fact that we are prepared, willingly or not, to sit and hear the evidence of the witnesses is the best answer to that, even though we may have to sit like last night, up until 10.30.

I do not think there is very much more I can say except to record the objections that have been raised.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, my suggestion was not in respect of the printed report. If we could get an unedited copy of the transcript so that we could go over it, that would be fine. It does not have to be in book form.

You talked about former committees that you have sat on. I do not think, in respect of those other committees that you referred to, that there ever was a deadline set that you had to meet? Apparently here is a deadline which we have to meet here, whether we agree with it or not. I think it is too serious a matter to go through the evidence in the manner in which we are because we are not getting the value out of the evidence which has been given. I am confused, as you understand, about the word "unification" and what it means, and I am quite prepared, if some of these witnesses can prove to me that the Minister is right, to go along with the bill. However, I have to be convinced, and I am going to be convinced by the evidence presented to this committee, if I am going to be convinced.

The CHAIRMAN: I do not think anyone can argue with that, sir.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, I thought when we discussed this matter last week that it was generally agreed at least that we would not sit three times a day unless it was absolutely urgent and necessary because witnesses were here and we wanted to complete their evidence so that they would not have to come back from some considerable distance. It seems to me that the difficulty we have been running into since we started is that we are sitting almost always when the

House is sitting. In other words, at no time have members of this Committee been able to be in the House and in committee also except for the orders of the day, and I do not think that there is anyone who will not agree that this is an unreasonable situation. Of course, I think the difficulty comes from the way in which the witnesses have been scheduled. As I pointed out, I think on Friday evening, if witnesses are scheduled in such rapid succession, as has been done, then this is the situation that we are going to be in and we will not only have to sit up to the regular time but, as we did last night, beyond it in order to hear witnesses who are here from distances. Therefore, it seems to me the answer to this is not to schedule people so close on one another's heels, as it were.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Harkness, as I say, I can only take this under consideration with the members of the committee as a whole. The bill has been sent to us by parliament and it is my job to see that it is moved ahead as fast as it is practical when it is the general wish of the Committee. I had not felt that we were being unreasonable in view of my previous experience on other committees.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, do you think it is reasonable that during the past five days the only time that members of this Committee could spend in the House was the hour after the House opened at 2.30 or 11 o'clock, as the case might be? This is just not a reasonable proposition.

The CHAIRMAN: We are doing the business of parliament by being here, it seems to me. The amount of time that we have spent here has been rather unfortunate, I must confess. Questioning some of the witnesses has taken longer than I thought it would take. Perhaps now that we have had the first batch of witnesses appear before us the amount of questioning will be directed more specifically to the bill and will not take quite as long, but only experience will show that. I will certainly keep in mind, as will the members of the steering committee and I am sure all the other members of the Committee, the points that have been put forward.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, would you take up with the steering committee this question of scheduling the witnesses and make a suggestion that we schedule only one witness a day because in case of delay the scheduling itself is going to force three sittings.

Mr. WINCH: Oh, no. I attended Committee twice yesterday. We had seven witnesses and I did not think that they were curtailed in any way.

Mr. NUGENT: I believe it was a different subject.

Mr. CHURCHILL: But you were not here for this meeting.

Mr. WINCH: I could not be in two places at once.

Mr. CHURCHILL: No, of course you could not, nor could anyone else.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I think the point has been made. I do not wish to spend any more time debating it.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Cancel the sitting for tonight at eight o'clock and that will settle today.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Mr. Chairman, so that you will not be accused of being a dictator may I move, if I have a seconder, that we continue with the schedule?

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, may I point out that that is a debatable motion. I think that arrangements should be made by agreement with the various parties. If you want to debate the scheduling and so on, we can spend all day debating it, and I am quite prepared to do that. I am not going to be pushed around.

The CHAIRMAN: Could we have a consensus regarding the question of continuing with the proceedings as they are today; then at 6 o'clock we can see how things are and decide then if we wish to continue the questioning at 8 o'clock. Does that sound reasonable?

Mr. LAMBERT: Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that the Bank Act has been before the Finance Committee since last October. The scheduling was on the basis of a majority decision by the Committee and it sat for two days a week, not five days—and this bill is no more important than the other one.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that never in my experience—and I have a bit more experience than you—have I ever sat on a Committee that sat this many days a week and had as many sittings. You stated Mr. Chairman that in your experience you have had as many sittings.

The CHAIRMAN: I acknowledge the greater experience which you have Mr. Nugent. I was only speaking from my personal recollection.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, we all want to hear from Rear Admiral Brock. I would suggest that we hear him and then later this afternoon, when we see the progress we are making, we can make a decision as to whether or not we sit tonight.

The CHAIRMAN: I started to introduce Rear Admiral Brock earlier. He is appearing before us as a witness. Admiral Brock tells me that he has no brief prepared but he is willing to answer questions. He has a short introductory statement.

Rear Admiral JEFFRY V. BROCK: Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, in light of the foregoing discussion, I will not delay you unduly.

I had the opportunity of appearing before this Committee only once before when in late July of 1964 you came down to visit me and my command in the Atlantic at Halifax, where you will recollect that ample opportunity was provided for Committee members to seek all the information they were after. We billeted you as guests of the commanding officers and men of the various ships so that you might live closely with them and take your soundings from that vantage point. There were many briefings arranged for you by more senior officers and they provided you with an opportunity to witness demonstrations and exercises at sea and in the air, taking you to Bermuda and then for discussions with SACLANT and his staff at Norfolk, Virginia.

You also will recall that toward the end of our discussions in the Halifax area, there was a final summing up briefing, conducted largely by myself and that I provided a very lengthy period toward the end for free and easy off-the-record question and answer period. My recollection is that you availed yourselves quite freely of this opportunity. You also will remember that even at that early date, discussion tended from time to time to become somewhat acrimonious politically, between yourselves, and that when my professional advice or aid was sought, the associate minister not only permitted but, in fact, urged me to answer

you frankly and fully—while dodging any of the political implications of course. I did so; I gave you all the information that you wanted.

You left to return to Ottawa on July 30 and five days later I was fired. I have been waiting for 2½ years for you to ask to see me again. Now that I am here, I have no brief to provide to you. I hope that my years of experience have provided me with some small measure of judgment in these matters, and that this judgment will be helpful to you. Mr. Chairman, I am now at your service.

Mr. WINCH: I would like to put three questions, the first to Rear Admiral Brock.

May I first say that I was a member of that Committee and I appreciated the opportunity of learning from the answers which were given. You have now said that five days after our Committee left, you were fired?

Rear Admiral BROCK: That is correct.

Mr. WINCH: Would you mind telling this Committee, as far as you know, the reasons given to you as to why you were released of your command?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I can only give you the reasons that were given to me by the Minister himself. On the Monday following your departure, he called and asked when a convenient date might be established for a meeting in Ottawa with him. By comparing our diaries, it was decided that Wednesday, August 5 would be mutually convenient and I came to Ottawa and saw him. It was a very short and brief interview, less painful than going to the dentist but more hurtful. His reasons were that I was one of those officers who had been for so many years so keenly interested in the provision of new equipment for the forces that I would readily understand the necessity for making money available for this purpose from a fixed budget, that I was well aware of the trends of increasing personnel costs which was squeezing out capital investment and that presumably I would be the first to agree; and if personnel costs could be cut in order to make funds available for this other purpose, that it would be a good thing, and that these cuts could not be made just at the bottom, the middle or at the top, but right across the board. "You" he said "Admiral are at the top".

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, through you, could I ask the Minister of National Defence why Rear Admiral Brock was released of his command?

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Winch, the witness before us today is not the Minister of National Defence, and I think we will have to wait until he is before us.

Mr. WINCH: I thought that this would be the opportune time to ask that question. Do you say that I am out of order in asking it now?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, I think you are.

Mr. WINCH: All right; I always bow to the decisions of the Speaker of the Chairman. Please make note that I would like to have this answered by the Minister of National Defence.

Rear Admiral, what can you tell us of your views, from your experience, on questions of integration and unification?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Mr. Winch, this is going to be a difficult one to sum up in a few words. This is the whole purpose—

Mr. WINCH: But this is the information that this Committee requires, especially from one who stated he was fired.

Rear Admiral BROCK: I have been opposed to pressing the concept of what has now become known as unification from the very beginning. My views were pretty well known, and of course, as part of my duties, I had made official representations while in the service to higher authority and through higher authority to the Minister, and in fact directly to the Minister. I hope my suggestions were not destructive, being purely critical.

At the time, I had put forward a good many constructive suggestions and in my judgment, as I told the Minister, and which I have said many times since, what he was trying to accomplish, or all that is good in what he is trying to accomplish, or what I understand he is trying to accomplish, could have been achieved by going to the three chiefs of staff and saying: "You gentlemen, as heads of your services and leaders within your profession must from now on, by order of me, the Minister, ensure that only one defence policy is pursued on behalf of Canada. I shall state the policy; I shall delineate the financial resources available to you for this purpose; now please get together and do it within this time scale or I shall find three new chiefs of staff".

Now, in my judgment, had this occurred in this way, the Minister and the government by this time would have been very much further along the road to achieving and reaping all the benefits which can be derived from what has been called integration, leading toward a measure of unification—I use unification in another sense, in a military sense—far further along the road at this point than we are at the moment. There would have been none of the disturbances which have become widespread throughout the services and, in consequence, the disturbance felt, I think, by the electorate of this country, nor would there be any need perhaps for this meeting toady.

Mr. WINCH: I would like to ask one supplementary, because I know other members wish to get important information. I have gathered from what you just said, Rear Admiral, that had the procedure which you have just outlined been pursued, we would have been far further along the road. Do you mean far further along the road from integration to unification? What do you mean when you said: "We would be far further along the road?" I gather you mean in efficiency, policy and equipment and so on. What did you mean when you said that had this procedure which you outlined been followed, "we would be far further along the road"? I am certain you understand the importance I place on that statement you just made. What did you mean by that?

Rear Admiral BROCK: What I meant by that was that there was no one that I know of, any responsible senior leader in the services, who was not anxious to keep on proceeding along a road of development toward greater efficiency in the Canadian forces. Some of this involved ministerial, Treasury Board and government authority and approval for taking measures that had long since been recommended in terms of creating a better system of management. Here we must be careful of our terms. I was sitting in here yesterday and heard many people ask for definitions of integration and unification. Herein lies our difficulty. During the last two and a half years I have become a student of *Hansard*. I have read averything that has been said about it, both inside the House and elsewhere. To my mind there is still a good deal of confusion about what is meant here.

Let us deal with integration first. If, by integration, one means the combining of certain common functions in such a way that they can be more efficiently

and economically performed, then this is a good thing and something that most serving officers then and now will be anxious to see. If, by integration, you mean evolving some system of training and management that will enable what can best be summed up in the one word "interchangeability"—because here we are dealing with people in the services—then I foresee, as I did before, many pitfalls, many dangers and many difficulties, and in many cases this is just not possible. I beg your pardon. I will not say that it is not possible; anything is possible within a disciplined, uniformed service directly responsible to one man in sole authority. Anything is possible, but integration will be more expensive, in that sense.

Let us now take unification. I have for a very long time been an outspoken advocate for a form of unification, but not in the sense it is used today. I do not believe there is an experienced, senior military man alive who would not say that, in a military operation or any form of operation that the Canadian forces are likely to be called upon to perform, it is not only highly desirable but mandatory in this day, and has been for the last three generations at least of military men, to place one officer in command and that this one officer shall have command and control of all those functions that support his mission. You have to make sure these men are trained, and let us make sure they are properly supplied. He has the responsibility, and with this responsibility goes the authority to bring on to his staff those other specialized officers who can best contribute to the fulfilment of his aim. This is unified military command. Mr. Winch, I know of no senior officer in Canada or elsewhere who would not acknowledge the right and ability of any other sufficiently senior officer to act in this capacity, no matter what the colour of his cloth. That is what I mean by unification. Does that answer your question?

Mr. WINCH: Not quite, sir. I do not want to take too long, but you said that under your proposal we would have proceeded to a greater extent than we now have. Are you indicating that under your idea of unification we could have proceeded to a greater extent toward unification?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Please do not try to read other meanings into my words, Mr. Winch. I was endeavouring to convey, perhaps ineptly, that, in fact, the services, from a morale, recruiting, manning and equipment point of view, and the over-all management situation would have been better now than it is.

Mr. WINCH: Thank you, Rear Admiral Brock, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to ask this question.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Foy, on a supplementary?

Mr. FOY: Rear Admiral Brock, you said that under one single command it would be more expensive. Would you mind elaborating on that?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I am sorry, no; I said that any two great efforts to achieve interchangeability of personnel would be too expensive.

Mr. FOY: What are the reasons for this?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Let us take a simple one. Let us take bread, the staff of life. You have to provide bread for the men and obviously, if it is possible, the best way to do this is to put it out to tenders to find out who will provide the greatest amount of bread at the cheapest cost, as long as it is palatable enough for the troops, and then distribute it. Unfortunately this cannot be done in outlying stations in the far north for the air force and in some army establish-

ments. Therefore, they have to find a baker, which they do, and set up a shack along side the cookhouse, and he bakes bread. There is not enough room in the navy for a cook and a baker so the cook is also a baker. But he is also a seaman; he also supplies ammunitions to guns; he also has other various duties within the ship. Now, if you wanted to, you could take a cook from the army and train him to be a baker, send him to sea and train him to be a seaman if he does not get seasick, but it would be more expensive. It can be done. There are very, very few examples indeed where savings could be made by interchanging people with acquired skills between the trades and you have to consider their personal inclination to be in that one particular service within that one particular environment.

Mr. Foy: I take it then that I misunderstood you. I thought you said that it would be more expensive to have the three services under one commander.

Rear Admiral Brock: No, I did not say that.

Mr. Foy: I thought you did.

Rear Admiral Brock: I am sorry.

Mr. Smith: With reference to Mr. Foy's question, after you train the cook to bake bread at sea and train him to be a seaman, it would, by the same token, I presume be fairly expensive and a waste of talent to post him back to a land station where he would not have to have the other skill.

Rear Admiral Brock: I think that is a fair inference.

Mr. Smith: You mentioned, Admiral Brock, that by the exercise of perhaps authority over the chiefs of staff a rational method of acquiring equipment and developing our military policy could have been developed. A member of parliament who is just a casual observer may have concluded from the estimates that the purchasing policies of the armed forces over the years were rather like a lottery in that one force would try to get some new equipment perhaps at the expense of another. Is there any fairness in the assumption that perhaps you were pushing for your D.E.s and perhaps Air Marshal Sharp was pushing for some air equipment without either of you necessarily having consideration for the well-being or the purpose of the whole military force. Is there any accuracy in that comment?

Rear Admiral Brock: That comment was accurate, Mr. Smith, up to the point where you said, without regard for the welfare of the whole. Of course, there was competition, but there has always been regard for the welfare of the whole. In fact, the three chiefs of staff and their predecessors—many of whom I knew very well and sat with on conferences—were, of course, interested in getting what they could for their own services. There was always a bit of give and take; there was always a bit of rivalry. However, they always got together pretty quickly when it was a question of facing the minister and the Treasury Board to ensure that the defence concepts that they had evolved or helped to evolve, were sound.

Mr. Smith: I think you were in the room yesterday, Admiral, during the discussion with one of the witnesses concerning the fact that we could still maintain our anti-submarine warfare role with perhaps less men, having regard to the fact that there are helicopters from the destroyers and other technological

advantages. You have only been away from the service for two years. What is your feeling on that? Can we maintain our ASW role with less sailors?

Rear Admiral Brock: No, certainly not. This is a pretty complex subject. Let me, without over-simplification, make my point quickly. It would be possible, for example, with one aircraft carrier presumably to increase the potency, size, speed and characteristics of its on-board aircraft to a point where the carrier could accommodate no more than one aircraft. This would be going too far. There are happy mediums. The question as to what the mix should be in the navy of ships that are highly sophisticated, ships that are somewhat out of date and ships that are very much smaller and less expensive is one that can best be judged by the experts in the field. Whether the judgment of these experts has been followed or even sought in recent times is a puzzle to me.

Mr. Winch: Was your advice ever sought?

Rear Admiral Brock: Well, sir, I do not think I would have held the appointments I had successfully had it not been sought and accepted, up to a certain point. I have given you the date of the parting of our ways.

Mr. Smith: I would like to turn now to the evidence that was presented to us the other day concerning the modern operational equipment that was going to be obtained for the services. I think that you were involved very much during a considerable part of your later serving career in the design and procurement of new naval equipment.

Rear Admiral Brock: Yes, I was.

Mr. Smith: During a discussion in Halifax of the then proposed destroyer escorts, I believe I heard you say something to the effect, "My God, I designed them".

Rear Admiral Brock: As Vice Chief of the naval staff it was my responsibility to co-ordinate all such functions.

Mr. Smith: Now we are acquiring four vessels which are referred to as DDH's. Are they a modification of the destroyer escort?

Rear Admiral Brock: Do you mean a modification of the destroyer escort or of the—

Mr. Smith: With respect to the frigate program, which one was cancelled?

Rear Admiral Brock: It was called a general purpose frigate.

Mr. Winch: If I remember correctly, that was your suggestion.

Rear Admiral Brock: The general purpose frigate?

Mr. Winch: I am sorry, Mr. Smith, but I do remember that you at our meeting put forward a certain plan which was not accepted.

Rear Admiral Brock: Oh, I was very fond of the idea. Yes, indeed. The DDH's, I am not sure; I am perfectly certain that you would save the time of the Committee and get better evidence with respect to the details from witnesses better qualified at this stage. In respect of the concept of the future Navy, in which I had helped, it was indeed accepted by the naval board, and indeed agreed in general terms I believe by the chiefs of staff committee and the government, that part of this whole program, in addition to the building pro-

gram for general purpose frigates, should include a modification in certain of the St. Laurent and Restigouche class of ships whereby they would be given a capability for carrying a helicopter. This is some form of DDH—H meaning helicopter. There were also proposals and drawings available for another class of ship which was designed really to carry helicopters mostly; this also could have been called a DDH. I am not quite sure what is meant by the present DDH.

Mr. SMITH: One of the first items of modern equipment shown was the new propulsion system. Do you know anything about that?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I know that in my day it was considered highly desirable to put gas turbine propulsion units into all new construction so that, while taking advantage of modern steam propulsion units already in production to keep the costs down, they could provide additional speed over and above an economical speed. This had not been fully decided, but from what I hear and read in the press, the decision has now been made to go all the way to gas turbine propulsion. I am not an engineer.

Mr. SMITH: The second item was the automated point defence missile system. Are you familiar with that? Was it under development or consideration when you were there?

Rear Admiral BROCK: It may or may not be the same thing that we were referring to as a guided missile point defence system. You cannot put a very long range guided missile in ships the size of those we have in the RCN and the point defence system—which means medium to short range type of weapons—was automatic.

Mr. SMITH: Is that a reference to the American weapon which was called in by the United States and shelved?

Rear Admiral BROCK: It was not in my day, but what is going on now I could not say.

Mr. SMITH: I have just one other item I want to mention. Was the anti-submarine rocket system called ASROC under consideration then?

Rear Admiral BROCK: No, it was not. I am sorry; it had been considered and discarded.

Mr. SMITH: Do you have any recollection as to why it was discarded?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Yes. It was discarded basically on the question of the philosophy of the tactics of anti-submarine warfare. I can enlarge upon it if you like. The ASROC is a weapon that has been fitted in the U.S. navy for some few years. As with all such sophisticated weapons, it had its teething troubles in the early days. It is a system of launching a home torpedo from a surface ship so that it glides through the air, enters the water, starts its search pattern, hunts for and hopefully destroys a submarine at long range—comparatively long range. One of the difficulties, of course—perhaps these difficulties have been overcome: hopefully they may have—has always been, at least up to two and a half years ago, the solving of the problem of identification as opposed to location of a submarine, of knowing in fact that that was an enemy submarine. These difficulties seemed insoluble at long range and therefore it did not seem desirable to have a very expensive and sophisticated long-range weapon which the command would be reluctant to release without this confirmation. It was for that reason that ASROC was discarded.

Mr. SMITH: I have one final question, Admiral. When you were a senior naval officer, were any studies made of which you are aware or took part in as to the efficiency or inefficiency or the benefits or lack of benefits concerning the unification—I do not know which one of the many words to use—of material command and the supply services?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I cannot give you chapter and verse, but I seem to recollect that these questions had been discussed through some agencies of the chiefs of staff committee.

Mr. SMITH: What was your own opinion of the effectiveness of a single materiel command and a single supply service for all the combat forces?

Rear Admiral BROCK: My opinion was, and still is, that this is a good thing wherever it can prove savings and guarantee the effective supply of what is needed in materiel to the officer who holds the ultimate responsibility of command.

Mr. SMITH: Have you read or studied any reports, articles or professional publications concerning the problems of the American supply and materiel service in Viet Nam?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Yes. I am under the impression from what I read that they discovered, even though they have not gone as far as we are attempting to go, they went too far and that the system, I understand, was not standing up as well as it should have to support the individual service activities. That is my impression.

Mr. SMITH: Thank you.

Rear Admiral BROCK: It does not suprise me.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Admiral, I have one question resulting from Mr. Smith's questioning on which I would like you to elaborate. I think with respect to Mr. Smith's reference to the anti-sub role of the navy, that you said the role could not be increased with less men. Is that what you said?

Rear Admiral BROCK: The effectiveness could not be increased with less men.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Would you agree then with France's policy? They say that the reduction in their manpower is compensated by the increase in fire power of the new weapons. Could that same thing not be achieved in the Canadian policy?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I think that this is possible within an individual unit of the navy. For example, a ship may be so designed and its weapons systems may be so automated that fewer men are needed to do the job; but again, I must point out that in order to do the over-all job—that is, to fulfil the role of the navy—a certain number of ships of various classes, sizes, shapes and functions —are involved and they need the manpower. I think that explains the point.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I want to draw your attention now to the time that you say you were fired. The minister said in a statement in Edmonton that he took such action in regard to so many senior personnel because of civilian control over the military. In other words, he inferred that there was a coup about to take place. Were you involved in that coup? Later on he said in the House that it was one person. Were you that one person?

Mr. NUGENT: Were you revolting, Admiral?

Rear Admiral BROCK: All admirals are revolting, as far as I can make out.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Did the minister ever accuse you of this?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Certainly not, and any such accusation or suggestion would have been insulting, wrong and nonsense.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Have you any idea to whom he is referring?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I have no idea whom he is referring to. I am perfectly certain—perfectly certain—having known these gentlemen all my life, that no such thing occurred.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You do know, though, that the minister made this statement. You said you read *Hansard*.

Rear Admiral BROCK: Yes.

Mr. MCINTOSH: He made the statement.

Rear Admiral BROCK: Yes.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Right. Now, prior to the time that you were fired, did any difference of opinion with regard to policy arise between you and the minister —that is, between the time the minister took over the portfolio and the time that he fired you?

Rear Admiral BROCK: No, there was no open conflict of any sort. I think the minister and I, as far as I am aware, got along quite well together. He has been with me in my home; we have seen a great deal of one another and travelled around together, as was my duty and in fact my pleasure. I spoke to him very frankly. I gave him all the advice he ever asked for.

Mr. WINCH: Where was the conference—

Mr. MCINTOSH: Just a moment, Mr. Chairman, I think I have the floor. Perhaps I should refer to the instance where he dismissed you or fired you. Were you satisfied with the reason that he gave you for taking that action?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I had nothing else to go on. I was dumbfounded that he should go about it in the way he did, but who was I to stand in the way of progress if the money that was to be paid to me for the few remaining years I had left to serve was going to be a big benefit to Canada. How could I protest?

Mr. MCINTOSH: Was your position not going to be filled by some other body?

Rear Admiral BROCK: It was; but I believed the impression the minister was trying to convey to me was that the reductions and other savings in personnel, of course, would be sufficient to provide more equipment for the services, and that this was what he was going to do. I think the fact that it did not turn out that way was predictable.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Did you understand what the minister said with respect to the amount of savings to the department he would achieve by firing you?

Rear Admiral BROCK: That was his declared intention.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Did you not argue the point? Did you accept his statement as a fact?

Rear Admiral BROCK: It is very difficult to argue with a Minister who has just fired you. My arguments had taken place previously.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Your arguments? What were your arguments about, Admiral?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Well, perhaps that is the wrong word.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I asked if you had any differences of opinion and you said No, not to your knowledge.

Rear Admiral BROCK: Well, I think the Minister was perfectly well aware of my feelings of concern, about the manner in which he was proceeding and the speed at which he was proceeding, through quite a few conversations, and others also, hopefully, conveyed to him by other officers senior to me, to whom I had expressed the same thoughts. There was no open conflict.

The inference of your first question was that there was something unfriendly in the business. This was not the case.

Mr. WINCH: May I ask a supplementary—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh has the floor.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I want to continue my questioning.

The CHAIRMAN: I will put you down for a supplementary, Mr. Winch.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Prior to the time that you were fired did you understand the Minister's definition of the term "unification"?

Rear Admiral BROCK: No; nor did anybody that I know—any senior officer who had discussed this thing. No one seemed for a single moment to believe that the one reference in the White Paper could be anything but an odd expression. All the senior officers I know, most of whom have since departed, found the thought unworkable. We just thought, "Does he really mean this? All one service? All in one uniform? He could not possibly; not possibly. No one would advise this". "No senior officer would go along with it". It could not be, so it was dismissed.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Were any of the arguments that you referred to between yourself and the Minister on this subject of unification?

Rear Admiral BROCK: No. And, indeed, I have heard the Minister say, and I believe he has said on the floor of the House, and I believe he said it in his White Paper, that there was no intention of striving too hard to force something that would not fit; that these things would evolve gradually; that his intention was to feel his way carefully; his intention was to consult very carefully the advice and judgment of his senior officers; that we were running into trouble right away. This was our impression.

Mr. MCINTOSH: What I am trying to determine is when you first heard of this term "unification"? Was it while you were still in the services, or was it after you were fired?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Well, I read the White Paper while I was still in the service.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You read the White Paper. Was there anything in the White Paper of 1964 that would lead you to believe that a policy of unification, as stated by the Minister, was to be implemented in our forces.

Rear Admiral BROCK: Clearly, no.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I want to get back now...

Rear Admiral BROCK: Let me say: Unclearly, no.

Mr. MCINTOSH: The present vice-chief of the defence staff in his presentation asks this question:

> What would the forces look like if we stopped at integration and did not proceed to unification?

Could you answer that question as you understand unification today, and is there any change in your understanding of the term today from what it was prior to being fired on February 5th?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I will answer the second part of your question first. There is a very great difference between what I understand to be the Minister's intention now on unification, and what I believed at that time.

To answer the first part of the question, on what the services would look like if the program were stopped now, I do not know; I do not know what they would look like, but I know how they would feel. They would feel delighted. They would be delighted. Stop! Re-examine!

I strongly suspect that—and I hope you will have an opportunity to obtain direct evidence of this—that there are a great many senior officers presently serving, who would be delighted to have a pause for reexamination at this time. Perhaps they should be asked.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Admiral, during the time that you served as Rear Admiral under the Minister I imagine that there would be many occasions on which you would get memoranda or phone calls from him. You did not have any difficulty in understanding what he meant, I presume? I want to ask you: What is your interpretation of the Minister's definition of "unification"? I will repeat it. He says:

> Unification is the end objective of a logical and evolutionary progression.

Can you interpret that for me?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I am sorry, I cannot.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You do not know what he means by that?

Rear Admiral BROCK: No.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Have you any idea, after listening to the hearings so far, what the term "unification" means? Can you give us a short definition?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Well, in practical terms, if the present legislation is passed in the House it means the disappearance of the three services. That is what it means.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, you have read the Minister's speech on the introduction of Bill No. C-243. He tired in that speech to imply to us and to the public that there is going to be no change in the three services, the Air Force, the Navy and the Army.

Rear Admiral BROCK: I do not know what he was endeavouring to imply, but from what he has said there can be quite clearly no other purpose for the

bill, than to abolish the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force and form a new service.

Mr. McIntosh: Do you get the same impression from his speech that I do, that he is saying Yes in one place and No in others, so that he can take either answer.

Rear Admiral Brock: For some considerable time, I have found a very great deal of difficulty in understanding what the Minister is driving at.

Mr. McIntosh: Are you of the opinion that there is a great deal of confusion between the terms "integration" and "unification", as used by the Minister and all members of this Committee?

Rear Admiral Brock: There has been all along, yes. My impression, even listening to the discussion yesterday, was that this confusion had not been cleared up.

I made some modest attempt to redefine these terms earlier this morning, but whether my definition is any better than anyone else's is a question for a judgment.

Mr. McIntosh: Well, frankly, every witness has done the same thing, Admiral, but no two have come up with the same definition.

I believe it was the Esher Reform in Great Britain that resulted in the British Department of National Defence not accepting the single command such as we have today. I took it from what you said in answer to a previous question from one of the members here, that although you did not come right out and say it, you were more or less in favour of the single command. Are you?

Rear Admiral Brock: I am in favour of single operational authorities being appointed in command of operational functional activities; not functional in the sense that it has been described to you in the White Paper and in other speeches, but functional in the military sense of command and control, so that one person is made responsible for, and given the authority to enable him to conduct, a form of military operation, either within a certain theatre of war or an area of peace time endeavour. I do not think that there is any military authority anywhere that will quarrel with this.

This, in effect, was the outcome of the Esher Commission. It amounted to the same thing. If there is to be one officer of one service appointed for this job within a certain area, it presupposes that there will be three services contributing their expertise—knowledge—to the enterprise. Whether we can make such a supposition today is doubtful.

Mr. McIntosh: You said that among the heads of the three services, there was always rivalry in obtaining equipment or necessities that they felt they should have. With the new proposal by the Minister, though in fact it is now implemented, do you think that this rivalry will still exist, but possibly at a lower level?

Rear Admiral Brock: Well, so long as there is going to be one officer of the staff responsible for the conduct of maritime affairs whatever he may be called, and one officer responsible for the creation of a mobile force, whatever he may be called, both of them needing money for equipment to support activities that are vastly different in nature, I can hardly see any change.

Mr. McINTOSH: Do you see any danger in eliminating such rivalry?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Indeed, I do.

Mr. McINTOSH: What is the danger you envisage?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Well, the danger is that the best advice will not always be available to the Minister. At least he is not provided with a range of options from which he can select the best, and the most skilled knowledge and brains are not brought to bear upon the problem, in contest, to sort it out.

Mr. McINTOSH: In other words, he will hear only one side of the story?

Rear Admiral BROCK: He will hear only one side of the story so long as he stays in Ottawa with his staff. If he visits Mobile Command, or Maritime Command, he will hear different stories.

Mr. McINTOSH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Winch has a supplementary question.

Mr. WINCH: I appreciate the opportunity, because there is one matter which I personally want to clarify as a member of this Committee.

Do you in any way relate the fact you were relieved of your command a few days after starting it with the full investigation by the visiting members of this Committee, at which you answered our questions so fully and honestly—some answers being in opposition to defence department decision and policy? Do you relate these in any way?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Well, Mr. Winch, let me put it this way: At the time, certainly not. In the light of subsequent events, and with all respect, I have often wondered; I have often wondered.

Mr. WINCH: Whether or not our visit and your answers may have had some effect?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Yes; I have wondered.

Mr. WINCH: Thank you.

Mr. LANIEL: Admiral, at the beginning of your remarks you gave your definition of "integration", and you said that you would support integration if it meant the combining of certain common functions for the purpose of economy and better functional operation, but that you would not approve of integration if it meant inter-changeability at the level of personnel?

Rear Admiral BROCK: That is going too far towards integration.

Mr. LANIEL: Have you got the impression from anything that has been said up until now by the Minister, or in the White Paper, or anywhere else, that it was intended that the army, navy or air force personnel would be interchangeable and could be transferred from one service to another?

It has been clearly stated by both the Minister and the Associate Minister that soldiers would stay in the army, and so on, and that at no time, even though there was to be concentration on basic training at one step of the training, would it mean that further on these people would not specialize in army, navy or air force work. How can you have the impression that the purpose of integration, or even of unification, was to go as far as to create inter-changeability horizontally, as you have put it?

You spoke of a baker. We will have a baker who will go through basic training and who will one day be on a ship, and in my opinion that man will be on a ship because he wants to be in the naval services of our country. He will have chosen that trade in relation to one particular service.

Rear Admiral BROCK: I hope this will be so, Mr. Laniel.

Mr. LANIEL: As far as the civilian control of the armed forces is concerned, is there not a relationship between your resignation and, perhaps the strong position that you took about the programs you have helped to put forward? This is what I gathered, anyway, when the Committe visited Halifax, at one moment or another. You certainly took the opportunity to try to prove to the members of the Committee that the government was wrong in its decision to put aside the general purpose frigates program.

Rear Admiral BROCK: Mr. Laniel, I would like to differ. I took no such opportunity. You, as I recall, as members of the Committee, were availing yourselves—

Mr. LANIEL: You were answering questions.

Rear Admiral BROCK: I was answering questions with, and by the authority of the Associate Minister to whom in each case I deferred, and upon every occasion he urged me to continue, with the words, "Carry on; you are doing fine".

Mr. LANIEL: You said that you would support the set-up that we had previously, with the three chiefs of staff, and you said that the government could have attained the same objectives if the Minister, or the government, had gone to the three chiefs of staff and told them that there was only one defence policy, that it ought to be followed and that anyone deviating from that decision would more or less stand the chance of losing his responsible position as one of the chiefs of staff.

Do you not think that it is much easier with integration, with the present set-up, with one chief of staff who can get advice from responsible and highly-qualified people in the three services, or in the three branches of one service, eventually, than to have three people, and the Minister all the time warning them that there is only one policy and to stop playing around?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I do not agree that it is easier, or better, Mr. Laniel, and I do not think there was ever any inclination on the part of the three senior officers just to be playing around. This thing works both ways. It works up and down. The Minister, or any person who is supreme in authority, must obtain his advice, if he is acting wisely, from the best sources from which he can obtain it. This works all the way up. The giving of this advice, in terms that are meaningful and most expert when it reaches the ministerial level, can best be done by an officer who has been brought up in the service and environment on which he is advising.

On the aspect of working downwards, of course, it gives confidence to all in all the services to know that the advice, judgment, studies, and knowledge of that environmental service are being submitted by a professional direct to the Minister. This is what gives confidence, creates loyalty and builds morale. That is gone.

Mr. LANIEL: Where do you think that the integration and unification program originated?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I do not know.

Mr. LANIEL: Do you think it originated with the Minister in one dream?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I am aware that the Minister, on assuming office in his present portfolio, was at great pains, and burned a great deal of the midnight oil, to study all the documents on which he could lay his hands. The ones that would have been most useful in these studies seem not to have been followed.

Mr. LANIEL: Yes; but you said that the Minister usually takes decisions on advice from the high-ranking officers surrounding him.

Rear Admiral BROCK: I would hope so.

Mr. WINCH: Did you not start integration 12 years ago in the Maritime Command?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Wherever it has been within the competency of any officer of any of the services we have been trying to discover better and cheaper ways of performing certain functions in the services; in the Maritime Command, as early as 1958.

Mr. WINCH: How about combined operations?

The CHAIRMAN: I do not think we can permit too many interjections at this point and still give the witness and the questioner an opportunity to carry through a line of thought.

Rear Admiral BROCK: Shall I finish my answer to this question?

Mr. WINCH: Yes, of course, Mr. Chairman; but I know you will understand that a statement like this about where integration started is rather important, because we have a good deal of evidence that integration actually started in the Maritime Command a good many years ago.

Rear Admiral BROCK: I would not call it integration, Mr. Winch, in that sense. What I mean is that the senior authorities of both services—or portions of the services—working over the sea on anti-submarine warfare and in the seaward defence of Canada had long since come to the conclusion that a closer working relationship was desirable, and had established this on their own. The co-operative spirit and friendly rivalry engendered by this were enormously helpful and created a first class defence force wherever it was employed.

Mr. LANIEL: Sir, when you were in command in Halifax was your deputy an airman?

Rear Admiral BROCK: My deputy was an airman.

Mr. LANIEL: He was?

Rear Admiral BROCK: He was.

Mr. LANIEL: In your capacity as adviser to the Conservative party caucus, you prepared a paper for them. I have a few questions concerning that, not on your capacity as adviser but about some of the points you raised there.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I do not think we can allow that statement to go. I belong to the Conservative caucus and I have never had this paper.

Rear Admiral BROCK: Mr. Chairman, I was just about to object to the introduction to the question, but I would be prepared to answer any questions you would like about a paper that I prepared.

Mr. LANIEL: On page 6, you said—

An hon. MEMBER: On page 6 of what?

The CHAIRMAN: I think you had better identify the document.

Mr. LANIEL: This is a document which is headed.

TO: The Progressive Conservative Party Caucus on National Defence
FROM: Rear Admiral J. Brock
RE: National Defence

and the date is October 18, 1966.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Whose signature is on it? Perhaps you wrote it.

Mr. LANIEL: No, I did not write it, because—

Rear Admiral BROCK: Let me see if I can identify it for you. I wrote that paper.

Mr. LANIEL: You did?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I did.

Mr. LANIEL: Does that satisfy the honourable member?

Mr. MCINTOSH: Did you prepare that paper for the P.C. caucus?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I wrote it as a basis for discussion.

Mr. LANIEL: My question might clarify the point.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Just one minute. This is a false document, so far as I am concerned. It was not given at any time to the P.C. caucus.

Mr. LANIEL: On page 6 of the document I have here, in proposal eight, on the management of the armed forces, you say as follows:

> Firm assurances should be given that upon gaining office a Progressive Conservative Government would take immediate steps to restore the morale of the armed forces—

An hon. MEMBER: Hear, hear.

> —by ensuring that matters affecting the present welfare and future careers of all ranks are decided by competent professional officers of their respective services.

My question is actually about morale. Is the present state of morale of the navy at Maritime Command—the poor state of morale, some people say—mainly caused by the integration and unification plan?

Rear Admiral BROCK: The state of morale within the navy—and, I am pretty sure, within the other services—depends very largely on the type of leadership. Morale has reached, I believe, as someone said yesterday, an all-time low within the commands, not detectable from Ottawa, and I believe it is due to a state of grave uncertainty amongst the uniformed citizens of the country. They just do not know what is happening. They do not know; and what they do know, they do not like very much.

Mr. LANIEL: Yes, but Admiral, when we were in Halifax in 1964 did you not tell us that the problem of morale was mainly a question of lack of housing facilities, the problem of schools, of leave from the sea, and things like that?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I am quite sure that I did not say there was a problem of morale. I said that problems of morale were affected within the navy, and I touched upon such points as you have outlined—housing, schools and personal services.

The morale wthin the forces at that stage—you must remember that was in the middle of 1964—was still pretty good. There did not seem to be any serious suggestion of unification. The steps and measures that had been taken along the lines of integration were those which had long since been recommended by the services themselves. Things were going fine, and money was being made available in little ways. The problem was being approached with vigour. We were delighted with a lot of things. There was no problem of that sort with morale then.

Mr. LANIEL: Did you feel at that time, in 1964, that the Air Force, working closely with the Maritime Command, or the Atlantic Command, was quite happy about the situation? The brief that the Committee received from Mr. Carpenter did not give that impression.

Rear Admiral BROCK: Happy about what, Mr. Laniel?

Mr. LANIEL: We were left with the impression that there were differences of views, mainly on this question of competition between the services and that the higher authority and main control by the navy made some of the heads of the RCAF at Halifax uneasy.

Rear Admiral BROCK: There was only one head of the RCAF at Halifax and that was Air Commodore Carpenter to whom you have referred.

Air Commodore Carpenter was my deputy and from an operational point of view there was no conflict whatsoever between us. Air Commodore Carpenter was inclined to be, in some ways, hopeful that the Minister would press on with unification plans in a manner that he—Carpenter—was interpreting. He is now an Air Vice-Marshal.

Mr. LANIEL: Do you mean by that remark that some of the promotions that have been given in the past many months were influenced more by support of unification than by the competence of the officer concerned?

Rear Admiral BROCK: In the light of the fact that those 30 or 40 senior officers who have ben fired, retired or otherwise disposed of, are those whom I know to have been advocating caution, at least—the very least—if not objection to the ultimate proposal now before this Committee; in the light of the fact that, with very few exceptions, they have been replaced by other officers promoted into these jobs; and in light of the fact that even some of these officers who were promoted into these jobs were then, after a short period of service, retired and again replaced, I find it difficult to come to any other conclusion.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Laniel, your time has expired.

Mr. LANIEL: May I just ask one more question, or would you put me on the second round, sir?

This is a reflection on the competence of the higher officers who are there now and occupying positions of high authority in the different services. I do not think that this should be allowed to pass.

Rear Admiral BROCK: I do not intend to allow it to pass by in that way, Mr. Laniel. It is no reflection on the officers who have been promoted to these positions. I think it is a reflection on the system that arranges for these changes.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. FOY: Could I interject one supplementary, please?

You were speaking about morale being at a very low ebb, Admiral. What would be your answer to Air Marshal Reyno's statement that morale is actually very high at the present time?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I cannot answer for what Air Marshal Reyno says.

Mr. FOY: Well, he is another competent officer, in the opinion of the Committee, I am sure.

Rear Admiral BROCK: I would suggest that the most competent advice and testimony that you can get on the state of morale are through those whose morale is affected; not those who are serving in Ottawa, but those who are doing their job in the field, wherever they may be. Go and see them; go and talk to them, or bring them here.

Mr. FOY: I would not say that Air Marshal Reyno would stay particularly here in Ottawa.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Mr. Chairman, two or three of the areas I have wanted to deal with have already been touched on and undoubtedly will be developed later I will therefore go into what was actually to have been my final question in the ten minutes or so I have available.

I would like to ask the Amiral one or two questions in the light of his professional experience. They are not necessarily technical, because I realize that the Admiral has now been out for two and a half to three years. I would like to go back to the relationship between the RCN and the RCAF in the combined ASW work on the east coast.

Admiral, could you tell us, within the competence of your experience as you came up to flag officer level, how effective was this combined operation in terms of communication, the laying on of exercises, the co-ordination of programming and so on? How effective was it in terms of the job that we were at once training to do and, in fact, carrying out?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Of course, I was in command of the operation; and I am bound to say that it was absolutely first class. However, I think, Mr. Forrestall, there is enough on record from other authorities, including commanders-in-chief of the Home Fleet of the British Navy, the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic and other senior officials of the alliance, to indicate that the whole system, in response and fighting ability, had reached a very high level of confidency.

Mr. FORRESTALL: How effective were your direct lines of communication with the supporting air services?

Rear Admiral BROCK: He was in the office right next door to me. We met every morning.

Mr. FORRESTALL: That is what I thought.

This, you suggested, started as early as 1948, was it?

Rear Admiral BROCK: In 1958.

Mr. FORRESTALL: In 1958?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Yes, 1958; about that time.

Mr. FORRESTALL: What was the system employed prior to that?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Before that one must remember that the RCAF did not have a very large Maritime air component and there was not really enough of it consistently available to be worked into the plans of the Maritime commander for his operations. It was at about that time that the Argus aircraft was coming along so well, plus the other squadrons they had—their Neptunes.

There was another consideration, too, of course, and that was that dealing so closely with the United States Navy, it was desirable to make our systems as compatible as they might be, and the United States Navy, owning and managing its own long-range maritime patrol aircraft, I think, felt a little easier working with us when some similar system was in effect in Canada.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Admiral, after three years of integration and a leaning towards unification—and admitting that you have had to look at it from the outside—do you feel that we are any more efficient now than we were in 1964, other than in terms of new equipment—although I am not all that certain how much new equipment we have obtained since then?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I hate to say it, but I think we are a long way down.

Mr. FORRESTALL: That is sufficient.

Mr. LANIEL: Could I ask a supplementary question?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes.

Mr. LANIEL: Were we all that efficient in 1964, when the Committee went to Halifax and we went out to sea with three destroyer escorts and one could not fire one round, another one fired one, and one two, and no one hit the drogue?

Rear Admiral BROCK: We heard testimony from a witness yesterday that these troubles with a gun that he called a three inch 50—I think, perhaps, he should have said a three inch 70—are still with us.

Mr. SMITH: You mean they still will not fire?

Rear Admiral BROCK: You can get better evidence on that, Mr. Smith. I am not sure. It would not surprise me if there are still some difficulties there.

Mr. LANIEL: But that has nothing to do with integration?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Nothing at all.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I was not implying that it had anything to do with integration. I qualified it.

If I understand you clearly, Admiral, it is your professional opinion that we are not as effective today in executing our present commitments under our

foreign policy and within our areas of responsibility as we were, say, in 1964? Is that correct?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I can only answer that from my judgment and I have given you my answer. No; I think we are less efficient.

Mr. FORRESTALL: In what portion of the North Atlantic could you effectively do patrol work for example, in, say, 1964, and in what portion of what I believe is called CANLANT, is it not, might we be able to do effective patrol today?

Rear Admiral BROCK: The use of the word "effective" makes answering this question a little difficult because there are many other factors which have to be taken into consideration.

It depends on the strength of the opposition and the disposition and many other things. There is no doubt that for a given area—and here again one must qualify it—that is large enough within an ocean one can do a better job with more ships than with fewer; and one can certainly do a better job, with whatever number of ships one has, if the men who man them know their jobs, if the ships themselves are fully manned and if morale is high. These are the ingredients that now, to a large extent, are missing.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Do you agree that the functions of the ASW exercise are, first, detection, then identification, localization, the delivery of the system, or the vehicle, to destroy the submarine, and its ultimate destruction. Is this still a viable concept in ASW work? Would that generally be the sequence of events?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Yes; if I understand you to mean that you must, first, know that the submarine is there; secondly, detect its presence; and, thirdly, classify it, identify it and then attack it with an effective weapon, yes, clearly.

Mr. FORRESTALL: How can this best be done, in your opinion?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I am not quite sure—

Mr. FORRESTALL: My question was prompted by your saying that if you have more ships you are more effective. I was wondering if you would elaborate on that and look at it from anther angle? My point is that no matter how sophisticated your equipment is, if you have only one ship and one gun, or one airplane, you are going to be restricted.

Rear Admiral BROCK: I thought I had covered that point earlier when I went to the ridiculous extreme of saying that, of course, you can get to the point of having just one aircraft on one aircraft carrier. The same thing would apply in respect of vessels.

If we could afford it, of course, it would be very nice to have as many as are needed, and all of them effective.

Mr. FORRESTALL: That is my point.

Rear Admiral BROCK: No country could afford this.

Mr. FORRESTALL: In your opinion, how many ships would be required to cover the area?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I do not think that is the sort of question I should answer. I think I am aware in detail of too many studies that have to do with war planning.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I will continue in this general area for the first time around, because I only have a few minutes left.

During the period that you were Flag Officer, Atlantic Coast, and subsequently Maritime Commander, what percentage of your naval allocation—and I think as vice-chief you would have been aware of this—was directed into capital acquisitions? Was it low, or generally healthy and steady?

Rear Admiral BROCK: It was lower, of course, than we would have liked to have seen, but of course the country could not afford, or apparently could not afford, very much more.

I know that there were long-range plans for the replacement of existing vessels that were becoming obsolete and that these had certainly met with the complete approval of the navy, the general approval of the chiefs of staff committee and, I believe the approval of the government until there was a change of government, and then these plans were dropped or delayed.

Mr. FORRESTALL: But you were not dissatisfied with the planning procedures that were in effect on capital equipment?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Oh, no. I think that the program projected into the future, which seemed to be well within the financial capability and the availability of funds, was a sound one. It would not have increased the size of the navy, but it certainly would not have diminished it by two-thirds.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I have one final question. We have something in common, coming from Nova Scotia and having some awareness of the impact of the defence economy on Nova Scotia.

What can you tell the Committee about what to me, is the very real and apparent state of concern of the general public in Nova Scotia about this program of integration and unification?

Rear Admiral BROCK: If I were permitted enough time to pursue my own personal project of integration with the civilian community in which I live, I might be able to answer your question more fully, but you are their Member of Parliament, Mr. Forrestall, and you should know as much about that as I do.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I do know; but what I am asking you is this; In your capacity as a retired naval officer, can you say whether or not people in the professional disciplines, and people that you meet around, are talking about this, and are they concerned about it. After all, they are paying for it.

Rear Admiral BROCK: Indeed, they are.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Are they happy with it?

Rear Admiral BROCK: No, they are not.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Quite the contrary; is that right?

Rear Admiral BROCK: That is true.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Thank you.

Mr. MCNULTY: Admiral Brock, in answering Mr. Forrestall on one occasion, and in answer to other members, I believe you mentioned that in your opinion the state of morale in the Maritime Command is lower than it ever was before. Is that correct?

Rear Admiral BROCK: This is my feeling.

Mr. MCNULTY: I believe you also said that in your opinion the state of morale depends on leadership. Is that also correct?

Rear Admiral BROCK: That is correct.

Mr. MCNULTY: Between 1963 and 1966 who were the commanding officers of Maritime Command?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Between 1963 and 1966 the responsibility devolved upon certain officers from the Minister himself who is the ultimate leader in this field.

Mr. MCNULTY: Who were the commanding officers of Maritime Command?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Do you mean the flag officer in over-all command? I was appointed in 1963 and left in 1964, and I was succeeded by Admiral Landymore.

Mr. MCNULTY: Can you give us any proof to support your feeling that morale is either higher or lower than ever before, especially under the new commander, Admiral O'Brien?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I cannot give you any proof about this, and I do not think that mine would be the best evidence. I am sure that you can obtain this from other sources. As I stated before, it is my earnest hope that you do so.

Mr. MCNULTY: That is all.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Admiral Brock, I am going to ask you something which I think should be asked of other witnesses. Will you tell us what service you had in the navy? When did you start and how many years service do you have? Were you a shore-based officer, or a supply officer, or were you on actual active service in wartime?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I started as a sea cadet when I was very young. After leaving college I joined the naval reserve—the RCNVR as it known in those days—and after two or three years I was a first lieutenant, second in command of what used to be known as the old Winnipeg division. From there, when I moved for business reasons to the west coast, I was in command of the Vancouver division of the naval reserves.

After a month or so on the west coast, after the outbreak of war, I went overseas because we had more qualified officers in Canada than we had ships and the Royal Navy had lots of ships and were short of qualified officers. On loan to the Royal Navy, I was given a command at sea, and I was in command of various ships of the Royal Navy and escort groups until the conclusion of the war.

When I came back to Canada I spent a short period on the west coast at a staff college course and was then appointed director of naval plans and operations at the time when we were beginning NATO arrangements. I was one of the founding members of NATO.

I went from there to Korea. I was in command of the first three ships that left Canada for the Korean theatre of operations a few days after the war broke out.

When I returned from Korea a year or so later, I became the naval director of the National Defence College in Kingston, Ontario. From there I went as a naval member of the joint staff in London and as naval adviser to the High Commissioner.

Upon my return from there I again went to sea in command of the sea-going ships on the Atlantic. I then went to Ottawa as assistant chief of the naval staff for air and warfare, and was promoted to Rear Admiral and appointed vice chief of the naval staff. I spent five years in Ottawa altogether.

My last appointment from Ottawa was as Flag Officer, Atlantic Coast Maritime Commander of the Atlantic, and commander of the NATO sub-area for SACLANT.

Since that time I have been living in Chester.

Mr. CHURCHILL: How many years of service do you have?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I think my pension is based upon 31 or 32 years. In effect I had more time than that, but it does not count.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Durng the course of World War II you were at sea quite a bit. Were you doing convoy work and anti-submarine work?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Almost exclusively.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You were in contact with the enemy on occasion, were you?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Yes.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Did you have casualties on board your ship?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Fortunately, no; not on my own ship. I have picked up a good many others.

Mr. CHURCHILL: In the Korean episode how long were you there in command of our destroyers?

Rear Admiral BROCK: About one year.

Mr. CHURCHILL: What was your position in 1964? What was your rank and position before you were retired from the service?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I was a Rear Admiral; Flag Officer, Atlantic Coast, Maritime commander; commander of the Canadian sub-area for SACLANT.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Were you senior naval officer in the services?

Rear Admiral BROCK: In what area, sir?

Mr. CHURCHILL: Generally, in the Canadian navy.

Rear Admiral BROCK: No; there was one officer senior to me, Admiral Dyer.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You were retired in 1964. Had you not been retired then how many more years of service would you normally have put in?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I was retired just before my 51st birthday. I had expected, of course, in the normal course of events, to stay on until age 55.

Mr. CHURCHILL: To age 55; or another four years?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Which is normal.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Was it in the summer of 1964 that you were retired?

Rear Admiral BROCK: That is so.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Were you the first senior officer to be compulsorily retired, or fired, if you like?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I am not sure of this. I asked the Minister this question during our short interview. I asked if I was the first and only one, or what was the situation He said: "No, by no means; there are others whose names it would not be proper for me to disclose to you."

It so happened that General Bernatchez, who had been my colleague on the vice chiefs of staff committee, had retired just shortly before, for what reasons I do not know.

Mr. CHURCHILL: The reason for your retirement has been made very clear to the Committee. The Minister was starting a ruthless purge of the senior officers of the service and you apparently were the first sufferer.

Rear Admiral BROCK: Of course, the chiefs of staff committee had also been dissolved, as you know; which included the retirement of one of them.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Yes. May I ask you this: Were you consulted on any detail with regard to the program which the Minister now calls amalgamation? I do not want to confuse you, but this is another term that the Minister used in December. Were you consulted by the Minister in any great detail about the amalgamation of the services?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Not in any great detail. Of course, the views that I had held about the future of the services were a matter of record, officially rendered in many forms, and available to the Minister, and I am quite sure that he had consulted some of them.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Were those views presented before or after the production of the White Paper?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Before.

Mr. CHURCHILL: May I ask you this: Did you at any time have an opportunity to place your views before the Prime Minister?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I made an opportunity. If I may go back to answer your question in this way, it will be recalled that when the announcement of my retirement came, some 10 days after my discussion with the Minister, there was a certain amount of publicity attending this event. I resisted all pressures to comment to anybody. I continued to serve for about another three-and-a-half months to ensure that projects that were planned were properly conducted and concluded. Being on retirement leave for a period of six or seven months, of course, I was still in the service and it would have been improper for me to enter into any controversy on the matter, I thought.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Are you free to say why you saw the Prime Minister?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Yes; by February of last year, 1966, I had become so alarmed at the way things were going that I came to Ottawa to consult with some friends of mine. I hasten to add here that none of these were serving officers. Here I found a great deal of confusion about what was going on. I detected more strongly than anything else a sense of despair and frustration.

One of my friends, who is a very prominent well-known member of the press gallery with whom I had had a few off-the-record discussions, put me under extreme pressure under these circumstances, now that I was free to do so, to break my silence. Again I declined on the grounds of propriety, believing that perhaps if I was going to do anything I ought to make one final attempt to deal through proper authorities and to represent to the highest level my views. So I sought an interview with the Prime Minister, and he kindly granted me an opportunity that same day. I spent an hour with him on Friday, February 5, 1966.

My impression was, while I know quite well that he trusted my integrity of purpose, and, I hope, my judgment, that he listened to me with an attentiveness that far exceeded his well-deserved reputation for courtesy. To make a long story short, I left the following morning to return to Chester—my home—with a sense of accomplishment and a belief that perhaps some more careful examination was going to be made of defence matters, or that something would be done to impede, or stop, or check, the headlong rush into what I foresaw.

Mr. CHURCHILL: In other words, you apprised the Prime Minister, then, of your doubts with regard to the program that the Minister of National Defence was putting forward?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I did.

Mr. LANIEL: Could I ask a supplementary question? Sir, did you then, or at any time later, see the Leader of the Opposition?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I did at a later date; that was not until September of last year.

Mr. LANIEL: What were your conclusions from that meeting with him?

Rear Admiral BROCK: With whom?

Mr. LANIEL: With the Leader of the Opposition.

Rear Admiral BROCK: We did not arrive at any conclusions at all. What I was doing at the time, and what I have done since—as you may recollect during the pre-Christmas debate in the House on this matter—was trying to interest as many members of Parliament as cared to listen to my views. I sought interviews again with the Prime Minister, to no avail, over a period of two months. I asked to see the leaders of all other parties in the House, and failed to gain entrance to their offices. I tackled members of Parliament in the corridors, and I bent the ears of backbenchers. I hammered on all the doors.

Mr. LANIEL: Not mine.

Rear Admiral BROCK: I am sorry; my services are still available.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You saw people, then, in all political parties here?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I did. Of course, I am well aware that a good many members of the Conservative party were speaking quite strongly to the subject. Two members of other parties that I did see were Mr. Brewin and Mr. Langlois—

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): On a point of order, sir, which Langlois?

Rear Admiral BROCK: The other one.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Thank you, sir.

Rear Admiral BROCK: —both of whose speeches on the subject are well worth re-reading.

Mr. LANIEL: Not one Liberal?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I saw a good many Liberals, including one Cabinet Minister.

An hon. MEMBER: Was the Chairman included?

Rear Admiral BROCK: The chairman of the Committee? We passed the time of day, but no more than that.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Your purpose in seeing all these members of Parliament was to express your doubts, then, with regard to the proposed program. Was that the intention?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Exactly; and to try to do what was possible to stir an atmosphere of interest great enough to cope with the seriousness of the problem.

Mr. CHURCHILL: When did you first become aware that the identity of the navy might be destroyed; was it from reading the White Paper?

Rear Admiral BROCK: No.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You took the same conclusion from the White Paper, then, that I did. The concluding remarks of the White Paper, which I think should be quoted, are:

> In this paper no attempt has been made to set down hard and fast rules for future policy and development.
>
> . . .The paper is a charter, a guide, not a detailed and final blueprint. The policy outlined in it is not immutable. It can be altered or adapted to meet the requirements of changing circumstances, national and international.

Did you conclude from that that there was no finality in 1964 with regard to proposals being put forward?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I could not have come to any other conclusion, inasmuch as I had heard—from his own lips—assurances from the Minister that his programs would be cautiously proceeded with and implemented.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I would like to question you, as a naval officer with a great deal of sea service—and active service; in contact with the enemy—on the Minister's speech of December 7 which has been given far too much publicity. On page 10829 of *Hansard,* he says this, and I quote:

> The old recognizable dividing lines between land, sea and air have long since disappeared. Therefore it has become imperative that there be a higher loyalty beyond that which is given to a particular service.

I have two questions on that, Admiral. Do you consider that the old recognizable dividing lines between land, sea and air have long since disappeared?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Well, sir, when I walk out my front door and down the garden, I can tell that I am in the water; I know where the dividing line is there.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Do you consider that it has become imperative that there be a higher loyalty beyond that given to a particular service?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I consider that there is no higher loyalty required of any citizen of this country serving in or out of uniform than the best interests of his country. So far as I am aware, there has never been any breach, or suggestion, that those in uniform—and certainly my friends not in uniform—had any but these interests at heart.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Did you gain any impression during your years of active service that the officers and men serving with you had a loyalty only to the navy, and not to their country, Canada?

Rear Admiral BROCK: The thought had never crossed my mind.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, I have not exhausted my questions, but my time is up.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, may I ask a supplementary question?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr. Andras.

Mr. ANDRAS: Admiral Brock, I would like to know your views on this: Would you agree, sir, that it is the duty of a serving officer in the forces loyally to carry out the policy of the government and, furthermore, that this would go so far, in the sense of duty, to require him to resign his position if he felt strongly that he could not support those policies?

Rear Admiral BROCK: In general terms, yes; but it depends to some extent on the nature of this officer's duties. In my own case, what I had made abundantly clear during my time in Halifax was that while I disagreed with the trend of events or because I disagreed that I would continue to serve as I had in the past with loyalty. There could be no question about my willingness and desire to further any policy directives emanating from Ottawa. I had also made it clear to the Chief of the Naval Staff before he left, and to his successor afterwards, that under no circumstances would I entertain the suggestion that I should return to Ottawa where I would have to be party to the making of these policy decisions. Is that a fair answer?

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, it is almost 12.30, what is your wish? Mr. Lambert, do you have a supplementary question, or do you want to make a suggestion? We have four questioners on the list.

Mr. LAMBERT: I was hoping that we might go on with the meeting, if I could get out at one o'clock. Unfortunately, I am one of those who are hit for House duties this afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN: I am sure Mr. Nugent, who is next on the list, would not mind surrendering his position on the roster if it is the wish of the Committee to carry on. I do not know how the witness feels, or if he is prepared to stay a few minutes longer to allow Mr. Lambert at least to get his questioning in.

Mr. NUGENT: I have no objection to surrending my place on the list, but I have that same objection to the number of hours we must sit here today.

The CHAIRMAN: It seems to me that it is not just a matter of hours, it is a matter of the length of time we have to sit; there is a difference. If we are able to

get a little further on with the questioning now, it is conceivable that we will not have to sit tonight. Mr. Lambert?

Mr. LAMBERT: I want to thank the Committee for letting me step in at this time. Admiral Brock, in July of 1964—which followed the passage of Bill No. C-90 by about a matter of six or seven weeks—had there been at that time any disclosure to commanders of your level any plan for the integration of either the headquarters in Ottawa, or in the field?

Rear Admiral BROCK: So far as I am aware, the answer is no, and so far as I am aware, no such plan existed. In fact, it is my understanding, and it was the understanding of most of us, that the Minister meant seriously what he said —that he was going to work his way through this, that nothing was inflexible and the plan would be developed as we went along.

Mr. LAMBERT: Nothing had been disclosed to you with regard to a single unified defence force?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Certainly not.

Mr. LAMBERT: The reason I raise this is that such great reliance is placed upon the fact that at some point in the White Paper there is one phrase that integration is the first step towards a single unified defence force, and that this was notice to all concerned, and what we are seeing today was apparent to everyone. What I am asking is: Was it apparent, or was it even disclosed in any degree at all to the senior commanders of the forces?

Rear Admiral BROCK: No, not that I am aware of and, of course, it would be quite unreasonable to expect 140,000 sailors, soldiers, and airmen to read the White Paper, even if they could have gained anything from this.

Mr. LAMBERT: What I am concerned about is that at that time you were the Officer Commanding Maritime Command and a senior field commander. My anticipation would be that the thinking was clearer then at headquarters and that officers, at your level, whether in the army, air force, or the navy, would certainly be in the picture.

Rear Admiral BROCK: Let me put it this way. Two or three days before coming to Ottawa for my final interview with the Minister, I was sitting in my home after dinner with General Moncel and Mr. Cardin who was at that time the Associate Minister. Of course, we were talking shop. I had outlined to these gentlemen—General Moncel was Comptroller General in Ottawa at the time— and discussed with them the furtherance of what seemed to be the policy decisions being taken in Ottawa in respect of how, within my command, we could further some of these objectives. My description of how it was my intention to proceed, and my plans for the future, were not only accepted but applauded by these two gentlemen.

They suggested to me at that time that this was the general feeling in Ottawa also, that we were all seeing eye to eye, and that I ought to be prepared at some early date, because no doubt I would be sent for, and when sent for if the Minister wanted to know, please to be sure to put it in some nice easy and concise form. This I had prepared, and carried with me in my briefcase when I came to see the Minister. I was at that time, of course, under the assumption that this was why I had been asked to come here. We did not get down to opening my briefcase.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, that is an entirely different field. In the White Paper, which is deemed to be the alpha and the omega of the defence policy of this country, the objectives are listed on page 5. For purposes of refreshing everyone's memory, I will read them:

> The objectives of Canadian defence policy, which cannot be dissociated from foreign policy, are to preserve the peace by supporting collective defence measures to deter military aggression; to support Canadian foreign policy including that arising out of our participation in international organizations, and to provide for the protection and surveillance of our territory, our air-space and our coastal waters.

I would like to know what your opinion is as a result of the concentration, or an emphasis, on the mobile force for purposes of peacekeeping. Have we, in some way, re-arranged the priorities, or altered the objectives of Canadian defence policy?

Rear Admiral BROCK: The objectives of Canadian defence policy, as stated in the White Paper, are in no way that I understand different from defence policies that we had before or, in fact, no different basically from the defence policies that ought to be adopted by any enlightened country of the western world; there is no change here. I am not quite sure what is meant by your suggestion of an emphasis on the mobile force. You do not create a mobile force, in the military sense, by changing the name of a unit and appointing a peregrinating general.

A mobile force, in the sense that it has been discussed in recent days, is an enormously expensive proposition. The justification for creating such a mobile force, it would seem to me, must be weighed against the desirability of devoting funds to other aspects of our defence commitment as a whole. If this can be done within the budgetary limits that we have been operating under, it will be a trick of some wizardry.

Mr. LAMBERT: It has been stated that there seems to be much greater emphasis on peacekeeping purposes. Everything that is said about the mobile force relates to its peacekeeping role. I am just trying to be enlightened here. Does this, in your mind, change the priorities relating to the actual purposes of our armed forces? Will this, for instance, downgrade our ASW role because of greater demands for mobile force so that we would, within the limits of the budget, have to skimp with regard to anti-submarine facilities?

Rear Admiral BROCK: On the first part of your question, let me dispel any thought that our uniformed citizens are a lot of bloodthirsty hired assassins. The purpose espoused by all service personnel is to preserve the peace on behalf of Canada. This was our policy and our intent. If one fears war, one should be prepared beforehand.

With regard to the second part of your question about whether the plans for a greater emphasis—if such be the plans—upon a mobile land force might have an effect upon the anti-submarine capabilities of the navy, I do not know. In my judgment—and I have said this before—the provision of a fully mobile land force is an enormously expensive proposition. In my judgment it would be an act of wizardry to do it within the present budget, plus everything else; and the proof of the pudding is in the eating thereof.

Our navy now, and its anti-submarine capability, is greatly diminished from what it was two and one-half years ago.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, may I ask the Admiral a supplementary question relating directly to what Mr. Lambert put? Would it not be rather more than an act of wizardry? Would it not be more direct to say it would be entirely impossible to have a mobile force of the type that has been described, carry on the other roles that we are now carrying on, and do it all within the budget that we have now? Would that not be an impossibility?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Mr. Brewin, I would have said so, and I think every thinking man would say the same thing. But after the experiences of the last two or three years, and seeing what has been going on, I am not sure that anything is impossible.

Mr. BREWIN: Perhaps impossible is a strong word, but does it not really face those responsible for policy with something of no alternative; whether they regard the mobile force as being the most valuable contribution, or whether they regard other roles as being either necessary, for one reason or another, or more advisable than the expanded mobile force. Are they not faced with no alternative?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I agree, and it depends upon who you count as being responsible; ultimately Parliament is responsible. If it were possible for the responsible minister always to obtain the most expert advice on these matters from parliamentarians, then this is surely where it ought to come from. In the absence of that expertise amongst members of Parliament, surely it ought to be obtained from those very senior professionals that are experienced in this field. Whether, in fact, this has happened raises a doubt which, I believe, has given rise to this Committee meeting this morning.

Mr. BREWIN: Of course, Admiral, you raise a further question there as to the extent to which this choice of alternatives should be done for political reasons—and I guess political reasons have to come into it—or on purely military advice. You raised a question there, and perhaps we should not pursue it now, but it is a very real question.

Rear Admiral BROCK: It can be answered very simply in my judgment, Mr. Brewin. The general policy direction, the purposes, aims, and functions of the armed forces, the reason for their inter-relationship with external policies, and the nature of these external policies—cum—defence policies, ought to be decided by Parliament. The government is charged with this responsibility, and selects a minister to execute the desire of the country. But in the execution is where the military advice is needed if we are to avoid the pitfalls that we have fallen into.

Mr. BREWIN: I entirely agree with you, Admiral Brock.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Are we on supplementaries, or are we on regular questioning?

The CHAIRMAN: We are really on supplementaries. Mr. Brewin is down at the end of the list.

Mr. BREWIN: I am finished.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nugent? I understand Mr. Lambert has finished his questioning.

Mr. NUGENT: I would like to go on at 3.30, Mr. Chairman; let us adjourn now.

The CHAIRMAN: Could I ask the help of the Committee for just a moment's housekeeping? Between the secretary and myself we have received a series of 12 letters from individuals and groups, and I would like the concurrence of the Committee to table this correspondence. They are from individuals, written over a period of the last six months, concerning the matter which is now before the House.

An hon. MEMBER: Addressed to whom?

The CHAIRMAN: They are a series addressed to the Defence Committe, the secretary, or the Chairman.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Can you run off photostats?

Mr. MCINTOSH: Can we have copies?

The CHAIRMAN: I am sure that can be arranged by the secretary.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Put a red number on it.

The CHAIRMAN: We will adjourn then until 3.30, or after orders of the day, when we will have Mr. Nugent, Mr. Harkness, Mr. Deachman, and Mr. Brewin.

AFTERNOON SITTING

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

TUESDAY, February 14, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, when we adjourned this morning, Mr. Nugent was just about to commence questioning the witness.

Mr. NUGENT: Admiral, I was glad to hear Mr. Churchill bring out your service record so that we might get some idea of your background. I am sure that you will have been impressed, if you have followed the Committee meetings very long, by the anxiety of some of my hon. friends opposite in making sure people are not slighted. For instance, the reference to some of the junior officers being moved up a little more quickly than usual, and expressing some hesitation as to whether the country may have lost something in losing the advice of these senior personnel, was taken as a slight by some of those new officers who are now in that position. Since we are on the subject of slights—and perhaps we should look at the qualifications of some officers—I wonder if you would correct me if I am wrong in discussing you a little bit more. For instance, I understand you are entitled to wear some decorations, such as the Distinguished Service Order, the Distinguished Service Cross, the Officer of the American Legion of Merit—which, I understand, is the highest award the United States government can make to a foreigner—the Canadian Forces Decoration, that you have been twice mentioned in despatches and are entlitled to wear about 10 campaign medals. Is that substantially correct, Admiral?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Yes, this is true.

Mr. NUGENT: I am not too familiar with Admiral Landymore, but I understand that after his name appears the Order of the British Empire, the Canadian

Forces Decoration and that he also has an impressive list of campaign medals. Would you say that most of the prematurely retired senior personnel have comparable honours and decorations to their names?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I know them all to have been very gallant gentlemen, yes.

Mr. NUGENT: In connection with this and the slights that we are so sensitive of in this Committee, I want to go back to this subject of the revolting admirals and ask you: Have you, in your service career—before you left, or since you have left—found any justification for why there should have been suggestions by the Minister or by anyone on his staff, or any members of the Liberal party here before this Committee at some time or another, that perhaps part of the difficulties which are now experienced in defence is because there seem to be some disgruntled senior personnel, admirals and so on, who are plotting against the Minister in some manner, shape or form?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Categorically, no.

Mr. NUGENT: Have you seen or observed any action which could give the slightest shadow of excuse for a minister to so treat these gallant gentlemen in this way?

Rear Admiral BROCK: If I, during my period of service, had ever observed or been informed of any such conduct, I would have immediately taken some action.

Mr. NUGENT: I do not want to repeat the scurrilous attacks—the contemptible attacks—that were in *Hansard* just a week or so ago and in the press, made by the Minister and some of his propaganda agents. However, I want to clear up this point on loyalty. I am sure that all members of the House of Commons are familiar with the duty of a Minister to protect the people in his department, and I presume we have always thought it was the duty of the Minister to protect those serving under him because they are not allowed to go to the press. I want to ask the Admiral whether he understands that is the duty of the Minister and that the serving officers expect their loyalty to the Minister will be reciprocated; that he will be their protector?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I think the basic assumption of every officer and every man in the service is that he shall loyally serve his next senior and his master, in the presumption that his master is leading him in the direction of the will of the people of his country, and that in return for this he gets some nominal amount of pay, is fed, clothed and protected.

Mr. NUGENT: Would that protection include the protection of his reputation so long as he conducts himself as a gallant gentleman?

Rear Admiral BROCK: It appalls me that the suggestion should come from any quarter at all that the integrity or loyalty of public servants is felt in question.

Mr. NUGENT: Admiral, in your experience you will have seen many occasions where senior serving officers have had a difference of opinion on the course of defence policy, and have made known their opinions, as is their duty, to the Minister, and found that the Minister has overruled them. Have you, in those circumstances, found that the officers have displayed any disloyalty or failure to carry out the Minister's decision?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I have discovered over the period of my public service that it is generally understood and practiced—or it used to be—that in the contest of opinion and will in the formulation of policy there were many disputatious moments. But once the decision had been made by formally or properly constituted authority, in uniform or out, everyone put his shoulder to the wheel and made it work. This is the only way that the services can function and during my period of service, at least so far as I am aware, this was the practice. It was not a policy; we did not need a policy for that, we were brought up in that way.

Mr. NUGENT: Would you think that any doubt of whether this policy is being continued, or has changed, would have an affect on morale among the senior personnel, and that this might be reflected all down through the service?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Yes. Part of my objections, officially voiced at the time, to the practices that were being adopted just before, or about the time I left, were based upon that very point. In my judgment it was becoming the practice to direct the detailed management of the services from one office not, perhaps, entirely a one-man band, because there was little more than the one trumpet note sounded. We were not sure of where the trumpet note was leading us.

Mr. NUGENT: Admiral, do you think in your own experience that the explanation the Minister gave you for firing you satisfied you even at that time—never mind now—as a common sense reason for being discharged? Did it make sense or rhyme or reason?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I think I have answered that question already. I will put it again, if you like. I had no option but to accept, in good faith, his reasons. It did not seem a very reasonable suggestion or approach to me.

Mr. NUGENT: With respect to your failure and, perhaps, the failure of your brother officers still in the service—in fact any officers, even down to the junior ranks who saw what had happened and who failed to appreciate or understand any reasoning behind it—do you think that their morale would have been shaken by this sort of treatment?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Indeed it was.

Mr. NUGENT: Do you think that it might inhibit the willingness of officers whose duty it was to give their best advice to the Minister?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Beyond any shadow of a doubt.

Mr. NUGENT: There would be a reasonable apprehension that those who had advice to give to the Minister contrary to what seemed to be his whim or mood or, perhaps, plan of the moment, would hesitate to do their duty because it would mean they would no longer be able to serve their country in the capacity for which their years of experience had suited them?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Mr. Nugent, I will not be put in the position of suggesting that any officer, past or present, failed to do his duty.

Mr. NUGENT: There would be a danger that it would make it more difficult then, sir. Would that be accurate?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Well, there is no question about it being more difficult.

Mr. NUGENT: This leads me to what I thought was a most interesting observation of yours when it came to passing along advice to the Minister. When we have the heads of three services presenting advice to the Minister, as was their duty, I think you observed that this gave the Minister a range of options of advice, so that he could weigh one against the other to help him reach a conclusion; whereas, with the single service concept, only one bit of advice would trickle upward to the Minister. Is that—

Rear Admiral BROCK: I did say that.

Mr. NUGENT: Your observation is that it is a fair way of putting it?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Yes, and since you ask me again I would add the fact that there would be a range of options; there is that interplay of intellect and experience that leads to the formulation of the best judgment, as well as providing a range of options.

Mr. NUGENT: Now, Admiral, since the Minister has also made it, shall I say, a part of his propaganda effort aimed at the public to suggest that this was a struggle to decide whether the military dictates policy or whether the government does, would you comment on a thought that occurs to me in connection with this ability of giving advice? If the minister relies, in coming to his judgment on policy, on the advice that he receives and his ability to get the best advice from all quarters, having only one bit of advice coming up to him, in effect gives the military, under the unified concept, much more of a stranglehold on policy than it would have under the three services concept?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I do not know that there has ever been any desire on the part of the military establishment to have any stranglehold at all, and I hope that such is not the case today. But I would think that there are dangers in the present system which were non-existent in the old system. And I would go further if I may, Mr. Chairman, and suggest that, in fact, when people give advice to the Minister of National Defence they are, in effect, advising as experts. They are advising the Parliament of Canada, and the people of Canada. And it would seem to me to be the duty of any minister, when he speaks to the people of Canada either publicly or upon the floor of the House of Commons, to make clear whether the opinions and judgements that he voices and enunciates are the opinions of the man by name at the time—in this case the Hon. Paul Theodore Hellyer—or whether in fact, he is speaking as Minister of National Defence. It would seem to me that the public of this country and Parliament have a right to expect that when some hon. gentlemen rises in his place and speaks, purportedly as the Minister of National Defence, that he is, in fact, speaking with the advice, or upon the advice, of his senior advisers. Whether this has always been the case is something that I think this Committee might be interested in inquiring into.

Mr. NUGENT: Perhaps I used the word "strangled" a little inadvisedly, and I will re-phrase it this way. It seemed to me that where, under the three services concept, you had three opinions going to the Minister, under the single service concept, it is the military. Because by answering to the Minister through one man it will be possible to filter out perhaps two of those opinions and present only one to the Minister and, therefore, to that extent the weight of their decision on policy making has increased. Would that be what you had contemplated on this range of options?

Rear Admiral BROCK: With a different minister and a different defence staff under these same circumstances what you say, I think, is a perfectly valid point. But I have some doubts about whether the deliberations and advice of the defence staff of recent years have been their personal judgments voluntarily arrived at and rendered to the Minister as advice or whether, in fact, what has not occurred is that the Minister has, in too great a detail of its management of the services, directed policy in such detail that the defence staff is performing no other function than the staff work of putting the papers in order and the regulations in shape.

Mr. NUGENT: Without their expert advice having much influence or effect, or guidance to the minister on policy?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I am not the best witness about this point.

Mr. NUGENT: I believe, Admiral, that you had some connection with planning; the positions you held in recent years gave you some experience with planning and, perhaps, gave you some experience with some new ideas tried out over the years that could be taken under this general umbrella of integration. Have you seen, even before the present Minister came along, various innovations tried which might be taken as steps towards integration and unification?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Oh, yes. I think there was a proposal which was placed before the Chiefs of Staff Committee some few years ago. I am not aware in detail of all their deliberations, but certainly it did not get anywhere. Because the proposal emanated from a military authority, it would astonish me if I were to learn—In fact, I believe that it was nothing like the form of unification and integration that is being pursued now by the present Minister.

Mr. NUGENT: Perhaps I will put it more directly. You were in a position that with anything as startling as the unification proposal that the Minister now puts forward—anything so far reaching—in your experience in a responsible command position did you feature such an innovation being brought in without a great deal of long distance planning with the best advice of all the senior personnel?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Well, Mr. Nugent, really there was not anything startling about it because anyone who has been involved in the military field has thought about these things. We know that the very same sort of proposition had been advocated by crackpots in other countries and discarded and, as far as we were aware within military circles, it was thought to be just not on; Canada could not go this way.

Mr. NUGENT: Let us suppose that it had been taken seriously, that the Minister was going to implement it and that you had known about it; how much planning then would have been required, do you think, between the conception of the idea and the formulation of that policy by the Minister and the advice given by responsible officials as to how long it would be before you would be in a position to complete the plans to start to implement it?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I cannot give you a specific answer to this. This partly depends upon the stability of the government, for one thing. During my last period in Ottawa as Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff and Vice Chief, I served five ministers of National Defence, and everybody wanted a radical review of defence policies. It seems to me before we can decide how long it would take to

formulate in detail the practical application of a new way of things we must have some consistency in the general national approach and outlook. The military establishment, interrelated with the Department of External Affairs, must be sure of their course and it takes a good many years to make a change as great as this.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nugent, are you coming to the end of your questioning?

Mr. NUGENT: Yes, just one to go.

Then would unification, as the Minister suggested bringing it in, be brought in in a responsible way without a plan and are you aware that there ever was a plan?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I am aware that there was not a plan. There was not a plan that was made known to the then responsible senior military advisers.

Mr. NUGENT: Was there a plan of progressive steps of integration?

Rear Admiral BROCK: We have only the Minister's word for this and he has repeatedly said so on the floor of the House of Commons.

Mr. NUGENT: Were you aware of such a plan?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I have not seen such a plan.

Mr. NUGENT: Were you in a position where you would have thought you would naturally have been aware of such a plan?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Well, as the officer in command of what was then the largest military establishment for Canada it would seem I would have been, and particularly as Vice Chief in Ottawa before my last job.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Harkness?

Mr. HARKNESS: Admiral Brock, when you were appointed as Flag Officer, Atlantic, at the beginning of 1963, my recollection is that we at that time had something in the order of 45 to 47 fighting ships in commission. Is that correct?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Yes, as I recollect, we were committed for 43 anti-submarine vessels, an aircraft carrier, a supply vessel and a couple of escort maintenance vessels. Some of the minesweepers had gone, but there were some of those and some auxiliary vessels. I should think the total came closer to 60 altogether.

Mr. HARKNESS: I was talking more particularly of what you might call major fighting ships.

Rear Admiral BROCK: 43 was the number of anti-submarine class.

Mr. HARKNESS: On Thursday the Minister informed us in answer to questions that we now have 28 ships in commission, 8 of which are under refit, and of the 20 remaining, 16 are ready for immediate operations. Now, in spite of that, the Minister stated in this Committee, and he stated repeatedly in the House of Commons and other places, that our anti-submarine capability is greater now than it ever was at any other time in Canada's history. What would be your comment on that?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Balderdash.

Mr. HARKNESS: I ask you this particularly as one of our—I think everyone will admit—chief experts as far as anti-submarine warfare and general fighting naval operations are concerned, and I take it from your answer that you believe there is no validity in that contention whatever?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Mr. Harkness, I would have to examine very carefully the words of the Minister because, as I was trying to explain this morning, there is a difference between the fighting effectiveness of just a single unit and the capability of the whole.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, following this up, of these 28 ships which we still have in commission, how many have been completed as new ships since you first took over command in 1963?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Well, none. Some have been modified. There are modification programs and some of them have been completed. I do not think the whole program is yet complete. Again, better testimony on this subject is available from other more senior officers recently connected with the service.

Mr. HARKNESS: In effect, your evidence is that these 28 ships are the same ships that were in commission in 1963?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Oh yes, indeed. It takes 7 to 10 years to lay down from the beginning of the design; letting of the contracts, production of the ship and training the crew. It takes from 7 to 10 years to produce a ship.

Mr. HARKNESS: The Minister's contention is that the present ships are so much more modern, so much more up to date, that the total anti-submarine capacity is greater than it was before but, in effect, these are the same ships. Now, what improvements have been made to them, to your knowledge, which would make them much more effective?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I do not know of any improvements that have been made that had not long since been planned.

Mr. HARKNESS: I think this is correct. Helicopters have been added to some ships which is a program that was under way at that time. Improved sonar has been added which was another program that was in hand at that time. Have there been any other improvements in their anti-submarine capabilities that you are aware of?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Not that I know of. It may be helpful to have colonels in command, but there is nothing else I know of now.

Mr. HARKNESS: As an expert in this field, then, you would say the contention that our anti-submarine capability is greater than it has ever been before just will not stand up to examination?

Rear Admiral BROCK: It does not appeal to my judgment.

Mr. HARKNESS: I say that as an expert in this field you would say that is just not the case; that the present 28 ships which are the same ships with, in some cases, some improvements cannot do nearly as good a job as the 45 to 47 that we had at the beginning of '63?

Rear Admiral BROCK: That is so, yes.

Mr. HARKNESS: As far as this ship building program is concerned—the general purpose frigate program providing for 8 ships that you have mentioned

in your earlier evidence and which have been laid down and on which considerable progress has been made—when would those ships have come into operation had the program proceeded?

Rear Admiral Brock: I am sorry; I cannot answer this with any accuracy, but I would have thought by next year. The planning was complete. As a matter of fact, as I recall, even before leaving Ottawa, some of the contracts had been called for some of the equipment.

Mr. Harkness: Do you have the recollection that the first of those ships was supposed to come into commission in approximately four years?

Rear Admiral Brock: It is my recollection that four years comes into it; perhaps it was four years from laying down. I am not certain, but it was about that time.

Mr. Harkness: And they were to come into operation over a period of how long, if you recall?

Rear Admiral Brock: Again, I think it was one ship one year, two the next, one the next, three the next and then the next, something like that; I am not sure.

Mr. Harkness: In other words, over a period of three to four years, sir?

Rear Admiral Brock: Subject to correction, yes.

Mr. Harkness: As that program was cancelled and as a subsequent program for four ships only was approved—but no contracts have yet been let and no ships have been laid down for this, so that there will be no ships available for at least four years more—in effect, would you agree this means the Navy will have 8 fewer modern anti-submarine vessels than was considered necessary back in the period immediately prior to 1963?

Rear Admiral Brock: I would say, sir, that it is a good deal worse than that. The Navy had been recommending to successive governments a program for the replacement of obsolescent ships that would have taken care of the wastage and the paying-off rate. The delays of the last few years have set that program back enormously.

Mr. Harkness: Then would you agree the total result is that the naval anti-submarine commitment we had to NATO is fairly seriously in default at the present time, and will continue in default into the forseeable future?

Rear Admiral Brock: On the basis of the commitment to NATO we had in those days, that is undoubtedly so. What the new commitment may be, I am not aware of.

Mr. Harkness: I do not think anybody knows what the new commitment is or whether there is any new commitment, but certainly there has been no announcement to my knowledge in that regard. In any event, we are no longer capable of doing the anti-submarine job which we had agreed to do for NATO?

Rear Admiral Brock: That is so.

Mr. Harkness: In connection with the change in the organization of our naval activities under which there is one maritime command in place of two, and the commander on the Atlantic theoretically is in charge of both coasts, do you think this is a move which would make for greater efficiency?

Rear Admiral BROCK: No, I think in earlier days the Navy itself was, in fact, a maritime command charged with the fulfillment of international obligations, NATO commitments, defence of Canada to seaward, and it was under the control and command of the Chief of the Naval Staff who sat next door to the Minister of National Defence, and his chief servants and agents were the Flag Officer, Atlantic Coast and Flag Officer, Pacific Coast. He had direct communication with them both up and down, but such is no longer the case.

Mr. HARKNESS: Then would you consider that the possibility of getting rapid action in an emergency is less under this organization than the one which prevailed at the beginning of 1963?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I would not like to comment on that because I have the greatest confidence in those people who would spring to arms if any sudden emergency arose, but in my judgment the force that could be brought to bear has been considerably diminished.

Mr. HARKNESS: Just from the straight point of view of coming to decisions and the transmission of orders, would you think there would be greater delay now than was the case under the previous set-up?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I think there is no question about it and I think a very superficial examination of the lines of communication that are now needed under the new arrangement would reveal this. I am no longer privy to the secrets and confidences of those who are serving, but I do hear a bit of gossip and they are hard-pressed. It has become administratively very burdensome.

Mr. HARKNESS: In other words, your view as an expert in naval warfare would be that effectiveness and efficiency has been reduced by this type of organization rather than increased.

Rear Admiral BROCK: Beyond any shadow of a doubt.

Mr. HARKNESS: Turning to another phase of the matter: On the basis of your experience what do you think the effect of doing away with the navy, the army and the air force as separate services and the substitution of a single service for them would be on the general morale in the navy, which is your own service, and particularly, what effect would it be likely to have on incentives to young men to join the navy; in other words, on recruiting?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I suppose the proof of the pudding is in the eating thereof, and they are not having much success with recruiting or re-engagement in recent times. Morale—there has been an awful lot of talk about morale—a lot of publicity. I have yet to hear somebody define service morale.

Mr. HARKNESS: What would be your views on that particular subject?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Morale in the uniformed services consists of an amalgam of three main ingredients. First of all—this sounds a little silly, perhaps—it is a concept of a good way of life and a dedication of purpose. Secondly it is pride—pride in identity with a unit. Thirdly it is confidence in leadership. These three are inseparable. If someone should say to me: "Is morale built in the sense that the forces will go out and fight the enemy?" The answer is: Certainly, of course they will. They are red-blooded Canadians. "Is morale good in the sense they turn out a good guard of honour for the Minister when he arrives at Camp Gagetown" I will say: Of course they will because the young captain will

say: "Look chaps, it is our turn; spit and polish today". And they will all say: "Aye, aye, sir," or whatever they say in the army and they will do a good job. Of course they will. But if you ask me whether morale is good because the services—all of them—have full confidence in top leadership, then in this sense morale is non-existent; and all three must be there or morale is bad.

Mr. HARKNESS: My question was more particularly on the point of whether, in your view, the substitution of a single service in place of the present three would lead to as good morale in each of these services but particularly in the service you know best as a naval officer as would maintenance of a single naval service?

Rear Admiral BROCK: No, of course it does not, and since the question has been asked I would not like it to be thought that because I am just a naval officer I am unaware of the views of my sister services and my friends of a lifetime. I know how they feel too. I suggest, of course, again, in respect of the other services, there is better evidence to be had than mine.

Mr. HARKNESS: Of course, I was asking you these questions as an expert naval officer; from that point of view particularly. I think a number of us here could give some evidence ourselves with regard to morale and what makes it and what destroys it in other services or in other arms of other services.

Another point came up in your evidence this morning and that was your discussion with the Prime Minister with regard to these matters. Are you at liberty to disclose the details of that discussion and the reaction of the Prime Minister?

Rear Admiral BROCK: The Prime Minister was kind enough to see me privately in his own home. For my own part I would be very happy to discuss all the details of this subject, of course, to his permission. I see no reason why he should object.

Mr. HARKNESS: You would not be prepared to do so unless you had the prior consent of the Prime Minister?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Well, as in any personal conversation, I do not think this would be proper—no.

Mr. HARKNESS: That is all the questions, I have, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FAULKNER: Mr. Chairman, may I ask a supplementary question on some of the cross-examination by Mr. Harkness? I am just concerned about the testimony of experts before this Committee. Rear Admiral Brock, in his answers to Mr. Harkness' questions about our anti-submarine capability, was very critical. He was very firm in asserting that our position today is not what it was before. This Committee will remember that on June 23—this is testimony which has been brought before the Committee before—Rear Admiral Landymore took quite a different position under cross-examination by Mr. Lambert on his point which appears on page 336 of the *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*.

Rear Admiral Landymore made this point:

> —For my money, I would say that the force of ships that we have available now to offer NATO are infinitely more valuable than the larger number of ships which we offered to NATO in, say, 1954. I do not see any way to add and substract numbers and come up with an answer on a NATO commitment.

Later on Mr. Lambert—on the same page—asks this question of Rear Admiral Landymore:

> All right, I will follow on with that. Are you satisfied that we will fully carry our commitments in so far as effectiveness, the commitments, say, to 1972, are concerned?

Then Rear Admiral Landymore replies:

> The answer to that is Yes, I am well satisfied.

I was wondering if the Rear Admiral would like to comment on this position. I must say, as a self-confessed layman in the field, in view of this apparent contradiction of testimony by so-called experts—not claimed experts themselves, but declared by others in the Committee—I would be interested in hearing your comments.

Rear Admiral BROCK: My comments would be these; I think I can clarify the point a little: One would have to know what commitments Admiral Landymore, as my successor, was obliged to fulfil. There has been a good deal of talk about NATO commitments. The Minister himself—and I believe quite rightly—has in times past suggested that these commitments as figures on a piece of paper are meaningless without the will and the ability of any country to support. These commitments in international agreements are arrived at by international consultation. In effect, what happens? No one is a supreme commander over the defence forces of Canada. Canada makes a contribution that Canada is willing and able to make. This is recorded as a commitment.

Mr. FAULKNER: Would you not agree that Rear Admiral Landymore would be aware, specifically and in detail, what commitments he was required to meet? Would you not agree that those are the commitments that the country is committed to meet? When the man in charge admits before the Defence Committee that he is capable of meeting those commitments right through until 1972, there is a basic contradiction between his testimony as your successor and what you said to Mr. Harkness.

Rear Admiral BROCK: No, I think there is no contradiction at all.

Mr. FAULKNER: Were you not talking about our commitments today up to 1972? That was my impression of Mr. Harkness' question. He declared that the Minister stated that we are in a better position to meet our commitments today.

Mr. HARKNESS: I did not say that. I said that the Minister stated our anti-submarine capability was greater today than it ever was before, which is a different thing.

Rear Admiral BROCK: The question as I understood it was, were we able today to meet the commitments as I knew them at that time. The answer is No.

Mr. FAULKNER: We are not in a position today in 1966 to meet the commitments that you knew about in—what year?

Rear Admiral BROCK: In 1964.

Mr. FAULKNER: In 1964. We are more concerned in this Committee with our commitments today. Would you be satisfied with Rear Admiral Landymore's assertion that we are in a position to meet our commitments today? Would you not agree that it is this Committee's primary responsibility to be aware of

whether we are able to meet our commitments today, and not whether we are able today to meet the commitments of 1964?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I would like very much to know what the commitments today are and I think a good many other people in Canada would, too. What are our commitments?

Mr. CHURCHILL: What about the question of personnel? He did not read far enough in the evidence. Admiral Landymore said that they were short of men, but you stopped short of that.

Mr. HARKNESS: Admiral Landymore made a comparison between 1954 and 1966—not between 1963 and 1966, which are two very different things because of the nine intervening years.

Mr. FAULKNER: He carried it forward to 1972.

Mr. HARKNESS: From 1954 to 1963 a very considerable number—in fact, most—of our modern anti-submarine vessels had been built and had come into commission.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, I have a few questions here; not very many. This morning, Admiral Brock, you were discussing our co-operation with the United States in the Maritime Command and you noted that we need to have a force on the Atlantic coast which is capable of co-operating with a similar force operating on the American Atlantic coast, and I think you went on to note the organization of that force as a complete force under the navy, carrying out its own sea role and its own air role. Is that not correct? Is that not the way the United States Navy handles it?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Do they, in fact, perform relatively the same functions within the navy that we perform on the Atlantic coast within Maritime Command today?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: How does this role work in the United States navy? Do they draw on assistance from the United States air force or the United States army in any way, or do they carry that out entirely within their own organization?

Rear Admiral BROCK: They call upon the assistance of the other two services through co-operation wherever needed.

Mr. DEACHMAN: In what particular respect; in ways that we do not, or in ways that we do, or just how?

Rear Admiral BROCK: If forces were seconded or attached for purposes of an operation to the navy, it would be normal for them to place the total operation under the command of a naval officer. Is that what you mean?

Mr. DEACHMAN: No, what I am coming to is this: Does the navy itself operate its own air units equipped with their own ASW equipment?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Yes, as does the RCN.

Mr. DEACHMAN: So that we on the Atlantic Coast operate through the RCN and its air units; its aircraft are operated under the RCN and by the RCN and then, in addition to that, we have the air units of the RCAF?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Yes, but to clarify the point the operation of these aircraft is controlled by the one officer, the Maritime Commander. It has always hitherto been expedient to ensure that personnel administration, effects of morale and expertise was managed by the people of the respective services who had been brought up in that field.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Now, returning to the U.S. side again. On the U.S. side you would have the Navy with its sea units, and with its air sea units as well, operating under the Navy, is that correct?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I assume by air operation you mean the long range maritime patrol aircraft?

Mr. DEACHMAN: The Navy operates them, those are naval—

Rear Admiral BROCK: They belong to the Navy. They are part of the U.S. Navy.

Mr. DEACHMAN: They belong to the Navy, whereas on our side they belong to the RCAF and are operated by the RCAF, is that correct?

Rear Admiral BROCK: They are not operated or administered by the RCAF and they belong to Canada.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Well, RCAF personnel fly them. They are part of an RCAF unit integrated with Maritime Command, is that correct?

Rear Admiral BROCK: They belong to a specialized segment of the RCAF known as the Maritime Command, which is a highly specialized field. They are controlled for operational purposes by the Navy.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Looking at the U.S. side, then, they operate with one service, the Navy. Both the sea and air units of their Maritime Command are owned and operated under one service. We do it differently, we have an integrated command in which we have the Navy operating both air and sea units and the RCAF, which is integrated with them, operating aircraft, is that not correct?

Rear Admiral BROCK: The RCAF administers the management of their Maritime Patrol Division, the operations of which are controlled by the Maritime Commander.

Mr. DEACHMAN: With RCAF personnel flying them?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Happily, yes, because they are the experts in this field.

Mr. DEACHMAN: You also have navy personnel flying naval aircraft?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Of an entirely different type and for different functions, from an aircraft carrier.

Mr. DEACHMAN: And they fly helicopters from the decks of the DDHs?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: So, you have Navy airmen, RCAF airmen and Navy seamen operating in your Maritime Command?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Oh, yes, and a lot of other things. They are called upon to—

Mr. DEACHMAN: On the other hand, the U.S. Navy does it under one command with seamen and naval airmen, is that correct?

Rear Admiral BROCK: That is correct.

Mr. DEACHMAN: So that in effect, really, the U.S. are operating a unified command in Maritime Command, whereas you operate an integrated command, is that not so?

Rear Admiral BROCK: In effect, as I see it, they are doing no such thing.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Is theirs not a unified command?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Within the Navy?

Mr. DEACHMAN: Yes, sir.

Rear Admiral BROCK: No. It is their Navy. It is the way their Navy is run.

Mr. DEACHMAN: One service—

Rear Admiral BROCK: One service.

Mr. DEACHMAN: —one commander and one uniform?

Rear Admiral BROCK: For operations of that kind, yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: You have one commander, two services and two uniforms, is that correct?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Correct.

Mr. DEACHMAN: As it now stands you are operating an integrated command in Maritime Command?

Rear Admiral BROCK: You can speak of it that way by some interpretations of integration.

Mr. DEACHMAN: You are not operating separate commands in the sense that you have two commanders and two services are you?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Yes, indeed we do.

Mr. DEACHMAN: You have two commanders?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Yes, we did, in fact. There is a distinction to be made between the operational employment of the forces that are placed at the disposal of a commander and their command in the sense of personnel administration and management.

Mr. DEACHMAN: These are under separate commands?

Rear Admiral BROCK: They were under separate commands.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Are they now?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I am not sure how this works now. One of the functions of command was, for example, the expertise needed in advising on staff requirements, maintenance and replacement of aircraft. Who could do this better than those who are specialized in that field? Whether this still goes on or not, or whether this is managed here in Ottawa, I do not know. I am not sufficiently up to date on it.

Mr. DEACHMAN: The U.S. organization of their maritime command is easier to explain, is it not, than our own because they simply operate under one service, the Navy does the whole thing?

Rear Admiral BROCK: It has been my experience, Mr. Deachman, through life that many things that appear to be simple, straight-forward and sensible are wrong.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Do you mean by your answer that the U.S. Navy's method of operation in Maritime Command is wrong?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I mean that it appears to be right for the United States of America. It is not right for the United Kingdon, it has not been right for Canada and it is not right for a good many other countries.

Mr. DEACHMAN: In other words, you could not have the situation on the east coast where you would have under the single command of the Navy and with the Navy performing the Maritime Command role, this would not be right for Canada?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I am sorry, I do not understand.

Mr. DEACHMAN: It would not be right for Canada to put the Navy in charge of the maritime role with the Navy operating the sea units and operating the aircraft and doing the whole thing?

Rear Admiral BROCK: The Navy, in effect, is doing that now. They are achieving this objective by co-operation and they were exploiting the highly specialized men in the training which is needed for the management of these enormous machines. An Argus aircraft carries sixteen or seventeen crew members, most of which are officers. It is a huge aircraft which costs seven, eight or nine million dollars. There is an enormous backup entailed. You can train the Navy to fly it. You can train the Air Force to go and run ships. I suggest, unless it is necessary to do so, that it would be very costly.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Why did the U.S. do it? Why did the U.S. Navy decide that they would handle the whole of the maritime operation within the Navy? What were the considerations which led to this?

Rear Admiral BROCK: This did not happen in the United States. What happened was that until recent years the United States had nothing but a Navy and an Army. The Navy had its own extension of weapon systems through the medium of the air as these machines were developed. So with the Army, they had an Army Air Corps, which was part of the Army. It was not until the last war, really, that the United States deliberately created a third service. I think history may reveal that except for such highly specialized jobs as their strategic bombing command, which lasted only a few years, that the creation of a third service for that purpose at that time was not necessarily right.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Indeed, what should have happened was that the Navy and the Army should have operated their own air services? Is that the conclusion you are drawing?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I hesitate to say what would be right for the United States.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Is this the suggestion you are making, that historically they erred in developing a third service and that the air services should have been absorbed by the original Navy and Army?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Not entirely, because in a historical sense all that happened, in fact, was that a third service was created and the Navy retained its air arm in the same way that the Army retained its air arm. This is a perfectly natural thing. Every soldier today is comforted by the knowledge that his own commander has his own aircraft.

Mr. DEACHMAN: This Committee has had suggestions from witnesses who appeared yesterday and the day before to the effect that in unifying the logistic services, and so on, we should perhaps move into a fourth service. Do you agree with this idea? We would have an Army, a Navy and an Air Force, and then we would have a fourth service, a logistics service.

Rear Admiral BROCK: Mr. Deachman, I cannot agree with that for the reasons that I attempted to mention this morning. After all, there is no purpose in the creation and the maintenance of defence forces unless they are capable of performing the function for which they were designed. In the performance of this function for which they were designed they must have someone at the top who commands this as an operation. The function in this sense is the function of command and control and the security and knowledge that his mission can be achieved because he who is responsible has the authority to ensure that his men are trained, that they are fed, that they are equipped, that they are supported and that he has the assistance in expertise from other services if he should require it.

The CHAIRMAN: Your time is almost up, Mr. Deachman.

Mr. DEACHMAN: You and I come pretty close to being in agreement on many of these things. Like you, I cannot accept the idea that we should be moving to a fourth service. I think this is moving in the wrong direction and I believe you feel this way, too. I think the suggestion which you are making is that perhaps the trend of history should even have been toward absorbing the third force into the original two forces, and you go along with me in the idea that we should be moving in the direction of integration and unification. I am very impressed with what you tell me about unification of command, sir, and the need for unification of command.

I wonder if the men themselves do not have the feeling that they would like to be unified and if within your own service, where you have the advantage of having the people who are serving at sea and serving in the air under one commander and one service and one uniform, you do not consider that a very desirable thing, and whether the men themselves do not take great pride in being able to serve at sea and in the air under one uniform and under one service and under one commander? Do you find that there has been pride taken in this? Do your commanders and your men feel pride in it or do they reject the idea and wish to see the services bi-sected and tri-sected?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Is this your question?

Mr. DEACHMAN: Yes, sir.

Rear Admiral BROCK: I have never encountered a sailor who was not very proud of being a sailor. I do not think they want to be tri-sected or bi-sected or unified.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Do they have pride in the air arm or not? This is my question. I did not ask whether a sailor is proud of being a sailor, I think we

appreciate that. I asked if they take pride in the fact that in their role on the Atlantic Coast they serve both at sea and in the air and that they perform these two functions under one command and one uniform, or would they prefer to reject the air arm and see that role taken over by the RCAF?

Rear Admiral BROCK: You seem to be making a distinction between those sailors who serve in the air and those who serve in ships.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Yes, I do. One flies and the other sails.

Rear Admiral BROCK: They are all sailors, Mr. Deachman, and they all take their place at sea. Some of our most distinguished and best commanding officers of ships and commanders of squadrons have been brought up through the naval air arm, but they were sailors first.

Mr. DEACHMAN: You mean they do two things?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Yes. They do two things that are part of one thing. Some fire guns. Some can extend their hitting power a little further through an air machine.

Mr. DEACHMAN: But, Admiral Brock, you are telling me that your men have a capability and a pride in doing the very things which you reject when we discuss unification; that you cannot put these people together, that you have to keep them apart for the purposes of healthy competition, and all that kind of thing. Now, you cannot have it both ways.

Rear Admiral BROCK: Mr. Deachman, I did not say any such thing. I said that anything can be done with a disciplined uniform service and a sufficiently strong and determined leadership, but it is not always advisable, and in my judgment, it will inevitably be more expensive. That is what I said.

The CHAIRMAN: Your time is up, Mr. Deachman. Mr. Brewin is next.

Mr. BREWIN: Admiral Brock, I am sorry I was not here this morning, so I did not hear all that you said.

Rear Admiral BROCK: Then you missed, Mr. Brewin, something that I said in the most complimentary terms about a speech you made before the House of Commons.

Mr. BREWIN: I do not know who is going to disarm whom here! I will certainly read what you said. My interest has been stimulated.

I do not wish to be repetitive but I want to ask about a particular aspect of this matter and get your views on some of the strategic concepts behind the use of our maritime forces, and particularly our anti-submarine forces. I recall your saying when we were down in Halifax with the Defence Committee two years ago that you thought, in modern circumstances, that sea power had a most important role to play as a flexible means of bringing force to bear in many different parts of the world. I think at that stage we were perhaps dealing with the rather superficial argument that in a nuclear world we did not need sea forces. You said that in your view sea forces are absolutely essential in the modern world, because they are a flexible means of applying force in various situations.

Rear Admiral BROCK: Exactly.

Mr. BREWIN: One of the matters of controversy before us seems to be the degree to which we should concentrate on a mobile intervention role. If you did this you would clearly have to have a maritime component, would you not?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Mr. Brewin, that is narrowing the terms of reference here, a little. What sort of intervention do you mean and where?

Mr. BREWIN: Well, interventions as wide, I suppose, as the world, but would a lightly armed force in all probability not need maritime transport? If it was to be flexibly applied in different parts of the world I presume you would either have to use air transport, or maritime transport. I am suggesting that maritime transport would be almost an essential addition, at any rate, to air transport.

Rear Admiral BROCK: Mr. Brewin, history teaches us that no great nation or combination of nations has ever been able to maintain their point of view in the world without the use, in its broadest sense, of sea power, and by this I am not talking about gunboat diplomacy, I am talking about sea power in the sense of the free and independent use of the oceans of the world. I am talking about the fact that history has shown—and it is as true today as it was in the days of the Phoenicians or the Athenian League—that the seas are not barriers between the continents, they are indeed the highroads by which civilization, religion and, indeed, the very way of life of this continent depends, and it is as true today as it ever has been.

In the military sense the creation of a force that is capable of instant response, without the requirement for violating the sovereign air space or territorial rights of other countries, has much to commend it and I have long advocated an approach to the creation of the Canadian defence forces along these lines.

Mr. BREWIN: Yes. Well then, Admiral Brock, if we may come down from that generality, I presume an anti-submarine component would be necessary if you were transporting a land force, an intervention force, to almost any part of the world, would it not, because many nations have submarines, I assume the USSR and the USA have a great many more than the others but many nations have submarines. Am I not correct in that?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Yes.

Mr. BREWIN: So, if you were contemplating for some reason or other the application of force in any part of the world you would need an anti-submarine component, I suppose, would you not?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Unless somebody else was going to do it for us.

Mr. BREWIN: Yes. Well then, may I come down to the type of anti-submarine role that we are involved in now. I take it that it is perhaps almost entirely a NATO operation.

Rear Admiral BROCK: Well, the last time I was privy to these matters almost the total effective part of our anti-submarine force was committed to NATO obligations, yes.

Mr. BREWIN: I wanted to ask you because we were told some time ago in the Defence Committee by Admiral Rayner, I believe, that at that time our anti-submarine forces were not equipped to deal with nuclear-powered submarines. I do

not know whether that situation has changed. Do you know this or do you have any unclassified information you can give us on that?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I think it is or should be general public knowledge that our plans a few years ago embraced a replacement program of older ships that would give us this capability.

Mr. BREWIN: Whether we have that now or not perhaps you are not in a position to say?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I would suggest you can get better evidence on the point.

Mr. BREWIN: Suppose one were to contemplate an all-out surprise nuclear attack on North America, our anti-submarine defence would not have much relationship to that, would it?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I think that any question of finesse or the esoterics of forces would have very little to do with it.

Mr. BREWIN: May I put it to you this way. The only effective defence against a sudden attack, whether it be from submarines which are nuclear-powered or otherwise, an all-out nuclear attack on North America would be retaliation, would it not?

Rear Admiral BROCK: No, sir, I do not agree. I think there has been a bit of woolly thinking about this in recent years.

Mr. BREWIN: Will you give us your thinking and then perhaps—

Rear Admiral BROCK: If I will not be accused of speaking in generalities too much, perhaps I could suggest that it is my concept that a nuclear retaliatory capability deters no more than the outbreak of that form of warfare.

Mr. BREWIN: Perhaps we are not talking about the same thing. What I am asking you about is whether, if a nuclear attack on North America were to be contemplated, it might very well be deterred by retaliatory forces. But if it were, would our anti-submarine search and destruction be of any significance?

Rear Admiral BROCK: No, but surely, Mr. Brewin, our hope is that in the expenditure of these vast sums of money we are attempting, with our allies, to provide the sort of forces that deter the outbreak of all forms of warfare. We are clearly not in the business of deterring the outbreak of a nuclear exchange. Surely, then, if it is within our capability we should at least render some assistance in deterring the sort of warfare that might next most seriously strike at our vitals, and my earlier dissertation upon the importance of sea power is what I am getting at.

Mr. BREWIN: Precisely, and I think that is what I am also trying to come to. If you are not using your anti-submarine capacity to actually prevent an all-out nuclear attack, are you contemplating it be used in some anti-submarine campaign over an extensive period of time, something like we had in the last two wars?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Who can forecast the nature of future events. It may be that nuclear warfare—

Mr. BREWIN: We have to try.

Rear Admiral BROCK: Of course we must try. First of all, it seems to me we must try to do just what I suggested earlier, we must try to make it clear to any potential enemy that a probe or an effort or an attack in any direction or in any medium will not be worth while; that we are in a position to defend ourselves capably, not just as Canada but in concert with our allies.

Mr. BREWIN: What I am trying to put to you is that the type of defence that is envisaged by our anti-submarine forces at the present time in the North Atlantic envisages a war in which there would be a protracted attack upon shipping by submarines of some hostile power, for instance, the USSR, does it not?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I do not know what the present concept is.

Mr. BREWIN: The concept as you knew it when you were involved in it, then.

Rear Admiral BROCK: No, sir, the basis for our planning was to provide in so far as we were able, a force that would be capable of rendering some effective defence if such a thing should happen. This is part of the deterrent.

Mr. BREWIN: Speaking of such a thing happening, are you talking of the prolonged anti-shipping campaign by submarines in the North Atlantic? Is that the type of threat that you are seeking to meet with your anti-submarine forces?

Rear Admiral BROCK: No. One of the advantages of naval and maritime forces is their mobility and flexibility. They can go wherever the battle is, whether it is in the North Atlantic or the South Atlantic or elsewhere. If there were such a prolonged attack against shipping in the North Atlantic, that is where I hope our ship would be.

Mr. BREWIN: Have you given consideration to the fact that any sort of resumption of an anti-submarine campaign on a large scale is perhaps unthinkable without involving an all-out nuclear war? Perhaps you do not agree with that concept.

Rear Admiral BROCK: I am afraid I do not. I can conceive of situations developing that could escalate to a point where the pressing of the panic button would be withheld; I can conceive of this. There have now been since the end of World War II some forty international incidents involving the use of force.

Mr. BREWIN: Admiral Brock, far from being peripheral, would not a major attack on North Atlantic shipping by a major power such as the USSR almost inevitably escalate into a nuclear war?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Mr. Brewin, if the North Koreans had been capable of preventing our arrival in Korea the outcome of that incident would have been quite different.

Mr. BREWIN: We are not meeting each other's points, so I will pass.

Rear Admiral BROCK: I am sorry.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Stafford, you are next on my list.

Mr. STAFFORD: I did not realize my time had come up so quickly. This is my first day on the Defence Committee, so that my questions may not be as learned as some of the others you have heard today. I note that in your brief, which you apparently gave to the Progressive Conservative Party, and at one point in your

evidence this morning you said that you have been opposed to the concept of unification from the very beginning, is that correct?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Would you refresh my memory, please?

Mr. STAFFORD: I have it in my notes here that this morning you said you were opposed to the concept of unification from the very beginning. Are you opposed to the concept of unification?

Rear Admiral BROCK: As I understand its development today, yes.

Mr. STAFFORD: In your brief I note that you say:

> —the present government will be unable to achieve the objectives set forth in its White Paper on Defence dated March 1964.

Do you still agree with that?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I do.

Mr. STAFFORD: Further on you express the following opinion, speaking of the government:

> —which has bamboozled a badly informed public.

Do you still say that the government has done that?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I do.

Mr. STAFFORD: Then on the first page of your brief you go on to say:

> Our party can perhaps set fire to the imagination of a Canadian people whose deep desire to be citizens of a respected and influential nation is not now being satisfied; and give them a hope—not just for real leadership—but hope for real and honest pride in an honest and purposeful country.

Do you still say that?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Of course I do; it is my own—

Mr. STAFFORD: I am reading from page 1 of a photostatic copy of the brief, and it states:

> Our party can perhaps set fire to the imagination of a Canadian people.

Do you still agree with that?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I do.

Mr. STAFFORD: Then under the first proposal in this fairly large brief of yours you say, under the note "Observation".

> The facts stated in this Paper are incontestable. The historical references to post-war developments affecting Canadian Policy are accurately noted so far as they go, but are misleading inasmuch as there has been an avoidance of any reference to Liberal Government responsibility for all those basic ills that they are now trying to correct.

Do you still say that?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Yes.

Mr. STAFFORD: What are those basic ills that the Liberal Government is trying to correct? You must keep in mind that there was another government in power for a few years after the war.

Rear Admiral BROCK: I had hoped that I would not be dragged into any acrimonious political discussion on the matter. I am not sure that the committee is interested in my political views but I am quite prepared to discuss them if it is the desire of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN: I did not know that it was so much your political views—

Mr. STAFFORD: What are those basic ills that the government is now trying to correct?

Rear Admiral BROCK: The basic ills are embodied in the lack of a defence force that is capable of meeting the commitments which I understand this government and all earlier governments had subscribed to in the field of our international relationships. Those are the basic ills. Everyone has been trying to cure them. My suggestion is intended to imply that the methods now being adopted are not likely to succeed.

Mr. STAFFORD: You go on to say further that:

> —Canada was the only country naive enough to swallow hook, line and sinker the American philosophy of "balanced forces within the alliance".

Do you still say that?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I do. Would you read on?

Mr. STAFFORD: It continues:

> Unlike other members of the NATO alliance, Canada is now left with no internationally recognized, and independently useful, national armed forces of respectable proportions.

Do you agree with that?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Certainly. I wrote it.

Mr. STAFFORD: What is different now in our armed forces—and, as I said, I am new on this committee—from what they were, say, back in 1964 when you were employed?

Rear Admiral BROCK: We have by far fewer people. As far as the Navy is concerned we have by far fewer ships.

Mr. STAFFORD: A minute ago you mentioned that recruiting was not having much success, but is it not correct that it is always more difficult to recruit men when civilian jobs are plentiful?

Rear Admiral BROCK: That has not been my experience. It is a generality that has been bandied about quite a good deal. In my experience with a force of the size that the Navy has always been—which is anywhere up to about 20,000 in peacetime—we have managed with great success by methods of voluntary recruiting to get the pick of the crop, and in our selection we turned down great numbers of them.

Mr. STAFFORD: As time is limited, I am now going on to the third proposal in your brief, where you say:

> It's time we got off the fence about nuclear arms. Canadian forces have no need for nuclear arms either now or in the foreseeable future.

I would like to ask you which party it was, at a cost of approximately one billion dollars, that procured all of our nuclear carriers, the Starfighters, Voodoos, Honest John rockets and the Bomarcs?

Read Admiral BROCK: I do not know. It was one of the governments I served.

Mr. STAFFORD: Do you remember what year it was?

Rear Admiral BROCK: No, sir. I have no particulars. I know that a program of re-equipment of the armed forces was undertaken, which included some of those weapons. I am not fully aware to what extent the program has been fulfilled.

Mr. STAFFORD: Was that program not taken on under the Conservative government?

Rear Admiral BROCK: If you say so.

Mr. STAFFORD: Did you think it was wrong then?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Yes.

Mr. STAFFORD: Did you express your views to your party then?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I had no political party during all my period of service.

Mr. STAFFORD: What did you mean by what you said on page 1 of the brief, which I read to you twice:

Our party can perhaps set fire to the imagination of a Canadian people—

Now, what did you mean when you used those words? You should also consider that you gave this brief dated October 18, 1966 to the Conservative Party.

Rear Admiral BROCK: Yes, two and one half years after I had left the service.

Mr. STAFFORD: That is right. Did you express your views at the time, if you were so firmly opposed to nuclear arms?

Mr. CHURCHILL: What is the purpose of this, Mr. Chairman? Are we dealing with unification or with something else?

Mr. STAFFORD: I am just asking a question.

Rear Admiral BROCK: I am sorry, I had to—

Mr. STAFFORD: By dealing with your brief and by taking your opinion on one topic and seeing how you express it can actually give us more of an indication of your opinions here. I am just asking you a straight question. Did you express your views to the government at the time?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I did not. I expressed my views through properly constituted authority at the time and I continued to do so.

Mr. STAFFORD: Are you in disagreement with Canada carrying out her obligations under NATO and NORAD?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I am in agreement that we should carry out all obligations undertaken by the government. In my judgment the obligations which should be undertaken in the military sense ought to be subject to the advice and the help of military experts in the formulation of this policy.

Mr. STAFFORD: When you discussed the United Nations you said:

> The past performance of the United Nations in reducing world tensions, in confining areas of world conflict or in quelling national insurrections of potential danger has not been too distinguished.

Do you still agree with that?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Would you continue reading?

Mr. STAFFORD: Yes:

> We must never disparage the efforts that have and are being made but we must at the same time be realistic about the results so far achieved—

Rear Admiral BROCK: I agree with that.

Mr. STAFFORD:

> —and the likelihood of success in the future.

Rear Admiral BROCK: I agree with that.

Mr. STAFFORD:

> The average Canadian cannot feel any great sense of pride in a national policy that seems to suggest that a commitment of token military forces, to an as yet unformed international police force, will absolve us from all national responsibility for more realistic measures to preserve world peace.

Rear Admiral BROCK: And then?

Mr. STAFFORD: The next line reads:

> The major deterrence to global war is nuclear stalemate and not the United Nations.

What do you mean by "is nuclear stalemate"?

Rear Admiral BROCK: The major deterrence to global war is nuclear stalemate.

Mr. STAFFORD: You mentioned this morning that the people of Nova Scotia are not happy. On what definite evidence do you base that opinion?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I was asked this morning what my impressions were of conversations I had had within my own community with various citizens that I know.

Mr. STAFFORD: Did you know that five or six weeks ago on a Saturday morning radio program from station CJCH in Halifax called Open Line Phone Forum that Paul Akehurst on a two hour program asked the people if they truly understood what defence policy was and apparently, as I understand it, he challenged the people to give their ideas and found out that they really did not know. Would you agree that after two hours of the public expressing their

opinions on that Open Line Phone Forum there was no widespread antagonism over the two hour period and that there was, in fact, a general acceptance of the new defence policy?

An hon. MEMBER: On what do you base that? I listen to that program.

Rear Admiral BROCK: I have appeared for two hours on the same program.

Mr. STAFFORD: I am referring to this particular program.

Rear Admiral BROCK: I am not sure what date it was and I did not listen to that particular program.

Mr. STAFFORD: I said about five or six weeks ago.

Rear Admiral BROCK: About eight or nine weeks ago I was on the same program and I found quite a different reaction over a period of two hours.

Mr. STAFFORD: Did you ask the public to telephone in to you?

Rear Admiral BROCK: No, I was an informant. I was merely there to answer questions, as I am here.

Mr. STAFFORD: And you found them totally antagonistic, did you?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I beg your pardon?

Mr. STAFFORD: How did you find the people when they put their questions to you on that program?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I found they were interested and ill informed.

Mr. STAFFORD: Is that not exactly what I said here, that the people were ill informed and that there was no widespread antagonism to the new defence policy.

Rear Admiral BROCK: I think there can hardly be either commendation, support or antagonism amongst people who have no information.

Mr. STAFFORD: Is it not correct even in the Halifax papers that almost all the opinions that you read on defence policy are those of Mr. Forrestall, whom we know is not in favour of it, or those of retired admirals?

Mr. CHURCHILL: May I ask a supplementary question?

Mr. STAFFORD: Wait until I get my answer. Is it not correct that that is just about the weight of the news that you get in the Halifax *Herald*?

Rear Admiral BROCK: No, I would not agree.

Mr. CHURCHILL: May I ask a supplementary at this stage?

Mr. STAFFORD: Yes, I yield.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I wonder if Admiral Brock has been reading the Winnipeg *Free Press*, in which Brigadier Malone, a prominent liberal, has been expressing in the strongest terms his dissatisfaction with the liberal policy?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Yes, I have read some of these, Mr. Churchill, and I also noted with great interest that during the supply debate on the defence question there were an enormous number of newspapers commenting editorially right across this country, seemingly demanding some open public inquiry into what was going on, and the consensus of all of this, in my judgment, is that the

people of this country wanted examination before legislation. This is all that has been asked for. It is a perfectly reasonable request.

Mr. STAFFORD: And were there even more enormous editorials across Canada in favour of unification?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I do not think so.

Mr. STAFFORD: Could I have an answer to my previous question before Mr. Churchill interrupted me? Is it not correct that most of the news in the Halifax *Herald,* which I understand you read, come from the opinions of Mr. Forrestall or retired admirals, rather than from the other side, if you analyse the news over the past two years?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I suppose there have been a few instances of this. I would not say most, no.

The CHAIRMAN: I think the witness could only be expected to express an opinion on this.

Mr. STAFFORD: That is what I want, an opinion. I understand he has been reading the Halifax *Herald* and certainly if he reads the *Herald* and sees this he should be able to express an opinion, because he expresses very strong opinions on other things.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Do you read the Winnipeg *Free Press*? You should.

Mr. STAFFORD: I look at it now and then when John Reid brings it into the house.

Rear Admiral BROCK: I must, of course, point out—if this be so, and there is a good deal of truth in what you say—that the people who have been asked to comment have been those to whom the newspaper can turn. They can ask anybody they like for their comment.

Mr. STAFFORD: I am not talking about whom they ask, I am asking about the news they print. Is it not correct that most of it is on the side that I just mentioned?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Yes.

Mr. STAFFORD: And did you hear about the informed and efficient manner in which Paul Akehurst actually introduced the subject on that two hour program I just mentioned?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I have already said I did not hear the program and it is news to me.

Mr. STAFFORD: Did you ever hear of Paul Akehurst's program?

Rear Admiral BROCK: No.

Mr. STAFFORD: Could I just ask one more question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, you just have time for one more.

Mr. STAFFORD: What could the Minister of National Defence do to make integration and unification more clear to you? It is set out in the White Paper, in his numerous speeches and also in the bill itself; what more could he do?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I should think that he could start from the beginning to delineate in clear terms exactly what his program is and what it involves.

There have been frequent promises of this as recently as mid-summer of last year when Admiral Landymore was dismissed and he was succeeded by Admiral O'Brien. Admiral O'Brien on accepting the job, and after presumably having an interview with the Minister in Ottawa, came back to Halifax and at a press conference—after speaking to his own men—announced in all directions that he has accepted this job on the understanding and with adequate assurances from the Minister that further drastic steps towards unification would not be undertaken before an ample opportunity had been provided for all ranks to be well informed and to air their views, and similar assurances were apparently obtained by Admiral O'Brien and, in fact, I think they were published by the Chief of the Defence Staff. So far as I am aware there is no serving man on the east coast who feels that this undertaking has been honoured. There is not one man.

Mr. STAFFORD: But you did not answer one part of the question. Is the bill not particularly clear on what unification means?

Rear Admiral BROCK: It is absolutely clear what it means. What it means is to abolish the Navy, Army and Air Force and create another force.

Mr. STAFFORD: Was it not clear by page 19 of the White Paper?

Rear Admiral BROCK: It certainly was not.

An hon. MEMBER: Is that what you understood by it four years ago?

Mr. STAFFORD: Could I just finish this off by reading three or four lines; otherwise I will have to come back to it. It says:

> . . .the government has decided that there is only one adequate solution. It is the integration of the Armed Forces of Canada under a single Chief of Defence Staff and a single Defence Staff. This will be the first step toward a single unified defence force for Canada. The integrated control of all aspects of planning and operations should not only produce a more effective and co-ordinated defence posture for Canada, but should also result in considerable savings.

Then it goes on:

> Two objections are given as reasons why integration should not be undertaken. First, that morale or "esprit de corps" is weakened, and second, that competition is diminished.

But then it goes on to say a little later on:

> The sailors will press for more ships, the soldiers for more tanks and the airmen for more planes.

Couple that with what the White Paper says in the last part of the Conclusion:

> The paper is a charter, a guide, not a detailed and final blueprint.

Would you not say what I have already read to you in conjunction with the Minister's speech, coupled with the bill, is a very clear indication of exactly what it means?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I would not. In the light of subsequent events all has been made clear and it is now being revealed, but I would challenge any person in the service or any person in this room to describe, upon reading that White Paper or hearing it read for the first time, what was going to happen. There is not anyone in this room except, perhaps, the Minister himself.

Mr. STAFFORD: I have just one final question.

The CHAIRMAN: I think you have had your final question.

Mr. STAFFORD: No, this is still part of it. You said you had read *Hansard* over very carefully. I take it, then, you read Mr. Lambert's question on April 9, 1964. This is the question:

> Am I to take it from the reference to unification that the minister intends there shall be one defence force, or one armed force in this country, and there will be no distinction among the present three services or any of the units thereof?
>
> Mr. Hellyer: —I made it quite clear—and this is set out in the white paper—that the integration of the defence staff is the first step toward a single unified defence force for Canada.

Could it be any more clear, Mr. Brock?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Mr. Stafford, what I said was that I had become a very careful student of *Hansard* since my retirement. I was not interested in the deliberations on this matter in the house. I had other duties at that time.

Mr. STAFFORD: That is all, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: We are now on the second round, with Mr. Laniel, Mr. Nugent, Mr. McIntosh and Mr. Andras.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Do you not have me down there?

The CHAIRMAN: No, I have not, but I will put your name down right now. Mr. Laniel?

Mr. LANIEL: In your preliminary remarks this morning you clearly stated that you are opposed to pressing the concept of unification. This is a little contradictory to the reply you just gave about being opposed to integration. Does this mean that you are not opposed to unification itself if you knew what it was and how it would be implemented?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I am not opposed to any innovation that is going to enhance the effectiveness of the Canadian armed forces or that will result in economies, but before I could make any judgment upon that or before, in fact, any military man or any parliamentarian could make a judgment upon it, he must know what the plan is.

Mr. LANIEL: That is the reason I am asking this question. You have an open mind on some of the things you have been told?

Rear Admiral BROCK: It certainly is.

Mr. LANIEL: There is no fence that makes you fight unification?

Rear Admiral BROCK: None at all. In many cases in the past I have been a strong advocate of some of the measures that have been adopted recently.

Mr. LANIEL: I will come to that later. In some of your replies you said there were great differences of opinion between you and the Minister. What were these differences? Were they mainly on the question of integration and unification, naval policy or commitments, hardware purchases, or on ships' building program and things like that?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I want to correct any impression that may have been left with the Committee that the Minister and I were in frequent arguments. This was not so. There was no argument about it. One does not argue with the Minister; one makes representations; one expresses one's views; one puts forward recommendations. I detected at a fairly early date that the recommendations that I might have been putting forward, had I ever been asked, would not be entirely acceptable to the Minister. In other words, so far as I could see his intentions developing, his plan developing—it was awfully difficult—I was not really in agreement. Basically, you see, I was not in agreement, to begin with, that it was a desirable thing to abolish the professional heads of the services. I was concerned lest the creation of a monolithic staff structure would lead to the sort of dangers that we are examining now. That was basically my concern. This is a difference of opinion with the Minister. He was quite sure it was going to work out the other way.

Mr. LANIEL: Would you say that the Minister was more or less trying, in his own way, directed by his own personal views, to improve the services of Canada rather than to destroy them?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I have never questioned for a single moment the basic integrity or purpose of any minister of the Crown.

Mr. LANIEL: What did you mean when you said, "Who am I to stand in the way of progress"? What kind of progress?

Rear Admiral BROCK: This was in reference, of course, to the Minister's assurances to me that the reason for my removal from the service was part of a pattern to make more money available for those that remained in the services for their better re-equipment. Of course, who could stand in the way of such a desirable concept? I did not believe it could be achieved.

Mr. LANIEL: Do you admit that there were people other than those in the Minister's office who believed in that kind of progress within the service?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Believed in what?

Mr. LANIEL: Unification and integration, and bringing savings that would permit the buying of equipment and so on?

Rear Admiral BROCK: At that time, you see, there was no concern on the part of serving personnel about unification in the sense that it would destroy the separate identities of the services. This had not been revealed to us or it was revealed only in the form that is contained in the White Paper. I have already spoken to this point; it just did not occur to any professional in the field that anyone should undertake such a program. It was felt that something else must be needed that would be revealed in the fullness of time.

Mr. LANIEL: You have reservations even on integration, by inferring that there was no plan for integration, at least that you were informed of, at the time you were in the service.

Rear Admiral BROCK: No, I have, as I always have had, reservations about adopting a philosophy called "a philosophy of integration" without any knowledge of what it meant. No one has ever objected to those measures that could be, perhaps, categorized under the terms of integration, but that would best put together certain minor and non-essential functions of the services at less cost

But I was very much concerned at the time, and I still am, that adopting integration as being a good thing because it is a good and new word and a new concept and applying it wholesale across the board will be more costly than anything we ever had before, and I think it is so proving.

Mr. LANIEL: Yes, but do you mean to say that in 1964 that there was no plan or study by the department, within the department, for integration of command?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Are you talking about integration of command or services? Integration of command is an entirely different thing.

Mr. LANIEL: I am talking about integration of command at—

Rear Admiral BROCK: The expression "integration of command" has been used quite frequently. I would prefer to put it the other way; command and control function is part of unification and not integration. A unified command in the sense of an authority functioning to perform a mission is a well-understood military concept, but integration of command is a matter of day to day expediency of one person in command who has the authority to call to his assistance all those that he needs, to bend the efforts of all people and services in support of his mission.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Laniel, I would like to keep the questions down to 10 minutes, if this is agreeable to the Committee, on this second round.

Mr. LANIEL: It is up to you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: You have a moment or two, yet.

Mr. LANIEL: In the brief to which I referred this morning, in one of your proposals you called for:

> —pause and re-examine the pros and cons of integration in the light of present experience—

Then further on in your observations you said:

> It would be wrong to assume that all integration proposals are entirely wrong. Indeed, it should be recognized that many measures proposed for implementation or already achieved are helpful and popular both within and without the services.

By this do you mean that you are not opposed to the concept of integration, that it has brought some improvements, but you still conclude that the whole process should be stopped? Would you think that in respect of any changes like this, any overhauling of our services—to use the words of Air Marshal Sharp—although there may be some worry and disorganization, there would be general advantages to be gained from this reorganization of our services. I do not like to hear absolute opinions on a subject like integration or unification, where people are for or against, and some people look at the black side of it and others look at the white side of it and there is no in between. I think that the only way we can get anywhere is to carry on further.

Rear Admiral BROCK: Mr. Laniel, I have been leaning over backwards to avoid painting things in colours too dark or too light. There are indeed many shades of grey in between. You just quoted me back to myself; my recommendation there has been no more than that we should stop, have a pause, and reconsider. I have not endeavoured at any time or in any way to dictate policy. It

is not a question as far as I am concerned, about the quality, the colour or the cut of the cloth.

Mr. LANIEL: I have one more short question.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Laniel, I must check you off now. I gave you warning that we were going to try and keep this down to 10 minutes and you just went over your time.

Mr. NUGENT: Admiral Brock, frequently during examination today you suggested to the Committee that other people might be called who could give more exact and expert testimony on some of the questions asked and I wonder if you would recommend to this Committee some people who could give more and better detailed information.

Rear Admiral BROCK: Indeed I shall; there is a wealth of material. I would suggest that the deliberations of this Committee, by any stretch of the imagination, could not be complete—with all due deference and respect—until you have heard from those officers who were, themselves, promoted and appointed to positions where they would implement or help in implementing the new policies of integration and unification and who, again, before completion of their normal period of service were retired. For evidence of this recent history and further views on unification, and to be questioned about what their advice was to the Minister upon these matters, I suggest that you should call Lieutenant-General Moncel; Lieutenant-General Fleury; Vice Admiral Dyer and Air Marshal Annis. I would suggest also that the Committee should be interested in hearing from these officers for evidence of recent events and the reasons for their retirement: Rear Admiral Landymore, Rear Admiral Stirling, and Rear Admiral Welland. I would suggest also that for some of the earlier background and knowledge it would be wise to consult with Lieutenant-General Walsh who was chief of the general staff and then vice chief of the new staff arrangement; Vice Admiral Rayner, who was chief of the naval staff and is now retired from that position; Air Marshal Hugh Campbell, who was chief of the air staff at an earlier date. I would also suggest that the chairman of the chiefs of staff committee who then became chief of the defence staff, Air Chief Marshal Miller, might contribute to your understanding of the problems that are being faced by the services.

Mr. Nugent, I am glad you have given me an opportunity to put forth these names because there has been so much talk about Admirals revolting. We had the navy league yesterday, with the naval Officers' Association; today we have J. Brock; I understand that Admiral Dillon will be here, and I believe Admiral Landymore is due tomorrow. Gentlemen, this is not a naval problem, there is more to it than this, and I would urge you to call these senior officers who were recently involved because it is fresh in their memories and you will be able to receive better testimony on many of these subjects from them than you can from me.

Mr. NUGENT: Admiral, I think you had testified earlier that not only had you never heard of a plan of unification of the forces into one service but that there was no general over-all plan by which the Minister was proceeding from step to step toward integration. Is that accurate? Was it a hit or miss arrangement?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I would not say it was a hit or a miss arrangement, it came along in dribs and drabs. There were an enormous number of committees

and working groups studying these matters. "Committees" was a bad word in those days, they were called working groups.

Mr. ANDRAS: May I ask a supplementary question?

The CHAIRMAN: I will put you down but Mr. Nugent has the floor.

Mr. ANDRAS: I want to know the date you are referring to that he had not heard of this.

Mr. NUGENT: Up until the time of his dismissal in 1964.

Mr. ANDRAS: Then he had not received the message from the Chief of the Naval Staff on April 2, 1964.

Mr. NUGENT: Not yet.

The CHAIRMAN: I will allow you extra time, Mr. Nugent.

Mr. NUGENT: In each one of these so-called integration steps—for instance, if they decided to unify the mail service for all the services I guess that would be called a step in integration—how long would it take to evaluate such a step? I suppose it would vary with the seriousness of it, but as each step is taken is there a specific time or a certain length of time needed for evaluation to weigh each one?

Rear Admiral BROCK: This is a very difficult question to answer. The medical services, as you know, had been mixed up together; the lawyers had been mixed up together; some of the works and bricks people did not present a too difficult problem. The postal services were all right, although it used to annoy me a bit that I did not get my mail promptly for a while, however, they soon got into the swing of it. There was not much else that was planned, to my knowledge, at the time I left.

Mr. NUGENT: Admiral, would it be fair then to say that since each step had to be evaluated, there is nothing logical in the suggestion that because one service may be integrated that it must necessarily follow that it is a good thing for all the services, supply and all the rest, to be integrated. Is there any logic to that?

Rear Admiral BROCK: No, and this is what I have been saying all along. I object to integration in capital letters because integration is a good thing; it is not—some parts of it are good.

Mr. NUGENT: Therefore it just does not make sense when it mentions, in the White Paper, steps of integration leading to unification. That is not necessarily the end result.

Rear Admiral BROCK: I do not think that they have anything to do with one another.

Mr. NUGENT: One of the biggest things that the Minister has been trying to sell the country is this idea that he is giving this country more defence for less money. Would you care to comment whether, in your opinion, the steps that the Minister has innovated have been at all successful in saving the taxpayer money and whether, in fact, we are getting more defence today.

Rear Admiral BROCK: Mr. Nugent, you had testimony from others and also from myself that the navy has not the potency that it had before. Much of this is

true of the other two services; we have fewer people all the way around. This Committee is well aware of the fact that the defence budget has not come down; it is going up.

Mr. NUGENT: Before you left the services had any of the steps taken by the Minister in his so-called plan of integration resulted in any substantial administrative or other savings that you are aware of?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I do not know; I am not an accountant. There may have been a bit of saving in the postal services but I do not think there has been very much.

Mr. NUGENT: Nothing that would make a substantial contribution toward new equipment or anything?

Rear Admiral BROCK: In that sense, no.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Nugent asked if you had never heard of a plan to integrate or unify the forces up to the time of your dismissal, and your answer was that you had not. I am a little confused because I have before me a photocopy of a letter dated April 2, 1964, to all members of the armed forces and the employees of the Department of National Defence. I presume it is a photocopy of a signal from the chief of the naval staff. I will not read it all because it is reasonably lengthy. However, there are some pertinent quotes.

> 2. The White Paper enunciated the policy that the armed forces of Canada should be integrated under a single Chief of Defence Staff and a single Defence Staff. It further stated that this would be the first step towards a single unified defence force for Canada.

It goes on to describe the three steps.

> 3. The first step is to establish a single Defence Staff at National Defence Headquarters.
>
> 5. The second step will be the reorganization of the field command structure.
>
> 6. The third and final step will be the unification of the three Services.

Another paragraph says and I believe this was quoted by Mr. Churchill yesterday, perhaps not in toto:

> 7. The process outlined above is not immutable. As the lessons of the reorganization are learned, changes in the plan or in the timing may result.

I do not think the next sentence came out yesterday. It says:

> However, the end objective of a single Service is firm.

I am confused because this certainly would stimulate thought toward the idea that there was a major reorganization in process or planned and that this would end up with a single service.

Rear Admiral BROCK: Mr. Andras, that is a very fair observation. Perhaps I was speaking a little loosely. However, the date of that communication, I think, is some time in April—

Mr. ANDRAS: My information is April 2, 1964.

Rear Admiral BROCK: April 2, 1964. I am not sure when they received it but it was three months after I left.

Mr. ANDRAS: Three months after you left the service?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Three months before I left the service.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I want to refer back to a question that was asked by Mr. Churchill this morning in regard to your qualifications. I believe you said that you took the staff course after World War II and later you were in charge of the naval staff course.

Rear Admiral BROCK: No, I was the naval director of the National Defence College.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Air Marshal Sharp, in his presentation to this Committee, said that there were only two courses open to the government: to increase defence expenditures; or to cut down on operation and maintenance of defence forces. In your opinion, as a staff officer, were there any other courses open to them.

Rear Admiral BROCK: Certainly you cannot spend money that you do not have. No, there are clearly no other courses open.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Are you familiar with the course that France has adopted? They have cut down on personnel and increased their equipment so that they have more firepower now with 50 per cent of the personnel.

Rear Admiral BROCK: I would put that under one of these categories.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Which category would you put it under?

Rear Admiral BROCK: The reduction of—what was it you said—maintenance and operation.

Mr. MCINTOSH: He said that there were two courses open to the department or to the Minister; to increase defence expenditures, or decrease operation and maintenance.

Rear Admiral BROCK: I assume operation and maintenance means personnel costs; that is: food, housing, pay and all the rest which involves personnel and personnel costs, in its broadest sense.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Were you at any time in an advisory capacity to the present Minister as a staff officer?

Rear Admiral BROCK: No.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Never?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Well, let me put it this way: I was vice chief of the naval staff and in the absence of my chief I was responsible as his chief naval adviser.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Did you at any time make an appreciation to submit to the Minister in regard to the contents of the White Paper of 1964.

Rear Admiral BROCK: Oh no. Did I make any submission to him about the contents of the White Paper?

Mr. MCINTOSH: Right, before it was published?

Rear Admiral BROCK: No, but I have detected some similarity of language and thought between some expressions and concepts in the White Paper and documents that I had produced to the government myself, which were available to the Minister.

Mr. MCINTOSH: What type of documents?

Rear Admiral BROCK: There were many. One of them that got no further than the vice chiefs of staff committee—and I think may still be on the files—had to do with unified command arrangements by geographical areas within Canada. The other was a document that was written primarily to outline the future plans and objectives for the navy in relation to the other defence forces of Canada, and it was, by and large, written altogether in unclassified terms except for one final section. I think these documents were widely circulated. Perhaps I ought not to disclose the name of the latter one because I think it is still marked confidential but, in any case, I at one time asked the Minister whether he had read it and he said "Yes indeed." He told me he carried it around and kept it by his bedside. You have no need for it anymore.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Admiral, to your knowledge, were there any other documents which you produced that reached the Minister?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I could not recount the numbers, the nature or the contents of these documents but there were a great many that in the normal course of my staff duties as vice chief I would process, approve and either have signed by the chief of the naval staff or directly to the Minister's office, dealing with a multitude of subjects.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Was there anything in those documents that you were the author of that would lead you to believe that you should be dismissed by the Minister on your visit to him in August?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Not that I know of. In fact, I would not have expected that any officer at any time would be dismissed for the reasons and advice he was rendering to his own Minister. A Minister can always accept or disregard advice.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Then your dismissal came as a complete surprise to you?

Rear Admiral BROCK: As a complete surprise. I came to Ottawa for other reasons, I believed.

Mr. MCINTOSH: What were the other reasons that you think you came for?

An hon. MEMBER: He already has answered that, I think.

Mr. MCINTOSH: That is all right. This is my question?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I had been advised a few days before that there was some likelihood that the Minister himself would like to put his final approval upon tentative plans that I had outlined verbally to the Associate Minister and to the Comptroller General about furthering the intent of his plan within my command, and that I should be prepared to speak to this point briefly and outline these ideas to the Minister, if I were called. And sure enough, I was called within a day or so and, as I said earlier, I did not open my briefcase to get out these documents.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Admiral, in answer to Mr. Nugent in regard to personnel that this Committee should hear evidence from, you listed a number of senior

officers who, strange as it may seem, were all included in a list given to us by TRIO, with the exception of Campbell. However, they did include several more; they were Cameron, Harvey, Hendrick, Orr, Piers and Kitching. Are you familiar with any of these names?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I know all of them very well.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Would you include those in your list?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Certainly, if time permits.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Now in regard to the questioning by Mr. Stafford in regard to the Halifax *Herald*, are you familiar with the Winnipeg *Free Press*?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I was brought up in Winnipeg, but I do not subscribe to the paper now.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You know the political affiliations of that paper?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Yes I do.

Mr. MCINTOSH: In an editorial on November 7, 1966 headed "A case for consideration", we find these words:

> One reason for the doubts and questioning is that the government's complete plans for integration or unification are as yet vague and undefined,—

Would you agree with that statement?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Yes.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Would you also agree with this statement:

> Critics of the integration program have three major objectives. They want to see maintained the identity of the three services, even within an integrated defence organization. They would like to see a halt made now in the integration program so that problems that have arisen can be examined. And they would like to have a full inquiry made into future plans of the government in this field so that their impact can be properly assessed.

Would you agree with that?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I agree, but I would put them in a different order. I have been suggesting all along that what we want, first of all, is the very careful and detailed examination. That should come first, it may result in these others.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Another statement made in this editorial is:

> The critics' requests for fair hearings do not seem unreasonable—The implications and consequences are many and varied. It is, in the circumstances, no more than right that the government should be willing to lay its cards on the table, so that the armed services and the Canadian people can see what the government is trying to do and can then give the government's plans the consideration they deserve and should have.

Would you agree with that statement?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Yes. I have been advocating exactly the same thing myself, and I am not an unreasonable man.

Mr. McINTOSH: Would you also agree with this statement, which is contained in the same editorial:

> Legislation containing so many critical changes to the nation's defence structure should be given detailed study in Committee before the House is asked to approve it in principle.

Rear Admiral BROCK: I was disappointed, as I think thousands of people in this country have been, that this course of action was not followed.

Mr. McINTOSH: My final question is in regard to what has been published in the Halifax *Herald*. I do not read the paper. Would you say that this paper gives a one-sided slant to this whole issue?

Rear Admiral BROCK: The Halifax *Herald* is a local paper and papers of this nature are always inclined to give a local point of view—there is no question about that. I have been asked before what the feeling is going to be in Halifax, because this place has been a naval seaport for generations.

Mr. McINTOSH: The point was made that possibly the editorials and the articles were based on releases by the member from that area, namely Mr. Forrestall. Would you say that the same thing applies to the article from Winnipeg, that this editorial was based on what Mr. Churchill has said?

Mr. CHURCHILL: I subscribe to that paper; I like Brigadier Malone and I respect his judgment as a military man.

Rear Admiral BROCK: I have found, by and large, that newspapermen are pretty independent people. I think they probably publish what they feel.

The CHAIRMAN: Speaking of a case for consideration, the witness has been before us now for some time. Our next witness is Rear Admiral Dillon. We have another questioner, Mr. Churchill. I think there is a general feeling that we finish the questioning of Rear Admiral Brock within a short time.

Mr. NUGENT: I do not find that feeling a general one.

The CHAIRMAN: We will now continue with Mr. Churchill's questions.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I will restrict myself to two questions. I will not base them on some radio program that 20 million people in the country have not heard; I will base them on the Minister's speech which I regret having to refer to so often. Scattered through the speech, there are repeated references to the fact that there will still be soldiers, sailors and airmen, and there will be little change in the structure of our forces and so on. I would like to ask your opinion about this quotation from page 10834 of *Hansard*:

> —while the barriers to movement of personnel between the forces will be removed, personnel in the combat forces will continue to be identified as sailors, soldiers and airmen until the force structure within the unified force is developed.

My question is this: Despite the repeated references to maintaining sailors, soldiers and airmen, have you any confidence that their identity will be retained in view of that sentence which I have just read?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Certainly not, if the defence bill before the House is passed.

Mr. CHURCHILL: My second question is based on the Minister's statement with regard to the demand for modern warfare. I would like to ask you a question on this because you have had a very long service in contact with the enemy. You are a combat officer; you have seen danger, and you understand the operations at sea against the enemy. In this speech on page 10831 of *Hansard* under the heading, "The Demands of Modern Warfare" it states:

> The white paper of 1964 would not have recommended integration as a first step toward a single service if we had not been certain of the improved capacity of a unified force to meet the demands of modern warfare. The pattern of warfare in which armies fought armies, navies fought navies, and air forces fought air forces is not likely to be repeated.

As a combat officer, would you consider that modern warfare will be met as effectively as warfare in the past by a unified force—which are the terms the Minister uses in regard to a unified force? If so, in what particulars will this be superior to what we have done in the past under combined operations?

Rear Admiral BROCK: In that sense, I cannot see any possibility of superior performance through an enforced form of unified single service than can be achieved through the sort of co-operation that is achieved in the face of the enemy.

Mr. CHURCHILL: The expectation in the Minister's mind is that the pattern of warfare wi l not involve, in the future, fighting armies. Is it your understanding that armies are fighting armies in South Vietnam?

Rear Admiral BROCK: That is my impression.

Mr. CHURCHILL: At the moment we do not appear to have navies fighting navies, but we might in the future because of anti-submarine activities. Air forces appear to be fighting air forces to a limited extent in South Vietnam. Is that your understanding of that situation?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I would not—

Mr. CHURCHILL: Do you see any major change in warfare at the present time from what it was in Korea or in World War II other than perhaps better weapons?

Rear Admiral BROCK: I think that the nature of future warfare is always going to require the presence of armies, land-based troops to move in with modern weapons, or rifles with bullets and rice in their pocket or sticks and stones to smite the enemy, hip and thigh, and occupy the territory that they are after until their war aims are achieved. There is no way around this. They may be helped by air forces and naval forces, and they will certainly be supplied.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I have one final question. I quote from page 10832 of *Hansard*:

> The need for fast decision-making and quick reaction is synonymous with modern warfare.

From your experience as a combat officer, were you obliged to make fast decisions and were you obliged to react quickly?

Rear Admiral BROCK: Yes—fortunately successfully or I suppose I would not be here.

Mr. CHURCHILL: That was my own experience. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN: That would appear to conclude the questioning of Rear Admiral Brock at this point.

Before we conclude, there is another piece of housekeeping that I would ask you to consider. I would like to receive a motion that reasonable travelling and living expenses be paid to any out-of-town witnesses, excluding departmental officials, duly summoned by the Committee to appear voluntarily during its current hearings in connection with Bill No. C-243. I understand from the Clerk that this is a blanket approval and we will not thereby as a result of this have to go back. We did it for individuals and this is to overcome the necessity of doing it for each one every time.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I so move.

Mr. MCNULTY: I second the motion.

Motion agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: Before I thank Rear Admiral Brock, I think we should consider the procedure for the remainder of the day. Once again, speaking of consideration for witnesses, we have had one witness, Rear Admiral Dillon, here for the past two hours. I understand his brief is not a lengthy one, so I submit it to you for consideration whether we should not proceed at 8 o'clock, because we have the room, to complete the hearing of this witness.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Is Rear Admiral Dillon in the service at the present time?

The CHAIRMAN: I understand he is on retirement leave. He is available here in Ottawa.

Mr. CHURCHILL: He will not be so seriously inconvenienced than as perhaps someone who is from out of town?

The CHAIRMAN: That is correct. It is just a matter of consideration. He is ready to deliver his brief and, once again, he is here at our request. It would seem desirable to hear him today.

Mr. NUGENT: I object to sitting tonight.

Mr. CHURCHILL: My objection is the same as it was this morning.

Mr. ANDRAS: I understand the gentleman is leaving the country very shortly and it would be most inconvenient to hold him over.

An hon. MEMBER: Could we have a motion on this, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: I would rather not put it to a motion. I think we could probably agree amongst ourselves. We seem to have done all right so far.

Before we decide on this, I would like to thank you, Rear Admiral Brock, on behalf of us all for appearing here, staying so long before us, and submitting to our questions.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, in view of the fact that we now have been sitting over five hours today and the fact that Rear Admiral Dillon is in town and, therefore, has no difficulty in coming and going, it would seem to me that it would not be necessary for us to carry on with these hearings tonight. I must say, as I have said several times before, that I think it is really too much of a strain on the members of this Committee if they are going to carry on any other

activities whatever, to be sitting here morning, afternoon and night. Therefore, I would request very strongly that we do not go ahead with this meeting this evening.

The CHAIRMAN: Could I say just one thing more. I am doing my best to clear the calendar for next Monday so that there will be no meetings of the Committee that day. I know one or two of the members are very anxious that this be done, and it would make it a lot easier for me if we could deal with this matter today instead of postponing it until next week.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, I do not know the nature of this brief, or how long it might take—it would depend on how contentious his evidence is—but there certainly is no guarantee if we did hear him tonight that we would finish tonight.

Mr. HARKNESS: As a matter of fact, from past experiences, I think it would be extraordinarily unlikely.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I would rather sit on Monday than to sit three times a day.

The CHAIRMAN: Speak to one of your colleagues over there; he has a long face.

Mr. FOY: Mr. Chairman, I would like to make the observation that we do not meet three times every day, that we only meet three times on two occasions during the week. The proposed schedule is Tuesdays and Thursdays.

Mr. MCINTOSH: And that we also meet on Friday and Monday?

Mr. FOY: We meet once on Friday and once on Monday.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Is that to accommodate those who leave early Friday and come back late Monday. What about those of us who stay here for the whole week end?

Mr. FOY: I suppose so.

The CHAIRMAN: I am glad you said that.

Mr. FOY: I suppose this is to accommodate members.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Why not accommodate us? We think three sittings a day are too much.

Mr. FOY: I think we should keep up to schedule. Rear Admiral Dillon is on our schedule for today and I think we should carry on. If you want a motion to that effect, I will be glad to put it, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It is a debatable motion and I will be glad to debate it. Go ahead and put it and we will spend all night debating the motion.

The CHAIRMAN: I do not know if that would help any of us, Mr. Churchill.

Mr. CHURCHILL: That is it. Let us come to some arrangement here. Meeting every day of the week is too much and meeting three times on Tuesdays and Thursdays is too much. Let us come to some sensible arrangement. You are wearing out your colleagues; you have had to change three members of the Committee already and I am sympathetic towards them.

The CHAIRMAN: I am sure you are. Will you gentlemen consider this. As Chairman, I will do my best to see that next Thursday we do not sit three times during the day. However that is largely in your hands.

Mr. NUGENT: I am glad you said that it is largely in our hands. Is there a prescribed time table which sets out that we have to finish with certain witnesses at a certain time?

The CHAIRMAN: Not exactly no, but when one does schedule two witnesses for one long day, as Tuesday and Thursday is, then I think we must leave space in the evening just in case the time table does go behind schedule, as it has done today. If we schedule one witness for Thursday I think the two sittings should be sufficient and then we would not have to set it the late evening, I will attempt to do that for you.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I am prepared to suggest a compromise to you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: I thought that was a compromise.

Mr. CHURCHILL: If you will agree that next week we do not have the third sitting on Tuesday and Thursday evenings, and if you will agree that we do not sit on Monday next, as has been suggested, then we might consider conceding the point for tonight. Let us come to some determination on the future.

The CHAIRMAN: I do not like to find our hands tied with such a definite undertaking, but we will certainly work toward that end, Mr. Churchill.

Mr. CHURCHILL: We have had a very definite undertaking under your arrangements up to the present because we have been meeting steadily with no time at all for the House of Commons, and I think it is ridiculous.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I think that we must bear in mind at the same time that Mr. Nugent has been whooping it up to have us interview every living admiral and general, and at the same time persuading us to cut down on the number of hearings. We cannot oblige Mr. Nugent, as anxious as we are to, and at the same time curtail our program of meetings.

Mr. NUGENT: I am afraid that I have been urging this Committee to do its job in the normal way that Committees usually do. I cannot see this extreme urgency.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, Rear Admiral Dillon was invited to appear before us today.

The CHAIRMAN: We'l gentlemen, you have heard the discussion there has been so far. In the interest of promoting the work of this Committee and to retain the good spirit which so far has seemed to prevail, I would like to hear the witness that we have invited to appear before us tonight at 8 o'clock. Since we have spent so much time talking about it now, perhaps we could meet at 8.15. Would that satisfy members?

Mr. CHURCHILL: What happens Thursday night? Will you have invited someone else and will we then have to go through all this routine again?

The CHAIRMAN I will not invite anyone for Thursday night, Mr. Churchill.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Will you follow Mr. Deachman's suggestion that you also call all the witnesses who have been suggested to us today?

The CHAIRMAN: I take it then that it is the consensus that we meet again at 8.15 tonight.

EVENING SITTING

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we have a quorum. I apologize for starting five minutes late.

The witness this evening is Rear Admiral Dillon. Before we adjourned there was a question about Rear Admiral Dillon's status. I may have inadvertently misinformed you inasmuch as I may have given you only part of the story. I will ask Rear Admiral Dillon to clarify his present status in the armed forces.

Rear Admiral C. J. DILLON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, if I may just put myself in perspective here, I am still a serving officer. I am now in my 36th year of service with the naval forces. As did Admiral Brock, I spent my first eight years, in the volunteer reserve, and was placed on active service in September, 1939. During the subsequent years I transferred to the regular force where I have remained since.

I retired in the normal manner—and I would like to emphasize this, because I was not fired—in September of 1966, having reached the age at which you start your terminal leave.

However, about two and a half months later I was asked by the Chief of Defence Staff, through the Chief of Personnel, to come back to carry out a special study relating to the common, non-public funds system for the forces. I agreed to undertake this, and I am now in the process of doing it. My retirement, as a result, has been deferred for this period.

I have been a supply specialist during nearly all of my service career and I have, as a result, been mixed up with material, with the other facets of supply, with the general administrative picture and, latterly, with finance, through the comptroller of the navy and the comptroller general of shops.

My experience has been fairly broad within those limits. I served at sea on three occasions during the war; and subsequent to the war I have been rather exposed to Ottawa. This was the sort of way the cookie crumbled.

I was naval secretary from 1947 to 1950; followed by four years as dispatch officer and officer in charge of the supply depot on the west coast, and two years as command supply officer on the east coast. I returned to Ottawa during the latter part of 1954, and in 1955 was appointed as supply officer in chief. I remained in that appointment until 1960.

I attended the Imperial Defence College in London for a year in 1961, and when I returned to Canada I was for a short period the senior naval officer for the St. Lawrence River region.

In July 1962, I was called to Ottawa and appointed naval comptroller and served two years on the naval board in that appointment.

When integration took place on August 1, 1964 I was appointed deputy comptroller general, and I held that appointment until last September when I proceeded on my retirement leave, which has since been interrupted for a short period.

I have no formal brief to present, gentlemen, and I am at your disposal for any questions you may wish to ask.

Mr. WINCH: Your experience goes back many years and deals mostly with finance and supply. No doubt you have carefully followed the submissions that have been made before this Committee on the integration of supply.

There have been, from my point of view, some queries about whether it can be done efficiently because of the specialties that may be required by one or other of the three services.

From your experience and knowledge, including the time you spent in Ottawa in charge of supply, is it your contention that it is possible to have complete integration and unification of logistics, as you understand the picture?

Rear Admiral DILLON: Yes, sir, I believe it is. We have really been tending towards integration of logistic services for almost 20 years. We started nibbling away at it in 1947, and we have been gradually working towards it in many facets since then. You will always require people with specialist knowledge in certain fields; but it is entirely feasible.

Mr. WINCH: I ask because two or three times we have been given, as the example of why it will not work, the experience of the United States in Viet Nam. Have you followed that situation? Can you foresee any difficulties so far as Canada is concerned?

Rear Admiral DILLON: There undoubtedly will be difficulties. There are big problems in common cataloguing, and they are segregating those items which are peculiar to one environment. The United States' experience, with which I am rather familiar, was brought about more by the suddeness of the expansion of the operations. They really suffered from a policy of economy in their inventory in an eadeavour to save funds by reducing the backlog. This has created very many problems.

Their defence supply agency, which looks after the supply of general items to all the services, excluding certain specialist categories like electronics, suction engineering equipment and other ordinance materiels, for instance, has been highly successful, but they ran out of stock much sooner than they expected.

They had a critical situation in relation to uniforms because they did not expect the usage that they ran into in Viet Nam. They were thinking in terms of normal peacetime. I do not think the system was to blame. It was the policies under which the system was operating.

Mr. WINCH: You feel that Canada will not have the same problems if the complete changeover is well-planned and extended over a proper period of time?

Rear Admiral DILLON: That is correct, sir. It will not happen overnight, but it will work in the long run.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, in the Minister's address on second reading there is a short paragraph which describes the functions of the comptroller general. These are the functions that you have performed until now; is that correct?

Rear Admiral DILLON: I was the deputy comptroller general.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I should like to read this short paragraph because it sheds some light on this post. Perhaps you could then enlarge on some of the functions. It states, as reported at page 10822 of *Hansard* for December 7, 1966:

The comptroller general and deputy comptroller general are responsible for the administration of financial and general management services. Specifically, this embraces the development of the organizational structure of the Canadian forces, the allocation of authorized manpower resources, the preparation of the annual estmiates and subsequent management of the approved budget, operation of pay services for military personnel, and management engineering services, including automation. The comptroller general's branch is divided into three divisions, each headed by a director general. These are: director general finance, director general organization and manpower control, director general management engineering and automation.

Sir, I wonder if you could give us an idea of how those three branches have functioned during the period of integration, what changes have taken place and, in your opinion—just give us a general summary—what has been going on there, so that we can get some grasp of the situation?

Rear Admiral DILLON: Prior to integration, sir, the three services had relatively parallel comptroller organizations: the comptroller general of the army, the comptroller general of the air force and the comptroller general of the navy; and, within some variety in the dimensions of our teams, we had the same type of organizations and carried out the same functions. Unquestionably, the integration of the comptroller functions was the easiest to accomplish in all the forces headquarters because we talk the same language. We did not have any problem with semantics, which have caused some problems here and there. We were dealing with money, manpower and management, and we were all pretty well on the same frequency. The creating of this organization proceeded very smoothly, and we were able to seize hold of the various problems and wring them out as a team, whether the people involved were from the naval, army or air environment.

I would say that the comptroller general's shop settled down and got on with the job probably quicker than any because it had the most favourable climate in which to do so.

In the financial world—the budgeting—it was quite simple to put together the various primaries which were aligned in the first instance by Treasury direction, and we were able to combine the funds and manage them together quite satisfactorily.

The problem of manpower control—that is, billets rather than people—was a little more complex, but it has been taken firmly in hand.

On the management engineering side, the air force probably had the greatest input in numbers of people involved, but all three services had something to contribute.

Mr. SMITH: What do you mean by "input", sir? I do not understand the term.

Rear Admiral DILLON: They had the greatest number of people in their management engineering section, and they had developed various management techniques, probably further than had either the navy or the army. We all fell in quite happily with this, and it really worked very well.

With respect to organization, the direction came from the comptroller general and the defence staff. The problems of drafting the various organization

complexes required for CFHQ and the commands were dealt with jointly by the director general of management engineering, who was specifically directed to take an interest in this, and the director general of organization and manpower control, who was on the other side—both directors general. From my own experience, I think this exercise was a very successful and rewarding one. Everybody worked happily together. We were not, of course, without problems and conundrums, but the job was accomplished pretty well on time.

Mr. DEACHMAN: In commands such as Maritime Command, Mobile Command and Materiel Command, where you have elements of the three services, are you now operating, let us say, with three pay branches and three sets of books, or is it at the point where you have one set of books and one pay branch? How does that work?

Rear Admiral DILLON: The pay organization in the three services is still essentially and mechanically the same as it was before integration. In August 1964, a pay study organization was formed to study the program, and it was reckoned that it would take approximately two and a half years to reach the final stages. They developed a common pay system. They then investigated how the program should be managed and accomplished, and out of this they developed a computerized pay system.

It was then necessary to detail to the very last operation every facet of this new pay and accounting system. When that was completed it went to tender and I understand—I have been away from the comptroller general's shop since September, and I am not entirely au fait with this—that the successful tenderer has now received a letter of intent and that the computer will be installed between now and June. The system should be in operation by mid-summer or early-fall, and will result in a common accounting system with a very considerable saving in the bodies who are involved in this process. It could not be accomplished overnight because a great deal of work had to go into it.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Computers have been discussed during these hearings. What is the back-up system in the event of the loss of a computer, or, say, a computer being scrapped because of damage or action? How do your back-up systems work when you lose a device of this kind?

Rear Admiral DILLON: If you blow a fuse you are out of luck until you can fix it.

Mr. DEACHMAN: What happens if you blow a whole computer?

Rear Admiral DILLON: You go back to a manual system. This is quite feasible in relation to this pay system. You would have something to go by because you would work on the last-produced pay list until the damage was repaired or until you got another computer. This is a risk taken by practically everybody who computerizes their operations. In a case of major disasters, such as the loss of all your tapes, you would be in a bit of a spot, but the calculated risk is small.

Mr. DEACHMAN: If my time is not exhausted I have one more question, Mr. Chairman.

Heretofore I imagine that the general surveillance of your accounting was laid out along the lines of accounting in three services. Now you are organized in

functional commands. Has your accounting system for determining the cost of the operation of those commands been changed so that it is now done on a command basis rather than on a services basis?

Rear Admiral DILLON: Yes; this is in the process of being introduced now. A pilot study is being carried out, by the joint team of a firm of management consultations and service officers, on Air Transport Command, to determine the possibility of putting in accrual accounting, and the results of this study will set the form for enlarging it to cover all commands and all elements.

Mr. DEACHMAN: We of this Committee, as a Standing Committee of the House of Commons, are charged with the examination of the estimates of your department. As you convert to a new system, the way in which you are setting yourself up to report to parliament is very important to us, because you become increasingly complex and we find it increasingly difficult to know what you are doing.

I wonder whether steps are being taken, as you are converting to a new system, to bear Parliament in mind so that we understand the processes that you are going through and can intelligently follow your course?

Rear Admiral DILLON: I can assure you that the sausages coming out of this machine are being stamped with the approval of all interested parties. We are not going off on any tangents here without the direction of the treasury staff, the deputy minister's office, the Auditor General and everybody else who has an interest in this. These studies are based on certain precepts which must be followed, and there is no intention of confusing anyone with signs.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Thank you very much.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Admiral Dillon, I do not believe I have heard you mention the word "unification" since you have appeared before us as a witness. Could you give me your definition of "unification"?

Rear Admiral DILLON: I believe that unification is the formation of one force; one group of people that will be involved in three environments.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Do you do away with the idea that the army is a force, or the air force is a force, or the navy is a force?

Rear Admiral DILLON: As I understand it, they are components of a force.

Mr. MCINTOSH: It is an amalgamation of all three?

Rear Admiral DILLON: Yes.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I would like to introduce another word, "standardization". In your position you must have had something to do with NATO.

Rear Admiral DILLON: Yes.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I understand that there is a base in Bergen, Norway, which was to service all NATO allied ships, armament and so on, and that it was the desire of the officials of NATO at one time—I do not know whether or not it is now—that all countries participating in the NATO plan standardize their engines, armament and so on and that they were unable to achieve that end for economic reasons within the different countries. Has there been any suggestion, under what you understand by "unification", that there be standardization within our forces in armament—say, tanks and artillery and so on?

Rear Admiral DILLON: One of the most laborious jobs has been the standardization of screw threads. For the past 15 years we have been trying to do this, but, of course, that is a long way from standardizing ordinance.

Considerable progress has been made in the NATO field in this respect, and the standardization of cataloguing nomenclature and stock numbers has been a very meaningful step.

Obviously, with the diversity of countries in NATO and the diversity of sources of military equipment, we are a long way from standardization of repair parts. Even in Canada we have problems. Improvements have been made in many ways over the years, but during the second world war years we had British-manufactured equipment with its own peculiar screw threads and electrical characteristics; we had British patterns manufactured in Canada; and American and Canadian patterns and all the standards that went with them. It was all rather confusing. This is being ironed out. We certainly have not reached the ultimate, by a long shot. We have made some progress along that road through these NATO standard agreements.

Mr. MCINTOSH: To your mind, is there any connection between standardization and unification?

Rear Admiral DILLON: No, none whatsoever.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Hellyer has stated that his definition of "unification" is: "The end objective of a logical and evolutionary progression." Does that meet with your idea of unification?

Rear Admiral DILLON: I certainly agree that unification is going to be an evolutionary process. There is no magic wand that can create it overnight. It will have to grow into this. We really have not started to unify yet. As I understand it, we have not been given the legal green light. The integration process, which is a managerial one, has progressed far down the road. The unification process has yet to come. There is a lot of planning going on in some of which I have participated; but in most of which I have not. It is still just on the horizon. We have not attacked it.

Mr. MCINTOSH: From your understanding of unification, do you believe it will affect economy within the department?

Rear Admiral DILLON: Indeed it will, in the long run. However, speaking as a comptroller, if I may, for a moment, it is extremely difficult to prove the economies at this time because we are in an inflationary spiral. You save a dollar on the one hand, but it costs you $1.10 to do something else. At the moment, we are swimming against a rather strong current. We will do all right if we just stay in the same place, moneywise.

I am speaking now completely as a comptroller, and I do not want to become involved in matters of policy. In trying to save a "buck" today you may find that something is going to cost a buck fifty tomorrow, which means you have to re-align your plans in order to compete again. This is one of the things we have been up against for the last ten years, or more.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I have a telegram here from a former commodore in the navy. From your answer I take it that you disagree with his statement to the effect that, unification is to effect economy even at expense of morale—

Would you agree that unification does affect morale in any way?

Rear Admiral DILLON: I heard Admiral Brock speaking on morale this afternoon. Morale is a thing of many facets. I would say this about morale, that if you say to everyone you meet, "My, you are not looking very well. Are you sick? The "chap", even if he is in the best of health, will begin to feel twinges, and think that he is not in the best of health. The forces have been subjected to comments about their morale for the last four of five years, and I am not surprised that people are now wondering about their morale.

There are morale problems at various levels. In the course of my current assignment I travelled from Victoria to some of the central points and many of the military establishments. Ninety per cent of the people I met seemed to be in a state of good morale. I do not want to decry other statements on this, but I found them all to be pretty "chipper". The things they worry about are not necessarily related to unification. They all have their moans and groans, but generally speaking they all seem to be getting on with their jobs.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Admiral, are you referring to the combat or the non-combat forces?

Rear Admiral DILLON: I have seen a number of our field units. Most of the bases I visited in the last month have been army and airforce. They all seem to have their tails straight up. I visited a couple of infantry battalions, and some air squadrons; and we went aboard one of the ships on the west coast and found that they were a very eager bunch.

Mr. MCINTOSH: The commodore to whom I referred also stated:

> The present Minister's policies have not produced any new weapons systems to forces as deliveries made since his advent to office were from orders made by the predecessor.

Is that correct?

Rear Admiral DILLON: I do not think I am competent to answer that, sir. I have not been on the materiel side lately. We have lots of orders in the system, but sometimes there is a bit of a lapse between the time a certain weapon system is ordered and the time you fire the first round from it.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I take it from your remarks, again, that you are in favour of unification, as you understand it. The same officer also stated:

> Minister reorganizing department and establishing new commands with more very senior ranking officers than before...

Would you agree, in your understanding of the way in which unification as you interpret it has been implemented so far; that more seniors officers are required now than before?

Rear Admiral DILLON: Well, I do not believe we have more senior officers now than we had before. I certainly would not want to discourage anybody from being put in a position of responsibility and authority without the commensurate rank; but, without doing some quick addition—I have no paper—I do not think we have any more "brass" today than we had before. I think we have fewer, in fact. We have shuffled the positions around, but—

Mr. MCINTOSH: He also stated:

> ...he has promoted more to three star rank than any predecessor in efforts to enforce support for his policies. Unification was never proposed

> by chiefs of staff committee as valid, military necessity, it is political mirage which has produced astonishment among our allies and deluded our fellow citizens.

Would you agree with that statement?

Rear Admiral DILLON: I do not think it is in my part of the ship, as we say in the navy, to comment on a statement like that. I do not know who this commodore is. Although I might engage him in a debate over a gin some day I certainly do not want to comment on his statements.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH: Admiral, I believe you mentioned that your last appointment, had to do substantially with pay and personnel.

Rear Admiral DILLON: That is right.

Mr. SMITH: You have however, been a materiel officer. You mentioned the stages through which the managerial side of integration had gone, but in reference to materiel command you said that it would not be done overnight.

Rear Admiral DILLON: That is correct.

Mr. SMITH: In length of time, what do you mean by "overnight"? In other words, how long will it take to complete the integration of the materiel side of our services?

Rear Admiral DILLON: First of all, we have to complete a very large job of cataloguing. Following that, we have to transfer the inventory control from the methods and procedures that are being followed by the three individual services into one master inventory and for that we need the tools, which, again, means a computer. The air force materiel inventory is carried on a computer; the naval one is carried centrally on punch cards, although there has been some change over to the computer within the last two years; and I believe the army one is carried regionally in their central ordinance depots, on punch cards. To bring this whole operation under one roof, with the automated processes that will be associated with it, and to accomplish, prior to that, the complete cataloguing program, would probably take about five years.

This has been under way now for less than a year. Materiel command was formed on April 1, 1966, I believe. We also have a steering committee which is developing an integrated logistics system. I would say that we will have done extremely well if the whole thing is tidied up, "debugged" and operating in five years time. However this is not to say that benefits are not going to accrue as we go along.

Mr. SMITH: Five years is roughly what you mean by "overnight".

Rear Admiral DILLON: Yes.

Mr. SMITH: I know that you have not been involved in the other branches of the services, but you have recently left National Defence Headquarters and that is why I shall ask this question. The minister said in his speech of December 7:

> . . . personnel in combat forces will continue to be identified as sailors, soldiers and airmen until the force structure within the unified force is developed.

How far along are the plans for the development of the force structure within the proposed unified force?

Rear Admiral DILLON: To the best of my knowledge, sir, nobody has yet come up with a better generic term to describe people than as "soldiers", "sailors" and "airmen." No doubt one will be produced in due course.

In the study on NPF we are trying to think ahead in terms of what this man—this unified "chap"—is going to be. For the purpose of having a "handle", we call them "finks"—flying infantry with naval knowledge. The motto of our team is "Think Like a Fink". We have not come up with any better jargon at the moment. It is very helpful when we are speaking about this.

Mr. SMITH: How far is the force structure planned ahead? How far are the plans under way for a unified force structure?

Rear Admiral DILLON: I do not think I am in a position to answer that, sir, because I do not really know. I have not been close to that problem.

Mr. SMITH: Do you know of any force structure studies that are being made?

Rear Admiral DILLON: I believe that there are very extensive ones being carried out in the personnel branch, but I have no direct knowledge of this. I am not associated with them.

Mr. SMITH: As far as you know, no committee has been set up to study the force structure.

Rear Admiral DILLON: I am quite sure that there is, yes.

Mr. SMITH: But do you know of your own knowledge, that there has been? Logic would compel me to agree with you that such a study ought to be under way, but I do not know that there is and I assume that you do not actually know either?

Rear Admiral DILLON: I cannot identify the group, but I do not think there is any great significance to my ignorance.

Mr. SMITH: Well, I do not think there is any great significance to my ignorance either.

Mr. ANDRAS: Admiral Dillon, as you probably know we have had associations appear before us in the last two or three days. We heard from the integrated command of the opposition forces on Friday, and we heard from the separate branches of the opposition forces yesterday. Their common complaint was that the principles of good corporate management were not being applied to the new program of intergration and unification.

Having been controller in the branch, would you agree that good corporate management principles and techniques were not being applied to the planning in this particular regard?

Rear Admiral DILLON: No, I would not. I think we have management techniques coming out of our ears at the moment.

Mr. ANDRAS: There have been many studies. Have a lot of new techniques developed over the last three or four years relating to the integration-unification program?

Rear Admiral DILLON: Yes; we have lots of management consultants coming along to give us the benefit of their wisdom, and this is being mixed with that of the minds of the military staff officers. I do not think there is any lack of application of management techniques.

Mr. ANDRAS: One of the avowed goals of the White Paper, which was repeated in Air Marshal Sharp's presentation the other day, is the modernization of our management methods and procedures. Would you say that progress has been made towards the realization of this goal? Are the management methods and procedures modernized as a result of integration?

Rear Admiral DILLON: Yes, I would; as part of the integration process, but not necessarily as a result. They are part.

Mr. ANDRAS: Could this progress have been achieved to the same degree without integration?

Rear Admiral DILLON: Modern management techniques have been applied over the last 10 or 15 years.

Mr. SMITH: The air force computer in Materiel Command?

Rear Admiral DILLON: Yes; and any number of studies have been carried out. We have followed the development of various United States' logistic and management systems with great interest, and we have adapted them to our needs through the years. We cannot always adopt them *in toto*; we have to adapt them to our rather smaller dimensions; but this has been a process which has been carried on effectively and energetically in the individual services and now in the integrated organization throughout. The reservoir, or the group, of officers trained in management has been increasing significantly, particularly amongst the younger officers.

Mr. ANDRAS: Is the fact that many of the officers, starting with the more senior officers and graduating downwards, are going to management schools and computer schools, etc., contributing to this progress?

Rear Admiral DILLON: Yes; I think that possibly the best argument to support that contention is that there are all sorts of people in other government departments and in industry who are ready to steal our bright young officers who have this training.

Mr. ANDRAS: You are satisfied, from your experience and examination, that the computers themselves will effect net savings that will offset their cost and operation?

Rear Admiral DILLON: A computer is a high speed moron. It has to have the proper input. You have to put the right things into it, and you have to be able to interpret what comes out of it. You need very intelligent, knowledgeable people to deal with the torrent that comes out of a computer.

Undoubtedly it saves much manual labour. It has a very much higher degree of accuracy than a character with a blunt pencil, and it makes it possible to make management decisions that much faster. As the IBM people say, "If you put garbage in you are going to get garbage out".

Mr. ANDRAS: In your experience it is working well, though, and there is neither garbage going in nor coming out?

Rear Admiral DILLON: The computer is here to stay.

Mr. ANDRAS: In discussion the other day the opinion was expressed that in order to achieve flexibility and interchangeability in the so-called supporting services—not the direct combat services, but the supporting services—and to take advantage of the commonality that exists in a great many trades within those supporting services, rather than having one unified force in one uniform we should have a fourth force consisting of the supporting services, which would be common to all trades, graduating from the ones that now exist in all services up to the more specialized ones. It was suggested that they all be grouped in one fourth force, with, presumably, a fourth uniform.

I understand that this was considered as one of the alternatives. What would be your opinion of such a step as compared to say, the single force?

Rear Admiral DILLON: Well I would take a very dim view of a fourth force because if you do that you create a sort of second-class citizen who is not at the sharp end. People should be part of whatever environment they happen to be in. We would be going back to the days of the old pursers—

Mr. ANDRAS: The Commissaires of the British army?

Rear Admiral DILLON: Yes; the Commissaires of the British army; and the sutlers who looked after the American army when they opened up the West; and they certainly fell into some disrepute in their days.

This would be a great mistake. I think that anybody who was a member of this fourth service would get the feeling that he was probably a third class citizen. I would not support it.

Mr. ANDRAS: In addition to what, to me, is your very valid comment that it would create a distinction unacceptable to those in that fourth service, what about the overhead of such a fourth organization and the cost and expense of it? Do you think that it would be more expensive to the Canadian Armed Forces than say, a unified force?

Rear Admiral DILLON: It is very difficult to say. I suppose that if you made it a complete force all by itself, with its pyramid of administration and all the rest, it would be more expensive, yes.

Mr. ANDRAS: Would it be reasonable to assume that such a force would have to be accompanied by such things as headquarters and personnel and administrative branches and so forth, so that you would have to have a fourth layer of staff and so on?

Rear Admiral DILLON: Yes; duplication of all the echelon.

Mr. ANDRAS: Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Laniel?

Mr. LANIEL: Admiral, the Department of National Defence has been accused, on the one hand, of acting too quickly and of not doing sufficient planning, and, on the other hand, of not deciding sooner the details of what is involved in unification.

Do you feel that there has been a lot of improvisation in your work on integration up to this stage, and do you have the impression that the planning and the studies on unification are based on some supposed dream that some people had years ago?

Rear Admiral DILLON: Well, sir, on the question of the rapidity of it, I think that the sooner people find out where they are going the happier they are. There is no question that uncertainty is disturbing and upsetting, perhaps, and that people like to know where they are at.

The broad goals of integration were set out and the defence staff was told to get on with it and work out the methods, and this is what occurred.

From my knowledge of unification, it is obviously still in the planning stage because it is not legal at this point.

The problems associated with it are being wrung out in various branches of the defence staff. The proposals are presented to the Chief of the Defence Staff, and his advisers and, in turn, to the Minister, and they are either accepted or rejected.

The process is rather similar to this job that I have been assigned to now. We know what our problem is and we are now going around gathering the facts. We will explore various alternative ways of solving the problem and then we will make firm recommendations that will be either accepted or rejected. We intend that they should be accepted; I mean we are not going to put forward impossible ones. This has been the form in all the facets of the thing. I have not personally been involved in very many of these, because of my position in the headquarters complex, but certainly this is the way it worked in the comptroller general's branch.

Mr. LANIEL: In your work did you feel that there was some planning of integration?

Rear Admiral DILLON: Oh, yes. It did not just occur, you know. There was a lot of planning and a lot of work.

Mr. LANIEL: At different levels?

Rear Admiral DILLON: Yes, sir.

Mr. LANIEL: Because of the personal feelings of individual members of our armed forces and, because of the talk on unification and the worry of other people about the further step, or the continuation of steps, towards greater integration, do you feel that we should stop this process now and pause and re-examine the whole situation, or do you not think that this could be done as we go along and that we could make the corrections?

Rear Admiral DILLON: I would certainly hate to have to unwind it all. There is only one thing to do, and that is to press on right now.

Mr. LANIEL: Do you feel that standardization will bring an improvement in the supply system and produce economy in this operation?

Rear Admiral DILLON: The supply systems are pretty good right now. I do not believe they will get any worse. That probably was not a good choice of words. I do not think they will deteriorate.

Once the various problems that are associated with putting this ball of wax together are solved and straightened out I think it will undoubtedly lead to economies. It will lead to economies in paper; it will lead to economies in warehousing; it will probably lead to economies in the level of stock that is held.

Mr. LANIEL: Do you think that unification will help in reaching the goals that have been established?

Rear Admiral DILLON: I do not think we can mix unification with developing a new supply system because they are apples and oranges, sort of thing; I think they are in separate worlds. I do not think there is a link between them. I may have misunderstood you, though.

Mr. LANIEL: What I am concerned about is, without unification would you need three systems of supply?

Rear Admiral DILLON: We are on our way to one system now under integration.

Mr. LANIEL: Under integration?

Rear Admiral DILLON: Unification is only going to affect the people who are working in the systems, not the systems themselves.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Admiral, I only have one question. You have been talking about things that are clerical in nature, that is, they have to do with computers, and so forth, and I agree with much of what you have said. You have left me with the impression that you believe unification and total integration of the branches that you served with—or the particular responsibilities you had just before you took up some other special duties—was a good thing and would work and, indeed, it was a very desirable thing. Is that correct?

Rear Admiral DILLON: Peaople make things work, not squares on a chart and I think we have the people who can make things work.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I agree with you. We have had the Minister's speech into the computer and comments about what comes out. I just wanted to ask you whether or not you wou'd agree that unification would work with the same degree of success, possibly, at the combat level as it does at your level? Whether the men who actually have to do the work of fighting are equally as adaptable as those at your level?

Rear Admiral DILLON: I think it has been clearly stated that there are going to be people who are going to do the fighting on the land and people who are going to do the fighting on the sea, and under it and over it, and people who are going to be primarily associated with flying machines. Therefore, no matter what happens, people are going to have an identity in an environment. This is a rather cumbersome way of expressing something. There is going to be a hiving of the fighting peop'e. I think it has been said quite clearly that people are not going to be expected to qualify in all fields; to be able to lower a sea boat, and dig a trench and mend a jet engine. So, putting that aside, it looks to me as though at the grass roots—the sharp end—we are going to have very much of what we have always had. People will be in armoured regiments and battalions.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Well, unification Admiral, is unification and total integration, amalgamation, common identity of certain services, such as the one that you most recently had some responsibilities in. The necessity of total unification of the services does not necessary follow. In other words, you could have your computers and do for all three services, whether they were amalgamated, integrated or unified. This would not effect materially the efficiency with which unification or integration—

Rear Admiral DILLON: Mr. Forrestall, we are not going to win any battles with computers. We may be in a better posture to win them. I think we want to keep our eye on the ball there. I think when all the froth is blown off the beer and we get over this period of adjustment these people are embarking on, I suppose I could say my only regret is that I am too old to participate any further.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Admiral, I suggest when you go to Halifax, drink whisky not beer.

Rear Admiral DILLON: What will Bruce Oland say to that?

Mr. FORRESTALL: I will probably catch it for that one.

Admiral, what I asked you was whether or not you felt the level that you most recently represented could work efficiently and effectively with or without unification of the combat troops.

Yes or no will suffice for that. You lose me—I get into beer when I should be talking about whiskey and whiskey when I should be talking about beer.

Rear Admiral DILLON: Certainly the environment I have just left could operate with or without unification. I referred to being a third class citizen a little while ago and I would say that if you were not part of it you would not feel that you belonged. I have never felt like a second class citizen, althought I have been a supply officer all my life. I have had some very rude exchanges with Admiral Brock on occasions but we have always ended up in a pretty friendly fashion.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I do not know why you would have felt like a second class citizen. You were in the same service as he and I always understood it to be the senior service.

That was all; I was just wondering whether or not the pay level, or the supply level, or this other area could work if it were to stop at a certain level; whether or not you could accommodate three separate identities.

Rear Admiral DILLON: Well, I do not really think that in the last two years, in the Controller Generals shop, people have really given very much thought to what colour uniform we wore anyway. We had to get accustomed to each other's sort of buzz words, and once we did that it worked very tidily.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Admiral Dillon, I missed what you said at the start about the special study that you were involved in. Would you name that, please.

Rear Admiral DILLON: Yes, sir. It has to do with the non-public funds; the canteen operations, the amenities, the communal benefits, the wets, as they are known. We have found that part of this must embrace some thoughts on the future of the welfare and financial assistance funds.

Mr. CHURCHILL: This is not anything new. We have had these now for a long time, have we not?

Rear Admiral DILLON: Yes, indeed we have.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It it is not new with regard to integration or unification.

Rear Admiral DILLON: No, except we have all done it in our own happy way. The Army had the Maple Leaf Services; the Navy and the Air Force have followed the private enterprise type of operation with small variations.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Earlier a question was asked with regard to United States experience in Viet Nam and their having suffered a bit because of the rapid expansion of their forces there. Would we not also suffer accordingly if we had a sudden expansion of our activities? How many years will it take before things have been sorted out under the present re-organization before we could expect to cope with sudden expansion?

Rear Admiral DILLON: If we were thrust into a shooting war we would have lots of problems but I believe that our existing supply arrangements would function quite satisfactorily. We certainly would not want to be included in a shooting war and changing the system. Probably we would have to defer some of the more drastic changes because we would not have the time nor the people. I do not think there is any question that the supply system as it is today could not meet the load. We would probably run into very many of the problems that the United States did; the usages exceed practically all your calculations. We would undoubtedly have lots of problems but I think we could cope with them.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Well, you think that you could, but the United States people found that they could not, so it is a very uncertain period that we are going through now.

Rear Admiral DILLON: Yes, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: We need an assurance from the Minister of External Affairs that we will not be thrust into a shooting war for several years.

Rear Admiral DILLON: Well, we always hope our political masters will give us due warning of these things.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Well that is his field; he is the master in that field.

Rear Admiral DILLON: It takes two to make a quarrel.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Last week I was questioning the Minister with regard to economies and he admitted that unification would result in only marginal economies. I attempted to copy down what you said in response to a question tonight. I do not want to misquote you, but the words that I wrote down are these: "Unification will effect economies in the long run" and yet you immediately qualified that by saying: "Inflation would throw the calculation out", and then you made an earlier statement that: "Unification had not become operative". How could you then say, other than just as a guess, that unification will effect economies in the long run?

Rear Admiral DILLON: Various processes are now being developed which will effect significant savings in people. This new centralized pay system is one. The number of people that ultimately will be removed from that field will be—I believe the magic figure is 650. We are still operating three separate pay systems and will be until four or five months from now. For a short period we are going to have to continue operating on the old pay procedures, and then we will parallel that with the mechanized one just to debug it. Then we will chop the other and there will be a resulting saving.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Your answer discloses one of the grave difficulties under which this Committee has been labouring. We have been attempting to distinguish between integration and unification. Integration, we have said, means an amalgamation of the supply services and the pay services, and so on, and that is what you are talking about.

Rear Admiral DILLON: And the commands, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: And the commands, yes. When you talked about unification we have been endeavouring to reach a conclusion on the definition of a single service. How can you now say that there will be economies in the long run under the formation of a single service?

Rear Admiral DILLON: Well, perhaps I am crystal gazing here, but there will undoubtedly be an increase of snowballing in the merging of various operations and procedures. It is difficult for me to say exactly how unification is going to work out because recently I have not been associated with the unification planning; this has not been my task. But certainly, in the integration process there have been a number of consolidations, shall we say, of functions which have produced savings in people, savings in real estate, and savings of time and effort.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Well, unification has not commenced yet; integration may have achieved those objects.

Rear Admiral DILLON: That is what I said.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Yes, but you used the word "unification".

Rear Admiral DILLON: Well, I was asked about unification, and I believe unification will; but I cannot tell you precisely how it will because it is a little nebulous in my mind at the moment.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It is just a guess, then, on your part.

Rear Admiral DILLON: An educated guess, yes sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Educated on what basis?

Rear Admiral DILLON: Well, I have been in the service quite a long time and sometimes when you put things together you do get economies. We have been practising economy for a long, long time. In fact, we have been practising economy since 1945 when the war ended and the supply of cash ended with it. We have been through some pretty good wringers since then and we have achieved economies in various directions, and economies upon economies.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I grant that. The Minister has told me in the House that thanks to releasing quite a number of men from the service and from the civilian component—23,000 was the figure he gave me at one time—there had been a reduction in personnel costs of $150 million which was to be applied elsewhere, so I am familiar with that. What I am wondering is why and how you can make a statement that unification will effect economies in the long run because it has not commenced yet, and unless you can be specific about it I do not think we can accept that statement.

Rear Admiral DILLON: Unification will produce economies in the long run as we streamline the forces structure.

Mr. CHURCHILL: What do you mean by streamlining the force structure—reducing the number of personnel?

Rear Admiral DILLON: Reduce the number of personnel on the support tail.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Integration.

Rear Admiral DILLON: I do not want to get into a field that is not mine here; I probably have straggled off in it, but I am not suggesting that unification is

going to cut down the number of people in a battalion because this is an entirely different requirement. I am sure you understand that better than I do, sir. I was never a soldier. I think that it will trim the support tail.

Mr. CHURCHILL: That is just another guess, though, is it not?

Rear Admiral DILLON: Well, it is a statement.

Mr. CHURCHILL: The reason I am pressing the question is that we have been subjected now for two or three years to statements emanating from the Minister, from the Minister's office, and from various other people, to the effect that great economies were going to result from integration and unification. Just last week the Minister said that the economies on unification would be marginal and yet tonight you have given us a statement which would make a good headline: "Unification will effect economies in the long run", and I suggest that you have given no evidence to this Committee to bolster that up.

Rear Admiral DILLON: Well, I regret I cannot use any factual evidence because I am merely looking into the future and I do not suppose I am any more qualified to do that than anybody else.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Thank you very much.

You had something to say about morale which has been a topic of interest here. Your opinion was that morale was good in the units that you visited. You did not mention a visit to Maritime Command. Were you there?

Rear Admiral DILLON: If you mean Halifax, I have not been there. I was in the Pacific, in Victoria, but not in Halifax. We are going there in the latter part of March.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Admiral Dillon, do you dislike khaki uniforms?

Rear Admiral DILLON: No, I always wear one in the summer. I have been accused of having foisted it on the Navy.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Good. What would you think of somebody from the Navy saying that sailors dislike khaki uniforms?

Rear Admiral DILLON: I would not be surprised. I have heard it said before.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Do you think this would apply to the great majority of sailors?

Rear Admiral DILLON: Well, a great majority of sailors do not get an opportunity to wear it. It is only the officers and the chief petty officers that wear it.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): They all wear it at times?

Rear Admiral DILLON: Yes, in the summer.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Nobody dropped dead over it?

Rear Admiral DILLON: No, khaki uniforms were introduced originally in 1942 and then it was carried on. I think there was a slight gap at some point—I must have been away or something—but it has been worn ever since in the summer and in the tropics. It does not get as dirty as whites.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): As I see it, the Navy has khaki, the Army has khaki and, if I remember correctly, the Air Force has khaki too.

Rear Admiral DILLON: They used to wear it in the summer too, yes.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): They still do.

Rear Admiral DILLON: Yes.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Why is everybody complaining about wearing the same colour uniform, then? Everybody has been wearing it for years and nobody said anything about it. What is this fuss all about?

Rear Admiral DILLON: Well, I am not fussing, sir.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN: We have made it a rule that any member who is not a member of the Committee may ask questions after the Committee members themselves have finished and Mr. Rock has a question he would like to ask.

Mr. ROCK: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I asked to be excused for a few days from being a member of the Committee for good reasons and I thank you for the privilege.

First, Admiral Dillon, I must say that I like your colourful manner.

Rear Admiral DILLON: Thank you very much.

Mr. ROCK: I mean that as a compliment.

When DND issued orders regarding the White Paper on Defence and particularly the planning towards integration and unification, was there full co-operation amongst the naval officers of your rank? Were there any admirals who showed reluctance and were non-cooperative with regard to planning for integration and unification?

Rear Admiral DILLON: That is a pretty dirty question, sir.

Mr. ROCK: If I can add something to the question, you made a statement earlier, Admiral, that it is too bad you are of retirement age because if you were younger this would have been a real challenge for you. Do you feel, then, that some of the admirals who were in the same age bracket—close to retirement—were not very happy because they would not have been able to follow it through, or that they knew they were close to retirement age and, therefore, they were disinterested?

Rear Admiral DILLON: I have never seen any admiral, or commodore, or captain, who did not pitch in and do his job. I think that all my colleagues, and all these people, have done their duty. Undoubtedly, it would be ridiculous for me to say that there are not people who are disenchanted one way or another but there are various processes by which they can make their opinions known. But certainly anybody I have ever worked with has done his job wholeheartedly.

An hon. MEMBER: Even the admirals?

Rear Admiral DILLON: Especially the admirals.

Mr. ROCK: You feel that there was no laxity or disinterest shown by some of the high ranking officers when they were issued orders for planning towards integration and unification?

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, I wonder whether this line of questioning is really in order? If it is, will it be all right for us tomorrow or the next day to ask some other witness to give his opinion of Admiral Dillon?

The CHAIRMAN: I think this is a very unfortunate line of questioning and I do not think it is in order. I ask the witness to change his type of question at this point.

Mr. ROCK: It was an interesting question, Mr. Chairman, and I cannot see how I can change it, except possibly to ask other witnesses in the future directly.

Rear Admiral DILLON: Well, I would like to leave you with your mind at rest, sir. I can assure you that you cannot point the finger at people for not doing their jobs and not doing them in a very conscientious way.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any other questions?

Mr. LANIEL: Admiral, although you have not done any work on the planning of unification—but you must have heard of unification—do you feel that the officers and men of the Navy will get the impression of serving in a different kind of Navy with unification? Something has been said along that line and it has even been added that a very large percentage of officers and men would elect to leave the naval services. From your late experience and your visits to some of our bases, did you get the impression that many of our naval personnel were waiting for something to happen so they could leave the service?

Rear Admiral DILLON: No, I have not run into this. There are questions of conditions of service which are bothering some people which I understand are now being dealt with, and I am speaking particularly of senior NCOs and Chief Petty Officers. These are things that had to do with their service contract, if you will. I do not think anybody is fussing that he might suddenly be taken off a ship and put into the Black Watch, or something like that, and sent off on a winter exercise. I think everybody is sufficiently mature to appreciate that.

There are, undoubtedly, officers who would leave. The Navy has been traditionally very traditional, and it has been very close knit and, perhaps, a little old-fashioned in many ways. It always considered this to be a strength rather than a weakness, and these are rather cataclysmic times for people who are accustomed to an essentially non-changing environment. This is a very dynamic world. I have often said to people, when they have talked about unification, "you ought to belong to my church". I happen to be an adherent of the church of Rome and it is going through some very traumatic experiences these days. They are probably akin in some ways to what is over the horizon for the services. I think we can rise above this.

Mr. LANIEL: Would you agree with this statement which I have already given you part of up to this point. I quote: "I would estimate a very large percentage of officers and men would elect to leave the naval service as I said. I also forecast that a large number of those who remain would do so only because they were financially unable to take the risk attached with changing careers. Of the remainder, a large number would be those who had not learned their loyalties well and were inferior fighting men in any case." Landymore.

Rear Admiral DILLON: I have not met very many of these people so I really could not support that statement. Perhaps had I served elsewhere than in Ottawa I might have. One thing about being in the Controller General's shop, you did not do much travelling. I cannot agree with that statement but I cannot say that I have gone around canvassing people. When the young officers that I have worked with, and even the middle aged ones, have considered leaving the

service, it has generally been to improve their opportunities. As I say, there are lots of carrots being dangled around these days for people with service backgrounds; similarly for our technicians—there are lots of opportunities for them. It is not my field, but I hardly need to say that the airlines are all eyeing the pilots that the airforce train so capably and well. These are very difficult times to keep people in the services; there is no fighting going on, and peace keeping is not very exciting. The fields a mile or so away look pretty green to people; I suppose this is a factor. The future of unification is probably a good excuse for some people to try to do something else.

Mr. LANIEL: Thank you.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I have just one more question. I would like to ask the Admiral this: After spending 36 years in the Royal Canadian Navy, is the Admiral not the least disturbed over the proposal to destroy the identity of the Royal Canadian Navy?

Rear Admiral DILLON: I may be absolutely unique here—I may be unique amongst Naval officers, let alone amongst admirals—but I have been an incurable optimist most of my life, and I believe that somehow when all this business is over and done with we will have retained the best of the old and we will be quite adjusted to the new. Now, I am sure that there have been other traumas that affect the people in the services. I believe that when horses were removed from the cavalry there was a lot of—

An hon. MEMBER: We did not like it.

Rear Admiral DILLON: And I have also read somewhere in history that when the longbow was retired in favour of the crossbow there were a lot of people who were very upset about this; they wanted to keep the longbow for ceremonial purposes. I think in a country like Canada we can rise to this occasion and it is not going to affect the willingness or the enthusiasm of our young people to get on and do their job in the defence of their country. I think as long as we remember that the job is the defence of the country, we will be all right. I have not any real despondent thoughts about this. Undoubtedly there will be things that will upset people. We are all inclined to be upset by things that are not too clearly etched out for us. The fear of the unknown is probably the greatest drawback. But, being an incurable optimist, I think we are going to come out of this all right.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You gave examples of weapons which were changed for new, and forces being discontinued because the tank was developed, of which thoroughly approve. But that hardly dismisses the question. I was talking about the Royal Canadian Navy with all its tradition and its magnificent service over the years. Whether people will adjust to that in the future, of course, nobody can guess at the present time, but do you not think, as a serving officer with 36 years service, that there would be some value in retaining the identity of the Royal Canadian Navy and continuing it in its role?

Rear Admiral DILLON: I do not think its role is going to change. I would be prepared to debate the name. Once upon a time we had a thing called the Provincial Marine, which was not a very exciting name, but it was very active on the Great Lakes. Even the uniform has gone through very considerable evolution through the years; the knee breeches and buckle shoes disappeared. I think

possibly the army has gone through more in that particular direction. I happen to be very interested in military history and I read as much as I can on the subject, and the evolution of uniform is a very interesting thing. Generally—and history has certainly supported this throughout—the fighting uniform of one war is the walking-out uniform of the subsequent peace. We always copy our enemies. You will see that today the United States army is very Teutonic in its mode of dress; they have shoved their caps straight up and they have got practically everything but the jackboots. All these things are part of a sort of dynamic changing process. I certainly will shed a tear for the Royal Canadian Navy, but I think we live in a world where we must adjust to change. And as I say, I am an incurable optimist, Mr. Churchill. I think that it is all going to work out all right.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I am also a student of military history, and I appreciate your interest in it too. But again you have been giving examples of changes of uniform and things of that nature. I have been through that in my own experience with the Army. But I was talking about a service, and despite all these changes that you have read about in military history and that I have read about, the major powers have retained navies and they have retained armies. I was talking about the retention of the Royal Canadian Navy, and your optimism seems to slant you to the direction that you do not really care, so long as there is change.

Rear Admiral DILLON: No, I do not say I do not care. However, we have companions in misery in the Royal Canadian Air Force. They must be in the same boat as we are, and they all look pretty chipper and I guess we can be too.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, gentlemen, that seems to bring the questioning of the witness to an end.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Mr. Chairman, may I ask just a short question?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, indeed.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Admiral Dillon, you said when you started to speak around 8.20 that you had been retired a little while ago. Are you sure that you are the right age to retire?

Rear Admiral DILLON: Yes.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): You look to me to be pretty young at heart.

Rear Admiral DILLON: Well, thank you very much. I feel very young too, but I cannot avoid the calendar or my birth certificate. I have reached the magic age.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): You should spread your recipe around.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, Admiral Dillon, I know the members of the Committee would want me to thank you again for appearing before us tonight. I am sorry the time is not longer, but it is almost 10 o'clock. Thank you very much for coming.

Rear Admiral DILLON: Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: The meeting is adjourned.

OFFICIAL REPORT OF MINUTES

OF

PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

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Translated by the General Bureau for Translation, Secretary of State.

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,
The Clerk of the House.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966-67

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. DAVID W. GROOS

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 20

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1967

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1967

Respecting

Bill C-243, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and other Acts in consequence thereof.

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WITNESS:

Rear Admiral W. M. Landymore, O.B.E., C.D., RCN.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1967

25768—1

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. David W. Groos

Vice-Chairman: Hon. Marcel Lambert

Mr. Andras,
Mr. Brewin,
Mr. Churchill,
Mr. Deachman,
Mr. Éthier,
Mr. Fane,
Mr. Forrestall,
Mr. Foy,
Mr. Harkness,
Mr. Langlois,
(Chicoutimi),
Mr. Laniel,
Mr. Latulippe,
Mr. Lessard,
Mr. Loiselle,
Mr. Macaluso,
Mr. McIntosh,
Mr. McNulty,
Mr. Nugent,
Mr. Rochon,
Mr. Smith,
Mr. Stafford,
Mr. Winch—(24).

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

ORDER OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS
THURSDAY, February 16, 1967.

Ordered—That the names of Messrs. MacRae and MacLean be substituted for those of Messrs. Smith and Fane on the Standing Committee on National Defence.

Attest.

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

25768—1½

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

WEDNESDAY, February 15, 1967.
(33)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 3:45 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Groos, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Brewin, Churchill, Deachman, Ethier, Fane, Forrestall, Foy, Groos, Harkness, Lambert, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laniel, Lessard, Loiselle, Macaluso, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon, Smith, Stafford and Winch—(23).

Also present: Messrs. Faulkner, Jamieson, Kindt, MacRae, Moore (*Wetaskiwin*), Nesbitt, Pugh, Rock.

In attendance: Rear Admiral W. M. Landymore; *From the Department of National Defence:* Honourable Léo Cadieux, Associate Minister; Air Marshal F. R. Sharp, Vice Chief Defence Staff; Air Marshal E. M. Reyno, Chief of Personnel.

The Chairman introduced Rear Admiral W. M. Landymore and invited him to begin his presentation. Rear Admiral Landymore read a prepared statement, copies of which were distributed to the members. Following the Introduction, Admiral Landymore's statement dealt with the following subjects:

The National Defence Act (Section 26)
Minister's Report to the Standing Committee (12 May 1966)
Promotional Opportunity
Retirement Ages
Career Service Concept
Rank Structure
Uniform
Career Opportunity
Loyalty
The Ultimate State of the Armed Forces
Untimeliness of Unification and Faults of Integration
Summary and Recommendations

At the end of Rear Admiral Landymore's opening statement, the members questioned the witness concerning his career in the Royal Canadian Navy, subjects referred to in his brief and various other defence matters.

The questioning of the witness continuing, at 6:00 p.m. the Committee adjourned, until 10:00 a.m. on Thursday, February, 16, 1967.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

THURSDAY, February 16, 1967.
(34)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 10:10 a.m. this day, with the Chairman, Mr. Groos, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Churchill, Deachman, Éthier, Fane, Forrestall, Foy, Groos, Harkness, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laniel, Lessard, Loiselle, Macaluso, McIntosh, Nugent, Rochon, Smith, Stafford and Mr. Winch—(20).

Also present: Messrs. Kindt, Lefebvre, Nesbitt, Pugh and Mr. Rock.

In attendance: Rear Admiral W. M. Landymore; *From the Department of National Defence:* Honourable Léo Cadieux, Associate Minister; Air Marshal F. R. Sharp, Vice Chief Defence Staff.

During the whole of this sitting, the members continued to question Rear Admiral Landymore on the various subjects referred to in his statement which was presented at the previous Committee sitting and on related defence matters.

During the discussion, Mr. Deachman raised a *question of privilege,* in connection with testimony from the witness concerning a meeting between the Chairman, Mr. Deachman and Admiral Welland. The Clerk was instructed to ask Admiral Welland if he would consent to appear, to give evidence on this particular question.

Later, the Chairman advised that Admiral Welland had declined the invitation to appear. The Chairman made a statement concerning his involvement. Mr. Deachman stated that it was still his wish to have the matter clarified. It was agreed that the question should be pursued during the noon hour adjournment.

It was agreed to print as appendices, the following three briefs prepared earlier by Admiral Landymore: *A Brief By Rear Admiral W. M. Landymore, Prepared For The Standing Committee On National Defence; An Account of Circumstances of Altered Testimony For The Standing Committee On National Defence In June 1966 By Rear Admiral W. M. Landymore; The Navy's Place In Unification, February, 1966. (See Appendices "E", "F" and "G").*

At 1:05 p.m., the Committee adjourned until 3:30 p.m. this day when the Committee will continue to question Admiral Landymore.

AFTERNOON SITTING
(35)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 3:35 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Groos, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Churchill, Deachman, Éthier, Fane, Forrestall, Foy, Groos, Harkness, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laniel, Lessard, Loiselle, Macaluso, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon, Smith, Stafford and Mr. Winch—(21).

Also present: Messrs. Faulkner, Pugh, Rock and Mr. Watson (*Chateauguay-Huntingdon-Laprairie*).

In attendance: Rear Admiral W. M. Landymore; *From the Department of National Defence:* Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister; Honourable Léo Cadieux, Associate Minister; Air Marshal F. R. Sharp, Vice Chief Defence Staff.

The Committee continued its questioning of the witness, Rear Admiral W. M. Landymore, during this afternoon sitting. The Chairman stated that the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure will be asked to consider if the witness should be recalled at some future date. The Chairman thanked Admiral Landymore for his appearance before the Committee.

At approximately 5:00 p.m., the division bells having been rung, the Committee adjourned until 8:00 p.m. this day, when the witness will be General Charles Foulkes.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(*Recorded by Electronic Apparatus*)

WEDNESDAY, February 15, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: I will now call the meeting to order. Before we call our witness may I say that there is no special significance in the notices from the Clerk which indicated that there was a meeting at 8 o'clock tonight and tomorrow night.

Our witness this afternoon is Rear Admiral Landymore. If you have a brief, sir, would you like to present it now?

Rear Admiral W. M. LANDYMORE:

Mr. Chairman; Gentlemen,

I welcome this opportunity to re-appear before your Committee, and hope my brief will be useful to you.

The circumstances of this appearance are vastly different to those of my appearance here last June. Nevertheless, I would like to assure you that I haven't come here to fire broadsides in anger, nor on the other hand, do I feel the urge to sink quietly beneath the waves with my flag flying. I have come here to do everything in my power to help you to a clearer understanding of the thorny legislation of Bill C-243, of its implications, and to tell you of matters which I believe (from the background of all my years of professional training and experience) will convince you that major amendments to the Bill are vitally necessary.

I feel, by now, you will have realized that political science has been used where military science should have been used. As a result, the Bill before you may seem, politically, very desirable. However, from the military point of view, it is, I'm afraid, quite the opposite—that is, most undesirable.

The Navy, under the proposed form of unification, is being so torn apart, that its whole personnel structure has been seriously weakened. In consequence, our Maritime Defence has been weakened. This is happening at a time when it was never more important, in peace, to be on guard. In my classified brief to you last June, I gave a factual account of why we should be very alert, and very active in our sea areas of interest. It is a very serious matter when a proposed policy does so great a hurt to morale that it undermines our defences. It is even more serious when this is ignored and legislation is being contemplated which indicates indifference to the opinions of the professionals who serve you in our Maritime Forces.

In your debate in the House of Commons, it seemed to me that no questioner could elicit the information he wanted on the role of the Armed Forces, but that most people seemed to be playing a hunch that we are starting a process, which has as its ultimate goal, a police force—no more, no less—and that some members were contented with this hunch. Under these circumstances, unification

may appear attractive. I seriously doubt the wisdom of this kind of thinking. But this is political science and not military science. However, bear in mind, that a police force can do nothing for the defence of our country when our political scientists stumble. In international matters, this happens all too frequently. When it happens, it will not be a police force that you will want, but armed forces which will come effectively to the defence of our country.

Critics of unification have little to examine. The only authoritative explanations are those provided by the Minister last year on the 12th May to your Committee and on the 7th December, 1966 in the House of Commons. While both these speeches were long, they dealt with unification only in the broadest, most general terms. The critic is therefore in the position of being unable to come to grips with the situation, because he hasn't even a definition of unification. In some ways, one can gain a better knowledge of unification by what has *not* been said. Nevertheless, those points which have been made, indicate that the theory is both impractical and unrealistic. Under questioning, the proponents of unification invariably fall back on the advantages of integration to support their stand. As far as I can determine, not one single argument indicates that unification will provide either economy or increased efficiency.

If there was any evidence that increased efficiency or economy would be achieved by unifying the Services, you would not find me here to-day. You would not have experienced a lowering of morale and interest, for, primarily, every fighting man, every professional, wants the best fighting force possible and will never resist or drag his feet when improvements are made. Reluctance to accept unification stems from the realization that unification doesn't provide economy and efficiency. Reluctance to accept unification stems from the conviction that it is a change for the sake of change, and a most unpalatable one, at that.

THE NATIONAL DEFENCE ACT (SECTION 26)

Now I will turn to the actual legislation.

The National Defence Act says this:—

> "No officer or man shall, without his consent be transferred to another service of the Canadian Forces"—

Let me repeat that:—

> "No officer or man shall, without his consent be transferred to another service of the Canadain Forces"—

There are no "ifs", "ands", or "buts" to that bit of the Act.

You have debated at length whether we will have one service or three. By vote the Commons has approved in principle that the Royal Canadian Navy, the Royal Canadian Air Force and the Canadian Army will be abolished, and a new Force created with a new name. The legislation calls for this new Force to have an Army rank structure and a common uniform. The Forces have been completely re-organized. New recruits will not join the Army, the Navy or the Air Force. Instead, they will join the new unified Force. In other words, no matter what legal judgment is expressed, there can be no doubt in your minds that we will have a new Service,—*another* Service. Legally, perhaps, you are

not bound to observe the quoted clause of the National Defence Act, but morally, you cannot, in fairness to your servicemen, ignore it. I would hope you will want to be scrupulously fair and demonstrate the highest possible degree of integrity towards your volunteer servicemen by getting their consent to volunteer to join this new Service and serve in it. In the Bill before you, the words I have quoted from the National Defence Act are being dismissed as though they don't apply—almost as though they don't exist. But there can be no Member of our Parliament who, in all conscience, having heard the quoted section of the Act, can say truthfully he would be acting properly by ignoring it. If you do ignore it, you would be going through the handy process of rationalization. It would be saying: 'continuing to service does not constitute a transfer'—'and by saying that no one will arbitrarily be made to serve in duties which would not have been required by the service he joined voluntarily in the first place insures no radical change, the legislation must be all right'—Logically, of course, one must ask oneself: 'how can anyone *continue* to serve in anything which has just been newly created and which didn't exist prior to the passing of Bill C-243'? Be scrupulously fair; get their consent; and in so doing, those who give it will start your unified Force on solid ground. Without it, the new Force will be a very sad outfit. No major military organization can be successfully operated if the officers and men in it are simply 'going through the motions' and their hearts are not in it.

Enthusiasm for career service within the Armed Forces has diminished markedly. The cure for this will be delayed as long as officers and men are trapped into serving in the unified Force.—when they are serving as 'pension prisoners'.

Having obtained the consent of all officers and men, we will be faced with the problem of what to do with those who don't consent.

There is only one course open. Give them an Honourable Release, and for their service, full pensions. Remember, at the outset, our pension plan is a contributary one. You have been told that officers and men released under these circumstances would have their pensions adjusted according to the Superannuation Act: It has been stated that there are no penalties involved. It has been stated that there is only an actuarial adjustment made to their pensions. It doesn't really matter what you call it, adjustment or penalty—in actual fact, very substantial reductions in their pensions will be made and in some cases, these are penalties.

Let me give you an example of what I mean:

Two officers, the same age, joined the Royal Canadian Navy on the same day. Both are still serving at the age of 44. Both have completed 25 years of service. One has been more successful than the other and has reached the rank of Naval Captain, while his term mate is still a Lieutenant Commander. The Captain, over his 25 years service, will have paid slightly more into the pension fund. As they are the same age, they must have the same life expectancy. Therefore, actuarily, the Captain should receive a slightly larger pension if they both request early retirement on the same day. But this doesn't happen. The Captain's pension is subject to a 55% reduction. The Lieutenant Commander's pension is reduced by 5%. The Captain will receive a pension of less than $3,000.00 a year, while the Lieutenant Commander receives a pension of

about $5,000 a year. The Captain has been penalized—he has paid more for his pension, he has taken greater responsibility, and, for his success he receives a much smaller pension. To my way of thinking, he has been penalized.

In order to treat everyone fairly, each officer and man must be given a full pension. By this I mean, a pension equal to 2% of his pay and allowances (averaged over the last 6 years of service) for each year of service, for all those who have served 10 or more years. For those who have served less than 10 years—they should have their pension contributions returned to them and be given a gratuity to help them adjust to civilian life.

You may well ask—Couldn't this be pretty hard on the taxpayer? The answer is—No.

The Pension Fund stands at over 2 billion dollars. In the fiscal year 1965/1966, the fund paid out about 37 millions. In that same year, servicemen put in nearly 55 millions. If in addition, we value the fund at a 4% interest rate, you will see that, providing full pensions, as I have recommended, will not in any way represent an increased financial burden to the taxpayer.

Whatever else you do, if you are fair to your volunteer servicemen, these provisions,—that is, both the consent of the serviceman, and full pension benefits for those who do not choose to volunteer for the new Service—must form part of the legis'ation. Failure to make these provisions will make our Parliament look very unscrupulous in the eyes of servicemen; and moreover, you may be in danger of losing support for unification by those who might otherwise support it. I can think of no worse way of trying to make unification succeed.

MINISTER'S REPORT TO THE STANDING COMMITTEE (12 MAY 1966)

Now, I'd like to turn our throughts in a new direction. I wonder how many Members of Parliament would have voted for Bill C-243 at second reading, had they known what I'm about to tell you?

On the -12th May, 1966, the Minister addressed your Committee. He said this to you:—I'm quoting from the official record—

> "I think it is obvious to all of us that we could not undertake a re-organization of such magnitude without some problems arising. The differences between the three forces, which had always existed, have become much more noticeable now that the seamen, the airmen and the soldiers work together in the same office.
>
> Integration has not *caused* but *highlighted* anomalies and inequities among the three Services. For instance:—
>
> —Different terms of service
>
> —Different trade structure
>
> —Different promotion opportunities
>
> —Different commissioning-from-the-ranks policies
>
> —Different retirement ages, etc.
>
> I repeat, Mr. Chairman, these differences...are not new; the only thing new is that our Service personnel are becoming very much aware of them. It is the intention of the Associate Minister and I that these disparities be corrected as soon as possible. We must have equal opportunity, equal treatment for all personnel, regardless of their founding Service. We mus

bring the conditions of service for military personnel at least up to par with that of their civilian counterparts. Unification will provide us with a golden opportunity to correct these inequities...and democratize our forces".

That is the end of the quotation.

I am sure that the Minister left you with the impression that there was something seriously wrong when so many differences existed in a comparison of personnel matters of the three Services. In his speech on the 7th December to you in Parliament, he covered this same ground over again.

I think these matters should be examined most carefully. Differences which have been made to look like serious faults are in fact, essential differences. The Minister has promised to correct them—to remove the differences. It is this promise which is so startling, for if it is kept, the Services will be much more expensive to operate and less effective.

PROMOTION OPPORTUNITY

A readily understandable difference is promotion opportunity. This is to be made the same across the board. To assess how the Minister's promise stems from sheer ignorance, we must look at the basis for rank structure for men in the three Services (as opposed to officers).

The Royal Canadian Air Force has almost no requirement to use their men in a fighting capacity. There are no men flying aircraft in fighter squadrons or in reconnaissance squadrons. There is one man in the crew of each Argus Aircraft—the others, fourteen or fifteen, are all officers. In other words, apart from a very few men (less than 1%) men of the Air Force support operations, and have no exposure to actual fighting in the air. Under these circumstances, the basis of rank follows a simple pattern. The Air Force needs supervisors to take varying degrees of responsibility for handling, maintaining, arming and cleaning aricraft. They need supervisors to oversee the administration connected with it. Administrative leadership, therefore, is a requirement—fighting leadership is not a requirement.

Now think about the Army. Briefly, the support trades of the Army are not used to any degree in a fighting role. These trades must base their rank requirements on administrative requirements. The fighting arms—the infantry, armour, or artillery, for example, base their requirements for rank on fighting leadership.

The Navy has a basis for rank which is different again. A ship has many separate compartments, each one essential to the fighting of the ship and to its safety and that of its men, both in peace and war. There are SONAR rooms, Radar Rooms, Boiler rooms, magazines, Handling rooms, Radio rooms, and so on. In action, the men in these compartments work in isolation, but are bound into one fighting unit by a complicated network of internal communications. Each space requires experienced men in charge, as each space is important, perhaps vital in the fighting of the ship and to the safety of the crew. The ship's personnel cannot remain indefinitely at their stations and so therefore, all important stations are provided with a supervisor in each of three watches. Briefly, then, this requirement forms the basis for the Navy rank structure. The men whose normal duty provides support, are also required to man a fighting station. Cooks

may be in magazines, pay writers in damage control parties, stewards may be fire fighting. In other words, every sailor in the ship is used in a fighting capacity in an operational environment.

Fundamentally then, there are vast basic differences in structure necessary to determine rank requirements. I mean no slur on anyone when I say:—Air Force men are rarely exposed to a fighting environment—Army men are split between those who fight, and those who support the fight—All Navy men are expected to be fighting men, whether they are in fighting trades or support trades, by virtue of the fact that they go to sea.

Careers for men are geared to the basic requirement of their environment. There is no economical way to make careers equitable between the three fighting environments. To achieve an equitable career plan, as promised by the Minister, will introduce uneconomical rank structures on a grand scale and may upset rank requirement so extensively that operational efficiency will be seriously reduced.

RETIREMENT AGES

Sensible retirement ages should also be geared in principle to the degree of exposure of men to the fighting environment.

It will be clear from the career structure argument that men of the Air Force can serve effectively for a longer period than sailors, because airmen of the R.C.A.F. are not required (except in very rare instances) to enter the fighting environment. The support tradesmen of the Army can serve effectively at a greater age than the men in their fighting arms. Men in the Navy, in both the support and fighting trades are required to go to sea and therefore they should have the same retirement age.

By promising to remove the differences in retirement ages, the Minister has introduced an arrangement which will either force the fighting arms to accept too great an age, or the support arms to be retired before it is necessary. It is therefore, either uneconomical, or alternatively, damaging to operational efficiency.

Now let us assume that the inequities are being removed. See what happens to our rank structure.

The Army has cooks, the Navy has cooks, the Air Force has cooks. To make all men of this trade compete on equal terms for promotion vacancies is the only possible way to eliminate inequalities. Let us assume that there are 40 promotion vacancies from the equivalent of Leading Seaman to Petty Officer. Promotions will be based on length of service, trade knowledge, and efficiency, and so on. There will be many candidates who are fully qualified. Let us assume that the Army, as we know it now, needs 20 of the vacancies, the Air Force 10, and the Navy 10. If the promotions are not made to fill these vacancies *by Service*—that is, by *environmental requirement*, we could have a situation where one fighting environment had far too many, and the others too few. In other words, there could be caused, by promotion, a serious shortage of qualified personnel needed in the operational environments of the Forces. Unification will create this type of imbalance. The fault referred to by the Minister is not a fault, but if his unification promises are fulfilled, serious faults will be introduced.

If retirement ages are unified, the retirement age will move upward. This will be the case because more men, across the board support operations then are actively engaged in fighting. This, in turn, will obviously reduce promotion opportunity. I wonder how many service personnel will support unification when this becomes general knowledge.

CAREER SERVICE CONCEPT

Unification is bringing us within striking distance of another serious mistake. I use the word 'striking' advisedly.

When the Minister spoke in Parliament on the 7th December, he referred to a new 'career concept' for men. He said this, referring to the length of engagement periods for men:—Quote:

> "If they join, it will normally be for an initial engagement of five years. If this engagement is mutually satisfactory, they may, under the provisions of the Bill, be re-engaged for an indefinite period. If they want to be released later, this can be done with six months notice, except in an emergency or during periods of obligatory service".

This is an invitation to have trade unions in the Armed Forces.—Let us say that a group of technicians is dissatisfied with some aspect of their service. They can, under this concept of engagement, en masse, give six months notice, in order to exert pressure to have their wishes fulfilled. Here is subtle, silent, collective bargaining, entering the Armed Forces. This has no place in the Services. I am not objecting to trade unions or collective bargaining in industry or in civilian life, but this form of activity is not acceptable in the Armed Forces, for very obvious reasons, however democratic we might wish to be. I cannot tell you how often this type of unlimited engagement has been considered and, in wisdom, not adopted. This concept has the further disadvantage that men will naturally always be thinking of opportunities elsewhere, and this, in turn, will lead to higher wastage rates in the Forces—particularly amongst tradesmen whose skills are in demand in industry. We will live to regret this concept, if we allow it to become the practice. In an effort to have similar engagement periods for the three Services, this has been jumped at as the answer. It is a foolish step to take.

Throughout a man's service he should be required to re-engage at set intervals. The initial engagement of five years is excellent. This should be followed by a second and third engagement of five years, each with a final engagement to pension. This spacing provides an essential safeguard and is fair to everyone.

RANK STRUCTURE

Under Bill C-243, the Canadian Armed Forces will have a single rank structure. Much has been said on this subject in your debate in the House of Commons, so I will mention it only briefly. The Minister, realizing how unpalatable this structure will be for some of the officers and men of the Navy and the Air Force, has made provision for present ranks to be retained under circumstances which he will prescribe. This arrangement, which sounds so reasonable, so full of understanding, is in fact, quite impractical and most unreasonable, for several reasons.

First:—any officer or man who wishes to retain his naval rank designation will be classified as a 'non-unifier'—as someone who does not wish to conform. This will have a very bad effect.

Second:—promotion can be made contingent on accepting the new rank structure, so that great pressure of decision will be faced by successful officers and men.

Third:—it is impractical in a ship to have two rank structures in effect. We could have a Colonel in command, a Commander as executive officer, ten Captains as watchkeeping officers and departmental officers and an odd assortment of privates, able seamen, sergeants, petty officers, corporals and so on. I think you can see how ridiculous this would be.

In any case, it would be difficult for anyone to retain his former service rank if his commanding officer had adopted the new rank structure, or vice versa. The bizarre effect of this mixed rank structure is beyond description.

I hope we won't make this mistake as it is unworkable and one of the weakest points of the legislation. The legislation should be amended, making provision to leave the Naval structure unchanged. It might be desirable to leave the Air Force structure unchanged, although Air Force personnel may not feel so strongly about the change, in view of the fact that the United States Air Force uses Army ranks.—But one must bear in mind that the U.S. Air Force is a separate Service in every way and easily identifiable as such by its uniform.

I understand that the Canadian Armed Forces Council very recently recommended little or no change to the Naval rank structure. This Council is obviously aware that the Naval rank structure designates a *professional qualification* and association which is recognized and respected the world over, and therefore, the removal of it will create a serious morale problem.

I strongly urge you to determine the recommendations of those qualified to speak professionally for the Maritime Forces in the Canadian Armed Forces Council on this subject, and provide for their recommendations on this subject by amending the legislation. Bear in mind, of course, that no greater effectiveness can be achieved by abolishing Naval rank designators—and since computers and IBM records deal in *numbers*, the change does not have any tangible administrative advantages.

UNIFORM

I would now like to talk about uniforms.

It is very difficult for anyone like myself, who has worn the Naval uniform of Canada in all parts of the world with pride for more than thirty years, to take kindly to the proposed uniform changes. It is all the more difficult because sailors the world over have a marked similarity in their uniforms which sets them apart as professional seafarers. Nevertheless, however you approach the problem from a practical standpoint, there can be no denying that it is an expensive change. The Minister claims that he will make it economical by bulk buying, smaller inventory, and by lowering distribution costs. These economies are purely imaginary. Because of the new uniforms, the inventory will increase, both in value and in numbers of items carried. We are at present bulk buying our uniforms, therefore, further savings cannot be realized by this procedure. Distribution costs are unlikely to be reduced unless bases are closed. The case for

the uniform change is very weak and will not stand up to close scrutiny. But what is worse, it is inconsistent. Ceremonial dress for the Regiments will be retained, but ceremonial dress for the Navy and Air Force will disappear. The Minister was very seriously in error when he said that the Navy and Air Force have no order of dress comparable to Regimental ceremonial dress. Both the R.C.N. and the R.C.A.F. have well known and fully recognizable ceremonial dress. The sailors wear their navy blue uniforms, medals, white belts and white gaiters. The officers wear their medals, black gaiters, and carry swords. The R.C.A.F. men wear their medals, white belts, white gloves and white gaiters with their light blue uniforms. Their officers wear their medals and ornate gold belts and shoulder boards. Mess dress is to be retained, so in the messes we will have the three former services represented as before. Present service dress will be worn on appropriate occasions. These inconsistencies put the lie to the whole case that is being made over uniforms. What is more, the Minister will perpetuate resistance to his aims, for it will be many years before he or anyone else will be able to eliminate the pride of uniform so deeply and properly ingrained in the hearts of Canada's loyal Servicemen. In any event, differences of opinion over this will cause great bitterness and thereby create additional morale problems. There are other problems too. There isn't space in a sailor's locker to hold the additional uniform. I am astonished that anyone can be taken in by this foolishness. In other words since there will always be soldiers, sailors and airmen, and the Minister himself has stated that nothing could be more drab than everyone looking the same, it is unreasonable and impractical to embark on a very expensive change of uniform, which will be so damaging to morale.

The Minister claims that in this day and age, there should be no difference in the quality of the cloth used for officers uniforms and mens uniforms. I suspect that this is supposed to imply some deep dark plot on the part of the officers to maintain some form of class distinction. What the Minister is not aware of, is the fact that officers and men of the Navy have for over fifty years, been free to have any uniforms of any quality they desired. They have been free to purchase their uniforms where they wished and of the material they wished, just so long as the uniforms conform to colour and regulation cut.

On the day the Minister tried to make so much of this point in Halifax, he was laughed at, and I don't think that until that moment he could have realized how silly the statement must have seemed. Your Chairman could have advised him on this point.

All this hoo-ha over uniform achieves nothing constructive. However, it will be expensive and form a basis of long lasting resentment.

Ask yourselves—what is being accomplished by this change?—and you will find that your answer is—precisely nothing, and moreover, that 'nothing' costs plenty in money and emotional upset.

Officers of the Armed Services, after an initial outfitting, have always paid for their own uniforms. In 31 years of service the total sum given me to provide uniform was $175.00. Naval men have always been given an initial kit on joining, then have received a small allowance to keep their kit replaced. This is the reason the forces have had a good deal of independence in the selection of their uniform. Under the new arrangement, officers and men will have to be supplied with the new uniform at public expense. As it is also more expensive, allowances or pay will have to be increased accordingly.

CAREER OPPORTUNITY

Now I would like to say a few words on career opportunities. The Minister claims that there will be a greater career opportunity for highly motivated officers and men. If career opportunity is what I believe it to be—that is, the ratio of the number of persons in one rank to the next higher rank,—then the Minister's theory is not valid. Each trade or speciality will have its separate rank structure, just as it has had in the past. The need to have a rank structure tailored to the fighting requirements on land, sea and in the air, remains unchanged. There will still be the same overall ratio of all ranks to the total force. In fact, at the present time, there is precisely the same percentage of senior officers in the Services in relation to the total Force as there was prior to integration. The number of senior officers has been reduced by 12 1/2%. The Force as a whole has shrunk by 12 1/2%. At the predicted rate of shrinkage, the ratio of senior officers to the total Force will increase. Only in this very artificial argument is there a better career opportunity. Of course, there is the very sound argument that the compulsory retirement of everyone at the top creates vacancies for promotion, and goodness only knows, there has been an epidemic of that.

No one in the Armed Forces believes the claim made by the Minister.

LOYALTY

Now I would like to say a few words about loyalty.

The Minister has this to say on the subject. I quote:—

> "With the establishment of a common identity, sailors, soldiers and airmen, although loyal to their ships, regiments and squadrons, will have an overriding loyalty to the whole Force and its total objective on behalf of Canada". unquote.

This is claimed to be an advantage. At present, a sailor is loyal to his ship, his squadron, his Service, to his Queen and to Canada. He may be loyal to his old school, to his church, to his home town, his home province, his family and so on. How does an attempt to remove his loyalty to the Navy make him a more effective Serviceman or a better Canadian? If anything, a man will find it difficult to replace his loyalty to his Service with loyalty to an overall single Force, most parts of which he never sees, serves in, or knows about. It will not be possible to train him or make him at home in the three environments. Moreover since he will still wear mess kit or ceremonial dress of his former Service, and will serve, in all probability for the most part in only one environment, his loyalties simply become confused.

There is no such thing as an overriding loyalty to a Force. There is one overriding combined loyalty—to Queen and Country—From there on down, the loyalty of the individual is the strength of spirit imbued in him by his professional association. So, to say that 'unification' is an advantage with regard to loyalty is just so much talk—and rather meaningless talk.

THE ULTIMATE STATE OF THE ARMED FORCES

What will happen to the three existing Services under what seems to be the proposed form for 'unification'?

First, the Army:—The Army will be almost unchanged. The Regiments retain their identity. The 'Royal' for Regiments continues to be used. The Army rank structure is retained. The basic fighting organization is unchanged. Ceremonial and mess dress is unchanged. The only change of any importance for the Army is the provision of a walking out dress which for years, has been a much needed change. If then, we ask a soldier what he thinks about unification, we should get an enthusiastic response.

Now, the Air Force:—They lose their uniform, their rank structure and their force designation—that is the 'R.C.A.F.' But bearing in mind that under integration, Air Transport Command and the Air Division in Europe are virtually the same as they have always been, and bearing in mind too, that Army type rank structures are used by the Air Forces of other nations (The United States Air Force has a similar rank structure to the United States Army), the changes for the R.C.A.F. are not so great as to make them unacceptable.

But the Navy:—Here is where you are asking the impossible. The Navy loses its rank structure—a rank structure very similar to that used by all navies. The Navy loses its dress, very similar to that used by other navies. It has already lost its battle ensign (while all the Regiments have been allowed to keep theirs). Under unification, it will have all the fundamental requirements of training, career structure and even retirement re-moulded to provide uniformity, but a uniformity which makes it lose its distinctiveness as a seafaring force. For a seagoing Service, it is awkward and detrimental to fighting efficiency. These are the reasons that your Naval Service is the Service which is being demoralized by the legislation to 'unify'. The Navy is a small Service, closely knit. This was once a strength but with the prospect of unification splitting our loyalties down the middle, this great strength is becoming a weakness. Personally, I feel very deeply about these things. Unification is virtually destroying your Navy and this brings with it the destruction of our ability properly to give Canada a Maritime Defence.

UNTIMELINESS OF UNIFICATION AND FAULTS OF INTEGRATION

Not only is unification a foolish move, but it comes at a time when integration is not living up to expectations and much needs to be done to correct organizational faults. To do this involves more organizational turmoil. Adding unification to this will seriously retard the correction process.

The matter before us is unification and my departure from the subject is to show how untimely unification is, because of integration problems.

There are five basic faults in the adopted integrated organization. These are urgently in need of repair.

First:—Materiel Command is not living up to expectations. Because fiscal control rests with the Headquarters and because manpower controls rest with the Headquarters organization, in many ways Materiel Command becomes a post office between the Headquarters and the Operational Commands. Admiral Burchell has been studing the supply organization since last August. I think he would be able to give your Committee a very clear picture of the deficiencies and the necessary corrective measures. Since this will lead ultimately to a very serious personnel upheaval and is vital to effective operations, it cannot be delayed. Unification added to this will seriously delay progress.

Second:—Training Command is a luxury we cannot afford. Far too much expense is involved in this Command, which in essence, like Materiel Command acts as a post office between the Headquarters and the operational commands. When the Navy was at its greatest peace time strength, there were officers and men responsible for the direction of training (at Headquarters level) for the entire Navy. There are now 65 in Winnipeg, and in addition, there is still a staff in Ottawa. Operational Commanders are the people who know best the level and extent of training required, and can best advise school staffs on what is wanted. Training Command has not been a success and should be reduced to functioning in relation to basic training and common training outside the purview of operational Commanders.

Third:—The Defence Staff is constituted in such a way as to introduce professional weakness. The present Defence Staff has serious weaknesses in relation to professional matters concerning operations, personnel and support. The Defence Staff needs broadening in environmental professionalism. The advent of the Canadian Forces Council has repaired some of the Defence Staff weaknesses, but not all of them.

Fourth:—The reserve organizations, coming as they do under a common administration, are poorly placed in the organization. The Naval Reserve should be part of Maritime Command. The militia should be part of Mobile Command. To put them where they belong will create more organizational upheaval.

Fifth:—Mobile Command is too large and so is Maritime Command. They have been created due to the adoption of a functional organization. The resultant large commands with vast geography to contend with makes them both unwieldy and uneconomical. Maritime Command should revert to its former East and West Coast Commands. Mobile Command should be given a three way split into East, West and Central Commands.

Mobile Command is not only too big. It is dangerous to our democracy. If ever a commander of that Command decided to set himself up to control this country of ours, he has a ready made organization to achieve it. If a Minister of National Defence and a Commander Mobile Command got together, we could have a dictatorship overnight. As Members of Parliament you should contemplate this organization with some alarm.

In addition, what makes all these matters worth thinking about very seriously is the fact that integration was accepted on the basis that it would save money. I am certain that the fiscal policy and the White Paper are at odds. Certainly, all that was promised by the White Paper cannot be achieved within the current fiscal allocations. Unfortunately, the programmes have been given broad brush treatment and window dressing which look very good; but because these matters were not properly staffed and studied in detail in advance, we now have a most serious situation. You have been sold a 'bill of goods' once, and you are now in danger of a second hoodwinking.

Overall, integrating is by no means a smooth-running, economical and practical organization. While the principle holds good, the means of achieving it are far from perfect and over the next two or three years the situation must be corrected. This will, in turn, be most unsettling. Unification should not be added to the upheaval.

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Now let me close off my brief with a summary.

Unification has very little, if any, merit. It is a change for the sake of change. It is unnecessary and expensive. It is oriented politically and not militarily. It is, and will continue to be destructive of morale. It is riddled with inconsistencies and with impractical and unrealistic promises. The best course of action would be to set it aside and there are many dedicated professional men who continue to hope that party politics will not prevent this most sensible course of action from being adopted. The next best solution is to amend the legislation to provide for the following:—

First:—Obtain the consent of all officers and men at present serving, in accordance with the National Defence Act. Release honourably all those who do not believe in unification and give them full pensions as I described earlier in this brief.

Second:—Call a halt to the unnecessary and expensive uniform change. Seek instead, administrative uniformity where it is feasible and economical in the field of administration.

Third:—Call a halt to adopting the Army rank structure. Retain it for the Army. Then set about finding out what rank structure best suits the R.C.A.F. Let them have some say in the matter and adopt for them a rank structure which suits them. Then make provision in the Bill to retain the Naval rank structure as it exists at present. This latter step is in accord with the recommendations of the Canadian Forces Council.

Fourth:—Examine carefully the following points and provide for them in the Bill:—

(a) The powers of the Minister of National Defence. In the present Bill, they are far too sweeping. He is given a blank cheque.

(b) Examine the section of the Bill (section 28) which allows our forces to be seconded to any state. This virtually allows the Minister to send our Armed Forces to fight anywhere at any time. Under this, he could, I daresay, commit our Forces to Viet Nam, for example, without consulting anyone.

(c) Consider the place of Mobile Command against the possibility of the military taking civil control. I think the present organization may give you some qualms.

(d) Call before your Committee the Commander of Materiel Command and seek satisfaction that his Command can support the Armed Forces under emergency conditions. You will not get satisfaction—you will be left seriously perturbed.

(e) Call before your Committee the Commander Maritime Command. Ask him what he considers are acceptable limits of unification. Ask him how his Command will be more efficient and more economical. Ask him whether his administration has increased or decreased under integration. Ask him how our ships are being manned.

(f) Call Admiral Burchell. Ask him for his findings in relation to the failures of the Materiel Organization.

(g) Recall the Vice Chief and have him read to you the official report on the results of FALLEX. This will give you a shock or two.

(h) Call the Chief of the Defence Staff and ask him in camera, to describe the current emergency defence and mobilization plans—he'll have his troubles.

Please consider all these matters very carefully. Our country's defence is more important than partisan politics. Our defence must not be prejudiced by stubborn, blind adherence to a party line, and our servicemen must not become fodder for political cannon.

I know you have the best interests of Canada at heart, and coupled with the ability and foresight to act wisely, that you will do so.

Finally, I would like to say that I have examined carefully and conscientiously the proposed unification. I have applied all my professional training and experience in making a judgment. I have discussed the proposal with senior officers of foreign Navies and Air Forces. I have applied judgment which derives from my operational experience in command of the Fleet and as the Maritime Commander, both in the Pacific and the Atlantic, and in my contact with NATO Maritime Forces. My conclusions are based on professional operational knowledge and experience. While it is not possible to eliminate emotional considerations because of the importance of esprit-de-corps in Armed Forces, I have not allowed this fact to have undue emphasis. I have been practical and realistic. Unification is a mistake.

In the White Paper, the Minister said:—and I quote:—

"No attempt will be made to set up a theoretical establishment to replace the existing one, nor will the details be prescribed in advance. *Inevitable changes will take place under the direction of the men charged with responsibility in their various fields...*
In this paper no attempt has been made to set down hard and fast rules for future policy and development. Flexibility, not rigidity, has been the keynote. The paper is a charter, a guide, not a detailed blueprint. *The policy outlined in it is not immutable. It can be altered or adapted* to meet the requirements of changing circumstances."

Unquote.

Now is the time for Parliament to act on the statement, that the policy is not immutable. It is almost too late, but there may be time, if all is halted now, to prevent the greatest fiasco of all time—a fiasco having branded on it all the dash and verve of 'the Charge of the Light Brigade', and making about the same amount of sense.
Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: We will go on with the question period. I have four names on my list: Mr. Deachman, Mr. Forrestall, Mr. McIntosh and Mr. Winch. Are there any others?

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, we are all grateful for the presence of Admiral Landymore here this afternoon and for the brief which he brought us. We have waited, with some expectation, for his appearance before our Committee because I think most of us have heard that this is a subject in which he is interested.

I think that the brief which was presented to us is in many ways a good one. It is rather refreshing to have before the Committee, especially after some of the subjects we have dealt with during the past few days, a brief which addresses itself very specifically to the bill, and I think this is commendable. I would certainly like to voice my appreciation to Admiral Landymore for bringing us a brief that deals very specifically with the bill because this bill already has passed second reading in the House, has been approved in principle by the government and parliament, has been sent to this Committee for review, and must return to parliament. The brief certainly takes a shrapnel approach to the bill; the shot certainly fell in the whole rigging of Bill C-243. I find it a little difficult to understand how so many people could have done so many things wrong in the drafting of Bill C-243, and I jotted down a few questions while Admiral Landymore was reading his brief.

Admiral Landymore, on the second page of your brief you deal with the reluctance to accept the unification system in that it will not provide "economy and efficiency". We have had a considerable amount of testimony to the contrary, and I think in some of your previous writings you mentioned specifically the additional costs that were being incurred by integration in your own command as an example of how this would not work. I am just wondering whether you are basing this statement on a demonstrable judgment of your own, and whether you can add any details to what you said in that sentence?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: First of all, I think you said that I applied a cost factor to an increase in administration. That is not quite correct. What I did say publicly and on numerous occasions since the middle of July was that administration in my command had tripled and that I had no means within my command to calculate the additional costs arising out of that triplication.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Do you mean triplication of dollar costs or triplication of personnel?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I am not talking about either; I am talking about the amount of administration in the form of letter writing, telegrams and all the other paraphernalia that goes with the administering of a command.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Is this expressed in hours of work on the same staff? How is this expressed?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: It is expressed in the amount of accomplishment for the amount of paper work that we had in the command.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I wonder, sir, if you could be a little more explicit. It is not a dollar amount; apparently it is not a manpower amount in terms of numbers of men; it does not appear to be an hours-of-work item. Can you pinpoint it a little more for us?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes. I should say that this is an organizational matter. Prior to integration the navy had a command on each coast, and those commands each had one line of communication to its headquarters. In addition, we had one naval reserve organization which also had one direct line of communication to headquarters. We had two dockyards and they each had one direct line of communication to naval headquarters. After unification the command was made into a single command, which gave the Atlantic headquarters a new direct and operative line of communication to the west coast. We then introduced a new

direct line to training command, one to materiel command, one to headquarters and one to mobile command, but unfortunately none of those headquarters is authorative in itself. They each have a line back to the headquarters. So although we had initially five direct lines we now have something in the order of fifteen, and this in itself is what has created so much more administration. That is your answer; that is the measure of it.

Mr. DEACHMAN: In addressing the House on second reading of the bill, the minister made reference to the Canadian forces communications systems. Although not a command, the Canadian forces communications systems has functional responsibility throughout the Canadian forces. Are you familiar with this development in communications?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Not in detail, but I know generally what is being organized, yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Do you think this will solve the problems you referred to when it is developed?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I understand that some of the best communications experts in Canada are working with the department as advisers in the development of a single communications system which will avoid some of the very problems which, I think, you just mentioned.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: That is not correct. It will not eliminate any problems unless you eliminate the organization. The communication organization which you refer to is the means by which some types of communications are transmitted. All that wi'l happen is that the new organization will be transmitting more communications.

Mr. DEACHMAN: So this communications system is not going to work?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I did not say it would not work—I should think that with so many expert people it will be made to work—I said it was going to carry a great deal more traffic as far as maritime matters are concerned because of the organization that has been set up.

Mr. DEACHMAN: On page 4 of your brief you deal generally with morale. We have had testimony here, sir, that the morale is good, and testimony that it is better than it was, say, a number of months ago. We also have had testimony which casts some doubt on the statements with respect to morale which you have made in your brief. How can we effectively measure morale in this Committee? Is it possible to examine, let us say, the re-enlistment rates, and could this set of figures, compiled over the years be used as an index of morale? Can you give us some guidance as to how specifically we can put the finger on whether or not morale is good, bad, improving or declining? There has been much testimony and counter-testimony on this point.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think that the best way to measure morale would be to approach your servicemen and let them, without any reference to who or what they are, express their thoughts about the organization in which they are being placed. If you did this I am quite certain that you would get a very accurate measure of the morale and state of mind of all individuals of the armed

forces. You may recall that I recommended this to your Committee before you took the bill to second reading in the hope that you would do this. The actual words I used were, this will give you a measure of the support which, in fact, in relating to unification is a part of morale. You did not choose to do that, but it is still not too late for you to go out to your servicemen, put the picture in front of them and ask them what they think about unification, provided they are not personally involved so that their careers will not be affected. Out of that questioning, I think you would get a very good measure of the morale of the armed forces. If you are not prepared to do that, then I think you should get a full account of the number of resignations by officers—perhaps not put up officially, but an account of those letters to the chief of personnel inquiring as to the conditions under which they would be allowed to leave the armed forces. In this way you may not get a full measure of the morale, but you would get an indication. I do not think that re-engagement rates, under these circumstances necessarily fully apply. You must remember that a large proportion of the people who were in the armed forces at the commencement of integration have not engagements which expire for a full period of five years; therefore, you would not know on the basis of rates whether those people felt the morale was good or bad in relation to unification.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I refer to page 5 of your brief, "Promotion Opportunity". We have just been through a long exercise over several years now to provide bargaining rights for the civil service—this bill is just coming back to the House—and in the process of setting up these new procedures the government has overhauled the whole of the Canadian civil service job classification system—that is, all the aspects of government jobs and classifications. I am just wondering whether you believe a similar operation could be done successfully for the armed forces.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No, and I think the reasons are very obvious. An armed force is not a service made up of individuals with individuals' rights in it. It is a service based on a disciplinary system where each individual is responsible to all persons of each rank above him. You cannot have collective bargaining.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I am not speaking as much of collective bargaining as I am of the enormous task of job reclassification, as was done in the civil service, which has now been completed quite successfully, and will form the basis of bargaining, recommendations for job promotion, job definition and classification. If we can restructure the entire Canadian civil service, do we not have the competence to restructure the three armed services?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes, I am sure you have the competence to examine every type of activity carried on by personnel in the armed forces under the same type of thing. In fact, I am quite certain that it is being done; it has always been done in the past—all the duties, qualifications and indeed all things necessary pertaining to personnel have always been very carefully studied in relation to one particular aspect. This is the difference between the armed forces and the civil service. The armed forces in the final analysis are being trained to fight, so everything has to be geared to the requirement that men may have to shoot at someone. There is a very, very vast difference in doing job analysis for people who are not required to expose themselves to perils and dangers of that kind.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Deachman, your time is up. I am going to limit questioning to ten minutes because we have agreed on this. Mr. Forrestall, you are next.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Admiral, I would like to join with other members of the Committee in welcoming you back. For the record, would you tell us briefly your service record and relate your career in the RCN, including the date you joined, your battle commands, administrative commands and so on up until the time of your retirement.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes sir, I joined the Royal Canadian Navy from the Royal Military College in 1936. I served with the Royal Navy to get my early training in cruisers and remained with the Royal Navy until I completed my training as a sub-lieutenant. War was declared and I first served in H.M.S. *Windsor*, a destroyer in the U.K. I returned to Canada shortly after the first few months of the war and served in H.M.C.S. *Fraser*, H.M.C.S. *Restigouche*, H.M.C.S. *Margaree*. I became a gunnery specialist and then served with H.M.S. *Belfast*, having been returned to the Royal Navy, and as gunnery officer of the 25th flotilla. My wartime service at that time was in the Atlantic and in the Arctic. Canada acquired the cruiser H.M.S. *Uganda*, which we renamed H.M.C.S. *Uganda* and I became the gunnery officer of her and served until the end of the war in the Pacific in her. Since then I have had, in sea-going duties, command of HMCS *Iroquois*, when I was in Korea, and I was also the senior Canadian naval officer taking charge of the Canadian squadron in Korea. After that I had operational experience and became the captain of H.M.C.S. *Bonaventure*.

The administrative experience I have had is as follows: director of manning, deputy director of weapons and tactics, director of naval plans and operations, chief of staff in the Atlantic command, senior officer afloat Atlantic, flag officer Pacific coast and Maritime commander Pacific, flag officer Atlantic coast, Maritime commander Atlantic, and under integration I became the Maritime commander for all the Canadian forces.

Now to go through this in detail, with dates and so on, would take a rather large amount of time without accomplishing very much.

Mr. FORRESTALL: It would be interesting to hear it Admiral, but I thank you for that. Earlier in the proceedings with direct reference to the bill that is now before us, some very serious allegations and insinuations were made, some charges levelled, imputing to you certain motives that questioned—at least in my opinion—without right and proper reason to do so, your loyalty first to the country and secondly to the men who were serving under you. I think that you will recall vividly, as most of us here do, the circumstances surrounding that, and I wonder if you would care to comment on it?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I do not think that it is necessary to comment at great length, except to say that the one matter which has concerned me from the beginning of this whole episode, as far as I am personally concerned, is that the defence of Canada is being virtually destroyed in maritime matters because of the plan to unify the armed forces.

The personnel structure has been so seriously weakened that I felt that regardless of the consequences, as far as I was personally concerned—and believe me I have some idea of what the consequences might have been—it was

more important to bring this to the attention of the people of Canada, since I could see not other way that it would come to your attention.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Thank you Admiral. I wonder if we could leave this for the moment because I would like to get into it in depth later on. Another thing that has been of continuing concern to me over the intervening months since your last appearance before us, has to do with the chronological sequence of events stretching from your last appearance before us up to, let us say, the middle of August of 1966. I am concerned, Admiral, about the events that took place and on what particular dates that they took place. There have been numerous charges made that, indeed, you were dismissed or fired because you had seen fit to speak publicly to the press about your grave concern for the future of Maritime command and Canada's navy. Can you, of your own recollection, set forth on the record, clearly and unequivocally, the chronological sequence of events?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes sir. I have put this into a brief which has been sent to every member of Parliament and to all members of the Senate so that all members of Parliament can, if they wish to refer to it, go over the sequence of events that you are talking about.

On June 22, I came to Ottawa to deliver two briefs for your Committee. On that date I appeared before the Minister and did a so-called dry run. On June 23 I was here with you in the Committee. On June 24, having been requested to see the Minister, I had a meeting with him in his office. He asked me to go away and that he would get in touch with me shortly after that. I saw him again on July 12, on which date he told me I would be compulsorily retired. Three days after that I spoke in public for the first time. The statements made in public were made after it was perfectly clear that I had been compulsorily retired—to me and to a good number of other people—because I reported this fact to the chief of the defence staff and the chief of personnel.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Thank you, Admiral. I wanted that in the record for very obvious reasons.

I have one further question arising out of a question asked by Mr. Deachman a few moments ago. He wanted to know what guide could be used to determine morale levels and states of morale. I would like to invite him to Halifax—he has left the room for the time being. Your answer was an excellent one. I know what certain orders under the Queen's Regulations state about officers talking to pressmen, but I thought perhaps if he wanted to find out you might be able to confirm or deny this. This might have been something that happened subsequent to your dismissal—I am not sure. Back during that period one of the national television medias went to Halifax and were denied access to the men and officers to ask them about this particular question of morale. Was that while you were serving, or subsequent to it?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: That was subsequent to it.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Can I put my name down for the next round of questioning, please.

The CHAIRMAN: According to my calculations, you still have two minutes.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I do.

The CHAIRMAN: You have two minutes left because I let Mr. Deachman have 12 minutes.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I will wait until my next turn around. I want to keep things in their proper sequence.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Winch.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I thought I was next.

The CHAIRMAN: Well I was given your name by the Clerk at the same time I was given Mr. Forrestall's and Mr. Winch had put his hand up before I had received this from the Clerk.

Mr. MCINTOSH: The next time I will give my name to you because it seems to me that for some reason or another I have been put further down on the list every meeting.

The CHAIRMAN: I am sure Mr. Winch would not mind.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I will let Mr. Winch proceed, but I just wanted to bring this to your attention now.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, I think it would be very profitable to hear Mr. McIntosh.

The CHAIRMAN: I have Mr. Winch next, and Mr. McIntosh seems to accept that.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the fact that several weeks ago Admiral Landymore sent me a copy of his precis. I noted in that precis that he had spent some time on integration. He stated in his brief that integration had started 12 years before in respect of the navy in Maritime command both on the Atlantic and the Pacific.

Admiral, you ended your section on integration with these words, and I will quote:

> So that the move towards total integration was neither strange nor unreal and was really only felt in logistics and administration.

Do you still agree—and this was written some two months ago, after you had been retired—that the move toward total integration was neither strange nor unreal, as far as the navy is concerned? Do you still stand with that statement?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Oh yes, very much so.

Mr. WINCH: Thank you.

On page 1, paragraph 5 of your presentation today, you state:

> ...most people seemed to be playing a hunch that we are starting a process, which has as its ultimate goal, a police force—no more, no less—...

Is it your belief that the plans of integration and unification are tending toward, as you say, as police force, no more and no less? If so, what is your comment on the repeated information given to this Committee by the Minister and his military advisers that Canada is going to maintain all its commitments:

NORAD and NATO in all aspects. If that is the declared commitment of the government with regard to its planning how do you come to the conclusion, with that definite commitment made in the House and to this Committee, that the planning is wholly and solely toward a police force?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think that I implied and showed that the rundown of personnel for the navy was such that it would soon not be possible to maintain the government's commitment in relation to its international commitments, whether it was in the White Paper or not.

Secondly, there is a great deal of evidence, as far as I am personally concerned, to indicate that the naval role is being gradually run down. Why it is being run down I do not know. The evidence is very clear. When I prepared a brief to your Committee saying that we should have a certain replacement rate of ships and the one we had was not fast enough, this was scrubbed out. I also pointed out that it was time to start studying and making plans for a replacement aircraft, and this was scrubbed out. Only the things that had to do with peacekeeping were left in and improved on. I naturally came to the conclusion that if the policy was to allow the navy to run down so its ships might be in existence but not manable, and if the replacement program was too slow to keep the life of the navy up to date, then it was an obvious conclusion that the navy under this would gradually disappear—and if that were the case then all you would have is a police force.

Mr. WINCH: Last year you were the commander in chief of Maritime Command. We have had a statement made more than once by the Minister and by others, that we were in a position to meet all our commitments to NATO. Will you tell us whether or not we were in a position when you were in command to meet our commitments to NATO?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: We were in a position to meet our commitments to NATO in numbers of ships, but not in the way those ships were usable operationally.

Mr. WINCH: I am sorry, but we cannot sit on both sides of the fence. Were we in a position where you in Maritime Command able to meet the commitments which the government had made to NATO?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: If you wanted me to say yes or no, the answer is "no". I tried to point out that your commitment, as far as the navy is concerned, is to supply so many ships and so many airplanes. So in a sense, if you have the number of ships, you are meeting your commitment.

An hon MEMBER: Unmanned.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Well, the way that we are doing it, they could be unmanned.

Mr. WINCH: Was our commitment in number of ships and personnel or fire power, when you had the responsibility?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: We did not have enough personnel to man the ships.

Mr. LANIEL: Could I ask a supplementary to that?

Mr. WINCH: As long as it does not come off my 10 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN: If you will permit the supplementary, I will add the time on.

Mr. LANIEL: Admiral, does what you have just said correspond with your statement at page 325 of the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence where you say:

> —I can say that we have achieved this massive reorganization to an operational command in being without degrading our operational effectiveness during the transition period, in spite of the inevitable dislocation and the reorganization entailed.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: This is perfectly true; I still stand by that statement too, but that has nothing to do with the numbers of men manning the ships.

Mr. LANIEL: That was not your reply to Mr. Winch.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I told Mr. Winch that we had the numbers of ships that the government had allocated to our NATO commitment, but we did not have enough manpower to man them effectively.

Mr. LANIEL: What do you mean by operational effectiveness?

The CHAIRMAN: I think you have had one supplementary question and we will have to keep it to that.

Mr. LANIEL: No, but the words are "operational effectiveness"; it is not manning. The words "operational effectiveness" are mentioned there.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Well, the level of operational effectiveness was not affected by making an organizational change. When we started the organizational change, we had so many ships manned properly and at the end of the organizational change we had so many ships manned properly. You are trying to relate two things that are not relatable.

Mr. LANIEL: Not from my point of view.

Mr. WINCH: At the time that you were in command of Maritime command, we have been informed, more than once again, that our anti-submarine role was the greatest ever in Canadian history. Is that correct?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think that during my period of command our technical ability came to a higher point of effectiveness—and I am not saying that it has anything to do with my personal efforts.

Mr. WINCH: I am asking about those under your command, the ships and equipment.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: We, at that period of time, when I got that command, were beginning to reap the benefits of about 15 years of thoroughly long and hard work by all the people who were in the service and trying to make this a really truly good technical service.

Mr. WINCH: Then it was the most effective then?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I do not think that I want to really—

Mr. WINCH: Right.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Winch, may I ask a supplementary question?

The CHAIRMAN: As long as it is along the same lines.

Mr. MACALUSO: Admiral, perhaps it is my cloudiness on this issue, but on page 336 of the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 12 on June 23, 1966, in answer to a question by Mr. Lambert about your NATO commitments you say, and I quote:

> I think the best way to look at it is that as ships are kept in the modern state, and the ships we are building now being so much more expensive than some of the ships which were previously in our force, that it will never be possible, under the economics as I see them, to maintain number for number ships that have been allocated in the past...For my money, I would say that the force of ships that we have available now to offer NATO are infinitely more valuable than the larger number of ships which we offered to NATO in, say, 1954. I do not see any way to add and subtract numbers and come up with an answer on a NATO commitment.

Further down on that page, Mr. Lambert says:

> Are you satisfied that we will fully carry out our commitments—

—and I assume he is still referring to NATO—

> —in so far as effectiveness, the commitments, say, to 1972, are concerned?

Your answer sir at the top of page 337 is:

> The answer to that is yes, I am well satisfied.

Yet in *Maclean's* magazine of September 7, 1966—and you can say whether this is right or not—you said, and I quote:

> Canada cannot even meet her naval commitments to NATO.

If that is true, how do you rationalize these two statements, two months apart. In one you say the answer is, "Yes I am well satisfied", and you are referring to the year 1972, and yet you seem to be giving contradictory evidence in answer to Mr. Winch.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I can understand—

Mr. MACALUSO: I just want to clarify this. You say:

> I do not see any way to add and subtract numbers and come up with an answer on a NATO commitment.

The CHAIRMAN: I think you made that point in your question, Mr. Macaluso. Give the witness a chance to answer the question.

Mr. MACALUSO: I would just like some clarification.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: First of all, Mr. Macaluso, I can understand why you might ask that question, because you were not at the briefings on that particular day when I made that answer.

Mr. MACALUSO: That is correct.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Therefore, you would not be aware that previously I already had stated to the Committee that we did not have sufficient manpower to meet our commitment. Therefore, one does not go through the complete gamut in answering a second question. Moreover, on that same day, I

had pointed out just what I said to Mr. Winch a moment ago, that certain things had been deleted from my brief and these were of course fresh in mind.

I still stand by a statement in relation to that briefing, which is that the numbers of ships and the way those ships are equipped, make us a very effective force; but the ships will not do very much fighting if they are sitting alongside the wall waiting for crews.

Mr. MACALUSO: Yes but why—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso, I cannot permit you to continue.

Mr. MACALUSO: I thank Mr. Winch for this time. I will come back later. Put me down on the list please.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Put me down too, if Mr. Macaluso is going to talk. I thought he had left the Committee permanently.

Mr. MACALUSO: I am flattered, Mr. Churchill.

Mr. WINCH: Admiral on page 2 of your presentation today you quote from Section 26 of the National Defence Act, as follows:

> "No officer or man shall, without his consent be transferred to another service of the Canadian Forces"...

If my memory is correct, in Bill No. C-243, it is exactly the same with the additional words, except in a case of emergency. Is it the addition of the words "except in a case of emergency" that you object, to, because otherwise it is the same.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No, I object to—

The CHAIRMAN: Order please.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: What I have said to you, in essence, is that I believe you have a moral responsibility, because of Section 26 of the existing National Defence Act, to obtain the consent of services.

Mr. WINCH: But this is in Bill No. C-243. You must have the consent of the man or officer to the transfer, except in the case of emergency, and that is the only difference from the existing National Defence Act. Is that your objection?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No, no. I am merely saying that you are starting an entirely new service and you are expecting everyone to roll on smoothly into that and continue into it.

Mr. WINCH: That is exactly what I am after. Although the names may be changed, Canada is still going to have an army, an air force and a navy, and it states in Bill No. C-243 that—

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No, because Canada is not going to have an army—

Mr. WINCH: —you cannot be changed from one category to another without your consent.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: You are not right. We are not going to have an army, air force and navy.

Mr. WINCH: Of course we are.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: We are going to have soldiers, sailors and airmen in a single force. There is a very considerable difference.

Mr. WINCH: We are going to have an army, navy and air force and do not kid yourself about that, no matter what the name is.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: That is—

Mr. WINCH: I am saying that actually there is only that one change in Bill No. C-243.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: If that is the case, Mr Winch, why are we unifying?

Mr. WINCH: I know that others have questions; we adjourn at 6 o'clock on Wednesdays, so I will have to come back.

I notice on page 9 you say:

> Not only is unification a foolish move, but it comes at a time when integration is not living up to expectations and much needs to be done to correct organizational faults.

Now we have not started unification yet—there has been evidence along the line that requires legislative sanction; it's integration. Integration has been going on now for four years. When you say "integration is not living up to expectations" do you believe that integration has been a failure, when almost—and I am going to say it because that is my personal opinion—all the evidence, even from those who are opposed to unification, seems to support the policy of integration.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I said in my brief to you, sir, that I still agree with unification in principle, but that in carrying out integration, I believe some very serious organizational faults have been created—and I could name them for you: Air Material Command and Training Command.

Mr. WINCH: Would you not expect some bugs to develop in a matter like this?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I would have expected lots of bugs to develop, but not major ones of the kind that have developed.

Mr. WINCH: Would you not expect that our personnel and trained military advisers would be able to correct them?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I am perfectly willing to make any kind of a statement in relation to the correction. I sent briefs to you last summer and in them I said that integration faults can be corrected in the service, but I think that you ought to know what those faults are and have some idea what they amount to.

Mr. WINCH: Basically then, you are not opposed to integration?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Oh no.

The CHAIRMAN: I think your time has expired now, Mr. Winch.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, I want to say to the Admiral that one reason that some of us oppose Bill No. C-243 is that we do not understand the term "unification". Also, I think the results of this Committee have shown that many of us have the terms "integration" and "unification" confused. I was very sur-

prised to hear you say a few moments ago that you believe in unification in principle.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Integration in principle.

Mr. McINTOSH: No, you said unification.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: If I did, it was a slip of the tongue. I beg your pardon; I agree in principle to integration and I have no agreement whatsoever in unification.

Mr. McINTOSH: The record will show that you said you agreed in unification in principle. I will accept that as a slip of the tongue, but I would like to get someone to define this term "unification" to me. All that we have been able to get the Minister to say—and I have repeated this several times to the Committee and I am going to repeat it to you—is that unification is the end objective of a logical and evolutionary progression. Now can you tell me what that means?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No sir, not without going to the Rand Corporation.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, will you tell me what your definition of unification is in a very few words. I want to understand Bill No. C-243.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: One service, one identity.

Mr. McINTOSH: Somewhere you said that the naval force has little or nothing in common in terms of fighting with the land fighting forces or the air fighting forces. You went on to explain that the role of the supply personnel for the navy is somewhat different from that of the other two services in that the navy takes some of its supply personnel into combat with it. What additional training would be required to take that portion of the supply personnel that you are compelled to take with you into combat; how long a term would it take to train these personnel; who are they in regard to officers and in regard to men. This is a two part question.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: It applies to all supply officers and it applies to all men in the supply trades: cooks, stewards, pay writers, administrative writers, victualling storesmen and naval storesmen. They are the supply trades for the navy.

Mr. McINTOSH: How long would you say that it would take to train a man so he could go to sea and immediately into battle. Would it be a matter of months or years?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: At the lowest rank level, the Private, Ordinary Seaman level, the courses that we normally give them take upwards of twenty-two weeks to give them the very fundamentals of ship organization, ship security, and the type of thing that would make them at home on board. So a man coming from another service, initially to be of any use, would get about twenty-two to twenty-six weeks training.

Mr. McINTOSH: I take it from your remark, Admiral, that you have had a great number of years of training in recruitment. You always have had to look after the morale in the services, which has been up and down; you always have had this problem with you. You have had problems in training. Would this be aggravated by the implementation of what you understand is unification?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes. If you try to make your personnel interchangeable between the three services in any way, then it is very seriously aggravated, because at all levels everyone requires additional training to make them suited to the environment in which they are going to fight.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You mentioned a few moments ago that it takes twenty-two weeks.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Well, I said also that that was at the very lowest level. This is a raw recruit.

Mr. MCINTOSH: How long would it take under unification to have all your personnel trained so that they could go to sea and go into combat immediately. I do not suppose you have any idea.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: That would be a study in its own. For example, it takes about five years to train a suitable executive officer. It takes roughly five years to train a suitable supply officer. If you are going to train somebody from another service, presumably it will be something upwards of five years—if we are going to use them effectively in the ship organization. If you get down to Chief Petty Officer and Petty Officer level, it takes perhaps a little less time, but in all cases it is extensive.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I believe you also said in one of your briefs, or it has been expressed here by former witnesses, that it does not take too long a time for a pilot to adjust, once he is a pilot, to training on the various types of aircraft. I think, that you said it is more difficult to train them to take off and land on the deck of a ship than it is on land. How much longer training does a pilot have to have?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I am not sure how long a time is spent in all the various different types of RCAF aircraft. I think that the point here is more that having trained someone to take off and fight from the deck of a ship that it would be foolish to take him away from that until he was too old to go on doing it. There is not much point in taking someone trained in the land environment, that is, RCAF training for people who take off from land bases, and putting them into a ship for a short period of time in order to use their services after training them for that, and then send them back to their other service. It would just be a waste of money and time. It takes too long to get a naval pilot.

Mr. MCINTOSH: With the implementation of unification, do you see more difficulties arising in the recruitment field?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes, very much more.

Mr. MCINTOSH: That takes me to the question regarding Canada being one of the few, if not the only voluntary service in the world. Would you consider that unification then is the first step in compulsory military service or conscription?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: If the manpower totals that the government wants to maintain to meet their commitments and to keep a certain size force in operation cannot be maintained by voluntary recruitment then I suppose the only alternative is some form of compulsory service. I would have thought that long before anyone could be convinced that we should have compulsory service

in Canada that a lot of things will be done to try and encourage more people to come into the services. I do not think that compulsory service—of course, this is a political thing—is a very favourable outlook for quite a number of people.

Mr. McINTOSH: Do you think that unification will step up recruitment?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No, I do not.

Mr. McINTOSH: What do you think it will do?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think that recruitment will fall. In fact, this is not just my opinion; the last study I saw on this subject prior to my leaving the Navy indicated that the armed forces would run down uncontrolled to about 92,000 or 93,000 people.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well then you would agree with me that anybody who votes —and this is our responsibility as members of parliament—for Bill C-243 is in effect voting for the first step in compulsory military service for our people.

Mr. WINCH: Now, now.

Mr. McINTOSH: I am asking the Admiral, not you, Mr. Winch.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I do not think, Mr. McIntosh, that I can put a political judgment on a military matter here. I am quite certain that no government, regardless of which side of the House he comes from, would be very keen to introduce measures of conscription or compulsory service without going through every possible course of action to encourage people to come in.

Mr. McINTOSH: Can you suggest any other courses?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: You could do all sorts of things with money and with different terms of service. There are any manner of ways of running a thing so uneconomically as to get over that particular possibility.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well then, you do not think that this was the only course open to the government—that is, taking the action that it has, that there were other courses that the government could have considered.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Well, I do not recall any serious difficulty as far as the Navy is concerned in keeping up to reasonable strength under the former system.

Mr. McINTOSH: I thought you just mentioned, sir, that you were under strength before.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Well, we were, but this was under the threat of unification.

Mr. McINTOSH: Under the threat of unification.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Oh, I think so.

Mr. McINTOSH: Thank you.

Mr. HARKNESS: Admiral Landymore, I would like, first of all, to revert to the matter which Mr. Macaluso brought up, the statement which you made before the Committee last summer to the effect that our anti-submarine capability now was greater than it was, say in 1954, which has been quoted here several times during the past week that we have been sitting, as support

for and proof of the minister's repeated statement that our anti-submarine capability at the present time is greater than it ever has been at any time in our history.

Mr. MACALUSO: On a point of privilege, Mr. Chairman, I did not use the word "anti-submarine"; I quoted from the minutes of the proceedings.

Mr. HARKNESS: The record speaks for itself. I was summarizing it very briefly because I did not want to take the time to read it again.

The date of 1954 may be quite significant in regard to this. I think a much more valid comparison would be between 1963 and the present time rather than 1954 and the present time. In 1963 we had in commission something in the neighborhood of forty-five to forty-seven anti-submarine vessels and on the figures we were given here last Thursday, we now have in commission some twenty-eight ships, of which eight are under refit, and of the remaining twenty, sixteen are ready for immediate operations. Do you consider that at the present time our anti-submarine capability is as good as it was in 1963?

An hon. MEMBER: Where are you getting your figures?

Mr. HARKNESS: The figures I have just quoted were given to us by the minister on Thursday last.

An hon. MEMBER: Then, they must be right.

Mr. HARKNESS: Admiral Landymore would you answer that question.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Over the period of time that you are speaking of, the strength of naval personnel has been constantly running down and, therefore, it would be incorrect to say that our capability as a result is as good now as it was in 1963. However, on the other hand, if you want to relate your question only to numbers of ships and how they are equipped, then I think the statement would be accurate.

Mr. HARKNESS: I am not relating it solely to numbers of ships and how they are equipped; I am relating it to the entire picture: personnel, the number of ships in commission, the number of ships which can be put to sea in other words, all the factors combined. On that basis is our anti-submarine capability today as good as it was in 1963?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No.

Mr. WINCH: I thought you told me that it was when I asked you a similar question.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Harkness has the floor.

Mr. HARKNESS: I mention this because this particular extract from your evidence in the summer has been brought up there time after time to support the broad general statement made by the minister on repeated occasions: that our anti-submarine capability now is greater than it ever was before, which every naval man that I have talked to, and I am sure your answer would be the same, says is just not correct.

Next, I quote this statement from page 3 of your brief:

> Enthusiasm for career service within the Armed Forces has diminished markedly.

Would you say that that applies equally to officers and other ranks, or would you make any distinctions between the two in that regard?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think on the whole that one has to make some distinction. I think the officers are rather more distressed by the threat of unification because as you realize, when they signed up in the first place they signed for life. The men are not so trapped; they have a five year engagement to meet and they can leave at the end of the five years if they so desire; moreover of course, our officers joined as officers because they wanted a career. A large percentage of men, of course, joined in the first place just to have a crack at it stay around for a while and then leave.

Mr. HARKNESS: Would you consider it much more serious, as far as the continued efficiency of the services is concerned, that it is the officers who are most concerned?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think that there are more officers who are concerned, but I think that those who are concerned are equally concerned, if you understand me. There are many Chiefs and Petty Officers, and many young men who are very concerned at this moment.

Mr. HARKNESS: My question was that as far as the continued efficiency of the services is concerned do you consider it more serious that it is the officers who are more concerned in regard to this matter.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Very much so.

Mr. HARKNESS: And for what reason?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Well, I think that as soon as this legislation goes through, there are going to be an awful lot of officers leave the services, and it seems to me that you have before you the alternative to stop this before it happens.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, would you also consider that the first and greatest necessity for any effective service is a body of highly trained officers.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: And technicians.

Mr. HARKNESS: And technicians, yes.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: That is the backbone of our service.

Mr. HARKNESS: As a result of your personal experience at Atlantic Command and also subsequent to that, to what extent do you think that this enthusiasm for a service career—in other words, general morale of the forces particularly the naval forces, has declined?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: The navy is split right down the middle. I do not think there is very much morale left. The navy is very seriously affected by this.

Mr. HARKNESS: On the basis of your experience can you indicate the extent of the decline in morale.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think it has declined to the point where operations have been very seriously affected. I do not think it can be very much worse than this.

Mr. HARKNESS: Concerning the example that you gave in regard to the effect on the pensions of two men of equal service, how does this arise under the present Defence Forces Pension Act?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: That is how the Act is written.

Mr. HARKNESS: This, I might say, was new to me. I was rather shocked to see that a Captain would get a considerably smaller pension than a Lieutenant Commander although they both had the same number of years of service.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Well the proposed penalty or the actuarial adjustment, or whatever you want to call it, is a 5 per cent reduction for every incomplete year of service against the age limit for rank. In other words, a Captain in the Navy goes until he is 55, so in the example I gave you, he would have eleven years left to serve; if he left then he would lose 55 per cent, whereas the Lieutenant Commander who would be retired at 45, has one year to go, and he loses 5 per cent.

Mr. HARKNESS: It is an outstanding example of how inequitable the benefits on retirement of two men in that position would be. I would hope that this Committee might deal with the Defence Services Pension Act in order to ensure that situations of this kind did not and could not arise. I think you have done a service in bringing this to our attention.

In connection with retirement matters and so forth, you state on page 5:

> Differences which have been made to look like serious faults are in fact, essential differences. The Minister has promised to correct them—to remove the differences. It is this promise which is so startling, for if it is kept, the Services will be much more expensive to operate and less effective.

Have you any idea how much more expensive they would be?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No sir. I have no way of measuring that until I know just to what extent these inequalities are going to be evened out.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Harkness, your time has expired.

Mr. HARKNESS: Will you put me down for the next round, please.

The CHAIRMAN: I do not think that this ten minutes is working out.

Mr. BREWIN: I would like to refer Admiral Landymore back again to the fifth paragraph on page 1 of his brief in which he makes the remark:

> In your debate in the House of Commons, it seemed to me that no questioner could elicit the information he wanted on the role of the Armed Forces.

I suppose you made that remark after reading the debate. I think, in fairness to the Minister, did he not repeat that the roles of the armed forces would be those set out in the White Paper?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes.

Mr. BREWIN: Does that not imply that the roles would be, as the White Paper certainly seems to imply, a continuation of the roles as presently being performed by the armed services without any radical change?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I felt, Mr. Brewin, that under the questioning you were expecting—not you personally but the questioners—not only to refer back to the White Paper but to deny in some form the statements which had been made and have had a lot of publicity, which indicates that there were many people who could see the armed forces going in this general direction, so that when I say that questioners could not elicit the answer, we have been referred back to the White Paper on just about everything for two years.

Mr. BREWIN: May I put it to you this way, that despite what the minister said about the White Paper, for a number of reasons, you believe that the end process, the end result of his unification process, would be a switch away from the present role toward what you describe as a police force, but it might be called a mobile unified force—integration force. Is it correct that you felt that this was the end result of this unification process.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes.

Mr. BREWIN: And was it your feeling that in the course of that the anti-submarine role on which the Navy has specialized would be either starved or dropped.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Starved, I think, is a better word than dropped, yes.

Mr. BREWIN: In answer to a question by Mr. Winch you said that you felt the naval role was being gradually run down. I take it by "naval role" you meant that the present anti-submarine role of the Navy was being gradually run down.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes, that is correct.

Mr. BREWIN: At the same time I think you mentioned that the peacekeeping aspects—those crafts of the naval forces that would be useful for peacekeeping, seemed to be getting special attention.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: That is correct.

Mr. BREWIN: From all of this, you have deduced, perhaps quite correctly—you cannot read everybody's mind—that the end result, this unification process, would mean a switch in role.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: That is correct.

Mr. BREWIN: There is one detail on that I would like to ask you about. You say—perhaps inquiring a little bit into the minds of other members—that there is a hunch it is going to become a police force. Would not a mobile international force be something a good deal more than a mere police force? Would it not be, for example, available to NATO as a mobile reserve?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: It might be. It might be something more than just a policeman wearing arm bands and side arms, yes.

Mr. BREWIN: Would it not be something more than what our forces are now contributing in the peacekeeping operations of the U.N.? Would it not be equipped for hostilities on quite a different scale than those envisaged by our present peacekeeping force?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think that when you go into the definition of policing, one does not look upon it as having a military force at all but rather,

military trained personnel who go abroad, who do not intend to do any fighting; they intend to try to act just as a policeman acts.

Mr. BREWIN: But, Admiral Landymore, it seems to me that there may be a false distinction between a police force, on the one side, and a total commitment to all types of military action on the other. They can be a force which is somewhat in between the two, which would be available as a mobile reserve for something much more than peacekeeping.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think that you might draw that conclusion. On the other hand, my argument really is that the whole purpose of having armed forces is for the defence of the country. If you put all your eggs into some kind of police force, where it is equipped the way an army might be equipped, you are losing one of the most important parts of the defence of Canada in the maritime field.

Mr. BREWIN: Yes, but let me put to you that this is a matter that we would have to look into very carefully. Is it not true that the mobile force would be available, for example, to deal, if not perhaps with a full scale invasion of Canada, with any incursions on a Canadian shore that were not of a substantial protracted variety.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: If you have armed forces, regardless of how they are equipped, they will be used to defend Canada in some shape or form, and whether that defence is effective or not is another matter.

Mr. BREWIN: Precisely, but you seem to imply in your discussion here and in your argument in this paragraph, that if the political sciences stumble, which they frequently do, we need to defend our country and that a police force could do nothing. Now, I agree with you if it were a mere police force but if the force were lightly armed but mobile and could get to any particular place quickly, had an air component and a naval component to assist it, why would this not be useful to the defence of Canada—I would like to add just one sentence particularly if you take into account that we are part of North America and a neighbour of the greatest military power in the world.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Because I think it is neglecting forms of defence which are essential to the defence of Canada.

Mr. BREWIN: You do not separate them. Do you think of the defence of Canada as being separate from our position as a part of an alliance.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No, I do not, but I do separate maritime defence from defence on the land and defence in the air.

Mr. BREWIN: Are you not thinking of maritime defence then in terms of the anti-submarine campaign and the type that we are involved with in NATO at the moment.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Well I say that that defence is going to be run down to nothing and you are going to end up with men equipped as an army, if you like, who will be able to perform in defence of Canada in the field and in that environment.

Mr. BREWIN: Admiral Landymore, could it now be true that the real question is whether an anti-submarine force as we now have it is essential to the defence of Canada and that is the subject that we should be concerned with.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes.

The CHAIRMAN: Is it your wish that we should call it six o'clock or do you wish to carry on with Mr. Smith.

An hon. MEMBER: Call it six o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we have one obvious difficulty; Admiral Landymore's testimony and his replies to questions are not nearly finished. Tomorrow we have meetings at ten o'clock and three-thirty. We will have General Foulkes here. I can hold only myself responsible for this because we had asked General Foulkes some time ago, before we had scheduled Admiral Landymore, if my recollection is correct, to appear at ten o'clock. Would you leave this to me to work out. I will ask General Foulkes if he would mind delaying his appearance at least until the afternoon.

Mr. HARKNESS: I know General Foulkes has a lot of old friends here in Ottawa and I would feel quite sure that he would not mind staying here another day.

The CHAIRMAN: Is there any other business that anyone wishes to bring up at this time.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, I was not here yesterday but I had the opportunity of viewing CTV news last night. Has there been a new rule brought in during my absence that committee hearings be televised. Is that what I saw last night?

The CHAIRMAN: No, they are not televised. If what you are referring to is what I think you are referring to—I did not see the program—I gather Mr. McIntosh was one of the stars. CTV did come into the room and after the Committee meetings were over did take some pictures. No change has been made in the rules. As your Chairman I did not give them permission to film any of the proceedings of the Committee.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, the reason I asked is that it was indicated that it was a committee hearing. I just want the record to show that it was not an actual committee hearing but perhaps something set up afterwards, as you stated.

The CHAIRMAN: No, I can state categorically that it was not.

May we adjourn then until ten o'clock tomorrow morning.

THURSDAY, February 16, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I see a quorum.

When we adjourned last night at 6 o'clock Mr. Smith had just been given the floor to question the witness. I will ask Mr. Smith if he would like to continue now.

Mr. SMITH: Admiral Landymore, yesterday with Mr. McIntosh you were discussing the means of providing the manpower for a naval service. I understand that in the United States there have been studies going on in their defence

department for some time on how they can put into their drafts a series of professional incentives. I think these are the words they use. I suppose one professional incentive is always your pay scale? Pay is an incentive?

Rear Admiral W. M. LANDYMORE, O.B.E., C.D., R.C.N.: Yes.

Mr. SMITH: Do you think that by itself pay is enough of an incentive to man a naval force with the technical people that are needed?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No; pay is a very important factor, but I do not think it is by any means the only factor. I think that the majority of servicemen who make careers in the service enjoy service life. They enjoy the professional association.

I do not think there has ever been a time when servicemen have been paid as well as their counterparts in civilian life, but they still stay and complete their careers in the service. I think that answers your question. It is fairly obvious that although they must have enough pay to have a reasonable standard of living, it is not by any means the thing that will keep them in the service.

Mr. SMITH: What are some of the incentives that you feel are important in the naval branch of the service apart from pay?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: First of all, I think probably expertise, professionally, and their association in a professional environment. That is probably the most important one. Comradeship and mess life are the second; and I think perhaps third in line might be, for men, service to one's country; and for officers that would be higher on the scale. However, there are many other aspects such as travel, and minor factors of that sort, particularly for young sailors.

The main thing, I think, that keeps us interested is the professional association and the fact of serving.

Mr. SMITH: And you feel that changes in the uniform and going into a unified force will detract from those other professional incentives.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes, I do. I think it must be perfectly obvious that a lot of the difficulty we are in stems from the fact that the servicemen have been very disillusioned by the attempt to remove their loyalty to their service. This is a loyalty which springs, once again, from professional association. It becomes a very fierce loyalty; it gets to be built-in in a big way. This, of course, is all done deliberately, because this is the main factor, I suppose, in building up the esprit de corps which makes a real fighting man out of an ordinary individual.

Therefore, these matters of identity are extremely important in a fighting service.

Mr. SMITH: To continue with personnel, on page 10 of the brief you have some criticism of the effectiveness of a single Training Command. I have assumed from reading the brief and from hearing you yesterday that this, in a sense, relates to what has been called here the interchangeability of men from one environment to the other. Is that a correct assumption?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Partly; the real reason for my feeling that a Training Command set up in the way we have it at the moment is uneconomical is that the best people to set up the bases for all types of fighting training are the operational commanders who have got to employ these people in the fight. As

matters now stand, in the relationship of Training Command with my old command, all the arrangements for professional fighting training were established by the command; they were really rubberstamped by Training Command. In fact, in relation to my command Training Command's functions were simply to approve the production from the command and to assist us in getting the necessary training equipment to carry out the syllabi that we had arranged.

I think this is very wasteful in effort, because Training Command does not have financial control or manpower control. Because all these things involve both those factors they would then have to turn around and go back to the headquarters to get final approval of some of these matters. Therefore, it made them a post office in our arrangement.

Mr. SMITH: Do you think that a high degree of interchangeability of men will be accomplished as between the different fighting environments as they develop?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No, it will not be accomplished. It is perfectly obvious to everyone in the headquarters at the present time that there is a very, very limited degree of interchangeability.

Mr. SMITH: Would it be a reasonable conclusion that your belief is that there will be very little, if any, economy in manpower resulting from this so-called interchangeability?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Perhaps "interchangeability" is the wrong word now in the context in which I am now going to use it, because if you reduce the roles of the armed forces and come back to one role, and, for example, limit the navy in its particular role, then, presumably, you could make one service do the job; but so long as we are still vitally interested in the three environments, then it is an uneconomical proposition to attempt even it.

Mr. SMITH: Uneconomical in terms of dollars, or in terms of manpower?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Dollars and manpower. Let me see if I can think of a suitable example. I think perhaps the training of pilots is one that can be readily understood. We have used—and long before integration—a very sensible and economic system here for all the armed forces. The RCAF took all our flying personnel and gave them their basic training up to what was called twin-engine standard. This meant that they were capable of moving into the field of operational aircraft. Then they broke off the air force men going to learn to fly their machines, and the naval people coming to theirs.

Now, the economic way to continue to use these personnel in both fields is to use them until they are either too old or too nervous to continue to fly in the environment for which they have been trained.

If you believed that there was some economy in interchangeability, you would then say: "Well, now we can give the people in the Argus squadron a change of scenery. We will let them fly for the navy". It would take us roughly two years to get the air force man trained to be the second officer in a Tracker aircraft. Eighteen months later he would be in the lefthand seat. By this time he has left the air force. He is now in the navy, because there is no economic way to employ him elsewhere.

The only justification, as I see it, for interchanges of this sort, is where we have integrated operational commands in which air force officers may be re-

quired to give a professional opinion on a naval flying matter. I think we are justified in training a few people from another service so that they can move into staff jobs and be effective in them. Of course, there is some pretty comic opera stuff going on in relation to that sort of thing at the present time.

Mr. SMITH: You have taken the rather high, and very specialized skill of fliers. What about the interchangeability, we will say, of plumbers, or whatever you call the man who does the plumbing on a ship, who looks after the water pipes on a ship—somebody at a much lower trade level than a flier?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think that is probably a very good example. We do have plumbers in a ship, but we do not have room on board to carry a plumber, a tinsmith, a coppersmith, a welder and a woodworker. Therefore, the navy has to train its artisans—and those are the artisan trades—and put all these skills in the hands of one person. The other services, of course, have employment for each of these artisans in their separate field.

Either we have to degrade, using interchangeability as a factor, the training of the people we require and put more on board—which is physically unsuitable—or continue with the present process.

An army plumber is not interchangeable with a sailor unless we give him training in the other trades, and then, having completed that, we have to make him a sailor. He must be trained in damage control and fire fighting, and have the sailor's normal knowledge of professional seamanship.

Mr. SMITH: I think my time is coming rapidly to an end, but I have one final question. There is an apparent discrepancy between your evidence in June and your statement in the brief concerning the effectiveness of our anti-submarine warfare capacity. I gather now, from the discussion yesterday—you can correct me if I am wrong—that in June you were talking in your brief about the equipment and the state of the equipment on the ships and that yesterday you were talking about both the equipment and the personnel to operate the ships. Is that right?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: That is correct. I was attempting to show that difference. I am afraid it was misunderstood.

Mr. SMITH: What was "FALLEX"? Was it an exercise?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: It was a major national exercise, yes.

Mr. SMITH: Was it administrative, or—

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: It was a paper exercise to cover a complete emergency situation.

Mr. SMITH: Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Andras?

Mr. ANDRAS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Landymore, yesterday you mentioned—it is on page 11 of your brief—your concern about the size and power of Mobile Command:

> It is dangerous to our democracy. If ever a Commander of that Command decided to set himself up to control this country of ours, he has a ready made organization to achieve it.

Would you elaborate this thought on this danger that you have expressed?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes. I think perhaps I should use an analogy to start with, and it is a sailor's analogy. We live in ships which have magazines which are full of high explosives, and we live on top of them. Because one uses rather peculiar expressions to make things sink into the minds of people, we always say that ammunition is safe until you forget it is dangerous. Aboard our ship, therefore, we are extremely careful to set up an organization that is both technical and has in it an organizational arrangement to ensure the safety of the ship in relation to that ammunition.

In relation to a democracy, I believe that you always have to build-in safeguards to make sure that the freedoms, which a good many of us in the services have fought for from time to time, are protected. This is not because someone might want to remove our democracy, but just merely to have an organizational safeguard against any potential danger.

Here we have a huge command with one man in charge, and responsible, in fact, to one man. In view of that fact I think that it would be a very sensible move to split Mobile Command back into three geographical commands, because this would at the same time remove any potential hazard in this field.

Now, do not misunderstand me. I am not suggesting that the commander of Mobile Command is going to take over the country, or anything like that. No one that I know of in the armed forces would even dream of it. But I suggest that one should never take even a calculated risk on a matter as important as this to a democratic nation.

Mr. ANDRAS: Admiral Landymore, even assuming the very remote possibility, as you have described it, of any known person desiring even to attempt this military coup today, really how practical is it, even with the Mobile Command set up as it is?

Would not the commander of Mobile Command organizationally have to depend on such practical things as consultation with Air Transport Command for movement of his scattered forces? Secondly, would he not also have to depend upon the commander of Materiel Command to supply his force, designed for a military coup? Would this not then require collusion between the commander of Mobile Command, the commander of Air Transport Command, and the commander of Materiel Command; to say nothing of our historic experience and the commonsense of all the officers and servicemen under his command? Would this not really, for practical purposes, require this kind of collusion between at least the three commanders, to say nothing of the men serving under them?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Not necessarily; although I have not done a complete or even partial study of how one might go about this, I can assure you that the support and the transportation required to move forces anywhere the Mobile commander wanted to move them could be ordered by him in the form of an exercise, which was not, in fact, an exercise. He would then have complete control of what he wanted to do, without having, so to speak, to let the cat out of the bag to anyone. You do not have to have collusion.

Mr. ANDRAS: He would have to have a pretty intricate and deeply-planned program, not so far removed from what he would have had to have under circumstances before Mobile Command was formed. It would be a really complicated and intricate exercise to arrange.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: It is a complicated and intricate exercise. It was a complicated, intricate exercise in Italy, Germany, Russia and Cuba—

Mr. ANDRAS: It is always a gamble, whether —

The CHAIRMAN: The Admiral is replying to your question, Mr. Andras.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: It was just as complicated an exercise in any country where it has happened as it would be in Canada. I would hope, and expect, that Canadians are slightly more sensible than people in the banana republics have been, and I am not suggesting that this is likely to happen, or that anyone is likely to take part in such a thing. I am saying that this is an organizational safeguard so that you can go about your daily work as members of parliament, and not have to wonder what is going on in your military forces.

Mr. ANDRAS: The second part of that same thought was the suggestion that if a minister of national defence and a commander of Mobile Command got together we could have a dictatorship overnight. Sir, I just pose this to you to ask you if this would be some reassurance: I am sure you are probably walk straight into the Cabinet and tell them what he was going to do. That seizing control of the country in collusion with the commander of Mobile Command, section 19(2) of the National Defence Act as amended by Bill C-90 of 1964-1965, reads:

> Unless the Governor in Council otherwise directs, all orders and instructions to the Canadian Forces that are required to give effect to the decisions and to carry out the directions of the Government of Canada, or the Minister, shall be issued by or through the Chief of the Defence Staff.

Would this not mean that the collusion between the minister and the commander of Mobile Command would have to start from a cabinet decision, and that such orders emanating from the cabinet decision would be transmitted through the Chief of Defence Staff? The cabinet of the country, the Minister of Defence, who is part of that cabinet, the Chief of the Defence Staff and the commander of Mobile Command, would all have to be in collusion. Then you have the added fact that in order to support such a military coup the commander of Air Transport Command, and the commander of Materiel Command would also have to be included.

It builds up to a rather pretty deep-rooted and elaborate program, not too different from what might have been perpetrated under these hypothetical considerations even with a different organization.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I am sure that the "chap" who is going ot pull this coup, is, first of all, going to read the National Defence Act, and say "It would be a naughty thing to do, so I had better not do it". Secondly, he would walk straight into the Cabinet and tell them what he was going to do. That would not make him a dictator, would it? That would just help him to improve our democracy.

I think that anybody inquiring into such a thing—and I hope it is quite clear that I am no expert in these matters—would not go through the processes of getting in touch with any people in the Cabinet whatsoever. That would not make him a dictator, would it? He would go through certain other processes. He would try to get control of the press, as a start, or a part of it; he would purge all his military at the top where he thought he might lose support; he

would then set up a national exercise in some form or another in order to get the support he needed; and then he could go to work.

Mr. ANDRAS: A sort of Dr. No, or Mr. Goldfinger type?

The CHAIRMAN: Your time has expired Mr. Andras.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I would like to ask Admiral Landymore a question or two about his retirement.

How many years to normal retirement would you have had ahead of you, Admiral, had you not been retired by the Minister?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Five, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Five years of useful service based on a very extensive war-time experience. This is a sad loss to the country.

I am interested in the Minister's massive and ruthless purge of senior officers during the last few years. The first on the list, I think, was Admiral Brock. Have you worked out your position on that list? Were you number 6 or 10, or have you any idea?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think I was probably number 3 on the Navy list; but I have not attempted to work out my position in relation to the removals.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It would be an interesting exercise for someone to list the senior officers who have been purged and let the public know the number and their rank, and the years of service that they had ahead of them. I think it should be brought up to date.

From some material that you sent to us earlier I understand that you were asked to resign on the 12th of July. Earlier than that, on the 24th of June, you had a conference with the Minister. Did you reach the conclusion at that conference that he was going to ask for your resignation?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: On the 12th of July he asked you to resign. Did he specify any reason for his asking you to resign?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No, he did not; but I do not think he had to. It was perfectly clear that he was not prepared, at that stage, to make any compromise whatsoever in relation to his ideas concerning unification. Mine were somewhat different from his, and I think he realised that in view of my frankness before this committee previously it was unlikely that our association would be very productive.

Mr. CHURCHILL: In the days when you and Admiral Brock and some others were in the service and appearing before this Committee it was a much more dangerous proceeding than perhaps it appeared at the moment. I am not sure whether serving officers who appear before this Committee now are similarly running into danger. You mentioned the fact that you considered your compulsory retirement by the Minister was a result of your appearance before this Committee and the frankness of your answers to it. Is that a correct statement of what—

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: That is the correct statement.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Yet at the time you appeared before the Committee you thought that you were protected in your position, and that you were expected to give complete and full answers on military matters. Is that right?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes, that is right.

Mr. CHURCHILL: As it turns out, there was no protection at all.

You mention in this earlier brief that on July 12 the Minister said that you were to be retired; that you reported that to the chief of the defence staff and the chief of personnel; and that you then told the Chairman of the Standing Committee about your compulsory retirement. Did you suggest to him that he should re-summon the defence Committee to consider it?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No, sir, I did not. I also told him at that time that my brief has been altered and that I had rather hoped that he would bring this to the attention of the Committee.

Mr. CHURCHILL: But he took no action. You state also that Mr. Deachman of the Standing Committee knew of your retirement.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: That is correct.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, on a point of privilege, since my name has been brought into this, I wonder if Mr. Churchill would just clarify in what way I learned of this.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I will read from the brief.

Mr. DEACHMAN: What are you referring to here?

Mr. CHURCHILL: Do you want to listen?

Mr. DEACHMAN: Yes.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I quote:

> Mr. Deachman of your Committee also knew of the retirements for he and Mr. Groos called on Admiral Welland to get confirmation of what I had told them.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Knew of whose retirement?

Mr. CHURCHILL: The retirement of the Admiral and three other admirals.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I did not know of the retirement of the Admiral until it appeared in the newspapers.

The CHAIRMAN: Do you really have a point of privilege here?

Mr. DEACHMAN: I am just asking why he is suggesting that I had any previous knowledge of any admiral's retirement, or anything about the retirement arrangements, which is what he is suggesting.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Churchill is reading from a brief that was presented by Admiral Landymore.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Yes; that is exactly what I was doing; and Mr. Deachman does not like it. It is there on the record.

Mr. DEACHMAN: What record?

Mr. CHURCHILL: The record of the proceedings of today.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Well, what is the statement, Mr. Chairman, that is being read, which contains my name and in which this appears? Where is this statement?

Mr. CHURCHILL: For ordinary people a statement read once is sufficient. I do not propose—

Mr. DEACHMAN: Well I am no ordinary person. Read it a couple of times.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I would like to ask the Admiral whether he then saw the Prime Minister and whether that meeting was arranged through the Chairman of this Committee? I think he mentioned this in this earlier brief.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: That is correct.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, we have not yet dealt with this point. I notice that Admiral Landymore himself agrees that I apparently had some private and prior knowledge of the arrangements for the retirement of an admiral. I wonder whether this could be explained to the Committee.

Any point of privilege has not yet been dealt with, and I think it should be before it is passed over by Mr. Churchill.

I will direct the question to you sir, as Chairman of this Committee, and through you to Admiral Landymore, who apparently has written this statement into his brief: I wonder if I could have an explanation from Admiral Landymore on what this is about?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: The purpose of mentioning this in the brief was to indicate that I had not spoken out publicly before it was well-known, not only to Members of Parliament but to the military, that I had been compulsorily retired along with three other admirals, one of whom was kept on to do a special study afterwards; that the statements which were being made, that I had been fired because I spoke up publicly, were not correct; and that that had taken place beforehand, and that there were certain people with that knowledge. You were one, and Mr. Groos was another.

Admiral Welland will be very glad to come before this Committee and testify that you and Mr. Groos went to his house and discussed this with him on the night of July 12th.

Mr. DEACHMAN: What did we discuss with him?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: His retirement.

Mr. DEACHMAN: His retirement. Now we have a statement.

Now, sir, may I ask you this: Are you making the statement that I, along with Mr. Groos, went to Admiral Welland's house and discussed with Admiral Welland his retirement? Is that what you are stating?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes; not his retirement; just the knowledge.

Mr. DEACHMAN: The knowledge that he was retiring.

I will tell you how we can settle this. I do not think that you would want to leave a statement on the record if it were wrong, because you are an honourable man. You could go to the telephone now and phone Admiral Welland who, I think, is in the city. You could ask him what took place at that conversation. I was at his house with David Groos. You could ask him the specific question.

When you have done that you could come back and let us know whether or not that was a fact, and that would resolve this question of privilege.

Would you be prepared to do this?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Why do we not do better, Mr. Deachman, and bring Admiral Welland here?

Mr. DEACHMAN: Well, we know that you are an honourable man, and you can tidy up this matter. If you have made a false allegation you would not want to leave it on the record. Will you go to the telephone and call him and find out whether or not that is the fact?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Admiral Welland has personally told me that that is so; and he is prepared to come before this Committee and testify to that effect.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Then, Mr. Chairman, I wonder whether or not we could make arrangements to have Admiral Welland come before the Committee?

Mr. CHURCHILL: I wonder sir, if I could get back to my question?

The CHAIRMAN: If Mr. Deachman has finished on his point of privilege perhaps we could continue with the questioning. In the meantime I will ask the clerk—

Mr. DEACHMAN: I have a point of privilege, Mr. Chairman, and I want to state it very carefully. My point of privilege is that I did not say that; that that statement in the record, if that is the way it stands, is false; and that I would like to have that question clarified by the presence here of Admiral Welland or by whatever means are necessary to contact Admiral Welland and to have a statement from him. I do not want a false statement standing on the record.

The CHAIRMAN: I will instruct the clerk to ask Admiral Welland if he will consent to appear before the Committee to answer this question.

Mr. CHURCHILL: May I continue now?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr. Churchill.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I did not think Mr. Deachman was going to be so "touchy". It is quite obvious that he, as well as the Chairman, knew about the retirement of various admirals and did not bother to have the Standing Committee re-summoned.

May I ask Admiral Landymore who made the arrangements for him to meet with the Prime Minister on the 13th of July?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Your Chairman made the arrangements.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You state in this brief that the Chairman asked you not to say anything to the Prime Minister about the censorship of the brief that had occurred in the Committee. What was the reason behind that?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think only the Chairman could answer that.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Well, we may ask the Chairman later on.

Are you free to tell us what you said to the Prime Minister when you saw him, or was that a private conversation? Would you have to get the consent of the Prime Minister to disclose all the matters that you discussed?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I do not think the Prime Minister would object to my saying that probably the most important part of our conversation was that he had made a promise on board one of our Canadian ships, when he was visiting the west coast, that he was not going to interfere with any traditional aspects of naval life. He pointed out that he had made that statement to me.

He also said that he did not really know how far Mr. Hellyer was going with unification; that he thought he would have a meeting with him to discuss it. At that, he turned to Mr. Groos and said "I would like you to be present when we do this."

It seemed to me that he was not aware of the degree of unification in the mind of the Minister.

Mr. CHURCHILL: After you were fired from the services did the Prime Minister ask to see you, or have you had any contact with him since?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: He has taken no interest in the matter?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I have no idea whether he has, or has not; but he certainly has not been in contact with me.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Have you always considered the Prime Minister the final authority with regard to the defence of this country?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Is that opinion shared, to your knowledge, by senior officers of the services?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I would have thought that that was the general feeling of all service officers, particularly those who served in the pre-integration days, because the chiefs of staff formerly, if they had any difference with the Minister, had the recourse of going to the Prime Minister. This, I think, would indicate that the former arrangements would still be in the minds of anybody serving today, and one would, I think, come to the conclusion that the Prime Minister is the final authority in relation to differences between the services and the government.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Under the new arrangement no senior officer now, except the chief of staff, has the privilege of going to the Prime Minister with regard to military matters.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: That is right.

Mr. CHURCHILL: That is the situation now?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Did you, during your term of office over the last two years, have any contact with the defence committee of the Cabinet?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: And after you were retired so ruthlessly by Mr. Hellyer did any member of the defence committee of the Cabinet ask to see you, or consult with you, or speak to you?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I saw the Minister shortly afterwards. I was summoned to Ottawa to discuss matters with the new chief of the defence staff. I had a very short meeting with the Minister.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Other than that, nothing?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: General indifference on the part of the Prime Minister and the members of the Cabinet.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I do not know whether they—

Mr. CHURCHILL: Will you put me on the second round, Mr. Chairman?

An hon. MEMBER: Let the witness finish, please.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I did not ask a final question. I just made a statement.

An hon. MEMBER: That is just a hypothesis.

Mr. STAFFORD: Admiral Landymore, in reply to a question by Mr. McIntosh yesterday afternoon you stressed the high cost of interchanging trained servicemen from one arm of a service to another. Where in the White Paper, the Minister's speeches, or in Bill No. C-243, is there any indication that a supersonic jet pilot would be taken from a CF-104 Starfighter and placed in charge of an engine room on a destroyer escort?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I do not know of any place where that appears in the White Paper, or in any other paper. But I can assure you that arrangements are already being made to have some degree of interchangeability. We already have that going on.

Mr. STAFFORD: To some degree.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: And a very uneconomical "some degree" it is.

Mr. STAFFORD: Let us take a look at page 19 of the White Paper where it says:

> The sailors will press for more ships, the soldiers for more tanks and the airmen for more planes.

I will couple that with the words of the Minister of National Defence in a speech in the House of Commons on December 7th, 1966, where he said:

> It is important to state that it is not and never has been any part of the planning associated with unification to convert our servicemen to "jacks-of-all-trades". An infantry soldier will not be asked to do the job of a sailor in a fighting ship; a sailor will not be asked to fight in an infantry platoon; and a fighter pilot will not be required to drive a tank.

Did you read that?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes, I did, sir.

Mr. STAFFORD: Well, it is obvious that the interchange is very limited, and one that will not cost the services much money.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Then I ask you this question: Why unify?

Mr. STAFFORD: I am not here to answer questions of that kind.

In other words, you agree with what Mr. Harkness said in the House of Commons on October 31st, 1966, at page 9310 of *Hansard*, that:

> Apparently he—

meaning the Minister

> believed that you could put a man trained in the army into the navy, a man trained to do an army job into the air force, and vice versa.

Is that correct?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: In Halifax, as of today, there are soldiers carrying out sailors' duties on board, uneconomically. Stewards have been rounded up from the army, given a training course and sent to the navy. Now, they will do a service amounting to about 16 months, which is one cycle. They will then return to their service and all the naval training that they have been given will be totally wasted.

It would be much more economical to have got a recruit, trained him, and kept him in the service for five years. Therefore, whether or not anybody has said there is going to be any interchangeability, it is certainly taking place.

Mr. STAFFORD: It would be far better, would it not, Admiral, to change a man in one position, where you had extra men, and put him into a position in another sector of the force where you needed him, rather than to keep him in a job where his services were not required?

Mr. SMITH: How do we know that his services were not required in the army? How many army units are undermanned?

The CHAIRMAN: Your turn will come in a minute.

Mr. SMITH: How many army units are undermanned?

The CHAIRMAN: Order, order.

Mr. STAFFORD: You informed Mr. Harkness yesterday that the number of anti-submarine vessels has been reduced by approximately 50 per cent since 1963, and thus our anti-submarine capability has diminished, in spite of what the Minister has said.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: May I correct that statement, sir. I did not make that statement. It was he who quoted the Minister's figures, not mine.

Mr. STAFFORD: Yes; but you agreed that it went from—

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I agreed that there was a drop in efficiency because of a reduction in the personnel to man the ships.

Mr. STAFFORD: Is it not a fact, Admiral, that our fewer anti-submarine ships today are so well armed with the latest anti-submarine weapons and weapons detection system that the anti-submarine capability of our fleet is in fact higher than it was in 1963?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Only if it is properly manned and properly supported and properly replaced by modern ships as the ones we have go out.

Mr. STAFFORD: I said: Is it not a fact that it is now.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: The fact is that it is not, because it is not properly manned.

Mr. STAFFORD: I would like to refer you to the words of the Minister on page 9349 of *Hansard* of October 31st, 1966, where he said:

> The honourable gentleman—

—and he is referring to Mr. Harkness—

> —also said that our anti-submarine capability had been decreased. This, again, is contrary to fact, though it is a mistake which is easy to make if one falls into the error of assuming that because there are fewer ships our capability is less. It is something like saying that for certain purposes four bows and arrows are better than one rifle.

Did you read that in *Hansard*?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No, I did not read that in *Hansard,* but I would agree with that statement.

Mr. STAFFORD: The Minister is certainly in a position to know the strength of the anti-submarine vessels, is he not?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: By numbers of ships, yes; and by manning.

Mr. STAFFORD: In answer to a question by Mr. Forrestall you said that the Minister told you on July 12, 1966 that you would be retired and that three days later you called a press conference. You were still a serving officer at the time you spoke to the press, and, thus, you violated the Queen's regulations and orders under section 118 of the National Defence Act.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I am still a serving officer and I spoke to the press yesterday.

Mr. STAFFORD: Yes; you never quite answer the question, Admiral, but I think that is sufficient.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Churchill, on a point of order.

Mr. CHURCHILL: What document is the member quoting from?

Mr. STAFFORD: I am quoting what he said to Mr. Forrestall yesterday. If you had been here you would have heard it.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Are those Mr. Forrestall's exact words?

Mr. STAFFORD: Those are approximately his words. He gave the two dates and then he said he gave the press conference three days later. I have it here in my notes as I made them, on each individual that asked questions.

I will now refer to an article in the Toronto *Telegram* of Monday, July 25th, 1966, entitled "Landymore's Poll," and it is headed, "Almost All Back Me":

> Admiral William Landymore, fired in a dispute over unification of the armed services said today, almost 100 per cent of the officers in his command supported his views, but the support came only after the officers had been briefed on Admiral Landymore's views by the Admiral himself. They were then asked to stand at mass meetings if they supported him. Only three officers, two lieutenant commanders and one commander stayed seated out of 367 polls.

Admiral Landymore said today a record was kept of the meetings.

Do you think that there may have been some connection between your admitted briefing of officers and your anti-unification views, such as in that article, and the Minister's decision to end your service, Admiral?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: If there was, the Minister certainly took a long time to make up his mind about it because that happened a year before he fired me.

Moreover, after I had spoken to my officers I wrote officially to Ottawa and told them exactly what I had done. I put it all in a brief—and that quote of yours is full of inaccuracies—which I addressed to you and to every other member of Parliament. If you want the record it is all there.

Mr. STAFFORD: It goes on further to say:

> Admiral Landymore said he first told Defence Minister Hellyer two years ago that he could not support a unification program that would mean loss of navy identity.

And then it goes on to quote you:

> "I expected I would be asked to resign", he recalled. "I was surprised when I wasn't".

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: That is also a misquote.

Mr. STAFFORD: It is, is it?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: The correct facts in connection with that you will find in the brief which I sent to you.

Mr. STAFFORD: Did you write to the *Telegram* stating that they had misquoted you?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I expect that the *Telegram* knows they have misquoted me because they also got copies of the brief.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Stafford, your time is up.

Mr. STAFFORD: Could I have one more question? Actually, my time is barely up, Mr. Chairman. I have had less than eight minutes.

The CHAIRMAN: I have just been told by the clerk that your time is up.

Mr. STAFFORD: Well, I can say this, that I started at twelve minutes to, by that clock. Perhaps the clock is wrong.

Further to the questions by Mr. Andras, on page 11 of your brief you state that Mobile Command "is dangerous to our democracy", and that:

> If a Minister of National Defence and a Commander of Mobile Command got together, we could have a dictatorship overnight.

Would you not go even further and agree that it is a very far-fetched idea to imagine that the Mobile Command at St. Hubert, Quebec, could get together with a minister of National Defence and take over the 20 million democratic people of Canada stretched across 4,000 miles of Canadian soil?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Well, I suggest to you that Russia has got a little more soil and a great many more people than we have and they managed to do it there.

Mr. STAFFORD: Now, just one more part of this question. *Globe and Mail* reporter Anthony Westall was quick to pick up your remark yesterday. He has a front page article, headed "Overnight Seizure by Canadian Dictators Seen by Landymore". I would like to read you the first three paragraphs and have you comment on them.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I would prefer that you read the whole piece.

Mr. STAFFORD: I prefer to read the first three. If you want to read all of it, that is fine. My time is almost at an end, Mr. Chairman.

An hon. MEMBER: The hon. member's comments go beyond questioning.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, Mr. Stafford, I will put your name down again, if you wish.

Mr. STAFFORD: Yes; put my name down again.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): On a supplementary, Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN: Is it a real supplementary?

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Of course it is; it follows from what the hon. gentleman has just said.

Admiral Landymore, you referred to a brief which you sent members of Parliament last summer, and you said that the Toronto *Telegram* also got one. I thought that brief was personal and confidential.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: It was, initially. I released people from that personal and confidential category.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): How long after?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Almost immediately after.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso.

Mr. LANIEL: Am I on your list?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes; you are next, Mr. Laniel.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order. When I put my name in yesterday I was following Mr. Macaluso. Why was this juggled around? I always like to hear him first.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, this is supplementary to the point I raised. I think that you should continue with your list, and then we know where we are.

The CHAIRMAN: On the list at the moment are Mr. Macaluso, Mr. Laniel and Mr. Nugent; and then we start on second round with Mr. Forrestall, Mr. McIntosh, Mr. Harkness, Mr. Churchill and Mr. Stafford. I promise you I will not vary this one iota.

Mr. MACALUSO: I am going to quote a statement that has been made and I am going to ask you whether or not you agree with—

The CHAIRMAN: Will you just wait until I ask the witness if he would like to join me in a cup of coffee?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Thank you very much.

Mr. MACALUSO: You can buy the whole Committee around, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HARKNESS: Let us not show impartiality here!

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): When Groos has coffee everybody has coffee!

Mr. MACALUSO: This has to do with Mobile Command, and I quote:

> It is considered that the concept of this Command is useful and valuable in so far as it will ensure by its organization a greater degree of readiness of the army and supporting air force units attached to it. However, this only follows the same concept as the combined Maritime Command which was established in 1958 with naval and air units operating under an integrated command headquarters.

Would you agree, or disagree, with that statement?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I disagree with that statement. I think it is too big and unwieldy as a command.

Mr. MACALUSO: You disagree with that statement?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: The first part of the statement.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, this statement is in a brief that was submitted to this Committee by the TRIO organization last Friday. I was just wondering about it, because in your brief you say that Mobile Command is not only too big but that it is dangerous, etc. I bring this forward because it rather seems to support what Mr. Andras was questioning you on, about whether Mobile Command needs support units, and about the material support units, which you rather disagreed with. However, you disagree with that statement. That is fine.

I have read the brief which you were kind enough to send to all of us. At that time I was not a member of this Committee and I was very grateful that you sent it because it brought to my attention a lot of matters which otherwise might not have.

I have compared your brief to this Committee with the briefs which you say was altered—the appendices C and D which you had to your previous brief that was sent out—and one of my main concerns, on reading the brief that was originally prepared for this Committee, beginning at page 17 and also at page 19—is that all through these briefs you keep reiterating that your main difference with the Minister is in the matter of identity—that is, tradition, dress, rank structure and service designations.

You believe that it is necessary to have a navy identifiable as such; an army, or mobile force, identifiable as an army; and, for the foreseeable future, an air force. I find that last sentence very interesting, because throughout the brief that you have presented yesterday and today you do not attach too much weight to the air force. You can correct me if I am wrong, but that is what I gather from the brief that you have presented.

My main point is that from what I can understand, with certain qualifications that you have about the organization of the integrated services, you are for integration. The problems that you raise on integration are matters of organization. Your only opposition is to the idea of one service with one uniform, and the absorption of the navy's identity into that one service.

Am I correct in that brief summary?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Partly.

Mr. MACALUSO: Where am I wrong in it, sir?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I believe that one should not reorganize to any degree unless it is evident that it will mean greater efficiency and economy. I can see, as I think I said several times in my brief yesterday, that there is no hope of greater efficiency or economy coming out of this move.

Mr. MACALUSO: Are you referring to the one service, or to the integration?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: The unification aspect of it.

Mr. MACALUSO: You told us that in your view unification is really one service—one uniform. I want to get that straight in my own mind.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: That is all one can say. There is no official definition, so one just has to guess.

Mr. MACALUSO: Yes. Therefore, I am really not wrong. It is just the single force that you are opposed to?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I am opposed to altering the identity of a perfectly good service, on which are built its morale and its esprit de corps, to achieve nothing in the way of greater efficiency and greater economy.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, actually your answer agrees with my contention that you are opposed to a single service.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: It must be perfectly clear that I am opposed to that.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, sir, if you could just simply say "yes" or "no", perhaps I would not have had to ask that.

Dealing now with defence policy, I would like to have your views on the role of nuclear arms in our defence system. Do you agree that the Canadian forces have no need for nuclear arms, either now or in the foreseeable future? Do you feel that there is a role for nuclear arms in the navy?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: There is certainly a role in the navy for nuclear arms.

Mr. MACALUSO: And you disagree with that statement that I just made, that Canadian forces have no need for nuclear arms, either now or in the foreseeable future?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes, I disagree with that.

Mr. MACALUSO: In your view, what is the sole objective of Canadian defence policy, sir? What would you think our Canadian defence policy should be?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Well, obviously the defence of Canada.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, is that all? What about the external—

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: That is the aim. You can use any number of different courses of action to do it but the aim is to ensure the defence of Canada.

Mr. MACALUSO: What of our external policies?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Well, presumably in relation to defence your external policy is the defence of Canada.

Mr. MACALUSO: I can understand that generalization, but I want to put something else to you. Do you think that the government should define our defence policy as being in support of Canadian external policies which, in turn, derive from national policies of enlightened self-interest?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Say it any way you like. I presume that you have armed forces to defend the country. How you use them, or what courses of action you take to give us defence, is a matter which brings in external policy as well.

Mr. MACALUSO: Suppose, sir, that this bill passed unaltered through this Committee and through Parliament. Let us just assume that. Would you suggest that a change should be made in the future if another party took office? Should this whole plan be completely reversed without giving it a chance to see whether or not it works? It is a hypothetical situation, I agree.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order. The Speaker of the House of Commons rules out hypothetical questions. In our procedure here I think we should follow the same rule.

The CHAIRMAN: It is a hypothetical question, Mr. Macaluso, which requires no answer.

Mr. MACALUSO: I can get what I want by putting it in another way, in any case.

Do you agree that the careers of all ranks should be decided by the professional officers of each of the three different services, or could it not be done by an integrated command as we have now on the defence staff?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think this is probably the greatest weakness of integration. By integrating in some fields you move professionalism to such an extent that difficulties arise. In fact, in this Committee the other day I believe Air Chief Marshal Reyno showed you a new organization that has been imposed since the original organization and he has gone back in order to correct this very point that you have raised with me within the present integrated organization by setting up three environmental departments to look after careers and postings so that such professionals would be in the right place to do it. We have run into some very serious difficulties over this.

I will give you a good example. One of the most important selections of people in the navy is the selection of commanding officers for destroyers. At the present time we have 23 of them. That means that each one of these men has a very large responsibility in relation to the defence of his country.

This selection process is very carefully done. When we had the correct professionalism to do this, a captain in the navy listed the names of the people eligible. This was then scrutinized by a commodore, a rear admiral, the deputy chief of personnel and the chief of personnel, who made the selections. They then took those selections to the Chief of the navel staff who would invariably call in the vice chief of the naval staff—again, two admirals—and the vice chief being responsible for operations; so that when the selections were made they were as sure in their own minds as anyone could be that they had the right professional person in the job.

As that would be done today, a captain or a commodore would make the initial selection. He would pass it to a major-general who would take it to an air marshal who might take it to another general and another air marshal. Of course, the whole point of taking it to anybody has been totally lost. Professional care cannot be taken under those circumstances.

Does that answer your question?

Mr. MACALUSO: Yes. But I am just wondering, sir—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso, you wasted some of your time on that hypothetical question and I must tell you that your time is now up.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, with all due respect, the answers were quite long and I expected that—

The CHAIRMAN: And the questions were longer.

Mr. MACALUSO: No, no, I am saying—Mr. Chairman, would you mind listening to me, please? I am not criticizing you, but time must have been passing faster than I thought.

The CHAIRMAN: That is right.

Mr. MACALUSO: I have this last question, sir, on a point I want to have clarified. Do you reject completely the argument that nuclear weapons are useless for the Canadian armed forces?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I reject the argument that they are useless. They are very, very necessary.

Mr. MACALUSO: That is fine. Thank you very much. I wanted to bring that forward because it is Admiral Brock's contention that they are useless, you see. I just wanted to find out what your views were on this matter.

The CHAIRMAN: The next name on my list is that of Mr. Laniel.

Mr. LANIEL: Admiral, at page 1 of your brief you say that the circumstances of your appearances of yesterday and today are vastly different from those of your appearance last June. However, taking into account the fact that the navy is still there and operating—since we nearly lost two destroyer escorts off the Puerto Rican coast the other day in operation Springboard '67—and if you forget for a moment your information and your prediction about the shortage, and eventual lack, of personnel because of unification, do you still agree with your general statement of June 23 on the operational efficiency of the R.C.N., not taking into account the manning of the ships, about which you have your doubts?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Partly; I am not satisfied that the fleet in an emergency can be properly supported, and that is clear in my brief. I am not satisfied that the replacement program to keep the fleet technically fit is satisfactory either. Other than that, I am satisfied that the ships we have are well-found ships and can do the job that they are supposed to do.

Mr. LANIEL: Sir, at page 228 of the evidence of June 23rd, you said:

> We have the largest capital holdings of any command of the Canadian armed forces.

And you continue and say:

> My inventory of ships, aircraft and equipment gives me a reasonable capability of discharging my responsibilities and the new construction and modernization program I mentioned a few moments ago will increase that capability once it reaches fruition.

To me this means that the navy, in general, from the point of view of capital and expenditures, has been treated very well compared to the other services.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Well, navies are very expensive things to keep up. If the army required equipment of the same capital value as that of the navy you would have so much equipment that you would not know what to do with it. You would have equipment for an army almost five times the size of the one that we have. Capital equipment for the navy is very expensive. You can buy an awful lot of trucks and things for $35 million, the cost of a ship.

Mr. LANIEL: But even at that, if we take into account this statement and the information that has been given in evidence before this Committee about the programs of construction and spending for the navy, does this you the impression that someone at the government level wants to destroy or get rid of the navy?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think someone at the government level has introduced a policy which is destructive of the navy and I think there is some evidence of intention to allow the navy to reduce.

Mr. LANIEL: You do not seem to agree too much with views of other people that support unification or their predictions. But do you not feel that your own prediction in that article in *Maclean's* review did not turn out completely right when you said that unless conditions changed drastically by ...at May the navy will be able to man little more than half of its 23 modern destroyers? Do you feel that we cannot, by this time, man more than half of our fleet?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: If the circumstances that pertained at the time the statement was made still pertain, that would be factual, yes.

Mr. LANIEL: From my point of view, the purpose of your presentation here is mainly to fight Bill No. C-243 and to convince us—the members of the Committee and finally parliament—that it should be revoked. Is this based on your experience and personal feelings as a sailor? Could you tell me where the unification project was initiated? Who sold the idea to the Minister? Were these people servicemen?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I have no idea because there was never any study or paper produced which indicated how anyone had arrived at this.

Mr. LANIEL: That last statement has been contradicted, though, by people presently in the forces.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I would like to know who they are and what they have said and what they have seen, because nobody in the armed forces that I know of has seen a study on unification.

Mr. LANIEL: Three of them are witnesses who have already appeared before the Committee.

It seems that you do approve of integration in principle but you have doubts about what has been achieved up to now. You say that unfortunately the

programs have been given broad-brush treatment and window dressing which looks very good, but because these matters were not properly staffed and studied in detail in advance we now have a most serious situation. So you still say that nothing was studied in advance; no plans were made?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: You were talking on two different parts. In one we are talking about unification and in the other one we are talking integration. You have related that last statement and it was related to integration. With respect to integration I have said that the programs were given broad-brush treatment and window dressing because I mean it. Quite recently one of your admirals came to Halifax and pointed out quite clearly to all officers that there was not sufficient money in the budget to have the equipment which was being purchased and the manpower level necessary to operate it, and that we were going to end up with either one or the other but not both.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Which admiral was that?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Admiral Hennessy.

Mr. LANIEL: At page one of your brief you say that:

> —political science has been used where military science should have been used.

After some of the statements put in front of this Committee by other servicemen, are we to believe that military science exists only in the navy, because most of the military witnesses who have been here—except one—were not navy officers?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think most of the senior officers who share my point of view are now doing what I am doing—farming.

Mr. LANIEL: I would say that these people surely have been consulted; surely are aware of the—

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I strongly recommend that you call them before your Committee and get their point of view.

Mr. LANIEL: Well, they were here.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: You could call General Fleury—he has not been called; you could call Admiral Dyer—he has not been called; you could call Air Chief Marshal Miller who was the Chief of the Defence Staff at the time; and I would suggest that it is very important that you do call him and find out why these people were so disillusioned by what was going on. Then you will have a well balanced picture on which to make a judgment on this bill. Incidentally, some of the senior officers who are presently serving also have said in my presence that they do not go along with it, either. I should not say, "do not go along with it" because they have gone along with it, but they do not agree with it. That does not apply only to service officers. Actually, a member of your Committee, David Groos, does not go along with it.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I think the Admiral has made a statement which—

Mr. LANIEL: Not on my time, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: The Admiral has made a statement which I will have to reject. I may have had some doubts about certain aspects of it but this does not necessarily reflect the statement that the Admiral has just made.

Incidentally, if I may interject at this moment, we have been in touch with Admiral Welland who has stated to the Clerk that he does not wish to appear as he is deeply involved in his personal work. If I may make another remark at this point, I would not like this matter of the visit to Admiral Welland to get out of perspective. My interpretation of this is that Admiral Landymore has not made any charge here; he has merely made an observation in his brief. I happen to think he is wrong on the point of the visit to Admiral Welland and the purpose of it, but this will probably be cleared up, no doubt, by someone getting in touch with Admiral Welland and finding out what did take place. Therefore, I do not regard this as being a charge but merely an observation among many which the Admiral has made. If you wish to continue with your time—

Mr. SMITH: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order in the matter of the witnesses generally, I think some of these witnesses will have to be subpoenaed. It will not be a question of their personal convenience. I would suggest that serious consideration should be given to this matter. It is all very well, perhaps—

The CHAIRMAN: I think we will have to consider this as a Committee.

Mr. SMITH: We should consider whether we want Admiral Welland. The mere matter of phoning a person and having him say: "Well, I do not want to come," I do not think is good enough. It may be that he will refuse to give evidence when he comes, but I think he should come here and say that he will not say anything.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, on a point of privilege, when we are through here—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Deachman, on a point of privilege?

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, there was a definite point of privilege put to this Committee and the point of privilege was that I had gone to see Admiral Welland and had put questions to him on whether or not he was fired, or I had received information of that kind from Admiral Welland, and I deny this. And in order to settle this question—this is an allegation put by Admiral Landymore—I deny this. I do not want to see that standing on the record.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You admitted you had gone there.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Yes, I was there. I was there with David Groos, but this is not a question that was put. It was not a question that was put by me and it was not a question that was put by David Groos and it was no a piece of information which was given voluntarily or mentioned in the conversation by Admiral Welland. I want that matter cleared up. If it is necessary to subpeona Admiral Welland to bring him here let us do so; I want this matter dealt with as a matter of privilege before this Committee. I do not believe a member of parliament in a standing Committee—and I say this for every member of parliament in this room—can allow a witness or somebody else who has raised an issue of privilege of this kind to say that they are not prepared to come before a Committee: that they are too busy to come and see parliament. I do not believe that we, in this room, can tolerate that position.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I think it would be advisable to take this matter up in Committee but not at this very moment. We may take that up later in the day. I will have to get some advice on the legalities of the situation. I am not sufficiently experienced to know exactly what the situation is but I will go into it during the lunch hour.

Mr. Laniel, you have one minute to go.

Mr. LANIEL: Mr. Macaluso had 12 minutes and I think this is unfair. I have only taken eight minutes—I still have two minutes. I will try and do it quickly.

From your statement I conclude that the RCN would have greater difficulty in adapting itself to a project like unification because, as you say, of its particular situation and environment, sea-going operation, uniform, rank structure, supplies and so on. Do you say that if unification were implemented at the end of all this it could be done if a special case were made for the navy?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: That is the bulk of my recommendation.

Mr. LANIEL: Do you believe that unification of the army and air force is possible?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I do not know.

Mr. LANIEL: That is what I conclude from your remarks, anyway.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I do not know how either the army or air force feel about it, but I think they would not be as greatly upset as the navy. There might be some possibility of any amalgamation there but I do not think it is at all satisfactory for the navy.

Mr. LANIEL: At the bottom of the last page of your brief you refer to the statement of the Minister in his speech on second reading where he said:

> '—The paper is a charter, a guide, not a detailed blueprint. The policy outlined in it is not immutable.'

Personally I think that I can take this statement as a protection to all the servicemen because I do not see why I and other people should go by some of your statements; an overnight dictatorship does not scare me too much. The power of the Minister to send troops to Viet Nam and the eventuality of trade unions in the services are absolute affirmations that will have less influence on me and I do not think these things are really helping the Committee because statements like that in comparison to other statements just put the Committee in between. We want to know what will happen and we do not like scarecrows. I would be more interested in knowing this. If you were an adviser of the Minister, in your capacity as an experienced officer—apart from your personal feelings and if a decision had been taken by parliament and you had to implement unification—how far would you go and how would you do it? That is, as a career man who has a job to do? Let us say, in a way to cause less damage because you pretend there is going to be big damage.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: If, after the law was passed and I was still in the armed forces, obviously I would be obliged to carry out the policy. Frankly, I would not be there; I would not stay under those circumstances. I would not leave myself in a position of responsibility and watch a service, of which I am entitled to be sincerely and deeply fond, fall apart underneath my eyes. This was already evident while I was in command, and this is the reason I have taken the

steps I have taken. It was impossible to stay day after day in my command and watch the policy and the ill-advised press leaks, and the other things coming from the Minister's office, virtually destroying the officers and men—their morale, their esprit de corps—under my command.

I do not think if I were given the opportunity to serve after the bill was passed, that I would stay for one second. There are a great many other people who feel absolutely the same way as I do and who will not stay either.

Mr. LANIEL: This is not a question; I am finished, Mr. Chairman, except in saying this means that from the beginning you were against unification and, as a senior officer with great responsibility, you did not even want to go to the trouble of looking for an option.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: There is no question of looking for an option in this case; there was no option given; there are no courses of action open for anybody to select from. There was no detailed explanation of what unification was going to look like.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nugent?

Mr. NUGENT: Admiral, I think perhaps this is a good place for me to start. I get the feeling, and I think the evidence shows—and I ask you if you have a similar opinion—that under present conditions today under this Minister of National Defence, officers who feel it is their duty to give advice feel very constrained in being able to speak frankly to this Minister, because if they are critical it means they will be purged. Is that correct?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I certainly feel that is so, as far as I am personally concerned, but I really could not speak for all the others, Mr. Nugent. I do not know whether any people in the top strata who have access to the Minister are in any way opposing what he is doing, so that I do not know whether those circumstances arise.

Mr. NUGENT: We have the evidence of so many being fired so summarily. Do you know any reason for this? Would it be the military competence of all these gentlemen that suddenly was called into question?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think that most unlikely. I think General Fleury was recognized as a very able, reliable, and knowledgeable officer. I know it to be a fact that Admiral Dyer is a reliable, dedicated officer with tremendous operational experience behind him. I think General Moncel is recognized by people in the army as being a very competent soldier. I do not think there was any question of military competence involved in the Minister's decision. Admiral Stirling, who also went, was undoubtedly a dedicated officer, and a very able one.

Mr. NUGENT: Admiral, the situation, then, is that we have these very capable people, and you cannot give us any reason why they should have been dismissed when they were in their most useful years for the service. Would you then asnwer this: Do you believe that the present atmosphere within the service would tend to lead most serving officers to believe that the best chance for promotion would be to make sure that no criticism came from them about unification, no matter how they feel?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think that all people serving today are very conscious of the fact that it is not a very popular move to be opposed to unification.

Mr. NUGENT: In the brief you had prepared previously, you mentioned that you had worked hard for integration and supported it in principle. Is integration a new principle introduced by this Minister of National Defence?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No, sir.

Mr. NUGENT: The only new principle, then, introduced by this Minister of National Defence, is the concept of his concept of unification.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I do not think it is entirely new as a concept either. It is certainly new as far as Canadian forces are concerned.

Mr. NUGENT: You have been critical before this Committee of some of the effects of integration—the continuing program, shall we say, of integration. Would you care to tell us with respect to integration what steps over the last three or four years you found had worked fairly well and whether they still need a little brushing up, or some of the improvements that have been instituted in the last few years.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Basically, it is very difficult to give a full assessment of where there have been achievements. Undoubtedly there have been a good number of areas of very sensible administrative economy. An area which I can cite, I think, would be the supply of aircraft parts from one system for all three services. I think the navy supply system has improved under that particular arrangement. As far as the navy is concerned, of course, we were integrated operationally, so this is not an achievement of the last four years, and our integration was very successful.

I think there are other areas where economics certainly will be realized in the fullness of time, provided the organizations are sensibly remolded and carried out, but where I feel the error of integration has occurred is that in an effort to economize, perhaps, we have gone so far as to remove a great deal of very essential professionalism in a great number of areas.

To begin with we made the mistake in headquarters, in operations. It was rapidly found out that it was an unsatisfactory move to integrate it so extensively that we removed professionalism. This was put back. It has just been found out in personnel, as Air Marshal Reyno must have told you. I have not seen the official text, but I have seen a copy of his brief, and he has put back into the personnel section the professionalism needed there. It has not gone back yet into such areas as the Defence Staff; it is not composed of a broad enough professional background.

Let me give you an example of how it failed. My organization from Maritime Command was taken to Ottawa to be considered and approved or shot down by the Defence Staff. The only admiral on the Defence Staff was Admiral Dyer, and he happened to be out of town. The Defence Staff sat down with a group of people, none of whom were knowledgeable in any way in maritime warfare. The group consisted entirely of generals and air marshals. I was not present, nor was the admiral from the Pacific coast, nor any of my deputies. Therefore, here we had a military organization being examined in detail and decided upon, and

there was not a solitary professional in the room, in my opinion, competent to pass a judgment on the operational aspects of the organization.

This is readily correctable, and people know of these things, and I am quite sure the in-service arrangements will see that they are corrected. That is where the organization has failed, and I think if the officers now serving continue to look for economies in the administrative field and make them where it is sensible to make them, the integration arrangement will prove to be a satisfactory arrangement.

Unfortunately, so many claims have been made that they are very hard to live up to. I have noticed that more and more seem to be stating obliquely that great economies are being made because someone does not want to be criticized, whereas they do not exist. I think it is putting a peculiar picture in front of the public—and, indeed, in front of servicemen—of what is being achieved by integration. I think the time has come when this has to be very carefully analyzed so that we will know what areas of economy have been achieved, and what areas are not providing economy.

I gave as an example yesterday that I do not think the administrative arrangements for the command I commanded are in any way economical, and I think they can be made more economical, still within the framework of integration.

Mr. NUGENT: Admiral, looking at ways to make it more economical, is it not rather difficult to do a critical examination of these policies in the light of the fact that it is rather dangerous to speak critically in the present atmosphere? Is this going to slow down that process of looking for ways to improve administrative efficiency in the service that you and other people worked for?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I wish I could answer that question. I do not know how the public statements are arrived at, or from what background they derive: I am not in contact with it. I just have to rely on my former experience and what I actually was exposed to prior to mid-July of last year. At that time there was no question in the minds of senior officers that the capital program and the operating costs were not dovetailing very well. Presumably it has become worse because, as I just told you earlier, Vice-Admiral Hennessy came out with it and said to the commanding officers in Halifax, "We cannot have both the equipment and the manpower," so something has got to go somewhere.

Since the program was based on realizing economies, and taking into consideration a reasonable amount of inflation, it seems to me that the claims for the economies of integration have, perhaps, been overstated. The time has come to stop overstating them and analyse very carefully where economies could result and pursue that course, and where it is uneconomical to do something else. This, of course, is why I made such a strong point of the uneconomical aspects of unification, because it is an expensive program and it is not going to achieve anything. Presumably, it would be better to apply the funds which would be used in that program to help maintain the balance that we want to have between capital program and operating costs.

Mr. NUGENT: Admiral, I get the feeling that it is rather an unreal world because of this concentration on how it looks rather than on how it is working. Is there that much lack of planning now going on in this concept of unification, for instance?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think there is a good deal of planning going on.

Mr. NUGENT: Was there any planning for unification that you knew about; any well laid out course of integration of the forces under unification? Is such a plan in existence now of how it would be carried out?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: There are two very general broad plans written by two committees, one headed by General Anderson and one headed by Admiral Hennessy, which treat the program for unification in a very general sort of a way, based on the assumption that unification would take place. It did not argue the pros and cons of unification; it started with the premise that unification would occur and this was what would have to be done. To that extent there was general planning, but I think from that, of course—as Air Marshal Sharp told you here quite recently—there is a very extensive program of planning being carried out, in relation to unification, if it passes through this Committee.

Mr. NUGENT: The planning for unification did not start before 1964, did it? When did that planning start?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I had seen both the reports by General Anderson and Admiral Hennessy prior to leaving the service.

Mr. NUGENT: When would that have been?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I first saw General Anderson's report a very long time after it was written, actually about May of least year. I think I first saw Admiral Hennessy's report about June of last year.

The CHAIRMAN: Your time is up, Mr. Nugent. Mr. Forrestall?

Mr. FORRESTALL: Admiral, I would like to change the direction just a little bit, and come back to the area at the top echelon of our defence command. You said in one of the three documents you forwarded to us earlier, entitled "The Navy's Place in Unification", at page 8 under the heading of "recommendation", and I will just quote it to you to refresh your memory:

> I recommend that since we have the freedom to define unification, this definition should confine itself to unification at the top. The definition should encompass the concept of a single Chief, a single Defence Staff, a single budget, a single program, and single administrative procedures. To go beyond this will indeed split the Navy down the middle and cause an exodus of many of our best people. The consequences from these are obvious.

I would like to deal with what you consider the concept at the top echelon if you would be kind enough to elaborate on the Defence Staff that you, from your professional point of view, think would be best suited. For example, the term "straight line" has been used. How would you work back into our top echelon Defence Staff the relationships to the three environments that have now been disposed of with the amendment to the National Defence Act of 1964-1965, Bill No. C-90, which disbanded the—

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we are having trouble hearing the questioner because of the noise coming from the microphones. Would you repeat your question, Mr. Forrestall?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think I heard enough to answer your question in a very general way, Mr. Forrestall. I believe, first of all, that the Defence Staff should be broadened to contain, for each environment, professionals in every one of the functional fields; in other words, a Defence Staff which would be composed of officers who, as far as maritime warfare is concerned, are competent in operations, personnel, and suply matters, and presumably as well, in engineering; on the land fighting environment section, a similar group; and on the air fighting element, a similar group. This entire group then, would give you at the top a full coverage of all the professional aspects of a fighting force whether it is a single fighting force or three. Within this, one person for each of the environments would be a head of service, so that those people appointed or drafted to the particular environment would have a service head who understands their problems, and who would be in their line of communication.

A single Chief of Defence Staff, under that sort of an arrangement, would act rather more as the chairman of a slightly larger board than he has now, and we could be certain that no matter what matter was under consideration by the staff, a voting member of the staff would be able to express a professional point of view.

I think the example I gave you was when the Maritime Command organization was reviewed. This was a weakness because the staff was not composed in a satisfactory way to pass a professional judgment on that particular aspect. I do not think the serving officers of the Defence Staff in any way feel competent at the present time to deal with all the problems in connection with environmental warfare. For example, an officer whose name I will mention—not in any derogatory way—is sitting in the room. The Vice Chief of the Defence Staff is, in fact, the man responsible for operations. Air Marshal Sharp would be the last one to say to you, "I am competent in maritime warfare". Yet, it is his opinion which is going to decide, or which is going to sway the Chief of the Defence Staff as to how maritime forces are going to be allocated.

Now, we have had a case of this. Last year *Provider* was required for an army exercise, and it was already involved in a naval exercise. Someone had to decide how the split would be made. The decision was taken by the Chief of the Defence Staff—an air marshal—on the advice of a general. Now I do not think in that particular instance they made a bad decision; but it could have been. The area for error was ever present. I emphasize the operational side at every opportunity, because this is the business we are in. We are not in the business of managing a bank or an industry; we are in the business of producing fighting men and fighting equipment. Therefore, all our thinking has got to be oriented to that end, even though on some occasions we may accept certain uneconomical measures in order to achieve greater efficiency where it is justified. If all thinking is oriented toward administration then, of course, we at the business end fail to get what we require.

In summation, what I said in "The Navy's Place in Unification", in suggesting the definition of unification should be: a single chief—a single Defence Staff, I was not thinking of the composition of the present Defence Staff; I was thinking of one covering all the professional aspects of fighting—a single program. This, I think is good and a Defence Staff composed that way would make sure we did have a balanced program, and a single budget, and a single program to spend

that budget, and—to carry it to the extreme—where we had administrative procedures, wherever possible, to fit all three environmental requirements.

I gave you an example of where I think a very good administrative procedure was adopted, and that is where the air force undertook to supply all elements with certain types of equipment. It is perfectly obvious that a common administrative system for pay is an efficient system. These are simple examples; there are many hundreds of them. It is not necessary to have this professional aspect in every part of integration. There are many straight administrative tasks that go on day after day which can be done just as well by a soldier, a sailor or an airman. We can realize all the benefits of that under the integrated organization, without carrying it to the ultimate extreme of unification.

Mr. FORRESTALL: You partially answered my second question. I wanted to ask you—and it is not in the hypothetical context at all, but based on your own professional experience—do you feel that we could have, at the top level here in Ottawa, a totally integrated command structure; unified, if we want to use that word? If I might be theoretical, you could even put them in a unified force and stil effectively operate in three distinct, identifiable environments, that is the navy, army, and the air force, under its present context. This would in no way impair the viability of the three distinct services. In short, could you have your unification and integration at the command level, and at other certain supporting levels, and still operate a navy, an army, and an air force?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Certainly; the effect of leaving matters as they are, having three services in an integrated arrangement, is perfectly feasible in my opinion.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Is this type of operation in effect in any other country? I am sorry this is theoretical, Mr. Chairman. But is this procedure followed elsewhere?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I do not know of any other country that is unified. I know that many staffs, both in war and in peace, have been integrated in other countries. I do not know of anyone who has carried even integration to the extent we have.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I was thinking of this at the top level, and they might describe it under other terms, but the United States, for example has a very closely knit high echelon and use this integration and unification process in the field. The United States navy, for example, has the third largest air force in the world, second only to its own air force and the Russian air force. That is an integration; they have marines and everything else, but it is still the navy. At the top echelon, for all practical purposes, they have one unified command concept, or do I misunderstand?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think you misunderstand. Each of the United States services has a top echelon of service people in their own service. It is brought together through the Joint Chiefs of Staff in somewhat the same manner as we used to bring it together here in Canada under a Chairman, Chiefs of Staff with the three heads of service, the Chairman of the Defence Research Board and the Deputy Minister.

Mr. FORRESTALL: That is all now, Mr. Chairman, but I would like to be put down for the next turn round.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh?

Mr. MCINTOSH: Admiral, last evening Mr. Brewin said, when he opened his questioning, "In all fairness to the Minister, we should refer to what he said in his speech". Similar statements have been made this morning by Mr. Stafford and Mr. Andras in reply to the Minister's speech. I think these quotes from the Minister's speech were an effort to show that your fears were groundless in what you believe will happen to the navy under unification.

I do not know whether you are of the same opinion as I about the Minister's speech; to me it was very confusing. I think as the result of that speech many on this Committee are confused about the meaning of the word "integration" as compared to the word "unification"; we seem to get mixed up in a different definition.

I am going to quote some statements made by the Minister in his speech—if you can all it a speech—which was supposed to clarify this Bill No. C-243. Under the heading "Advantages of the Single Service" we find this statement:

> The principle of the Bill to create a single Service is very simple.

Under the heading "Aim of the Reorganization" we find this statement:

> "However, the end objective of a single service is firm."

Under the heading "The Single Service Concept" the Minister said:

> —the three services would no longer retain their status as individual entities within the Canadian Forces.

He also said under the same heading:

> The concept of three separate service entities was thereby abandoned in favour of one.

Under the same heading, he says:

> Comprehension of the concept of a single service will be assisted by an understanding of the structure of the force.

Then he says:

> None of these will be changed in moving to a single service from three separate services.

None of them will be changed. He continues:

> Moreover, a single service will involve no change in the organization of these force units into formations such as brigades, air wings, or squadrons of ships.

My question to you is: From what has already been said and what I have quoted from the Minister's speech, how can these services be different and still be identical?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think, in endeavouring to answer your question, I find myself in the same boat as you—there is no answer to that.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I thought you said last evening you understood unification when I asked you a question; that you understood what the Minister was saying in his speech. I admit that I cannot understand what he said.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I indicated I think there were inconsistencies in what he said in his speech, but I did not say that I could not understand what he was saying. I did not go through the speech to look for contradictions.

Mr. McINTOSH: Do you admit that there are contradictions in his speech?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: You apparently have found some.

Mr. McINTOSH: My second question is: How can the three separate service entities be abandoned in favour of one and there still be no change in the three services?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Of course, that is perfectly obvious. There is going to be a change in the three services, if only a physical change in appearance.

Mr. McINTOSH: What does the Minister mean in his statement and I quote:

> None of the these will be changed in moving to a single service from three separate services.

Would you agree with the article in the press which stated that many of Mr. Hellyer's arguments in support of unification have an improvised air about them as though he had dreamed up unification first and then devised the evidence in support of it afterwards?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I am sure that is so. I asked him that very question myself. I asked him, in order to help me support the program of unification, whether he would give me an example of where there might be greater efficiency and economy. The answer I got was that every nation in the world would follow our example.

Mr. McINTOSH: For what reason?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I do not know for what reason.

Mr. McINTOSH: Admiral, I want to refer to the last part of the brief which you presented last evening under the heading of "Summary and Recommendations" and "Fourth", which is underlined. You say:

> (a) The powers of the Minister of National Defence. In the present Bill, they are far too sweeping. He is given a blank cheque.

Then in (c) under the same heading you say:

> Consider the place of Mobile Command against the possibility of the military taking civil control.

The Minister made a statement in Edmonton that the whole issue was in regard to civilian control over the military, and in the House later he said it was one person that caused him to make such a statement. Was that one person you, Admiral?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: He certainly made that statement in Edmonton in relation to me.

Mr. McINTOSH: In relation to you?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes.

Mr. McINTOSH: What were the circumstances leading up to his making such a statement?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: The fact that I had spoken out publicly against unification.

Mr. McINTOSH: Did you think that the Minister had no responsibility as far as the military is concerned and that the responsibility was all yours as far as the people of Canada were concerned?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No, I did not sir. I traced the whole circumstances which led to this in the brief which I sent to you. I think if you trace the history of my relationship with unification, you will find there was no desire on my part to speak out in public against it until I was certain in my own mind that unless I did it nothing would never be brought to the attention of the public. Moreover, I was expressing not just my own personal point of view but, as I pointed out in the brief, the point of view of a very large number of responsible people.

I do not think the Minister for one second really thought that I was taking civil control or even dictating government policy. I think he was quite certain in his own mind that he had to bring this legislation to parliament before he could act. I think he found that someone like myself, who was opposed to his views, was a nuisance and it was better to eliminate the nuisance and get on with his views.

Mr. McINTOSH: Was there any suggestion, in your discussions with the Minister about your opposition to the program of unification, that there would be a coup of any type by the senior military personnel in the three different forces?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No sir.

Mr. McINTOSH: You cannot remember anything that would suggest to the Minister there was a possibility of this which would cause him to make such a statement?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No. When I saw him after he made that particular statement I did not discuss with him his point of view in relation to what I had done.

Mr. McINTOSH: I will drop that subject for a moment, Admiral. I was very interested in your remarks this morning when you said that steward personnel from the army were now used as stewards with the navy. Was this because you have not sufficient personnel within the navy recruitment program to fill these positions?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes, we have a shortage of stewards. I am not too familiar with the figures, but I assume that was the reason.

Mr. McINTOSH: You have a shortage of stewards. Is there any branch in the navy that is not short of personnel?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: There were acute shortages in about half of the trades of the navy at the time I left. I could not say what the present situation is. I have no access to day-by-day assessments of strength as I had when I was the Admiral in Halifax.

Mr. McINTOSH: Are you quite in accord with our program of national defence as it was while you were a serving officer, in that the defence of North America now will only be attained by continental defence against ballistic missiles, and so on? Is it possible for Canada to defend her borders herself against aggression?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No, it is not possible. We always have to depend on making a contribution to the United States to ensure our defence and, I think, to collective defence arrangements, rather more to demonstrate a willingness to prevent war than an arrangement that gives us all the security that we need.

Mr. MCINTOSH: With your understanding—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh, will you make this your last question at this time.

Mr. MCINTOSH: My last question to the Admiral will be this then: Where the Minister refers at all times to a single service—which I cannot understand, and I have never found anyone yet who actually understands it, including the presentation made by Air Marshal Sharp, the Vice Chief of the General Staff do they not more or less mean the funeral service for the armed forces? Please put me down for the next round, Mr. Chairman.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think I could comment on that. I think unification having a single service—would make a good deal of sense if the Canadian government decided we would have only one role; a very limited single role. But it makes no sense if we are going to continue to carry out the roles that are indicated in the White Paper.

Mr. MCINTOSH: We would have to opt out of these collective defence agreements that we have?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Well, unification has serious disadvantages to continuing with the present commitment as laid down in the White Paper. This leads me to suggest that someone has it in mind to change the role, because if unification does make sense, then it also means that it is based on having only one role.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I will continue my questioning on that line in the next round.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Harkness, you are next.

Mr. HARKNESS: I was concerned over the statement you said Admiral Hennessy had made, that the amount of equipment required for the maritime role or the amount of manpower would have to be reduced. Either one or the other would have to, I think was the phrase.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I do not think Admiral Hennessy was referring specifically to the maritime role. I would think he was talking about the armed forces across the board; there was not enough money both to buy the total capital program and to maintain the size of force required to operate what would come out of that program, and that something had to give.

Mr. HARKNESS: In other words, your assumption from this statement would be that the number of personnel is going to be further reduced or, otherwise, the equipment to be secured is going to be reduced and, therefore, it would not be possible to carry on the roles now laid down in the White Paper?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I would assume so, or else there would have to be a budgetary increase to cover the discrepancies.

Mr. HARKNESS: Now, as far as the navy itself is concerned—from this point of view—with the 28 ships still in commission, how many naval personnel are required to operate these ships; in other words, to keep them at sea?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I will have to refer to a chart to give you that information. It is a chart which you have, incidentally. It is part of the brief that I prepared for the Committee the last time I was here.

The total manpower—men that is—who man the fleet as we have it now, including the ships program, is 17,500. The number we had at the time I left the service was some 14,500—reading it roughly off the graph—so we were about 3,000 people. I think the actual figure I used at the briefing was 2,600 people short of the numbers needed to meet the program.

Mr. HARKNESS: There are roughly 18,000 personnel in the navy at the present time. What are the remainder of these people?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I was referring only to men, not officers.

Mr. HARKNESS: I see. What would be the total including officers?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Under integration it is impossible to assess the total number of officers required. So many officers of the navy are used in positions which are open to officers of the three services that the establishment has to be based on an over-all requirement for officers, rather than a single requirement to man ships or an aircraft. I am afraid that I cannot give you that kind of information. You would have to ask that question of Air Marshall Reyno, and I suppose the way to ask it would be to ask how many professionals in each of the separate fighting environments is necessary within the organization.

Mr. HARKNESS: As a professional naval officer of high competence I thought you were the best witness to state the number of personnel required to keep these ships in operation, and that is why I asked you the question. But your answer essentially is 17,500 men, plus how many officers?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: We kept a fleet of about that size with about 1,700 officers previously; I would have thought something of that order.

Mr. HARKNESS: In view of the fact—as we were told on Thursday by the Minister—that only 16 of these 28 ships are now in full operation, is it your view this is due to a shortage of trained men?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I do not want to duck your question, Mr. Harkness, but I do not have access to detailed information about what changes are contemplated, and how ships are being manned, or the re-engagement strenght of the forces at this very moment. So all I can do is make a guess. But I suggest that the situation, as far as the destroyers are concerned, is not as bad as I predicted, because the refit of *Bonaventure* has been very considerably delayed. The demands for personnel to man her have also been delayed and so presumably, there are people available to keep the destroyers in operation for a little longer.

Mr. HARKNESS: How long?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Well, I am afraid I am just six months too late to give you an accurate answer to the question.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, in view of the fact that *Bonaventure* is in for refit plus, apparently, seven other vessels, and in spite of that fact apparently there are four of the destroyers not in operation, but are tied up because they are not fully manned, what conclusion do you reach from those facts?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: The same conclusion that I had arrived at in June—that we are very short of personnel and it is reflected either by ships being laid up or ships being sent out with reduced crews.

Mr. HARKNESS: In view of the fact that there are still some 18,000 people in the Navy, can you give any other explanation of why only 16 of these ships would be in operation and able to go to sea?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I do not think we have that many men in the Navy. I think it is well below the requirement.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, the figures that we were given on a return which I received just two or three days ago show something in the neighbourhood of 17,200, if you subtract the people who are on terminal leave.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: That would include officers?

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes, that would include officers.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I would say that was about right.

Mr. HARKNESS: But it would still seem that this should be enough to operate at least these 20 ships, which are the ones not in the refit or otherwise out of commission for other reasons.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No sir, that is not enough to man them. We need very nearly 17,500 men alone, not including officers, so if the total figure is something of the order of 18,000 now, it is obvious that we could not meet our commitments.

Mr. HARKNESS: I thought you said earlier that in order to man these 28 ships we required 17,500 men and some 1,700 officers, and as we are down below that—something in the neighbourhood of 3,000—does it not seem a little peculiar that we are still able to man only 16?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I am sorry, I do not follow your arithmetic here.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, we have a total of something like 17,500 personnel in the Navy—officers and men—and we are manning only 16 ships. I think your statement was that in order to man the 28 ships we actually possess, it would require in the neighbourhood of 19,500 personnel.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I am having the greatest difficulty in following this questioning. I am sorry. I am not trying to duck answering these questions, Mr. Harkness, I just do not really follow what you are trying to get.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, I just do not understand why 4 ships are tied up and not in operation, apparently because we have not got sufficient men to man them.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Well, you have given me your own answer to that; we are short of men, so we cannot man them. But I think, perhaps, where we are at odds here is that all the ships in refit are not unmanned. *Bonaventure,* of course, I imagine is far below her normal complement. But the destroyers, which are in maintenance in their first days of their operating cycle, have their man-power totally allocated. So, even though they were alongside they would have their complement. And even though they are refitting their ships, or in maintenance, they would have a full quota. So, I do not think the counting of the total number of ships at sea in operations can be separated from the ones

that are in maintenance well when you are talking in terms of the tota manpower available.

Mr. HARKNESS: What I was coming to following that was: Is this situatio due, to a large extent, not so much to the crude figures of the number of peopl in the Navy as the fact that in a large number of the specialist trades, as yo mentioned earlier, there is an acute shortage?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: It is just a general shortage of personnel. I thin in the past year we very nearly got within the total numbers of people required We had the trades quite well balanced in relation to crews. In other words, w are not so short of one trade that we are holding ships out of operation becaus of that one trade. Within the totals that we have, the complement is quite we balanced now. Initially we were putting ships alongside partly for the reason c shortage, and partly for the reason of lack of balance of key personnel. But tha has been corrected; now I think it is just a general shortage. For the period of years that I was in Halifax, we were not getting nearly enough recruits to kee the strength up; we were falling behind all the time. And, of course, this wi reflect later on because it takes quite a long time to make those men skillfu enough to bring them up, so that the efficiency drops for that reason alone.

Mr. HARKNESS: I would now like to—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Harkness, I will have to call an end to your questioning At this point you have gone over the 10 minutes that we agreed upon; I hav allowed you 12 minutes. Do you have a series of questions?

Mr. HARKNESS: No, I was going to revert to some of the specific points in th Admiral's brief, so if my time is up, perhaps you had better put me down for th next round.

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, I will.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I would like to raise a point of order Mr. Chairman; we ar close to the noon adjournment. My impression has always been that the commit tees of the House of Commons operate quite freely without any direct or indirec influence from ministers. We have seen this morning the Associate Minister c Defence conversing at great length with members of this Committee, and he i supported by his staff. I wonder whether this is the procedure which is normall followed in committee—I have not seen it before. The interest of the Associat Minister is well known, so perhaps we should call him to the stand so that h could participate publicly with us. I believe he is very seriously concerned abou the continuing deterioration of the forces, and perhaps we should hear from him

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, may I make a comment on that point? Unles Mr. Churchill has radar ears to hear what anyone is saying, perhaps he shoul not put into question what members are talking about back and forth, becaus unless he knows that the matters of this Committee are being discussed, then suggest that this allegation is false like many others that are presented here b him.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, if I may just have a word, I do not think th is really a point of order; it is just another curious Churchillian observation.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I consider sir, it is a valid point of order. I think ther should be no direct or indirect influencing of committees by Ministers, unles

hey become part of the committee or take the stand. And that is all I am asking. know how disturbed the Associate Minister is with regard to the way things are leteriorating in the defence service.

The CHAIRMAN: With regard to your point Mr. Churchill, if the Committee wishes to call—Order, please!

If the Committee wishes to call the Associate Minister before it, of course it s perfectly able to do so, but I would say, at the moment we have just as many witnesses as we can handle, presuming we have General Foulkes, who has agreed to come before us this afternoon. It is your question period, Mr. Churchill.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I would prefer to adjourn for lunch at 12.30, rather than have my questions plit into two parts.

The CHAIRMAN: It seems to me that we now have arrived at a point where we have to make a decision as a Committee on what we wish to do. We have Mr. Churchill, Mr. Stafford, Mr. Macaluso, Mr. Forrestall, Mr. McIntosh and Mr. Harkness.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, I pass; you can take me off the list.

Mr. STAFFORD: I will pass too.

The CHAIRMAN: I find this hard to believe. That leaves Mr. Churchill, Mr. Forrestall, Mr. McIntosh and Mr. Harkness on the questioning. Mr. Nugent, I did not put you down; where you will fit in?

Mr. NUGENT: Put me at the end.

The CHAIRMAN: We invited General Foulkes to appear today and General Foulkes deferred to Admiral Landymore this morning; these are arrangements which I must confess I made. It seems to me that it might be possible to complete the questioning of Amiral Landymore this morning, if you are able to continue until 1 o'clock. Is that your wish? Would you like to continue and see how the questioning goes? Mr. Churchill, Mr. Forrestall, Mr. McIntosh, Mr. Harkness and Mr. Nugent.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Are you confining us to ten minutes in the next round?

Mr. CHAIRMAN: No, it is not necessary; I am in your hands.

Mr. MCINTOSH: This just points up the objection that we raised on several occasions of having so many meetings so close together, and calling so many different witnesses. You cannot possibly do it completely, the way we want it done and the way that the people of Canada want it done.

The CHAIRMAN: I accept that observation.

Mr. MCINTOSH: And you also said last evening that the continuity of questioning of one witness, was very necessary and it should not be broken up by the intervention of some other witnesses. Now, are you changing that decision you made last evening

The CHAIRMAN: No, I am just hoping—that was an observation also. It is very difficult to assess how long it is going to take. It depends upon the length of the questions that are put to the witnesses and the number of questioners. This does not mean to say that we should limit our questioning in any way, but I think those of you who have been chairmen will agree that this is a difficulty the

Chairman faces. I do not think it is impossible to rule upon the number and length of questions that members wish to put to witnesses. So, could I ask if you would continue until 1 o'clock?

Mr. MACALUSO: Agreed, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, on the basis of the number of questioners that you have just read off which was 6 or 7, and if they are only 10 minutes each, it is still going to take more than one hour and, I think, considerably more than that.

The CHAIRMAN: I am hoping that some of the questioners will not take their entire 10 minutes.

Mr. HARKNESS: I do not think that is a very reasonable hope.

Mr. MACALUSO: We have some courtesy to pay to the witnesses that have been called to appear here today who have come along way, as the Admiral has. I think this has to be taken into consideration by the Chair. We just cannot call a witness and leave him sit here for two or three days. At the same time, I can understand the point of questioning. I think we are doing very well; let us continue until 1 o'clock, Mr. Chairman, and then perhaps, if necessary, we may have to bring on General Foulkes. Perhaps the Admiral will not mind coming back later on this evening if we finish General Foulkes. I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we continue and adjourn at 1 o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN: Would you agree to sit until 1 o'clock and see how it goes?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

Mr. NUGENT: I am hungry now. We usually sit until 12.30, and I do not think there is any possibility of finishing. It does not seem quite logical to me to say, "let us go on a little longer" when we are sure we are not going to finish. We are going to be back anyway. This is our usual noon-hour adjournment time, and I suggest we continue the practice.

The CHAIRMAN: We have sat until 1 o'clock before, have we not?

An hon. MEMBER: We have sat until 1 o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN: I think we have gone on until 1 o'clock before. Would you agree to continue until 1 o'clock today?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, Mr. Churchill, it seems to be the consensus that we will continue until 1 o'clock, so you have the floor, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I will likely ask to be put on the next round, too. I would like to ask the Admiral this question. With regard to the brief that the Admiral presented to us yesterday, was that brief subjected to any censorship by the present Minister?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: There was no resemblance, then, to the action that was taken last June when your brief, presented to the Committee at that time, was seriously censored by the Minister?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No sir, no similarity.

Mr. CHURCHILL: The portion that was out in June, 1966, was one of the most vital parts of the evidence that you had expected to give to the Committee. Is that correct?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Has there been any attempt to intimidate you with regard to any evidence that you might, give to this Committee? I know you would not respond to intimidation, but has that happened at all?

Mr. LANDYMORE: No, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I think you mentioned in the earlier brief you submitted to us that there was some suggestion that you would be subject to a court martial. A very mysterious figure who appears from time to time in press reports called a "spokesman for the Minister" is alleged to have made this threat. We had a spokesman for the Minister unmasked by Scott Young. I wonder if that is the same spokesman that you mention in your brief?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think I named him in my brief.

Mr. CHURCHILL: No, you called him a "Minister's spokesman".

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes, that is so. I thought you were referring to something else.

Mr. CHURCHILL: And was there a threat of court matial at that time?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Not in any correspondence or contact with me; such a statement I read in the press.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I think I read it in the press too, and it was attributed to this mysterious spokesman of the Minister. Well we will get something that is not hearsay then, if the Committee wants it. With regard to civilian control and the great scaring of the public that the Minister attempted last summer, about July 16, I will read from the Winnipeg *Tribune* of that date, which quotes Mr. Hellyer directly. The article reads:

> Mr. Hellyer said the law said the Minister and the government were responsible for the running of the armed forces...

And then the next words are a direct quote of the Minister:

> ...This is the law, and this is the way it will work...for a change,..

That is the end of his direct quotation. The article then goes on:

> He said in the past the military people have run things.

And then the direct words of the Minister:

> "This is strictly an issue of civilian control."

I would like to ask this question of you, Admiral: In your long, distinguished service under I do not know how many ministers of the Crown, has it been your opinion over the years that the military people were running things in this country and not the civilian authority?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No, never.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It never came to your attention?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I do not say it never came to my attention. I just said that the military at no time attempted to run this country in any way, shape or form, that I know of.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Hellyer said:

This is the law, and this is the way it will work...for a change...

Were former ministers, going back during your period of service, subject to military control or did they exercise full civilian control?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I do not know of any Minister who was subject to military control.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It is just an attempt on the part of the Minister to scare the public, I think, and get us all aroused and excited.

I would like to ask you a question with regard to the subject of morale which has been in front of us on one or two occasions. From your long experience as a trainer of service personnel for the Navy and your long experience as an active combat officer, with many of the hazards of war attached to that, you tend to place a great deal of emphasis on morale. Is it your opinion that a commander, who has had combat service as you have had, is in a better position to judge the question of morale than civilians and non-combatant officers?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I ask you this with regard to the training of forces for the Navy: under the present set-up a Training Command has been established. Have you any idea of how that Training Command will function with regard to men who volunteer for service and wish to become naval personnel? What sort of training will they get under Training Command and then what are the following steps in order to make them naval personnel? Will they receive, under Training Command, the type of training that would be suitable for men who are going to serve on ships at sea.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I do not see how Training Command can make any changes in the type of professional training people get for each of the three separate environments. After all, even though we are not going to have navies, armies, and air forces, we are still going to have soldiers, sailors and airmen. They have to be trained as such, and technically trained as such, so I would not think there is going to be any difference in the professional training that Training Command will adopt.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Do you see any improvement in the training for naval work by Training Command over what was done in the past?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Have you had any past contacts with the Minister for External Affairs, who has spoken on matters of policy and the linking of foreign policy with our defence policy? Have you had the opportunity on any occasion to discuss the defence of Canada with him?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: That is unfortunate because I think he has been made an honourary colonel inthe militia and might have something to contribute. However, my question is based on a statement that he made on September 15, 1964, to the Atlantic Treaty Association at Ottawa, and in the course of that statement on Page 3 he used these words:

> In the field of defence, Canada has begun the process of reshaping its armed services to meet the tasks they are likely to be called upon to perform in the next ten to twenty years.

The Minister of National Defence has used somewhat similar language. Both these gentlemen have better knowledge than average mortals of what is going to happen in the next 10 to 20 years and we have to be very careful when we deal with their statements, but I would ask you this: From your experience of warfare in the Second World War, Korea, from your study of what is going on in the world and all the international crises that have sprung up in the last 25 years, and what is going on now in Viet Nam, do you see—other than the change in superior weapons, perhaps—any marked change in the task that a navy would be asked to perform during the next 10 to 20 years? Will there be some fundamental change that would then require this alteration to a single service?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No sir, I do not see any fundamental change in the foreseeable future for naval forces of the type we have. Both major Communist navies have submarines; both of them will have the capability of placing missiles off our coasts. I would have thought that the need to demonstrate that we can control those situations in the sea area will remain, certainly, for 20 years.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I have just one final question. If I asked the Minister for External Affairs whether he is prepared to meet with you, and Admiral Brock and some of the other senior officers who have been purged by Mr. Hellyer, would you be prepared to meet him and discuss the future with regard to Canada's defence forces?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Of course.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Forrestall?

Mr. FORRESTALL: Admiral, all of the letters I have had from various officers and men in the service, with one exception, tended to express grave concern and doubts about their future in the armed services. As a matter of fact, a good many of them have indicated to me in their letters that they were seriously considering removing themselves from the service, notwithstanding the losses that might be incurred. I wonder, in your capacity as Commander, Maritime Command and senior naval officer on the Atlantic coast, whether you could tell the Committee whether or not there was widespread unrest documented, for example, by your telling us whether or not any of these officers or men, or both, approached you seeking advice on what they should do about their careers?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes a large number of them came to see me to seek advice and are still coming to me to seek advice.

Mr. FORRESTALL: You say "a large number". Would that be 10 or 15, 20, 30?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Directly, I would say of the order of 50 or 60 and indirectly, perhaps as many as 100 or more. I have not combed my correspondence but I, like you, have had hundreds of letters from serving people on these matters. It would be unlikely that too many people would approach me in this regard, because you will remember the brief which I sent to you. A great number of officers promised me personally that they would not retire from the

Navy until such time as the legislation had been passed. The vast majority—in fact, all of these people—are, in my opinion, men of their words, so I do not think they would make direct overtures to get out or do anything else until they are automatically released from that undertaking. Of course, the undertaking was given me in order to protect the fibre of the Navy as long as it could be protected under these circumstances, so that while people are still coming to seek advice they are not, I think, timing it as they might have timed it had circumstances been different.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Admiral, what I am getting at is that earlier today certain inferences were left with regard to a series of meetings you had with the men in your command, particularly those at *Stadacona*. I wonder, for the benefit of the record if it is not classified and you feel it is in pour competence to do so, or if it would be of benefit to the Committee, whether you could enlarge upon that series of meetings and tell us exactly what took place?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think the best way to do that would be simply to read from the brief that I have prepared for all members of parliament.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I read it quite clearly, Admiral. What I am wondering is whether you care to place it on the official record? The other three briefs are not part of our proceedings here.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I will be glad to if you think there is any purpose in my doing so.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I do.

The CHAIRMAN: Is it the wish of the Committee that this be tabled?

Mr. NUGENT: We want it on the official record, not appended to it.

Mr. FORRESTALL: How many people would want to read the proceedings of this Committee? Next week it will not be a matter of press information.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, this has been in our hands for a long time and I see nothing wrong with having the three briefs, or whatever brief Mr. Forrestall is referring to, printed as appendices to today Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence as part of the Admiral's presentation.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Mr. Chairman, on this point of order, the matter was raised this morning and certain inferences were left. I would not want to impute motives that were not there, but certainly my own opinion of what took place here this morning makes me think the matter should be clarified, and it should be clarified now.

The CHAIRMAN: That seems reasonable.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, on the point of order regarding the tabling of these briefs, I want to be quite sure that the point of privilege I raised this morning with respect to an item in one of those briefs is properly dealt with, and that we do not find ourselves in a situation where the brief stands alone on the record without a settlement of the point of privilege that I raised. I think hon. members would consider that only fair. I see nothing wrong with attaching those briefs as an appendix to today's record the moment we get that matter cleared up.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I have no objection to the tabling of the briefs, but I would ike to have, in its proper context, the other side of a certain inference and I agree with Mr. Deachman that indeed—

The CHAIRMAN: Is it agreed that we should table these and make them part of the record of the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of today?

Mr. LANIEL: Mr. Chairman, as long as someone does not come along later and say, "Well, I have written a brief about the Navy or about the Air Force; could it be included in the evidence?"

An hon. MEMBER: We deal with them as we see them.

The CHAIRMAN: The Admiral would like to read now. Have you outlined how far you wish him to read?

Mr. FORRESTALL: Oh, just that portion dealing with the meetings. He can paraphrase it; it is not necessary for him to read it or, if he chooses to read it, that is all right.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Prior to that I endeavoured to show you in the brief that I was very seriously concerned about the morale of the officers and that I felt it necessary to take some action with respect to it. Now, quoting from the brief, page 8, bottom line—

> I decided to act, to check this deterioration of morale amongst my officers. The way I acted, and it is this that caused the Minister's "spokesman" to hint I had intimated my officers and men, was to call to a meeting all officers of my Command of the rank of Commodore, Captain and Commander. This meeting occurred in July last year.

That was the year 1965.

> At the meeting I made these points clearly, emphatically and with conviction.—
>
> *First*—That unification had not been defined so we were allowing ourselves to be demoralized by an unknown quantity.
>
> *Second*—The National Defence Act called for three services which couldn't be changed to a single service without an amendment to the Act in Parliament and I was certain that good sense would prevail in this important matter.
>
> *Third*—I traced the events concerning unification up to that time in precisely the same way as I've traced them for you today.
>
> *Fourth*—I told them I could see no merit in forcing the navy to lose its identity and referred to our dress, our traditions, our rank structure, and the designators for our ships. Finally, I told them regardless of my personal views I would represent their viewpoint and that they would have an opportunity to indicate to me what their point of view was. I then asked them to stand to signify agreement with the following points.—
>
> *First*—That they wished me to represent their viewpoint.
>
> *Second*—That they wouldn't feel they couldn't speak openly and frankly about their views on unification in the service and outside. I pointed out that this would be the state of affairs until the law was changed in Parliament. I told them not only was it quite proper to talk about it but that I encouraged them to do so.

Third—That they should not consider a loss of identity for the navy inevitable and so become apathetic about it.

Fourth—and this is most important—that they wouldn't ask to be retired because they couldn't accept the theory of unification. I pledged that if their viewpoint was ignored that it would be I alone who would take appropriate action in protest.

Fifth—That for the information of people outside the room the purpose of our meeting was to discuss morale.

Now, it goes on, Mr. Chairman, to some statistics on a number of people present and reference to two similar meetings that occurred subsequently in the month of August, and then to a reference to my reporting these actions to the Chief of Personnel on August 23 after the third meeting.

The CHAIRMAN: Does that cover your point Mr. Forrestall?

Mr. FORRESTALL: It does Mr. Chairman. Thank you, and thank you Admiral. I would like now to relate that back to what appears to me to be indicated from the letters and mail I have received from these men; that—quite the contrary to the position you were left in, Admiral, by certain innuendo, or procedure by innuendo, and remarks by spokesmen in the Minister's office, and contrary to that general, very unsatisfactory feeling that was left—you indeed did everything in your power to advise these people and to encourage them not to jump to conclusions about what might be going to take place. Quite the contrary—you left them with some encouragement; you tried to sustain their morale and indeed you, and perhaps you alone—and I do not like to impute motives to you—perhaps stopped what could have been a mass exodus from the RCN in the eight or nine months prior to your dismissal and subsequent to it. Am I way off base in drawing that conclusion?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No sir, you are not way off base; generally those were my motives. I felt very strongly that I simply could not allow the fibre of the Navy to be destroyed by something that might not be necessary. It has not yet been decided whether the armed forces will be unified, so it seems to me that in the summer of 1965 it would have been very premature for any officer to become so disillusioned at that stage that he would retire for that reason.

In addition of course as I said yesterday, throughout the whole of this thing my motive—and it probably sounds holier-than-thou at this stage of the game—has been a concern for the defence of my country, and since I alone was charged with the responsibility for the maritime defence of Canada, obviously I would have been derelict in my responsibility had I not taken steps at that time with my officers to bolster morale, and had I not later on brought this matter to public attention. I am very hopeful today, and have been all along, that your Committee will see fit either to shelve this matter indefinitely and so support the viewpoint that I expressed there, or amend the bill sufficiently to remove at least the most unpalatable aspects in the hope that we can restore the confidence of our naval officers and men, and thereby restore our maritime defence in the way it should be restored.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Is my time up now? It is 1 o'clock, I think?

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, it is almost 1 o'clock—

Mr. FORRESTALL: I call it 1 o'clock, but I have one further area of questioning, Mr. Chairman, that I would like to get into. Will you put me down again?

The CHAIRMAN: We have to decide now what our procedure is going to be from here on. I am in hands of the Committee. I have told you what the arrangements are, and this is something you will have to help me resolve. General Foulkes was invited to appear this morning. He has consented to delay his appearance until this afternoon. Evidently we still have some questions for the present witness from Mr. McIntosh, Mr. Harkness, Mr. Nugent and again Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I asked that my name be put on the list when I first started.

The CHAIRMAN: When you first started?

Mr. CHURCHILL: When I spoke just a little while ago.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, I was paying attention and I do not see it here, but I will put your name down.

Now, what is your wish, gentlemen?

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, we have invited General Foulkes to appear before us. He has been delayed now. The Admiral has presented us with a very long brief and there has been a great deal of questioning giving rise to further questioning, no doubt, but I do believe that we should go ahead with the other witness General Foulkes, who has been scheduled for this afternoon.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, that has not been the procedure in the past. The point was made that you had invited a witness to appear here this afternoon. I hope you have not given a commitment to him that his time before the Committee would be restricted just to a certain number of minutes or hours?

The CHAIRMAN: No, I did not.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You have given no indication to him that he will be finished this afternoon and that he may not continue tonight. Now apparently this is the way you are proceeding and this is one of the reasons you gave us for these continual meetings, which we objected to in the first place.

I felt last night that you had decided you would deal with one witness, and continue with that witness, until the Committee was satisfied that they had asked the witness all the questions they wished. I see no reason why you should change that procedure daily.

The CHAIRMAN: We have not changed our procedure.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You are in the process of doing it now.

The CHAIRMAN: We are meeting with this problem: The Admiral tells me that he wishes to return to Halifax some time later today. He has an engagement tomorrow that he cannot miss. There was some inclemency in the weather this morning when we came in here. Now, what do you wish to do this afternoon?

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, I think the only reasonable thing is for us to complete the questioning of Admiral Landymore this afternoon as the first order of business.

The CHAIRMAN: I certainly have no wish to try to cut off the questioning. Mr. Macaluso?

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, may I ask the Admiral by what time he has to leave this afternoon?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I do not have to leave at any specific time. I could leave later on this evening, but I would like to be in Halifax for certain tomorrow. The ceremonies are in my honour; there are a large number of people involved, so I feel I must attend.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, perhaps we can deal with General Foulkes this afternoon. I am sure that his presentation will not be as long and detailed as the Admiral's because of circumstances. Then we could complete our questioning of the Admiral this evening so that he could keep his commitment tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN: Can I have some indication of the number of questions? It might help the Chair if we had some idea.

Mr. FORRESTALL: If it is of any assistance to you, I have only one other area of questions which might take 15 minutes.

Mr. NUGENT: May I ask the Chairman whether General Foulkes understood that he was to come and give evidence when we had finished with Admiral Landymore? I think that it is the usual procedure. I am sure he will understand that the Committee cannot be certain of the time or hour we shall finish with any one person. He is available in Ottawa. I can see no point in interjecting him this afternoon and then going back to Admiral Landymore. I believe we will be finished with Admiral Landymore handily this afternoon and we could then start with the General. I do not think he would find it unreasonable of us to ask him to wait that little time this afternoon until we are finished with this witness.

Mr. CHURCHILL: The loss of time was caused by Mr. Deachman who is overly sensitive.

Some hon. MEMBERS: No! No!

The CHAIRMAN: Order, Order! I would say that seems a sensible arrangement to me and the indications are that we will be able to fit in all our arrangements. I will personally phone General Folkes and ask him to hold himself in readiness to appear a little later this afternoon than we had originally intended.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, does that mean we will question the Admiral this afternoon and General Foulkes this evening?

The CHAIRMAN: Later on this afternoon. There seems to be some indication that we will be finished not too long after—

Mr. MACALUSO: Perhaps under the circumstances we should agree to sit this evening, if it is necessary, to hear General Foulkes.

The CHAIRMAN: We will meet that when we come to it.

Mr. MACALUSO: I suggest that this be seriously considered, because we also have a responsibility to see that General Foulkes gets back to his home base by this evening.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you for that contribution. Thank you very much for helping the Chair in this matter, and we will adjourn now until 3:30.

AFTERNOON SITTING

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we have a quorum. When our proceedings were adjourned for lunch Admiral Landymore was just about to be questioned by Mr. McIntosh.

Mr. McINTOSH: Admiral, when I was questioning you before lunch I was dealing with the terms collective defence and continental defence and alliance policy. I take it from what you said that you were fully in agreement with the collective defence policies or alliances that we have entered into. I refer to NATO, NORAD SACLANT, and so on. When you first heard of the term "unification" was it your understanding that there would be another force formed, another commitment to the Canadian forces, in that there would be an additional role that Canadian forces would play in that they would be used for peacekeeping purposes under the supervision of the United Nations. Was this a concern of yours at that time?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No, and it is not a concern now, sir.

Mr. McINTOSH: It still is not a concern?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Only if the other roles are dropped and peacekeeping becomes a single role.

Mr. McINTOSH: Did I understand from your testimony, admiral, that as far as your forces were concerned you were having difficulty in getting recruitment to fulfil your role to NATO?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: We have been having difficulty getting recruits. I do not think it is associated very much with our role.

Mr. McINTOSH: Did you have sufficient recruits coming in to keep up the role to which you had been committed?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Formerly yes.

Mr. McINTOSH: You felt with the implementation of unification that the role would be aggravated?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Very much so.

Mr. McINTOSH: But in your view of collective defence you felt that it was a necessity; we had these commitments and we should keep them up, but possibly with the implementation of unification it would require an additional effort on the part of the government to recruit more personnel for the forces and you felt that this may be impossible.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: That is certainly the state of affairs.

Mr. McINTOSH: Did you at that time offer the Minister any other alternative on how he could carry out what you felt was his policy and still live up to our commitment?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No, I had no meetings with the Minister in which I could give him that kind of advice. In any event, as a maritime commander I had no responsibility or connection with recruiting other than to note the effect of a lack of recruits on the operational status of my command.

Mr. McINTOSH: Have you at any time thought, since you first heard this word "unification", that it would be the first step, as I said last evening, toward conscription or compulsory military service?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: As I said yesterday, I think it is a matter of government policy how the manpower requirements for the armed forces are going to be met. I do not think I am really qualified to say whether or not the government would decide to conscript people or whether they would attempt a much more attractive service in one way or another to get the men than the unified service.

Mr. McINTOSH: Yes, but is our defence policy not closely associated with our foreign policy and do you not, as a commander, have to consider one in relation to the other? Under the objectives outlined in the White Paper it states:

> The objectives of Canadian defence policy, which cannot be dissociated from foreign policy, are to preserve the peace by supporting collective defence measures to deter military aggression; to support Canadian foreign policy including that arising out of our participation in international organizations, and to provide for the protection and surveillance of our territory, our air-space and our coastal waters.

Certainly this would be of some concern to you as a military commander in charge of a certain defence of the North American continent?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: In relation to that, I obviously have to take the policy directive and translate it into operational planning and operational posture in order that I can fulfil the government policy.

Mr. McINTOSH: In your opinion can any of these roles—defence of our coastal waters, our air-space and protection of our territory—now be carried out with Canadian forces only?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No, they cannot. In any case, the whole North American defence is an interwoven defence. We take responsibility for some parts of the defence of the United States and they take responsibility for the coastal defence of Canada, because a missile submarine suitably placed in Canadian waters of interest can, of course, attack American targets, and vice versa. Therefore the forces are interwoven in both instances so that we can look after one another.

Mr. McINTOSH: Do you not feel that the United States are going to defend the North American continent anyway, and there could be a possibility in the Minister's mind that we do not need the Canadian forces any more?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I do not know what is in the Minister's mind but I am quite certain that the United States intends to defend its country, and if it is necessary to use our coastal areas and our air space and other things, they will do so.

Mr. McINTOSH: In the introduction to the White Paper we find this sentence:

> Many of the basic principles that govern Canada's defence policy are constant because they are determined by factors, such as geography and history, which are specific. Others, such as the nature and the magnitude of the threat to peace and security and the development of weapons and weapons technology, change rapidly and drastically. Therefore, defence policy must adapt itself to such changes, while principles remain constant.

Can you tell me what is meant by principles remaining constant?

The CHAIRMAN: Order. Mr. McIntosh is questioning Admiral Landymore.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think the principle which remains constant is that you have defence forces to defend your country, and that is about the only one that remains constant in combining foreign policy with national policy.

Mr. McINTOSH: Then the introduction continues:

> That is why it is desirable for the government not only to provide for defence changes when they are necessary, but to keep the public informed of the nature of and the reasons for the new policies.

Did this concern you at all in your discussions with the Minister? Did you feel that not only was the public not being informed as to the program but your forces and your officers also were not being informed about the new policy of the Minister?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I do not think there was any doubt in anybody's mind, having read the terms of the White Paper in relation to what our roles were, what was in the Minister's mind at that particular time. I think there has been a lot of doubt, however, about the picture in relation to unification. That is the only place where I think that they would be in very much doubt.

Mr. McINTOSH: Did you at any any time feel that your understanding and the Minister's understanding of unification were one and the same thing?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I do not think they have been one and the same thing from the start. I defined unification in the paper which was sent to you and which was written a year ago—long after unification had been mooted—and in that I gave what I considered to be a reasonable definition of unification. It is a long way off from what appears to be coming out of Bill No. C-243.

Mr. McINTOSH: I would agree with that, Admiral Landymore, but have you ever found anyone who agreed with your definition of unification?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think that most of the people who are opposed to the change agree with the definition I provided, or something very close to it.

Mr. McINTOSH: Have you found anyone that could understand or agree with the Minister's definition of unification?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I was not aware that the Minister had a definition of unification.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, you read his introduction to Bill C-243 and in the speech that he made in the house he made certain that everyone who heard it understood it. This is what he said:

"Unification is the end objective of a logical and evolutionary progression."

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: So is the caboose on a train. I received just at lunch time today a copy of the introductory remarks that the Minister made at the re-opening of your Committee hearings in which he defined unification, and this is the first time I have seen it defined. I do not yet know whether this is an official legal definition or whether its is just a cockshy at it for the committee to work at.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh, your time has expired. Do you have a number of other questions?

Mr. McINTOSH: Are you going to confine us to ten minutes?

The CHAIRMAN: Well, I think in this instance we can carry on but I hope it will not be too long.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, I think that I can finish up.

Did you understand the definition of unification that you received just at lunch time which was given by the Minister to this Committee?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes, I think the definition he gave is consistent with what I thought he had in mind since reading his speech of December 7.

Mr. McINTOSH: Consistent with what you thought he had in his mind?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes.

Mr. McINTOSH: Now, I do not understand what he said. Would you define it for me?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think I would have to go to the reference. This may be rather unfair because I am not sure in my own mind that this is an official definition. I think from the wording of the text that I have here it might imply that he was just making a general statement for your benefit to indicate the general lines on which he thought the Committee would be proceeding in relation to the bill.

Mr. McINTOSH: I do not want to be unfair with you, Admiral, and if you would rather not—

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: It is unfair to me. I think perhaps it is unfair to the Minister.

Mr. McINTOSH: I think the minister has been unfair to us, so I have no compunction in respect.

Some hon. MEMBERS: No, no, no.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, certainly he has; he would not answer any question that we ever asked him in the house. He would not define unification. He would not pause and let us study it. He forced the bill through the house, which it is said in essence means that we agreed to it in principle, which we do not. I do not think that he has been fair to the people of Canada.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh, perhaps you can—

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, you understand compulsory service, you understand conscription, and I hope that your voters understand it.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh, order, please. You will have a chance to question the Minister when he appears before the Committee later on. In the meantime I would appreciate it if you would continue your questioning of Admiral Landymore.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I have here minutes of Proceedings and Evidence No. 14 dated Tuesday and this is what the minister said at page 440: February 7:

> When I refer to a unified force I refer to a single integrated service encompassing the naval, land, air and support units necessary to carry out its assigned roles and missions and operating under unified management and control.

Now, I would like to think that perhaps that is the definition, because this could, in fact, with very little modification become a definition which would leave our services intact because in this particular definition he does not refer to indentity in any shape or form.

Mr. McINTOSH: Yes, but this morning, Admiral, I read a lot of what to my mind were contradictions in the Minister's speech, and this is also a contradiction. He says that the services are not going to be changed, but I take it from what you read that they will be a single service. Now, I ask you again, how can they be identical and different at the same time?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I do not know. I say again, sir, that I think the only person who can answer that question for you is the Minister.

Mr. McINTOSH: Right. Well, I will not belabour that.

I am concerned with this statement in the brief that you gave to the Committee:

> Unification has very little, if any, merit. It is a change for the sake of change. It is unnecessary and expensive. It is oriented politically and not militarily.

I believe a similar question was asked of you this morning. What do you mean when you say it is oriented politically and not militarily?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think that the theory of unification, in view of the fact that it achieves nothing in the way of military improvement, cannot really be considered a military theory. However, as it emanates from the Minister's office, I take the liberty of suggesting that it must therefore be a political theory.

Mr. McINTOSH: Right. Now, to sum up, could I say that your concern, Admiral, before your discussions with the Minister got to the point where you were fired—and I am using your words—was in connection with the morale of your service, in connection with the recruiting of your service and in connection with additional difficulties in the training of your service. Now, on the basis of what you understood by unification, were these three factors of the greatest concern to you?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes.

Mr. McINTOSH: And in which order, Admiral?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: The lowering of morale was the largest single factor because this was the backbone of the force I was commanding.

Mr. McINTOSH: Right. And by lowering the morale it would also lower the possibilities of an increase in recruitment, would it not?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Certainly, to the extent, at any rate, that officers and men within the service are probably our best recruiters. They are the people who bring the recruits to the door rather than the advertising, and when officers and men in the naval service are satisfied and confident in their careers, then they go out and recruit other people, but I do not think that has been going on to any extent.

Mr. McINTOSH: Are you satisfied, Admiral, that it is the Minister's intention to carry on the commitments which we already have to these alliances. Is there

any fear in your mind that we are going to opt out of these alliances? I want to be fair to the minister.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I cannot see any reason why the Minister should have that intention, although I cannot see why he would want to have a unified force unless he is going to have one role for the armed forces, in which case it would, of course, be necessary to opt out of certain activities that we are now engaged in.

Mr. McINTOSH: Right. Now, what in your opinion would that one role be?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I would have said a policing role.

Mr. McINTOSH: A policing role? In the event that he was not going to opt out of these alliances and was also going to assume another role which required more troops, would you then not agree with me that Bill C-243 is the first step to conscription, to compulsory military service? If this were not put into force, where would you then get your recruits?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I do not think that the military by any manner or means has run out of ways and means of getting more recruits. I would like to think that if the numbers were short and you were going to continue with voluntary recruitment, that there could be all sorts of incentives which would bring recruits to the door. I would have thought, in the case of recruits, that money would have been a very considerable incentive at the beginning. Money becomes less of a consideration as people become involved in their careers. I do not think that anyone thinks it is hopeless to get recruits for any kind of force.

Mr. McINTOSH: Voluntary recruits.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: But it may be a very difficult thing to get them voluntarily economically.

I would have thought that Air Marshal Reyno, who is charged with the responsibility of getting enough manpower for the armed forces, could have told you what he is going to do to improve recruitment.

Mr. McINTOCH: Were you going to cut me off, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN: No, I was just going to remind you that I think in fairness to the other members that Mr. Harkness is next. You have had twenty minutes.

Mr. HARKNESS: Admiral, I just have a few questions in regard to specific points which you brought up in your brief.

The first question is with regard to retirement ages. You state in your brief:

> Sensible retirement ages should also be geared in principle to the degree of exposure of men to the fighting environment

Down a bit farther, you say:

> By promising to remove the differences in retirement ages, the Minister has introduced an arrangement which will either force the fighting arms to accept too great an age, or the support arms to be retired before it is necessary. It is therefore, either uneconomical, or alternatively, damaging to operational efficiency.

I agree with those statements and I wonder if, for the future guidance of the Committee, you could give us your views on what the differential should be with

respect to retirement age for those engaged in fighting roles as compared to those engaged in administrative functions.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I see no reason why people who are engaged in administrative functions, provided they are physically fit, should not serve in the armed forces until they are about fifty-five years of age. I think the limit for the operational personnel is of the order of forty-five years of age.

Mr. HARKNESS: Would you say that this is a case for both officers and men, or do you make any distinction in that regard?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think I make a distinction for officers of higher rank, for commanders and above, and I would have thought that the present age of fifty was a reasonable one. I also would have thought that the age of fifty-five was a reasonable age for the captains and more senior officers.

Mr. SMITH: What about sixty, sir?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think in some cases it would be perfectly satisfactory to have rear admirals at the age of sixty. In services as small as ours, of course, it is very disheartening to have people go on that long in their service. The United States Navy has any number of admirals who are over sixty years of age. The Royal Navy has the odd one who is over sixty years of age. Generally speaking, I think in the present day and age, with the vast technological changes, and so on, that it is probably preferable to have people who are taking responsibility for decisions which become involved in technical matters retired at about the age of fifty-five.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, we will not take that out of your time, Mr. Harkness.

Mr. HARKNESS: Would you think it desirable from that point of view to retain in the services for a longer period of time some of the professional personnel who are difficult to obtain and difficult to hold, and I am thinking particularly of medical officers and dental officers. In other words, would you think it desirable to have a further distinction as far as age requirements are concerned for people of that nature?

Rear Admiral RANDYMORE: I think an off-the-cuff answer to that would be that I do not see any reason why people who are not exposed to a fighting environment, such as professional men, should not serve after the age of fifty-five. I do not think for example, that lawyers who work for the armed forces deteriorate too rapidly, and I happen to know there is one in the room, so I...

Mr. HARKNESS: I agree with you. I think that a considerable number of economies would be effected and efficiency would also be improved if certain groups of people along this line had a retirement age which was considerably higher than those engaged in the combat or straight fighting roles.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Mr. Harkness, if I may just amplify my answer a little bit. I think, because service people are career people, that one has to attempt to reach a happy medium between age, economy in operations and allowing a flow of people through the system.

Mr. HARKNESS: By and large, you consider it highly desirable that there be a very great degree of flexibility rather than rigid uniformity in regard to this retirement age matter?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Very much so, yes.

Mr. HARKNESS: My next question refers to the term of enlistment and particularly the re-engagement period, as it is provided for in the bill which we have before us. Which is termination on six months notice. The fact is to be noted particularly that under this type of re-engagement several groups of technicians could give six months notice, and this would exert a very considerable amount of pressure with regard to whatever point they might want to make. However, more important than that, would the effect of two or three groups of technicians of this sort actually terminating their contracts all at the same time and on six months' notice place the Navy in a position where it would really be unable to go to sea and discharge its functions?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Well, of course—this would be an en masse sort of retirement and I do not think, unless there was some collusion, some agreement amongst the technicians, that everyone would put his name down, so to speak, to leave at the same time.

Mr. PUGH: If I may ask a supplementary question, Mr. Chairman, would that not be tantamount to an emergency?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Well, we have not been—

Mr. PUGH: This would not apply in an emergency, Admiral Landymore, but would that not be tantamount to an emergency?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Why certainly; if you lost every key technician in any single trade it could quite easily bring your forces to a standstill. For example, if all the engine room artificers of the Navy did that on the same day not a ship would go to sea.

Mr. HARKNESS: This is the point I am getting at, that the type of re-engagement which is proposed really presents a potential threat in the sort of situation where a group of men decided on that course of action, and the Navy and various other combat forces could be rendered ineffective and inoperative at any particular time.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes. I think I would use that kind of argument sir for the en masse type of thing. I think that the disadvantage which I did not cite in my brief was that the same thing prevents any wise prediction on how many people will be leaving the service at any given time. We never know. However, with the engagement system you can, prior to their engagement expiring, find out whether they intend to re-engage or not, so that you can build up your training and recruiting to take the place of those who express an intention to leave. So, along the lines of your question, I think it makes it very difficult to predict from day to day what the strength of the armed forces will be. As a matter of fact, six months notice is not a great deal of notice for replacing a man.

Mr. HARKNESS: No, sir. This type of provision would give a much greater degree of instability and there would also be a very severe potential danger in it.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think I would agree with that, yes.

Mr. HARKNESS: My next question is in connection with rank structure. On the next page you set out your third point, which is:

It is impractical in a ship to have two rank structures in effect

As a practical working operation in a ship, would it really, work at all to have, as you have noted, two rank structures in effect; to have half a dozen captains, a colonel, some majors, some commanders and goodness knows what else, this sort of thing?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I suppose no matter what you call people, in some kind of fashion you can make the thing work. I think it would be a very serious embarrassment to the officers. I think, in the presence of foreign navies with whom we work, they would think everyone in this country had taken leave of their senses. It would be very difficult to explain to anyone why such a confused state of affairs existed. Moreover, I think that in a maritime community, where sailors invariably live, that the public would constantly poke fun at the people for the outlandish names they were carrying. I can just hear the captain of HMCS *Saguenay* being introduced to a local person as a colonel, and after spending twenty minutes explaining that he did not come from a regiment, that he was captain of one of HMC ships, I think by that time his listener would have long since departed and gone to the bar to stimulate himself.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, I do not think there is any question about the fact that it would be a source of very, very considerable embarrassment to all of the officers concerned and also, from the practical standpoint of running things, would lead to a considerable amount of confusion and thus a reduction in efficiency.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I might point out, Mr. Harkness, a situation that is almost in effect at the moment, when an officer is promoted. I think this is an interesting point, and I am sure, your chairman, if he were permitted to speak, would tell you that for officers the most important moment in their lives in the naval service is when they are promoted from lieutenant commander to commander. This is the big hump in service life, and for all of us who have lived through it, probably the greatest satisfaction is to be promoted to the rank of commander from the rank of lieutenant commander. They are now receiving promotions which read: "Selected for promotion to lieutenant colonel, or equivalent". Now, in Halifax anyone who has been promoted is now being congratulated on having reached the rank of "equivalent". I think it has taken a great deal of the satisfaction from this particular promotion, which is entirely unnecessary.

Mr. HARKNESS: In your view there is no advantage whatever to be gained from the idea of making use of IBM machines, and so forth, as far as pay and records and the like are concerned?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I do not think so, because everything is dealt with numerically.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes. So, there is really nothing in the argument that in order to have a uniform pay system, administrative procedures, and so on, that it is necessary to have a uniform rank structure?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Not as far as I know.

Mr. HARKNESS: Further down on that page you say:

> I understand that the Canadian Armed Forces Council very recently recommended little or no change to the Naval rank designators.

What is this Canadian Armed Forces Council that you are referring to in this case?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: This is the new organization which was set up by General Allard when he became Chief of the Defence Staff which, as I understand it, brings in all the commanders from all the operational commands to Ottawa for regular meetings in order that there will be a fresh operational point of view for the Defence staff to use when they are making their policy decisions. It is my understanding that at a recent meeting Admiral O'Brien made this point to the Council and they acknowledged that it was a sensible point, and agreed that this should be part of any undertaking in relation to unification. As I understand it, the undertaking was that there would be no change in the naval rank structure. Now, naturally I do not have access to minutes of this sort, but I am quite sure that the Chief of the Defence Staff would be only too pleased to read to this Committee findings of that nature.

Mr. HARKNESS: Do you consider that the setting up of this particular council was an attempt to substitute at a lower level the expertise which was present in the Chiefs of Staff Committee under the previous setup, and to make more of that available? Do you consider that was the case in the initial stages of the integration process?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I do not think that was the primary purpose. I was asked by General Allard to go to Ottawa shortly after I was compulsorily retired to talk to him, and at that stage in time he had just decided that this was a system of organization that he would use, and at that time he gave as his reason for this the breakdown of communication between the operational commanders and the headquarters. This had been, of course, one of the points that I had made. I considered that I had had the greatest difficulty in communicating to Ottawa my concern over matters of morale. At that particular time General Allard said to me, "Bill, what happened to us as commanders will never happen again. I will not allow it to happen again. I am going to have a system of bringing all the commanders in from the field at regular intervals and they will have a very important part to play in the formation of policy". Naturally I was very pleased to hear that he was taking that step and I thought it was a very good step to take. As I said in my brief, I thought that eliminated in part some of the deficiencies that I have felt exist professionally within the Defence Staff itself.

Mr. HARKNESS: I agree with you, and it is this latter point you have just mentioned that my question was directed to particularly. The formation of this council now brings to bear a greater degree of what you might call the expert opinion of people who have specialized in maritime, land or air warfare and makes their advice available to the Chief of the Defence Staff in a way which was really accomp'ished before by the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes, there is a parallel. Previously I believe we relied on keeping our General Staff, Air Council and Naval Board current by bringing in officers from operational commands to perform those duties.

Mr. HARKNESS: I have just one other question, and that is in regard to reserve organizations. You state in your brief:

> The Naval Reserve should be part of Maritime Command. The militia should be part of Mobile Command. To put them where they belong will create more organizational upheaval.

Previous to that you state:

> The reserve organizations, coming as they do under a common administration, are poorly placed in the organization.

Would there really be much upheaval if the Naval Reserve were directly under Maritime Command?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No, I think that the upheaval would occur much more on the militia side. They have never really been connected with operational command and because of the size of the Navy and the small size of the Reserve I do not think there would be any really serious upheaval. There would be a lot of change of direction because at the present time the direction comes from Ottawa and in this case the direction would come from the Maritime Command, so in relation to the size of that particular organization there would be quite a considerable upheaval at the top level, yes. Other than that, I think they would fit into the organizational scheme of things without too much dislocation.

Mr. HARKNESS: Thank you.

Mr. NUGENT: Admiral, there are a few matters on page 10 of your brief that I want to look at. Not being an expert, I wanted to be clear on the faults that you point out under the heading "Untimeliness of Unification and Faults of Integration".

> First:—Materiel Command is not living up to expectations.

Is Materiel Command a new command set up under this Minister?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes. It is a part of the integrated command.

Mr. NUGENT:

> Second:— Training Command is a luxury we cannot afford.

Is Training Command a new concept by this Minister under his new integration program?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes it is, but I think I ought to qualify that by saying that the Air Force had both a Training Command and a Materiel Command prior to integration and in going into a functional organization this is probably an extension of those original commands.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Harkness dealt with the Defence Staff.

> Fourth:—The reserve organizations, coming as they do under a common administration, are poorly placed in the organization.

Has their placement been changed since the new innovation by this Minister?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes.

Mr. NUGENT: The fifth point is that mobile command is too large. Is mobile command a new innovation by this Minister?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes.

Mr. NUGENT: These faults which you have pointed out in this integration program, do they necessarily involve a waste of men, material or time? In other words, would they be expensive mistakes?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes, I think in connection with Materiel Command it is a very expensive mistake. As far as Training Command is concerned, I

think it could function on basic training and on training outside the purview of operational commanders. General training, which is required by all three services in certain fields, for example, management training or leadership training, can be cut to size and the operating commands could make their own training arrangements at a much lower cost.

Mr. NUGENT: This is the point I am getting at, Admiral.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: You asked me if this was a new innovation, and I would not want to leave the impression that I thought the Minister had dreamed up the entire command structure. I think that would be leaving the wrong impression. I think the Minister set people to work to set up an integrated structure and that he acted on their advice.

Mr. NUGENT: The point I am making, of course, is the question of time. The Minister is responsible for what goes on in the defence department while he is Minister, and that is what I was clarifying. There has been much said and we have heard much evidence here that one of those things that we had hoped to achieve is the saving of money on administration so that we could spend more on supplies or materials on the same budget. Would it be a fair inference to draw that the faults you have pointed out on page 10 of your brief are costing money rather than saving money?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: That is correct.

Mr. NUGENT: I note in your brief that there is hope, at least, that some of these faults which presently exist may, on being reviewed and looked into very carefully, be straightened out so that they will function in the way that it was hoped they would function when first set up. Is that an accurate statement?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I certainly have every confidence that in-service correction of these things can be made.

Mr. NUGENT: I think it was yesterday you spoke about the intervention of supreme headquarters so there would be more lines of communication. That is something which could only be changed by reversing that, I presume?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes. I think if Materiel Command became part of the headquarters organization and the Training Command reverted to basic organization and we did with the two naval commands what I suggested, the they would go back to having direct lines of communication with headquarters as would the dockyards, and this would put the administration back where it belonged.

Mr. NUGENT: And that would save money?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes.

Mr. NUGENT: I presume these difficulties could not have been foreseen before these programs were instituted. There was some planning and it did not quite work out the way the planners thought, is this what happened?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think in making such a sweeping change that the basic planning tends to get a fairly broad brush treatment and I do not think that anyone was so unwise as to think that some changes would not be necessary along the line. I do not think anyone felt that the basic command structure was not sound and therefore commands such as Materiel Command would be as uneconomic as they are.

Mr. NUGENT: The point I am getting at is that while you have been here you have heard the members of this Committee press on with all speed. There seems to be some urgency that we must press on with this bill and get the unification legislation passed in a hurry. The only point I wanted to make in my questioning of you, Admiral, is that from reading your criticisms of this program it is obvious that a good deal of time must now be spent on the steps of integration that have already been taken, either to improve them or reverse them, but certainly to analyse them and see how effective they are and what is the best use which can be made of them. Is that correct?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes, you have expressed that very clearly. That is exactly what I feel and why I consider unification in relation to that particular thought untimely. I do not feel we ought to create such conditions that the backbone of our naval force, at any rate, who can help us with their experience and knowledge in putting these things right, should all be rushing out to get jobs on civvy street.

Mr. NUGENT: The longer these faults go uncorrected the more money, I presume, it is costing us?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes.

Mr. NUGENT: I note in your brief you say that by putting unification through at the same time it will cause a further upheaval, which will necessarily delay an appraisal of some of the faults already existing in the integration steps that have been taken. Is that right?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes.

Mr. NUGENT: In other words, by rushing on with unification we are unnecessarily complicating the necessary corrective measures and therefore ensuring that we shall continue to waste more money through some of the errors now existing.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think you can look at it that way.

Mr. NUGENT: I was looking for reasons for the necessity for speed in bringing about unification. I think you said, in answer to a question this morning, that at the present stage of integration the services can function all right and that you would be able to continue applying these corrective measures where necessary, but that this will not take place if you stop at this point. It is a ridiculous situation, is it not?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No, there is nothing ridiculous about that. This would clear the whole thing up very quickly.

Mr. NUGENT: There is no necessity to go on to unification?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: None whatsoever.

Mr. NUGENT: It is not as if this were a process which had started and it must be carried through to unification?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think there has been a lot of planning done, assuming, that unification was going to be effected. I think that planning, of course, would be wasted because they could then devote themselves to personnel matters in relation to the services as they exist.

Mr. NUGENT: Perhaps they could devote themselves to cleaning up some of the errors that have already been committed?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: That might be very productive employment.

Mr. NUGENT: Now, sir, I have been given to understand from the Minister and from some of the supporters of unification that they feel there is some urgency about bringing it about. You have given us some very cogent reasons why there should not be urgency. Is there any reason that you can think of or that you have heard of that unification must be proceeded with swiftly and at once?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: None at all.

Mr. NUGENT: There is no reason at all?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: None that I know of.

Mr. NUGENT: None that has been brought to the attention of this Committee either.

In answer to Mr. Forrestall's questions this morning about the state of morale, the recruiting problems and the feeling of uncertainty among the officers in the Navy, would I be correct in drawing the inference from your testimony this morning that the mere suggestion of unification is such that you have the fear that many officers would retire quickly just at the mere mention of the word and that you felt it necessary to intervene to try and reassure the men in order that we would not have too sudden a departure of officers from the service?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes.

Mr. NUGENT: Would you be able to give us any idea or have you thought about what percentage of officers, if they were given the choice—which you say would be fair to them if this unification legislation came in—would probably not go into the new service?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: As I pointed out this morning, because of the undertaking to me I have no way of gauging that figure accurately. I would have felt from my contact with officers that the percentage of officers who feel trapped by this thing is very high indeed in the Navy.

Mr. NUGENT: There would be a certain number, I suppose, who have reached that stage in their careers where they have to put up with almost anything because it is too late now to change careers?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think if a full pension was given there would be no question about those people remaining, no matter how difficult the situation outside might look for them. I think they would be more than prepared to take the risk. I am sure a great number of them, whether that happens or not will leave anyway although I think it would be grossly unfair under those circumstances to let them go.

Mr. NUGENT: In my opinion your testimony, then, would amount to this—and correct me if I have judged it incorrectly—that if unification is brought in the only way we are going to have a chance of keeping anything like the necessary number of officers to make the Navy effective is to keep them there by giving them no choice, holding them by as much force as we can legally exert?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: You are making their choice an extremely difficult one to take if they are going to have to accept the 5 per cent per year penalty.

Mr. NUGENT: In your brief you put it on the basis of fairness to the officers, and I presume that if they are going to have the choice of going into this new force that it would only be common justice that they should suffer a much lesser penalty to get out than might be the case now.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I do not think they should be exposed to a penalty at all, or to what was termed an actuarial adjustment. I think I put in my brief the financial solution to it, which is 2 per cent per annum.

Mr. NUGENT: Admiral, could I project this a bit further. If this unification bill goes through, and in order to get out, officers will have to suffer a penalty and will not receive that fair treatment which you have recommended, do you think that in the face of those difficulties enough of them are going to get out that the efficiency of the Navy is going to be very seriously impaired?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes indeed.

Mr. NUGENT: Then can you see any hope that this unification bill can have any other effect than the paralysis or the near destruction of the Navy immediately?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No, I cannot see any other effect. We are certainly going to lose a lot of experienced people who will go regardless of the pension arrangement, and if the pension arrangement is such that there is no penalty, then I think there will be a general exodus. If you do not do that I think you are going to be left—as I said yesterday—with people who feel that they are prisoners to their pension and who will only be going through the motions of being servicemen.

Mr. NUGENT: One last question, if I might. If there were any benefit to be derived from unification if this bill were passed this year, can you think of any benefit that is available today that would not be available if the whole plan were shelved and thought over for another year or two to reassure ourselves on it and then brought in two years hence? In other words, is there any possible benefit from unification—if one exists now—that would not still be there two years from now?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think if it were just postponed that we would continue to have the same general feeling of unrest, because people would simply say, "Well, if it is not today it is tomorrow." Under those circumstances I do not think there would be any great improvement by postponement. I would have thought that if you are going to contemplate a postponement, one should cancel the whole issue and say nothing will be changed, and then we will perhaps look again at this matter in five years time, when we have integration completely under control, to ascertain, without the other difficulties in our road, whether it is feasible, and then take it from scratch and study it thoroughly.

Mr. NUGENT: All right, let us put it that way, Admiral; say it took five years to clean up integration and reappraise everything, is there any benefit that could be gained now by unification that would be available five years from now.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No.

Mr. NUGENT: Thank you.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I will try to confine my question to about four points, Mr. Chairman. First I would like to draw attention again to a matter raised by Mr. McIntosh which had to do with a speech that the Minister made in Edmonton last summer which the Admiral considered, in answer to a question, had been directed against him. I think for the permanent record of our Defence Committee that I should read the statements and replies in the House of Commons on January 31 on page 12464. Mr. McIntosh is speaking and he said:

> The minister in my opinion deliberately misled the Canadian public when he said some time ago in Edmonton that this issue involved civil control over the military.
>
> Mr. Hellyer: Hear, hear.
>
> Mr. McIntosh: I ask the minister to get up at this time and deny that he made that statement.
>
> Mr. Hellyer: I said it, Mr. Speaker, and I meant it.

Mr. Churchill, questioning Mr. McIntosh:

> —Has not the minister, by the answer he gave us just a minute ago, cast a very serious reflection upon the officers and men in our services, namely, that they were trying to gain control over the civilian authority in this land?—
>
> Mr. McIntosh: —It does cast a reflection upon all officers now serving in the armed forces and in particular upon those who left under a cloud, as it were.
>
> Mr. Hellyer: It was directed to one.
>
> Mr. McIntosh: Tell us who that one is.
>
> Mr. Hellyer: You know who it is.
>
> Mr. McIntosh: We do not know who it is. You told us you knew.

In questioning this morning, Admiral Landymore, you said you considered that Mr. Hellyer's remarks were directed against you. Are you of that opinion and are you the person who was referred to here in *Hansard*?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I cannot say whether I am the person referred to in *Hansard* but I can say that I was the person referred to when the statement was released in the press at, I think, Winnipeg.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Edmonton.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Or Edmonton.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It was that to which Mr. McIntosh was drawing reference.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I have not seen anyone else named in the newspapers.

Mr. CHURCHILL: The reason I bring this to the attention of the Committee again is that I feel a very grave injustice is being done to you, Admiral Landymore, and your retirement from the service is clouded unless this matter is cleared up. I think that subsequently, when the Minister appears before us as a witness, I will proceed with this matter in the interest of yourself, sir, or any

other retired officer who may have been meant by the Minister. The charge of the Minister amounts almost to a charge of treason, that an officer or officers were trying to gain control over the civilian authority in this land. We had your word this morning, Admiral Landymore, that you never made any such attempt. Do you repeat that statement?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Your record with regard to your allegiance to your country, to the Queen and to the service is the same as it always has been?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You never conspired with anybody to attempt to exercise control over the civil authorities.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I hope that the record will clearly show that your name is cleared as at this point, and subsequently I will ask the Minister to effect the final clearance which is essential.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, would Mr. Churchill permit a supplementary question?

Mr. CHURCHILL: Yes.

Mr. ANDRAS: Admiral Landymore, I have before me an article in the Montreal *Star* of January 19, 1967 written by Peter C. Newman. I take it that he interviewed you at your home.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes, that is correct.

Mr. ANDRAS: He has in quotation marks here a remark attributed to you and I have no way of judging whether it is accurate. It reads as follows:

> 'The danger internationally', he says is 'that some politician in Norway, for example, will say to himself, if it is all right for Paul Hellyer to make political gains by challenging the military establishment, maybe it is all right for me, and if this kind of thing happens western defence will eventually be weakened.'

Is that an accurate quotation.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes.

Mr. ANDRAS: Would it not be reasonably fair for some people to take from that the implication that political people or the civil authorities simply should not question the military professionals on military matters.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think not.

Mr. ANDRAS: I beg your pardon.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: The claim made by the Minister that all countries in the world would follow our example is a claim that is both unreasonable and unlikely. I do not think it is sensible to leave that on the record. I think that the only way it will ever come off the record is to indicate to people in a similar position, who might be influenced to do this to their armed forces, what has happened to our own. In view of the fact that countries with whom we associate are part of our own defence, I would have thought that the statement is a very reasonable one.

Mr. ANDRAS: But would you not agree that it would be reasonable for people reading that statement, which you have told us now is reasonably accurately quoted, to take the implication that the political people, the civil authorities, simply should not or actually have no business disagreeing with the military professionals or the military establishment on even military matters. Is that not a reasonable implication to take from your remarks?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No, I do not think that is a reasonable implication to take from my remarks. I think that the reasonable thing to take from my remarks is that Canadian forces recognize that the Minister of National Defence is charged under the law for the management of the armed forces and that he, through the government, sets the policy for the armed forces—as long as he does not take steps which as a result of ill-considered judgments reduce the effectiveness of those forces—and I do not think that is a part of his responsibility—and there is some justification in encouraging others not to follow our example.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Churchill, I have made a note of the time.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I would like to make a comment following the interjection which has occurred. As a citizen of this country, not without some military experience, I think that it is a very serious matter indeed when any Minister of the crown, whether he is minister of defence or not, whether he has military experience or is a non-combatant, should refuse to accept the advice and the specialized knowledge that rests with senior officers of the three services of our country. At the appropriate time I will make certain charges against the Minister. I have made them before and I will make them again. I cannot be scared off very easily.

I would like to direct my attention to the bill itself which was introduced in the House on second reading by Mr. Hellyer on December 7, page 10835. After going through a long series of confusing statements in which he told us, on the one hand, that there would be no change and, on the other, that there would be, he drew his remarks to a close. I quote from the bottom of page 10835 where he deals with what he calls the essence of this bill:

> —It has nothing to do with the question of naval forces, land forces, air forces or even space forces. Rather, it has to do with the management, the strategic and operational planning, the training and support, the capacity of the force to adjust to changing requirements, and the ability of the force to provide meaningful, challenging and rewarding careers for service personnel.

Do you see anything in that statement, Admiral Landymore, dealing with the essence of the bill, that has to do with the fighting efficiency of our forces or of training men to fight?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think if one tried hard enough one could find some indication that something of that sort might have been in mind; but to take your inference, I would agree that we are looking on the armed forces more as an industry than as armed forces, and that the emphasis is on what happens in the offices as opposed to what happens in the fighting environment.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Thank you very much. I have searched those immortal words time and time again and I could find nothing in there which would induce me to believe that the object of our defence forces was to fight.

I refer now to the bill to which you drew our attention. Clause 17, which appears on page 2 of the bill, states:

> 17. (1) In an emergency, or if considered desirable in consequence of any action undertaken by Canada *pursuant to any international arrangement* for collective defence entered into by Canada, the Governor in Council may establish and authorize the maintenance of *a component* of the Canadian Forces, referred to in this Act as the special force, consisting of
>
> (a) officers and men of the regular *force* who are placed in the *special force* under conditions prescribed in regulations;—

You may have studied that, Admiral Landymore. I cannot at the moment see that that separates any one of the components, the navy people from army people or from air people. The special force may be comprised of any members of the Canadian forces that the Minister wishes to put into that special force. Can you read any other meaning out of it.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No, sir; I read that meeting out of it.

Mr. CHURCHILL: This is clause 28 on page 7, to which you drew our attention.

> 28. (1) An officer or man may be attached or seconded *to the armed forces of any state*,—

This is a new addition to the act. In subclause (2) it says:

> (2) An officer or man of the armed forces of any state may be attached or seconded to the Canadian Forces—

I looked at this several weeks ago and I reached the conclusion that you came to in your presentation to us, that this gives unlimited authority to the Minister to second and attach our armed forces to any state, or second and attach the armed forces of any other state to Canadian forces. This means that Canadian forces could be employed as mercenaries abroad in the pay of a foreign state; mercenaries of a foreign state could be employed within the Canadian forces, and all of this at the whim of the Minister. Did you reach any other conclusion?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No; that is the conclusion I reached.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Those are all the questions I have, Mr. Chairman, unless I hear someone make an unfounded statement in the near future.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Forrestall is next. I am sure that you will not hear any unfounded statements from him.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Admiral, I also drew an inference from section 28 that disturbed me a little. I am sure that the United States would be most concerned about our inability to meet certain commitments and, in the absence of our being effectively able to do so could indeed step in and, if necessary, right into the present infrastructure of our Maritime Command. Is that theoretically possible? Is that your understanding of that section.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I would see nothing under that section to prevent that.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Admiral, I wanted to take your mind back and deal with one other point, again for clarification. We have been told by the Minister on

numerous occasions in the House and elsewhere that the vast majority of men serving in the forces are in support of his present plans. I quote from the Victoria *Colonist* of Friday, September 23rd.

> The contention of the Minister of Defence, Mr. Hellyer, that opposition to his ideas of unification for the three branches of the armed services comes only from the brass, the senior serving and retired officers. The charge got the denial it deserved when he addressed the junior non-commissioned officers and men at the big Halifax Maritime Command base. He was booed and heckled and when he faced a press conference after three "closed" meetings with men of the three levels of rank he said he had not noticed any vocal opposition.

And a direct quote:

> "I didn't hear it if there was any", he said. However, from officers and men came very different versions of these particular meetings.

Admiral, this refers to a meeting which the Minister had in Halifax on which he found occasion in the House, in reply to questions, to deny that he noticed any opposition to his meetings. Were you present at any of those meetings?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No, sir.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Were you invited to be present?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No, sir.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Do you have any knowledge of them?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I have a very considerable knowledge of them.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Indeed, Admiral, without wasting the time of the Committee, you are completely familiar with every word that was spoken in that room?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I have a record of every word that was spoken on all occasions on which the Minister spoke.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Yes. Is the statement: "I didn't hear it if there was any" in connection with whether or not there was any reaction to the Minister's presence there and certain statements he was making—

Mr. MACALUSO: Why do you not ask the Minister?

Mr. FORRESTALL: Is that statement "I didn't hear it if there was any"—

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I am sure he heard it when he spoke to the officers, Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I beg your pardon.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I am sure he could not have failed to hear it when he spoke to the officers.

Mr. FORRESTALL: So that statement then is not correct?

An hon. MEMBER: Do not put words into his mouth.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I am sorry. I did not mean to put words into your mouth. Your impression of the meeting from what you heard of it would leave you very much surprised indeed if the Minister heard something different.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: That is correct.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Do you know how many members, for example, of the commissioned ranks were present at that meeting?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No. I was told that there was upwards of 300 at the officers meeting.

Mr. FORRESTALL: That would be a substantial percentage of those not otherwise committed to jobs that they could not very well leave during the day?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: That would represent a very good proportion of the people available. In fact, everyone who was available was required to attend.

Mr. FORRESTALL: They were required to attend?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think so.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Was it indeed what we refer to as a parade?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: Yes.

Mr. FORRESTALL: We will question the Minister about this later on.

The CHAIRMAN: Order, please.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Admiral, can we revert to the bill for a moment. I want to question this matter of continuing service. You have made certain recommendations, which have been repeated to myself in hundreds and hundreds of letters. Subclause 1 of clause 6 reads:

> (1) Officers and men who are members of the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army or the Royal Canadian Air Force immediately prior to the coming into force of this Part are, subject to the provisions of the National Defence Act, members of the Canadian Forces.

Admiral, you make the point that this was going to have some serious effect on morale? Were you telling that the retention of this might force people to reconsider whether or not they would stay on in the armed services?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I did not go as far as to say that. I thought that not gaining the consent of the people in the armed forces would lead to resentment which would be long standing.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I think the Committee, earlier in our hearings, had agreed to hear a legal point of view. Could you tell the Committee how, for example, the officers feel about their present commitments to the RCN? Is it your own impression that you joined the Royal Canadian Navy and not something else, and that you would not wish to be discharged from anything other than the Royal Canadian Navy?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: That is right, yes.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Is this the general opinion that is held by not only officers but men as well?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I cannot say how general it is. I have had a good number of people express that point of view to me. I have not done a survey to find out how general it is.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Thank you. I think that is all.

Mr. FANE: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Admiral Landymore a couple of questions.

Did I understand you correctly to say that materiel command, which integrates the three supply services of the three branches of Canada's armed forces is not working out as well as was expected? Did you say that is was more expensive than having three separate supply services?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think rather that the authority for the supply of materiel should rest with the headquarters. Once again, it would create economy by eliminating the line of administration from operational command to authority. I think there is a fundamental error with a command like materiel command. I think that military commanders on the whole would say that they do not like to commit their forces to military operations unless they control their own support. Under the arrangement that we have, materiel command will function in relation to supplying an operational commander with support adequately as long as we are undertaking only one-half. An example of that might be sending a force to Cyprus. The Canadian force is committed to some kind of police action—and it could involve navy, army and air force—but because there is only one task there would be no difficulty in establishing the priority for sending material to keep that force operating and functioning properly; in other words, the commander of the force would have direct access to all the resources available. But if we consider a case where there are two activities required, where mobile command for example might be taking on reinforcement in Europe while maritime command would be functioning in its antisubmarine role, committing its forces to the western Atlantic. In that event, there are two commanders now making demands on materiel command and the question of priority, where there are common requirements, cannot be settled by the commander of that command—they must be settled by the defence staff itself—and this leads again to what I would call an administrative involvement which is undesirable and unnecessary. Questions in point: for example, the mobile command might wish to have the supply ships to support them or the *Bonaventure* to transport helicopters whereas the maritime commander would want those identical forces to be committed to operation. Here we have a fairly serious argument in relation to priorities for the supply of the available support, and what happens is that the two commanders are pitted one against the other in order to get that support. I think it is an awkward arrangement. It is not as militarily sensible as it could be if the authority for support was all in the headquarters complex and no separate commander or command for that purpose.

Mr. FANE: Strange as it may seem, I thought that was one of the places where integration could have worked all right. However, I can understand perfectly well how difficult it is for—

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I think that the supply matter moved into the headquarters could still be integrated perfectly satisfactorily. It is really more a matter of control and priority to get quickly decisions required to support the actual operation.

Mr. FANE: I guess that explains my difficulties. Thank you very much for that, Admiral.

On the top half of page 4 of your presentation you speak about pensions for retired officers. In this presentation you speak of two officers, both requesting early retirement, and they do not receive the same pension or the pension that they should. That is something that is entirely beyond my understanding

However, I never was connected with the navy. Is there any provision made in the pensions of senior officers who have been retired involuntarily recently, which is different or do they have to take the same cuts as the two that you mentioned.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: I do not know what arrangements were made for their pensions. My pension was arranged so that I received the compensation that I have described as being a fair compensation in that paper—that is, 2 per cent of my pay and allowances.

Mr. FANE: Yes. Do officers like you, whose retirement was forced early, receive the pension that they would have received had they put in their full time?

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: For a period of time, which I think ended last May, officers who were compulsorily retired were given full pension plus a gratuity. Since that arrangement expired, I think anyone who was retired compulsorily would simply receive a full pension for the number of years service that would be required under the Superannuation Act.

Mr. FANE: Not how many years he would have served—

The CHAIRMAN: The bells are ringing.

Mr. FANE: —had his retirement not been forced.

Rear Admiral LANDYMORE: No.

Mr. FANE: It does not seem quite right. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN: Have you finished your questioning?

Mr. FANE: Yes.

The CHAIRMAN: Is your questioning of any duration, Mr. McIntosh?

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, I do not know if my questioning has any duration, Mr. Chairman, but I feel that I share the concern that apparently Admiral Landymore and a great many of us share. I feel that the Admiral is in possession of a lot of information that has not been revealed yet. I had wanted to continue on his summary and recommendations. He gives five suggestions which have not been gone into by this Committee. I think this Committee is entitled to discuss these. Also, I am afraid, because of the pressure that you are putting on us that we are not going to be able to call the witnesses that he suggests. I would like to know, for example, more about FALLEX that he refers to. I would also like to know more about what he asked us to ask the Chief of General Staff in camera—current emergency defence and mobilization plans. What is wrong with this? He apparently has this knowledge; he has conveyed this to us in his brief and we have not brought this out yet. He also suggests that we ask the commander of the maritime command how our ships are being manned; perhaps that has been touched on but it may not have been all brought out. He also asked us to call Admiral Burchell and ask him for his findings in relation to the failure of the materiel organization. There is one other on the previous page; he refers again to the commander of materiel command:

> and seek satisfaction that his command can support the Armed forces under emergency conditions. You will not get satisfaction—you will be left seriously perturbed.

Well, I am perturbed about the information that the Admiral apparently still has that has not been brought out in this Committee, and I would like to question him on these to see if he can reveal these fears to us which are not, to my knowledge, in our possession at the present time. How long it will take me to question him to bring this out, I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, obviously, you will not be able to get through this within the next few minutes.

Mr. MCINTOSH: This is a very serious matter, as far as I am concerned, and a very serious matter for the whole country. I think that as far as time is concerned that we should not rush these witnesses.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, may I suggest that the questions Mr. McIntosh wants to bring up can be put to the Chief of Staff and Vice Chief of Staff when they are here.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well. I am not too sure that they are going to be called as witnesses. You seem to be restricting the witnesses.

Mr. FORRESTALL: As a matter of housekeeping, I was wondering whether or not you could advise us if there was a certain portion of Admiral Brock's testimony that dealt with a conversation between Rear Admiral Brock and the Prime Minister. If so, has there been any indication of the Prime Minister's reaction to that request?

The CHAIRMAN: I did not read that into Admiral Brock's testimony.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Was the Prime Minister not contacted by the Committee?

The CHAIRMAN: No. Gentlemen, the bells are ringing.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, I suggest that we adjourn until eight o'clock to hear General Foulkes, as we had planned.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Are you going to respect my request to get this information from Admiral Landymore?

An hon. MEMBER: Oh, well—

The CHAIRMAN: I do not think so. The witness has indicated that he could appear—

Mr. MCINTOSH: I do not care who is going to be here, I want to question this witness.

The CHAIRMAN: Order. The witness has indicated that if the Committee required him he could appear at another date. It is up to the Committee and we shall have to decide on it.

Mr. MCINTOSH: My point here, Mr. Chairman, is that this witness has information that we possibly would not think to request from the Chief of the General Staff when he is here. He is a qualified military expert and I think that it is his duty not only to us but to the people of Canada to give us these suggestions that we ask so that we can seek out the information that we want.

The CHAIRMAN: This is all a matter of record, Mr. McIntosh.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I do not care about the record. I want to know if we are going to be able to do this or if our investigation is going to be restricted.

The CHAIRMAN: We will take this matter up in the Steering Committee and then decide, as a Committee of the whole, what to do.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Is the witness not going to be here again?

The CHAIRMAN: The witness has said that he is prepared to come down again. I have said that already.

Mr. MACALUSO: When will we meet?

The CHAIRMAN: The bells are ringing now. We have General Foulkes waiting to appear before us. It would seem to me that if the vote is completed within the next ten minutes or so—

Some hon. MEMBERS: No.

The CHAIRMAN: Perhaps we should adjourn until eight o'clock. Before you go, gentlemen, I would like to thank the Admiral for taking the time to come here yesterday and today.

The meeting is adjourned.

APPENDIX "E"

A BRIEF

by

REAR ADMIRAL W. M. LANDYMORE

O.B.E., C.D., R.C.N.

Prepared for

THE STANDING COMMITTEE

ON NATIONAL DEFENCE

ADDRESS FOR THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE (1966)

By Rear Admiral W. M. Landymore, OBE, CD, RCN

"Unification"

My last appearance before you took place on 23rd June. On that occasion I opened my briefing with the statement,—"It is a great privilege to have been invited to appear before you"—About three hours after the session began your Chairman brought the meeting to a close with this expression of thanks—"We would like to thank you for your brief and for answering our questions. We would like to wish you, in all sincerity, the very best of good fortune and continued success, and I know we would all hope, in this Committee, that in some way, we can be of assistance to you in your task".—Precisely nineteen days later the Minister asked me for my resignation.

In "Backstage in Ottawa" dated 20th August in *Macleans* Magazine, an editor had this to say concerning my appearance before you on the 23rd June; I quote,—"But according to several men who were present it did not include criticism of, or even direct reference to, the unification programme. This was Landymore's big chance to make his point in public with perfect safety and propriety—he was answering questions before a Committee of Parliament and no one could have faulted him for speaking his mind in candor."—unquote.

You will recognize at once that everything in the quote is not quite right. You will find in the minutes that in referring to naval matters, I said morale is bad—that there is a great deal of unrest amongst officers and senior men, that I didn't agree with unification, that there was reluctance in the navy to accept unification, that identity is most important as far as servicemen are concerned, and that sailors dislike khaki uniforms. This may not have been enough for the Ottawa Editor of *Macleans* but I'm afraid it was rather too much for the Minister.

Nevertheless, I find it interesting that he assumed a service witness before this Committee could speak with perfect safety and propriety. I submit, gentlemen, that the main factor causing my compulsory retirement was my frankness in answering your questions, at a meeting which would be reported publicly, as my answers to you clearly indicated a disparity between my views on unification and those of the Minister. So much for safety—so much for propriety—so much for candor.

But so that there can be no doubt in your minds on the sequence of events, of that period, I was not compulsorily retired because I made statements to the press. On the 12th July the Minister informed me I would be compulsorily retired, and I reported this fact to the Chief of the Defence Staff, to the Chief of Personnel and also informed the Chairman of the Defence Committee on the 12th July. I made no statement to the press until 15th July. In other words neither the time I spoke to the press nor what I said were factors connected with the Minister asking for my resignation, and when on 12th July I wouldn't co-operate by offering my resignation, he told me I would be compulsorily retired. No one in the Department has bothered to make this clear. I presume, because it was easier to allow the public to think my press statements were the reason the Minister retired me, and not the real reason.

While those were not factors which brought about my retirement, my appearance before your Committee most certainly was.

For serving officers these were days charged with a great deal of emotion. In rapid succession two Lieut. Generals, one Vice Admiral, three Rear Admirals and I were either to be retired by "mutual agreement", for reasons of dissatisfaction or, as it was, in my case, simply being fired. Can you imagine any Department of Government firing or retiring early no fewer than seven of its top executives and not a word being said about it? I would have been derelict in my duty had I not spoken out. However, Admiral Dyer warned me not to—He said—"the Minister will slap a charge on you as quick as look at you"—The Chief of Defence Staff said he wasn't going to say anything. By appointment, I was the next senior naval officer to Admiral Dyer. If I didn't speak out, who would? Moreover my official date of retirement is 5th April 1967, if I had waited until then to speak out, not only would my information be outdated but also the disaster in the making would then be almost beyond repair.

In the course of the next few minutes you will learn why I spoke out, and what I will tell you will leave no doubt whatsoever, that it was necessary to alert the people of Canada to a perilous state of affairs in defence matters.

But first I must observe that compulsory retirement is a poor alternative to completing the full course of one's career. It is not a suitable alternative not only because senior officers don't like to be fired but also because it involves a considerable financial penalty.

While I attribute my appearance before your Committee as contributing handsomely to my early retirement, I am, nevertheless grateful for your invitation to reappear here today for it affords me an opportunity, not only to put the record in order but also to give you my views on unification. I will try to accomplish two tasks at this meeting. First I will show that my public statements and objections to unification, made on the 15th July were not arrived at on the spur of the moment, but came after many months of attempting, unsuccessfully, to indicate through official channels, available to me, the seriousness of the situation in my Command directly related to the matter of unification. In any case, a *spokesman* in the Minister's office suggested you should call me before you to answer for my deplorable actions in intimidating my officers and men, and, while I doubt that it is his responsibility, or any of his business to tell you who to call before you, I'm sure you would want to know the facts of the matter to which he alluded.

This occasion affords me the opportunity to tell you why unification is a foolhardy venture, and one which has already done untold damage to the armed forces. I hope, through discussion of this second important matter you will gain the knowledge there are two sides to this question and that it is a matter of vital importance to the Defence of Canada, and therefore worthy of the most searching inquiry into its full implications.

The story of unification as far as my personal activities are concerned began 11th April 1964, that is, about a month after the White Paper appeared. On that day the Minister visited my Command on the West Coast where I was the Flag Officer and Maritime Commander (Pacific). The Minister addressed two meetings that day, meetings attended by a total of more than five hundred officers and men from all three Services and the reserves. He explained the integration

policy of the White Paper, and told us he intended to press on with integration, but in the matter of unification there was no intention to force it down anyone's throat, that he expected it would evolve naturally as a result of a desire within the services to unify. I had personal reservations about the unification concept but his statement that it would be allowed to evolve naturally, that it wouldn't be forced down our throats, put my fears to rest; for it seemed to me, that if good common sense was to prevail and a proper, qualified study of all the implications was to be carried out, unification would not occur in my lifetime.

This was the situation until November 1964. I was appointed to relieve Admiral Brock as the Flag Officer Atlantic Coast and Maritime Commander Atlantic. You will remember Admiral Brock was compulsorily retired because he had reservations about the proposed new organization. Just after I took up my appointments, I was summoned to a Commanders Conference in Ottawa. As it turned out, the only Commander's Conference to be called during my twenty months in command on the East Coast.—November 1964—The Minister opened the Conference, and told all the Commanders they were to "go along" with integration and unification, or, as he put it, "put their letters on his desk". When he finished his opening remarks we had an opportunity to ask questions. At this time I told the Minister that unification would destroy the spirit of the navy, and that, unless he would provide the details of the unification programme and the time span over which it was to be achieved, I could not support the policy. I thought this frank and honest disclosure of my position relieved me of any necessity to resign. If there was to be a move to discuss the matter further or to call an end to my service it was the Minister's move,—not mine.

At this time the word unification was *assumed* to mean, a single service, with a single identity, that is, a common identity or personnel serving in the force. This definition had to be assumed for there wasn't an official definition then, nor as far as I can determine, is there one now. Indeed, in the military forces of other nations "unification" means something altogether different. For example, in Britain it is used to denote that in a theatre of operations there will be only one Commander-in-Chief, who, with proper senior advisers from the other services, will command the theatre. There was no study of unification to show how it had been arrived at as a concept. Although it has been claimed integration was studied, as far as I can determine there hadn't been a study of the implications of it either. Can you imagine the complete re-organization of an industry employing 120,000 people with an annual budget of 1½ billion without a study of its implications by the board of directors? That's what happened. Nevertheless, while there was no written appreciation of the implications of unification, there were many references, official and unofficial hinting at what it might involve. The Minister himself gave us a clue at a meeting held in Ottawa in June 1965. At an assembly of a very large number of senior officers who had been invited to Ottawa to learn something of the organization plans for integration, the Minister in his opening remarks announced there would be a single walking out dress and a single rank structure by July 1967. I immediately asked the Chief of Personnel for more details of this as he, normally, is responsible for dress and rank structure. He told me he had no pre-knowledge of the announcement or any knowledge of any such plan.

There have been references to "green uniforms". There was an article in a leading weekly on the "Royal Canadian Marines." There was a recent statement

that Highland Regiments would be permitted to keep their traditional dress. There has been reference to the Royal 22nd Regiment retaining their identity—but there has been no document defining unification in terms of a single service with a single identity. At the time I was relieved of my command there was no such definition, so all anyone had been able to do since the White Paper of March 1964, was guess. Speculation within the armed forces on a matter as important as this will lead to unrest. But it is impossible for anyone to support something, or to be against something if he doesn't know what it's all about. For my part, from the beginning, I have made it clear, that if unification is to be carried to the rumoured extreme so that the Navy would lose its identity, there would have to be clear improvements to efficiency and economy or I'd oppose it.

The announcement by the Minister in June 1965 that the services would have a single walking out dress and a common rank structure by July 1967 struck the officers in my Command like a bombshell. The announcement caused a most serious setback in morale. Officers and men were deeply distressed by it. I was personally so concerned about its effects that I ordered an informal poll to be carried out in HMCS *Stadacona*, the barracks in Halifax, and at HMCS *Shearwater*, the naval air station. I left it to the respective Commanding Officers to conduct the poll in their own way. My purpose in doing this was to be able to report to Ottawa the true effect of the announcement. The result of the poll indicated there was precious little desire for the changes. In fact, there was considerable resentment the changes should even be considered. On the 21st June I reported, in writing, to the Chief of the Defence Staff, the results of these enquiries. My letter ended with this paragraph—I quote—"I cannot overemphasize the adverse result which will occur if the present course toward unification is continued. This being so, the choice seems either to live with a service which will have no heart for its work for years to come, or to pursue integration with all its benefits leaving the matter of identity totally intact. I most strongly urge the second alternative. It is requested the Defence Council be made aware of the foregoing observations"—end of quote.

There was no reply to this letter.

My concern did not end there. It was my practise regularly to visit the ships and shore establishments of my Command. When I did, I always spoke to the Ship's Company. I tried to keep them informed of all matters concerning them. At these sessions I always permitted the officers and men to question me on any service matter. The matter of the single service was always raised, but I never had anything to tell them, because they knew as much as I knew, even so, the question always came up and, in such a way, they tried desperately to tell me they didn't like the idea. I couldn't escape the message they gave me, that they were pinning their hopes on me to do something to save the Navy.

In the first three weeks after the announcement more than twenty officers told me this was the "last straw" and that they would try to get out, and would if they could do so without a pension penalty. It was a new experience for me to find officers demoralized in this way. I was concerned that the navy would lose key officers in the organization, officers who had years of training and experience in the realm of maritime warfare.

I decided to act, to check this deterioration of morale amongst my officers. The way I acted, and it is this that caused the Minister's "spokesman" to hint

had intimidated my officers and men, was to call to a meeting all officers of my Command of the rank of Commodore, Captain and Commander. This meeting occurred in July last year.

At the meeting I made these points clearly, emphatically and with conviction:

First—That unification had not been defined so we were allowing ourselves to be demoralized by an unknown quantity.

Second—The National Defence Act called for three services which couldn't be changed to a single service without an amendment to the Act in Parliament and I was certain that good sense would prevail in this important matter.

Third—I traced the events concerning unification up to that time in precisely the same way as I've traced them for you today.

Fourth—I told them I could see no merit in forcing the navy to lose its identity and referred to our dress, our traditions, our rank structure, and the designators for our ships. Finally, I told them regardless of my personal views I would represent their viewpoint and that they would have an opportunity to indicate to me what their point of view was.

I then asked them to stand to signify agreement with the following points:

First—That they wished me to represent their viewpoint.

Second—That they wouldn't feel they couldn't speak openly and frankly about their views on unification in the service and outside. I pointed out that this would be the state of affairs until the law was changed in Parliament. I told them not only was it quite proper to talk about it but that I encouraged them to do so.

Third—That they should not consider a loss of identity for the navy inevitable and so become apathetic about it.

Fourth—and this is most important—that they wouldn't ask to be retired because they couldn't accept the theory of unification. I pledged that if their viewpoint was ignored that it would be I alone who would take appropriate action in protest.

Fifth—That for the information of people outside the room the purpose of our meeting was to discuss morale.

About fifty officers were present and all but one stood to signify his agreement to the five points. The one officer who didn't stand told me later that he agreed with all my points but that he thought I had been wrong to ask officers to make their personal views known under non-private circumstances. In August I had two further meetings. They were conducted similarly to the first meeting. By 17th August I had spoken to 230 officers of the rank of Lieutenant Commander and above. Of this number three had not signified their agreement to the five points but of these only one believed in full unification. That is, one in 230.

I wrote a letter to the Chief of Personnel on the 23rd August to tell him what I had done and the result. The letter ended with this paragraph—I quote—"Surely it is time then, to put the case to the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Minister, to encourage the pursuit of progress in integration, to abandon

the attempt to force the single service concept down the throats of unwilling recipients and to restore the lost confidence of officers and men by standing up for individual service identity" unquote.

Later I was to speak to a number of officers who hadn't been present at the meetings and the total ultimately reached 367 with no other officer not accepting the five points. I had ascertained there was absolutely no support for full unification amongst naval officers in my Command, and now it was therefore my responsibility firmly and consistently to represent their point of view.

In December 1965 came the article on the Royal Canadian Marines. This caused more bitterness and resentment than anything that had happened previously. Not only was the concept of the Royal Canadian Marines considered to be silly but the officers and men didn't like getting information from magazines which had no official status. It was generally known that a member of the Minister's personal staff had generated the article. Personally I considered it to be a trial balloon, that it was ill-considered, untimely and that it had seriously damaged morale.

On the 29th December I reported my views on ill-considered semi-official press releases to the Chief of the Defence Staff. The letter ended with this paragraph—I quote—"I expect you have heard my views often enough to find them boring. If this is the case, and if my protestations have become meaningless, and if the ill-considered press releases continue, there won't be a chance for effective leadership here to be exercised by anyone. In any event, as you can appreciate from the tone of this letter, my task of providing effective command is becoming increasingly difficult and may prove to be impossible"—unquote.

In spite of my strong statements on morale I was not visited in my Command by the Minister, the Associate Minister or Chief of the Defence Staff. In fact, I was not visited by any of them during my twenty months in command. Presumably I was supposed to look on bad morale as an acceptable condition and to ignore the causes of it.

In January of this year I was informed that there had been a few informal meetings between the Defence Staff and the Minister when unification was discussed. As I hadn't seen an appreciation on unification I thought I should send my own to Ottawa in order to show the place of the Navy in unification. I wrote my own appreciation and discussed all appropriate factors—interchangeability of personnel between services under unification, environmental conditions of sea service influencing unification, identity, esprit-de-corps, links with the past tradition and so on. This appreciation has since been published. I forwarded the appreciation to the Chief of Personnel and advised the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff it had been forwarded and that I hoped he would read it.

The appreciation ended with this recommendation—I quote—"I recommend that since we have freedom to define unification, this definition should confine itself to unification at the top. The definition should encompass the concept of the single Chief—a single Defence Staff—a single programme—and single administrative procedures. To go beyond this will split the Navy down the middle and cause an exodus of our best people. The consequences of this are obvious."

I believe that the sequence of events can leave little doubt in anyone's mind that the channels of communication open to me were used and used properly.

reported conscientiously my actions, my observations on matters causing bad morale but to no avail. Then occurred a new way to destroy morale. On the 14th April of this year there appeared in the Toronto *Globe and Mail* a news item concerning re-engagement rates in the three Services. At the end of this release appeared the following statement—I quote—"Another factor is the generally acknowledged difference in officer/man relationships in the Navy. Defence officials say that naval officers still retain to some extent an above decks, below decks mentality where personnel are concerned. They've got to realize that this is now a highly technical service, a spokesman said. Sailors don't just scrub decks and set the sail now, they're skilled men and the old attitudes of officers just don't fit. We're trying to change that."—unquote.

The spokesman was Mr. Lee.

We had reached the stage where an influential person on the Minister's personal staff had publicly criticized the whole officer corps of the navy. I was not consulted at any time by the Minister on officer/man relationships and had there been any criticism of our officers I should have been sent for and had it made known to me. I asked for a public apology or denial. I got neither and so had to protect the Minister by telling all my Commanding Officers, in a message, he held no such views,—this to prevent a complete breakdown of confidence between naval officers and the Government. While this matter is not related to unification it illustrates that the Minister has no regard whatsoever for the state of morale in the navy.

More recently, in fact on 22nd September while in Halifax the Minister told an assembly of officers he had found matters affecting morale which required correction on the West Coast and that, at his direction the Commander had put them right. At that time I was the Maritime Commander and should have been consulted. When I broached this matter with him privately on 24th June he defended Mr. Lee. In Halifax he apologized for it but blamed it on the press. This was a belated way out, for there was no reason, if it were true, to say the press had misquoted the spokesman, and so correct the record at once.

On 16th August I wrote to General Moncel who had become the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff on the progress being made in the Command in making plans for the new Command Organization. I had just returned from Quebec City where I had attended a ship commissioning. During that visit I took the opportunity to call at the Barracks of the Royal 22nd Regiment. A number of the officers I met expressed considerable concern over the possible effect of unification on their Regiment. When I wrote to General Moncel I mentioned that I had these conversations with the officers and passed them on for what they were worth. In his reply to me 20th August he had this to say.—"I find your closing comments most upsetting and my immediate reaction is of course to wonder what you are doing to offset this growing resentment. I am at a loss to understand what you mean by a loss of identity. The Royal 22nd Regiment is unaffected and unchanged by the process of integration other than the fact they are in the position to be better equipped, better commanded and better trained and further that officers employed outside the regiment have far greater opportunities for more interesting work in a much wider field—Under these conditions where is the loss of identity? *No one has or is even contemplating in their wildest dreams interfering with their sacred rituals, customs, bones or relics.* I

sense a certain degree of imagined fears and perhaps some deliberate conjuring up of ghosts. It is our job to lay these ghosts and put them back where they belong." unquote.

To me this reply was a clear indication that not even the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff knew what was going on in the Minister's office on the process of unification. Moreover it clearly indicated the Defence Staff was not discussing or studying unification. It was always the same, whenever I questioned members of the Defence Staff on unification, the answer was always that nothing was being done about it. On returning to my Command where I was asked the question by my officers and men all I could reply was that I had been assured in Ottawa that nothing was being done about unification. My officers and men did not find this very satisfactory in light of the rumours in the press.

Now let me make the sequence of events clear to you.

On June 22nd I presented two briefs, one unclassified, one secret in the Minister's conference room. These were the briefs which I had prepared for your Committee. The Minister, the Associate Minister, Mr. Lee and Mr. Grant were present. To assist, I had three of my senior staff officers with me. Admiral Stirling, the Maritime Commander Pacific, was also present. A few Headquarters' Staff Officers were also in the room but there wasn't any member of the Defence Staff present. I found it incredible that I was to make a complete report on my Command and not one member of the Defence Staff would know what I was going to say to you.

In the unclassified brief I had used figures and graphs to illustrate a number of points. This applied to the personnel section of the brief. The figures used were checked with Headquarters staff officers before the briefing to ensure there was nothing being used which wouldn't be fully supported in the Headquarters.

When I finished delivering my briefs a copy of the unclassified one was given to the Minister's Staff at his request. The personnel section was virtually re-written. I was upset there should be a censorship of the brief. I received the censored version that evening.

The following day, 23rd June, I delivered the briefs for your Committee, that is the censored version of the unclassified brief and the classified one. Before I appeared before you I had a brief meeting with the Minister. He told me the personnel section has been altered because he wanted a positive attitude taken on personnel matters. He did not state that I had dealt with matters beyond my purview or that there were inaccuracies. This was said later by a spokesman after I disclosed there had been a censorship. I have with me the unclassified brief, as I intended you should hear it, and the same brief after it had been re-written by the Minister's Staff, and later if you desire I will read them both to you so you can judge whether or not there was censorship. Moreover Admiral Stirling was present for all this and would attest to the accuracy of my statements as would staff officers who accompanied me.

After I briefed you and as I was leaving the building, the Minister asked me if I would remain in Ottawa an extra day in order to have a talk with him. This meeting occurred on 24th June. It lasted more than an hour. During it the Minister gave me his views on a number of matters including some points on

unification. I warned the Minister the present course toward full unification was simply not being accepted by the Navy and that if he forced a loss of identity on the Navy it would lead to disaster. The meeting was inconclusive and he said he would ask me to come to Ottawa for further discussions within the week. However, the meeting did not take place until 12th July, that is almost three weeks later. In the meanwhile he had announced that the Highland Regiments would be permitted to retain their traditional dress so I had high hopes that when we met on the 12th July I could persuade the Minister to take the same logical step for the Navy. It seemed obvious that the identity of the Navy must appear to him as important for the Navy as the dress of Highland regiments is to them I was soon to be disappointed because he would not compromise or alter his views. He asked me to resign. I refused and for two very good reasons both of which I have stated publicly. Firstly, I could see no reason why I should resign my commission over a difference of opinion on undefined policy, a policy which had not been ratified by legislation in the parliament, and secondly, if an officer or man resigns or asks to be retired he has to accept a substantial reduction in pension. Since my difference with the Minister was only in the matter of identity and as there are, to my certain knowledge, a large number of officers with the same vested rights, who have the same difference with the Minister, I would not establish a precedent which could adversely affect my officers and men. The Minister then told me I would be retired, that he would arrange my pension and give me the date when he returned from Paris, and when a relief could be posted.

I reported the Minister's decision to the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Chief of Personnel that same afternoon 12th July. That evening I got in touch with your Chairman and asked him if he would arrange for me to see the Prime Minister. By this time I had ascertained that neither the Chief of the Defence Staff nor the Chief of Personnel intended to take this step. I told your Chairman about my compulsory retirement and the early retirements of three other Admirals. Mr. Deachman of your Committee also knew of the retirements for he and Mr. Groos called on Admiral Welland to get confirmation of what I had told them. I also told Mr. Groos the personnel section of my brief to his Committee had been censored. I thought these matters were so serious that the Prime Minister should know about them at once. Mr. Groos arranged an informal meeting with the Prime Minister for the early evening of 13th July. That is, the next evening. I had my opportunity to tell the Prime Minister of the retirements. Your Chairman asked me not to say anything about the censorship to the Prime Minister. I presumed because he intended to deal with the matter himself. The Prime Minister told me that he fully supported the Minister's policy on integration but that he didn't know to what depth he intended to carry unification. He reminded me he had visited the Ship's Company of HMCS *Saskatchewan* on the West Coast, and had promised them the Government would not interfere with naval traditions.

He said he would have a talk with the Minister and asked Mr. Groos to be present when he did. I must emphasize that the meeting with the Prime Minister was informal and that I'm deeply grateful that he saw me. I had no reason to expect the Prime Minister to take any specific action as a result of our conversations. I felt I could not live with my conscience if I did not take every step possible to make known the seriousness of the situation.

I should point out that the Associate Minister of Defence, although he heard my briefs on 22nd June was not involved in any way I know of in the alteration of them, nor was he present at any of the meetings I had with the Minister.

On 14th July I returned to Halifax. In advance I sent a message to say I would like to see the four Commodores serving in the area, at their convenience between 4 and 6 p.m. that evening. It was necessary to inform them at once so that they could make the necessary arrangements for my relief. That evening I received local and long distance calls from the press asking if rumours of my retirement were true. I referred them to Ottawa saying I had no comment until an official announcement was made. At about 9.15 a.m. on the morning of the 15th I was called by a highly respected member of the Halifax press, Mr. Jack Brayley. He gave me the information that my retirement had been announced, that the wires were full of the story, and that great harm would be done to the Navy if I didn't answer the questions of the press. I agreed to do so and let it be known I would be at my house that afternoon and would answer questions for anyone who was interested. I was not responsible directly or indirectly, as far as I know, for leaking the news to the press.

The rest of the story you know as well as I do. The Minister has stated that my actions were "reprehensible" that it was a simple matter of the military taking civil control. There is a vast difference between alerting the nation to a pending disaster in defence matters and taking civil control. There is a vast difference in advising to what degree a policy should be carried out and taking civil control. This charge was unfair and unreasonable. It was designed to discredit me personally so that no one would take any notice of the situation. I was threatened by the Minister's spokesman with Court-Martial. I wondered if this wasn't a warning to others who might be tempted to speak out. I resolved from then on, that I would answer every question asked me, and I have done so truthfully and frankly.

I am prepared to answer your questions, and I have with me the original copies of all the papers I have referred to, so that you can have the full text if you wish.

Now I would like to turn to the second matter, and tell you why, I believe, unification, if it is carried out to the full limit, is a foolhardy experiment.

I would like you to know that I have worked hard for integration and have supported it in principle; I would also like you to know that I am in support of administrative unification where it will lead to greater efficiency and greater economy.

My main difference with the Minister is in the matter of identity, that is, tradition, dress, rank structure and service designators. In other words, I believe it is necessary to have a navy, identifiable as such, an army or mobile force identified as an army and for the foreseeable future an air force. It would be an easy matter to say now—is all this fuss just over the matter of identity. Bear in mind the armed forces have been shrinking at an unprecedented rate. Bear in mind that a very large number of responsible people in the armed forces feel that this so-called trivial matter is so important that they will leave the services if it is carried out. Bear in mind that naval officers in Halifax on 22nd September jeered the Minister for his complete disregard of their opinions. Bear in mind it

is not in the nature of Naval Officers to show anything but the highest regard for Ministers of the Crown. So do not allow yourself to be made to believe this is a trivial matter.

Had a proper and complete study of unification been conducted, it would have been obvious that the basic premise, and only justification, for a single force, on which the proponents for full unification could hang their argument was that the armed forces had only *one* role. I think there grew up an idea that the policing role *was* the only role, and if that was the case why not have a single force, a highly mobile force which could go anywhere quickly to deal with policing situations? This idea was expanded with the argument, that if the police force was properly equipped with modern weapons it would, in fact be a mobile army capable of dealing with policing situations and able also to meet army commitments in an emergency. Along with this there grew up the idea that because of inter-continental ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons war was unthinkable. War of all sorts is unthinkable, and always has been, but it hasn't prevented us becoming involved in war, nor can a defence of Canada be based on a gamble that we cannot become involved in war.

Those of you who heard my classified briefing on 23rd June must have been startled by the serious situation which had developed at sea. You could not have failed to conclude that there is a distinct and separate role for the navy—and a highly specialized and professional one that is, distinct and separate from the mobile force and police force concept. You could not help but conclude that this role is a continuing one, and that it is so vastly different and far removed from the predictable tasks for the Mobile Force that to lump all three services into a single force makes no military sense whatsoever. I am not alone in this viewpoint. The Chiefs of Staff in Britain, in the United States, in all of NATO to my certain knowledge share my concern over the situation at sea, and have no doubts whatsoever as to the distinctly separate role of navies in respect of it. This being so, there can be no merit in causing a complete upheaval of the navy to remould it into a single force, a single force having two completely separate reasons for its existence.

The Minister, in his early utterances on unification, assumed there was a high degree of interchangeability of personnel. There is almost no economic and practicable interchangeability possible between the navy and the other two services. It was argued, for example, that the artillery officer of the army was interchangeable with the weapons officer of a ship. Nothing could be further from reality. To attempt to achieve, within a single service, a high degree of interchangeability, would be a very expensive and futile venture. So the premise that unification will lead to economy is false.

It has been argued that recruiting for a single service eliminates competition between the services to obtain the prospective recruit and is therefore more economical. There may be some merit in this argument but there are other arguments which are more important in sustaining the personnel strength of the armed forces. The weakness of this theory has been demonstrated amply, already, for the armed forces are not getting anything like enough recruits to meet their tasks. When I went on retirement leave the current forecast was that the armed forces would rundown until they were 18000 officers and men below strength. The effect on the navy will be that in June of next year only about 14

or 15 of the navy's 23 destroyers will be manned. The others will be in maintenance for lack of crews. The battalions and the air squadrons will be in the same mess. Not only will Canada fail to meet its NATO and Canada/US agreements but also our defence will be woefully inadequate. We are told *money* is the cure to keep people in the forces and to attract the numbers we need. Pay is certainly a factor but it is by no means the only factor, and far too much importance is attached to it. The *threat* of unification, the unrest caused by the lack of information about it, and the prospect of a hybrid force have, in my opinion, already caused an exodus of officers and men from the forces and this will not be halted. Moreover, I believe the prospective recruit still wants to choose his service and be certain at the start whether he will be a soldier, sailor or airman and he wants to look like a soldier, sailor or airman.

Formerly we derived a great deal of help for recruiting by the officers and men actively serving. They recommended it to others. The officers and men of the navy are thinking more of how they can get out than of their careers. This source of recruiting assistance, for the navy at least, has almost disappeared. The veterans of three services were always helpful to our efforts. The veterans are opposed to the concept of a single service and so this source of recruiting help has all but disappeared. The cadet organizations which take their image from the three services are no longer as effective as they were formerly. The proponents of full unification cannot bring themselves to admit that these are factors and so the armed forces continue to run down. If you were to ask the Commanders of our commands, maritime, training, air transport, mobile, each one would tell you his main problem is a shortage of personnel. The gamble has been that a new pay structure will fix all this; by the time anyone is prepared to acknowledge this isn't the cure, it will be too late.

It has been argued that rigid systems of seniority and zealously guarded equality of representation between the armed forces is a good reason to unify. Whether we have a single service or three services it will always be necessary at the top to have a balance of senior officers who are fully competent in land warfare, sea warfare and air warfare. Hiding everyone in a single uniform will not eliminate the requirement to have the balance in the Defence Staff of properly qualified officers. It is an unattainable goal to have officers fully proficient in all three. The Minister recently stated that the present system of three services legislates against selecting suitable options for equipment. While he is confused between integration and unification, a single service will not eliminate what he believes is a problem for the final decision for the selection of a weapons system will require senior officers trained in the separate environments to state their case, or we will end up with the wrong weapons system.

Full unification requires, according to the Minister, the destruction of naval identity. He is supported publicly by people who claim that it would be a good thing to do this, because the navy is hidebound by tradition, and because it is patterned to a great extent on the Royal Navy. The latter argument is not a weakness, it's a strength. All our armed forces have got their beginnings from the armed forces of Great Britain. Our parliamentary democracy, and our judicial systems were patterned on those of Great Britain too. I don't see anything wrong with this, nor can I see anything wrong with our servicemen displaying the same courage, skill at arms and fortitude for which the British forces are famous. Yet we are, within our services, very Canadian and proud of

it. The Navy is not hidebound by tradition. I know of no custom or tradition carried on in the Navy today which stands in the way of progress. Our dress, our rank designations, our traditions and customs, our ship designators, give us the esprit-de-corps essential to a fighting service. Moreover these same identifying marks are very similar in all navies throughout the free world. The vast, and unnecessary change under unification will destroy morale. It already has done great harm. How can this be more effective, more economical? Think for a moment about the cost of the change. To outfit 107,000 servicemen with a single walking out dress is a very expensive change. The servicemen will need a winter dress, a summer dress and a tropical dress—more than one of each because even servicemen send their uniforms to the cleaners. I estimate the initial cost of this venture will be of the order of 40 millions. The waste of existing stock will run as high as 20 millions. The total cost will be about 60 millions to put servicemen in uniforms which, for the most part, they don't want to wear. Sixty millions would purchase the two replenishment ships in our current naval building programme and more besides. I simply cannot understand how the integration policy which claimed economy for the taxpayer and efficiency for the armed forces can be carried to the extreme of unification, with public support, when it is so obviously costly without gains in efficiency and succeeds only in satisfying the outlook of anti-traditionalists.

Rank structures are important to fighting forces. While we don't yet know what the new rank designations will be at least we can ask how will a change in the rank structure be more efficient, more economic? Every order, record, and publication concerned with personnel matters will require revision—and amendment or rewriting. This is an expensive business and it will succeed in providing new designators the servicemen don't need and as far as I can determine for the navy, don't want. The Minister claims there will be no extra cost. He argues that it was the intention of improving the quality of cloth for existing uniforms in any case, so if you allow this, and make the change over a four or five year period there will be no significant cost. This argument is entirely false because officers and men are only outfitted with their uniform on joining. After that men are given an allowance to keep their uniform in good condition. Officers provide their uniforms at their own expense. The change to a new uniform therefore is a change requiring a complete re-outfitting at public expense.

The Minister has stated that he intends to retain the ceremonial dress of units. and the mess kits. The navy's ceremonial dress is their traditional dress—yet this is to be eliminated. There is no logic to this whatsoever.

When the Minister was asked about this in Halifax 22nd September, he insulted every officer at his meeting by saying in reply—"I think you almost approach it from the standpoint that your uniform was ordained by God at sometime at the beginning of the earth and has never changed". The jeering which reportedly followed this statement was so intense that Admiral O'Brien had to intervene and it went on until he stopped it abruptly with a most emphatic command. It is no wonder the rest of the meeting was more orderly.

The single service concept inevitably forces all services to accept something less suitable, right across the board.

The experiment of unification has been embarked upon without a full study of its implications. We are told the reports written by General Anderson's

Committee and Vice Admiral Hennessy's Committee are the blueprints for the personnel structures. Neither of these studies, and hence the blueprints, argue the pros and cons of unification. They represent only a possible structure if the forces are unified. Had these two groups been given the task of studying unification as well, the picture would be vastly different. In fact, everyone I know who has done any thinking on the subject has come to the conclusion it would be a mistake to unify now; that even five years from now might be too soon; and furthermore that *never* is probably the solution.

The White Paper was written in March 1964. Even the name of the new force has not been decided after over two years, let alone anything else.

It has been claimed that servicemen fully support the policy of unification. We have heard the middle ranks are right behind the Minister. This is sheer conjecture for certainly no one in the commands has been asked his views. In Halifax 22nd September officers, of all ranks, made it perfectly clear this was not their point of view.

Every aspect of full unification seems to me to be less effective, less economic, destructive in morale, and amounts to a change for the sake of change.

I understand your Committee will have an opportunity to study the legislation for the unified force. I hope you will bear in mind that every officer and man at present serving in the armed forces voluntarily joined one, and only one of the three services. If a single service becomes the law and every officer and man man is transferred into it with no choice in the matter you can be assured the servicemen won't like it. While conscription is perhaps not a completely accurate word to use under these circumstances, it is the word the servicemen will use. You'll have a morale problem on your hands, for this reason alone, for years to come. If, on the other hand, you allow each officer and man to elect whether he'll join, and if he says "no", you release him honourably and without pension penalty as would be only fair and reasonable under the circumstances, I predict such an exodus from the armed forces will occur that there won't be a chance of recovering during your lifetime and beyond.

This is not a very satisfactory situation because both choices are equally damaging to the armed forces. You will hear the argument put this way—surely servicemen joined the armed forces to serve their country and this above all should be sufficient motivation to accept the theory of the unified force. It is true they joined the armed forces to serve their country but in a specific capacity, that is, as a member of the Royal Canadian Navy—the Canadian Army or in the Royal Canadian Air Force. They did not join to serve in a unified force. You serve your country as Members of Parliament. The RCMP serve their country as policemen. Everyone in federal employment serves in a specific capacity which they chose themselves and so, should have the right to say if they choose to serve in a different capacity.

It will be argued that if you gave each person a free choice it would not be possible to differentiate between those who would choose to leave because they don't wish to serve in the unified force and those who wish to leave for other reasons and would use unification as their excuse. The Minister used this argument in Halifax. There might be officers and men who would use such an option to get out but surely, no one can believe we can have effective volunteer

services made up of personnel who don't wish to serve. The fact is, so many officers and men do not support unification that it would probably mean a general exodus, and thus, going on with unification would end in disaster. This is the real reason there is no intention of providing each individual with the option.

The public has been duped into believing unification is the end all and be all of integration. I predict, it will be the end of effective defence for Canada and I don't envy you your task of explaining your mistake if you support it.

But it is not too late to call a halt to the fally and if you take the following course of action you can be sure of your ground:

First—Your Committee must demand that all processes of unification, however unimportant they may appear to be, be halted immediately. This is your only course of action at the outset, because there is no way to get a full knowledge of the implications of unification until a complete study of its full implications has been set down on paper. In any case, a delay in the programme of a few weeks, or even a few months cannot be very harmful to the programme since many of its most enthusiastic supporters think it is going ahead too swiftly. A delay for careful study may mean avoiding a catastrophe.

Second—Start a thorough and searching inquiry. Demand to know the full implications. Demand to see a complete study of the plan before it's undertaken, before it becomes law. Seek advice from serving personnel and from retired personnel who have already experienced the beginnings of integration and unification. Cause a poll to be carried out under conditions which will allow every officer and man and woman honestly to indicate his or her position with relation to unification. This will give you a measure of the chance of success or failure of the idea. It may be argued that polls or referendums are no way to run the armed forces. I submit that it is quite proper under circumstances where each individual's career is affected to consult the individual.

Third—Should you be unable to see your way clear to halting unification altogether before proceeding with the final legislation, I urge you to treat all your servicemen fairly and with consideration and include as a condition of the legislation that all serving personnel be allowed the right to decide whether or not they will join the unified force. Those who, in all conscience, don't wish to be a part of it, should be Honourably released and whatever pension they have earned should be paid to them in full without penalty. Even the most enthusiastic supporters or the most ardent defenders of the status quo can't object to treating our servicemen correctly under these circumstances. It is not good enough to limit your treatment to a ruling that officers and men will not be forced to serve except voluntarily, in an environment different to the service environment they initially chose.

Our armed services are manned by volunteers—our volunteer manpower is our greatest resource. Whatever may be your opinion on the merits, or otherwise of unification, believe me when I say our greatest resource is shrinking in numbers to the point where the operational effectiveness of our services will be impaired for years to come and that this shrinkage is largely due to misplaced enthusiasm for the untimely experiment of unification.

I have spoken at length—too long perhaps but I felt it necessary to touch on most aspects of this important matter so that your questions would embrace the whole subject. If I have failed to impress you with the potential danger to the country's defence of following the Minister's headlong rush to full unification, then I have failed in the most important duty it has been my privilege to discharge.

Thank you.

APPENDIX "F"

AN ACCOUNT OF CIRCUMSTANCES
OF ALTERED TESTIMONY

For The

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE

In June 1966

By

REAR ADMIRAL W.M. LANDYMORE, O.B.E., C.D., R.C.N.

I intend only to discuss the background of the circumstances surrounding what I first described as "censorship" of an unclassified brief which I had repared for delivery to the Standing Committee on National Defence 23rd June, 966. I had used the word "censorship" believing it would indicate that portions f the brief I had intended to deliver had been altered, or deleted and in some ases other wording substituted in place of my words. I used the word censorship ecause I thought it would be clear to most people that I wished to convey the oint that the alterations were made without my consent, and that the changes ere made so as to change the emphasis, or the meaning, or the information I ished to convey to the Committee.

I now see that according to parliamentary law the expression "tampering ith evidence" is perhaps a more accurate way of describing what I meant by nsorship. At the outset, then, let me emphasize that I thought the changing of y brief was morally wrong, that it was not done to assist the Committee, quite ie contrary, that it was done to deny the Committee information, opinions, or ggestions which I though should not have been changed. For example in the anpower section I had said—"I am *desperately* short of naval personnel quired to meet my immediate commitments". The removal of the word *des-erately*, in my opinion, changed what I intended to convey. Insertion of the ord *immediate* again changed the sense of the statement. In this brief I will vite your attention to all the differences between the original brief and the nended brief to simplify your researches.

First, however, let me provide you with the official background which ought me before the Standing Committee on National Defence.

On 7th June, 1966 I received a message from Canadian Forces Headquar-rs under the Date/Time Group 071945Z. A copy of this message has been tached to my brief as Appendix A. This message began with the following rective—

"Standing Committee on Defence have asked for a briefing on organization d mission of Maritime Command at 0930, 23 June '66 with preliminary briefing r Minister at 0930, 21 June.

2. Briefing to be unclassified between 45 and 60 minutes with 30 to 45 inutes for questions. Commander and briefing team are to be responsible for esentation and be prepared for questions.

3. Briefings should include description of Command mission, and brief review of organization. Present and projected savings in manpower and dollars should be included if reasonably firm. Description of equipment and Command activities should be given. Mention should be made of Canadian Forces Base consolidation as it affects Command.

4. Visual aids and other projections may be used. Charts, diagrams, photos of equipment should be produced on transparent slides for projection on rear projection screen. Acknowledge advising any arrangements required.

5. Dates may be changed with 48 hours notice."

When I received this message I was somewhat disturbed by my Terms of Reference. My Command organization had been set up without the means to do any detailed work in money matters, and as far as staff was concerned my Command had been re-organized on the basis of an arbitrary cut in numbers by 8% which did not reflect my personnel requirements, thus to talk about "savings" in personnel would have been misleading. Finally, I could not see how I could give the Committee the slightest insight into our mission in an unclassified briefing. Because of these matters I telephoned Admiral Dyer, Chief of Personnel, and asked him to arrange for my directive to be changed. He discussed it with General Moncel and verbally I was directed to prepare two briefs, one, unclassified, to be a survey of the general state of the Command including as much as possible of the information originally requested, and a second brief, classified to level of secret on operational matters. In effect through this directive I was given what amounted to "carte blanche".

On the 8th June I received a second message, 081510Z which began "Standing Committee on Defence" and referred to the message previously quoted. It changed that date of the briefing to 0930—23rd June, with the "preview" briefing for the Minister set for 0930 22nd June. A copy of this message is attached as Appendix B. There were no other official instructions concerning the briefings.

On the basis of these directions I prepared two separate briefs. A classified briefing on operations, and an unclassified brief. I issued instructions to my operations and intelligence staff to amend an existing operations brief so as to bring the security in line with my directive. I then drafted, personally, the unclassified brief which I turned over to my administrative organization for editing. The only part of that brief I didn't write was the personnel section and this was left to my staff entirely to prepare in order that any figures used would be as up-to-date as possible. However, I gave verbal instructions that I wanted re-engagement rates, the manning situation and the recruiting intakes included in the brief.

I was committed to NATO meetings in Paris which required me to leave Halifax 12th June returning to Canada 19th June. Because of the requirement to brief the Standing Committee I changed my return plans and went directly to Ottawa and had three of my staff officers join me there with the draft briefs on 20th June. This allowed us time to do all the final work on the briefs. The officers who joined me in Ottawa were Commodore R. J. Pickford, my Chief of Staff for Logistics and Administration, Commander C. G. Pratt, my Secretary; and Group Captain J. Creeper, my assistant Chief of Staff for Operations. Rear-

Admiral M. G. Stirling, the Maritime Commander (Pacific) came as an observer and to assist me with matters affecting the West Coast.

I have named all these officers because they were familiar with the briefs and were present at the briefings for the Minister on the 22nd June and are, herefore, able to verify almost all of this testimony if you require it.

On the 22nd June we reported at the Minister's conference room for the first briefing session. In addition to the officers named above, the Minister, the Associate Minister, Mr. Lee and Commander R. Hayden were present. I believe 'm right in saying Commodore Charles, Mr. Grant and a few other people were lso present. However, no one from the Defence Staff was present. By that I nean—The Chief, Vice Chief, Chief of Personnel, Comptroller General and the Chief of Engineering and Logistics. None of these officers attended the briefing essions on the 22nd and 23rd June.

I delivered both the unclassified and classified briefs with only a slight nterval between them. At the end I was thanked and the Minister observed that here wou dn't be time to clear one or two statements with the Department of xternal Affairs and they would, therefore, require amendment. I made no omment in this direction. He also remarked that the cyclic system was expen- ve in the use of personnel.

From this point on it will not be necessary to refer to the classified briefing gain. It was delivered for the Standing Committee word for word as it was .ven to the Minister. All references to changes refer to the unclassified brief and . referring to it I will refer to the "original" brief as it was delivered to the tanding Committee the following day.

On conclusion of the briefing session the Minister asked for a copy of the nclassified brief. I referred this matter to my Secretary and left it to him to ovide a copy or copies as required. Later in the day, at about 4 p.m. 22nd June, entered the office of Commodore Charles which had been made available for y staff officers to use. I went there to obtain a copy of the "altered" brief. It had t yet been sent up from the Minister's Office. However, I found Commodore ckford and Commander Pratt standing by in case they were needed. I told em it seemed a bit strange that they needed a whole day to make a couple of inor amendments to the brief and that I now assumed it was in the process of ing more radically changed. I pointed out that I thought it was quite improper r any changes to be made without my consent and they were not to make anges, or agree to any changes without consulting me. These instructions were necessary as it turned out for none of us was consulted on the changes which ere made.

I then went to Mr. Grant's office and asked him to get the brief to me as ickly as he was able, pointing out that as I was to deliver it the following day I unted some time for final preparations. I arranged for him to get the brief to mmander Pratt and for Commander Pratt to deliver it to me at the Chateau urier Hotel.

The "altered" brief was delivered to my hotel room at about 7 p.m. by mmander Pratt where Admiral Stirling and I were waiting for it. As soon as was brought in I instructed Commodore Pickford to join us and we compared original and the altered briefs to find the changes. There were several anges, but the most disturbing one was to find the personnel section of the

original had been virtually eliminated and new material inserted in place of the deleted portions.

For your reference I have attached the original brief as Appendix C and the altered brief as Appendix D.

The changes which were made are as follows:

1. On Page 2 of the original brief I had said, and I quote—"So much of the World's goods move by sea that the slightest disruption to sea transport can create chaos in very short time. The situation in Britain today gives undisputable evidence of this, a situation which is having serious repercussions in Canada." This was altered to read—"So much of the World's goods move by sea that the slightest disruption to sea transport can create chaos in a very short time. The situation in Britain today gives evidence to this."

This change was one referred to by the Minister as requiring amendment. As the seaman's strike in Britain was headline news and as it was, in fact, seriously affecting Canadian trade I could see no reason for the change. However had I been asked to agree to the change I would most certainly have given my consent for I didn't feel then, or now that it deprived the Committee of essentia information.

2. The next change occurred on page 3, of the original and will be found or page 2 of the altered—version.

I had used several examples of the use of sea power since World War II and taken as examples Korea, Cuba, Suez, Viet Nam, Lebanon, and Kuwait. In my text I had said—"The present blockade of Rhodesia is yet another example." This was deleted entirely. Here again I could not see the point of the deletion because I had prefixed the whole series of examples by saying, and I quote—"forgetting for the moment the rights or wrongs of these events"—This i the second observation the Minister made and said an amendment would be necessary. As the deletion was only one example in a whole series of examples had I been asked for consent I would not have hesitated to give it. Here again did not think the Committee was being deprived of anything essential.

3. The third change occurred on page 7 of the original text and is related t page 5 of the altered version. In the original I had said, and I quote—"There ar other Soviet vessels which look like trawlers which spend their time on statio off the coasts of North America monitoring radio circuits and other electroni transmissions. They are in fact spies on our doorstep and they are always wit us looking for intelligence. I would be a poor neighbour of yours if I sat at m window with binoculars watching the activities of your household. I personall think that a nation which keeps electronic binoculars trained on Canada and th United States is showing an unhealthy attitude towards us. Because they ar legally on the high seas we must put up with their presence, but as far as I ar concerned they constitute an important part of a war making machine and s cannot be ignored."

This was altered to read and I quote—

"There are other Soviet vessels which look like trawlers but which spen their time on station off the coasts of North America monitoring radio circui and other electronic transmissions".

This alteration, of course, greatly changed the emphasis in the statement. However, as the whole matter of the activities of these ships was explained in much more detail in the classified brief the Committee was not deprived of any information by the change. Had I been asked my consent for the change I would have given it.

4. The fourth change was a deletion from page 10 of the original text with no substitution in the altered text. The part that was removed read as follows—

"It always seems extraordinary to me that the prevention of an arms buildup has not been an essential part of our peacekeeping operations. It is well known that while our peacekeeping forces have been at work in Cyprus both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots have added significantly to their arsenals. It would have been relatively easy to have prevented an arms buildup by sea blockade and airport control so that stable conditions could have been maintained while finding a lasting solution without further bloodshed."

No comment had been made on this matter at the briefing by the Minister. I would have very strenuously contested its removal had it been suggested. I still feel very strongly that our peacekeeping operations should afford our Canadian Forces every possible protection, and knowing that heavy tanks had been taken to Cyprus for the Greek Cypriots I was of the opinion that if a serious outbreak of violence occurred our Canadian soldiers would be in a dangerous and precarious position where they would not be able properly to protect themselves. Knowing this could have been prevented by sea blockade I felt it was an essential part of peacekeeping. In this case I felt the Committee was deprived of an important opinion.

5. The fifth change was a deletion from page 14 of the original text related to page 11 of the altered text. In talking about Argus aircraft I had said, I quote—"We have 32 of these remarkable aircraft but we should be thinking now of a replacement."—This was altered to read simply—"We have 32 of these remarkable aircraft"—the suggestion of a need for replacement was deleted.

This matter was not commented on by the Minister at the time of the preview and had I been consulted, I would not have consented to the deletion. Fortunately, during the question period several questions were raised on replacements for Maritime aircraft and I was permitted to answer one of them and made the point that was intended by the original statement.

6. The next change which will be found is on page 15 of the original text. I had pointed out that sea King helicopters were at present being operated from HMCS BONAVENTURE and that they would soon be operated from nine of our destroyers. My Secretary added the words "as well" to remove any ambiguity. This change which you will note, had nothing to do with the Minister's office.

7. The seventh change occurred on page 16 of the original text related to page 13 of the altered text. It was in connection with ship replacement programmes. I had said, and I quote—"When considering replacement programmes I think one must keep in mind that the life expectancy of a warship is about 20 years or at the most 25. So they must the replaced on a regular basis if we are to continue to meet our commitments effectively and discharge our missions. The last DDH joined the fleet in 1964—the first of the new class of DDH's is expected

to commission in 1970 so that there will have been a gap of six years in the replacement programme."

This was all deleted. The substitution read—"The special committee was briefed on ship construction last year."

This change was not remarked upon at the preview and I would not have consented to the change. The fleet consits of 23 destroyers. If they have a twenty to twenty-five year life it is necessary to have a building programme which brings into being on the average one replacement each year. Over six years we are getting four ships which would, of course, be 16 ships in 24 years for a long term reduction from 23 to 16. In my opinion the removal of this part of the text deprived the Committee of an essential opinion, and I did not wish to leave the impression that I was satisfied with the current replacement programme numerically. It will also be remembered that the cancelled frigate programme was for a total of eight ships. I would not have consented to this change.

8. The eighth change was connected with the manpower section of the brief. Pages 21, 22, 23 and 24 of the original were virtually re-written, and appeared as pages 18 and 19 of the altered text. No comment had been made at the preview that the original text was unacceptable to the Minister. I was more upset by this change than any other because I felt the substitution deprived the Committee of essential information to give them a true assessment of the personnel situation and its effects for Maritime Command, Moreover, I felt it was an alteration designed deliberately to deprive the Committee of information and that it was morally wrong to have made the changes.

You will see from that, I had clearly indicated I was alarmed by the failure of senior men to re-engage. I was greatly alarmed by the lack of recruits. I was seriously concerned that if the rundown of personnel was not halted almost half our destroyer fleet would be inactive for want of personnel. This meant we would not be meeting our NATO and Canada/US commitments; it meant that our ability to exercise reasonable control in sea areas of interest to Canada would be seriously prejudiced. I felt strongly that the Committee should have my observations on these matters and be given the necessary information to be able to question me on the subject from a brief but clear background. Three slides which accompanied the original text were also excluded because the altered version did not include their use. It was with reference to this section that the Minister told me the changes had been made because he wished a positive approach taken on personnel matters and mine was too negative. In my opinion, it would have been more appropriate to say my brief was so enlightening it might have brought the Committee to its senses on the parlous state of the Command in personnel matters.

I have placed photostats of the removed slides as Appendices E, F and G. Appendix G is particularly important because it shows graphically the continuing and increasing disparity between actual strength and requirements.

9. The ninth change removed a sentence on the employment of West Coast Forces. The sentence read—"West Coast forces are similarly committed to strenuous and exacting major exercise programmes." This disappeared completely. I believe this was a secretarial error which passed unnoticed, and happened, not by design, but by accident. I have no other comment on this change.

10. The final change is a change I made to the altered brief. In it, in discussing the cyclic system, the cycle had been described as an 18 month cycle when it was, in fact, a 16 month cycle. I corrected the error.

In conclusion I would like to make some observations concerning my part in all these matters. In a sense I would like to put the record straight. When I released the information on the censorship to the Toronto *Daily Star* in July my objective was to create conditions which would cause a thorough scrutiny of what is taking place in National Defence. That is still my objective. When the release was made the Minister's Office said I had dealt with matters beyond my purview and that my statements were inaccurate. My personal information was checked in Headquarters before it was used. It is certainly the responsibility of an operational commander to take a personal part in all matters concerning the manpower of his command and it was, I thought, wrong to say what had been said by the Minister.

Since 12th July I have come into contact with many people. I have repeatedly stated my objective is to have a thorough inquiry into current matters in National Defence. As far as possible I have confined my personal activities to answering questions as frankly and accurately as I can. It was implied I had allied myself with the Conservative Party in an attempt to damage the reputation of the Minister. This is not true. I have answered the questions of any person who asked me questions regardless of affiliation but, in every case, pointed out that I would not take any political position. I have answered questions on several occasions for Mr. Forrestall and Mr. McCleave. I was asked to go to Ottawa by Mr. Forrestall in September to answer questions for Conservative Members of Parliament. I met Mr. Lambert for a few minutes, Mr. Churchill for a few minutes and I was also questioned by Mr. Diefenbaker. I have answered questions for Mr. Regan, the Leader of the Nova Scotia Liberal Party, I have answered questions for Professor Aitchison who is affiliated with the New Democratic Party. I agreed to answer questions of the Young Liberal Party of Nova Scotia. They wrote me a letter of apology for not keeping their appointment. As soon as I detected purely political motives on the part of an individual I refused to answer questions. When I detected motives connected with party leadership I refused to go on with questioning. When I detected the object was to make a personal attack on the Minister to destroy his character in public I stated clearly I had no such motive that I could not be a party to motives of that kind in spite of having very deep personal feelings toward the Minister for having treated me and other officers so shabbily.

It has been implied that I gave questions to a Conservative Member of Parliament before I went before the Standing Committee in June. I had no direct or indirect contact with any member of parliament prior to that time, and had no reason to feel that the Committee would not be able to ask for full information on my Command until my brief was altered.

The circumstances leading to providing Mr. Nugent with an affidavit are as follows. I was telephoned by Admiral Brock from Ottawa asking me if I would see Mr. Forrestall on Thanksgiving Sunday. He said Mr. Forrestall would have a friend with him. Mr. Forrestall arrived at my home with Mr. Nugent who I had not met before. Mr. Nugent asked me if I would provide him with a statutory declaration in relation to the alterations to my brief. He pointed out that his

motive was to bring to the attention of parliament what he believed was a serious interference with the correct workings of the Committees of Parliament. Since I believed it was morally wrong that my brief had been altered, I consented to this. I wrote the declaration myself. I was assisted only in so far as the points of law which would have to be covered in the declaration, but not in the content of it. The paper I gave Mr. Nugent, he accepted. He did not change a word, or suggest any changes. This confirmed as far as I was concerned that his motive was just what he said it was. Naturally I have followed the subsequent events with interest but have made no public statements. I was asked by the Toronto *Star* for the wording of the declaration. I referred them to Mr. Nugent. I was called by a reporter from the *Globe and Mail* who asked a few questions. I answered the questions but did not volunteer any information of my own. A reporter from *Time Magazine* came to see me at my house to ask questions on the 19th October—that is a full week after Mr. Nugent raised the matter in Parliament.

You may have wondered why I did not confront Mr. Hellyer over the changes that were made to my brief at the time they were made. I could see no point in a confrontation over it. I believe it was morally wrong to have made the changes but I have not challenged his right to make changes for I haven't even now a useable knowledge of the legal points of tampering with evidence before a Standing Committee. I think you must also bear in mind that I was still a serving officer in the armed forces subject to the dictates of the Minister, and it is customary to advise the Minister, when advice is sought, but not to criticize if it is not taken. At the time I spoke to the Standing Committee I was hopeful that the Minister would alter the policy of unification and not carry it to what I believed were extremes which would be a disaster for the navy. I had no wish to create conditions which would prejudice a change of the course he had adopted. Please bear in mind also, that both the Minister and the Associate Minister heard my "original" brief in full. They are charged under the law for the management of the armed forces and might be expected to correct matters so clearly in need of correction. In any event, I did not challenge the Minister on the changes when they were made and although the press has indicated I was imprudent not to have done so, those are my reasons. Good or bad they are truthful. However, I had reported to the Chief of Personnel on 23rd June, that is, the same day I briefed the Committee that my text had been altered without my consent and so the questioning on personnel matters was not very satisfactory. On 12th July I informed the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the "censorship". Finally I reported it publicly through the Toronto *Star* 23rd June.

APPENDIX A

R071945Z
FM Canforcemed
TO Canmarcom
BT
Unclas Vcds 16

1. Standing Committee on Defence have asked for a briefing on organization and mission of maritime command at 0930, 23 jun 66 with preliminary briefing for minister at 0930, 21 jun

2. Briefing to be unclassified between 45 and 60 minutes with 30 to 45 minutes for questions. Commander and briefing team are to be responsible for presentation and be prepared for questions

3. Briefing should include description of command mission, and brief review of organization. Present and projected savings in manpower and dollars should be included if reasonably firm. Description of equipment and command activities should be given. Mention should be made of CDN forces bases consolidation as it affects command

4. Visual aids and other projections may be used. Charts, diagrams, photos of equipment should be produced on transparent slides for projection on rear projection screen

5. Uniform will be worn. Acknowledge advising any arrangements required

6. Dates may be changed with 48 hours notice.

APPENDIX B

R 081510Z
FM Canforcehed
To Canmarcom
BT
Unclas Vcds 20
Standing Committee of Defence.
A. Vcds 16 071945Z

1. Date of briefing amended to read 0930 23 jun. Location West Block Ottawa

2. Preview briefing will be held in ministers conference room at 0930 22 jun

3. Acknowledge

APPENDIX C

BRIEF ON MARITIME COMMAND FOR THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE

Mr. Chairman,
Mr. Minister,
Members of the Standing Committee
on National Defence:

Introduction

It is a great privilege to have been invited to appear before you today. As I understand it, the reason I'm here is to provide for you an outline of the purpose of the Maritime Command, how we are organized to fulfil our mission, and what forces we have for the purpose.

I welcome this opportunity to take you behind the scenes of Maritime Command because so often I feel that public knowledge of anti-submarine warfare is twenty years out of date and the public impression is that maritime forces are old-fashioned. The main reason for this misconception is that information about the tremendous strides made by the submarine has had excellent coverage in the press, while matters concerning defence against the submarine are little known. A proper opening for this briefing therefore is to give you the assurance that anti-submarine warfare has made progress just as dramatic against submarines, both conventional and nuclear and that your forces in this regard are amongst the best in service today. Moreover our officers and men are as skilful as any in the business and as professionals have not been satisfied and will not be satisfied to leave the submarine threat unmastered.

Sea Lines of Communication

Free use of the high seas and right of innocent passage through territorial waters are accepted by all Western maritime countries as the common privilege of ships of all nations. I say Western maritime countries because it is not true of all Iron Curtain countries, most of which closely regulate and restrict the movements of merchant ships through waters they control. As a major trading nation, free use of all the trade routes of the world by ships of all countries is vital to Canada. This slide shows a typical distribution of merchant ships in the sea routes of the world on any day of the year and as each dot represents three ships you can get some idea of the fantastic volume of this traffic.

So much of the world's goods move by sea that the slightest disruption to sea transport can create chaos in a very short time. The situation in Britain today gives indisputable evidence of this, a situation which is having serious repercussions in Canada.

Sea Power

This leads me to consider the broader implications of Sea Power, and here I think it is only proper to point out that almost every major skirmish since the

end of the Second World War has involved the use of Sea Power. Forgetting for the moment the rights or wrongs of these events, it is a fact that the United Nations could not have supported Korean operations without absolute control of the seas. Suez was a seaborne operation. Cuba was an example of the exercise of Sea Power in such a way that although not a shot was fired nor a life lost, the United States nevertheless imposed its will on the USSR. The United States could not be doing what is being done in Viet Nam without absolute control of the seas. Lebanon and Kuwait are further examples of the exercise of Sea Power in its basic meaning of the ability to use the seas for one's own purposes and to deny their use to hostile nations. The present blockade of Rhodesia is yet another example.

Canada's Role in Keeping Peace at Sea

In Canada we very rightly wish to prevent the outbreak of war of any sort, and failing that we wish to use our influence to prevent small wars from growing into bigger ones. The record of the Canadian Government in this respect is a record of excellence, both in word and deed; but it rarely occurs to Canadians how important stability and law and order on the high seas are to our national aim. The application of this aspect of our national aim is my responsibility as the Commander, Maritime Command. This responsibility postulates a positive requirement to be able to exercise Canadian authority over our sea approaches, and to act in response to national major alerts in times of tension. It is not enough to attempt to establish command of the sea after hostilities have broken out. Indeed, alertness in surveillance in peacetime of our approaches may be the very means by which peace is preserved.

In other words, any nation friendly or unfriendly can deploy men of war, be they surface ships or submarines, perfectly legally, just outside our territorial waters. If the intentions of these vessels should be hostile, it is necessary to demonstrate that we have the ability at all times to challenge such intentions.

The potential threat of submarines is so great that if ever any nation unfriendly to the free world got the idea that it had gained control of the seas, it might be tempted to challenge our freedom. By keeping a close watch on this threat, and by advancing in ways to control it, we in Canada are making a contribution to peace second to none, and out of all proportion to the size of the maritime forces we maintain.

Before moving on to the present operational situation, there is one other important aspect of peacetime employment of forces that should be mentioned. As you are well aware, we are constantly exercising under realistic conditions at sea, both in national exercises and also with other NATO countries. These exercises frequently take our ships and aircraft abroad, and it is customary in consultation with the Department of External Affairs to arrange representational visits to foreign countries for the promotion of good will and the improvement of trade relations, so that in connection with our professional activities we are able to take Canada overseas, and thus enhance our international relationships.

I would like now to discuss the present operational situation. A few months ago one of the Soviet leaders made the statement that the free world no longer enjoys a monopoly of sea power. Whatever his reasons for making this statement may have been, he most certainly had available to him knowledge that the

Soviets are in possession of the world's largest submarine force, now comprising some 35 nuclear and about 400 diesel-driven submarines.

This series of slides illustrates some of the types. Of these about one-sixth are equipped to fire missiles of one sort or another. Their nuclear submarines can range far and wide, and have in fact travelled from the Atlantic to the Pacific. An equally large proportion has the ability to take stations off our coasts. Moreover, it is probable that they will do so to match the western Polaris capability. This brings the submarine threat to our doorstep and confirms a capability of pointing missiles at this our Capital City and at most of our other centres of population and industry.

But this is not the only form of activity off our coasts. At this moment there are massive Soviet fishing fleets both in the Atlantic and the Pacific working very close to our shores. The number of fishing vessels varies from year to year according to the dictates of catches and the demand for fish, but each year it amounts to several hundred trawlers, complete with fish factory ships, supply ships, tugs, and all the logistic support needed for their fleet.

They are operated as navies are operated and it is significant thinking in terms of an emergency that last year there were over 800 of them deployed in the Western Atlantic and more than 200 in the Eastern Pacific. In the Atlantic group more than 20,000 men were involved in the operation. Personally I find no reason to be complacent about their presence.

There are other Soviet vessels which look like trawlers but which spend their time on station off the coasts of North America monitoring radio circuits and other electronic transmissions. They are in fact spies on our doorstep and they are always with us looking for intelligence. I would be a very poor neighbour of yours if I sat at my window with binoculars watching the activities of your household. I personally think that a nation which keeps electronic binoculars trained on Canada and the United States is showing an unhealthy attitude towards us. Because they are legally on the high seas we must put up with their presence, but as far as I am concerned they constitute an important part of a war-making machine and so cannot be ignored.

In summary so far, I have said that free lines of sea communication are vital to our national interests. I have indicated that the Iron Curtain countries have forces which could be used seriously to challenge free use of the sea and that this same force can deploy on our doorstep weapons of mass destruction. I have shown that day by day they gather intelligence, lawfully using the seas, but in such a manner that we cannot ignore the simple fact that it is unfriendly.

I submit to you that these activities define the purpose of Maritime Command as far as Canada is concerned and no matter whether or not we ever become involved in war we can be sure that by being indifferent to these matters our national interests will be neglected.

Maritime Command in the course of our daily activities must make itself fully aware of the situation in our sea approaches. This requires our ships and aircraft to be active in our areas of interest. While this activity keeps us both prepared and alert to the situation, we can and do perform an ancillary function in the field of Search and Rescue.

Each day I face emergencies at sea, in the air or on land which involve units of my Command. Never a day goes by that we don't perform a humane service of

rescue or medical assistance to Canadians or other Nationals in the common interest of helping our fellowmen.

As far as Canada is concerned, our Search and Rescue areas of responsibility are as shown on this slide. In all incidents that might occur from a ship in distress to a downed aircraft to a hunter lost in the woods or a medical emergency, our Search and Rescue organization springs into activity to deal with the situation. Our Maritime Forces, because they are expert in long range search and reconnaissance, and because in the course of their primary activities they are always available they are ideally suited for dealing with all types of rescue operations.

My next slide summarizes activities for 1965, a typical year, in the Atlantic Region. We dealt with 99 cases of distress in relation to ships and aircraft, we carried out 151 emergency medical evacuations and on 399 occasions either supplied assistance to meet a situation or alerted our forces to meet a potentially dangerous situation. This involved a total of over 2,000 flying hours for our aircraft and Canadian ships were involved for over 1,700 hours.

Our Maritime Command forces on the West Coast are similarly involved in their area of responsibility.

Sealift

At this point it follows logically to mention another ancillary task—that of providing sealift for Mobile Command. As you are well aware, our aircraft carrier has been used to transport troops and equipment on two occasions in support of United Nations peacekeeping operations. Ships of all types, while not specifically designed for this purpose, can to some extent improvise to be useful in this role. As the Minister mentioned in his briefing to you, HMCS *Provider* carried out a sealift to Norway this year, thus performing a useful service in Exercise "Winter Express". The design of our future supply ships will be influenced by the sealift task.

The next slide shows a support ship whose design has been influenced by sealift. It shows that in addition to meeting the requirement to replenish our anti-submarine forces with fuel, ammunition, and stores, she can carry an impressive lift of army vehicles. A typical load includes 2 helicopters, 35 operational vehicles and 51 support vehicles with their trailers.

It always seems extraordinary to me that the prevention of an arms build-up has not been an essential part of our peacekeeping operations. It is well known that while our peacekeeping forces have been at work in Cyprus both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots have added significantly to their arsenals. It would have been relatively easy to have prevented an arms build-up by sea blockade and airport control so that stable conditions could have been maintained while finding a lasting solution without further bloodshed.

Inventory

I would like now to describe to you the inventory of ships and aircraft assigned to me for my Command tasks. I appreciate that both the Minister and

General Fleury have briefly touched on this subject; nevertheless I think, out of deference to the Officers and men of the Command who attach great importance to their own particular units, it would be improper for me to neglect reference to our Order of Battle and in any event no brief on Maritime Command would be complete without it.

This slide shows the strength of forces currently assigned to Maritime Command:

1 aircraft carrier
9 DDH's of the *St. Laurent* and *Nipigon* classes and, not shown on the slide,
4 DDH's of a new class programmed for construction
11 DDE's of the *Restigouche* and *Mackenzie* classes
1 Replenishment ship plus 2 Operational Support Ships programmed
2 Mobile Repair Ships (1 of which is in reserve)
10 Minesweepers in Reserve, 4 of which are being disposed of
10 frigates, 4 of which are in Reserve
3 Destroyers in Reserve
3 Patrol Craft which are used in the summer months for cadet training
2 Submarines plus 2 more under construction
32 Argus and
21 Neptune Maritime Patrol Aircraft
71 Tracker aircraft
25 Sea King helicopters, with 16 more building, for a total programme of 41
2 Albatross aircraft and
2 Labrador helicopters for Search and Rescue.

I intend to very briefly deal with each of the major items separately giving you its current capability and mentioning approved modernization or new construction programmes where they apply.

Bonaventure

The Flagship, in a sense, of the Royal Canadian Navy is our one and only aircraft carrier—HMCS *Bonaventure*. The operational capability of this ship has been repeatedly demonstrated in tactical exercises. She is capable of keeping up to eight aircraft airborne continuously and this anti-submarine warfare effort can, of course, be moved to any part of the world where required. Last month she entered the Davie Shipbuilding Yard at Lauzon, Quebec, for a half life refit and modernization which will make a significant improvement in her general anti-submarine warfare capability. She should remain in service until the mid 1970s. She also possesses, of course, a modest sealift, army support capability.

Helicopter Destroyers (DDH) of the St. Laurent and Nipigon Class

This slide shows a ship of the Helicopter Destroyer (DDH) type, with its attendant helicopter.

When HMCS *Fraser* rejoins the Fleet later this year, this will complete the programme of conversion from DDE to DDH for all seven ships of the *St. Laurent* class. These ships together with *Nipigon* and *Annapolis* give me nine ships of this configuration and capability.

DDEs of the Restigouche and Mackenzie Classes

This is a Destroyer Escort (DDE) of which we have eleven of mixed *Restigouche* and *Mackenzie* Classes.

The seven ships of the *Restigouche* Class are scheduled for extensive modernization and conversion commencing early next year—in fact, work is in hand now on the prototype—*Terra Nova*. Using HMCS *Restigouche* as a model, the artists conception of the finished product is as shown on this slide. This conversion will improve the anti-submarine warfare capability of these ships and I am most anxious to have this programme completed as expeditiously as possible. Major work consists of fitting new sonars and a quick reaction anti-submarine rocket. Presumably some form of modernization will be given the four ships of the *Mackenzie* Class in their turn.

Operational Support Ship

This is a picture of HMCS *Provider*, our only Operational Support Ship at this time. She has proven to be an invaluable addition to the Fleet enabling our destroyers and the Carrier to keep the seas for extended periods. As I mentioned earlier, in addition to her main role of Fleet Support, *Provider* also possesses a modest sealift capability as demonstrated by her recent participation in "Winter Express".

Our two new Operational Support Ships, together with *Provider* and *Bonaventure* could carry up to 7,000 tons of military stores, and roughly the total required by a Brigade Troup, to any place in the world and therefore will provide the necessary sealift to meet our peacekeeping commitments.

Submarines

This is HMCS *Ojibwa*, the most recent addition to the Fleet—she joined us last winter from the Royal Dockyard in Chatham. Two more ships of this class are now building, also in Chatham. These, together with HMCS *Grilse* (or her successor) will serve to keep our anti-submarine forces in a high degree of operational readiness and will make us less dependent on the RN and the USN for submarine services.

Maritime Aircraft

Last, but by no means least, we have the air branch, or component, of the Command. Dealing with shore-based aircraft first, we have the Argus, which, despite the fact it is reaching mid-life is still as good as any long range maritime aircraft in service by any nation today. Its tremendous endurance, detection capability and weapon carrying capacity make it a most useful and potent vehicle for anti-submarine warfare. We have 32 of these remarkable aircraft, but we should be thinking now about a replacement aircraft.

This slide shows a P2V Neptune. While older than the Argus, the P2V is still a very good aircraft with a real capacity for operational employment. There are 24 of these aircraft.

Turning now to carrier-based aircraft, this is a CS2F Tracker. They operate either from the *Bonaventure* or the CFB Shearwater—or detachments of them sometimes deploy to the West Coast (as at this moment) to operate from Patricia Bay, outside Esquimalt. We have 71 aircraft of this type. So you can see our total holding of fixed wing anti-submarine warfare aircraft is fairly large.

In addition to the fixed wing, we are now in the process of equipping with Sea King helicopters. Twenty-five of these are now in service with an additional 15 on order. These have proven to be a good choice of anti-submarine warfare vehicle—possessing all the flying characteristics required and carrying both a detection and an attack capability. At the moment they operate from the carrier but they will soon be operationally flown from our destroyers.

The air component of Maritime Command is kept as current as possible in this age of rapid development. All the aircraft I have mentioned either have now or are in the process of being re-equipped with the most modern detection devices and armaments available.

Now, new construction. This slide is an artist's concept of this new DDH, four of which are programmed for building from approximately 1967 to 1972. When considering replacement programmes, I think one must keep in mind that the life expectancy of a warship is about 20 years or at the most 25. So they must be replaced on a regular basis if we are to continue to meet our commitments effectively and discharge our missions. The last new DDH joined the Fleet in 1964—the first of the new class of DDH's is expected to commission in 1970, so that there will have been a gap of six years in the replacement programme.

Finally, the Hydrofoil. This experimental vessel should arrive in Halifax later this year for testing in the North Atlantic environment.

Organization—General

As you are all well aware, the Canadian Government earmarks selected Maritime Forces for assignment to NATO and also to contribute to bilateral defence agreements with the United States. This might be a good place, before I describe our own domestic or National organization, briefly to review where we fit in these international agreements.

NATO

Within NATO, the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic has divided and sub-divided the North Atlantic into geographical areas of responsibility, of which CANLANT is the Canadian Sub Area. As sub-area commander I am responsible to the Commander-in-Chief Western Atlantic, with headquarters in Norfolk, VA., for the destruction of enemy forces and the protection of allied shipping in my sub-area. The NATO office of CINCWESTLANT, by the way, is held by the same person as the Commander-in-Chief, US Atlantic Fleet (a USN National Command).

Bilateral

Concerning our bilateral agreements with the United States, in the Atlantic t has been agreed to divide the Western half of the ocean into two areas of primary national interest, as shown on this slide the northern area to be covered by Canadian forces and the southerly one by United States Forces. These two areas are exactly the same as the NATO areas, which greatly simplifies the changeover from Canada-US operations to NATO. Both commanders look at the entire region as a common concern, and each keeps the other fully informed as to the employment of his surveillance forces.

Similar arrangements are in effect in the Pacific, in which the agreed areas of primary interest look like this. These are made under the Alaska/Canada/US Agreement.

I would like to emphasize that these arrangements are in daily use, maritime operations are in progress at this moment. Naturally the tempo is altered to suit the circumstances, but an alert watch is being kept around the clock.

Organization of Maritime Command

So much for our place in international affairs.

I would like now to direct your attention to how Maritime Forces are organized nationally. General Fleury also mentioned this briefly to you but I would like to elaborate on his remarks to some extent.

As reported to you by the Minister in his statement of last month, the new, unctional, Maritime Command, embracing all the naval and maritime air forces of Canada, was officially formed under my Command on the 17th of January last. While I cannot say this hasn't been without problems. I can say we have achieved this massive reorganization to "an operational Command in being" without degrading our operational effectiveness during the transition period—in spite of the inevitable and wholesale dislocation the reorganization entailed.

Line Organization

Creation of Maritime Command produced few changes of magnitude in the "line", or operational chain of command—depicted on this slide. One change of significance, however, is that maritime forces on the West Coast are now formed into a sub-command responsible to me in Halifax—whereas previously the Flag Officer Pacific Coast, the Flag Officer Atlantic Coast, and the AOC, Maritime Air Command each reported directly to Ottawa. Thus, as I have mentioned, *one* command has been formed embracing all our maritime forces.

Bases

Note on this slide in our line organization have been assigned to Maritime Command—four on the East Coast, Greenwood, Summerside, Shearwater and Halifax and one in Esquimalt. Included also is our Squadron line organization. The bases were all officially activated on 1 April last and are now functioning as fully integrated units providing support of all types to operational units and to units of other Commands in their areas. You have also had the Base Organization described to you by General Fleury and so I'll move on now to make one or two

tion observations on the organization of my Headquarters in Halifax and that of Admiral Stirling in Esquimalt.

Headquarters—General

Both Headquarters are now fully integrated, but this is no new experience for the navy or for our maritime air forces. Realizing the advantages to be gained by the closest possible co-operation between sea and air components in discharging a common task, the operations of maritime air and the navy were fully integrated some ten years ago.

In both Halifax and in Esquimalt for nearly a decade our operations staffs, our planners, intelligence staffs, meteorologists, oceanographers, operational researchers and communications have worked in an integrated organization, so that the move toward total integration was neither strange nor unreal and was really only felt in the logistics and administration branches of my Headquarters.

Manpower

Having discussed my ships, aircraft and equipment, I would like now to turn to my most valuable asset—manpower. This is the area of my greatest concern today because I am desperately short of the naval personnel required to meet my commitments. Overall figures available in CFHQ, and reported to you previously, show a recent improvement in both recruiting and re-engagement rates for all three Services. The improvement is not nearly enough to meet my manpower shortages.

This slide shows the re-engagement rate for men of the Navy. This is expressed in the percentage of those men eligible for re-engagement who actually signed on for a further term. You will note from the short bars on the right that there has been a 2% rise in the numbers re-engaging after their first engagement of three years and this is an encouraging sign. However, there has been a significant decline in re-engagements for the subsequent terms. Over the same period of three years there nas been a 10% decrease in men re-engaging for their final term, as shown by the red bars and a 6% decrease in those re-engaging for the third time. This represents a serious loss of our most valuable senior men. There has also been a slight decline in re-engagements at the end of the second engagement.

My next slide shows our shortfall on the recruiting side. You will see that last year we obtained only a little over 70% of our requirement for new recruits. This year we have obtained only 60% of the planned target at this time in the year. To meet our commitments and cover the previous shortfall, we must take into the navy over 2,600 new entry seamen in the next 12 months. Last year we graduated about half that number from Cornwallis.

Finally, this chart shows you graphically our actual manpower over the past two years plotted against our manning commitments. These commitments include the crews for ships the essential support activities ashore in the command and the expected forecast requirement for naval personnel in other Commands.

The green line indicates our total manpower requirement. The slight adjustments are fluctuations for ships coming in or going out of service. If the line was projected for new construction programmes the total would be kept at about this level as older ships are withdrawn from service. In other words, our

total naval manpower requirement will continue to be about 17,500 men. The red line shows the decline in total naval strength.

You will notice on the left side of the chart that early in 1964 manpower equalled the requirement, but the two lines have been diverging ever since. In April/May, 1966, the requirement has been reduced by the four World War II frigates which, as the Minister reported to you, will shortly be offered to Crown Assets for disposal. But the gap remains. Even if all the remaining older destroyers and frigates of the Fleet are disposed of, we will still have a shortage of 1,500 men required to man remaining commitments.

Our present net loss-rate of about 65 men per month will make it necessary to reduce six or seven additional destroyers to maintenance crews by May 1967, two of which will be undergoing modernization. We will then have only 13 or 14 out of 23 destroyers in full commission—nine on the East Coast and four or five on the West Coast.

I am happy to report that the RCAF portion of Maritime Command is in a very healthy condition, being manned to 95% of its establishment of 3,210 airmen and enjoying an 87% re-engagement rate, and at the moment there is no manning problem in respect to officers of either service.

If we are to meet our commitments it is obvious that something must be done to attract many more recruits to the navy. The minister has drawn your attention to a number of Service inadequacies and has expressed his intention of correcting them as soon as possible. In my Command, we will continue to press vigorously for those improvements in service conditions which will attract men to, and retain them in the service. The re-engagement rate for the navy has always been lower than the other services and this is a reflection of the inevitable instability of naval life involving regular and long separations from one's family. This makes it all the more important for the navy to have a high recruiting rate to cover this wastage.

Yearly Employment of Forces

Notwithstanding these besetting difficulties, the forces which are fully operational maintain a lively tempo. For example here on the slide is the schedule of major exercises in the Atlantic in which units of the Maritime Command are taking part this year. Some are national; some NATO; some Canada-U.S. This schedule is only the portion of the iceberg which shows above the surface. It represents the culmination of months of individual crew training, squadron training and inter-type training which must be completed before the ships and aircraft are ready for advanced exercises. West Coast forces are similarly committed to strenuous and exacting major exercise programmes.

In addition to these major exercises our ships and aircraft are constantly on patrol on and over our Maritime areas of responsibility on both coasts. Our Maritime Patrol aircraft fly daily reconnaissance sorties throughout these areas and frequently conduct surveillance flights to the more remote regions of the areas—many of these flights in the Atlantic terminate in such bases as Thule, Iceland, United Kingdom and the Azores. The Trackers flying from shore bases provide valuable coverage to our inshore areas and are particularly suited to surveillance of the Soviet fishing fleet activities.

And of course all our forces are available for Search and Rescue tasks and are called upon fairly regularly to participate in such activity.

All in all we lead a busy life.

Conclusion

That, gentlemen, completes my description of Maritime Command. In conclusion let me emphasize that as our maritime forces stand today we can hold our head up technically with any nation, big or small. In the field of anti-submarine warfare in all matters of development, tactics, and design we are second to none. In this way, we make a contribution to NATO which in importance far exceeds our size and financial resources to do so.

My Command consists of approximately 2,015 officers, 12,030 men, and 3,187 civilians. We have the largest capital holdings of any command of the Canadian Armed Forces.

My inventory of ships, aircraft, and equipment gives me a reasonable capability of discharging my responsibilities, and the new construction and modernization programme mentioned a few minutes ago will increase that capability once it reaches fruition.

Technically, my Command is making fantastic progress, so much so that I am confident that the submarine threat, however potent—and I mean both nuclear and diesel—would, in the event, be controlled, and our vital sea lines of communications secured.

I feel that the officers and men I command are second to none in the anti-submarine warfare field. I need more of them, and I would like them to serve longer but those who do dedicate their lives to the protection of Canada against attack from the sea have no peers amongst the navies or air forces of the world in our particular specialty, anti-submarine warfare.

APPENDIX "D"

BRIEF ON MARITIME COMMAND

For The

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE

Mr. Chairman:
Mr. Minister:
Members of the Standing Committee on National Defence:—

Introduction

It is a great privilege to have been invited to appear before you today. As I understand it, the reason I'm here is to provide for you an outline of the purpose of the Maritime Command, how we are organized to fulfill our mission, and what forces we have for the purpose.

I welcome this opportunity to take you behind the scenes of Maritime Command because so often I feel that public knowledge of anti-submarine warfare is twenty years out of date and the public impression is that maritime forces are old-fashioned. The main reason for this misconception is that information about the tremendous strides made by the submarine has had excellent coverage in the press, while matters concerning defence against the submarine are little known. A proper opening for this briefing therefore is to give you the assurance that anti-submarine warfare has made progress just as dramatic against submarines, both conventional and nuclear and that your forces in this regard are amongst the best in service today. Moreover our officers and men are as skilful as any in the business and as professionals have not been satisfied and will not be satisfied to leave the submarine threat unmastered.

Sea Lines of Communication

Free use of the high seas and right of innocent passage through territorial waters are accepted by all Western maritime countries as the common privilege of ships of all nations. I say Western maritime countries because it is not true of all Iron Curtain countries, most of which closely regulate and restrict the movements of merchant ships through waters they control. As a major trading nation, free use of all the trade routes of the world by ships of all countries is vital to Canada. This slide shows a typical distribution of merchant ships in the sea routes of the world on any day of the year and as each dot represents three ships you can get some idea of the fantastic volume of this traffic.

So much of the world's goods move by sea that the slightest disruption to sea transport can create chaos in a very short time. The situation in Britain today gives evidence of this.

Sea Power

This leads me to consider the broader implications of Sea Power, and here I think it is only proper to point out that almost every major skirmish since the end of the Second World War has involved the use of Sea Power. Forgetting for

the moment the rights or wrongs of these events, it is a fact that the United Nations could not have supported Korean operations without absolute control of the seas. Suez was a seaborne operation. Cuba was an example of the exercise of Sea Power in such a way that although not a shot was fired nor a life lost, the United States nevertheless imposed its will on the USSR. The United States could not be doing what is being done in Viet Nam without absolute control of the seas. Lebanon and Kuwait are further examples of the exercise of Sea Power in its basic meaning of the ability to use the seas for one's own purposes and to deny their use to hostile nations.

Canada's Role in Keeping Peace at Sea

In Canada we very rightly wish to prevent the outbreak of war of any sort, and failing that we wish to use our influence to prevent small wars from growing into bigger ones. The record of the Canadian Government in this respect is a record of excellence, both in word and deed; but it rarely occurs to Canadians how important stability and law and order on the high seas are to our national aim. The application of this aspect of our national aim is my responsibility as the Commander, Maritime Command. This responsibility postulates a positive requirement to be able to exercise Canadian authority over our sea approaches, and to act in response to national major alerts in times of tension. It is not enough to attempt to establish command of the sea after hostilities have broken out. Indeed, alertness in surveillance in peacetime of our approaches may be the very means by which peace is preserved.

In other words, any nation friendly or unfriendly can deploy men of war, be they surface ships or submarines, perfectly legally just outside our territorial waters. If the intentions of these vessels should be hostile, it is necessary to demonstrate that we have the ability at all times to challenge such intentions.

The potential threat of submarines is so great that if ever any nation unfriendly to the free world got the idea that it had gained control of the seas, it might be tempted to challenge our freedoms. By keeping a close watch on this threat, and by advancing in ways to control it, we in Canada are making a contribution to peace second to none, and out of all proportion to the size of the maritime forces we maintain.

Before moving on to the present operational situation, there is one other important aspect of peacetime employment of forces that should be mentioned. As you are well aware, we are constantly exercising under realistic conditions at sea, both in national exercises and also with other NATO countries. These exercises frequently take our ships and aircraft abroad, and it is customary in consultation with the Department of External Affairs to arrange representational visits to foreign countries for the promotion of good will and the improvement of trade relations, so that in connection with our professional activities we are able to take Canada overseas, and thus enhance our international relationship.

I would like now to discuss the present operational situation. A few months ago one of the Soviet leaders made the statement that the free world no longer enjoys a monopoly of sea power. Whatever his reasons for making this statement may have been, he most certainly had available to him knowledge that the Soviets are in possession of the world's largest submarine force, now comprising some 35 nuclear and about 400 diesel-driven submarines.

This series of slides illustrates some of the types. Of these about one-sixth are equipped to fire missiles of one sort or another. Their nuclear submarines can range far and wide, and have in fact travelled from the Atlantic to the Pacific. An equally large proportion has the ability to take stations off our coasts. Moreover, it is probable that they will do so to match the western Polaris capability. This brings the submarine threat to our doorstep and confirms a capability of pointing missiles at this our Capital City and at most of our other centres of population and industry.

But this is not the only form of activity off our coasts. At this moment there are massive Soviet fishing fleets both in the Atlantic and the Pacific working very close to our shores. The number of fishing vessels varies from year to year according to the dictates of catches and the demand for fish, but each year it amounts to several hundred trawlers, complete with fish factory ships, supply ships, tugs, and all the logistic support needed for their fleet.

They are operated as navies are operated and it is significant thinking in terms of an emergency that last year there were over 800 of them deployed in the Western Atlantic and more than 200 in the Eastern Pacific. In the Atlantic group more than 20,000 men were involved in the operation. Personally I find no reason to be complacent about their presence.

There are other Soviet vessels which look like trawlers but which spend their time on station off the coasts of North America monitoring radio circuits and other electronic transmissions.

In summary so far, I have said that free lines of sea communication are vital to our national interests. I have indicated that the Iron Curtain countries have forces which could be used seriously to challenge free use of the sea and that this same force can deploy on our doorstep weapons of mass destruction. I have shown that they gather intelligence, lawfully using the seas, but in such a manner that we cannot ignore the simple fact that it is unfriendly.

I submit to you that these activities define the purpose of Maritime Command as far as Canada is concerned and no matter whether or not we ever become involved in war we can be sure that by being indifferent to these matters our national interests will be neglected.

Maritime Command in the course of its daily activities must make itself fully aware of the situation in our sea approaches. This requires our ships and aircraft to be active in our areas of interest. While this activity keeps us both prepared and alert to the situation, we can and do perform an ancillary function in the field of Search and Rescue.

Each day I face emergencies at sea, in the air or on land which involve units of my Command. Hardly a day goes by that we don't perform a humane service of rescue or medical assistance to Canadians or other Nationals in the common interest of helping our fellowmen.

As far as Canada is concerned, our Search and Rescue areas of responsibility are as shown on this slide. In all incidents that might occur: from a ship in distress to a downed aircraft, to a hunter lost in the woods or a medical emergency, our Search and Rescue organization springs into activity to deal with the situation. Our Maritime Forces, because they are expert in long range search

and reconnaissance, and because in the course of their primary activities they are always available they are ideally suited for dealing with all types of rescue operations.

My next slide summarizes activities for 1965, a typical year in the Atlantic Region. We dealt with 99 cases of distress in relation to ships and aircraft, we carried out 151 emergency medical evacuations and on 399 occasions either supplied assistance to meet a situation or alerted our forces to meet a possible emergency. This involved a total of over 2,000 flying hours for our aircraft and Canadian ships were involved for over 1,700 hours.

Our Maritime Command forces on the West Coast are similarly involved in their area of responsibility.

Sealift

At this point it follows logically to mention another ancillary task—that of providing sealift for Mobile Command. As you are well aware, our aircraft carrier has been used to transport troops and equipment on two occasions in support of United Nations peacekeeping operations. Ships of all types, while not specifically designed for this purpose, can to some extent improvise to be useful in this role. As the Minister mentioned in his briefing to you, HMCS *Provider* carried out a sealift to Norway this year, thus performing a useful service in Exercise "Winter Express". The design of our future supply ships will be influenced by the sealift task.

The next slide shows a support ship whose design has been influenced by sealift. It shows that in addition to meeting the requirement to replenish our anti-submarine forces with fuel, ammunition, and stores, she can carry an impressive lift of army vehicles. A typical load includes 2 helicopters, 35 operational vehicles and 51 support vehicles with their trailers.

Inventory

I would like now to describe to you the inventory of ships and aircraft assigned to me for my Command tasks. I appreciate that both the Minister and General Fleury have briefly touched on this subject; nevertheless I think, out of deference to the Officers and men of the Command who attach great importance to their own particular units, it would be improper for me to neglect reference to our Order of Battle and in any event no brief on Maritime Command would be complete without it.

This slide shows the strength of forces currently assigned to Maritime Command:

1 aircraft carrier
9 DDH's of the *St. Laurent* and *Nipigon* classes and (not shown on this slide.)
4 DDH's of a new class programmed for construction
11 DDE's of the *Restigouche* and *MacKenzie* classes
1 Replenishment ship plus 2 Operational Support Ships programmed
2 Mobile Repair Ships (1 of which is in Reserve)
10 Minesweepers in reserve, four of which are being disposed of

10 Frigates 4 of which are in Reserve.
3 Destroyers in Reserve
3 Patrol Craft which are used in the summers for cadet training
2 Submarines plus 2 more under construction
32 Argus and
21 Neptune Maritime Patrol Aircraft
71 Tracker aircraft
25 Sea King helicopers, with 16 more building, for a total programme of 41
2 Albatross aircraft and
2 Labrador helicopters for Search and Rescue

I intend to very briefly deal with each of the major items separately giving you its current capability and mentioning approved modernization or new construction programmes where they apply.

Bonaventure

The Flagship, in a sense, of the Royal Canadian Navy is our aircraft carrier—HMCS *Bonaventure*. The operational capability of this ship has been repeatedly demonstrated in tactical exercises. She is capable of keeping up to eight aircraft airborne continuously and this anti-submarine warfare effort can, of course, be moved to any part of the world where required. Last month she entered the Davie Shipbuilding Yard at Lauzon, Quebec, for a half life refit and modernization which will make a significant improvement in her general anti-submarine warfare capability. She should remain in service until the mid 1970s. She also possesses a modest sealift, army support capability.

Helicopter Destroyers (DDH) of the St. Laurent and Nipigon Class

This slide shows a ship of the Helicopter Destroyer (DDH) type, with its attendant helicopter.

When HMCS *Fraser* rejoins the Fleet later this year, this will complete the programme of conversion from DDE to DDH for all seven ships of the *St. Laurent* Class. These ships, together with *Nipigon* and *Annapolis* give me nine ships of this configuration and capability.

DDEs of the Restigouche and MacKenzie Classes

This is a Destroyer Escort (DDE) of which we have eleven of mixed

Restigouche and MacKenzie Classes

The seven ships of the *Restigouche* Class are scheduled for extensive modernization and conversion commencing early next year—in fact, work is in hand now on the prototype—*Terra Nova*. Using HMCS *Restigouche*, as a model, the artist's conception of the finished product is as shown on this slide! This conversion will improve the anti-submarine warfare capability of these ships and I am most anxious to have this programme completed as expeditiously as possible. Major work consists of fitting new sonars and a quick reaction anti-submarine

rocket. Presumably some form of modernization will be given the four ships of the *Mackenzie* Class in their turn.

Operational Support Ship

This is a picture of HMCS *Provider*, our only Operational Support Ship at this time. She has proven to be an invaluable addition to the Fleet enabling our destroyers and the Carrier to keep the seas for extended periods. As I mentioned earlier, in addition to her main role of Fleet Support, *Provider* also possesses a sealift capability as demonstrated by her recent participation in "Winter Express."

Our two new Operational Support Ships, together with *Provider* and *Bonaventure* could carry up to 7,000 tons of military stores, roughly the total required by a Brigade group to any place in the world and therefore will provide the necessary sealift to support our peacekeeping commitments.

Submarines

This is HMCS *Ojibwa*, the most recent addition to the Fleet—she joined us last winter from the Royal Dockyard in Chatham. Two more ships of this class are now building, also in Chatham. These, together with HMCS *Grilse* (or her successor) will serve to keep our anti-submarine forces in a high degree of operational readiness and will make us less dependent on the RN and the USN for submarine services.

Maritime Aircraft

Last, but by no means least, we have the air branch, or component, of the Command. Dealing with shore-based aircraft first, we have the Argus which, despite the fact it is reaching mid-life is still as good as any long range maritime aircraft in service by any nation today. Its tremendous endurance, detection capability and weapon carrying capacity make it a most useful and potent vehicle for anti-submarine warfare. We have 32 of these remarkable aircraft.

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The air component of Maritime Command is kept as current as possible in this age of rapid development. All the aircraft I have mentioned either have now or are in the process of being re-equipped with the most modern detection devices and armaments available.

New Construction

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In the Navy, for example, we introduced a system to stabilize employment patterns which will enable serving men to predict their career prospects,

including service at sea and ashore, formal training courses and trade advancement by as much as five years.

A significant feature of the Cyclic System is that it ensures that in ships, where teamwork is of the utmost importance, there will be the same crew for a minimum of 16 months. For the individual it will provide a reasonably firm forecast of his employment and advancement prospects.

As chairman of the committee which recommended the Cyclic System, I can say that it has done much towards combining manpower effectiveness and the needs of the individual.

Last October the government announced a special sea duty allowance which has been a positive step towards recognizing the hardships of the seamen.

We have also made a major reduction in the housing shortage experienced by naval personnel in the Halifax area.

Still, this is not enough. The Minister has drawn your attention to a number of Service inadequacies and has expressed his intention of correcting them as soon as possible.

Another facet of the problem is the need for recruits to have a relatively higher education and technical adaptability. With the complex equipment we are operating today, we require a man who can absorb and utilize highly technical skills. We must recognize these skills and we must recognize that these skilled men are just as attractive to industry as they are to the services, with the addendum that the services make extra demands not equitable to civilian industry.

This makes it all the more important for the navy to have a high recruiting rate to cover this wastage. In my Command we will continue to do whatever we can at our level to improve Service conditions which will attract men to, and retain them in, the Services.

Early Employment of Forces

Notwithstanding the difficulties that beset us, the forces which are fully operational maintain a lively tempo. Here on the slide is the schedule of major exercises in the Atlantic in which units of the Maritime Command are taking part this year. Some are national; some NATO; some Canada-U.S. This schedule is only the portion of the iceberg which shows above the surface. It represents the culmination of months of individual crew training, squadron training and later-type training which must be completed before the ships and aircraft are ready for advanced exercises.

In addition to these major exercises our ships and aircraft are constantly on control on and over our Maritime areas of responsibility on both coasts. Our Maritime Patrol aircraft fly daily reconnaissance sorties throughout these areas and frequently conduct surveillance flights to the more remote regions of the seas—many of these flights in the Atlantic terminate in such bases as Thule, Greenland, United Kingdom and the Azores. The Trackers flying from shore bases provide valuable coverage to our inshore areas and are particularly suited to surveillance of the Soviet fishing fleet activities.

And of course all our forces are available for Search and Rescue tasks and are called upon fairly regularly to participate in such activity.

All in all we lead a busy life.

Conclusion


That, gentlemen, completes my description of Maritime Command. In conclusion let me emphasize that as our Maritime forces stand today we can hold our head up technically with any nation, big or small. In the field of anti-submarine warfare in all matters of development, tactics, and design we are second to none. In this way, we make a contribution to NATO which in importance far exceeds our size and financial resources to do so.

My Command consists of approximately 2,015 officers, 12,030 men, and 3,187 civilians. We have the largest capital holdings of any command of the Canadian Armed Forces.


My inventory of ships, aircraft, and equipment gives me a reasonable capability of discharging my responsibilities, and the new construction and modernization programme mentioned a few minutes ago will increase that capability once it reaches fruition.

Technically, my Command is making fantastic progress, so much so that I am confident that the submarine threat, however potent—and I mean both nuclear and diesel—would, in the event, be controlled, and our vital sea lines of communications secured.


I feel that the officers and men I command are second to none in the anti-submarine warfare field. I need more of them, and I would like them to serve longer but those who do dedicate their lives to the protection of Canada against attack from the sea have no peers amongst the navies or air forces of the world in our particular specialty, anti-submarine warfare.


REQUIREMENT vs OUTPUT
FROM CORNWALLIS
REQUIREMENT
(OUTPUT)
72 %
60 %
JAN-DEC 1965
JAN-JUN 1966
JUN-JUN 1966 367
2800
2600
2400
2200
2000
1800
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400

Appendix F


RE-ENGAGEMENTS RCN
(EXPRESSED AS A PERCENTAGE OF THOSE ELIGIBLE TO RE-ENGAGE)
FOURTH RE-ENGAGEMENT
THIRD RE-ENGAGEMENT
SECOND RE-ENGAGEMENT
FIRST RE-ENGAGEMENT
1964
1965
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

APPENDIX "G"


MANPOWER/REQUIREMENT
20000
19500
19000
18500
18000
17500
17000
16500
16000
15500
15000
14500
14000
13500
13000
12500
12000
11500
11000
10500
10000
J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D
1964
1965
1966
MANPOWER
REQUIREMENT

APPENDIX "G"

THE NAVY'S PLACE IN UNIFICATION

February, 1966

INTRODUCTION

From the point of view of the Maritime Commander, who has daily contact with naval operations, with the mechanical state of the fleet, and close contact with officers and men of the fleet, the Navy's place in unification should be relatively simple to visualize. At present, in the absence of a clear definition of unification, all the Commander can do, personally, is to say to himself—if the Navy is to be part of a single armed force, that force having a single identity, what are the implications, and is it a good thing to have happen or a bad thing? Is it economical or uneconomical; indeed is it practical?

2. The best approach to the problem is to examine the fundamental philosophy and the ways of sailors in an attempt to discern areas where they could be effective as fighting men in other environments.

3. First, we must acknowledge that almost all personnel of the Navy perform service at sea. The few who don't we will look at later. In essence, this creates a condition requiring sailors to be a "jack-of-all trades" and "master of one". In other words he must be both a sailor and a tradesman. In the case of officers we require a person who has mastery of a specific form of duty as a weapons officer, or an operations officer in order that he will gain the knowledge and experience to direct a part of the ship's organization in battle. This is his trade. But we cannot limit his knowledge to his trade because when the ship is not in the action state both in harbour and at sea there are duties to be performed on a continuing basis for the safety of the ship and her ship's company. So the tradesman officer has to be taught a whole additional series of duties and responsibilites. He will be taught to direct the ship at sea, to pilot the ship in coastal waters, to deal with emergencies of fire, flooding, and rescue. He also must be a leader, so he is taught how to manage men and to deal with their problems. In practice then, he becomes a jack-of-most-sea-qualifications and a master-of-one. If it were not so, we would double the number of officers required to steam and fight a ship in order to have a specialist in trade separated from those able to perform general duties.

4. There are exceptions to this, acceptable exceptions. We don't need Chaplains, doctors, dentists, and lawyers, for example, with both the general training knowledge and a specialist knowledge. Because the ship's engineer has duties requiring his personal attention at all hours of the day and night at sea and in harbour, we tend to keep him clear of other general duties, although to function as an engineer he requires a broad knowledge as to how the other half functions. Supply officers, however, are a little different again. Had we unlimited space to fit them into ships, we could have a few supply specialists for each ship to deal separately with pay and non-public funds, stores, food and clothing. But the space is limited, so it is practical to have only one supply officer who will manage all these matters. It can be argued that supply officers function in the same way in all three services. Up to a point this is true. It is true until the materiel

reaches the scene of operations. However, an officer responsible for the supply of all materiel to a force in the field requires a very different knowledge to the officer supplying materiel within a ship. It would be a very wasteful process to attempt to make these officers interchangeable, firstly because of the extent of the training problem, and secondly, because so few naval supply officers are needed in the fleet to perform this function.

5. Thinking now in terms of unification, the seagoing officer corps show themselves, for the most part, to be people who are sea specialists and within this sea specialty are expert in one trade, and have a jack-of-all-sea trades knowledge. Looking across the whole spectrum of the armed forces, it is not possible to discern any individual outside the Navy who by his training or experience will fit this requirement. This factor of interchangeability of officers automatically tends to make one assume a negative attitude toward any form of organization calling for interchangeability.

6. As far as officers are concerned, at all levels up to and including Lieutenant-Commander there will always be a need within a single armed force to have people trained specifically for sea duty. As this is a very time consuming process, it requires they be separated from the other services for training after their academic training has been completed.

7. If we now attempt to define unification in relation to officers, it would come out something like this—"Unification is a single organization which allows officers up to and including the rank of Lieutenant-Commander in the Navy to be sea specialists with interchangeability commencing generally at the Commander's rank for management duties but not for operational duties".

8. The situation for men of the Navy is not greatly different from that of the officers. In most functions and responsibilities we require a person who again is something of a jack-of-all trades and a master-of-one trade. The jack-of-all trades aspect allows a sharing of ship safety duties in harbour; it ensures that everyone is able to share at sea in emergency situations so that fire, explosion, flooding and dealing with the so-called perils of the sea are within the capacity of all men to play a part. Ship cleanliness and maintenance have to be shared by all lest it become drudgery for a few. Interchangeability is not very practical when thinking in terms of the other services when going from shore to sea. In the reverse direction, that is from sea to shore, there is a high degree of interchangeability possible if the welfare and training factors are dismissed. If they are taken into consideration, interchangeability narrows down considerably and will apply to a few trades but in many locations.

9. Unification, as applied to men, could be defined as follows—Unification is an organization which makes provision for men of all ranks of the Navy to be sea specialists while allowing them to take shore employment through the whole organization where their trade skill and/or general knowledge can be effectively utilized.

10. Thus far, the conclusion which stands out is that the degree to which unification is feasible can be measured in terms of interchangeability of officers and men between functional commands.

Sea Service Environmental Considerations

11. Going to sea creates special environmental considerations. Service at sea means service away from home. It means a total loss of privacy for men and a partial loss for officers. It means living in cramped quarters which are not only uncomfortable because they are cramped but also because they are in motion.

12. These environmental conditions create for each individual certain stresses and strains not found elsewhere. Life at sea requires a major adjustment from the way of life encountered in the home. For the married man, it means long absences from his family, not just once or every now and then, but for a large part of his whole service life. Assuming an officer or man can make the required adjutment from civilian life, to get a sense of purpose and enjoyment from his life at sea we now have to face up to the necessity of endeavouring to give him a reasonable home life and, while he is away, to be very conscious of the well-being of his dependents. We must remember also that when he returns from sea, his ship will require men to be onboard in harbour, for we cannot abandon what amounts to a floating magazine just because we are "home". We must remember also that in some instances the ship when overhauled will go to contractors yards, in some cases the best part of a thousand miles from home. We must remember he may require training in schools, some of which may also be away from home.

13. A large portion of our men will fail to adjust to naval life. A large portion who become adjusted will be restless when they marry and spend a great dealof time away. A large portion will continually come to a crossroads in their careers when they find demands of ship overhaul and training create further family separations.

14. From the start we will know, if we are realistic, that a smaller percentage of men who start in a navy life will have a full career than would be expected in the Army or Air Force. We can expect to find a lower re-engagement rate, and special welfare problems.

15. Coming back now to unification and interchangeability, it is obvious that whatever organization we adopt, care must be taken to avoid exposing to life at sea a greater number of officers and men than is absolutely necessary to fulfill the sea function. The more widespread service at sea becomes, the more we will introduce these special environmental problems. Wastage in the armed forces through failure to adjust, if carried across the board, would be wasteful in the extreme.

16. It is possible to control the sea service problem as long as the personnel involved do not get too far away from the centre of sea activity and *as long as people who deal with the problem are themselves experienced in the environment.*

17. Again thinking in terms of unification, it seems logical to separate sea service personnel from those in other functional environments in order to control special problems connected with the sea environment. In themselves, these factors tend to cause one to look askance at a single service concept of organization. Apart from the needs required to solve the problem of sea-shore ratio, interchangeability should be avoided. This, too, seems to point away from unification rather than toward it.

18. The training factor also requires consideration. In principle, I believe we should train for sea service only those officers and men who are required to fulfill the sea environmental duty. Having trained them, they should spend as much time at sea as is reasonable and consistent with an acceptable career structure in terms of sea-shore ratio. I think most people would agree with this principle. It would follow that widening the field will become uneconomical. For example, if we can produce a cook who can adjust to the environment we would keep him as close to it as possible and not go through the agony of training cooks already trained in other environments to cook at sea, even though we can argue a cook is a cook. This is applicable to all trades and specialists.

19. We might wish to argue that a pilot of an aircraft is interchangeable, but here, just as with all specialties environmental training adds a great deal of time in making the kind of pilot we need. Any officer from any service who has accomplished twin engine training and has his ticket can fly from land stations. He can, through a reasonable length of training, adjust to different aircraft types. It would therefore seem logical to consider all flyers, so to speak, as a common factor. Unfortunately, for a pilot to adjust to sea flying from the deck of a ship requires a very careful and lengthy additional training; so much so, that once trained it would be foolish in the extreme to take him from the environment before he is too old or too nervous to continue. Moreover, he is required to have a wide jack-of-all trades knowledge so that he is competent to take responsibilities for the safety of the ship in harbour, sharing with his shipmates this onerous and unpopular duty.

20. Each example in turn points out the weaknesses of considering naval personnel in the same terms as others. Common sense dictates that the Navy, by nature, is somewhat inflexible and doesn't readily adapt to a common mold, nor do officers and men trained in a non-sea environment stand ready and adjusted to sea service. Even in cases where they are adjustable, it does not seem prudent to add them to the numbers of people who have special problems because of sea service. These factors tend to cause me to shy away from interchangeability and thus away from unification.

Identity

21. The next factor is identity. The identity of any officer or man with his service is important. It is on identity that the service, whatever its function, builds esprit-de-corps. Unification can surely be accepted in the sense that anyone joining an armed force identifies himself overall with the Canadian Armed Forces. The Canadian people can accept the idea of a "Canadian Armed Force", as opposed to "Forces". They can accept that one officer of the highest rank is the "Chief" of the Force. It is probably more readily understandable to have one Chief for one force rather than one Chief for several forces. I think it is readily understandable to the public and to all officers and men that the single armed force should be directed by one group of officers of high rank: in other words, a single board, and, *provided the board contains enough people properly to represent professionally* the functions carried out by servicemen, it will be acceptable as well as understandable. In this sense we have unification. The Board has only one sum of money to work with. In this sense we are unified. It follows also we must have only one programme to spend the money. In this sense we are unified.

This line of reasoning can be carried into the single total of personnel allowed in the whole force and so on. In essence we already have a unified force.

22. However, we cannot build an esprit-de-corps on the fact of a single budget, or a single total allowance of personnel, or a single management. We've got to get right down to the man himself and find something close enough to him to demand his personal attention and loyalty. The closer we can get to the spirit of the individual, the better will be our ability to fight. This is identity. The officer or man who today is ready to flog his uniform for a different one is not a man who has esprit-de-corps. In other words, we haven't got to him and instilled in him the required amount of intangibles to give him a fighting spirit. The man we want is one who under no circumstance will let his ship down, who is proud of his uniform, who does his job to the best of his ability regardless of how long it takes him to do it, and who is ready to die if need be, to prove he is better than his enemies. To get this man, we must be able to train him to understand the purpose of what he is doing and the vehicles and equipment he uses to do it. To attempt such a training in three different environments over a vast array of vehicles and equipment is to attempt the impossible. We can therefore assume that one way or another a single fighting force must be organized into several different arms so as to enable us to train the man we must have to fight effectively.

23. Since we have organized under integration so as to emphasize the type of fighting we do, with each environmental force clearly defined, we have already departed from unification. The maritime force has little or nothing in common in terms of fighting with the land fighting force, or the air fighting force. In small ways they come together so that the maritime force might find itself helping the land force getting from A to B. We might find, in odd circumstances, the tactical air support of the land fighting force being called upon to fight with the maritime force but generally they have little in common from a fighting point of view. Likewise, the servicemen involved have little in common with one another, so that those trained in the land environment cannot communicate intelligently in fighting matters with those trained in the sea environment. This point could be argued in much greater detail but, however it is argued what we have to do is produce organizational conditions in which esprit-de-corps thrives.

24. By giving everyone the same uniform we will not create conditions under which esprit-de-corps can be made to thrive. A sailor must be made to look like what a sailor image is elsewhere; a soldier must be given the soldier image; the airman, an airman's image. So it is with rank designations. The sailor's rank must have the sea flavour in it, and so traditional forms are better than non-traditional forms.

25. I believe the same is true for soldiers. I think we are more likely to get a better fighting man in a regiment built on pride of tradition, custom and dress than one derived from something, perhaps more manageable, but less personal. Nevertheless, since in war, management in the form of organizational control becomes very important to success, we have to have readily identifiable organizations. The Navy uses the Task Group System, the Army uses numerical armies, corps and so on, while Air Forces use numerical squadron designators. But these by themselves are not enough. Men won't be proud to be in Task

Group 27.1 or Task Element 27.1.7 any more than we would expect them to say with pride I'm Able Seaman H-47629. For management and control, we require organizations which work through computers, IBM machines and typewriters. For fighting spirit, we need uniforms, distinctive service and ship designators. Under unification, whatever its form these matters which provide the foundation to give esprit-de-corps must always be present.

26. It is also inconsistent to give too much identity. Thinking in terms of a single service, we will find a single service identity provides a double identity. Assuming the single armed force was called the Royal Canadian Marines, our soldiers would have a double identity as marines and as soldiers. Our sailors would be sailors and marines; our airmen would be marines and airmen.

27. Carrying this argument further, Maritime Command could have a separate identity or the identity of a single armed force. If Maritime Command under unification had a separate identity, the former Maritime Air Command components would become Naval components. The former RCAF Officers and men would now become Sailors, dressed as Sailors. Even if they were not forced to go to sea, there would be first of all a huge emotional hurdle to leap. The Maritime Air component would be split down the middle, which would rob the Maritime Forces as a whole of their fighting ability. Nevertheless, assuming we could leap this first hurdle successfully, the next logical step would be to make them go to sea. This would have the effect on the positive side of "fixing" naval seashore ratio problems but on the negative side there would be an additional and unnecessary training requirement and adjustment for about 3,000 additional Officers and Men. The wastefulness of this would be appalling. Interchangebility problems would now appear, and in order to satisfy the need for a fair career for all, wastefulness of manpower to achieve this would be excessive. If Maritime Command as a whole was given a new identity, the problems from the emotional standpoint would now be enlarged to 20,000 Officers and Men and interchangeability problems also created by the increased numbers involved.

28. A single service with a single identity creates a similar condition on a grander scale, so despite the fact a cook's a cook, there is no way to make an acceptable single service unless that service has only one function.

29. The answer seems to lie elsewhere and may take a continuing of the form of an air component within the Maritime Force or Mobile Force.

30. In sum total, there is no good solution for "unification" when it is carried to the nth degree, even though at the top we are now unified.

31. It would appear to me that our future organization, to satisfy the announced intention to unify, calls for a definition which explains that unification is at the top only and means one force, one budget, one Chief, one Defence Staff, one programme and so on, but those matters dependent for effectiveness on esprit-de-corps are not altered.

32. To go beyond this would mean a dislocation which would cause a very high percentage of our officers and men to become disenchanted to the extent they would leave the force at the first opportunity. The overhead to replace them would far exceed any of the potential benefits of integration and would, in the final analysis, be wasteful in the extreme.

Vested Rights

33. If we are to depart from the present form of Canadian Defence Force with the Navy, Army and Air Force components, we have a legal problem on ou hands. This problem can be solved by an act of parliament which overnigh produces another legal force and transfers all present serving officers and me from existing components to new components. However complicated and difficul it is to make the whole thing "legal", we won't get away from the fact tha officers and men, if not given the choice of changing or not changing from th "old" to the "new" (without penalty), will feel and will voice a serious dissatis faction.

34. At one time, the Chief Petty Officers under Part V of the Pension Act, b legislation, were denied certain privileges which were part of Part V of th Pension Act when it was first introduced. This legislation was enacted withou difficulty but was never accepted by the men. Today, legislation is befor Parliament to correct this mistake. Vested rights had been tampered with an while a legal change was made legally, almost a decade later it is still a bon of contention.

35. If "unification" takes a form of changing the identity of the Nava Service, by which I mean the "Royal" of Royal Canadian Navy, the HMCS of th ship designators, the uniform, the traditional salute, and so on, legislation alon will not accommodate the change. Each individual will have to be given a choic as to whether he wishes to serve in the newly constituted force. If this is no done, there will be a very long period when every change within the force wil bring up the question of "vested" rights.

36. About 1947, the RCN introduced the ranks of C2 and P2 to align thei structures with the other two services. Even in 1966 there are still murmur concerning this change with respect to rank privileges. The passage of tim didn't eradicate the feelings that P2's were neither fish, fowl, nor good re herring. This persists today, even though the vast majority of P2's now servin hadn't even joined the service at the time the new rank was introduced.

37. A change on any scale which by-passes the "feelings" of the officers an men will create conditions of discontent which will take years to eradicate.

To Serve or Not to Serve

38. Having been given a choice as to whether officers and men will serve i a different kind of Navy, a large number will elect not to continue, assuming, o course, there is a loss of identity.

39. I would estimate a very large percentage of Officers and Men would elect to leave the Naval Service. I also forecast that a large number of those wh remain would do so only because they were financially unable to take the risk attached with changing careers. Of the remainder a large number would be thos who had not learned their loyalties well, and were inferior fighting men in any case.

40. It seems to me that we are faced with a Hobson's choice. If we make a wholesale change to identity, forcing people to serve on, we will have a situation that no expert quality of leadership will overcome. Alternatively, if we consult

the individual, we will have a serious exodus which will deny the Navy the ability to operate effectively for years to come.

41. The most unfortunate aspect of the whole situation is that those officers and men in whom the system has instilled fierce pride and spirit, as it should do, will be those who will oppose changes most strenuously.

42. Unfortunately, there is no way to determine the implications in advance. At present, the thought of change is causing serious unrest. An approach to personnel now would simply aggravate this situation.

Timing

43. Whatever changes are envisaged, they must be announced soon. The present unrest is caused just as much by not knowing what is going on as by opposition to change. In this, time is not on our side. If the changes are ultimately to be fairly sweeping changes, then it is better to get it over with, accept the damage, and start afresh. If the changes are to be barely noticeable, then it is equally important to make them before our personnel situation deteriorates even further for no good reason.

44. The present personnel situation doesn't lend itself to change. Changes should be made when the structure is strong where emotions are involved except, of course, those changes designed to improve known weaknesses. But in a situation in which recruits are not coming forward and where men have to be offered a carrot to continue to serve, this is not the time for radical change except by offering more money or better conditions of service.

Conclusions

45. This paper which presents my personal thoughts on the subject of "unification" will be read as "old stuff" because my views are fairly well known. Nevertheless, it should be clear to the reader that my personal thoughts are not simply based on a personal lack of flexibility or opposition to change. I have determined in all my contact with personnel of all ranks that the single service concept is not acceptable and to introduce a change of identity will serve only to destroy the fibre of what is now a strong and effective fighting force.

46. I think I have shown there is so little interchangeability possible from every practical and economic point of view that full scale unification would be unwise.

47. I hope I have left the impression that the Navy continues to have a strong link with the past and a conscience to those who have served in the Navy before. There is strong individual opposition amounting to an aversion to be burdened, by conscience, with changes which will reduce respect for them in the eyes of their forebears.

48. I hope I have left the impression that an enlargement of the numbers of people who go to sea will have the effect of decreasing personnel stability and increasing our problems.

49. It must be clear that it would be disastrous to pursue the concept of a single force with a single identity as far as the Navy is concerned. Moreover, since a large portion of the Naval force will feel they have been betrayed by

their commanders, I doubt that I, or any other of the present day Admirals will be able to exercise effective leadership if the Navy's identity is altered.

Recommendation

50. I recommend that since we have the freedom to define unification, this definition should confine itself to unification at the top. The definition should encompass the concept of a single Chief, a single Defence Staff, a single budget, a single programme, and single administrative procedures. To go beyond this will indeed split the Navy down the middle and cause an exodus of many of our best people. The consequences from these are obvious.

W. M. Landymore,
Rear Admiral.

24 FEBRUARY, 1966

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966-67

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. DAVID W. GROOS

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 21

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1967

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 1967

Respecting

Bill C-243, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and other Acts in consequence thereof.

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WITNESSES:

General Charles Foulkes, C.B., and Mr. K. R. Patrick, O.B.E., C.D., D. ENG.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1967

25770—1

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. David W. Groos

Vice-Chairman: Hon. Marcel Lambert

Mr. Andras,
Mr. Brewin,
Mr. Churchill,
Mr. Deachman,
Mr. Ethier,
Mr. Forrestall,
Mr. Foy,
Mr. Harkness,
Mr. Langlois, (*Chicoutimi*),
Mr. Laniel,
Mr. Latulippe,
Mr. Lessard,
Mr. Loiselle,
Mr. Macaluso,
Mr. MacLean (*Queens*),
Mr. MacRae,
Mr. McIntosh,
Mr. McNulty,
Mr. Nugent,
Mr. Rochon,
Mr. Stafford,
Mr. Winch—(24).

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, February 16, 1967
(36)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 8:10 p.m. this day, the Chairman, Mr. Groos, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Churchill, Deachman, Éthier, Fane, Forrestall, Foy, Groos, Harkness, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laniel, Lessard, Loiselle, Macaluso, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon, Stafford, and Mr. Winch (20).

Also present: Messrs. Herridge, Hopkins, Kindt, MacRae, Moore (*Wetaskiwin*), Pugh, Rock and Mr. Stanbury.

In attendance: General Charles Foulkes; *From the Department of National Defence:* Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister; Honourable Léo Cadieux, Associate Minister.

The Chairman introduced General Charles Foulkes who read a prepared statement, copies of which were distributed to the members. General Foulkes was questioned concerning subjects referred to in his brief, his military career and on other defence matters.

At 10:10 p.m., with the questioning continuing, the Committee adjourned until Friday, February 17, 1967 at 9:30 a.m.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

FRIDAY, February 17, 1967.
(37)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 9:40 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Groos, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Churchill, Deachman, Éthier, Foy, Groos, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laniel, Lessard, Loiselle, Macaluso, MacLean (*Queens*), MacRae, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon, and Mr. Stafford (18).

Also present: Mr. Johnston.

In attendance: General Charles Foulkes; *From the Department of National Defence:* Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister; Air Marshal F. R. Sharp, Vice-Chief Defence Staff; Major General M. R. Dare, Deputy Chief Reserves.

General Charles Foulkes continued to be questioned during this sitting of the Committee. The questioning concerned his presentation to the Committee at the previous sitting, his views on the implications of *Bill C-243,* and related defence matters.

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The Committee agreed to table a letter from Admiral Welland, dated February 17, 1967, which the Chairman read (Exhibit 1). The letter referred to the *question of privilege* raised by Mr. Deachman at the morning sitting on Thursday, February 16, 1967. Mr. Deachman stated that the point had been clarified to his satisfaction and the question of privilege was withdrawn.

The Chairman announced that a meeting of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure would be held at 12:30 p.m. this day.

With the questioning of General Foulkes to be continued at the next sitting, the Committee adjourned until 2:30 p.m. this day.

AFTERNOON SITTING
(38)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 2:35 p.m. this day, the Chairman, Mr. Groos, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Churchill, Deachman, Éthier, Foy, Groos, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laniel, Lessard, Loiselle, MacLean (*Queens*), MacRae, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon, Stafford, and Mr. Winch (18).

Also present: Mr. Pugh and Mr. Woolliams.

In attendance: General Charles Foulkes; Mr. K. R. Patrick; *From the Department of National Defence*: Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister; Honourable Léo Cadieux, Associate Minister; Air Marshal F. R. Sharp, Vice-Chief Defence Staff; Air Marshal E. M. Reyno, Chief of Personnel.

The Committee completed its questioning of General Charles Foulkes as the first order of business at this sitting. At approximately 3:35 p.m., the Chairman thanked General Foulkes for his testimony and the witness retired. The Committee recessed for five minutes.

The Committee resumed at 3:40 p.m. and the Chairman introduced the next witness, Mr. K. R. Patrick of Montreal. Mr. Patrick read a prepared statement, copies of which were distributed, along with the witness's biography.

Mr. Patrick was questioned by the members concerning his brief, his Service and business background and related defence matters.

The Chairman announced that the witness appearing on Monday, February 20, 1967, will be Lieutenant-General R. W. Moncel, and that the witnesses on Tuesday, February 21, 1967, will be Air Marshal C. Annis and Air Vice-Marshal M. Hendrick.

The Committee adjourned at 4:35 p.m., until February 20, 1967 at 3:30 p.m.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

THURSDAY, February 16, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we have a quorum

As you know, we have with us today General Foulkes, former chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. I do not think General Foulkes needs any introduction to anyone on this Committee. He is my former boss as chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and he is now a neighbour of mine in Victoria.

I will ask General Foulkes if he will be kind enough to present his brief, but before he does so I would like to make my apologies to him for delaying his appearance before us. The fault was entirely mine, General Foulkes, and I am very glad to see you here this evening.

General C. FOULKES (C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., C.D.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman,

First of all, I want to apologize for the miserable piece of paper that you have before you I did not intend to provide this, but I was talking with your clerk and he said that you would appreciate any piece of paper to save you taking notes, even though it had a lot of mistakes in spelling, and in English, and so on.

The truth of the matter is that I did not expect to be called as a witness before this Committee. My written and spoken views on integration have been quoted and misquoted on both sides of this controversy, and I had come to the conclusion that nobody wanted to hear anything more from me on the subject. As a result, I was able to read myself into the picture only when I arrived from Victoria and was able to get the relevant documents. I have had to work around the clock to make these few observations. Since I have no secretary, or stenographer, I had to pump these out on a very old-fashioned portable typewriter that does not even know how to spell! I hope you will excuse these remarks, and I hope I did not make any rude remarks in pencil on the sides of this, which I did not intend you to see.

As you all well know, I appeared before this Committee three years ago. At that time I put forward my views on some of the current defence problems. At that meeting on October 22, 1963, as the result of a question put to me by Mr. Winch, I put forward an outline plan for the integration of the armed services. I am therefore gratified that you have given me the opportunity to comment on the final stages of this enterprise.

I thought it might be of interest to you to know that the outline I presented three years ago was based on a paper I was asked to produce for the RCAF Staff College Journal. I was down there giving a lecture and they asked me to produce a paper. This paper was rejected and returned to me as being too revolutionary for the RCAF Journal to take the risk of publishing. However, that plan did not visualize penetrating as deeply into the combat elements as does the plan before you.

Furthermore, the method of implementing the plan visualized a much slower pace and a less rugged approach. When this integration scheme was first introduced I was quite surprised that it was accepted so readily. However, perhaps this was only too obvious. The choice was between an increase in defence spending or the streamlining of the military machine; and of course, the choice for the government, as well as for the taxpayer was very easy.

After a very enthusiastic start, however, there arose a spate of rumours in the press and elsewhere about the slipping of morale and frustration and confusion in the officer corps. The confusion and frustration may have been the result of the over-emphasis on the forcible retirement scheme, but in my view the absence of an outline plan indicating the extent and ramifications of this scheme was also a prime factor.

It is my view that a lot of the frustration, confusion and criticism could have been avoided if more time had been spent in planning and producing at least a tentative outline plan, showing the various stages of the operation prior to commencing its implementation.

To illustrate what I mean, I was in Ottawa during the early stages of the implementation of this scheme. I naturally asked a question about an outline plan. I was interested because I was aware that a copy of my outline plan, in some detail, was available in the headquarters. I was told that there was no blueprint, there was no phased plan, and that the details would be hammered out as they arose. It appeared to me that with such a complex problem, affecting the future of a lot of Canadians, more suitable implements would have been a sharp pencil and a big, big, big eraser. Mistakes made with a hammer are quite permanent, and they can sometimes, be quite painful.

Another issue which has come in for a lot of criticism has been the lack of authentic information. Information was replaced by rumour and conjecture, which no doubt disturbed the morale of the forces. A feeling has grown up that it is the system that is all-important, that everything else must give way to the adoption of complete uniformity. In this frenzy for uniformity it seems to me that we have forgotten that the services are made up of individuals, of Canadians with likes and dislikes, who do not like to be pushed about or treated as numbers or as punch holes in a computer card. This, Mr. Chairman, in my view, is the surest way of breaking down the morale of any force.

So much has been said about this question of morale, some of it by those who have neither knowledge of, nor experience in, combat. That I hesitate to add any views of mine. However, I would like to quote from an unquestionable source, and a real expert in this field of morale. One of the foremost exponents in the development of high morale is Field Marshal Montgomery. As you are all aware he took over the command of the Eighth Army at a time when morale was at a very low ebb as the result of the retreat back to the borders of Egypt. Within a few weeks of close personal relationship between "Monty" and his troops, a better morale was established. After a terrific battle at El Alamein, Rommel's forces were defeated, the tide of the war in the Middle East was changed, and the morale of the Eighth Army was never higher.

As many of you know, "Monty" used to visit his troops and explain his battle plans in this kind of a vein—he used to say: "Battles, battles; I love battles. Let us talk about this big battle." He would say to the troops:

> There are only two people important in this battle, I, Monty, who make the big plan, and you Joe Snooks who carry it out; in between there are a lot of other people, you know, generals and staff officers, but they do not count for much; it is you and I who are the important people in this battle.

He would go to no end to explain the general outline of his battle, and what he wanted the troops to do. Then he would say: "You know what I want. I am sure you will provide it." He knew the psychology of the soldier, and he got the best results.

I am just beginning to wonder if we are not forgetting about this question of understanding the psychology of the fighting soldiers. In his memoirs, "Monty" says this about morale of the serviceman:

> He can think, he can appreciate, and he is definitely prepared to criticize. He wants to know what is going on, and what you want him to do, and why and when. He wants to know, in doing it that his best interests will be absolutely secure in your hands.

Mr. Chairman, I strongly urge that those responsible for implementing unification ponder over these remarks, especially over the last sentence:

> He wants to know, in doing it, that his best interests will be absolutely secure in your hands.

Another factor contribiting to the deterioration of morale is the lack of authentic information on the extent and the implications of this scheme and of its effect on the career and livelihood of every serviceman. Both Field Marshals Montgomery and Slim, in their discussions on the maintenance of high morale, stress the constant need for authentic statements by the man at the top in order to combat rumours and conjectures that breed uncertainty, fear and resentment.

This question of keeping men fully informed is not just an army morale problem. Admiral Arleigh Burke, former Chief of Naval operations in the U.S., and a man who had a very distinguished career during World War II, writes about the sad effect of the lack of information. Actually, Mr. Chairman, this appears in the appendix of the procedures of this Committee. This is what Admiral Burke says:

> In every case of a breakdown in discipline or morale, four major factors have been present:
>
> 1. Lack of information. Subordinates were not kept informed of the problems or of the reasons why organization was required to take the action it did.

It is my view that this integration scheme could have been sold to the troops, and their worst fears would have been removed, if clear and precise briefings had been given. But who could do this? The Chiefs of Staff had been removed; the new Chief of the Defence Staff was immersed in the re-organization of the headquarters; and the commanders at the various commands were as much in the dark as the troops. There is no doubt that a titular head of each service should have been maintained, even in a temporary capacity, to give some

assurance to the troops that their interests were being looked after. He could have badgered the top for enough information to combat rumours and conjectures.

I believe that the steps taken last August, after the spate of criticism about the lack of information, which was discussed this afternoon, though a bit late, were in the right direction. It is hoped that through the Canadian Forces Council the field commanders will be kept thoroughly informed and will be encouraged to put forward their views and criticize any new proposals before they become policy.

Mr. Chairman, I want to stress this particular point, that the proposals should be put to the commanders and that they should be allowed to discuss the proposals and criticize them for all they are worth. If they can find fault with them, what will the enemy do? Then, when they become policy, everybody gets behind it and pushes it. If that is not done, and somebody says something about policy that they have not heard of before, they are accused of being disloyal. The way to avoid that is to make sure that all the proposals are put to these commanders beforehand and that their criticism and views are wanted. You then will have a policy that everybody will support.

I am sure, in this way, the views of those who have to carry out these policies can be heard, and a closer touch maintained between the combat elements and the staff.

Another point that has distressed me, and, I believe, many other former officers, has been the comparatively large number of experienced senior officers who have severed their connections with the services at a time when experience, knowledge and insight are of such importance in solving the vast number of problems which will continue to arise before unification is completed.

I am well aware that the emphasis today is on youth, but senior officers with command experience are becoming scarce. Although there are many brilliant young officers coming forward with briefcases full of theoretical answers, the successful completion of this experiment requires the levelling influence of those who know the exacting demands of active operations and the steps that are necessary to prepare the troops to meet hostilities. I am aware that senior officers are classed as "Blimps" and are accused of always preparing to fight the last war. However, I would remind you that some of the most brilliant leaders in the last war, such as, MacArthur, Marshall, Alexander, Montgomery and Slim all had distinguished careers in World War I.

It is hoped that very soon this question of unification will be finalized in Parliament and that the acute differences between the politicians and the military will disappear. Then perhaps the politician will regain confidence in his military advisors. I can assure you, gentlemen, that nothing has disturbed me more, having been a chief of staff for 15 years, than seeing this deterioration of the close relation that should exist between the military advisor and the politician.

It is not implied that the politician should always agree and not probe very deeply into the military advice he is given, and, indeed, overrule this advice if, in his opinion, the political considerations are paramount and the government is prepared to take the military risk. On the other hand, the politician must not become his own advisor, or discount, or downgrade, responsible advice, on the grounds of conjecture and opinion, arising from other sources. Even the great

Churchill, who had an abundance of military knowledge and practical experience, and who gave his advisors a very tough time, never overruled them on military grounds. Field Marshal Alanbrooke, who was his chief of staff throughout the war, says this in his memoirs:

> At Whitehall, because power rested with the defence minister, who, though not in awe of his service advisors and ready to harry them mercilessly, would never in their own sphere override them, or allow them to be overridden.

As I mentioned earlier, Mr. Chairman, I sincerely hope that the difficult days between the politician and his military advisors are over.

I would now like to make a few observations about the bill and its supporting papers. I would remind you that I had very little time to give these the scrutiny that I would have wished.

After studying the bill, the explanation in *Hansard* and the papers submitted by the staff I have been left with the impression—and I want to emphasize that this is an impression—that modern techniques, efficiency and tidy administration seem to be the predominant features. I am allergic to the expression and the meaning of "tidy administration", because of my own experience with it in the war.

Perhaps I should explain this. In Italy, because of the shortage of reinforcements, and to save the staff a lot of trouble, it was proposed to me that we should have a tidy system of reinforcing, and that we should abandon the other system we had whereby units were reinforced only through men from their own units—from the 2nd battalion, or the 3rd battalion, or people from the base, or at least from their own province. Now, I refused to accept this tidy scheme that they proposed to me, where they would keep them in a general pool and send up to the units anybody they liked. I did this on the ground that such action would place new recruits, who had never beeen under fire, among strangers—with men with whom they had few common contacts—and that this would not build up the men's morale.

Perhaps this is not the right thing for me to say to a federal body, but from my experience in war we are still a very provincial country. To have placed a Cape Bretoner with the Queen's Own would have caused a riot in both camps. Combat operations have made it quite clear to me that men fight much better if they are beside people who have the same characteristics, the same likes and dislikes and who talk the same language. We cannot get away from this human element in combat. I believe the aims of tidy administration often mean that men are being pushed about to make it easier for staff officers. I suggest that this Committee should look extremely carefully at the idea of tidy administration and having everybody working on rule-of-thumb, without bearing in mind that they are individuals.

Mr. Chairman, after reading the supporting papers I find myself a bit puzzled about just what our military roles are today. I may be a bit behind the times, but it seems to me that you cannot decide on the organization and the management until you have crystal clear what you are going to do; what the tasks are that you are going to carry out. Some years ago we used to say that all our defence resources, both in being and potential, were for the defence of the NATO area. Actually, we used to show all our defence appropriation as expenditures for NATO and, perhaps we still do; it does look good in NATO circles. But

in Air Marshal Sharp's presentation he said something that has worried me a bit. This is on page 15 of his evidence:

> A changing emphasis in roles with greater priority to be placed on the ability to quickly contribute military forces to troubled spots throughout the world and relatively lesser on the military resources designed solely for participation in all out nuclear war.

Mr. Chairman, I feel that there is room for some clarification of this statement and a more direct definition of Canada's defence responsibilities and aims if we are to reap the rewards that have been promised in the provision of equipment and management.

First, I would like to make some observations about our ground troops in Europe. The Committee will recall that in 1963 I raised the issue of the unsatisfactory position of the brigade group in the forward role in Germany and our inability to reinforce it, or to meet the commitment to build it up to a full division in time to be of use in the initial battles. As far as I know this commitment still stands.

I mentioned at that time that a new role had been offered to Canada, to place the brigade in close reserve under the commander of the central forces. It was felt that if the reserve role was acceptable there would be a chance to build up the brigade to a full division very quickly, provided it did not need heavy equipment. We then could meet our commitment to a full division in Europe, and we could have a division instead of just a brigade which we could not do anything about if hostilities opened up.

As you are aware, the White Paper still retains the brigade in the forward role; and I quote:

> Two brigades kept in reserve in Canada and earmarked primarily for the European theatre—

and it states, further, that the

> brigades will be re-equipped and retrained as a mobile force... They will be available for use where and when required.

However, the roles of these two brigades in NATO are not indicated. Nobody knows what they are going to do—if they do, they do not say so—or under whose auspices these forces will be employed in this world-wide pacification role.

The question of this free-wheeling, globe-spanning, trouble-shooting role bothers me a little bit. This indefinite and all-inclusive role could lead to all kinds of expensive ramifications if its purposes, extent and auspices are not clearly specified, or at least thought out. I fully realize that this is the planner's dream—the whole world to work on, no limitations to spoil the fun, no tough commander to bring them back to realities.

Since hearing about this free-wheeling role I have tried to conjure up where, and in what circumstances, these two brigades would operate. Such operations would have to be undertaken either nationally or under the auspices of one or other of the collective defence organizations, or under the UN. Would Canada want to undertake any such role as a national project? I am aware that there are some "eager beavers" who would like to see this country set itself up as the arbitrator in all world disputes, and to decide the merits of each case, but would Canada want to use these two brigades with its air component to force

acceptance of a decision in a dispute between two countries anywhere in the world? I wonder.

Of course, you could use these two brigades in the pacification role in one or all of the collective defence organizations around the world, but is it visualized that Canada should join SEATO or CENTO or the Association of the American States so that we could find a use for two mobile brigades in solving, by the use of force, any of the outbursts of violence which may precipitate a war? I am raising these questions because I do not know the answers.

There is also the possibility, of course, of using these two brigades under the UN auspices, and of settling some of the UN problems by the use of force. I am not a UN expert, but I have noticed a distinct aversion in the UN to the use of force to quieten down explosive situations. As you are all aware, Canada offered combat troops to the UN in Egypt, and was turned down. I have noticed also that white combat troops with their own built-in air support are not acceptable in solving explosive situations in Africa. Another UN operation such as Korea is, of course, not a possibility under the present composition of the Security Council, or the Assembly.

This leaves the last possibility for using these two brigades and their air component in support of the United States' efforts to pacify trouble spots in the world. However, from reading *Hansard* and some of the comments about the Viet Nam war I gather that any such arrangement would not be popular in Canada.

When, or where, or how are these free-wheeling roles to be finalized sufficiently to allow the planners to skilfully and economically plan the equipment, training and organization of this force?

This proposal regarding the change of emphasis away from NATO gives the impression that we are departing from the policy of interdependence and inclining toward a policy of self-contained national forces. The White Paper does not mention co-operation with our partners, nor does it comment on the impact of unification on our relations with our allies, who show little, if any, inclination to change their service systems.

However, I am concerned by an oblique reference to the functions of the NATO authorities, which I hope is just a mistake and not a forecast of further national ambition.

The last two sentences on page 10835 of *Hansard* of December 7th reads as follows:

> It has nothing to do with the question of naval forces, land forces, air forces or even space forces. Rather, it has to do with the management, the strategic and operational planning—

The words I am concerned with are the last four—"the strategic and operational planning". If this statement means what it says it would take away from the supreme allied commanders, NORAD and the UN, the responsibility of strategic and operational planning of the various Canadian contributions to their respective commands. How the unified command in Ottawa could do this task is beyond my comprehension.

One of the reasons which I have continued to put forward in favour of integration was that it could be accomplished by a country like Canada because of our limited defence responsibilities. Since our defence arrangements are based

on participation in collective defence arrangements our role is limited to raising, training and equipping force contributions. Strategic planning for NATO is done by the NATO military authorities in line with strategical guidance given by the Council. The operational planning is done by the supreme allied commanders. Even in peace-keeping activities the Secretary General provides the strategic and operational guidance for the forces.

As I said earlier, I hope this is just an error and not a notice of an intention.

I am somewhat concerned also by the vague statements in the White Paper, and in some recent publicity about the mobile force, regarding the provision of air ground support, which appears on page 22 of the White Paper and is also reflected in other papers.

In the White Paper, at page 22, it says this:

> The plan calls for the squadrons stationed in Europe to be associated-...more directly with the army brigade group. It is recognized, however, that this kind of association on a national basis may not be practical without some adjustment in the present NATO military organization in Europe.

I would have liked to have seen a period after the word "practical".

> Such an adjustment, if necessary, will be the subject of consultation with NATO. Squadrons in Canada would be available for training in close association with ground forces. Thus, ground and air forces would complement each other in a manner which has not been possible in the past.

This is perhaps a very laudable national slogan, but it constitutes a considerable waste of air support, and it would create the most chaotic air situation if every brigade in Europe decided to have its own private air support.

Anyone who has exercised higher command in war, or who has been engaged in planning at SHAPE, or who has even been exposed to SHAPE exercises, will be aware that the cardinal principle dealing with the operation of air forces is that of maintaining the maximum centralization of these forces. Parcelling them out in penny packages is most wasteful and creates complete chaos in the air over a battlefield and a grave risk that many of our aircraft will be shot down by the neighbouring forces.

During the last war, when close support was developed to a very high degree, air force groups were never centralized below army. If the corps, or division wanted air support they were alloted a certain number of sorties over a fixed time, and an air controller would arrive at the headquarters and he would control the air strike as dictated by the ground commander. On certain occasions, under ideal conditions—that is, where the weather was excellent and where we knew exactly where our forward troops were and where they were going to move—they sometimes would set up what is known as a cab rank—five or six aircraft immediately above the area where you were fighting—and these could be called down for strikes in front of our own troops; but this was an exception, and had to be done extremely carefully, because what you wanted to do was to kill the enemy, not your own troops. But control of the air forces would immediately go back to army as soon as that operation was finished.

Those who have not had experience, and who aspire to be pseudo-experts, would benefit by reading Lord Tedder's recent book, "With Prejudice". This most distinguished air commander outlines the problems of dealing with air

forces, both large and small, and he continually emphasizes throughout his book the necessity for centralized control of the air elements.

Some recent publicity indicates that Mobile Command visualizes the use of close aircraft support for ground troops in flank protection, similar to the exercise which was carried out in Norway by the Black Watch. This appeared to be a feasible operation, provided a rough air field had been smoothed off, and also defended, and that arrangements were made with the Norwegians that they would be allowed to use it.

Here, again, I think the principle of collective balanced forces should be exercised, and that we should ascertain whether we could not make arrangements with the Norwegians who could much easier have air forces available than to take them from Canada to do this kind of a task.

We know a lot about conditions in northern Norway. It may surprise the Committee to know that the Canadians were committed to Norway on two occasions during the last war and that on both occasions they were withdrawn because the conditions were such that General McNaughton felt that we would be tied there for the whole war. Anyone who has been in northern Norway will know just how difficult the conditions are for the operation of troops, especially with air support.

Therefore, I think we should realize that even though it looks all right to say, "We will support them with air support," there may be days when, because of flying conditions they will not get any support. Therefore, an alternative type of ground support may have to be provided in any case.

I think it might be helpful to this Committee if one of these cost effectiveness studies that we hear about were carried out to show the relative costs of providing ground support for a force going to Norway, by missiles, and then by aircraft.

There is no doubt that if close support is to be provided by the air force a training squadron is necessary, but it is equally important that our forces should stick to the established NATO system of using ground support, so that any of our forces could accept ground support from any of the Allied force elements.

I would remind you that when we start training on air support ourselves we are apt to think we can do it better than somebody else and develop a system of our own, but that is not very good if you are going to have to operate with other troops. It is far better to have a less efficient system which is understood and known by all the Allies.

On page 23 of the White Paper the use of ground support in air defence was suggested. It says this:

> Some of the squadrons stationed in Canada would also contribute to air defence as required, thereby eliminating the necessity of acquiring special aircraft for this purpose.

I presume that this suggestion will now be cancelled because the high performance aircraft mentioned in the White Paper have been replaced by the CF-5.

Mr. Chairman, I have a few more comments of the matters in *Hansard* in the explanation of the bill.

On page 10828, it states as follows:

> The force structure is comprised of force units which may be used individually or in combination, depending upon the military task undertaken. The force units are the infantry companies...

To say that the basic infantry ground force unit is an infantry company, that it may operate separately from its battalion with not only a variety of supporting arms but can be expected to operate with support from other force media, is to say the least, a very novel idea, and looks to me to be unification with a vengeance.

Most company commanders whom I have contacted find they have enough to do in keeping their platoons moving forward and keeping the battalion informed of their position so that our own artillery will not shoot them up without suggesting that they should be able to accept and control close ground support.

The only situation which I have been able to dream up where a company may operate with other media would be in the nature of a commando operation where a certain group of infantry soldiers would be put on a ship, perhaps to be landed on a beach, or to carry out some remote operational task; but these are specialized operations and not the normal operations of ground troops.

Here again, in spite of the suggested change in emphasis put forward in Air Marshal Sharp's paper, our main ground force effort is still in NATO. We have a whole division's worth committed to NATO, but in a rather confused circumstance. We cannot glibly go around and abandon the accepted and well-proven principle of using the infantry division as the basic ground element. Brigade groups were used, as I well know, in 1939, in the United Kingdom, in a scheme to repel invasion. This was done because communications were scarce and extremely vulnerable.

Similar use of small groups was tried in the desert in 1943, with rather disastrous results. One of the first things that "Monty" did when he went to Egypt was to forbid any operation of brigade groups, or of columns, or any of these other fancy things that they had put into effect. He laid down the dictum that from then on we would fight with divisions; and that stuck. He wanted it made quite clear to everybody that in his view, and there is no doubt it is not an isolated view, the division is the smallest ground element that can fight a sustained battle. You can add to it but you cannot split it up.

I am well aware of the difficulty in Canada because we have not got a division, and therefore we do try to make our brigade groups look like little divisions. Now we are going to try to make our battalions and companies look like—well, I do not know what.

I think this needs a great deal of looking at, because it breaks down all the principles which have been used over the many years in fighting battles.

I would like to make an observation now on this "Career Serviceman Concept" which was mentioned this afternoon. This concept calls for an initial engagement for 5 years, followed by an indefinite period of enrolment. While this concept is very satisfactory for the sedative positions in the force, it fails to appreciate the military necessity of keeping the combat elements youthful, alert, virile and efficient. These categories include combat pilots, platoon commanders and other close support offices, as well as NCO's and men.

Our experience in the last conflict showed that very few front line combat officers could stand the strain beyond the age of 27 or 30. Judging by the reports from Viet Nam combat is still a young man's business.

Therefore, a requirement exists for short-term commissions and for enhanced retirement schemes for those who become too old for combat and cannot be placed in sedative employment.

For men and NCO's the five-year engagement would look to be ideal from an age standpoint, but would create quite a training problem. To re-engage junior NCO's and men for an indefinite period would tend to worsen the problem. A short engagement requires the Commanding Officer to make a reassessment of the man's capabilities for continuing in combat training for another period. The man's age is always considered carefully, and if there is any doubt the man is not re-engaged.

By this proposed system, once a man is re-engaged he would have to be dismissed if he starts to slip at the start of his new engagement. I do not think this is very fair because if a man is dismissed it will place upon him a stigma which would not be an asset when seeking civil employment.

This problem of keeping the combat element of a voluntary force youthful has never been solved. It is solved in other countries where they have compulsory military training because you get your recruits and your junior officers all coming up very, very young and all leaving after their term is up. In a voluntary force you do not get that, and therefore we have to look at the situation as it exists and not try to deal with it, as you would through a computer, that everybody should be able to do his task up to his age limit.

It seems to me, in looking over these papers and plans, that this idea of looking after the combat element has been almost completely forgotten. I was amazed, in reading Air Marshal Reyno's paper, that I could not find the word "combat" at all, and not a word about what is going to be done with the combat officer who gets to be a little too old.

As I pointed out at the beginning of my testimony, I feel some responsibility in this field because I have been recommending integration for a good many years. I am rather concerned that, in the urge to create the most economical and efficient and ubiquitous system, the primary purpose of military management has been overlooked. It has been forgotten that the main purpose of the system is to assist in every way the serviceman to do his front line task where and when he is required to do it.

Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence, this "Blimp" would like to conclude his remarks with a few words to those who are responsible for implementing the final stages of unification and for translating the agreed policy, whatever it is, and the import of this bill into regulations and guidance for the commanders of the unified force. Here they are.

There will be many new and difficult problems, many unusual situations, and a host of unseen difficulties to be overcome. There will be an incessant urge in this mechanical age for uniformity because it looks better on a graph; fits better in the computer system and provides for tidy administration. But you must ensure that the human element is considered and that the regulations serve as well as restrict the servicemen.

The staff officer must continue to remind himself that he is the servant and not the master of the combat forces. It is they who will win or lose the battle.

These combat troops are all volunteers who think for themselves, abhor being treated as numbers and holes in a punch card, to be pushed about and kept in the dark, and then expected to do their damnedest when they go on the battlefield.

Experience in three wars shows that the Canadian will rise to the occasion and commit himself well if he is properly trained, properly equipped, well led, and has confidence in himself and those who lead him; but if any of these criteria are neglected he is confused, dejected and disinterested in fighting the battle.

If this unified force is to be the success its sponsors hope, if it is to satisfy the Canadian defence requirements of the next decade, it must not only meet the wishes and ambitions of those serving today but must be able to attract the youth of tomorrow. Therefore, the image of the new force must have appeal, plenty of advantages and the fewest possible restrictions, if it is expected to attract the youth of tomorrow to serve in the ranks, and the college student to seek a career in this new force.

This will be the first test of the unification scheme. I sincerely hope that the ultimate test of battle is never made necessary.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: I am looking around for questioners now. I have Mr. Andras, and Mr. Laniel and Mr. McIntosh.

Are you ready to answer questions, sir.

Mr. FOULKES: Any time.

Mr. ANDRAS: General Foulkes, may I congratulate you most sincerely on your very comprehensive, sound and down-to-earth presentation. I think it is one of the ones with the most meat on policy issues that we have had. There is a little nostalgia in reading it when you refer to cab ranks and air support to infantry, and so forth. It rather takes me back to my days as platoon commander, when I was most appreciative of bringing in Typhoons and so forth, but a little worried that they were coming awfully close to us, too.

Sir, as I would interpret your general thought behind this, you are in favour of the reorganization of the forces but are a little concerned, perhaps, about the method that has developed and the controversy that has developed; that you have a great desire to see the military and the civilian authorities forget their bruised feelings; and a certain apprehension about the role.

I go back, sir, to your conviction, as expressed on October 14, 1961, which starts off with something that certainly I, in my brief study of the situation, would agree with, which is that drastic changes are needed, or I would say, were needed, in the organization of the Canadian defence forces.

Later on you explain some of the frustrations, perhaps, and the problems that you encountered as the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee in seeing this program furthered; because I understand that at that time, sir, you did draw up a plan yourself, or in consultation with other officers. When you were with the Chiefs of Staff Committee you did draw up a plan to integrate Canada's armed forces in 1961; is that correct?

Mr. FOULKES: That is correct. There is a paper.

Mr. ANDRAS: I beg your pardon.

Mr. FOULKES: That is the paper I referred to. It was in the possession of National Defence when they started this.

Mr. ANDRAS: What was the reaction in 1961 to the proposals that you must have made at that stage?

Mr. FOULKES: Well, let me make this quite clear. By 1961 I had retired and the paper I mentioned was one that I prepared for the RCAF Staff College Journal. The Staff College Journal rejected this paper as being too revolutionary—I had spent several months preparing this comprehensive paper, including the various stages, and so on, and one day, in a very loose moment, I gave it to a journalist who said that he would like to publish a popular edition. That is what you are referring to, I presume.

Mr. ANDRAS: Yes.

Mr. FOULKES: The popular edition appeared in the Toronto *Star Weekly*.

Mr. ANDRAS: Yes, in the *Star Weekly*; that is the extract that I have. In that article you go into the problem that lead to the statement that drastic reorganizations were needed and you say: "The problem can only be solved by the complete unification of the three services, with one Chief of Staff, one chain of command, one ladder of promotion and one uniform". Basically, as a principle, do you still feel that that is a sound approach to it?

Mr. FOULKES: Yes; I have not changed my mind on the necessity for change. I think that there has been too much stress on the last item, but I agree that there needed to be a change.

There are various versions of how far that change is necessary, on which you can question me.

Mr. ANDRAS: Further on you mentioned that it seemed—and I presume that you were referring to that time when you made certain recommendations—that one single Canadian armed service was about to be born at any time, and then suddenly it was dropped. You also indicate that certain obstacles were encountered from then on.

Could you give us some information on the type of obstacle that at that stage seemed to be preventing the furtherance of this program that you say that you believe in?

Mr. FOULKES: I went into this subject very thoroughly on October 22, when I gave the history of this problem. I will go over it again, if you wish.

Mr. ANDRAS: I would appreciate it if you would, sir.

Mr. FOULKES: As I pointed out at that time, when Mr. Brooke Claxton took over as Minister of National Defence he decided to push the three services together. At that time the army was separate—the army and the navy had been under one minister before that—and the air force had its own minister. Mr. Claxton was appointed as the first minister, and he decided that he was going to have organization of the services into one.

He set about and reorganized the administration. As you know, formerly there were these deputy ministers. He put the whole thing together and he had one administration on a functional basis.

At the same time he suggested to me that he would like to do the same thing with the services, and at that time we drew up a plan for one service.

I do not know the real background of this—I can only suspect it—but when I did talk to Brooke Claxton one day about how far he was going to go with it he

told me then that he would have to drop it; that he had expected to come into the department for a short time, knock the chiefs of staff's heads together to get them thinking alike and then he was going to be moved to another department. The story had it that Mr. King told him that he had made a very good bed and that he had better sleep in it. Mr. Claxton found that he would have to wait a bit. He said that he had enough troubles on his hands, and that he was not going any farther with integration.

That started the set-up of a whole series of committees. That is when the committee fever started; in other words, integration by committee, and the start of committee hearings.

Mr. ANDRAS: When was that?

Mr. FOULKES: That was in 1946 and 1947.

Mr. ANDRAS: General Foulkes, with radical or drastic change, and people being human, would it not be natural to run into the resistance of a very sincere affection for tradition, and so forth? If I correctly read the tone of your article in 1961, it is one of recognition of the fact that anyone attempting to make this novel, radical and, as you said, revolutionary recommendation would naturally run into some considerable resistance; that it was just almost inevitable that there would have to be some upsets and possible effect on morale and so forth; that the ultimate goal that you were espousing would make it worthwhile, but one that would have to be prepared for a rought time in the middle?

Mr. FOULKES: I think you will have to realize that there was a lot of groundwork done on integration. As you all well know, in the National Defence Act discipline was all put on one basis. A great deal of work was done long before this integration, in the expectation that some day or other we would reach this goal.

Actually, while I was still chairman of the chiefs of staff I set up a committee on the staff level, headed by then Brigadier Rothschild, and he held a series of meetings with the services over a period of three or four months to discuss an outline plan for integration not too different from the one we are talking about. This was discussed at the chiefs of staff level on many, many occasions.

In 1963 when I was here, I think I remarked that the attitude of the chiefs was: "Yes; we believe in integration, but please do not do it while I am here. I do not want to be known as the chief of staff who ruined these services." This was the natural attitude of an officer who had come all the way up through the service, who was responsible for the welfare of this service, and not only to those in the service but to the institutions which supported it. Although they all supported it they were not so keen to go ahead with it during their tenure of office.

When Mr. Pearkes became Minister this plan was put to him and it received favourable consideration, but again it was felt that it was a bit too revolutionary, and Mr. Pearkes decided to start at the bottom and see what he could do about getting common services. This led to the amalgamation of the medical service and the chaplain service. It did not do much good. All we did in the chaplain service was to create two new brigadiers.

Mr. HARKNESS: That was a religious problem rather than a military problem.

Mr. FOULKES: There are two ways to Heaven!

Mr. ANDRAS: I have taken the view, sir—and I would not presume to suggest that I have anywhere near the knowledge of others—that in order for it to work an integrated process of command almost had to start from the top and work down, rather than work up. I just do not see how it would be practical for it to work the other way. Would you agree, or disagree, with that?

Mr. FOULKES: I entirely agree; and this plan shows that.

Mr. ANDRAS: In your presentation of 1961 you said:

> After my nine years as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, trying to co-ordinate the rival services, I am convinced that we can't achieve much more by the present road. Attempts to integrate the three services by persuasion have been going on ever since 1945. They have woven a huge spider's web of committees, which are rather like foreign ministers' meetings where rival powers try to reach a compromise.

You then go on to say:

> The problem can only be solved by complete unification of the three services, with one chief of staff, one chain of command, one ladder of promotion and one uniform.

I know this is a leading question but, generally speaking, I presume you would still agree with that statement of policy-conviction, at least?

Mr. FOULKES: That is correct; and I do not think in my statement tonight I refuted anything of that.

Mr. ANDRAS: Thank you very much.

Mr. FOY: If I could ask a supplementary question you could take me off the list. It arises from Mr. Andras' questions of the General and I do not propose to be repetitious.

Referring to the *Star Weekly* article about the single unified Canadian armed service general, could you tell us if there is any difference between your thoughts then, and the single unified Canadian armed forces in this present bill?

Mr. FOULKES: I think there are degrees to unification, as I tried to point out tonight. I must say that I am very, very alarmed when unification goes down to the company. This, to me, does not make any military sense whatever. Bring the forces together, by all means, but when you get down into an organization like a battalion and they are suggesting that you break up battalions, and you have companies running around—this does not make too much sense. Even in the army's ground forces theory, we did not break up battalions; we fought in divisions. I must say that the view that I had on integration, which appeared in this paper, was that we would form task forces. For instance, for air defence there would be task forces of air forces, and of ground troops if we were going to do rocketry or something like that; from Maritime forces there would be air forces and naval forces; but it did not visualize getting down to saying that we were going to mix them all completely so that you would have companies trying to be unified. This, I think, is a completely new concept to me.

Mr. FOY: I appreciate that. Thank you very much, General.

Mr. LANIEL: General, I think that you have made a very fatherly approach to this problem of unification and integration. You have given us your advice and recommendations and you have also told us of your worries about possible

mistakes. Do you feel that up until now there have been very, very great mistakes made at the level of integration of command by the elimination of the chiefs of staff of the three services and by the changes in the composition of the chiefs of staff defence council?

Mr. FOULKES: As far as the organization is concerned, of course, I am entirely in agreement that there should be one chief of staff this is the only way you could make it work.

The comment I made tonight and, again, they are mainly on the way to implement this—and in the plan that I proposed was to keep the chiefs of staff in being, along with the chairman, because I foresaw all kinds of difficulties and service problems which would have to be solved by someone who has really an expert in the particular service. I also foresaw that we had to keep up the morale; and, furthermore, if we got into difficulties that we ought to get down on our knees and thank the Almighty God that we did not get into war while this confusion was going on, because we would be completely useless, having no one at the top.

It is my view that you could have accomplished this by keeping the chiefs of staff there and making them responsible for implementing these changes and then having the chairman take over at the last part of it.

The first thing that I foresaw to be done was to reorganize and get all the personnel into a personnel command and to get all the administration unified; and when the administration was unified and you had the logistics in shape you would then abolish the chiefs of staff and have one chairman.

Mr. LANIEL: Yes, but—

Mr. FOULKES: So any organization that I know of if you cut its head off you are going to have trouble.

Mr. LANIEL: The concept of one single chief of staff does not exclude his getting advice from the commanders of the different commands?

Mr. FOULKES: But there are no heads. The head of the service can get all the advice he likes, but when you have the air force, or the army and you take away the top, the man whom the troops look up to as the man who is going to look after their interests, then, as I say, who is going to inform the troops of those decisions? You cannot get along in an organization without a head of some kind, and until you are ready to move them all into one you must keep the organization which can control it.

Mr. LANIEL: How could you really integrate and unify and keep three chiefs of staff, one for each service, if the services are unified?

Mr. FOULKES: It takes some time to unify. The plan unification is not settled yet, and we have had no heads of the services for two or three years.

Mr. LANIEL: But you must admit that integration is a first step towards unification. That is what was said and what was meant to be. However, I will leave that topic for the moment.

My next question relates to your last remark that there was a lack of authentic information at different levels. Do you not agree that for a project of this size and magnitude everything could not have been planned in detail, and because the Minister stated in the White Paper that the project was not an

immutable one—that it could be altered or adapted to meet the requirements of the changing circumstances—is it not re-assuring that nothing will be done to upset everything before the right solution is discovered step by step.

Mr. FOULKES: You made a remark that it is not possible to make an outlined plan. Let me suggest to you that I was able to do it—an outlined plan in three stages. I am sure that if the staff had been given the job they could have sat down and made an outlined plan. I am not suggesting that the outlined plan would reflect the final solution, but it would be at least a design. When you start to build a house you insist on the contractor bringing you a fairly detailed plan, and it is rather costly. You can make changes on it—you can put a verandah on and make the cellar smaller, but you must start out knowing exactly where you are going. If you want to have the confidence of people you do not say that you are just going to make changes; you explain what the changes are and what you have in mind. I think this is what has caused some of the trouble. You may say that it is better to keep flexible and not reveal what you have in your mind, but that is very upsetting for the people in the organization.

Mr. LANIEL: Yes, sir, but I imagine even your plan was quite general and it would not have satisfied all the levels of our military forces because each level would want to know what effect it will have on them.

Mr. FOULKES: This is it. Mind you, the final plan is not so very greatly different than what you have today; the broad concept is pretty much the same.

Mr. LANIEL: The reason you seem to still give, maybe with reservation—I do not know; I did not get that impression—support to integration and unification after all that has been said, I imagine, is influenced by the fact that you must still have confidence in those men who are there to implement it and you must have confidence that they will take into consideration the advice of experienced military people like yourself and others on military matters. In your brief you also put emphasis on the personal feeling of the combat men.

Mr. FOULKES: Let us get this quite clear: I am still an ardent advocate of integration—I always have been and I always will be—but the issues I am raising today relate to the questions of implementations, not the question of unification or integration at all. Some of these changes are quite radical and I want to make sure that they are not implemented without giving adequate consideration to those whom it effects. This is my concern, and mind you, I certainly have had plenty of correspondence on this matter over the last three or four years. I am sometimes held as the one responsible for introducing this scheme. As a matter of fact, one newspaper published an article saying that I was in the pay of the Liberals. If I am I just want to remind Mr. Hellyer that he is five years behind in his credit.

Mr. LANIEL: To go into another area of questioning, you said that you had reservations about our future military policies, as set out in the White Paper in different priorities. I think that you look at this in the concept of a big general war or an emergency that might happen. Do you believe that such an emergency could happen in this world of today?

Mr. FOULKES: I was not looking for an emergency; I was just quoting what is in the White Paper and trying to interpret it, and to point out that in my view it is not definite enough. I would like to see a clear and

concise statement as to where we are going to stand in regard to our commitments in Europe. We have one brigade in the forward role, as I pointed out, committed with heavy equipment; we have two brigades that are going to be re-equipped and retrained on a mobile basis, yet we still have a commitment to provide a division to NATO. How are we going to do it? Is the government proposing to change the role of that brigade forward and make it a completely mobile brigade so that we can have a mobile division, as I have suggested, or what is going to happen? There has been no indication of what the situation is going to be there, and certainly I am concerned about this concept that we are going to have a couple of brigades ready to go anywhere in the world to settle disputes. We have not really thought about or, if we have, we have not really said how this is going to be accomplished. This is what worries me—the indefiniteness.

Mr. LANIEL: I see your point, but do you think that a country the size of Canada could have an army that we as Canadians would be proud of in peacetime? I am thinking of a force that could be made available for different purposes. In this way we could show to the rest of the world that we want to assume our small share of responsibility by providing either a deterrent or peacekeeping force with the defence of Canada and things like that in mind. Is it possible for Canada to have such a force?

Mr. FOULKES: I am not one of these people who believes that Canada should be trying to show the world how good we are. I am talking purely about defence. What we should do is to try and make the best possible contribution that we can to keeping the peace; that is our greatest aim in the military field. We have tried to do that by making contributions to NATO, and I think we have done a very, very good job. What I am worried about is the suggestion that we are going to change our emphasis and that we are going to slacken up on our support of NATO and put that support somewhere else. I do not know about this kind of vague talk, but it is up to the Minister to change the emphasis and so on. I think we want to be quite sure what we are going to do or our staff officers cannot interpret that into plans. I think it is just a bit too indefinite.

Mr. LANIEL: But do you not think that even NATO itself is changing—

Mr. FOULKES: Yes, it is changing.

Mr. LANIEL:—because of political situations in Europe?

Mr. FOULKES: But should we not be changing our views on NATO too? Should we not withdraw that brigade from the forward role, where it is not very good? And I do not want to argue this case here because we would be getting into security problems. We would have made more sense, if we had our whole mobile division, providing a mobile brigade in Europe with two mobile brigades here. That seems to me to be a pretty sensible military order but today it is mixed up. We have two brigades and we do not know what they are going to do in Europe. You may know but I do not know because I have never been told.

Mr. LANIEL: May I ask one more question, please. When you spoke of our air support you said that we want to cut it down to the lowest level. How can we do it when we have a good part of our air component assigned to NORAD, some assigned to anti-submarine warfare, and whatever we have left at this time earmarked to NATO unless we change and try to build up a fourth component of

the air force—a big component. How could we completely support an army, if our brigade was back in Canada? If we brought our brigade back to Canada would we have to bring also our air force?

Mr. FOULKES: I think you misunderstood me completely. I was suggesting that our brigade in Europe should stay there but in a mobile role, not in a forward heavy role; and that the two brigades here should be equally equipped and so on so that we could make them into a mobile division. As it is now, we still have a commitment to send a division to NATO and we cannot meet that commitment.

Mr. LANIEL: I see your point.

Mr. FOULKES: As far as the air force is concerned, it is the last thing I want to do. All I am suggesting is that we do not break them up into penny packages. If we are going to make a support to NATO make it a support to collective forces. When we went into this NATO business I recall the instructions I received from the Prime Minister at the time, Mr. St. Laurent, and they were to provide NATO with the best kind of contribution that Canada could make to the NATO forces, and to make quite sure that this was what NATO wanted—a contribution as a nation, not necessarily the kind that would make Canada look better, but the kind of thing that would help the alliance. I think our thinking has moved away from interdependence; we are trying to think what we can do by ourselves. Canada has never been able to do anything by herself. I heard a discussion this afternoon as to whether the air materiel command could support it. Let us get this clear: In operations we cannot support ourselves anywhere. In World War I the British supported us; in World War II the British supported us again; in Korea we had to get support from the United States. We cannot support our forces overseas with anything like the kind of economy that is necessary. We have to depend on our allies. If war was declared tomorrow our brigade in Europe is still supported by the British; our air division is supported by the United States. We in Canada, with defence expenditures of about $1½ billion, cannot support forces overseas; we have to depend on our allies.

Mr. MCINTOSH: General, I was going to begin my remarks by telling you how much I appreciate the information that you have given to us but I see my time is limited so I will just endorse the opening remarks of my colleague, Mr. Andras.

I would like to make this comment: You said that some of the press has accused you of being in the pay of the Liberals. I just might say that although you would be politically opposite to what my beliefs are I wish that you still were in the pay of the Liberals.

During the opening part of your statement and practically all through it, you seemed to be dealing with the term "integration" and, did so with a great deal of confidence. However, you became very vague toward the latter part of your brief when you started dealing with the word "unification". I think perhaps one of the problems that has confronted this Committee has to do with the difference between "integration" and "unification".

Could you give us your definition or understanding of what you think unification means.

Mr. FOULKES: It is completely beyond me. I thought I knew what integration meant when we used to talk about it but I am beginning to have some doubts,

after visiting this Committee, where integration stops and unification begins. I think I made myself abundantly clear when I said that I am greatly alarmed when a suggestion is made that we start to unify or integrate, or whatever you like to call it, down inside an infantly battalion. I just shudder to think how you ever would control a battle if that ever happened. I do not know how this crept in; it is something completely new to me. I think that this needs to be looked at very, very, very carefully. I know that it is quite easy when you start to look at a problem like this, to let the problem get away from you. I think you ought to come back to the fundamental principles that if we have to go to war we will have to fight with allies who have divisions. Therefore, we have to be able to fit in with divisions; we have to fit in with air groups of other countries; we have to fit in with navies of other countries because we are not going to do it—at least I hope that we are not ever going to try and fight by ourselves. Perhaps it is a laudable idea but it does not make any military sense to me. As I have said, we cannot support ourselves.

Mr. McINTOSH: In defence of a paper which you wrote for one of the defence books—in answer to a question of my colleague—you said: "That is virtually what we have today", and I think that you were talking about integration as you had defined it. What is your definition of unification, and could you tell the Committee what we would have once unification is complete, as the government seems to understand it.

Mr. FOULKES: I will be quite frank with you. I do not understand it, so I could not explain it. My concept of this game was that you would have a unified staff and under that staff you would have task forces to do certain tasks. Those task forces could be varied, but there would still be brigades of infantry, as far as Canada is concerned, because we have no divisions, squadrons of aircraft, flotillas of ships, and so on. This is my view, but I am not up to date enough on this, as I pointed out, to know what it means to unify, or even to pretend to do so.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well sir, you were chief of the general staff, and I presume that you got that position because of your capabilities, and particularly your ability of seeing things that possibly were more difficult for junior officers to see. What is your impression of the position of the junior officers still in the force when you say, as a former chief of the general staff, that you cannot understand unification?

Mr. FOULKES: I was saying I cannot understand what it means by unifying down to companies, and I imagine that he will have some difficulties too. Remember, a company commander has only a few years experience, and to suggest that he can or should start to deal with the control of air support, just does not make military sense.

Mr. McINTOSH: I did not intend for you to go down that low in the officer class. How could the officers in formation headquarters and above understand it if you, as a former chief of the general staff, do not understand it. Do you think that they will have difficulties?

Mr. FOULKES: Oh, I imagine that they will have difficulties. My view of this all along has been that one should make as little change in the operations units of our forces as possible—make as little change. They function well as they are; we ought to be justly proud of them, and I do not think that we can improve too

much on striving to make them any more refined. Our brigades function well in Europe; our Navy people function well in the North Atlantic and the Pacific, and I do not think that we can improve on this.

Mr. McIntosh: You have mentioned the Minister's speech in the House, as well as the presentation made by Air Marshal Sharp, and then in spite of that—I assume that you have read both and studied them—at the top of page 2 some of your criticism is directed forward a lack of authentic information. Do you feel that we, as politicians, have not sufficient information to make a decision on this bill yet?

Mr. Foulkes: I was referring to the lack of information given out in the first two years before they had this armed services council, and I imagine you have heard enough about that from Admiral Landymore. There was a distinct lack of information at that time. Mind you, there might be good reason for it because everybody was busy doing something else. However, I think that it had a very disastrous effect on the acceptance by the troops of integration. I was only trying to point out that in my view some of this could have been avoided if they had had a titular chief of staff for at least the first two years. Then, when they were ready, the whole thing had to be sold to the services. Then, when the administration and other plans were worked out, phase out the chief of staff and let the boss boy take over, when he was in a position to control.

Mr. McIntosh: Do you agree with this concept of phasing out—which actually has taken place now—the defence council, as it were, the three heads of the different services?

Mr. Foulkes: That was inevitable. The timing of it is the only thing with which I was in disagreement.

Mr. McIntosh: You mentioned that two years ago there was a lack of information. Might I suggest to you now, because of your reply to my question asking you to define unification, that there is still a lack of information —because you, as a former chief of the general staff, apparently do not understand what unification means either. Is that a fair assumption? You spoke also about morale, and I was just wondering how high on the list you would consider the morale of the forces. How important is it to the forces?

Mr. Foulkes: Well, if they are going to fight it is all important—all important; there is nothing more important. If you have not a high degree of morale in your forces you might as well not put them in the field.

Mr. McIntosh: You also spoke about the experience of senior officers. I think that you had reference to senior officers we have lost before their period of service had, shall I say, expired unnecessarily. Can you convey to the Committee in a little more detail than you have in your talk, how essential this experience, rather than theory, is to a fighting force. Can you give any instances where because of experience Commanders saved lives of troops?

Mr. Foulkes: I do not think that I can go into the details of saving troops and so on. I would point out that there are a lot of things about exercising the art of command that you cannot get out of a book. You have to have somebody with at least a levelling of experience. As I pointed out, even in the last war—although we put an emphasis on youth—some of our most brilliant commanders

were fellows who had had pretty good records in the first world war. There are some things that you cannot learn from a book; you have to learn from experience. As we all know, some people never reach a position of high command because there is something in their makeup or experience that does not fit into it; it is something you cannot really put your finger on. What I am really concerned about is that we have only a small force, and if we start and eliminate most of the top, which we have been doing pretty rapidly, we are going to get down where we have all theoretical soldiers and nobody with practical experience who could look at these problems—who can look, for instance, at the problem I raised with you about recruits, about the need to have some consideration given to keeping the battalions and the combat units young. Now it is only somebody who has had experience in operations that understands that kind of thing. Now I found, some two or three years ago when I went to visit my own regiment, being Colonel of the regiment, that we had Company Sergeant Majors of 42; we had subalterns of 36, and I almost blew a fuse, because if we went to war those fellows would not last one or two days.

Mr. PUGH: The 36 year old's?

Mr. MCINTOSH: I think this has been proven. I mean I do not think that, the average age of our generals in World War II was over 36, if it was that.

Mr. FOULKES: That is not the way I see it because I was not a Corps Commander until I was 43.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I am not going to argue with you.

On page 6, you said that you were puzzled about just what our military roles are today—and you said that you were concerned about something else too—and I would ask you to elaborate on that. Do you agree with our system of collective defence—continental defence, for Canada? Do you see some ulterior motive, if I may put it that way, in the Minister's speech which would do away with our role today and then our forces would be used for some other purpose?

Mr. FOULKES: No, I do not think that anyone who really has the interests of Canadian defence at heart is going to do away with our NATO commitment or selective defence arrangements. What I suspect has happened is that they have been trying to find some kind of a role that looks a little more attractive—something that will get the "eager beavers" working. It is a rather nice concept; the planners will have a wonderful time, searching all over the world to ascertain how to use two mobile brigades. However, I think that we want to be careful when we say that we are lessening the emphasis on the commitments that we have accepted; I think that that is one of the things that does wear. Perhaps there is not too much harm in letting the staff officer play with the free-wheeling around the world, but I am a bit concerned, if we are going to lessen our NATO commitments, unless it is agreed in the NATO organization that everybody slims down. The amount of military value, training and operational value that we get out of being a member of NATO is enormous. We draw all our best information, for instance, in Maritime warfare from the United States. We have a wonderful opportunity; the advantages that we reap from interdependence is enormous.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You mentioned that we could not sustain our force as it is right now and that we had to have help from, say, one of the other larger

powers. In regard to our commitments to these alliances that we have now, do you believe that Canada has the manpower to form another force capable of keeping the peace any place else in the world and still live up to commitments that we already have?

Mr. FOULKES: No; as a matter of fact, I am one of the people that said we have one brigade too many.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Why have we one too many?

Mr. FOULKES: As you remember, we formed an extra brigade to go to Korea.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Right.

Mr. FOULKES: After the Korea show was over, I proposed to the then Minister that we get rid of that brigade because it was not necessary—it was arranged especially for Korea. However, the chief of the general staff at that time did not want to be the one to say that he was cutting down the army; I think we had an election coming on and, therefore, the Minister was a bit worried about disbanding it, and we have a brigade that we really have not a job for. We have four brigades, and to meet our commitments we only have to have one brigade in Europe in peacetime and two at home. We could have well got rid of this, but we have not. It would have saved a lot of money. This is the point I am trying to make: If we look at our commitments, as well as develop an efficient system, we might be able to save some more money. We would save some more money if we could get out of this forward role. For instance, we would not have to be training on heavy tanks.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Then you would not agree with the statement made by Air Marshal Sharp, in his appreciation, when he said that there were only two courses open to the government: to increase the expenditure, or cut down on operations and maintenance. If we followed your suggestion, we would not cut down on operations nor maintenance, although there would be a drop in maintenance, and we would not have to increase the vote of the department.

Mr. FOULKES: I do not think I quite said that.

Mr. MCINTOSH: No, but Air Marshal Sharp said there were only these two courses open to the government. I asked a former witness if he agreed with the statement that there were only two courses; he said no, and he agreed with me that it was a false premise and that if the appreciation was based on a false premise, then the conclusion was false. Do you agree with that?

Mr. FOULKES: Of course I have not studied Air Marshal Sharp's brief well enough to say. What I was trying to say was that there are other ways of saving money. It is pretty hard to make a case for keeping four brigades, and if you could get rid of one brigade it would save a lot of money. As I mentioned earlier, we want to get more specific as to what our commitments are, and once we know what our commitments are you can make a much better plan as to how to manage it.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh, I will have to cut you off. Mr. Harkness is the next questioner. You had more than fifteen minutes.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Let me finish one question.

The CHAIRMAN: All right.

Mr. McINTOSH: What you are trying to say, General, is that there are more ways to save money or defence expenditures than by implementing unification.

Mr. FOULKES: There are other ways.

Mr. McINTOSH: Do you think that they are better ways?

Mr. FOULKES: No; I will come back to my original statement, that I have always been in support of integration.

Mr. McINTOSH: We are not talking about integration General; we are talking about unification. I understand what you mean by integration. I agree with most of it.

Mr. MACALUSO: It means the same thing.

Mr. McINTOSH: Integration and unification? The Minister has not said so. This whole Committee is about the definition of unification and what the Minister means by it. I would like to go back to the Minister's speech in the House where I say that he says one thing one time and he always ends off the paragraph by contradicting himself.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh I will put you down for the next round. Mr. Harkness is next.

Mr. HARKNESS: Just on this last point, General Foulkes: If we are going to continue a peacekeeping role for the United Nations and put at their disposal available troops for various operations such as the Congo, Cyprus and God knows what else, would you not agree then that there is a case for this fourth brigade?

Mr. FOULKES: Well, you still have two brigades in Canada.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes, but those two brigades, as you stated, are committed really to NATO.

Mr. FOULKES: They are committed to NATO but they do not have to go until a major war breaks out. As a matter of fact, they are only committed after D-day, and surely if we are doing peacekeeping, the peacekeeping would just stop if a major war started.

Mr. HARKNESS: If your two brigades were committed to some peacekeeping task I do not think that you would be able to get them back to put them into Europe or to carry on with their NATO role.

Mr. FOULKES: Let me suggest to you that we have never had anything like two brigades on peacekeeping. We have never had even three battalions. We have had a small detachment in Egypt which are not combat troops. As you know, they would not let us send combat troops to Egypt. And, we have somebody in Cyprus.

Mr. HARKNESS: In Cyprus and in the Gaza Strip we now have a combined total of two battalions actually.

Mr. FOULKES: That is a long way from six.

Mr. HARKNESS: It is a long way from six, but I think there is also the matter of protecting Canada itself which I do not thing you would envisage leaving without any troops at all?

Mr. FOULKES: We would be entirely safe.

Mr. HARKNESS: Would you?

Mr. FOULKES: As long as we were putting our forces where the fighting was going on, we would not have to worry about what was happening here.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, I do not know. I think a considerable number of people would think that you need some troops for the local protection of the country, maintenance of order and God knows what else. However, this is not the line of questioning that I had in mind; I just followed this up because of the remarks that you had made to Mr. McIntosh.

I think that nearly everybody believes that a certain amount of integration, particularly as far as the administrative and supply services are concerned—the integration of staffs, a unified command, particulary in any specific operation of war—is a desirable objective. They are aims toward which, as you have indicated, we have been working for a good many years. However, when you come to this final step, which you said that you advocated in this paper that you produced, the formation of a single service, which is what I at least take as being what is meant by unification, do you think that that will save any money? Of course savings can be made in respect of manpower and otherwise in the various integration processes which have gone on, but do you think the formation of a single service rather than a separate navy, army and air force will result in any financial savings?

Mr. FOULKES: Well, I am not being very good on this question of how much could be saved. I gather, from reading the proceedings of this Committee that you can make figures talk several different ways. The big saving we have always talked about would be accomplished by streamlining headquarters and streamlining administration.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes, what is generally referred to as the "integration process", but not from this process of forming a single service rather than the three that we have had.

In what way do you think a more effective force would be produced if we had the sea element, the land element and the air element in one single force rather than in three separate forces, each operating in its own environment?

Mr. FOULKES: Well, of course, some of these are mixed up now. They are mixed up in Maritime Command; they are going to be mixed up in the mobile command. You will have to wait and see whether or not you are going to get any spectacular results from this.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, I think you would agree that there is still in effect going to be a navy or the equivalent of it; there is going to be an army or the equivalent of it; there is going to be an air force or the equivalent of it—no matter what you call it. Is there any advantage whatever in putting these people into a single force and calling it a defence force rather than having them in the three separate components in which they have been accustomed to operating?

Mr. FOULKES: Administratively, there might be decided advantages; I do not think, technically, that you will get any decided advantage.

Mr. HARKNESS: You are coming back then to what you decried in your paper as "tidy administration". I would agree with you that there is no tactical advantage, but I would also ask you if you do not think that there would be, from this step, considerable disadvantages, particularly from the point of view of morale?

Mr. FOULKES: I think one has to weigh very carefully the disadvantages, especially in certain fields. No doubt, there is no need for me to add anything to what you have already heard about the disadvantages in the naval field. One of the things that always has worried me is that our Navy does operate in a medium almost by itself with the Air Force, which they have been doing for the last 10 years. We set up operation control which really meant that they were working as a team 10 years ago—this is not something new—and it has always worked out extremely well.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes.

Mr. FOULKES: It was opposed at the time we put it up but that was easily settled by telling the Navy that if they did not agree, we would put an air force man in command. This has worked wonderfully well and I do not think you can improve too much on it.

Mr. HARKNESS: This is the very point I would like to make: I do not think you can improve very much on the present situation.

Mr. FOULKES: I am not talking about administration; I know precious little about it. However, I know an awful lot about operations in the field.

Mr. HARKNESS: That is right.

Mr. FOULKES: And I know a lot about operations under SACLANT in which our Navy takes an important part. I think that we have to be very careful that we do not lose something with the Navy in this role because they work much more closely with the United States Navy in this role than they work with the Army. With the Air Force, of course, they are together as a team. I can well see some decided difficulties in respect of the Navy in this particular role, and I would have preferred to have gone very cautiously with this step.

Mr. HARKNESS: The bill provides for a single service. Do you think that the components of that service will be able to work as satisfactorily with our allies in NATO or in any other operation which, as you said, is really the only way that we can work? We are not going to go to war by ourselves; we are always going to be working with allies of some sort—presumably, as far as you can see at the moment and in the foreseeable future, with the people who are presently associated with NATO, or with most of them at least. I think one of the criticisms which has been made of this concept of a single force is that under that form of organization, our forces will not be able to work as effectively with the forces of our allies, and they will not be able to integrate or co-operate with them nearly as well.

Mr. FOULKES: Well I think one can make a statement on that, but when you look at it specifically, I do not see any trouble with our ground forces operating in Europe with the ground forces because there is to be no change; in any event, we operate as an integral part of a British division now and I presume we will continue to do that, and there is to be no change in the Army. The Air Force has a separate role at the present time but it works very, very closely with the United States Air Force and 4 ATAF. However, I gather, from reading discussions in the House, that it is more or less considered that when these aircraft wear out the present role they are being given will disappear and they will be given another role, which is hinted here as ground support.

Now I can foresee a great deal of difficulty if we try to impose a small Canadian Air Force, no matter what you call it, to support our own troops and then try to stick those in the middle of the British Tactical Air Force which is now giving us support. This will really create a lot of difficulties and I think we should be awfully clear before we go far. I am not aware, of course, what discussions the Minister had with General Lemnitzer, but the White Paper suggested that he was going to have some. Knowing the situation in Europe, and knowing General Lemnitzer, I am just surprised he did not have a stroke because the one thing that we have tried to do in NATO, the whole time NATO has been there, is to try and get the forces to work together in the best location to suit the whole thing, not just to suit a particular nation. We are being used as an example, that "Canada will do the task we give it"—and we have been used as a startling example. I certainly would have some qualms about a suggestion that we should stick our support in there so that we could be supported by our own forces. It sounds well but it does not do too well in the Alliance because it makes everybody feel that we do not think that we will be properly supported, and on the Minister's side of it, at least, it would be extremely upsetting.

Mr. HARKNESS: To come back to what you said a few minutes ago, that you believe, in effect, we will continue to have much the same sea, land and air forces that we have, what is the value to be gained by putting them all into one single force?

Mr. FOULKES: As far as the fighting elements are concerned, I never visualized this, as I pointed out before. I visualized that we would have task forces made up of brigades, air force troops and so on, with as little change in those fighting elements as possible, and I have never ever given any serious thoughts to the idea of breaking up battalions and this kind of thing and making us ambidextrous.

Mr. HARKNESS: I personally do not think that it is a practical proposition, and I think that most people would agree on that.

Along this same line, you were mentioning particularly that you could foresee considerable difficulties as far as the Navy is concerned. What do you think of the proposition in this bill to change the navy's rank structure and to make one single rank structure for the navy, army and air force. Do you foresee difficulties in that regard?

Mr. FOULKES: Well I can see the difficulties—and mind you these are not new ones. As I pointed out before, when I used to discuss integration with the Chiefs of Staff, they all suspected, and did not mind saying so, that what I particularly had in mind was the army taking over the other two services. One of the former Chiefs of Staff reminded me of that the other day and said it has just happened. I think that this is one of the things that will cause a lot of trouble because it looks as if the ground forces—and I was with the ground forces so I can talk this way—had more or less taken over and pushed their ranks onto the Navy—more or less the rank structure. This is another area where I suggest that the reaction on the troops has not been given as much consideration as it should have been in order to achieve a tidy administration.

Mr. HARKNESS: Would you agree that it would be better to leave the navy as it is, with its present rank structure, rather than trying to impose the army rank structure on them?

Mr. FOULKES: I have to be careful about this because I am batting on a very difficult wicket, especially with the Chairman being a naval type.

Mr. HARKNESS: Oh, he will not bother you.

Mr. FOULKES: In my discussions with the Navy about rank structure when I was Chairman of the Rank Structure Committee, they used to impress upon me that the one thing that I did not understand was that to fight a naval battle you had to have what is called a "happy" ship. Is that not it?

The CHAIRMAN: I have heard that expression before.

Mr. FOULKES: Meaning that everybody on the ship, because of close confinement and so on, has to be of such a type and temperament that they can get along with each other, because, when they get into an emergency, the doctor, and the man who stokes the fire, and so on, have to do all kinds of jobs. I believe it is a problem that does not affect the other two services as much as it does the navy. That theory of a happy ship, I think, has some substance; they have a specialized problem that ought to be given very careful consideration.

Mr. HARKNESS: Now I come back to the direct question: Do you think it would be advisable to leave the navy rank structure as it is, rather than to impose the army rank structure on the navy.

Mr. FOULKES: You are talking about names of ranks.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes.

Mr. FOULKES: Certainly I would not have done this because I would have foreseen that this kind of thing would bring forth irritation—in other words—it would be doing more harm than good.

Mr. HARKNESS: I do not know whether you can see any good that it would do, but I certainly cannot see that it would do any good.

Mr. FOULKES: I know that I would abhor it if I was now called an admiral.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes.

An hon MEMBER: That would be asking to lower the morale.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, he has already said that. Mr. Harkness—

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, I have only this one question. What do you think is the effect of the present re-organization that has taken place, and what is the likely effect of this further step toward a single service, as far as leaving us with a mobilization base upon which we could expand our forces in the event of the worst happening?

Mr. FOULKES: Of course, we have to be a bit careful about this. We can talk about the necessity of a mobilized base, but if we are really realistic one wonders, if we get into another conflict, whether we are going to have time to form a base, or have a need for a base. Certainly, if it is a nuclear conflict, we will be doing everything else but forming a base. In the last few years I have never given much consideration as to how we are going to expand the forces. I think what we want to make sure of is that the forces we have at the time can provide the greatest possible contribution to the deterrent; that is our only hope. If this thing ever breaks out, we will not have time to mobilize on any kind of a base.

Mr. HARKNESS: You are speaking now of a full scale nuclear war, and I agree with you. Actually under those circumstances, the chief job of the armed forces—at any rate, those in Canada—is going to be a salvage operation, which will occupy their entire energies, attention and so forth. However, would you not admit that it is quite conceivable, if we get into another type of war—

Mr. FOULKES: I do not know. If you are talking about the major powers, I think you just have to put yourself in this position: If war breaks out—and suppose we get an agreement that we will not use nuclear weapons—you start to fight with the conventional weapons you have; you start to lose, and you have the nuclear bombs just behind you—what are you going to do? Pull them out and use them. Where the vital interest of a nation is concerned, it is going to use everything in its power not to be over-run. You may start with the idea that you are going to keep war clean—I do not know how you do that—but once you have started to use force, there is no way of preventing that force from being accelerated until one side or the other quits.

Mr. HARKNESS: You have an example at the present time of a very considerable war going on in Viet Nam, which we, of course, are not engaged in. However, it is quite conceivable that we might be engaged in a war of that nature, which would require a very considerable number of troops and as far as we are concerned, a mobilization base. In this particular case there has been no escalation to nuclear weapons, and it does not look as though there is going to be.

Mr. FOULKES: I certainly would think that you would have an awful time convincing the Canadian people to go into that kind of a battle. We only fight when our vital interests are affected. I do not think you would get Canadians to support the United States in their anti-Communist crusade.

Mr. HARKNESS: We fought in Korea; what vital interest was affected then?

An hon. MEMBER: Did we fight alone?

Mr. FOULKES: We fought with the U.N.

Mr. HARKNESS: I know we fought with the U.N., but it is just as conceivable that we might be fighting with some of our allies in—

Mr. FOULKES: In the U.N.?

Mr. HARKNESS: No, not in the U.N., with NATO in another conflict of the same nature.

Mr. FOULKES: In NATO?

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes.

Mr. FOULKES: If war breaks out in NATO, and we want to keep it conventional, our conventional forces will last 24 hours—a 24 hour battle, and that is all. You are not going to have any time to reinforce or mobilize for that, if that is the premise.

Mr. HARKNESS: We are now getting into the various theories in respect to the war that we might have, and I think it is a profitless exercise for us at this time.

The CHAIRMAN: Do you want to leave it, Mr. Harkness?

Mr. HARKNESS: I notice the witness is looking at his watch.

Mr. FOULKES: Oh, I do not mind; my time is yours.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Is the witness appearing before the Committee tomorrow?

The CHAIRMAN: The witness is prepared to come before the Committee tomorrow morning. We have the room available at 9.30 in the morning. We seem to be only half way through the questioners. What is the wish of the Committee?

Mr. MACALUSO: Do you have another witness on tomorrow?

The CHAIRMAN: We have someone who is available, yes, but General Foulkes, who has been waiting to appear before us at our request, says that he is able to remain for further questioning tomorrow morning.

We will adjourn until 9.30 tomorrow morning.

Mr. MACALUSO: Is my name first on your list for tomorrow morning?

The CHAIRMAN: It is, Mr. Macaluso.

Mr. MACALUSO: Thank you.

EVIDENCE

(*Recorded by Electronic Apparatus*)

FRIDAY, February 17, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, when we adjourned last night at 10 o'clock, Mr. Harkness had just finished questioning General Foulkes. Mr. Macaluso is the next on my list.

Mr. MACALUSO: General, do you agree with Admiral Brock's statement in his Defence Policy Proposals, and I quote:

> Possession of nuclear arms in any form does not enhance the flexibility of our armed forces, but, on the contrary, diminishes their usefulness in fulfilling their primary objective in support of Canadian external policy.

You will recall Admiral Landymore rejected this view and I am interested in the other side of the pcture as far as the Army is concerned and also as far as your experience in the field is concerned.

General FOULKES: Of course, none of us had any experience in nuclear weapons.

Mr. MACALUSO: Yes, I realize that, sir.

Mr. FOULKES: I do not think there is any question there. The position I have always taken with regard to nuclear weapons has been, and is, well known; that if the Canadian government accepts tasks which are required to be carried out by nuclear weapons, there is no alternative but to provide those nuclear weapons. Now, as I pointed out yesterday, with a country like Canada, which is only providing contributions to the collective defence organization, there is a lot of leeway in those contributions. If it is government policy that it does not want to be involved in nuclear weapons they can select, fairly well, tasks that are still to be done which do not involve the use of nuclear weapons. My objection before about nuclear weapons was that we had tasks which had been accepted and which required the support of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, I would suggest to you that in Europe, for instance, in a forward role where we

are likely to be attacked by superior forces, you need every kind of support you can get.

Mr. MACALUSO: My point concerns the flexibility or inflexibility of the statement. Admiral Brock says:

> Possession of nuclear arms in any form does not enhance the flexibility of our armed forces . . .

This is what I am concerned with. Does it enhance flexibility? Does it make our forces inflexible or more flexible?

Mr. FOULKES: I really do not understand this statement because when you talk about flexibility it is not necessarily a discussion about the type of weapons which you are carrying. For instance, whether the navy have depth charges with nuclear warheads or not, does not, I think, affect the flexibility of that particular ship.

Mr. MACALUSO: Thank you, General.

Now, General, you prepared your own plan. Could you tell us fundamentally what is the difference, if any, between your plan and the present plan.

Mr. FOULKES: As I pointed out yesterday, in the final analysis there is very little difference; that is, in the setup. The difference in the plan that I proposed some years ago was more in implementation.

Mr. MACALUSO: More in the mechanics of using the single force. Is that it?

Mr. FOULKES: No, not at all, because the plan I proposed was in three stages and the final stage looks very much the same as the diagram that you have. In other words, you have a completely integrated headquarters at the top, and then underneath you have task forces and those task forces will be made up of the forces that are required to do that particular job. Now, mine were not exactly the same names. I had: Maritime Transport, Air Defence Transport, and the one which is now called Mobile Command I had as a Strategic Reserve, but its functions were exactly the same. The difference was mainly in the way that I foresaw the implementation of this scheme. May I take five minutes to quote this?

The CHAIRMAN: Please do, sir.

Mr. FOULKES: I would just like to read this, because there has been a great deal of loose talk about what I intended because it all has been from that popular article that appeared in the *Star Weekly*. I will read exactly from the document. In describing it I said:

> There are three stages. The first stage deals with the development of a single administration, the amalgamation of all common administrative functions including standardization of all administrative procedures, records, special services, and the unification of all service establishments to create a single list of all service personnel. In order to ensure the wholehearted co-operation, especially in the initial steps of amalgamation, and to be able to deal expeditiously with the unexpected problems which are bound to arise, it is considered prudent to involve the whole of the Chief of Staff Committee as a policy and co-ordinating group during the first two stages of integration. The Chiefs of Staff would turn over their day to

day business to the Vice Chiefs in order to be able to devote as much time as necessary in dealing with the problems of the first stage of integration.

I foresaw that you would have serious morale problems arising from even the announcement of integration. The best way, I felt, to go and satisfy the services that they were not going to be disbanded or replaced by somebody else was to do it by their present titular head. And also there was another view. I thought that the Service Chiefs would work as a team because none of them would know whether they were the fellow to be selected for the top job, so we were bound to get full co-operation.

The first thing which I foresaw should happen would be the appointment of a Chief of Personnel and a Chief of Logistics and they would take up the positions of a co-ordinating group. In the matter of policy, the co-ordinating group—that is the Chiefs of Staff sitting in permanent session—would be the co-ordinating group, and the day to day business would be done by the Vice Chiefs.

The present collection of administrative committees would be abolished as soon as practical but the committees involving outside representation—that is, outside of Canada—working with the United States and with NATO, would be left as a policy group to take action.

During the implementation of the first stage, the operational and training functions would remain with the services. The Deputy Chiefs of Personnel would continue to function as a Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel, the Adjutant General and the Deputy Air Member for Personnel until the beginning of Phase II. This precaution I felt was necessry in order to make provision for a quick switch back to service control if we got into difficulties.

Now, as a military planner I could not put forward a plan which did not make provision for us immediately going to war. A politician could take the risk of saying: Well, we are not going to have a war for two or three years and therefore we can go along with a disturbed condition. A military man could not make any such recommendations, so I had to work out a plan whereby, if we got into difficulties we could immediately switch back. We still would have the Chiefs there and all we had been doing was getting the organization amalgamated which would break into three pieces very easily.

The second stage would be to appoint what I would call the Commanders in Chief; commanders of the various task forces. My concept of this is a little bit different. I call them Commanders in Chief:

> responsible for all operations and training above wing or individual standard. They would be responsible for all operation of forces at home and abroad. The Commanders in Chief would be the advisers to the Chiefs of Staff and the Minister on all aspects and functions of their respective command, such as, maritime, ground and air defence.

In other words, we would not have between the Minister and the Commanders in the field anybody else except the Chiefs of Staff. In other words, he would not have any need to meet his staff. They would do all the planning, all the advising and everything else. This means that you would have contact with

them almost all the time. I think this is one of the essentials in a close-knit organization.

They would receive operational direction from the Chiefs of Staff and would deal directly with the Chief of Personnel and Logistics on day to day administration. However, on policy of manpower, provision of equipment and composition of task forces, that would be dealt with by higher authority. The task forces would be a functional group composed of elements required to accomplish a particular task accepted by the government.

Now, the final stage: After—and only after—the administration and the logistics were completely set up and working, you would abolish the Chiefs of Staff Committee and then appoint the Chief of Staff of the Armed Services. I was not very good, and I did not feel I could dream up the type of headquarters I would require to handle the task forces until the task forces were set up and I could see how they were working and what was required, beyond the Commanders of those task forces, to control in Ottawa. That is the reason that I started this way. Then the Chiefs of Staff would be abolished and what was left, after the Commander in Chief's organization was set up and working satisfactorily, would have to be grouped together under what I called the General Staff; in other words, exactly the same as what is now the Vice Chief's department in the present setup. Then you would select your Chief and the show would run, but I would not put the Chief in charge until the show was running.

Now, that is the plan which I have been talking about. It is different only in approach to the plan you are bound to here.

Mr. MACALUSO: As I say, the difference is a matter of approach. This is my last remark, General. The final results of your plan and the present plan outlined in Bill No. C-243 are the same.

Mr. FOULKES: Yes, with this reservation: I foresaw no interference with the combat forces at all. I would keep the combat forces with as little change as possible. I could not see how you could very much improve on our combat forces and certainly, until the show was running fairly well, I would want to leave them with the assurance that they were still going to fight the way they were fighting before, and I did not see there was any need to do any unifying or integrating in the combat element.

Mr. MACALUSO: General, in the matter of your last remark, you mentioned last night the interference in combat elements, but I re-read *Hansard* last evening—I do not know whether you had the opportunity—where the Minister stated there was no such interference in those elements. I am just wondering whether you had the opportunity to read that also.

Mr. FOULKES: I re-read it and re-read it again this morning, and outside of not understanding the fourth paragraph on page 1834, I find myself in complete agreement. But I just do not understand that paragraph; if anybody else understands it and can explain it to me I would be very grateful.

Mr. MACALUSO: Thank you, General.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, I have just one question to address to the General about something that arose yesterday. General Foulkes, towards the top of page 11 of your brief you say:

> On page 10828 of *Hansard* it states as follows: The force structure is composed of force units.

And it is at this point that you go on to expand the idea that unification would break a military component down below the level of a battalion and we would find ourselves pulling apart the battalion formation. I was worried about this because it was the first time I had heard his idea put forward, and I looked up *Hansard* last night and have it before me this morning. There is one short paragraph which contains this quote and I want to read it. I am not sure it wholly clears it up, but I think it should be on the record.

> The force structure is comprised of force units which may be used individually or in combination depending on the military tasks to be undertaken. These force units are the infantry companies, the armoured squadrons, the artillery batteries, the engineering squadrons, field ambulances, the air squadrons, warships and the support ships, to mention a few. None of these will be changed in moving to a single service from three separate services. They will continue to be trained and equipped for their particular roles. Moreover, a single service will involve no change in the organization of these force units into formations such as brigades, air wings, or squadrons of ships. On the other hand, the deployment of these units and formations is directed by a single command chain in accordance with the missions assigned, and under a single command responsible for these missions.

Now, I think I could interpret that to mean that there would be no breaking up of the organization below the level of brigades, air wings or squadrons, but I can also see room for the interpretation which you put on it. I wonder whether you have had any opportunity between last night and today to clarify that point or think about it, because if it cannot be cleared while you are before us, I certainly think it is a question that ought to be raised when the Minister and his departmental people return. That is the substance of my only question this morning.

Mr. FOULKES: Mr. Deachman, this is the subject which we were just talking about. I entirely agree that certainly I can live with the latter part of that paragraph. The part that upsets me—that I cannot understand—is the first two sentences. The reason I raised this is that if I do not understand it, having considerable experience, I am afraid a lot of other people who have not had my experience will not understand it as well. I was just concerned because you can read into this that the battalions are going to be broken up and operated as individual companies, and I am sure that would disturb the morale of any battalion.

Again, I may be wrong in that, but if I am wrong I do not understand what it is there for. As I pointed out yesterday, you can see a situation where you might send a few troops off in a ship to do a commando raid or something like that, but that is not the normal. I take this statement of the Minister as a directive of the normal procedure that is going to be followed, and that was the issue I was raising. I entirely agree that these forces will be made up of brigades,

and air wings, and squadrons, but it was just these first two sentences that were puzzling me.

Mr. DEACHMAN: They still continue to puzzle me, sir, and I will raise it when the Minister is before us again.

Mr. FOULKES: May I add one word regarding the purpose of raising these issues. They may appear to be small, but I am sure that you did not bring me here just to have me talk about all the wonderful things that have been done. There are many, like the trade structure, and so on, but those are being said with much more emphasis in other places. I was quite sure what you wanted me to do was to take a critical look at this from the standpoint of the people that have to carry it out, and that is exactly what I am doing. If things are not clear to me I am sure that those a little farther down are going to have the same trouble in understanding it, and it is much easier now to clear it up than after it has become regulation. As I pointed out earlier, the next stage is for the staff to turn this directive into regulations, and once it goes in regulations anybody that does not follow them or disagrees with them is subject to military law. I think we want to be careful that we have the right kind of context and it is fully understood, so that when these are turned into regulations and directions and there is no recourse but to obey them, the matter is quite clear.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I have just one other short question. At the top of page 10 of your brief is a reference to the possibility of a chaotic situation if we developed a force in which every brigade had its own private air to ground support. In reading some background material about these matters I ran across an idea that the Australians are putting forward. In the Viet Nam theatre they find the American operation so big and they are so willing to take risks and to use masses of equipment that the Australians are rather overwhelmed by the whole thing. They are conceiving the idea that they would be far better off if they were to operate a sector of their own with their own complete forces and put in a task force, and make themselves responsible for that area and go it alone.

I just wonder whether or not we, as a much smaller nation than the major powers, if engaged in a major operation would not find ourselves looking at the same problem as the Australians now face with their 5,000-man force in Viet Nam, vis-à-vis the massive forces of the United States.

Mr. FOULKES: There are two things I would like to say about that. One is this: You are talking about Viet Nam where a very small force is working with a very large one. It is rather similar to the Korean operation and there were similar situations in the Korean operation and, as you all know by reading the history, we were not too happy on certain occasions about what the big partner was doing. But I think in a partnership like that where you have to depend on your support—like we did in Korea—on forces all from the United States, there are certain things you have to put up with.

Mind you, I think representations can always be made to the Americans who do not look at things in exactly the same way as we do. I did not like the way the Americans who operated with me in Europe handled their divisions, but they were given to me for a particular operation. They have a different approach to things than we do. In NATO it is quite different. There you have a group of nations but one is not dominating the whole situation; you are partners and we

always talk about equal partnership in NATO. Therefore, I think the tendency, as I mentioned yesterday, should be towards making contributions to the whole.

I realize that this paragraph on air forces might mean something different from my interpretation and certainly, if I had been writing this paragraph, I would have said something like this: "It is the intention of the government, as and when the strike role is no longer suitable to go into the role of ground support and to that end we intend to form a ground support unit to support the NATO forces. We hope that it can be placed in such a position where it will, besides supporting some of the other allies, support the Canadian brigade." If that is the context I have no objection to it, but from the way it is worded the particular thing that struck me was this mass flying.

An hon. MEMBER: What page is it on?

Mr. FOULKES: It is on page 22 of the White Paper. It is particularly the last sentence that made me feel we were going to do something else. It states:

> —Thus, ground and air forces would complement each other in a manner which has not been possible in the past.

Now, while that is nice to say, the troops on the ground do not know whether Canadian aircraft are flying over and supporting them, or U.K. aircraft or something else. All they know is that they are getting air support. I would hate to see us even suggest that we are going to put in air support just for the Canadian brigade. Mind you, when you want air support you want a whole lot; you do not want to have just one squadron. When you need it you want a whole lot—all there is—if you have a serious situation. At other times you do not need any and it should be available to go to support another part of the area.

That is what I was trying to get at in this question of air support; to try to give the full support to the man who is fighting the battle. It might be Canadians doing it one time or somebody else, but that is the air force's function. This gave me the impression that we were trying to say we were going to make sure our Canadians were supported by Canadians but, of course, that may not have been the intention. But again, I suggest that when it gives me that impression it might also give it to somebody else.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Thank you very much, sir.

The CHAIRMAN: Before we move on, may I just say personally how very nice it is—and I am sure the rest of the members of the Committee will agree—to see two old members of the Committee back again—Mr. MacLean and Mr. MacRae. The next questioner is Mr. Churchill.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Do you mean by that you would prefer to have them here rather than some of the new members?

The CHAIRMAN: Never!

Mr. CHURCHILL: General Foulkes, I was very much impressed with your presentation last night and your emphasis on the end result of our defence forces; namely, the combat part. With your experience, your remarks on morale and the combat essentials, I think, carry a great deal of weight with the Committee. The importance of hearing from a person like yourself, sir, is that—as you, I think, mentioned—we are soon going to be running short of men in the services who have had active war experience, and full advantage should

be taken at this stage of massive re-organization of those who have had active war experience, and you are in that category.

Would you mind, for the permanent record, giving us a rundown of your career? The reason I ask is that while we know it ourselves, people will be reading the Committee reports now and in the future and they may wonder who General Foulkes is and whether he is speaking with the voice of authority, or whether he is a sort of an honorary general who had no experience of any weight. Would you mind just giving us a brief outline of your career?

Mr. FOULKES: This is a little bit embarrassing.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I know, but it is important for the record.

Mr. FOULKES: Perhaps I can put it this way: I had the opportunity of commanding 1st Canadian Corps in the latter stages of the fight in Italy and the final stages of the battles in Europe, including the surrender of the 20th German Army to the 1st Canadian Corps in Holland. Immediately after the war I was brought back to be Chief of the General Staff. I was Chief of the General Staff from 1945 until 1951. During that period I had to deal with the demobilization of the overseas forces and the setting up of the new army and also the setting up of the Defence Research Board. Actually, if you read the history of the Defence Research Board you will find that it was the army that did most of the work on organizing the Defence Research Board.

I became Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff as well as CGS in 1947. In 1951, which was the time of the Korean war and the setting up of the forces in NATO, it became apparent that there was room for a full-time job as the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff. The government took the decision that the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff would be a separate job and I was relieved of the responsibilities of commanding the army. I remained as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff until 1959, when I asked to retire. I asked to retire because I had completed 35 years service and I felt if I stayed on any longer it would interfere with other peoples' promotion.

Now that you have given me this opportunity—perhaps you did not realize what you were doing, but you opened the way for me to say anything—I do want to point out at this particular time that I had the opportunity of serving under three prime ministers and five defence ministers and, while we never always agreed, during that whole period of time I was never asked to resign or did I ever feel like putting in my resignation. I feel quite strongly on the point that there is a great need for a genuine—I do not quite know what the right word is—but a co-operative working between the military and the politician. Unless we can do that in a small country like Canada I think we are going to get into a great many difficulties. I see no reason why it should not be possible. It has been possible in the past and I am quite sure were there to be give and take on both sides that we should be able to establish the closest possible relationship between the military and the political leaders.

I do not agree with some of the statements that were made yesterday on this matter. The military give advice; they do not make decisions—they give advice. The government can take as much of that advice as it likes as long as it understands at the same time, that it is taking the military risk. I think a point we have to bear in mind is where one begins and the other ends. Quite often I have found in my career that the military are apt to put a proposition to the Minister or to the government in a very direct military way. They say: "Here is

the problem; here is the military solution." I have found in my career that if I wanted to get something accepted I never just put up one proposition for a "Yes" or "No" answer—because you get "No" so quickly. But if you put up a proposition and you have one, two, or three difficult answers, I have yet to see the politician who will not show how good a chooser he is by picking one of those. So, you kept your scheme in—you may not have got exactly what you were trying to get—but you at least got one of the ones that would suit your purpose. The military are really to blame for a lot of their difficulties by putting things up in that way and not giving enough scope for consideration of the political factors that enter into every Minister's decision. I went much further than you asked me to go.

Mr. CHURCHILL: While we are on that topic, you always conceived it to be your duty to put frankly before the political leaders your views from the military point of view?

Mr. FOULKES: I did not, by any means, always get concurrence. I do recall one time, when I came into a Cabinet Defence meeting, that Mr. St. Laurent —who was, perhaps, the easiest man I have ever worked with—looked down to the other end of the table where I was sitting. He pointed his finger at me and said: "General, how many times do I have to say, No?" So I do not think one should get the impression that—

Mr. CHURCHILL: I will not be able to exhaust my questions in 10 minutes but I would like to concentrate on just one matter at this moment. In some respects, sir, you represent the chief witness for the government on the process of unification and you know we are involved in a little political controversy over this. I gained the impression last night, when you were questioned by Mr. McIntosh, that you did not understand the unification as proposed in the White Paper or in the Minister's speech and yet the press report which I read this morning states that General Foulkes approves of unification. This, of course, is the achievement of the object that the government has in mind, because with your support of unification and the weight of your authority, then the rest of us obviously will have to give ground. Is the report that you approve of unification correct, when you told us last night that you did not understand what the Minister meant by unification.

Mr. FOULKES: First of all, Mr. Churchill, let me correct one thing. I am not a witness for the government.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I know you are not, but the government is relying on you, sir, as I will point out in a moment.

Mr. FOULKES: I do not know anything about that, but I did not want the Minutes to show that I was a witness for the government. I have had no correspondence with the government on this at all; the invitation came from the Chairman of your Committee.

Now with regard to what appeared in the newspaper, I have not studied the newspaper so I do not know what it is, but I can make this quite clear, as I thought I did last night. I am not too clear myself on what is unification and what is integration, but I have no qualms at all in saying, categorically, that I agree with the integration as I understand it, and the integration as I read it in *Hansard*; that is, the forming of a top headquarters and command. But I have raised issues here, the things I did not understand and did not agree with, and

they appear to be only rather minor interpretations of what is meant, for instance, by company groups, how they are going to use the air force and so on. Those are the only reservations I make. I do not think there is any question about the fact that I have supported integration from the beginning; talked about it since 1945, and I have not changed my views on it at all. I have been critical about the way it is being implemented, but that has nothing to do with the principle of integration as I see it today.

Mr. CHURCHILL: When you appeared before our Committee in 1963 you dwelt at some length on integration and I have been reading it over again. At that time you said nothing to us—and yet there was ample opportunity—about a single unified force wth everyone in the same uniform and an amalgamation of the three forces. In fact, your submission then, like your submission last night, emphasized the need for maintaining the combat forces in the role in which they now operate. You made no suggestion to us that the identity of the navy should be destroyed. In fact, in 1963 you put considerable emphasis on increasing the activity of the anti-submarine role. You said nothing to us about destroying the identity of the air force. On the contrary, you were suggesting a modified role for it, and you said nothing to us about destroying the identity of the army.

But the unification proposal that we have in front of us now is precisely the destruction of the identity of the navy, the army and the air force, and everything you said to us last night with regard to morale and from your own war experience—we realize the importance of that—puts greater emphasis, I would think, on retaining the identity of these three services. My understanding of your position has been: integration, yes—but retention of the combat functions of the three services with their identity sustained. Is that a fair summary of your position?

Mr. FOULKES: Not quite. The question of the identity of the forces is one which has never given me too much concern because, as I have repeatedly said, I foresaw the construction of the forces remaining as it is. In other words, I foresaw brigades of infantry, flotillas of ships, and so on. You may be taking away the name of the force, but there are still going to be infantry battalions, and there are still going to be infantry brigades. You would have some difficulties, I think, if you tried to maintain the complete identity in that regard.

I did say, in a glib moment, something about uniforms, but again I suggest to you that in any scheme like this, you may have to change your mind. I feel at this particular stage, where there is a great deal of opposition being raised, perhaps it is not the time to bring in questions of a common uniform, nor do I think a common uniform has any significance whatever. We do not wear a uniform when we fight; we fight in combat clothing and, as I understand it, that is not going to change, and if it is I do not know why. We do not fight any more in uniform, we fight in combat clothing, and that is all that really interests me. What a man walks out in really does not matter.

I know you will remember that during the war the Highlander always wanted to wear his kilt, and when we turned a former Highland Regiment into an anti-aircraft unit, they still wanted to wear the kilt, and Harry Crerar almost had a cat fit—fancy a gunner in a kilt! In order to maintain its morale it still kept its kilt—it liked its kilt. Now, if a highlander will fight better in a kilt, as far as I am concerned give him a kilt or give him anything else. It seems to me

that these are the kinds of things that do not add to our efficiency but annoy people a bit, and I think we should try to avoid them at this particular time.

Now, you might reach a stage 20 years from now when everyone would say that they wanted to have a common uniform, but for my money it is not an issue that is worth while upsetting people about, because it does not affect their fighting efficiency one iota.

Mr. CHURCHILL: When you say that it is not an issue that is worth while, it is not an issue that is worth while from the standpoint of higher command or government, but it is an issue that is recognized as being important to the individual—the man that you so emphasized last night, the individual soldier, sailor or the airman—for his morale. Let the highlander have his kilt; it satisfies him. Let the airman have his light blue uniform.

Mr. FOULKES: That is what I said, but apparently I did not get it across.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I was saying, sir, that without your support the people who are propounding this idea of a single unified service would not have much to go on. Your words, which you said in a loose moment you permitted the Toronto *Star* to write up, have been imperishably recorded in *Hansard*, sir, on January 31, 1967 and you must give full credit to Mr. Jim McNulty. If he were serving in the forces you could mention him in despatches, because he has recorded on almost three pages of *Hansard* the complete record of the Toronto *Star* weekly of October 14, 1961. His supporters got a great deal of satisfaction out of this paragraph and I quote:

> The problem can only be solved by complete unification of the three services, with one chief of staff, one chain of command, one ladder of promotion and one uniform.

So, I take it that you are not quite so impressed at this moment with that statement which was extracted, I suppose, from your document of 1961?

Mr. FOULKES: I just want to read to you what I said about uniforms in the document of 1961. I said:

> There is one aspect of this problem which remains unsolved and that is the question of a single service uniform. However, this omission is perhaps in line with other matters of national identity such as the national flag and so on and I presume will be decided some time.

I did not make any strong recommendations. As I have pointed out, this is not a matter of grave import in the integration scheme and it has always been my concept that if it were going to upset someone, I certainly would not put it into effect. I think one has to look at these schemes. One makes an outline plan—the general policy statement—and then you start to work it out and if something becomes a bit difficult, then surely you can adjust your plan. And certainly, under the present conditions, I would not have recommended a change in uniform or anything else at this stage.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Let us say that with the benefit of your long experience, sir, as a serving soldier, a commander and staff man at headquarters, you have shown flexibility. I have many other questions, Mr. Chairman, but I will have to defer to someone else.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh, you are next.

Mr. McINTOSH: General, I want to pursue Mr. Churchill's interpretation of what was in the paper this morning. I took it for granted last night that you made an admission that you were somewhat confused between the two terms, integration and unification, and I would like to get it perfectly clear. There may be reason for this confusion; it may be the Minister's paper, or it may be that the term "unification" is used in the British forces and other forces where we have been using it as "integration." I think that we in the opposition have made it clear that we agree to a certain amount of integration, but this word "unification" is a mysterious word to us. We do not know what it means and actually I would say that you are making an assumption that there is going to be no change in the combat forces and all your remarks are based on that premise. Now, I would agree with you but, as you said yourself, we are politicians, and we have to be very careful what is put into these acts.

Now, I would refer you to the Minister's speech under the heading; Continuation of Units and Elements. He goes on at great length here to tell you that there will be no change in this, and no change in that, just perhaps a little change in the name. But the very last sentence is what concerns us and this is of deep concern to us. We do not know what it means and it makes us very suspicious. The last sentence reads that there be no change whatsoever, and I paraphrase the rest of the paragraph:

—until the force structure within the unified force is developed.

What does he mean by that? That is what we are afraid of in unification. Have you got that sentence there?

Mr. FOULKES: Yes, but I am afraid, Mr. McIntosh, that I am not one who can interpret what the Minister means. I think this is a question that you should put to him when he comes on the stand. I took it that this paragraph meant that we were going to have little change in—as you say—the combat element of the forces.

Mr. McINTOSH: We put this question to the Minister and to everyone we could think of and we have not had a satisfactory answer, and that is what leads us to believe that the Minister has dreamed up this term "unification" and he is going to try to fit the forces into something afterwards. We are concerned about our combat troops.

I will leave that and give you an idea of what our concern is about this, even with regard to what you say about integration and unification. I would say that perhaps the press is giving a wrong impression of your evidence, because I do not personally believe that you are in favour of unification. You state that time and time again. You are in favour of integration.

In a Canadian press release you made reference to the discharge of 500 newly trained pilots. You said that this was a grave error and it was a waste of $100 million. Would you care to elaborate on that statement?

Mr. FOULKES: I think, perhaps, while you read that statement you also should have read the retraction I made of that statement. I had wrong information about these pilots and I should have checked it. I did not take the trouble to check it—being in Victoria I had no way of checking it—and I published a retraction and an apology two days later.

Mr. McINTOSH: All right, that is a fair answer to that.

Also in your statement you said on page 7:

> As you are all aware Canada's offer to provide combat troops in Egypt was turned down.

Now could you tell us whether you have any information of why these combat troops were turned down in Egypt?

Mr. FOULKES: If you remember the circumstances of the Suez difficulty, Mr. Pearson at that time, as you know, worked out a plan to put in a force with the UN. It was the first real experiment with the UN and at the time we had a stand-by battalion ready to go. However, the stand-by battalion was not accepted. I have no information as to why the Egyptian government would not accept it. I think I stated publicly that my own view was we selected the wrong unit. Here the Egyptians and the British were having a tangle and we were not smart enough: we selected a unit with the name "Queen's Own" which is pretty hard to swallow. I think this had just about as much to do with it as anything else.

Mr. MCINTOSH: It was the name "Queen's Own?"

Mr. FOULKES: Yes, if we had used the Royal 22nd or something—perhaps the RCR—I do not think we would have had the same problem. However, you can imagine the reaction in Egypt, having trouble with the British and then having to accept the mediation forces, one of them known as the Queen's Own.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Would it have anything to do with flying the Red Ensign at that time?

Mr. FOULKES: Oh, I would not think so.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Would it have anything to do with the colour of the uniform at that time which was khaki?

Mr. FOULKES: Well, the troops we did send still wore khaki. We sent administrative troops. What happened, as you know, was that they said they did not want a battalion but they would like us to send administrative troops, so we organized an administrative force and, as you know, we sent it, complete with its equipment, in the *Magnificent*.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You said you thought the reason was because the name of the unit was the Queen's Own.

Mr. FOULKES: They said they did not want combat troops so we did not, therefore, send any combat troops.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Would it not also follow, then, that because the British had khaki uniforms and the Canadia forces had khaki uniforms, they did not want that likeness in the area?

Mr. FOULKES: Let me suggest, Mr. McIntosh, that I do not know of a country, except perhaps in South America, where the ground forces do not wear a khaki uniform. It is almost universal. I do not think that had anything to do with it.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well the people you fought against in the Second World War did not wear khaki?

Mr. FOULKES: No, no; they had grey.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You said this morning, also, that all combat uniforms were the same. I just want to point out they are not actually all the same.

Mr. FOULKES: I was referring to the combat clothing the forces have now in which I understand there is to be no change. That is what I meant. Perhaps I used to wrong word when I said the "same".

Mr. MCINTOSH: Where do you get the understanding, General, that there is going to be no change in that uniform? Is that laid down any place as what the Minister has said?

Mr. FOULKES: I am sure the Minister has made a reference to the fact that the operational uniforms are not to be changed. As a matter of fact, I think it is in his speech somewhere. But I do have a definite recollection of reading it.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I would like to point out to you again, General, that the Minister has said a great deal in his speech but our interpretation of it is, apparently, different from someone else's interpretation, and we can point out, as well as the other side can point out, the Minister has said this and we can point out in his speech where he contradicted what is brought up. It is a yes and no speech. He can point to any part of his speech and say: Yes, I did say that and I did say this.

In the paragraph I just referred to he said there is going to be no change in the forces whatsoever, but again I say he ends up: "until the force structure within the unified force is developed," which would lead you to believe there is going to be a change sometime; or this would lead me to believe so.

Mr. FOULKES: Again, I say that is a matter you should put to the Minister.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Right, I agree with you. Now, at the top of page eight, you make this statement:

> This proposal regarding the change of emphasis away from NATO, gives the impression that we are departing from a policy of interdependence inclining towards a policy of self-conained national forces.

Further down on the same page after referring to a statement contained on page 10835 of *Hansard* you say:

> If this statement really means what it says—

You are having the same difficulty we are having with the minister's speech.

> —it would take away from the Supreme Commanders, NORAD and the UN the responsibilities of strategic and operational planning of the various Canadian contributions to their respective commands. How the unified headquarters could do this is completely beyond me.

Would these two statements indicate to you that it is Canada's intention to opt out of any of our alliances?

Mr. FOULKES: No. Perhaps I am a bit allergic to military people using phrases like, change of emphasis. That may be all right on the political side but military people do not do things in half measures. If we are going to provide forces in Europe then we provide forces in Europe. There is no question of how much emphasis. You are not going to do just half of your job. The statement I was referring to was made by Air Marshal Sharp; that there was a change of emphasis. To me, that means a slowing down or not doing the job so well. Now if it does happen that the position in NATO is such it is agreed among the partners that the forces there can be whittled down, well and good. But that is a decision which is normally taken as an alliance decision. But a military suggestion that

we are not going to put as much emphasis on it as we did before, that we are going to let it slip a bit, is not, it seems to me, a thing the military should do. Surely we should fulfil this commitment, whatever it is, or cut the commitment down in agreement with our NATO partners. But, whatever we do, do it well. This seems to me to be suggesting we are going to let it slip a bit and put more emphasis, as he says, on this other role which I must say I do not understand.

Mr. McINTOSH: You are saying, then, that Air Marshal Sharp's presentation to this Committee is not clear as far as you are concerned?

Mr. FOULKES: Not this particular bit of it.

Mr. McINTOSH: Is that what led you to say further down on that page:

I hope this is only an error and not notice of an intention.

Mr. FOULKES: No, that is not referring to Air Marshal Sharp's statement; that refers to a statement which appeared in *Hansard*. It appeared in *Hansard* on page 10835 at the bottom of the page. It has to do with management and strategical planning. Again, I emphasize that I was looking at the NATO problem here. This is strategic and operational planning; it is not a Canadian function with regard to the forces that are placed under NATO which are the bulk of our forces. I was hoping that this was not some kind of an idea that we were going to try to tell the people in NATO how to do their strategic and operational planning. I hope that was not the case. We are part of the alliance and contribute towards the strategic concept. We extend our views on it but we do not do it. That is done collectively. I was just wondering, since there has been emphasis on a tendency to have national organized forces, whether this was some other kind of it. It can be read that we participate in the strategic and operational planning. It was not quite clear to me. But, as long as there is no intention of our not accepting strategic and operational planning from the Supreme Allied Commanders I am quite happy. But again, this is a matter I am sure the Minister will explain when he makes his speech because I have raised it.

Mr. McINTOSH: From your remarks I would take it that you had some doubt when you used the words "I was hoping" and "I was wondering". Now, has the situation been clarified since your recent visit to Ottawa, listening in on the Committee proceedings, and so on? Do you still have that doubt? Are you still hoping, are you still wondering?

Mr. FOULKES: You mean about strategic and operational—

Mr. McINTOSH: Well there are two points there that we raised. You said: "I hope this is only an error" and then you also said, "If this statement really means what it says" and two different points were brought out in the brief that you had doubts about. Now, have they been clarified since you have been down here?

Mr. FOULKES: Yes, I am quite prepared to look at it this way; that this strategic and operational planning put in here was really more rhetoric than anything else.

Mr. McINTOSH: Could I ask you what convinced you, because this is what we are looking for ourselves. A great deal of weight is going to be put on your testimony by the public of Canada and we are going to take a second look at all the remarks you have made here because we want to be convinced. We want

the assurances that you apparently have received now, and how are we going to get them? What convinced you?

Mr. FOULKES: First of all let me say that I feel you over-emphasize my importance to this Committee.

Mr. MCINTOSH: This is my opinion, General, so I do not over-emphasize that.

Mr. FOULKES: What I am trying to do is to point out things that are not clear to me with the purpose of making sure that this Committee comes up with the best possible solution to this problem. As I pointed out in my opening remarks, I did not expect to be called before the Committee. I had about 24 hours after I got these papers to prepare a critique on them. Therefore, I have not been able to take every phrase and examine it with great care. But, I pointed out to the Committee the things that have not been clear to me, because they may not be clear to you and I am sure that when you question the Minister you can get clarification of what is meant by this because this is the Minister's statement. I do not think anybody else but the Minister can interpret this.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I did not want an excuse, General, I wanted something concrete that I could work on when I fulfil my responsibility as a member of parliament who is charged with the responsibility of voting for or against this bill. You, as a military expert for whom I have a regard, are going to throw a lot of weight on what I do, regardless of what my colleague over here says.

Mr. FOULKES: I am still unclear on the question you want to put to me.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Let me put the first question, then. Do you think unification is good for the armed forces?

Mr. FOULKES: Yes, that is, on the understanding, as I have explained my view, that I cannot tell the difference between unification and integration.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I will not pursue that. On page 9, General, you say:

> Parcelling out the air facilities in penny packets is most wasteful and creates complete chaos in the air over the battle field...

I think it is a maxim of military training that no commander, regardless of what level, is to dissipate his forces in small packets. My thought on this is: Is Canada trying to opt out of the alliances it already has, for another purpose, or are we spreading our forces too thin over what we intend to do?

Mr. FOULKES: Well, I have already spoken about that particular paragraph in answer to a question by Mr. Deachman, but I can repeat it. You will recall that I emphasized the fact that Canada makes contributions to NATO. I am repeating it because I am dead sure that we should continue this kind of support for NATO. Our recent contribution was an air division. That air division, originally, was an air defence division. When these troops were put into NATO, I do recall the direction we got from the government of the day was that we should make our contribution to this appear to be defensive and not offensive.

When the air defence role became redundant and General Norstadt suggested a strike role, this was not accepted with very much enthusiasm by the St. Laurent administration. They did not like the idea that we were leaving what we had said we would do—defence of Europe. We were looking now as if we were going to strike. They were making quite a difference of it. Therefore, there was

no great enthusiasm to take over the strike role, I can assure you. But, as this was what the Supreme Allied Commander wanted, both governments—the Conservative government and the Liberal government—agreed to provide it. Now, this role is going to be phased out and the government has made a decision to change the role. This does not say that in words, but surely a decision must have been made or we would not have ordered the aircraft. So the decision has been made—let us put it this way—to replace the strike role with a ground support role which is a very worthy thing to do. It suits our purpose because we get out of the nuclear business which is not fully supported in Canada.

Mr. MACALUSO: Was that Mr. St. Laurent or Mr. Diefenbaker?

Mr. FOULKES: Who?

Mr. MACALUSO: You just mentioned Mr. St. Laurent.

Mr. FOULKES: You see, this question of changing the role came up before the Liberal government was defeated. It was under study but no decision was taken. I am just pointing out that it was not received at that time with great enthusiasm. The idea of a strike role with nuclear weapons was not considered the kind of thing the government had in mind in supporting the alliance. The alliance was always put up, as you know, as a defensive organization and it looked pretty hard to explain being defensive when you are going to throw atomic bombs on them. That is the point I was trying to make.

Now I see no difficulty in this. The difficulty I saw in using words like "squadrons will be stationed" and so on, which gave me the impression that we were not going to just transfer the air division from the role of strike to the role of ground support and station it in Europe wherever it could be arranged with Supreme Allied Commander. This looked to me as if there were some idea of doing it in a different way of just spacing a couple of squadrons. Now, that again may be a wrong interpretation of this paragraph. If the interpretation of the facts you put to the Minister is that we are going to form a close support air division and that it is going to be put into Europe—and we hope it is going to be put in a position where it can support our own forces—well and good. But, this gave me the impression, especially the last sentence, that our concern was not in continuing to put as much support behind NATO as possible, but to get Canadian aircraft supporting Canadian troops, which I thought was not as worthy an object as putting the best possible contribution from Canada to Europe for aiding the deterrent.

Mr. MCINTOSH: General, when you started you said the purpose of NATO and Canadian national defence policy then was a defensive one. Is that not the basis of all national defence policies of all countries?

Mr. FOULKES: That is right.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Were you suggesting, then, that there is an inference here that the role of Canada could be changed to an offensive one?

Mr. FOULKES: No, I was just raising the issue that on the political side they did not like the idea. Before, we had an air defence role and now it is a strike role. It did not fit too well—politically, not militarily. It is a political question.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I have one last question. On page 12 you speak of an evil genius of administration. Do you feel that Bill No. C-243 is putting too much emphasis on administration at the sacrifice of the combat troops?

Mr. FOULKES: I raised this issue because, in going through the papers, reading *Hansard* and what Air Marshal Reyno said to you, I did not find much —or any—reference to the steps being taken for the combat troops. There is a great deal in there on trade structure, and so on, which is all well. But I was wondering whether, in this business of trying to make sure we have the best trade structure and best arrangements for specialists, and so on, we were not forgetting about the man that really counts—the man who fights the battle. This is the reason I was raising this issue. It is a thing that happens all the time, if you do not watch it, especially in a big headquarters, because you get absorbed in the particular problem of looking after tradesmen specialists, creating careers, and so on, but there still is no use having the best headquarters in the world unless you have the fighting troops able to fight. This was the point I was trying to make.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Thank you general, that is what we were wondering about.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): General, it seems to me that one of the difficulties of the Committee, and one of the difficulties of understanding this whole problem all the way through, is the need for definition of the terms, unification and integration. You will have to excuse me; I am not as familiar as I should be with your proposed reorganization that you term unification. Bud did I understand you correctly when you said that in your plan you visualized the combat troops of the three forces could continue to exist pretty much as they are now, and that the question of uniforms and rank structure—whether you call a man a colonel or a group captain or a captain—is not the important matter? Have I understood you correctly?

Mr. FOULKES: Yes. Again, let me use an example. In Maritime Command, for instance, which is the easiest one to look at, I foresaw the commander of Maritime Command having under his command all the navy forces and a part of the present air forces. They would become a Maritime Command and the commander would be responsible for everything that goes on in that command —everything.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): Exactly.

Mr. FOULKES: In other words, the navy may have lost its CNS at the top but it still has a father in Maritime Command because it has all the navy there, and so on. What you call them is, in my view, rather academic. The changing of names of ranks, I do not think is important. If it upsets somebody, then let us not do it, because the rank of a fellow or what he has on his shoulders or his sleeves has nothing to do with his efficiency in battle. Therefore, in my view, it is not a matter that is urgent or really affects carrying out our job. I certainly would relegate those kinds of things down to a pretty, low priority. If it disturbs somebody I certainly would not have gone ahead with it.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): Mr. Chairman, on the basis of that your plan, in the terminology we have been exposed to, is not unification but integration and we have already passed that stage pretty well. The act that was passed some time ago brought into existence a plan roughly comparable to that which you propose. But what we are concerned with now, it seems to me, is a further step which has been called unification as delineated in Bill No. C-243. It is this matter

that I am chiefly concerned with at the present time. For example, Bill No. C-243, page 2, clause 2, reads:

> The Canadian forces are the armed forces of Her Majesty raised by Canada and consist of one Service called the Canadian Armed Forces.

I visualize this as the complete obliteration of the three arms of the services as we knew them in the past and the substitution therefor of one force, presumably wearing the same uniform if it is going to be one force, and having one rank structure throughout although there may be specialists in various branches of it who, because of their special training, may have to remain in that special branch. Now, I am concerned with the implications of this. I will ask you a hypothetical question: If you were still the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, how could you interpret that clause? How would you interpret the implications of this bill to the armed services?

Mr. FOULKES: I do not know how much more I can say on this particular subject. My reading of the paragraph you were referring to meant that there was going to be no change in the groupings of what we now call the army, navy and air force and that they would be formed into task forces and perform their jobs as they had been doing before. I can well see that you do not want to leave them under the names of army, navy and air force or you are going to have the same old problems that induced us to go into integration, and that was, we wanted to have enough flexibility to move people from one sector to another if this was necessary.

I think I gave you an example of where we had radar specialists in 1963 who were surplus in the army and we could not move them into the air force, who were training people for this same purpose, because the services could not agree. Now, I think you have to have flexibility to move specialists and so on, and so give them better career opportunities and also save on training expenses. Now, if you are going to do that you cannot stick to a rigid service structure. This concerns specialists and people of that type.

But when it comes to infantry battalions, and so on, I must insist that I see no sense in it, and I do not think the paper intends that these are to be changed at all. We will have brigades of infantry still commanded by a brigadier, and so on. Their functions and operations will be exactly the same.

Mr. MACLEAN *(Queens)*: I wish that I could have the same faith in the results of the bill as you have. My mind would be much more at ease if that were the case. Up to this time when there where three separate services, the ceilings and strengths of these services were usually considered separately. In other words, there was a mix of the defence dollar with respect to the three services and how much was going to be expended on each. But now, quoting page 2 of the bill, under "Organization", it says:

> The Canadian Forces shall consist of such units and other elements as are from time to time organized by or under the authority of the Minister.

Under this bill, if it becomes an act, it would seem to me that the Minister would have the authority, on his own to vary the balance or even to completely phase out what we now consider to be one of the three services.

Mr. FOULKES: Well, the Minister may have the authority but as long as he has to carry out the tasks which are laid down in this paper, he could not

possibly do it. For instance, you could not phase out the air force and still keep up the maritime role. You could not phase out the air force and still carry on the air defence role. Now, as far as I recall, the Minister or Governor in Council has always had the authority to raise or disband units. As I pointed out yesterday, I was very anxious to get a minister to disband an infantry brigade which was quite within his authority. I see no real concern there, because you have the task that has to be fulfilled and a minister responsible for fulfilling those tasks agreed to by the government, and to provide the forces to do it. I do not see any concern there.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, I have a quick supplementary question.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, Mr. Andras, we have not got to the end of our list.

Mr. ANDRAS: Well, it is related to this. Would Mr. MacLean permit me?

General, I have the feeling that some slight confusion may have been created this morning with regard to your position. Is it correct to say that you have for many years favoured the unification—or amalgamation, if you prefer the word—of the three services into a single service with a single chief?

Mr. FOULKES: In that broad outline, yes.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Well Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr. Churchill?

Mr. ANDRAS: You still believe in that concept of a single service?

The CHAIRMAN: Order, please.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, I raise a point of order here. This is really a loaded question. Combining the two terms, unification and integration, and getting the General to say, yes, is to my mind a propaganda effort. Let us restrict these terms.

The CHAIRMAN: In view of the fact that the bells are ringing and this opens up a matter which probably could not be clarified in the time that is available to us, I ask that we temporarily end the questioning now. Mr. MacLean still has some questions and, no doubt others, and also Mr. Nugent. This is the situation, gentlemen, and perhaps we could clarify it before we return to the House. Mr. Patrick, who has been asked to attend, is waiting and he has a paper which I understand from his secretary will take about half an hour. We have nothing on Monday; we have nothing this afternoon; we have a meeting of the Steering Committee today. What is your pleasure? General Foulkes has a wish to return to Victoria this evening, one which I can understand, and he is available for further questioning this afternoon. Is that not correct, sir?

Mr. FOULKES: Until four o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN: Would you agree to meeting some time after lunch to continue with this? There is one further matter. Since I came in this morning I received a letter from Admiral Welland addressed to the Chairman of the Standing Committee on National Defence dated 17 February, and I would like to have it tabled.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, on a point of privilege. If I understand you correctly, you have a letter from Admiral Welland with respect to the matters raised yesterday. Is that correct?

The CHAIRMAN: That is, in fact, what it is.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Well if this is going to be tabled, I think it would be my—

The CHAIRMAN: Well, I can read it.

Mr. DEACHMAN: —privilege to have it read before there is a motion to table it.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, it is fairly short and I will read it to you. It is addressed to the Chairman, dated 17 February:

> Dear Sir,
>
> The Secretary of your Committee telephoned me yesterday forenoon, asking if I would attend the session then sitting. I was not aware until that time that I would be invited, and declined.
>
> I am now aware that my presence was considered desirable by some members, owing to a discussion that developed around a statement made on page 17 of Admiral Landymore brief to your Committee: "Mr. Deachman, of your Committee also knew of the retirements for he and Mr. Groos called on Admiral Welland to get confirmation of what I had told them." The following may help to clarify the matter.
>
> It is correct that Mr. Deachman and Mr. Groos called on me on the evening of the 12th of July. I recall the gist of the conversation well, because at that time it was not entirely clear to me whether I would be retired or not. Because of this I volunteered no information on my private affairs, nor on those of any other person. Neither of my visitors asked me about myself or my intentions. The subject of retirements did not come up.
>
> Yours truly,
> Robert Welland,
> Rear Admiral.

Have I your permission to table this?

Mr. DEACHMAN: That satisfies my point of privilege and on the questions raised yesterday. I am prepared to drop the point of privilege which could have been settled yesterday had Admiral Landymore been willing to phone Admiral Welland when I gave him the opportunity. Thank you for your efforts.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, Admiral Landymore was being questioned at the time.

Gentlemen, we shall adjourn until two-thirty this afternoon.

AFTERNOON SITTING

FRIDAY, February 17, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I see a quorum.

When we adjourned this morning Mr. MacLean was asking some questions of the witness, General Foulkes, so I will continue now with Mr. MacLean.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): As I recall, the last question I asked was a question concerning the keeping of a proper balance between the various armed forces functions. I have a very high regard for the general's professional experience in

this field and I do not think there is any substitute for experience, but he may consider this outside his field and if it is an unfair question I will not pursue it.

At the present time, sir, do you consider that we are fulfilling all our commitments or that we have the facilities to fulfil all our commitments? I am thinking especially with regard to our contribution to NATO and SACLANT and also whether we have the capability to establish, from the military point of view, our sovereignty properly over our coastal waters, taking into consideration that it is the policy of the government to declare large bodies of water such as, the Gulf of St. Lawrence, Hecate Strait, Dixon Entrance and some others as national waters.

Mr. FOULKES: As far as I can see, we are fulfilling out NATO commitments. As I pointed out before, NATO commitments vary and there is a procedure in NATO whereby governments can vary their commitments by agreement. As I mentioned this morning, we changed over from a role of air defence to a strike role and the indications are that we are going from a strike role into a role of ground support. In NATO that is the accepted business of negotiating with the supreme allied commanders when you want to make changes, and normally the council are told and that is the way it is worked. As I pointed out, in Canada's position we have plenty of room for flexibility because we are only making contributions. Unlike the Belgians, the Dutch or the Germans, we do not have a border to defend and therefore, it seems to me, we are living up to our commitments there.

As to the other point you raised with regard to the maritime field, if you ask a military man whether he has enough he will always say he has not; we always could get along with a great deal more than we have. I have never seen a military man yet who has ever been satisfied. What we want to make sure of is that within the funds that parliament provides we are making the best possible use of them. Whether we should be doing more in the maritime field and less somewhere else is a question on which I think only the maritime commander could make representations; I certainly could not because I have not been in touch with that matter for the last five or six years.

I have always felt, however, that the maritime role is a very important and good one for Canada because we operate from our own coast, we do not have to go overseas to do it. We are able to operate from our own ports and we are not only contributing to the deterrent, we are also defending our own coast line. Furthermore, it is perhaps one of the closest associations with our bigger ally, the United States, and with that close affiliation with the United States we have access to a great deal of the work being done by the United States in the maritime field and the research field, and so on, and I think this is a very, very important field. I have felt—not because I have been living in British Columbia—that very shortly we are going to have to take another look at how much we are doing on that coast because that again, depending on what happens in China, is going to be quite a problem. Let me give you an example. If it so happens that we get a détente in Europe and we are able to withdraw some of our forces, or do it a little differently so that we are saving money there, there is still lots of room for putting more into the maritime role. I am sure that any of you who have been briefed by SACLANT are aware of the fact that they think they need a great deal more than they have at the present time.

Mr. MacLean (*Queens*): Naturally in deciding in which field you are going to expend your resources you have to weigh the various propositions that are advocated by those military experts who perhaps naturally tend to put forward the aspects of it in which they are most interested. Now, do you feel there will be in the new organization an adequate channel for presenting the demands of Maritime Command, for example, to the decision-making level, whereas they may not be an expert or a specialist in that field directly in the policy-making role?

Mr. Foulkes: Mr. MacLean, you remember this morning when I was talking about how I would like to see these organized I said that the Maritime commander would be the adviser to the Chief of the Defence Staff and to the Minister on all Maritime matters, and I am fairly sure that this is what is going to happen. In that way he would put his case forward, which would be considered along with the case put by Mobile Command, Air Defence Command, and so on, to be weighed in the picture. It seems to me that he is the one to put forward those views and if we give him the proper status so that he can really put forward his views strongly, then I see no difficulty there at all. As a matter of fact, I see a decided improvement because you would have the man right on the spot putting the case instead of the man on the spot having to put a case to his own boss, and then he having to put it to the chiefs of staff. I think this should be an improvement.

Mr. MacLean (*Queens*): At the present time there is only one link between the services and the Minister.

Mr. Foulkes: Yes, but the head of that link has also just arranged to have what we call an armed forces council, into which these people are going to be brought. I view this armed forces council—I may not be right about this—not only as a means of getting information but as a means of giving information to the Chief of Staff and the Minister on the conditions and requirements of the Maritime Command.

Mr. MacLean (*Queens*): This leads me to another question. This morning you were speaking of the advice given to the civilian head of the Department of National Defence, and that naturally you could not expect acceptance of your recommendation at that time there was a lack of civilian control of the armed services. There has been loose talk to the effect that the taxpayers have built an automatic juggernaut over which they no longer have sufficient control, and that the senior officers have set up their own empire and are chiefly concerned with continuing it. Now, knowing a large number of senior officers in the services, I consider that kind of criticism very unfair and not at all consistent with the facts.

Mr. Foulkes: Certainly not in my experience. As I mentioned this morning, I worked under five defence ministers and I never found one that I could push around, I can tell you that—not that there was any desire to push them around—but certainly they were determined characters who could look after themselves. I never saw any suggestion whatever that the Canadian officer corps was not completely loyal throughout. As you know, this idea of a revolt was tried out at the end of the war by Mr. King when he was having a little trouble with his conscription issue. He rather gathered up this idea that there was a generals' revolt. If you read what Professor McGregor has written about this you

will find that in his research into this problem there was no such thing as a revolt of the generals and this does not sit well in our Canadian life at all. I am sure you will all agree that Canada is in no way a banana republic that is in any real danger of the military ever taking it over.

Mr. MacLean (*Queens*): I agree with that point of view entirely. During the period that you were chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, or at any other time as far as that is concerned, did you feel that there was a likelihood that certain decisions would be so unpalatable to senior officers that they would accept retirement in considerable numbers rather than continue, if they had this choice. In effect, would you consider it a normal situation where this would happen?

Mr. Foulkes: As you know and as I pointed out before, we had real differences at the time of the Arrow. I do not know of any experience I have gone through in my career that was more exasperating than the Arrow situation because there was no really good answer to the problem. Certainly there were many views expressed on both the political side and the military side that were miles apart. Cool heads were kept, and it was realized that this was a tough decision not only for the military, but a tough decision for the government. We had to accept that fact. We knew very well that if we insisted on going ahead with the Arrow there would be no funds for anything else unless the defence budget was pushed up and in a situation such as this question of whether the military decided to quit or not it always seemed to me that the place of the chief was to sit there, because they had to sell this to their troops and get this thing understood. I remember we had a bit of a time with the Chief of the Air Staff at that time, but that was to be expected because this again was something that was hurting his service.

Mr. MacLean (*Queens*): I just have one more question. On the other side of the coin, do you think, sir, there is a danger that a political head in the Department of Defence—which, of course, is normal in our system—can be in a position where he is too vulnerable to perhaps completely invalid but popular notions of public opinion and where the popular thing for him to do would be to insist on some course of action that might be, from a military point of view, completely unsound. Do you think that there would be any validity in perhaps doing something to protect the Minister from these winds that blow—political winds, if you like, in the broader sense of the term—that might force him, in a case of self-preservation, to press something that is not, from a military standpoint, particularly sound? Might it be advantageous to recruit the Minister of National Defence from a more protected area where he would not be dependent on getting elected in the next election, for example, and would it perhaps be advisable to recruit the Minister of National Defence from the Senate rather than from the House of Commons?

Mr. Foulkes: Of course, what you are really suggesting is that in Canada there should be a system similar to what they have in the United States, where the ministers who are appointed are not members of the legislative body. However, this is a matter that I suggest is out of my province. I am sure any suggestion from me about re-organizing the government of Canada would not be too acceptable.

Mr. MacLean (*Queens*): I would not go that far. My suggestion would be perfectly possible under present conditions. I am finished.

Mr. NUGENT: General I do not pretend to be a military expert and perhaps I am a little slow in understanding some of these finer distinctions, but I wonder if you would see if I am right in my understanding of the military situation. The Minister has said, and I believe you also said the same thing, that even in a unified force the naval people would be fighting as naval units and the army as army units and the air force as air units, and I wonder if you could tell me what economy will be achieved for the Canadian taxpayer by having them as one unified force although fighting in the same way, as distinct from having them as separate forces with unified command?

Mr. FOULKES: I am not in a position to comment on savings because that can only be done by the people who plan this. I could not give you an answer to whether you are going to save any money or not; that is really outside my province. I have not been in touch with it that closely.

Mr. NUGENT: Then, sir, could you give me some illustrations of how this might result in increased efficiency?

Mr. FOULKES: That is, increased efficiency with regard to the forces being under one—

Mr. NUGENT: Being a unified force rather than having a unified command structure. This is what I understand by integration.

Mr. FOULKES: Where the forces would be more efficient.

Mr. NUGENT: Yes, some illustration of the way in which we would get more efficiency, because we now have one force instead of three separate forces.

Mr. FOULKES: I did not think that this was based on the question of making our combat forces more efficient. I think I said this morning that I thought our combat forces were just about as efficient as you could make them, and no matter where they have operated, whether it was in Korea or whether it was in the Gaza Strip or whether it was in Cyprus, or anywhere else, their conduct in operations has been pretty well beyond reproach. As I said earlier I have always looked at this integration business as a system of finding more money, and not necessarily that our forces will be more efficient if they did this. I will admit there will be a greater flexibility in regard to tradesmen and specialists, and so on, who can be moved from one service to the other on promotion, or something like that, or if there is a shortage, and I suppose you can say that will add to the efficiency because it will mean that your training stream will be much less, but I would not say that our combat forces are going to be altered at all by either one or the other.

Mr. NUGENT: This is getting down to where Admiral Landymore had some difficulty with this problem of unification. As I understood his argument, it was simply that he was principally opposed to unification, because of the effect on morale and that the Navy, of course, would take serious objection to the Navy disappearing as a service and to the uniform disappearing. I believe your position on the uniform was—and correct me if I received the wrong impression from your testimony—that it should not matter what uniform they fight in, and as it is not an essential part, why bother to do it if it is going to upset people. Is that about right?

Mr. FOULKES: I think that is pretty well what I said.

Mr. NUGENT: So far there is no real difference between your approach and that of Admiral Landymore. It has been a few years since you were out so that you would not be able to comment as to how effective some of the major integration steps have been, but would you agree with Admiral Landymore's general stand that he cannot approve of unification because he can find neither increased economy, nor increased efficiency in unification as distinct from unified command with separate fighting forces.

Mr. FOULKES: I think that is Admiral Landymore's opinion and, as I have not sat through his evidence and heard the arguments, I am not really in a position to challenge his statements at all. I was not here.

Mr. NUGENT: General, would you comment on this statement of his, which is the general argument that usually results when you are trying to discuss some of the monetary or other advantages of the question of unification. He said:

> Under questioning, the proponents of unification invariably fall back on the advantages of integration to support their stand.

Would you agree that that is a fair summary of the situation that exists today?

Mr. FOULKES: As I said before, I am not too clear on where integration stops and unification begins. It has always been a bit of a puzzle to me.

Mr. NUGENT: So, that probably gives a little strength to the convention that in trying to decide the pure question of unification we first find it too hard to get that concept strained of the impurity of integration.

Mr. FOULKES: You can have it that way if you like.

Mr. NUGENT: I wonder if you would care to comment on Admiral Landymore's concern over the fairness to the officers and men presently serving in our three armed forces. It is the admiral's contention that as Bill No. C-243 creates one new force and abolishes the three existing ones, that it would be unfair to those who have joined that new service for parliament to wipe out that service and put a new one in without giving them the option of going or staying.

Mr. FOULKES: Well, as I read this anybody can go or stay within six months.

Mr. NUGENT: I think that is fair enough.

Mr. FOULKES: Well, you could argue that perhaps it should be two months or three months or four months, but I would not consider it a grave hardship if a man has to wait six months. Usually he would require that time anyway to search around for employment.

Mr. NUGENT: I think that is all I have at the moment.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, a number of questions which I intended to ask have now been asked by Mr. Nugent, but as I have not as yet asked any questions, I would like at this time to make mine a little more specific. I do so recognizing that the general and I have been friends for a great many years—I hope I can put it that way—sometimes as antagonists and sometimes as protagonists. The general has been kind enough to tell me more than once that it was because of my questioning when he appeared before our committee in 1963 that he presented a position to the effect that he was then and always had been in favour of integration, unification and a single service. I listened most carefully to the general's presentation last evening and I gathered from his presentation that

he has not in any way whatsoever changed his mind from what he told us in 1963, that he was wholeheartedly in support of integration, unification and a single service.

Mr. CHURCHILL: On what page does that appear?

Mr. WINCH: It appears on three different pages. This is what it says:

> All these tasks could be carried out from Canadian territory with no Canadian troops stationed permanently abroad. These tasks would allow the services to work together as a team in all activities. There is no doubt that Canada could render a more adequate contribution to maintaining the peace by concentrating on two major activities instead of trying to emulate the big powers and attempting to carry out the whole panoply of military endeavour but in miniature.
>
> The concentration and simplification of Canadian defence aims and contributions would allow for a greater integration of the services and a streamlining of the staffs, schools, training establishments and administration with a considerable resultant reduction in manpower and expenditure. This trend should lead to the eventual complete integration of the services into one service with one chief, one staff, one administration and integrated flexible task forces to carry out the agreed contributions, and what I mean by "integrated flexible task forces", would be forces to deal with the naval and air force group in relation to the potential threat, a mobile reserve of the army, air force and navy.

Then the following question was put by Mr. Chester MacRae:

> I have one or two questions to ask mainly for the purposes of clarification, and I should like to reserve my right to ask further questions at a later stage.
>
> On the first page of your submission, General, you used the expression: "Through an abortive attempt to amalgamate the services".
>
> Do you mean by "amalgamate" the type of integration as you use that expression later on in your brief? When was this attempt made, and would you be so kind as to pinpoint the difficulties that were encountered?

And so on. Then he asked, also at page 508:

> Mr. MacRae: I understand from what you have said later on in the brief that you feel very strongly in favour of integration of the services?
>
> Mr. Foulkes: I feel very strongly in favour of integration of the forces, and I have felt this way for a number of years.

You will find that this is also mentioned in another place, at the moment I cannot place it.

General Foulkes, did you not state when you appeared before us in 1963 that you were completely in favour of integration, unification and a single service?

Mr. FOULKES: Correct.

Mr. WINCH: I am certain, sir, that you said that and it is on the record. I also understood from your presentation last night that you have not changed the view you expressed to the Committee in 1963, but you do have very reasonable and serious complaint to make about the methods used in approaching complete

integration, unification and the establishment of a single force. Also, that you stress a lack of information to the public in general and to the armed forces in particular—and I would like you to note this because I am going to be very careful on it—and you feel that in approaching this objective the department, the Minister and the government are proceeding too fast and perhaps making decisions which raise misunderstandings and objections, such as including in the bill before us, changes in the rank structure as between the services and in the matter of a common uniform and these are matters which should not be in legislation and which would normally evolve in the process of evolution. In other words, sir, you stay by the original principal?

Mr. FOULKES: Where did I say this?

Mr. WINCH: I said my impression was that the implementation towards the objective was proceeding too fast and that there was not enough information given to the public and in particular to the armed forces, and there may have been something in the legislation—the way I interpret it—such as uniforms or rank structure which may have caused a disturbance and which should be left to the evolutionary process. Now, have I put the picture honestly and clearly? If you disagree with what I have said, will you tell me in what way?

Mr. FOULKES: This was your impression; what is the question?

Mr. WINCH: All right, I will put it in three direct questions. One, you completely agree with integration, unification and the single service, as you did in 1963?

Mr. FOULKES: The answer is yes.

Mr. WINCH: Right. Two, did your presentation last night basically mean that in the implementation of these three objectives certain procedures have perhaps been carried out, too fast, and matters not requiring a decision at the moment be left to the evolutionary process?

Mr. FOULKES: I made some observations on the way the plan was implemented. I do not think I mentioned the word "legislation" at all.

Mr. WINCH: No, but you did bring up the matter of uniform and rank—

Mr. FOULKES: On uniform I did express the view—and I will express it again—that as this question of uniform is causing considerable difficulty at a time when it seems to me we should be minimizing the difficulties, I would certainly want to be one of the first people to say we should drop it. I think we want to get a good view of this question of uniform because it is a walking-out dress. Now, my impression of the young recruit of today is that he is not like the people in the Victorian era when they dressed up like peacocks and went out in Hyde Park to attract the girls. His off-duty activities can be much better carried out in a pair of flannels and a blazer than in a uniform.

Mr. WINCH: My point is that it is not required in legislation now in order to reach the ultimate objective.

Mr. FOULKES: Well, what goes into legislation, of course, is something which I have no right to speak about. All I am saying is that I do not think it is an issue that is vital to the integration of the services.

Mr. WINCH: Do you feel that we might have progressed a lot further on the general principal if we had not brought in this question of rank as between the services?

Mr. FOULKES: Do you mean that they—

Mr. WINCH: Was it necessary to bring it in?

Mr. FOULKES: The designation of ranks?

Mr. WINCH: The designation of ranks.

Mr. FOULKES: You do not mean the rank structure, how many you have, your are talking about the titles of them?

Mr. WINCH: That is right.

Mr. FOULKES: Well, here again I am perhaps a strange kind of a military man, I am a bit of a pacifist, so that if I found that it was upsetting people I would not put it into effect, and I think it is upsetting certain people, especially those in the Navy.

Mr. WINCH: Well, my final question is this. As your opinion is exactly the same in principal as you told this Committee it was in 1963, do you feel that the mistakes which are made in achieving an objective are incidental matters that could far better be postponed, and that it is better to proceed slowly and without antagonism toward your objective than to try to do it to quickly?

Mr. FOULKES: Well, I notice I was quoted to the press as saying that I had said the matter was going too fast, and I looked through the papers and could not find where I had made any reference to speed.

Mr. WINCH: This was no doubt my impression.

Mr. FOULKES: This is a very complicated and intricate operation, and I feel you certainly cannot rush it. I could not; at least. It will take a long time and I think when you are dealing with an emotional question like integration that you have to get the reactions to certain things you do before you do the next thing. However, that is only my opinion.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. MacRae?

Mr. MACRAE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have one or two question. I apologize if I should ask questions that have been asked before but, as you know, I have merely been in and out of the Committee as an observer. I am pleased to see General Foulkes again. Our acquaintanceship and relationship goes back 21 years, to when we both served in the same division very early in the war. My first question is this: The idea of an international police force has been expounded over the years, and very recently by the Prime Minister of Canada and the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and it would appear that it is not too acceptable to the United Nations at this moment and it has not got off the ground recently. I would like to ask General Foulkes if it should happen that we found ourselves being asked to take part in an international police force role, does he feel that as our forces are constituted at this moment with our separate services, and so on, that we could fulfil a satisfactory, efficient and honourable role?

Mr. FOULKES: Well, I pointed out yesterday, and perhaps you were not here, that in my view we have a surplus of a battalion of infantry in our force today, and I do not think would upset the department the least little bit if we provided one battalion to an international police force. I am sure that they could find a battalion fairly quickly for this.

Mr. MACRAE: Or more than that?

Mr. FOULKES: Well, perhaps two battalions, or something like that, but if you are going to have an international police force it has to be international and not too much from one country. However, I would think that if Canada provided a battalion, in any international police force under the sponsorship of the United Nations, that it would be a fairly good contribution. I do not say that an international police force will not fight; it will take on things like Cyprus, that sort of task. There are tasks which the Canadian soldier carries out extremely well. He has turned out to be a much quieter and passive policeman than some of us expected he would be. I think it is a good task for the military. It is certainly a change of atmosphere and one they do extremely well, but I have no hopes that you will ever have an international police force in the UN.

Mr. MACRAE: Thank you. The second question is one that I ask from your experience. As a member of this Committee over a number of years I have noticed, especially in the United States, that we seem to be over-ranked. I will explain that. It seems to me we had a major general or a brigadier there where normally I felt, with regard to what we were doing there, a major or lieutenant colonel would have been adequate. The explanation which I received for this—I read about it and then I tried to observe it—was that especially in our dealings with the Americans—and this may sound a little touchy at the moment—we had to have a brigadier there because if he were going to be talking to an American brigadier general there was no point in sending a colonel or a lieutenant colonel, and for that reason we seemed to have officers far above the rank required for the task that was being performed. I thought that as you are here today I would like to get a confirmation or a denial of that from your own personal experience.

Mr. FOULKES: Well this, of course, is very touchy because I became the first active force general in the Canadian force, but even when I was a lieutenant general I found no difficulties whatever in negotiating with my opposite numbers in the United States who were sometimes one or two steps above me. I do not think it is necessary to always have rank for rank. Most Canadians can hold their end up without any artificial backing such as rank.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I think I should point out that the General is looking at his watch. He has fifteen minutes before he has to leave to catch a plane.

Mr. WINCH: I have a supplementary question.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, Mr. McIntosh is ahead of you, Mr. Winch.

Mr. MCINTOSH: My question is very short. I have eliminated a lot I was going to ask and I think that the answer to the question I am going to ask now will clarify my opinion of the General's contribution to this Committee.

Some time ago when we were debating second reading in the house, General, on this one particular bill we objected to giving second reading to it before we heard these witnesses. One member got up in the house and said he agreed in principle with the bill but did not understand what it was. I am confused when I compare your answers yesterday with the answer you just gave Mr. Winch. Yesterday there was some misunderstanding of your use of the term "unification", but the record will reveal that you said you believed in unification, and afterwards, when I asked you, you said you did not understand what the Minister meant by it but you had an understanding yourself and you believed in

this. Now, in answer to Mr. Winch, when he put some questions blankly to you, you said you believed in unification. Is that right?

Mr. FOULKES: Mr. Winch asked me a question regarding a statement I made before the Committee when I presented the plan.

Mr. MCINTOSH: It was after that, General.

He read the statement and there was no mention of unification in the statement he read, but he asked you if you believed in unification and you said yes.

Mr. FOULKES: But there was a statement that he read where I said the forces should be unified, and I was answering his question with regard to the plan that I presented at that time and which used the word "unified". In that context I certainly agree with it.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, do you believe in unification in the context that the Minister tried to portray in his speech? Could you just answer "yes" or "no", and then I would understand?

Mr. FOULKES: Well, as I said before, I made some reservations before the Committee in regard to the extent of unification, as laid down in the paper, and those were the reservations that I had. Those reservations were not terribly big. I did not understand the paragraph dealing with the question of infantry companies being used separately, and things like that.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, you have just finished saying to Mr. Nugent, too, that you are not clear where integration stops and unification starts. Well, if you do not know what unification is, certainly you would not know where it started.

This is what puzzles me. The press comes out and says that you believe in unification. I would say from the testimony you gave us yesterday that you did not believe in unification. You have a term that you use, but we all seem to have different definitions of the term. I am trying to get an understanding of the Minister's intention to see if any two of us can agree on what he means, because he will not give us the answer.

Mr. FOULKES: But surely this is a question that you should put to the Minister when he appears before you.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I will, but I just want to see if I can get two people who will agree.

Mr. FOULKES: I am sure I cannot in any way forecast what the Minister is going to say about his views on this particular subject. I feel that we are playing around with words here more than we are with reality.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I agree, but we as politicians have to vote for this bill as it is presently worded and we are to get our direction from military experts like yourself. I ask you, do you believe in unification? You are accustomed to deciphering orders, and so on, from ministers and you said you worked under five different ministers, surely you can say whether you understand the Minister's explanation of unification in this case. Do you or do you not? You do not have to answer if you do not want to. I do not care. You are getting directions from the other side there.

Mr. FOULKES: I do not yet quite understand what you are driving at.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Do you understand what the Minister means by unification? Yes or no?

Mr. FOULKES: I understand what is in the paper with certain reservations, which I have raised, which I understand the Minister is going to clarify when he talks to you later on in the week. At least, I presume he will.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WINCH: I would like to get an answer if I can.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Is the General going to be here any longer? Mr. Winch has had his turn.

Mr. WINCH: The only time—

The CHAIRMAN: Order. I put Mr. Winch down on a supplementary and I put you down on a supplementary also, Mr. Churchill.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I do not want to delay the General, but how much more time does he have?

The CHAIRMAN: I believe he has about ten minutes.

Mr. FOULKES: I have about ten or fifteen minutes. I have to get out of here by a quarter to four.

Mr. WINCH: I have just one question and I am going to put it this way, Mr. Chairman. I hope you will accept it.

General you are a Canadian and a good Canadian. You served Canada for many years in the armed services; you were Chief of Staff for nine years if my memory is correct. With all your experience do you now believe that Admiral Landymore was correct in his admonition to the members of parliament that if we support the government policy on defence that a minister of defence and the commander of the mobile forces could overthrow our democratic institutions and establish a military dictatorship? What is your impression now, sir, as a good Canadian and as a member of the armed forces?

Mr. FOULKES: Are you asking me whether they have the ability to do it or whether they would have the intention of doing it?

Mr. WINCH: Well, if I can I am going to say, intent and ability.

Mr. FOULKES: There is no doubt the Minister of National Defence has the forces behind him to take any military action, but I do not think that really matters. It is a question of whether you think that any Canadian officer or politician is ever going to move against the democratic government of Canada. In my view it is absolutely absurd. I have seen nothing to support any such contention whatsoever.

Mr. WINCH: Thank you.

Mr. CHURCHILL: My question is not just a supplementary, Mr. Chairman. I thought I would have an opportunity for a second round.

The CHAIRMAN: No. It is the second round. I did not mean to convey otherwise.

Mr. CHURCHILL: General Foulkes, when Admiral Brock appeared before us and gave evidence my temporary friends across the way went to great pains to point out to the Committee that Admiral Brock on leaving the services had aligned himself with the Conservative party. To balance the record, I trust you will not object if I indicate that when you left the services you aligned yourself with the Liberal party. It is the right of any citizen to align himself with a party. You do not object to my balancing the record in that way, do you?

Mr. FOULKES: No. All I want to say is that the Liberal party would not have me, so that—

Mr. CHURCHILL: They treated you rather shabbily; otherwise you might have been sitting in the seat of the chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Heaven forbid!

Mr. FOULKES: Well, I do not think we want to go into conjecture.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I noticed that you were very critical in the paper last night of the policy of the government and also in the articles which were published in the Ottawa *Journal* on October 11, 12 and 13 of 1966, and yet you are being a bit kind today with respect to this question of unification. I raised with some other witnesses what I once again call the ruthless purge of senior officers by the Minister of National Defence, and I judge that this disturbed you quite a bit because in your article which was published on October 12, 1966, the following words occur, and I quote:

> Never before in Canada or in any other democratic country has a minister changed his whole staff at the same time and in less than two years of their appointments. The only other record of wholesale changes in the military occurred in the Hitler regime. He dismissed every general who dared to tell him what he should know and not what he liked to hear.

I presume that your opinion of this rapid change of battle—experienced senior officers is that it is not really a very good thing for the defence forces of Canada?

Mr. FOULKES: Well, I thought I covered that when I said last night that I was concerned about it because I feel there are still a lot of problems to be solved, and what I actually said was that I am well aware that senior officers with command experience are becoming scarce and while there are brilliant young officers coming forward with brief cases full of theoretical answers, the successful conclusion of this experiment needs the levelling influence of those who know the exacting demands of active operations and the steps that are necessary to prepare troops to go out and meet hostilities. I do not think I can say it any clearer than that. There is a great deal to be said, it seems to me, when setting up a new force, for having experienced people who had something to do with it before in action. That is the reason I made this remark.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I was wondering whether you could help us a little bit further on this line. I think when we examine the evidence we will discover that you are really suggesting a pause in order to settle down for a while. I notice that in your article of October 12 in the *Journal* you said, and I quote:

> Evidence given at the Committee on Defence shows that integrated logistic support will not be fully ready for three to five years. A risk of this magnitude should not be undertaken unless there are more compelling reasons than political expediency or, as some commentators have mentioned, the personal ambitions of the present Minister.

I judge that at that time you were thinking that there should be a lapse of time for these new command organizations to settle into the job before the next step was taken. Are you still of that opinion?

Mr. FOULKES: Well, this is based on the fact that I have always felt that you do not want to get in a position to go into operations until your supply

organization is ready, because you cannot maintain your forces unless your supply organization is ready. In reading the minutes of the previous meetings I believe it was General Fleury who pointed out that the integrated supply organization would not be ready for some three years.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Also on October 13 you mentioned this fact, and I quote again:

> Integration of the headquarters, the direction, control, administration and logistic support has been accepted by the services and the public.

You are setting out that integration can only succeed if it is accepted by all members of the forces, but there are many indications that this is not the case. Then you say what should be done and you list three reasons, and this is number two. I had better read it again so that it will fit in properly.

> Integration of the headquarters, the direction, control, administration and logistic support has been accepted by the services and the public. However, if further integration of the combat echelons is attempted there is a grave risk of chaos if an emergency arises before the training and logistic organization is completely ready for operations. No savings will be made and only the gravest risks will be taken by rushing ahead with further integration of the various combat forces.

That is similar to the reply you gave me just a moment ago, that from the military point of view it is unwise to rush ahead too rapidly until you are sure of your support lines and logistic control. Is that right?

Mr. FOULKES: That is right.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I will conclude with this. Are you prepared, sir, to recommend to the Committee and to the Minister that the present bill be postponed, with regard to operation, until a period of time has elapsed, perhaps three to five years, and until the integration up to this moment has been sorted out and has become effective and that then, and only then, might the next step be taken of attempting to proceed with what the Minister calls unification? In other words, a pause to reorganize.

Mr. FOULKES: I doubt that I am in a position to make a recommendation to his Committee. As I have pointed out, I have only studied this bill for the last twenty-four hours and one would have to study it very carefully to see what the impact of the further moves would be. If the impact is that there is going to be no change in the combat forces—and this has been indicated—I do not think it is perhaps necessary to say that there has to be a delay.

At the present time there are three different systems of supply, and those are being maintained until the integrated system is ready. If there was any change now in the composition of the forces so that they could not operate on their single system then it would be very difficult; but I understand that there is to be no change in the composition of the fighting element of the forces. Therefore, it is really of no worry to me now so long as that is the case.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Your information appears to be different from what has reached us.

I wonder, General Foulkes, if you would examine a compromise solution which I presented to the Minister in the House of Commons with regard to fulfilling some of our foreign commitments under the United Nations. The Prime

Minister, the Minister of External Affairs and the Minister of National Defence seem to be rather keen on fulfilling certain United Nations' obligations and they have had the support of Parliament as, for that purpose, the same support was given by an earlier government. I suggested to the Minister that a reasonable compromise to fulfill those engagements would be to form a special force in a special uniform with a special title—an elite force—to do police duties such as are being done now by our forces overseas.

We have about 2,000 men overseas in any given year, and they are not engaged in fighting; they are not on a punitive expedition; they have not engaged in the suppression of revolts of armed conflicts; they are performing peacekeeping operations. We could have the best of both worlds, I think, if we had that type of special force, trained, disciplined, drawn from volunteers in the services and posted overseas for a specified time. At the same time we would maintain our navy, our army and our air force as they are now, in co-operation with our allies. As you so wisely pointed out last night, we cannot operate on our own as an independent nation, but in co-operation with our allies we can provide naval and army and air forces to assist them.

That is the compromise solution that I put forward and I think it would satisfy all the people who are involved in this present controversy. I was wondering if you had had the time to examine that concept, and, if so, whether or not it had merit?

Mr. FOULKES: I have not heard of this concept before, but at first look one would hope, from the standpoint of the services, that we would not set up a special force. It is a good thing to be able to rotate the forces to do these various tasks; in other words, to do a stint in Cyprus, a stint in, perhaps, Germany and a stint at home. It seems to me that if this is done so that you always have trained forces; and the soldier who is trained to fight is also an excellent policeman.

I do not think there is too much advantage in it. It might make a spiteful force, if a fellow just thought that he was a policeman, unless you are going to raise that force somewhere else. There have been suggestions that we should raise a force somewhat like the RCMP and use it; but if it is to be a military force—I always like to think of a military force as one in which every man is a fighting man, and which may be used for different tasks.

Mr. CHURCHILL: They would be seconded, in my opinion, for this purpose and they would not be representing the aggressive combat forces of Canada abroad. You mentioned to us the difficulty of Suez—just a little while ago—using a combat force for that purpose and we ended up with administrative troops. That is what was in my mind when I was saying it would be a special force—separate and apart in nomenclature—from the fighting forces of Canada.

Mr. Chairman, that is the end of my questioning.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, that seems to complete the questioning of General Foulkes.

General, I think the extent of the questioning and the interest which has been shown in your presentation and in your answers are as good an indication as any of the great interest we have in this problem and of our appreciation for your coming here. Thank you very much indeed.

Mr. FOULKES: Thank you, gentlemen; I have enjoyed it.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, would you care for a five-minute recess? We will resume at 20 minutes to four o'clock.

—After recess

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, could we please come to order again?

Group Captain Patrick has been waiting since yesterday to present his short brief and he now has a deadline of 4.30. He has asked if he can have a taxi to take him to a train that he must catch at 4.30; so without further ado I will hand down a small paper showing Group Captain Patrick's background of experience and I will ask him to deliver the brief which we have invited him to present.

Mr. K. R. PATRICK, O.B.E., C.D., D.Eng.: Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, may I sit down to deliver it?

The CHAIRMAN: Please do.

Mr. PATRICK: I say "gentlemen", there are not many left but all who are left are gentlemen.

I welcome the opportunity to speak before this very important group on a matter vital to the well being of Canada. I am honoured as a private citizen, and as a businessman, to be permitted to express my views before such a distinguished group of Canada's elected representatives.

The Chairman has said that he is circulating some of the things that I am; but I would like to point out that what I am not is a professional soldier; and I am not an official. I am one of that breed of hundreds of thousands of Canadians who, when the defence of Canada requires it, make ourselves available. In many respects I think I speak for a large percentage of this group.

My remarks today are based on a long association with, and a very deep interest in, the problems of the "Defence of Canada" (both official and unofficial). My paper today *supports* the unification programme as *essential, timely,* and *logical.* To me it is evidence of political responsibility of the highest order.

The logic behind the decision to unify the armed forces is, in my view, incontestable in the face of the economic and military facts.

It is unrealistic to confuse the "Glories of the Past" with the inevitable, and in some places "agonizing", fact that our Canadian Armed Forces must be re-orientated to meet the domestic and international military needs of 1967 and beyond.

Interservice rivalry may have at times been a good thing but surely not if it prevents national military policy from being properly co-ordinated and managed, or if it results in duplication in installations and equipment.

Military manpower and equipment is so expensive to-day that both resources must be managed with extreme care. While our military equipment inventory is measured in billions fo dollars, these great resources are the men and the women in the armed forces.

The unification policy will result in a kind of management which will make these people more effective, more competent, more stimulated. Our fighting men will be better equipped, tougher and more respected than at any other time in history.

New policies of management of personnel have, for the first time in history of the armed forces, resulted in a rational relationship between the pay of the serviceman compared to civilian employment and the recognition and elimina-

tion of many inequalities that existed; not to mention the elimination of the traditionally rigid pay and promotional structures!

Some of the great minds, still respected, were outspoken advocates of unified defence forces. These are people to whom I have spoken personally: Admiral Louis Mountbatten, for one, and that the distinguished Canadian, General A. G. L. McNaughton, and there are others. You might be surprised to learn that most of the ex-service personnel I know from costs to coast agree with this.

Unification, after all, is not a new idea—a large number of service personnel have been advocating this idea for many years.

Before the end of the war in 1945 while I was still serving in the RCAF I prepared a paper which I delivered in the "War Room", right here in Ottawa, before a tri-service meeting of senior officers, advocating unification as an urgent post-war program. This was on the basis of what we were then learning about military hardware. Frankly, some of the "brass" reacted against the idea, but almost half of the younger officers conceded that the proposition was logical. That was 22 years ago!

Most of us in the armed forces were not career officers, and very few had their ideas set in concrete. When most of us joined the armed forces, if we couldn't get into one service we tried another. We have seen the pressure of war produce a direction towards unification. In any event, regardless of our preference for uniform, we always ended up in a "battle dress" and some of us became part of a unified command.

If you think for a moment that the men and women of the armed forces have low morale because of the "integration" "unification", I think you are wrong. The morale question, if any, has been related to the inequalities in the armed forces rank and pay structure, especially in these days when the considerable skills of the individual members of the armed forces are in such demand by the civilian economy. Although I must not discount the unsettling effect of some of the criticism that members of the armed forces read in the press.

The reduction from 346 trades in the three services to 97, which came about only because of the unification process, is nothing less than a masterpiece of personnel management. I think it happened just in time! Frankly, in another year it would have been too late and the armed forces would have suffered irreplaceable losses of many of their *best* people. The armed forces would have then found it possible to attract only those recruits who were, in effect, the rejects of "civvy street".

Almost all of the jobs in the armed forces call for technical expertise, in addition to the traditional fighting qualities. Today Canadian servicemen, for example, in Cyprus, Gaza, and other places, must also be something of a diplomat. Violence was once the principal skill but today he also has to add the task of *preventing* violence between others.

The armed forces management techniques must change and are changing. It is a vastly different world in which we live and while there must be a hard core of discipline, morale can be enormously strengthened if the concept and the organization are based on logic. The leaders have to have more than the officer and NCO stripes to earn the respect of their subordinates. Blind obedience has long since past. It is a glorious opportunity for military management and leadership and the key people in today's defence forces are leaping to it.

Defence is big business and a big piece of the taxpayer's dollar, yet for the first time the application of modern management techniques is being applied to the management of this "business".

It is an age of computers in management with amazingly rapid communications devices and techniques. The results can be the elimination of an enormous waste of manpower. Unification produces a single organization with enough "size" to make the best use of these new management tools.

We know that the era is significant in terms of rapid changes and that these factors are changing the traditional way of doing things. Political, economic and social changes throughout the world are having a profound effect on the nature and the location of confrontations that might lead to war. It is just not radar, guided missiles and atom bombs that are new. There are, for example, satellite observations and computer manipulations that enable the Armed Forces to keep track of all surface vessels throughout the world at any instant and when necessary to instantly attack this shipping through the use of this data. There are many similar examples.

Who would have thought that our main concern in a period of tension between the two great powers would be centered in the events of Cyprus or central Africa, or that this would be a sufficient threat to world peace to call for United Nations troops?

I am convinced that the men and women in the armed forces accept the changes and regard them as progress. There are opponents, to be sure, but I have yet to see any opposition based on anything other than *emotional* factors.

We are talking about reaction to change. Human beings react against change; change removes the comfort people enjoy and the stability in which they like to bask. Often people who are most against change are those who are afraid their weaknesses will be discovered.

Reaction to change, in my view, is the root of the criticism of unification of the Canadian armed forces.

Bill No. C-90 passed by Parliament, April 1st, 1964 (and passed without a single dissenting vote) abolished the Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee and the heads of the navy, army and air force.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, I am sorry I have a point or order.

The CHAIRMAN: Yes.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I cannot allow the record to stand like that—passed without a single dissenting vote. It was passed on division, which means that it was not unanimous; and the record so shows.

The CHAIRMAN: The record will show that, and the record of this meeting will also show it.

Mr. PATRICK: That is fair enough.

Integration, I think—

Mr. MCINTOSH: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman. I also do not see why there should be allowed to be read into the record reflections on former soldiers to the effect that anyone opposing this does so because of emotional factors, or because their weaknesses will be discovered, and so on. The soldiers who fought in the war in Korea in 1939-40 were not—

The CHAIRMAN: I think, Mr. McIntosh, that this—

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, may I ask a question before he continues? I have not seen the piece of paper on which is written the name of the firm this man is supposed to represent, but I will ask him this: Has he, or his firm, ever sold anything to the present government?

An hon. MEMBER: Oh, come now on this is—

Mr. McINTOSH: Just a minute; he sounds to me like a salesman who has come here with the idea of getting a contract from the government. I would like hom to answer that question now.

Mr. LANIEL: On a point of order—

Mr. WINCH: Do you propose to shorten this?

Mr. McINTOSH: Not necessarily.

Mr. LANIEL: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman. I do not seek to prevent the member from saying whatever he wishes to say, but I think the least he could have been polite, as we have been with all other witnesses even though we may have disagreed with their statements. He should wait until the witness has finished his statement and make his remarks then.

I would ask the witness to carry on with his presentation.

Mr. McINTOSH: In no other brief have we had statements like this.

An hon. MEMBER: I think Mr. Landymore's—

Mr. McINTOSH: Landymore's statement—

The CHAIRMAN: Order, order. I think we should do the witness the courtesy of hearing his brief, having asked him to come here.

An hon. MEMBER: Was he invited here?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, he was invited here. He was invited by the Committee.

Mr. McINTOSH: By the Steering Committee?

The CHAIRMAN: He was invited by the Chairman. I set up the arrangements in accordance with the lists that were handed to me.

Mr. McINTOSH: Continue, then.

Mr. PATRICK: May I continue?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, you may.

Mr. PATRICK: I would like to repeat my last point, that the first huge step had already been taken in the unification process.

I believe that "integration" and "unification" are terms that are kicked around glibly. I think they mean the same thing. It is unfortunate that the White Paper tabled in March 1964 before Parliament used the two expressions. Again, in my view, I think they mean the same thing.

For more than 20 years, in my own knowledge, governments have been endeavouring to integrate and unify Canada's armed forces. The first timid steps were taken with the dental and medical corps, and later with the transport department, chaplain services and so on. It did not work, because you do not integrate the armed forces from the bottom up; you first establish a policy and work from the top down. I think that is what is being done today.

We are told by some of the critics that this unification is all a great surprise. Perhaps members of the armed forces may not read government White Papers, but they are certainly compelled to read Daily Routine Orders! I saw at the

Officers Mess in St. Hubert on April 2, 1964, the Chief of the Air Staff's long statement which said:

> "I believe the proposed organization changes and the ultimate unification of the three armed services are sound in principle and will result in maximum military effectiveness".

On April 2, 1964, Lieutenant General Walsh, Chief of the General Staff also sent out a notice. I quote from this:—

> "The integration is aimed at reducing the overhead taken up in the administration of the three services. The unified defence planning will emphasize the *national entity of our* defence force, eliminate the duplication of services and ensure that there is no vacuum in overall defence policy planning".

Admiral H. S. Rayner, Chief of the Naval Staff on April 3, 1964, published a four page statement from which I quote:—

> "The third and final step will be the unification of the three Services. It is reasonable to expect that it will be three or four years before it will be possible to take this action. However, the end objective of a single Service is firm".

So much for the critics who say "they didn't know it was going to happen."

If we try to arrive at whether the unification process is a good or bad thing surely we must begin at the beginning and ask ourselves what policy parliament has set for the armed forces. What is the role of the armed forces? Once this is clear it should not be difficult to arrive at the appropriate means of fulfilling this role.

I have heard that Modern military operations are classified as follows:—

General thermonuclear war
General non-nuclear war
Limited War
Brush fires
Peace restoring
Peace keeping

I see Canadian policy in unification one of extreme flexibility in which we effectively support our alliances to prevent the general wars and at the same time develop an organization related to limited war brush fires, peace restoring and peacekeeping.

Again speaking as a civilian a question frequently asked is why does Canada have any defence force? (In fact, a substantial body of opinion does not accept defence as a rational occupation for Canadians). Some of the reasons might be: to put down civil rebellion (very unlikely need in Canada); to defend ourselves against attack by an aggressor. (This is equally unlikely in view of the massive defence of this continent by the United States); to seize and hold territory of other nations—Canada has no wish to be an aggressor.

Canada can use her unique position and size and relationship to other countries to try to build a better world to prevent war.

A major part of Canadian policy appears to be the prevention of the big war, somewhat along the lines of what has been done in the case of Egypt versus Israel and in Cyprus.

If the present policy continues to develop, Vietnam's in the future—and there may be many—can be prevented. Canada's role in international affairs thus puts us in a unique position without doubt, the most valuable contribution a defence force of our size has been in a position to make in world history.

Canadians want to be proud. They want to stand up and be counted. We honour and respect our NATO and NORAD alliances. I believe we are contributing our share to the "Nuclear Deterrent". I think it has been shown too that Canada's armed forces have more fire power now than at any time in her history. Her forces are tough and competitive and stand second to none.

Canadians now know that the army, air force and navy of the past were totally separate and unrelated components of the defence force. They lacked cohesion and inter-relationship. They were physically and organizationally separate. The air force had no relationship to the army's role. The army had no relationship to the navy's role. Each pursued certain individual tasks. I am not criticizing whether this *past* defence policy was wrong. What I am really saying is that today unification really makes sense.

You have been given several examples of problems arising out of a tri-service concept. I recall a few myself. For example, the RCAF did not believe in air support for the army!—and as a result, for all practical purposes, the army did not get any—an incredible situation in this day and age. I recall when the RCAF ceased to need heavy helicopters on completing the mid-Canada air-lift, the RCAF retrained these men to jet fighters, and at the same time the navy was in urgent need of helicopter pilots. They had to start from scratch.

One of the most serious and I think nearly disastrous events in recent history and this was referred to by your previous witness, was the RCAF program to build the CF-105, the Arrow. If this program had not been cancelled by the government in power, the total implications could have reached $4 billion. This would have left nothing for land and sea forces. The equipment 'tail' was really wagging the dog. In this case the equipment that may not have worked and may not have fitted into our national defence policy.

I make these remarks about my previous relationship with the RCAF in spite of a strong personal and even an emotional connection with the air force.

The critics say you can't have army personnel run a ship or naval personnel run an airplane. I do not think the question should be raised. As far as I can read the defence policy has never in any way implied this. It does not mean that a tank driver has to fly a supersonic jet!

In the past each of these services itself was "unified". Each had its own trade structure. In the future it will be possible for specialized groups to do specialized jobs that they always have done. Today in the technical trades especially there are hundreds of common positions which, grouped in a single force, can advance technical skills and efficiency.

One of the fears expressed about integration which does have a certain amount of popular appeal has to do with tradition—and tradition is symbolized by one word, "uniform".

We do not have a Canadian uniform, just as we did not have a Canadian flag. Many of the same kind of people who raised such a fuss about getting a new flag now do so over the uniform and for the same reasons.

The Canadian navy uniform is a copy of that of the British navy; the Canadian army uniform is a British army uniform; and the Royal Canadian Air Force uniform is a British Air Force uniform.

There is nothing distinctively Canadian about any of our uniforms and I think this has caused problems especially in our peace keeping tasks.

During the last war and during the years since Canadian servicemen have had a problem to identify themselves as Canadians and I am speaking first-hand. We want to be identified for good and practical reasons as Canadians. One way of doing this is with a distinctive Canadian uniform.

There are critics who say the morale of the armed forces will suffer if the uniform is changed. This is a story that goes way back in history. I would like to quote from Barbara Tuchman's famous and authorative book "The Guns of August".

> Messimy did his best, as War Minister, to equip the army to fight a successful offensive but was in his turn frustrated in his most cherished prospect—the need to reform the French uniform. The British had adopted khaki after the Boer War, and the Germans were about to make the change from Prussian blue to field-grey. But in 1912 French soldiers still wore the same blue coats, red kepi, and red trousers they had worn in 1830 when the rifle fired carried only two hundred paces. Visiting the Balkan front in 1912, Messimy saw the advantages gained by the dull-colored Bulgarians and came home determined to make the French soldier less visible. Army pride was intransigent about giving up its red trousers. Army prestige was once again felt to be at stake. To banish "all that is colourful, all that gives the soldier his vivid aspect", wrote the ECHO de PARIS, "Is to go contrary both to French taste and military functions". At a parliamentary hearing a former War Minister, M. Etienne, spoke for France.
>
> "Eliminate the red trousers? He cried. "Never! Les pantalons rouges, c'est la France!".

It is well known that that blind and imbecile attachment to the most visible of all colours was to have cruel consequences.

There is talk about the new uniform colour and what the style should be. I don't think most people really care, so long as it is sensible and functional.

As General Foulkes has just said, uniforms, as we know them, are not worn in battle.

"Vive les Pantalons Rouges".

The problem of Canadian identification has extended to our equipment as well. The RCAF airplane had the RAF Roundel, and after many years the RCAF placed a maple leaf in the centre of the Roundel, which is not easy to distinguish at any distance. Airplanes and tanks and other equipment had the Red Ensign painted on the equipment, but this did not help much either. The navy flew the White Ensign, the traditional symbol of British naval power and imperialism.

Critics often say that if integration is so good, why don't the Americans try it? I have seen at least two issues of the United States Armed Forces Management magazine and other armed forces publications, dealing with the Canadian unification plans in the most laudatory manner.

Back in 1959 Senator Clair Engle tried to unify the Armed Forces of the United States, declaring that re-organization on the basis of mission and function as an obsolute pre-requisite to meeting the challenge of modern warfare. This was followed up by the House Government Operations Committee, which sought a merger of the army and the air force to eliminate duplication and waste in the missile field, short of which it said: "the nation will be exposed to the vitiating effects of interservice jealousies, rivalries and wars for many years to come".

That was seven years ago. The proposals were stampeded and Congress decided that prudence was a better part of valour. Please, do not let us have this happen in Canada.

The economics of unification are impressive. To hold to the current defence budget and below to make the substantial and necessary improvements in wages and to provide for re-equipment is quite an accomplishment in this day and age. As a businessman I share with the majority of the business people in Canada a very healthy respect for what has been done and what the emerging policy holds for the future. Unification makes for maximum flexibility at minimum cost.

In his book "Change and Habit" the world-renowned historian, Toynbee, makes two pertinent points:

(1) That the advances of technology will not be stopped and
(2) Technology is a unifying force.

They may have been made in a somewhat different context, but they most assuredly apply to the military today.

I believe Canada is creating a national force with an international task.

Unification means unification of function so that Canadian policy, for the first time, can be implemented by a Canadian force. This may very well break with tradition, but the tradition of not being able to act nationally, in the national interest. The national interest, mind you, for Canada means taking up international responsibility. To be able to take up this responsibility in the interest of not only our own but the survival of the rest of humanity, may mean the founding of a tradition which is Canadian, truly Canadian and not taken over second-hand.

Soldiering is a highly honourable, but no longer a "romantic," job. It is a profession, to be performed efficiently, intelligently and perhaps matter of factly. It has been said that the soldiers of the First World War entered it with a romantic feeling. Those of the Second with the simple certainty of a job to be done.

To do a worthwhile job—to keep the peace—and to be able to do so is the task unification has set itself to do.

Tradition must have meaning and a meaning related to the present and not just to the past. Otherwise it is moribund, a dead hand, and that is why unification can become a living tradition for Canada, something we have shaped for ourselves—something which gives meaning to our defence efforts.

The CHAIRMAN: Would you be prepared to answer some questions?

Mr. PATRICK: Yes, certainly.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I will give this brief the consideration I think it deserves. I had an article here about the "Whiz Kids". I am just wondering if this witness is one of them.

First of all, I would like to ask the witness of what company he is the president, and whether it sells anything to the Department of National Defence or to any of the government departments?

Mr. PATRICK: Sir, my connection as an active vendor to the Canadian government—and I was an active vendor to the government—is that I founded the company called Canadian Aviation Electronics. Previous to that I was general manager of RCA Victor in Canada, and was privileged to be a contractor both so far as this government and Canada are concerned.

I sold my interest, I think, six years ago and I am now directly concerned with many, many companies—

Mr. WINCH: You sold it six years ago?

Mr. PATRICK: Yes, six years ago.

Mr. WINCH: Then you were dealing with the Conservative government.

Mr. PATRICK: I cannot think of the exact date, but the last time was about five years ago, and I was dealing with the Conservative government. I sold them a great deal of products. I also sold the Liberal government a great deal of products. I think I am damn proud of what we did. I sold my company and invested in a number of enterprises, none of which is in the market as far as the government is concerned. To my knowledge, I have no share-interest in any company that is doing business with the Canadian government.

Mr. WINCH: Not in the last four years?

Mr. MCINTOSH: I am questioning the witness, Mr. Winch.

Mr. WINCH: Well, be honest in your questioning.

An hon. MEMBER: Oh, hear me!

Mr. MCINTOSH: What do you mean by "be honest in your questioning"? All I have to say to you is what Dave Walker said to you.

The CHAIRMAN: Order.

Mr. MCINTOSH: How long did you have this company, Mr. Patrick?

Mr. PATRICK: My recent company, on—

Mr. MCINTOSH: Your own company; not when you were working for RCA or anybody else. I am talking about your own company.

Mr. PATRICK: I founded my company in 1950, I believe it was, and I sold it, as a matter of fact, not very long after the Conservatives came to power. I was a contractor, among other things. I was the contractor—

Mr. MCINTOSH: I asked you how long you had the company—from 1950 until what year? That is all I want.

Mr. PATRICK: I had it until 1959 or 1960. I might be out a year or two.

Mr. MCINTOSH: During that time what was the dollar volume of contracts that you sold to the government?

Mr. PATRICK: Well, we started out as a little company, doing about $50,000 a year; and during the last year we probably did about $4 or $5 million.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Yes. Are you in the selling business at the present time?

Mr. PATRICK: No, I am in the investment business in the Caribbean.

Mr. MCINTOSH: All right; I have no further questions.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I would like to ask the witness this. He said he served in Canada and overseas during the war, at least it states on the paper here,

including several command positions. Would you just indicate what they were; what type of service?

Mr. PATRICK: Yes. Well, when I joined the air force I was put into the radar business and my positions were very often related to night fighters. I was a radar engineer. I left the air force—

Mr. CHURCHILL: You were not a night fighter?

Mr. PATRICK: I was in the back seat of what was a night fighter, but I was in the radar end of it, reading the tube, rather than in the front end driving the airplane. The last time I was shot at, frankly, was in Korea, where I had seven operational missions. I came back for this particular task.

I joined the reserves—believe me, I was never a career officer—and left the air force at the end of the war and went into business. I think I ended up as the senior RCAF reserve officer in Canada for 15 or so years after the war. I was CO of two or three units.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I was thinking of World War II? Where did you serve, and what positions did you occupy?

Mr. PATRICK: Among other things, I was CO of the base at Trenton. I was assigned to the Americans on their submarine and carrier effort, again on a technical basis, as a technical officer, and I had the same kind of assignment with Fighter Command in the United Kingdom. In other words, I was one of the few people who had some fairly senior responsibility in the introducing of radar systems and VHF control and so on for both the Americans and the Canadians during the last war.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Did you serve in England or on the continent of Europe?

Mr. PATRICK: Not on the continent of Europe; in the U.K.

Mr. CHURCHILL: As a fighter—

Mr. PATRICK: When we first put in night fighter airplanes I was sent over on liaison duty both to learn and to teach the use of this kind of equipment.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You were not actually a combat officer?

Mr. PATRICK: I was never a combat officer. I was shot at, but I was never a combat officer in the sense that you are getting at.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You speak with quite a bit of assumed authority with regard to morale. I would like to know on what you base that?

Mr. PATRICK: My opinions—as I tried to tell you at the beginning—are based on my contact with a large number of ex-service people and the average man on the street. I travel from coast to coast. I have been down in the Maritimes, for example, three or four times this year, and I have been to the west coast two or three times. The nature of my existence puts me in contact with a large number of people. I have been associated with defence ideas for a very long while, and I have been invited to speak to reserve organizations. I have been an honorary colonel in a mess, and we talk there. I am a member of an air force mess, and we also talk there. Frankly, I am rather impressed by what the average fellow thinks.

My feeling is that the armed forces people, as a rule, disagree with what anyone in "brass" or government has to say and I think this is normal. But I have found that they have been less opposed to what seems to them to be a fresh and logical idea.

I had an experience when the Grenadier Guards asked me to be a speaker at a mess dinner before Christmas. The CO was very much opposed to unification, and in introducing me he practically instructed all the members to disagree with what I was going to say. There must have been 200 or 300 NCO's and officers there. At the end they all got up and asked very pertinent questions on why I thought it was a good idea. I would say that 90 per cent of them said that it made sense.

At the end of it, one of the warrant officers was so incensed at the fact that the CO had taken what he thought was a discourteous attitude toward the speaker that he tore up his lifetime membership in the mess. There are strong views and strong opinions. That is the kind of contact that I have, strictly as a civilian.

Mr. CHURCHILL: That is one man's opinion. There are others who have had long years with the militia or the active forces. In my case it extends 27 years, and I still have contacts with the militia. My opinion can be balanced against his.

Mr. PATRICK: Exactly.

Mr. CHURCHILL: At page 6 you state:

> —There are opponents to be sure, but I have yet to see any opposition based on anything other than *emotional* factors.

Are you prepared to substantiate that you have not met anyone whose opposition is based on other than emotional factors?

Mr. PATRICK: I must say that all the people that I have talked to, who were opposed, were frankly opposed, and even admitted they were opposed, for emotional reasons. They were willing to admit the logic, but emotionally they could not connect themselves with this new idea.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I submit that your reaction to this is based on emotion.

Mr. PATRICK: I think this is true of all of us.

Mr. CHURCHILL: At the top of page 7 you say:

> Reaction to change is the root of the criticism of unification of the Canadian armed forces.

Would you substantiate that?

Mr. PATRICK: Documenting this is not easy. I am again referring to my own experience. I think the nature of a military organization tends to produce a certain rigidity, especially when there are long periods of peace. Frankly, I think the armed forces really only make a rapid change under conditions of great stress, and as a result of the input of some hundreds of thousands of people who are not regular force people.

Perhaps that is not a very good explanation of my point, but I find that people do not like to change. They do not want to change their rank structure; they do not like to change their jobs; it is a nice comfortable situation.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I do not think you have substantiated your general remark very well. There are quite a number of people in this country, with much more experience than you, whose reaction to the proposal is not based simply on reaction and change, but on logic and reason.

On page 7 you went so far as to say that:

> Bill C-90 passed by Parliament, April 1st, 1964 (and passed without a single dissenting vote)—

You have endeavoured to present to us your great knowledge on these matters. Why did you put that statement in there and have you repeated this across the country? Is this part of your propaganda effort? If it is, it is false.

On the same page you say:

> Integration and unification are terms that are kicked around glibly as though they meant different things—, when they really mean the same thing.

We have spent two weeks endeavouring to settle this issue and now you put the two together. Do you really think that they both mean exactly the same thing?

Mr. PATRICK: I certainly do.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Thank you very much.

On page 8 you quote examples from Daily Routine Orders issued on April 2 and April 3, respectively, by the air staff, the general staff and the naval staff. You create the impression that the general officers issued this because of their enthusiasm for something that was happening. Has it occurred to you that this might have all come down from the ministerial office for transmission to the troops?

Mr. PATRICK: Well, I must say that I knew Admiral Rayner—I had met him a few times—and although his statement was not full of enthusiasm, as you undoubtedly know, I think the other officers made statements which were quite categorical and were intended to leave the servicemen who read them with the idea that this was a good thing. Now, whether they were beaten over the head by the Minister and forced to say this, is pure conjecture. I do not know this; but perhaps you do. I knew the CAS at the time and I do not think he would have said this if he did not mean it.

Mr. CHURCHILL: On page 12 you say:

> Many of the same kind of people who raised such a fuss about getting a new flag now do so over the uniform and for the same reasons.

I submit to you that that is an insulting remark.

There was a long controversy in Parliament, and a large percentage of the population did not accept the new flag. Here you are saying that the fuss and the objection that are being raised now to the proposals for national defence are put forward for the same reasons.

There are certain members of this Committee who opposed the flag in the form in which it was presented to us, and for very sound reasons. Now you are suggesting that we are objecting to the proposed defence changes for similar reasons, and these, of course, you dimiss. I suggest to you that you are insulting members of this Committee, and I would hope that you would withdraw that statement.

Mr. LOISELLE: I do not consider myself insulted.

Mr. PATRICK: May I point out that General Foulkes has just finished saying the same thing. You did not consider that an insult.

Mr. CHURCHILL: On page 17 you say:

> It has been said that the soldiers of the First World War entered it with a romantic feeling.

Where did you get that idea? Were you in the First World War?

Mr. PATRICK: I certainly was not. I know you were.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I can tell you emphatically that the men who enlisted in 1915, 1916, 1917 and 1918, with the full knowledge that their lives might be sacrificed, did not enter that war with any romantic feeling. You are casting a slur on the men of the First World War.

Mr. LANIEL: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order—

Mr. CHURCHILL: It is an insulting document.

Mr. LANIEL: Mr. Chairman, I want to point out that even in official documents I have seen First World War posters—they were on streetcars—advertising for enlistment, and inviting people on a trip to Europe.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It does not matter what you have seen or read. I happen to have been there. I am talking from experience.

Mr. LANIEL: It is still one man's opinion, though. It was a free trip to Europe.

Mr. CHURCHILL: There was no romantic feeling; there was no free trip to Europe. That is an insult to the men of the First Canadian Corps in Europe who lost their lives.

The CHAIRMAN: Order, please, gentlemen. I think probably various members of the Committee have different interpretations of the word "romantic".

This is a personal brief and we have almost come to the end of our time. Mr. Laniel, do you have a question?

Mr. LANIEL: I have three very short questions.

Sir, do you classify yourself as a sincere, respectable Canadian who has done his share for the defence of this country, and as a taxpayer who has the right, and even the duty, to be concerned about military policy?

Mr. PATRICK: I certainly do. I happen to represent a point of view different from a number of the people, in that I joined the air force and was commissioned on September 6, 1939 and served every day of the war and served in the reserve or in auxiliary capacity up until I retired. I had 20 years' service after the war, or something of that order. I naturally have an opinion and I was anxious to offer it.

I am also a businessman, fundamentally, and my willingness to come before this Committee was to give you not just my views but the views of a very wide segment of the business community on this emerging defence policy.

Mr. MCINTOSH: On a point of order. The witness was asked whether he was a taxpayer.

Mr. Patrick, as a member of the Caribbean Investment Company do you pay Canadian income tax?

Mr. PATRICK: I certainly do. All of my income is declared in Canada.

Mr. LANIEL: Your last remark partly answered my next question, in the sense that this is not only your own personal opinion but the consensus of the people around you?

Mr. PATRICK: I am speaking for the group of people with whom I am normally in contact. Presumably this was the opinion that you wanted or I would not have been invited to appear.

Mr. LANIEL: Do you believe that Canadians are concerned about the project of unification and the accomplishments of our armed forces?

Mr. PATRICK: I think they are not nearly as interested in it as you may think they are. My contacts with the Canadian public suggest that they are attracted by any idea that is going to do a job better for less money.

Mr. LANIEL: This will be my last question. When you were asked in 1945 to prepare a paper to deliver here in Ottawa before a triservice meeting of senior officers, advocating unification as an urgent post-war program, did you get the impression that you were asked to do so because these people considered you competent to put forward ideas that could be implemented?

Mr. PATRICK: Yes. Perhaps I might explain that. I happened to have spent the last year or so of the war working very closely with the Americans on a whole new concept of guided missiles. Guided missiles had really not been part of the experience of our side during the last war, although the V-1 and the V-2 certainly were nuisances. My job called for me to have a fairly wide knowledge of these things at that time.

When I talk about military hardware, I was trying to analyse the impact of these new weapons. I had a story to tell; I had slides; and I even had an airplane with a television camera in it—something unheard of in those days—to demonstrate that things had to change.

Mr. LANIEL: And that paper was in favour of unification?

Mr. PATRICK: It specifically said that we had to look toward the time when there would be unification.

Mr. LANIEL: Was it based on emotion?

Mr. PATRICK: No; I think it was based on the new gadgets that were beginning to emerge.

Mr. LANIEL: Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I am afraid that time is going to dictate the extent of the questioning of Group Captain Patrick on his brief. I again apologize to him for keeping him waitng so long. The fault was almost entirely mine.

I very much appreciate your coming down here, and I am sure this is also true of the members of this Committee.

Mr. WINCH: Some of us appreciate your comments. Do not be disturbed by insulting remarks.

The CHAIRMAN: Our next meeting will be at 3.30 on Monday afternoon, when General Moncel will be present. On Tuesday we will have Air Marshal Annis at 10 a.m. and Air Vice Marshal Hendrick in the afternoon. Thank you.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966-67

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. DAVID W. GROOS

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 22

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1967

Respecting

Bill C-243, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and other Acts in consequence thereof.

WITNESS:

Lieutenant-General R. W. Moncel, D.S.O., O.B.E., C.D.

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25812—1

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. David W. Groos

Vice-Chairman: Hon. Marcel Lambert

Mr. Andras,
Mr. Brewin,
Mr. Deachman,
Mr. Forrestall,
Mr. Foy,
Mr. Harkness,
[2]Mr. Hopkins,
Mr. Langlois (*Chicoutimi*),
Mr. Laniel,
Mr. Latulippe,
[1]Mr. Legault,
Mr. Lessard,
Mr. Loiselle,
Mr. Macaluso,
Mr. MacLean (*Queens*),
Mr. MacRae,
Mr. McIntosh,
Mr. McNulty,
Mr. Nugent,
[1]Mr. Ormiston,
Mr. Rochon,
Mr. Winch—(24).

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

[1] Replaced Messrs. Churchill, Éthier and Stafford on February 20, 1967.

ORDER OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS

MONDAY, February 20, 1967.

Ordered,—That the names of Messrs. Ormiston, Hopkins and Legault be substituted for those of Messrs. Churchill, Ethier and Stafford on the Standing Committee on National Defence.

Attest.

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

25812—1½

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

MONDAY, February 20, 1967.
(39)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 3:40 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. David W. Groos, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Brewin, Deachman, Ethier, Forrestall, Foy, Groos, Harkness, Lambert, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laniel, Lessard, Loiselle, Macaluso, MacLean (*Queens*), MacRae, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Ormiston, Rochon, Stafford and Mr. Winch—(23).

In attendance: Lieutenant-General R. W. Moncel; *From the Department of National Defence:* Honourable Léo Cadieux, Associate Minister; Air Marshal F. R. Sharp, Vice Chief Defence Staff.

The Chairman read the Ninth Report of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure which is as follows:

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AGENDA AND PROCEDURE

FRIDAY, February 17, 1967.

NINTH REPORT

Your Subcommittee met to consider the calling of additional witnesses in connection with Bill C-243. Your Subcommittee recommends as follows:

1. That Lt. Gen. R. W. Moncel; Lt. Gen. F. J. Fleury; Lt. Gen. G. Walsh; A/M C. Annis and A/V/M M. Hendrick, should be invited to appear, on a voluntary basis to answer the Committee's questions during the week of February 20, 1967.
2. That one of the following, Lt. Gen. Moncel; Lt. Gen. Fleury or Lt. Gen. Walsh, should be invited to appear on Monday, February 20, 1957.
3. That A/M Annis and A/V/M Hendrick should be invited to appear on Tuesday, February 21, 1967.
4. That the remaining two witnesses, if available, should appear on Wednesday, February 22, 1967.

Your Subcommittee also noted a general agreement that the Committee should try to complete the questioning of witnesses, including the Minister and members of the Defence Staff, in time to commence clause by clause discussion of Bill C-243 on Monday, February 27, 1967.

Following a discussion of the recommendation contained in the Ninth Report of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure, the Committee agreed to receive the Report.

The Chairman introduced the witness, Lieutenant-General R. W. Moncel, who was asked to outline his military career. The witness then proceeded to answer questions from the members of the Committee concerning military planning and organization, and his views on the implications of *Bill C-243*.

At 6:05 p.m., with the questioning continuing, the Committee adjourned until 8:00 p.m. this day.

EVENING SITTING
(40)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 8:15 p.m. this day, the Chairman, Mr. Groos, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Deachman, Forrestall, Foy, Groos, Harkness, Hopkins, Lambert, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laniel, Legault, Lessard, Loiselle, Macaluso, MacLean (*Queens*), MacRae, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Ormiston, Rochon, and Mr. Winch—(22).

Also present: Messrs. Berger, Chatterton, Mackasey, McCleave, Prud'homme, Régimbal, Stanbury, Tolmie, Watson (*Assiniboia*).

In attendance: Same as at the afternoon sitting.

Lieutenant-General Moncel continued to answer questions posed by the members of the Committee during the evening sitting, on a variety of defence matters related to subjects dealt with in *Bill C-243*.

The questioning was concluded at approximately 10:30 p.m. The Chairman thanked the witness for his appearance before the Committee. The Committee adjourned until 10:00 a.m. on Tuesday, February 21, 1967 when the witness will be Air Marshal C. L. Annis.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

MONDAY, February 20, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen before we begin the business of the day I would ike to present the ninth report of the steering committee on agenda and pro-:edure which met on Friday. The report is as follows. (*See Minutes of Pro-eedings*).

Mr. LAMBERT: This requires the questioning of witnesses.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): I want to make one observation. I thought that iere was a reservation at that time with regard to making definitive recommen-lations as to when the committee might be prepared to start the detailed :xamination of the bill. I thought that it was left fluid to some extent.

The CHAIRMAN: There was nothing nailed down in this connection; it was rought up, discussed, and it seemed to the chairman and the secretary that there vas general agreement.

Mr. WINCH: It set forward an impossible goal—

A hon. MEMBER: —which we hoped we could achieve; that was my under-tanding of it, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, it is whistling "Dixie".

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, there is only one point I want to make in onnection with the report. I was wondering why "on a voluntary basis" was ccented. Perhaps some of these gentlemen may have some hesitation in getting mbroiled. I hope that the invitation from the committee, although politely vorded, is couched in such terms that it will be understood by these gentlemen hat an option is not open to them, no matter what their personal feelings are. It s the feeling of this committee that we must have their advice and, therefore, hey are required.

The CHAIRMAN: I think, Mr. Nugent, that one of the very first things that we dopted in this committee as a whole, was the principle that witnesses who ttended were attending as voluntary witnesses and that there was no question f their being required. If the men now are being required, it is something new o this committee. Is there anything further that we should say about that?

Are you suggesting now that anybody we call is really required to come.

Mr. NUGENT: I should think that if any witnesses have been asked in that ıanner—that is, that it is purely voluntary whether or not they want to come—nd should decline, then we will have to reconsider immediately the terms in vhich the invitation is put. This committee is interested in getting information; ıese gentlemen have information; it is our duty to get it, and no matter how

politely we express it, I think it should be understood by all that we have the power to call them, and require them.

The CHAIRMAN: I do not think that there is any doubt that the committee, if it wished to actually put a motion and take a vote, would have the power; whether they would want to exercise this power, is another matter.

Mr. MCNULTY: Mr. Chairman, this was discussed in the steering committee, as you will recall. Some of the witnesses who had been asked earlier declined to come and then they were asked again at the request of two members of the steering committee, at which time it was emphasized that we would like to hear their testimony. However, I think that it was decided that we should not bring any one here under duress.

The CHAIRMAN: "Compulsion" I think, was the word. The reason that "In a voluntary basis" was emphasized was that there was some question whether a person who is still on retirement leave would want to come on a voluntary basis inasmuch as, technically, he is still in the service, and might have some reservation about this.

Mr. LAMBERT: I think most of the people that might be invited to attend would take a responsible position in this regard. I agree with Mr. Nugent that this might be something that might be considered at some time if the case should arise.

The CHAIRMAN: If the case arises, but not otherwise.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): Mr. Chairman, I think that everyone here is familiar with the fact that in the case of many committees, organizations, and even individuals write, asking for the privilege to appear before the committee. However, as I understand it, in this case the initiative in respect of most of the witnesses, must come from the committee rather than from the witness, and as long as that is understood, I think that meets our requirement.

The CHAIRMAN: I think that is so. Although people have indicated to the committee that they would like to appear, in actual fact the initiative has come from the committee itself.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, I trust that the report you read does not indicate that the steering committee came to any decision that no other witnesses would be called in addition to the ones which you outlined. To begin with, Mr. Deachman, I think was insistant that one other witness be called, and I think that there are some other witnesses whom we probably should hear also. I was not able to be here on Friday but I read in the newspapers that Admiral Rayner had asked to be heard. I would hope that there is no thought that this would exhaust, say, witnesses that the committee would hear.

The CHAIRMAN: That is something, of course, that the committee itself will have to decide upon.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, being a member of that steering commitee, it was agreed on two or three occasions at the meeting Monday that our objective would be to deal and finish with the witnesses this week, including the return of the Minister and the senior members of the serving defence staff and then start on clause by clause consideration of the bill a week from today. I believe that was established quite emphatically.

Mr. NUGENT: That is not even in the report. I do not know how you can say it is established.

Mr. ANDRAS: It certainly was discussed.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): My understanding is that the steering committee decided that would be an objective, but that no firm decision could be taken until the next meeting of the steering committee.

The CHAIRMAN: We did not nail it down to the floor but the secretary and I felt that this was the general feeling of the committee and that is the reason it was put in the report. I think we should now hear and question the present witness and then perhaps we could get together and establish something more definite in regard to our routine from here on.

Mr. LAMBERT: I will repeat again, Mr. Chairman, that in my book this committee has responsibilities within the ambit of the work of other committees and of the House and that it is sheer utter nonsense to try to say that you are going to work from Monday afternoon right through Friday afternoon attempting to ram these witnesses through, and I certainly will not have any part of that.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Lambert, you did bring this matter up and I appreciate your concern; we had a general agreement among the committee last week that we would try to cut down on this five day a week series of meetings. This is what we try to do but unfortunately, we were caught up by events of the committee's own wishes. I would like to do something about it this week and perhaps if we get together on this, we might be able to do something by Wednesday.

Mr. LAMBERT: Last week, it was a scheduling by the chairman and the secretary, not the steering committee or anybody else. Let us have that clear.

The CHAIRMAN: No; I accept that.

Mr. LAMBERT: That is all I am going to say about it. I categorically refuse to ram witnesses through on this basis.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lambert was not here last week as he does not know whether or not witnesses were rammed through. I suggest the opposite was the case. I just want that clarified on the record.

The CHAIRMAN: It is a matter of interpretation.

Mr. MACALUSO: However, I would suggest Mr. Chairman—if I still have the floor—that perhaps you can get together with the steering committee at our adjournment at 6 o'clock and discuss this so that we can come to some decision on this matter by this evening.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Let us get the record straight. Mr. Macaluso said that the witnesses were not rushed through. The record will reveal that I had other questions to ask Admiral Landymore, which I did not have the opportunity to ask because of certain circumstances, and I am not saying that we had anything to do with those. However, I will deal with this subject in a different manner. I want assurance now from you, as chairman, that the witnesses, whoever they are or however few they are, are not going to be rushed, and that we are going to be given the opportunity to ask them all questions to our satisfaction, whether the other side wants it or not.

The CHAIRMAN: I hope you will agree that I am doing my best.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I agree, but I want the assurance that we can question these witnesses as much as we want, with no restrictions on our questions.

The CHAIRMAN: I think the record will show that there has been pretty generous, opportunity for questioning.

Mr. MCINTOSH: In connection with what was said about Admiral Landymore, Mr. Macaluso was not here at the time.

Mr. MACALUSO: You must not have been here because I was here throughout the whole meeting. Do not make remarks like that in my presence.

An hon. MEMBER: That remark was pretty strong there, Mr. Macaluso.

The CHAIRMAN: Order. Mr. Macaluso, gentlemen, Mr. Brewin has a question.

Mr. BREWIN: I can understand Mr. Lambert's point, that we do not want to ram any witnesses through, but I wondered if we had some degree of clarity or unanimity as to witnesses we were going to call. It seems to me that before we do any planning, we should hear fairly soon from the members of this committee as a whole, whether there are other witnesses, in addition to those that you named, that they believe we ought to call. I do not mean that we then shut the door if some new person appears whose evidence is absolutely essential, but I think it would be helpful if we knew how many witnesses, quite apart from the question of how long they are going to be examined, will be coming.

The CHAIRMAN: It seemed to me from discussions in the steering committee and from conversations that I have had directly with some members from all sides, that there are a number of questions that have been raised by witnesses already to which we need answers which can be given only by the Minister, and when the Minister gives these answers, it may cut down on the amount of questioning that has to take place before the committee as a whole.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Mr. Chairman, if you are finished with the report of the steering committee could I ask whether or not my understanding is correct, that a telegram was directed to the committee from Rear Admiral Landymore dealing with certain statements that he made based on information he allegedly received from Admiral Welland. I have a copy of this telegram in my office.

The CHAIRMAN: I have not received one. Have you?

Mr. FORRESTALL: Apparently I received the copy before you received the original telegram.

An hon. MEMBER: That sounds logical.

The CHAIRMAN: No, I do not have this.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I thought it could be tabled and included as part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN: Of course it can. I just left my office a moment ago and I had not received it, and the secretary tells me he has not received it.

Mr. FORRESTALL: My copy arrived an hour ago, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: What is your wish in respect of this report of the subcommittee on agenda and procedure. You have heard the comments that have been made by the committee on the report.

Mr. LAMBERT: I move that we receive the report of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN: There does not seem to be anything in here that requires specific adoption. What we have agreed to recommend in respect to inviting witnesses to attend is now in the process of being done, so until such time as we are able to get together we will just receive it.

I would now like to ask General Moncel, who has been invited to appear before us, to join me at the table.

It was the wish of the committee, General Moncel, that you should be invited to appear here before us to answer questions and we are pleased that you were able to accept. Do you have a brief that you wish to present. If not—

Mr. WINCH: Is there some statement you would like to make prior to questioning?

Lieutenant General R. W. MONCEL: No.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, possibly General Moncel might briefly outline his past service to us because it has been customary to do that.

The CHAIRMAN: That is agreeable. A number of witnesses have done this.

Mr. MONCEL: Very well, if you like. I joined the Militia as a private soldier in 1934, was granted my commission as a second lieutenant and went through all the officer ranks to my present rank. I commanded at platoon, company, battalion, brigade, division, army command level; I held staff appointments at the third grade level in an armoured brigade. I was Brigade Major, First Armoured Brigade, G2, Fifth Armoured Division; GSO 1 (operations) at 2 Canadian Corps; Director of the Armoured Corps, Director of Military Training, Deputy Chief of the General Staff in those days, Quartermaster General and Commander, Eastern Command. I served as Senior Canadian Army Liaison officer in London and Military Adviser to the High Commissioner. I headed the military component of the International Control Commission in Viet Nam; I was Controller General to the Forces and, finally, Vice Chief of Defence Forces.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh?

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, since there is no brief presented by the General, I would like to question him on evidence that already been given to the Committee. As he was very close to the Minister in his position as Vice Chief, I have several lists of questions on different evidence and I was wondering if you were restricting us to a period of time in our questions and if you say "yes". If so, and you give me my time, that will determine which evidence I start on.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, I do not have a long list of questioners at the moment before me and I think that if you care to start off, I will play it by ear. I certainly will not limit you to less than 15 minutes.

Mr. MCINTOSH: The first question, General, is on Admiral Landymore's testimony. Then, Mr. Chairman, I will pause and ask if I am being too long.

General, in Admiral Landymore's testimony he suggested to the Committee that we endeavour to obtain further evidence as to the results and futility of the unification program. As a former member of the General Staff, could you first tell us anything about the present emergency defence and mobilization plan of the departments or the plans, as they were, when you left.

Mr. MONCEL: Is that in Viet Nam?

Mr. MCINTOSH: Yes.

Mr. MONCEL: I can, but I do not think I should.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Were you satisfied with the emergency defence plans and the mobilization plan as they were when you were Vice Chief.

The CHAIRMAN: Could you tell us when you retired?

Mr. MONCEL: July. No; I do not think that anybody is ever satisfied with a plan. Obviously they are constantly being updated and new factors constantly come to light. I do not think anybody at any time can ever say that he is truly satisfied with any plan?

Mr. MCINTOSH: I agree with you; you cannot at any time say that you are truly satisfied. However, at the time when you left could you say if the services were able to respond effectively to the demands placed on them?

Mr. MONCEL: It depends on the demands. We were meeting the daily demands. Whether we could have met all the demands that might have been made on us is of course a very different thing and I simply do not know. I would have to know what the demands were.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Did you agree with the mobilization plans and the emergency defence plans at that time?

Mr. MONCEL: I wrote them.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Under the direction of the Minister or of your own accord?

Mr. MONCEL: It was my job to produce these.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Did the mobilization plans at that time entertain the idea of compulsory military service or conscription?

Mr. MONCEL: No.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Did you contemplate that they would in the near future?

Mr. MONCEL: I never did.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Since you left the position as Vice Chief, General, the information that we have is that recruiting has been gradually falling off. Knowing the problems that you had with recruiting when you were Vice Chief, would you say that it would be necessary for Canada, if this plan of unification was implemented, to resort to compulsory military service or conscription to get recruits?

Mr. MONCEL: I would genuinely hope not.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Admiral Landymore suggested that we get information from the official report on the result of FALLEX, I think he said it was, and he further suggested that it would give us "a shock or two". What was the exercise FALLEX?

Mr. MONCEL: I could but I think it would be much more appropriate if somebody who was actually in the business these days told you about that. I had a lot to do with it at the time but because I was not there when the exercise took place, I am not an expert witness.

Mr. McINTOSH: You may not be an expert witness on this, but I understand that this took place when you were Vice Chief—

Mr. MONCEL: No; after I left.

Mr. McINTOSH: It was after you left. Did you plan it?

Mr. MONCEL: I had to do with it, yes.

Mr. McINTOSH: Did you at any time see the official report on this exercise?

Mr. MONCEL: No.

Mr. McINTOSH: So then, you can contribute nothing to what Admiral Landymore was getting at when he said that "this Committee would be shocked as a result of that report"?

Mr. MONCEL: I am afraid I was not here when he got at whatever he was getting at. All I read in the newspaper was one paragraph and it did not seem that he could have said what was stated.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, this was part of his brief to the Committee and it was clearly stated in his report.

He further suggested that we call Admiral Burchell and, "Ask him for his findings in relation to the failures of the materiel organization". Vice Chief, can you give us any information as to what these failures were?

Mr. MONCEL: I could possibly give you some information on what I think the potential failures might be, but I think for a specific word you would be far better off to ask Burchell, who was indeed involved in a much more direct way than I was.

Mr. McINTOSH: You heard the Chairman's remarks; it is doubtful whether we are going to have him as a witness before us. I think it would be valuable to the Committee if we get all the information we can on this particular subject. If you have any information that you can give us, we would appreciate it.

Mr. MONCEL: In my time, Materiel Command was in a very embryonic stage and essentially the old system was operating. We had just made the first faltering steps of putting this thing together and from the point of view of where I sat, Materiel Command did not fail.

Mr. McINTOSH: You would say that there were no evident failures, as far as you are concerned?

Mr. MONCEL: No.

Mr. McINTOSH: Admiral Landymore further stated, "Our country's defence is more important than partisan politics." He also said, "Our defence must not be prejudiced by stubborn, blind adherence to a party line, and our servicemen must not become fodder for political cannon." Do you agree with those statements of Admiral Landymore?

Mr. MONCEL: Could I have them again a little more slowly?

Mr. McINTOSH: He said first,

Our country's defence is more important than partisan politics.

Mr. MONCEL: I would think this was a fair statement.

Mr. McINTOSH: The second statement he made is,

> Our defence must not be prejudiced by stubborn, blind adherence to a party line,—

Mr. MONCEL: This is like motherhood in early spring, I suppose.

Mr. McINTOSH: He also said,

> —and our servicemen must not become fodder for political cannon.

Mr. MONCEL: Amen.

Mr. McINTOSH: I take it you agree with those statements.

Was it because you subscribe to such principles as outlined here that you left your position as Vice Chief of Defence Staff?

Mr. MONCEL: No.

Mr. McINTOSH: It had nothing to do with it?

Mr. MONCEL: I never thought of those three things.

Mr. McINTOSH: Would you tell the Committee, General, why then you made the decision to leave your position as Vice Chief?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes. I left essentially because I did not feel that under the then conditions and the conditions which I suspected were about to materialize that I could continue loyally to carry out my instructions.

Mr. McINTOSH: And what were those conditions, General?

Mr. MONCEL: The conditions, which I specifically refer to are as follows. At this stage of the operation, the lines were pretty well drawn and it was abundantly clear to me that we were going to force ahead with this process of unification which, to me, appeared to be moving on an uncharted course at a very, very high speed toward a very, very dim destination, and I did not think that I could produce the staff work necessary at that speed to keep the thing on the rails.

Mr. McINTOSH: You said, this "appeared" to you. Could you give us a definition of what your interpretation of the word "unification" means?

Mr. MONCEL: I understand it to mean a single Canadian defence force with a name and a title and a disappearance of these three services as we know them today.

Mr. McINTOSH: Might I also ask you, General, if you had not been retired at that time, how much longer could you have served before the regular retirement age?

Mr. MONCEL: I was not retired. I retired. I could have gone on, I suppose, another six years.

Mr. McINTOSH: Now I refer back to Admiral Landymore's evidence: He said:

> Unification has very little, if any, merit. It is a change for the sake of change. It is unnecessary and expensive. It is oriented politically and not militarily. It is, and will continue to be destructive of morale. It is riddled with inconsistencies and with impractical and unrealistic promises.

Are you in disagreement with any of those statements?

Mr. MONCEL: Oh, I think I would have put them in slightly different terms. Again, if you want me to comment on them, I would like to know a little more of the context in which he said those things.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well I will pick out an example. He said,

It is, and will continue to be destructive of morale.

Do you feel that this policy of unification or this plan of unification will be destructive to morale?

Mr. MONCEL: Not with a change of commitments.

Mr. MCINTOSH: And what do you mean by "a change of commitments"?

Mr. MONCEL: In the light of the commitments that are undertaken and which indeed are spelled for us in the White Paper, a unified force has no place. Now if you want to change the commitments to a commitment—I could write one for you if you want—which would call for a unified force then unification per se is obviously a good thing, if you change your commitments; but if you do change your commitments and produce a unified force to meet these much reduced commitments, then you should bear in mind that you are never again going to have a commitment that might call for something other than a unified force. I think this is the key to the whole thing.

Mr. MCINTOSH: By "commitments", do you mean our commitments to such alliances as NATO, NORAD and so on?

Mr. MONCEL: Precisely.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I also have some questions to ask you on General Foulkes evidence, when I come to it. I think that he said that an airborne brigade, as explained by the Minister, was useless. Do you believe that—with its own aircraft and so on?

Mr. MONCEL: I do not know in what context General Foulkes said this. I can write you a scenario which would show that it was useless. I wrote one which I thought showed that it was essential.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, I will continue on with Admiral Landymore, and we will come to that in a moment.

Admiral Landymore also said in his evidence that in Bill No. C-243 which is now before the Committee, the powers of the Minister of National Defence are far too sweeping; that he is given a blank cheque.

Did you get that impression from looking over the bill?

Mr. MONCEL: I must confess that I did not really look over the bill. All I read were the explanatory notes, as I believe they are called, on the first page which says that the object of this exercise is to introduce this bill and that the time is now considered appropriate so to do. I presume that this is what we are here for—to discuss whether this is the appropriate time to do this. I know some of the details of the bill, obviously, because I have worked on a lot of them—bits and pieces of them—but I have not gone through the complete bill.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Did the Minister ever convey to you why he felt it necessary to have these sweeping powers that have been referred to?

Mr. MONCEL: About a thousand times.

Mr. McINTOSH: And what were his reasons, General?

Mr. MONCEL: All genuine in his mind, I am certain; but, I think, founded on a basic belief that this was the right thing, and if you did not believe that this was the right thing, well, then you were stupid.

Mr. McINTOSH: Did you ever agree with him, or encourage him, in any way that this is what should take place within the Department of National Defence?

Mr. MONCEL: In the early stages I most certainly did.

Mr. McINTOSH: And when did you disagree with him, then?

Mr. MONCEL: When it became apparent to me that this bill on unification was going to be brought forward at this time.

Mr. McINTOSH: Under the authority granted to the Minister in Bill No. C-243, could the Minister, in your opinion, commit the Canadian forces anywhere without consulting Parliament?

Mr. MONCEL: I cannot believe this.

Mr. McINTOSH: Do you feel that that was the intention at any time?

Mr. MONCEL: Certainly not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. McINTOSH: Do you feel that the Minister's or anyone else's having complete unrestricted powers over the military is desirable in a country such as ours?

I think your answer to that would be obvious.

Mr. MONCEL: Well, if that is so perhaps you would let me answer it.

Obviously, as the responsible minister he must have very sweeping powers in his department, as in any other department. He is charged, as I understand it, by the Cabinet and by the government with responsibility for it. He is directly and personally responsible for it. Patently, if you are going to be responsible you have got to have authority and power. I do feel that there should be some restraints built in.

Mr. McINTOSH: More sweeping powers than any previous minister has had, General?

Mr. MONCEL: It is not a question of having more. It is a question of exercising it.

Mr. McINTOSH: Admiral Landymore further stated that the Committee should call the commander of Materiel Command and seek from him satisfaction on whether his command can support the armed forces under emergency conditions. The Admiral said that we would be seriously perturbed at the answer that we would receive.

Is it your opinion that Materiel Command could, or could not, support the Canadian armed forces under emergency conditions at the present time?

Mr. MONCEL: At the present time?

Mr. McINTOSH: Yes; or at the time you left office?

Mr. MONCEL: Well, as I said before, when I left, Materiel Command existed really in name only. We had put a nominal head in, but the three separate systems that supported the forces were still intact. At that time I think that we could have performed. What state they have them in now, I do not know.

Mr. McINTOSH: He also suggested that we call the commander of Maritime Command and ask the following questions: What he considered were acceptable limits of unification? How his command will be more efficient and more economical? Whether administration has increased or decreased with unification? How our ships are being manned?

Can you offer any suggestion about what answers we would get if those questions were asked?

Mr. MONCEL: No; I could not begin to guess at what he might say.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, I understand that you were closely connected with Maritime Command at one time, General. Could you not give us some indication of whether you were perturbed about the conditions either while you were commander or after you came to Ottawa on the Defence Staff?

Mr. MONCEL: You must be clear about my connection. I think we are talking of two different commands. I commanded the army, Eastern Command, which happened to have its headquarters in Halifax, next door to Maritime Command, which was commanded in my day by Jeffrey Brock, and before that by Kenneth Dyer.

Mr. McINTOSH: What has been your experience, since you came to Ottawa as part of the Defence Committee, of any problems that were arising there, or that would arise, in your opinion, if unification were put into effect.

Mr. MONCEL: Problems in Maritime Command?

Mr. McINTOSH: Yes; about whether the suggestions put forward under unification, as you understand it, and as you discussed it with the Minister, would create any further problems to Maritime Command? Would it be efficient? Would it be economical?

Mr. MONCEL: Well, of course, there are all kinds of problems that we envisaged could materialize. I suppose the most serious, in my mind, was the very, very real lack of supervision of the Maritime Commander at headquarters level.

What you have to understand is that we took a "chap"—the fellow in Halifax now, whatever his name is—and we put him in charge of both coasts, which is the entire navy, as we used to know it, and to his responsibilities we added Maritime Air Command. We gave to this one man—one man now—the same responsibilities that at one time were handled by two Admirals, one on the east coast and one on the west coast, backed by a naval board. It was the job of the commanders to command, and the job of the naval board to supervise, to inspire, to instruct, and, if necessary to restrain these men. Now you have given this wretched "chap" all these responsibilities. You are asking him to run the thing, to train it, and, if necessary, to fight it, and he is not backed by any real knowledgeable deepsea-going body. You have one sailor of any rank in the headquarters, who at the moment is Controller General. He happens to be a seagoing type, but he could just as easily be a paymaster. From a ministerial point of view this is where your naval control is. It is possible.

Mr. McINTOSH: This is my last question on Admiral Landymore's testimony, General. He made this statement: "Unification is a mistake". Do you agree with that?

Mr. MONCEL: I would say that it would be a mistake. You have not done it yet, I hope.

Mr. MCINTOSH: It would be a mistake?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Do you wish me to continue, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN: Well, not if this is a convenient time to stop. You have had 12 minutes.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Put me down for the second round.

The CHAIRMAN: I will put you down again. Next we have Mr. MacRae.

Mr. MACRAE: General Moncel, would you be so kind as to explain to me again, because I did not quite catch all of it the first time, just exactly what you understand unification to mean in our armed forces today.

Mr. MONCELL: I do not know if I am going to say precisely what I said last time, but, as I understand it, unification means the disbanding of the three services as they exist today and the creation of a single Canadian armed forces, if that is the term.

Mr. MACRAE: Would it be correct for me to say that you agreed with the principle of a certain amount of integration, certainly as far as it had gone when you were there, or up until just before you left?

Mr. MONCEL: Oh, one hundred per cent; wholeheartedly, yes.

Mr. MACRAE: But as I understood your testimony, one of the things that disturbed you was that the unification process was proceeding far too rapidly as far as you were concerned, from your experience as an officer of the forces.

This is a matter of economics. Is it your opinion that for an equivalent expenditure in the National Defence budget we will have a more efficient, better-equipped force after we have become unified, as you understand it, than we had with the three services? What is your feeling? Have I made myself clear there?

Mr. MONCEL: I think so. Within the context of what you are asking the forces to do, of the White Paper and of the roles and commitments you have given to them, my answer is no.

Mr. MACRAE: How much value, General Moncel, do you put on morale and esprit de corps in private units and private service in the matter of ability and willingness to do a job in this disturbed world?

Mr. MONCEL: It obviously is a very, very real factor. In a voluntary force such as ours it is of very real importance.

Mr. MACRAE: Do you feel that if the Canadian forces are unified morale will be as high, as you know it in the forces today and as you knew it in the forces when you left, or will morale suffer under unification?

Mr. MONCEL: If you change your commitments and are unified properly there is no reason at all why the morale should drop. If you leave the commitments as they are and proceed with this bill and you attempt to unify under the system which, as I understand it, they are trying to, I think you are in for very serious trouble.

Mr. MacRae: Thank you.

Mr. Nugent: General, it is the circumstances of your leaving that I find most interesting. Naturally, it must be of considerable concern to the nation that so many like you, with many valuable years left—perhaps the most valuable years—have been compulsorily retired so early. Perhaps you will not mind my probing a little more deeply into your reasons for leaving.

I believe you said that the essence of the reason for your leaving was that you felt that you could not do your best to carry out the policies as you understood them at that time, and that therefore the only honourable course was to resign?

Mr. Moncel: That is right, yes.

Mr. Nugent: If my notes are correct you summarized it by saying that we were moving on an uncharted course at a very high speed towards an unknown destination.

Mr. Moncel: That is rather good. Did I say that?

Mr. Nugent: I thought it was, too. I thought it was very neat. I believe that my note is correct. Is it an accurate reflection of your feelings about the whole situation?

Mr. Moncel: Yes, I think so.

Mr. Nugent: If I deal with the last part first, the unknown destination, can I relate that to our commitments, as expressed, however vaguely, in the White Paper, and to the question of the apparent design of the forces and what they would be useful for? Was there a conflict, in your mind, therefore, between what the Minister said in the White Paper and the manner in which he was trying to redesign our forces?

Mr. Moncel: A conflict?

Mr. Nugent: Yes.

Mr. Moncel: Yes, I think there was. First of all, the White Paper was a really splendid document, a courageous document, and one that I wish I had written. It was the first decent sign that I had seen in some thirty odd years that the role of the forces might be organized in the light of what we had committed ourselves to.

I wrote, I suppose, three or four parts of other White Papers but they always came out, after the event, as a neat catalogue of the splendid things we had done, and really were not worth the paper they were written on.

This was the first time that a White Paper had been produced in advance, saying "This is what we are going to do". It was very good.

It is an excellent paper provided people do not try to interpret it as a Holy Book. The intent was there and I think it was very good—splendid. It was wrong in about two, principal things, I suppose. First, to translate the White Paper into the force that it called for required, by all my calculations, a force of 150,000 at a budget of $2,000,000,064 accruing at 5 per cent. I could never do for less than what what the White Paper said could be done. Secondly, it grossly over-estimated the amount of fat that allegedly was there to be trimmed.

We have not been completely stupid for the last 25 years. There are some very, very able people in both the civil and military side who are very much aware of the need for economy in the forces. I think this was the fundamental flaw in the Paper. You can do all the kinds of fancy footwork you want to and jump around and say: We will do this and with the same forces we can do this and that. That is fine, providing nobody calls your bluff and asks you to do two things at the same time. Then you are in trouble.

Mr. NUGENT: Perhaps this would be the appropriate time to deal with your second point of very high speed. In this search for any fat that might exist and to trim it off, I imagine that at times are going to make a real effort it requires a certain amount of imagination and a certain amount of appraisal of the anticipated results, and that when it is being done, there must be a careful plan and a careful appraisal afterwards. Would it be a fair commentary on your statement about very high speed that there was not sufficient planning, not sufficient care, or that some or all of these steps were being proceeded with a little too recklessly?

Mr. MONCEL: I could see my way through the need and the requirement to move quite quickly into phase one of this the process of integration, where we had to pull the staff together and get the thing launched. I was quite prepared for it and quite confident that the staff we had could cope with this. The first eight months' work that we did from about 1964 on was really splendid. Spirit was very high and we had a very, very strong and very, very able staff. In that eight months we brought off a near-miracle.

What we needed was about five years to digest it. Changing policy is a cinch. It takes about three "chaps" with pencils to change it. My job always was to translate that policy into reality. My experience has been that with a force of about 150,000 odd strong to run a major change through the machine, to get the result back, and to polish it and refine it and to get it in reasonable shape, takes about three to four years.

This may seem ponderous, and sound as though we were rather stupid, but it took about that long to introduce something, particularly if it was geared to the commitments involved.

I was well aware of the fact that the White Paper said that unification was the ultimate end. That was fine. There was nothing wrong with it as an aim. There was nothing wrong with it all; and it may be that had they been given the time it might not have taken five years; it ought have taken three or four years in which a plot could have been evolved and the commitments altered to make unification fit like a glove without all this nonsense and trouble that we have had.

One-third of the way through the process of trying to straighten out this traumatic experience of the rebuilding we suddenly were told, "You have now got to unify by the end of centennial year,", or whenever it was. I thought it was wrong, and did the only thing I could do, having exhausted every other possibility.

Mr. NUGENT: I have a point on which I would like clarification. Many have left. You told us that when this started you had a very good staff, and that the spirit was high and that morale was high, even in the top echelons. Would you

say that they were completely loyal and pulling as hard as they could to try to make the policy work to the best of their ability?

Mr. MONCEL: Certainly, certainly; they could not have accomplished the results they did without this spirit.

What you must understand is that you have a splendid, highly-trained organization. In fact, if it has a weakness, it is that it is too highly trained and too obedient. It can, if necessary, write and carry out a plan to destroy itself.

Mr. NUGENT: General, it is that splendid organization that now, for all practical purposes, has disappeared, is it not?

Mr. MONCEL: I did not say that.

Mr. NUGENT: Most of the key personnel that were there at that time have been displaced and are now out of the services completely or shifted around into less responsible positions, are they not?

Mr. MONCEL: Not most; some may have been. There is still a very, very able staff who say in public that they can carry this out, and my constant prayer and hope is that, if they are going to do it, they can.

Mr. NUGENT: Would the members of that staff feel it to be their duty, as you did, to advise the Minister, or to make sure that those responsible are aware, of their misgivings, or to make known what, boom their own military skill and judgment, was a basic failure and bring it forward with the hope that it would be corrected?

Mr. MONCEL: You would have to ask them. I do not know.

Mr. NUGENT: Well, were you aware at any time among the people you were dealing with, of any dragging of the feet, or reluctance to discuss the practical realities of trying to bring this about?

Mr. MONCEL: There was no dragging of feet and no reluctance on anybody's part.

Mr. NUGENT: Did these people talk quite frankly to you and to the Defence Staff generally about some of the practical difficulties and day-to-day problems as they arose?

Mr. MONCEL: Of course they did; this is the essence of their business.

Mr. NUGENT: I am also interested in your remark about moving on an uncharted course. To me, that has a connotation of not sufficient planning. Would it be fair to say that?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes. As I tried to explain previously, I think we went off into the first phase of integration with the idea that we were going to produce a single staff. This I thought we could make work, and I think we did. Then we were going to look at every conceivable element of the force, and where it made sense, in the light of our commitments, to combine them into one we were going to do it. In many cases we did this and these were good things.

The internal communication system in Canada, for example, needed a thorough overhaul. We had been trying to overhaul it for 15 years. We suddenly had our opportunity. We made that into one. This is a good thing. It did not affect our commitments; in fact, it tied in with our commitments. We were

progressing quite merrily down this line of approach which I think was sound and which I thoroughly supported.

Mr. NUGENT: In this attempt to integrate command where you could, and where there would be an advantage, would there not be some instances where an integrated command, after a careful review and weighing of all the circumstances, would decide, "No, this is one place where we cannot have a unified command"?

Mr. MONCEL: Oh, certainly. With whom, for example, are you going to integrate Air Transport Command? There is nobody to integrate it with.

Mr. NUGENT: I know that question sounded silly but it bore some relation to the Minister's statement that the end result of integration is unification. I wanted to try to indicate that although integration is a progressive performance, and you can find many places where it operates, that does not necessarily mean that integration works everywhere or that it has no other logical end but unification?

Mr. MONCEL: Precisely; and as I tried to explain to one of the other inquisitors this depends entirely on your commitments. Give me a pencil and a scratch pad and I will write you a commitment for the country which will generate the need for a unified force. It is very simple. But with your current commitments you do not want one. In fact, it is better that you do not have one.

Mr. NUGENT: The reason for the high morale, the enthusiasm and the tremendous amount of work done by the staff when you started this was simply that you were doing those things which you thought made the Canadian armed forces more suitable for, and better able to carry out, our commitments and because you were making strides towards reducing costs?

Mr. MONCEL: Precisely.

Mr. NUGENT: Your disillusionment began—and correct me if I am wrong—when you found that the end goal of unification was going to mean that Canada's policies or commitments must necessarily be changed to fit the Minister's idea of unification.

Mr. MONCEL: No, no, no; that is wrong.

Mr. NUGENT: Or could only work, then, if the commitments were changed.

Mr. MONCEL: I became distressed because we were moving too quickly without an adequate plan, into the final phase of unification.

Mr. NUGENT: Did you ever hear of a plan of unification?

Mr. MONCEL: I wrote them.

Mr. NUGENT: When?

Mr. MONCEL: I wrote at least four, I suppose, one of which I liked; and the one they selected was the one I rejected out of hand.

Mr. NUGENT: I think it was Admiral Landymore—or maybe it was Admiral Brock,—who said that he got the feeling that the tail was wagging the dog; that in other words, you must consider your foreign policy, and therefore, your defence policy to fit in with it, and then reorganize your forces to carry out that policy.

I gather from your testimony, and from the way you have stressed it, that if you change the commitment you can do it. Are you not saying, in effect, what Brock has said, that the action of the Minister in moving so precipitously towards unification is going to necessitate a change in defence policy to make any sense at all?

Mr. MONCEL: I do not know what Brock said; and I am not a dog. I do not know how it feels to be wagged by one's tail.

If you press this thing forward your commitments must obviously vary with what the force is capable of doing. If you press a unified force through to its conclusion, you are going to have to drop some commitments, or change them.

Mr. NUGENT: Well, General, I guess you disagreed with my wording. You have just agreed with me in principle, anyhow.

Mr. MONCEL: I am sorry if I seem to be nit-picking.

Mr. NUGENT: You said that if they unified the force properly there would be no trouble. When you say "unify properly", do you mean you should change your commitment to make sure that your unification fits your commitment, and that that is the only way to go about it?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes, essentially that is it; and, having done that, for goodness' sake do it properly. Do not waltz in with this "wishy-washy" idea, a sort of Oscar Wildean approach where you are Jack in the country and Ernest in town, and wear an admiral's uniform at night and are called a colonel at sea, and this sort of nonsense.

There are only two ways in which you can possibly do it. You either build the thing in the form of the army, namely, a system of corps—and this is possible, providing you change the commitments—or you do it the way the navy and the air force are organized, where you have a single service which is built into a series of branches.

The two are really very much alike, except that within the army corps system you have much more formal recognition of the corps approach. For example, it would be quite possible to take the Canadian Medical Services and form them into the Royal Canadian Medical Corps. Dentists have been serving aboard carriers for years, just as do soldiers. Nobody ever worried about it; nobody ever liked him any better because of the fact that he was a dentist; but he was there. This kind of thing you can do.

The alternative is to form a new force—a Canadian force—provided your commitments will permit of this. Then what you should do, if you are sensible, is to hitch up with some organization. We cannot go this alone. We have had help and advice and support, worth millions and millions of dollars to the Canadian taxpayer, from the British army, the British navy, the British air force, and from their opposite numbers in the United States. We have lent on these people, far, far, far more than most people seem to realize; we are a very, very small organization. In the U.S. they spend more on their retirement pensions for senior officers than we do in our whole national defence budget. This is a very big organization, and the amount of assistance, advice, and help, in every sense that we get from these people is something that you do not want to throw overboard.

Likewise, from our close association with these people—and this may not sound very Canadian, but I think it is a fact that we should face up to—we have

drawn a tremendous amount of strength—strength that has sustained us in battle, and sustained us in organization. These were good things.

I say that if you want to form a wholly Canadian force, that is all right, but try to link it with something whereby we can continue this extremely useful and fruitful series discussions on a service-to-service basis with our friends in other countries.

Mr. NUGENT: General, in view of your remark about how much we have been leaning on them, would you care to make a comment on the Minister's suggestion that now that we are the world leaders they will all get behind and follow our marvellous system?

Mr. MONCEL: He keeps saying this. I kept telling them that this was not so; but he persists in it.

Mr. NUGENT: I will finish in the next round, Mr. Chairman; thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Lambert?

Mr. LAMBERT: Mr. Chairman, I want to go back to 1964, to the organization of the planning staff and your original staff following the passage of Bill No. C-90. It has been suggested by a number of critics who have commented on the military situation that the organization at that time was not the proper one; that the framework of a Commander in Chief vis-à-vis the Minister was the only contact, and that anyone below, either with a service interest or a branch interest, had to pass through the Commander in Chief; that, in other words, there was no Defence Council. No serving officers at the time were asked to testify how they felt about this organization.

Mr. MONCEL: If they said this it is quite wrong. I sat on the Defence Council, and we heard lots of "chaps" giving vent to their views on it.

Mr. LAMBERT: In the light of your experience of the framework, have you any comments to make about it?

Mr. MONCEL: The staff here at headquarters?

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes?

Mr. MONCEL: I think the basic structure is about right. You cannot do much better than have the three basic branches of operations, or general staff, or whatever you want to call it, and the personnel and the technical sides. I think any organization you dream up is going to end up with those sort of three pillars.

The comptroller side of it is relatively new, and I will possibly say something about that later.

I think that the weakness of the system—and I think you have to start at the top in this—is Defence Council itself. It is not a council. It may be called that, but it really is not. At the moment it is chaired by the Minister, as chief, with the vice-chief on the military side, as Associate Minister, the Deputy Minister and the Chairman of the Defence Research Board, essentially, as members, plus a representative from External Affairs, and whatever experts you want to bring into it.

The weakness of it at the moment is that it is not a real council, and thousands and thousands of hours are buried. The best possible military argu-

ments that we can produce are buried in the minutes of that organization under the phrase: "After some considerable discussion the Minister directed..."

Mr. LAMBERT: May I interrupt? Am I right that the Defence Council does not have the power of decision; that it is merely an advisory body?

Mr. MONCEL: The Defence Council, as such, is in name only. It is the Minister. Defence council decisions are signed out in the Minister's name.

Now, if I were going to do it, and I am not—it is wonderful when you are not really responsible; you can come forthwith all kinds of wild ideas—but if I were going to do it, I think that I would increase the military advice on the Defence Council. I would have a Defence Council; that would be essential. I would organize it along this line: I would have a chief, as they have now, and a vice-chief; and then I would produce three—and you can invent any name you want for them—absolute environmental experts—a sailor, a soldier and an airman.

I would make the Defence Council directly responsible to the cabinet defence committee. I realize that this is not done in any other government department, but this is not an ordinary department. I would make this Defence Council collectively responsible for the well-being and effectiveness of the Canadian armed forces.

When this Defence Council ran into a problem involving a severe clash between various elements of it the Council would be instructed to bring its differences to the cabinet defence committee. Then, if the people who were dissenting had a chance to say their piece they would then have the same option as I had—either of coming out of the room smiling, saying "That is the greatest decision that has ever been made", or of resigning. But at least they would have had an opportunity to speak out on these major issues without having to resign, or before they resigned. That is the first change I would make.

The next change I would make is that I would disband the comptroller general's organization. This is a military anachronism. I would put a civilian in charge; in fact, I would put the deputy minister in charge of this. As comptroller general you have all the controls of money and manpower that you possibly need. At the moment there is complete duplication between the deputy minister's office and the comptroller general's office. All the deputy minister's office did in my day, when I was Comptroller General, was to generate work for me. It was not productive. We maintained two sets of books, and two sets of everything. We were administrated out of our wits. You have an awful lot of soldiers, sailors and airmen—highly trained "chaps"—wasting their time on this business.

That is roughly what I would do.

Mr. LAMBERT: To continue, there followed the planning of, bringing in and setting up of the different branches—that is, the functional command—and then there were the changes in command. From your experience, where did the machine tend to go out of step? I use that phrase advisedly, because both you and your successor in office as comptroller general, General Fleury, have told us that integration would require three, perhaps five years really to shake down into the efficient type of machine that you wanted. Where did any of these parts of the machine start to get get out of step?

Mr. MONCEL: It got out of step in the one critical and vital area. The way you run the military is that you tell the chief what you want; the chief in turn

tells his staff to crank it out; and the staff and the chief in turn tell the commanders. The key to telling people is that you must know what you are talking about and you must never lie to them. There has to be, and there always has been, complete confidence between the commanders in the field and the staff and officers. Nobody wants to come to Ottawa; I think one would much rather be out in the field; but it has to be done.

Where it broke down was, when communication with our commanders was taken out of our hands. We began to read policy in the newspapers. We had a fellow called a defence spokesman—I do not know whether he is called that or not—who did information services—a fellow called Bourgeois, a first class chap. I suppose on 50 occasions I called him as a result of some statement in the newspapers about what we were going to do. I would say: "Bourgeois, who said it?, and he said "I do not know". We were then put in the position that you would speak to a commander one day and tell him something with the best possible intention, and you would be denied in print the next. After a few months of this we became gun-shy. The result was that you did not speak to the commanders; you did not dare tell them anything because you did not know. When Landymore, as somebody told me, said that communications broke down and he thought the Defence Staff had lost their heads, I do not blame him. Had I been a commander in the field at that time I would have quit long ago.

They destroyed this fundamental piece of communication. They destroyed the confidence of the commanders in their staffs, and, God knows, we lost confidence in ourselves. That is where it went wrong.

Mr. LAMBERT: You had been comptroller general. Were you satisfied, as a result of the planning, that you were saving in personnel, and that you were saving in cost with your new command structures? You have far more expert knowledge in this matter than any of us. Can you tell us where you feel that there was saving or where there was not?

Mr. MONCEL: There are obvious savings as you reduce personnel. The combination of personnel and overhead constitutes your principal costs. Obviously, if you reduce personnel you save money. All the savings we made, really, were because the personnel ran out too fast; hence, we had money to burn.

Mr. LAMBERT: When you say the personnel ran out too fast, do you mean that they left or that they transferred out to the field?

Mr. MONCEL: No; I mean that they left the service.

Mr. LAMBERT: I see.

Mr. MONCEL: We were supposed to drop 10,000, I believe, and we dropped 20,000.

Mr. LAMBERT: And that is how you saved money?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes; it is as simple as that.

Mr. LAMBERT: It has been said—and this may be right or it may be wrong, but I want to see whether you were aware of it, or of any similar type thing—that with a field commander such as Maritime Command, dealing with, say, Training Command, there was a great deal of excessive running back and forth and no direct line of communication. As an example, prior to integration some 17 people were in charge of naval training at headquarters, and now, under

Training Command, there are 65, and there are still some people at headquarters. Is this an unfair assessment, or are you aware of other things of this kind having crept into this type of organization?

Mr. MONCEL: You have got to be careful with this. The navy was a very different organization from the other two, and there is no doubt that it did things in an extraordinarily economic way. It was likened by some people—and the sailors would shoot me for this—to sort of a corner grocery store compared to Steinberg's. They did a tremendous amount of things with one "chap". You wore about 17 hats. It was extraordinarily effective, and very efficient. I think they were more upset by this sort of a switch than were the other people.

I think they had the right idea in Training Command, but here again, as with so many other things, it got out of hand. The original plot was that there was probably a very, very good case to be made for taking the raw input from civilian street and having some form of a joint, unified, training system for his *ab initio,* or basic, training. This is probably a very good thing, and there are demonstrable economies that could be effected this way.

I think that for the next few years it should have stayed just like that. But suddenly—boom—off it went, and generated into what is apt to become a monster if you are not careful, in that you lose the intimate supervision of the training class by the people who are going to receive the output.

I do not think that there is any lack of communication between the two commands at all, but I think that there are bound to be a certain number of growing pains, and I think this ought to be taken into consideration.

Mr. LAMBERT: To come down to my last question: Looking at the forces as they stand today, and accepting our commitments as they are, what, in your considered opinion, is the time that we should take to test this framework that we now have before going further?

Mr. MONCEL: I do not think it would be fair to put a time limit on it. It depends entirely on your commitments. As your commitments change so will your force; and, of course, force-requirements are going to change.

The planning heads have got to keep their wits about them and stay on top of this. It must be a progressive thing all the time, towards the most effective Canadian defence force. This is the object of the exercise; it is not unification. Surely the object must be to have the most effective Canadian defence force.

If, in the process of this system, you can prove—and I do not think that—we can at the moment—that the most effective way is to unify in relation to your commitments, then that is the time; so long as you understand that you are not going to be able to destroy the independent ability of the force to operate, and so long as you understand at that stage that you are not going to suddenly generate a requirement for an un-integrated force, or an un-unified force; because once you have unified it you are not going to un-unify it.

Mr. LAMBERT: Is it fair to say that a unified force, with that limited objective, in the end becomes more rigid—

Mr. MONCEL: Of course they must.

Mr. LAMBERT:—than what we now have?

Mr. MONCEL: Absolutely; it must.

Mr. LAMBERT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. MacLean?

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): Some of the questions that I propose to ask have been asked in part. I will try to avoid repetition, but I am afraid I will not be able to do that entirely.

In your opinion, sir, up to the point at which you left the service do you think that there was sufficient advance planning of the desired end in each case of the stages of integration so that the services were able to retain a posture which would allow them to react to an emergency if one arose—some unexpected thing? Or was there, in your judgment, a military risk involved, whether great or small, which was perhaps unacceptable from a military point of view, if such a situation suddenly arose?

Mr. MONCEL: I do not think it is fair to suggest that these risks were taken or were tolerated. We were obviously very, very conscious of this possibility, and took elaborate steps, to make sure that we did not expose ourselves to this. We were equally conscious of the fact that the climate, internationally, and so on, did not look too bad from the point of view that if you were going to do it this was a good time. But the risks we took were very, very marginal indeed, and I think they were quite justified.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): Whether or not the climate at the present time is a safe time to take the risk—if I can use that contradiction, and so phrase it—would be a political decision rather than a military one, would it not?

Mr. MONCEL: Ultimately, they all are; I think that this was a considered, military thing.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): With regard to Materiel Command, the unified supply system, I understood you to say that the three old supply systems were still functioning up to at least some point in time. How long will it take for the combined Materiel Command to reach the point at which it will be completely dependable for the purposes of the services generally?

Mr. MONCEL: I do not think that as it is currently set up and currently organized you will ever get it to that stage.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): Well, to an acceptable stage?

Mr. MONCEL: I do not think that you will ever get it to an acceptable stage. I will tell you why. It sounds great, when you say it quickly, to have one co-ordinated logistics system. If you look at the quantitative side of the holdings, numerically there are a great number of common items. When you analyse what these common items are, they are boots, shoelaces, socks, underwear and nonsense like that. If you take a look at the dollar value, very little is common. They have nothing in common with ships' turbines, aircraft engines, and tanks. Numerically these are relatively small in your holdings, but in a dollar value these are the bulk of your holdings. What you have got to ensure, all through the piece, is that you do not lose the expert management of the environmental items.

Now, as I understand it, at the moment you have a soldier in charge of technical services. I know him well—and he is a dear "chap"; and you have a soldier in charge of Material Command—also a dear "chap". They are both

splendid soldiers, with splendid records, but they know as much about ships as I know about being an astronaut. You do not have a high enough level of specialized technical advice built into it to give you decent advice. Your technical advice used to be there in very strong technical branches. Now they are destroying this.

This is why I say that under the current system, it will not work.

We went through exactly the same thing—fortunately we saw it quickly enough to stop it—on my side of the house, the operational side. We went through a most agonizing period of about four months when the whole theme of the thing—and it looked great, too; in any room you went into there were three people—you had a soldier, a sailor, and an airman, and everybody shouting together—and this looked splendid; but I suddenly found, to my horror, that soldier staff officers, who knew a great deal about the army, were staying awake hours at night trying to learn something about an air force problem to brief me on it. We had sailors trying to brief me on army problems, and we had airmen trying to brief me on some other problems. This became patent nonsense.

I am always reminded of when we took over from the British a military academy in one of these newly-emergent countries some years ago. The commandant of this academy was to be a member of the newly emergent nation. This was a good thing. He had watched his British forerunner very very closely for years, and he knew that every morning at a quarter to nine this chap used to arrive at the office, immaculately dressed, with a stick under his left arm. He went into the office, and at a quarter past twelve sharp, every day, he came out of the office, went into the mess and had a pink gin. He had lunch, read the newspaper, and at a quarter past two he went back to the office; and at half past four he left.

Now, this new chap, from this newly emergent nation, had this drill down absolutely cold. He arrived precisely at a quarter to nine, with a stick under his arm, and he walked into the office. He came out at a quarter past twelve, went into the mess, and had a pink gin, and so on. He followed that ritual perfectly, but he did not know what to do inside the office. He never saw what the "chap" did when he got the door closed. He was lost.

In precisely the same way we wasted hours, so we finally changed it and put it on the much more rational basis where a soldier dealt with military problems in the army sense; when you wanted some naval advice you got hold of a sailor. Everybody was much relieved, got some sleep, and were back on ground that they understood.

Now, I am saying that roughly the same thing can happen in a mixed materiel service if you are not careful.

Mr. MacLean (*Queens*): This leads me to another brief question. What is your opinion on whether or not there has been a waste of energy in manpower in the way that the re-organization, which has been required up until now has been done? Was the optimum time allotted for it with a view to doing it as efficiently as possible, or were there cases where the time allotted was too short, and in the end there was wasted effort because of a crash program?

Mr. Moncel: No, I do not think it would be fair to say that, up to the time I left. Of course, all planners would like to have more time, and I think it is necessary for the people in charge occasionally to apply the lash and say, "Get on

with it", and get it done. Up to the stage that I left, essentially we were given time to do what we were doing.

Mr. MacLean (*Queens*): In your judgment do you believe that a unified force, compared to three forces each in their own element, can as readily meet our commitments, working with our allies in NATO and NORAD, and so on? With a unified force will the meshing of the Canadian contribution be done as easily as if the organization were on the same basis as are our allies?

Mr. Moncel: Actually, it is much easier if it is on the same basis as that of our allies, if you have these commitments to work with them.

Mr. MacLean (*Queens*): Yes.

Mr. Moncel: If you do not have commitments to work with them then there is no need to set up that kind of a force. If you want a unified force that somehow is going to call up a need for a seagoing element that is essentially a transport element, that it fine—write your commitments accordingly; but do not then turn around and say that you want a fighting, deep-sea navy next week because you will not get it.

What people have got to understand is that in the fighting portion of the force—and this is the core of the thing—you cannot hire commanders off the street. You cannot put an ad in the *Financial Post* and say "I would like somebody to command a destroyer squadron", no matter how much money you put out. You have got to grow these people; you have got to train them; and it takes a very long time. We have very slim resources in this regard—very slim indeed. The thought of Brock and Landymore mucking around with cows and lobster traps down in Mahone Bay, Nova Scotia, just fills me with despair. You have spent millions of dollars on these men—millions—and you cannot buy them. There are too few resources. You can hire doctors, lawyers, dentists, architects—you can get them off the street—but you cannot hire fighting officers. You have to grow them; and grow them to that stage and then lob them off—well...

Mr. MacLean (*Queens*): Do you believe that our opportunity to gain from the experience and resources of our allies, which you mentioned some time ago in reply to a previous question—chiefly, Great Britain and the United States—will be lessened if we have an entirely different organization in the form of a unified force?

Mr. Moncel: Of course, it will. I will give you an example. When I was vice-chief there was a large and important conference down in the United States, which the vice-chief of the air staff would normally have attended. I went off and I was greeted extremely politely by the U.S. Air Force. I knew a lot of them by name, but we could not talk business.

Now, if I had not gone myself, as the vice-chief, who was I going to send? My next available senior air force officer was an air commodore and he would not have cut much ice in that league.

There is an association that has been built up between the Defence Staff and between Navy here, the RN, and the USN—and the same applies in all three services—where you have grown up with these people all your lives; you know them all on a first-name basis. You are going to lose that very quickly.

Another meeting that I did not go to—and I deliberately did not go—was an army conference in the United Kingdom, which, again, the vice chief of the

general staff would normally have gone to. I said that I would not go, because I might have been an airman and it would be stupid to send an airman or the vice chief might be an airman—and indeed the vice chief was an airman. Therefore, we had to look for somebody senior enough to go. We had to go out into the commands where we found a general, and sent him—a very able fellow—but he was the wrong man. He was a "chap" who was busy training troops in the field. He was not au fait with the policy work that was being done here.

We had to drag him in and give him forced briefings sort of over night, and we sent him off, looking a little harried, to go and represent us at an army conference.

You see, it becomes silly. If you carry on this way you are bound to lose these contacts, because you no longer go to school together and you no longer attend exercises together; and you cannot get the level up unless you produce some form of environmental expertise. This is what I mentioned previously to Mr. Lambert: Get three environmental experts on the defence staff and then you have people who you can hope will maintain this contact for you.

Mr. MacLean (*Queens*): I have a question related to this, which I jotted down, with special reference to Maritime Command. Do you believe that the Maritime forces under unification will have an opportunity to have their needs, and their experience and their resources adequately expressed and considered at command headquarters?

Mr. Moncel: I would like to have that again. I am sure you have a point but I am not getting it.

Mr. MacLean (*Queens*): Is there a sufficiently clear channel of communication from what would be Maritime Command—in effect, the entire Navy plus part of the Air Force—on the experience they gain as they go along, from new developments and so forth, and with regard to their needs and their general requirements for equipment and so on? Can communication be sufficient between Maritime Command and Defence Headquarters if you do not have in Defence Headquarters a senior officer who is an expert in that environment?

Mr. Moncel: Yes; the communication could not be simpler. It is straight forward. The Commander of Maritime Command talks directly to the Defence Staff. The problem at the other end is to interpret what he is saying.

Mr. MacLean (*Queens*): Well, that is my question.

Mr. Moncel: You have not got this under the present system. I do not think that you have sufficient talent to really interpret what he is trying to say. If you want to get expert advice you have to go away down, and you are putting "chaps" of the major level against "chaps" of the general level. It is very difficult.

Mr. MacLean (*Queens*): This is my final question, sir. I, as you, do not agree that integration has only one possible place to end, which is complete unification—I do not go along with that at all—but if complete unification comes about, and it is then found to be completely, or partially, unsuited to our commitments, is this process of unification easily reversed?

Mr. Moncel: No, sir. You are in dire trouble if you start this. I have tried to make this point on three occasions now. If you want a unified force you tailor your commitments to fit it, and, having done so, do not then go and change your

commitments in a hurry, because you cannot do it. It is a very long process, and during this unifying period—and I do not know how long it is going to last, if it does—you are not going to be training anybody for the other roles. There is no need to train people. In a time like this, when the military are working under these conditions it is not good for the military at all, and when you are so conscious of trying to save everything you are inclined to lose sight of what you are training for and you tend to organize towards efficient peacetime administration. This is a most extravagant and uneconomical business. There is no profit in it. If there was, General Motors would run it.

This is not a profit-making organization, believe me. It is a very extravagant organization. What you have to constantly bear in mind is that you organize and train to fight—nothing else. If you train for anything else you are finished.

We very nearly ruined the army about six or ten years ago when we had this rush of blood to the head on national survival. The whole object of this exercise was a type of role where we were going to go and dig my Aunt Millie out of the Nova Scotia Hotel. We very nearly ruined the force because we started to train for something other than to fight. Fortunately, we caught it in time and we did not.

This is what you have to be careful of. If you start to train for some highly specialized role you become quite expert in it, but you cannot do anything else. You should never overlook this basic principle: The forces are there to fight—nothing else.

Now, if you do not want forces, that is fine, and this whole argument becomes useless. If you want forces, and if you have them for anything else but to fight, you are making a mistake. They must be trained this way and organized this way, and they must be commanded, not managed.

Mr. BREWIN: General Moncel, I wanted to ask you to elaborate a little on the White Paper. I think you said that it had two major defects, as you saw it, and I wonder if I understood at least one of them, correctly. The White Paper contemplated the maintenance of the existing commitments that Canada was involved in, or, the existing roles—I think that is a better word than "commitments". "Commitments" implies that you have agreed to do it indefinitely; a "role" is something that you are doing. Now, as I understand it, the White Paper proposed the maintenance of a series of existing commitments—the brigade, the air division, the anti-submarine forces, the air defence, and so on; and it proposed continuing those without any apparent change and certainly with no early, or definite change. It also proposed, as I understand it, the creation of a mobile force, this intervention force, or whatever you want to call it.

Do I correctly understand you to say that if we are going to do all of these things this would involve a budget in excess of two billion dollars a year?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes, sir.

Mr. BREWIN: So that if you are going to accept a ceiling on the budget of, say, what we have now, which is approximately $1.5 billion, something has to give?

Mr. MONCEL: Precisely.

Mr. BREWIN: You have to make a choice on whether you are going to expand your mobile role or cut out some of the other roles. Is that correct?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes. This is the alternative.

Mr. BREWIN: Am I not right in my assumption from what you have said so far that this White Paper policy is still being continued by the Minister, or by the government, namely, the maintenance of existing roles plus the development of this intervention force?

Mr. MONCEL: I am not up to date now. I am six or seven months out of date. I think this is something that you had better ask the Minister. These roles, as I understood them at the time the White Paper was written, were the sum-total of the commitments plus this new and desired role. In short, we were going to do everything that we had been doing before, plus. This is why I say, you require more forces rather than fewer.

Whether or not the government is continuing with these commitments, or is not negotiating, is not for me to say. I do not know.

Mr. BREWIN: No; I appreciate that.

May I put it to you this way: As I understand it, it is your view that unification of the services makes no sense as long as we continue with the roles that we have at the present time.

Mr. MONCEL: That is right.

Mr. BREWIN: For example, if I may draw you out with a few examples, if you have an army brigade group in Europe as it is now integration is meaningless, or, indeed, harmful, because it creates disturbance in that it does not make any useful contribution to what we are doing in our brigade group now?

Mr. MONCEL: Not "integration".

Mr. BREWIN: I meant to say "unification". I am sorry.

Mr. MONCEL: Yes. Who are you going to unify it with?

Mr. BREWIN: Precisely; and is not the same true of the air division?

Mr. MONCEL: Precisely.

Mr. BREWIN: I suppose one could go through some of the other roles. The anti-submarine role of the Navy—how are you going to integrate that when it is basically a naval role?

Mr. MONCEL: That is right. I just do not know the answer to it. This is why I fault it here.

Mr. BREWIN: But I understand you also to say that if for various reasons, partly political and partly military, you decide that it is necessary to concentrate on this sort of intervention force then unification begins to make some sense?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes.

Mr. BREWIN: Therefore, the real choice that we have to make, as a nation, and that we are responsible for making in Parliament, in the matter of making sense out of unification, is whether we are going to continue the roles that we have or concentrate on this mobile intervention force?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes.

Mr. BREWIN: I understand you to say that you think there is a great risk involved in concentrating on the mobile force because you contemplate the

possibility that at some later date we might want to switch back to do some of the things we have done previously, and this would be virtually impossible.

Mr. MONCEL: Yes. My job used to be to try and hedge the bets, and every time I was told we were not going to have any commitments for the next five years, as I think my book shows, almost invariably, within six months, I was sort of just sent somewhere else. This is what you have to be careful of. You have to be careful of this peacekeeping role, *per se*. The types whom you are possibly going to have to go and intervene between are a far cry from the bare-bottomed "chaps" that we used to go and chase around. These new, emerging countries are equipped on a scale that makes us toe the line.

Mr. BREWIN: We would have to be prepared, I presume—

Mr. MONCEL: That is right. Do not look at it from the point of view of having an easy run.

Mr. BREWIN: —to use pretty vigorous methods. It would not be just a case of waving a flag in their faces.

Mr. MONCEL: That is right.

Mr. LANIEL: Could I ask a supplementary question?

Mr. BREWIN: Yes; although, I hope you do not interfere with my line of thought.

Mr. LANIEL: General, from what you have just said I imagine that you do not agree with Admiral Brock...

Mr. MONCEL: It would not be the first time.

Mr. LANIEL: ...that the Canadian soldiers in Gaza, Cyprus and other troubled spots in the world have not done a good job in quelling insurrections, or things like that.

Mr. MONCEL: I cannot believe that he said that.

Mr. LANIEL: He is dealing with the merits of the peacekeeping role, and on page 3 of this document that he prepared for some group he says that:

> The past performance of the United Nations in reducing world tensions, in confining areas of world conflict or in quel'ing national insurrections of potential danger has not been too distinguished.

Mr. MONCEL: I would agree 100 percent with him. I do not think this suggests for a moment that our soldiers have not been doing their job.

Mr. BREWIN: May I go back to this question of the different roles? Would you agree, General Moncel—in fact, I think you already have—that this is partly a political consideration.

Mr. MONCEL: Entirely a political consideration.

Mr. BREWIN: It necessitates, for example, trying to assess what sort of wars or disturbances are most likely to occur.

Mr. MONCEL: Yes.

Mr. BREWIN: It also invo'ves, I suggest to you, consideration of what our allies are equipped to do and are likely to do. Do you agree that there is not

much point in our re-enforcing something that they can do very well already? Is this not part of the consideration?

Mr. MONCEL: Of course it must be. I have been told that you have a lovely line of questioning that runs on and on and when you come to the climax, and after I have said yes to everything, you ask me another question. I would like to know what you are after?

Mr. BREWIN: I am afraid I am not in a position to tell you what I am after. I will go back once again to this question of the role. Do you not have to look across the whole defence spectrum, if I may use that expression, and find out what a country in Canada's position is most likely to be required to do and what it can most usefully do within its resources.

Mr. MONCEL: This is the constant job of the planners. We have this under constant review.

Mr. BREWIN: It is a job, I suggest, that has to take into account political considerations as well as Canada's resources.

Mr. MONCEL: And very elaborate machinery exists to ensure that this is done.

Mr. BREWIN: I am afraid that perhaps I have not asked the question that you anticipated.

Mr. MONCEL: I am disappointed; I was wondering what it was going to be.

Mr. DEACHMAN: General Moncel, I brought along a copy of the Canadian Army Staff College Journal called *Snow Owl*—not a bad name for a day like this—1965-66, which has in it an article by you entitled "Integration". Do you remember this article?

Mr. MONCEL: They published it, did they?

Mr. DEACHMAN: I might say that they not only published it but they have it as the first article in the book and it is accompanied by a very fine picture of yourself.

Mr. MONCEL: Thank you. I wish they had sent me a copy of it.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I want to ask some questions and review with you some of the things that you said in this article in the light of the circumstances as we find them today.

Early in the article you said:

> It is important that we understand the significance of what has occurred and acknowledge the unpalatable truth that until recently the military have lagged dangerously behind. We allowed ourselves to be overtaken by industry in all fields of data handling and effective management controls. Had we not awoken to this situation we would have been in danger of becoming a museum piece. Our problem now is to bridge the gap between what was essentially a late Victorian organization and the space age.

I presume that this article would have been written in the spring of 1966. Is that correct?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Your view at that time was that the armed forces organization of pre-White Paper days was a Victorian organization in the space age.

Mr. MONCEL: Of course it was.

Mr. DEACHMAN: You had no quarrel then with the steps that the department were attempting to take to bring it into the 20th century.

Mr. MONCEL: No; I welcomed them. As I say, I was the architect for most of them.

Mr. DEACHMAN: On the next page, you go on to say:

> —I am pleased to be able to say that for the first time in Canadian military history the Defence Department, which is the largest business in this country, has the means to achieve a comprehensive national defence plan, which extends as a unified program, more than one year into the future. Not only have we accepted integration as a philosophy but we have introduced the modern management techniques which unification has permitted us to use.

I find the words "unification" and "integration" in the same sentence and used in the same sense. Is it not correct that you really were talking in terms of ultimate unification when you made that statement?

Mr. MONCEL: I was talking in that statement as I will talk now: that given time, through the processes that we were going, integration or unification—if you want to use that term, might well be the answer—might well—provided you change the role and the role is fitted. There is no point in unifying for the sake of unification. We unified, if that is the term—we use the term integrated, as I mentioned before—the internal communication system. This makes sense. We integrated the recruiting system, and this made sense—or we unified them, if you like. This made inherent good sense—good sense.

Mr. DEACHMAN: You saw the whole thing as the desirable goal at that time.

Mr. MONCEL: No. I saw it as a possible goal. It was desirable because it had been stated as a goal, but it was going to take some time.

Mr. DEACHMAN: You go on a little later to say:

> Our future projections are capable of change to meet changing conditions because all our needs are expressed as portions of one program and it is a relatively simple matter to make offsetting alterations which keep the whole in balance. In the past this was not possible without lengthy interservice negotiations which could seldom prove fruitful as the various negotiating parties were unaware of the overall balance being sought—and indeed, as I have mentioned earlier, there was no such balance.

I just wonder, in respect of what you have been telling us about flexibility, if you were not here advocating that integration and unification were leading us toward a much higher degree of flexibility than we had heretofore known.

Mr. MONCEL: Integration, certainly.

Mr. DEACHMAN: But you use the word "unification" in exactly the same sense.

Mr. MONCEL: If you want to believe this, obviously I cannot convince you that I did not. I will say again that where it makes sense to put things together, this is what we were attempting to do—bit by bit. It makes no sense in the

current commitments to try and put the whole thing together. Now, later it might; at the moment it does not.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I am trying to believe you, but I want to go on a little with what is being said here:

> Our current program can now be both realistic and responsible because it is able for the first time to encompass not only the shape of the various forces that we need but also to stipulate the men, equipment, supplies, installations and budget dollars to support them.

Is this not the very definition of flexibility and is this not the flexibility that you have been telling us we cannot achieve by this method?

Mr. MONCEL: Well it is flexibility in a different way. I still say everything I said there. The system of planning, force development, and equipment acquisition was indeed long in need of an overhaul—and it got a good one, and I think we came out with a system which is quite capable of doing all that I hoped it would do. This does not necessarily mean that the more you continue to put things together the more flexible you become. What I am saying is that the more you continue to put things together, when you get into the fighting environment the less flexible you become.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Yet in this article you said that modern techniques—the use of the computer, and integration and unification—used to mean the same thing in the same sentence—has led us toward flexibility.

I want to go on to another sentence a couple of paragraphs on in which you said:

> —integration has conferred upon us a degree of flexibility and an ability to effect changes which collectively the three individual Services did not possess in the past.

And further down you said:

> A more practical course, and one which is being actively followed, is to improve the conditions of service and offer the widest possible scope of employment. The means to accomplish this are to be found in integration.

Mr. MONCEL: Absolutely.

Mr. DEACHMAN: So that the entire tenor of the piece is that what we have been doing and the plans that you were engaged in were for the development of the utmost flexibility and not a retreat from flexibility as some of your arguments before us today has led us to believe, sir.

Mr. MONCEL: I would say that I have not got my point across.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Well, let me go on to this sentence, and perhaps we can pin it down a little closer. You say:

> Its early influences were already making themselves felt when integration commenced. That they have been held so well in check over the past two years may be attributed to the fact that now, with greater flexibility at the management level, we are better able to adjust to changing conditions.

Mr. MONCEL: That is still true. I am sure it is true.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Finally, you end up, again on the theme that unification and integration are the same thing, and that really what we are talking about here today is a unified force, when we speak of flexibility. You said:

> In the final analysis perhaps integration is the wrong word altogether and it is "unification" of which we should speak—one force with many facets operating at the will of one commander in the fulfilment of one national defence policy.

Mr. MONCEL: That is right and I still say it. I said "perhaps", and I meant it.

Mr. DEACHMAN: There is no "perhaps" in here. This is very final.

Mr. MONCEL: I believe you read it out.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I am sorry. You say:

> —perhaps integration is the wrong word altogether and it is "unification" of which we should speak.

Mr. MONCEL: That is right.

Mr. DEACHMAN: What you were doing was integrating the two words "integration" and "unification".

Mr. MONCEL: Obviously, I cannot change your mind if you want to think that.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I can only think what I read, sir.

Mr. MONCEL: That is what I wrote.

Mr. DEACHMAN: It is an article in favour of carrying unification to its ultimate conclusion and nowhere in here is there a suggestion that we are moving too fast; in fact, if I can interpret the sense of urgency in this article, you were whooping it up to get on with unification—

Mr. MONCEL: No, get on with integration.

Mr. DEACHMAN: —with a view to achieving flexibility.

Mr. MONCEL: Of course, I was; this was my job. This was what I was paid to do and this was what I believed in doing. This article was written for an annual staff college publication. The government policy was that we were going to integrate and possibly we were going to unify. As long as I was a serving officer it was my job to make jolly sure that happened. That was part of what I was doing, and I believed what I wrote. When I finally got to the stage where I could not believe what I was writing, I left.

Mr. DEACHMAN: You told us earlier, sir, that you believed this, and apparently this was the doctrine that you were following and that you wrote about as short a time ago as the spring of 1966. Now, what has happened in the meantime? You have told us today that the sense of urgency has gone; the need for unification is passed; we need to be taking a slower pace. What has happened that you should be putting on the mental brakes.

Mr. MONCEL: I thought that I had spent the better part of an hour trying to explain why. Do you want me to try and rehash what I have said? The integration process—integrating the staffs to produce a single staff was a right decision. I went along with it. I was invited to join the staff to bring it about. Unification was a long-term goal. I think it perhaps still is; obviously, it is going to be to pass

this Bill. My worry is that if you make it a short-term goal and you make it a goal without relation to your commitment, you are apt to stumble and fall. When I wrote that article—I have forgotten the exact date—I do not think that I had been told that we were going to get this unification bill through in 6 months time. I have forgotten when I wrote that article but it was not at the same time as it was published.

Mr. DEACHMAN: When did you write it?

Mr. MONCEL: I cannot remember. When was it published?

Mr. DEACHMAN: This came up last summer. I presume that your story, for publication in this magazine, must have been written in the spring.

Mr. MONCEL: I believe they like about six months advance notice, so it would be about six months ahead of when it was published, I think.

Mr. DEACHMAN: So that the latest date on which you could have written this would be late 1965 or early 1966. Would that be about right?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes—and I believe what I said; I still do.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Well, I can only come back to your final conclusion here: one force. You speak of one force; surely that is unification?

Mr. MONCEL: Of course it is.

Mr. DEACHMAN: And what you were looking for at that time was unification?

Mr. MONCEL: I was not looking for it. I said perhaps this might lead to it, and perhaps it might—perhaps, someday.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Thank you very much.

Mr. HARKNESS: General Moncel, you have stated here now three or four times, that with the aims and objectives of defence policy as laid down in the White Paper and in consequence of those, of course, the roles which the defence forces have to carry out, that those roles cannot be carried out by the projected single unified force provided for by this bill which we are considering. Are you in a position to tell us which of those roles we would not be able to carry out with the type of force which would come into existence with the passage of this bill?

Mr. MONCEL: I do not think I quite said that, Mr. Harkness. May I relate to you where I think you will have trouble in carrying out the roles that we have at the moment, under a unified program. You are bound to lose the expert supervision of the forces required to carry out the roles. If you tend to make Maritime Command essentially a transport organization, and you do not continue to treat it as a sea-going fighting identity, you soon will be unable to carry out that role. From a soldier's point of view all you need know about the Navy—and this is true, I would say, of 98 per cent of the soldiers—is that the ships are well found, that they are well manned, and that they are commanded by chaps who will get you there, safely, both through hell and high water. In all my service, and I am not ashamed of it at all, I have spent exactly 2½ hours with the Navy in action—and this was going into the beaches. I had a glass of gin, read the Illustrated London News, somebody put me over the side and said "Good luck". That is all I ever saw of the Navy, and it is all I ever needed to see of it, because

I knew jolly well that they were a first-class organization. And, within it, the same is true of the air force. You want to make absolutely sure that the aircraft are well maintained and well founded, flown by chaps who are dedicated to this, and driven by somebody who knows what he is talking about. You are going to end up in this thing with five air forces: you will have a Maritime air force commanded by a sailor; you will have a tactical air force commanded by a soldier; a transport command and air defence command commanded by airmen; and an air division- five separate air forces. These fellows need to be driven, restrained, encouraged and worked. Who is going to do this? You are going to develop five separate things. Now, if you are lucky—terribly lucky—and you get five paragons, you will develop five jolly good air forces. These things are very much the victim of their commanders, you know, and they are the results of their commanders. On the other hand, the odds are that you cannot raise five paragons—you have to have one good one and four terrible ones. It takes you a long time to undo these problems. This is the area where I would see the roles starting to fall off—the specialized role for which you cannot possibly unify. You know, you cannot unify anybody into the sub-marine service; it is a pretty highly specialized business for quite a special type of chap. I think anybody has to be slightly nuts to do it, but then this is his affair.

Mr. HARKNESS: In other words, we still require, in effect, a navy, an army and an air force, whether you call them by those names or not?

Mr. MONCEL: As long as you have your current commitments, you do.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes.

Mr. MONCEL: Of course you do.

Mr. HARKNESS: And I say it does not matter whether you call them by those names or not, in effect, you still have to have those three services.

Mr. MONCEL: This is right, and there is no pay-off for calling them anything else.

Mr. HARKNESS: No.

Mr. MONCEL: None at all.

Mr. HARKNESS: On the other hand, would you say that there are very serious disadvantages in calling them something else?

Mr. MONCEL: Of course yes; there is no point in it. We asked ourselves this question a thousand times: "What are you going to save by taking the sailor out of his brass-bound suit and his bell-bottomed trousers?" What are you really going to save with this—if it makes him happy? I think this is a pretty important thing. This period that is coming up now, the late sixties, is a very, very critical period in the armed forces. And the reason that it is a critical period is this: In 1946-47, when we formed the post-war forces, we inherited from the war a tremendous amount of talent. And the weakness with the talent was that you had a very small age span in relation to the rank structure. That is to say, you had Brigadiers, who were very much of the same age level as the Lieutenant Colonels, who were at the same age level as the Majors, who were at the same age level as the Captains. You produced a block, right through the rank structure, all of the same age. Now, it does not take too much imagination to build a mathematical model and run this through on the basis of their age as against

their retirement time, to see that around 1968 it starts, and by 1972 it is finished—the whole lot goes at one fell swoop. The whole fighting experience, the training and so on, all leaves at once because they all reach retirement age at that time. I produced this mathematical model and I went to the then Adjutant General—Bunny Weekes, God rest his soul—and Weekes threw me out of the office. He said, "Are you crazy? It is now 1946. You are projecting this thing into 1967, and that is an awful long way away. Get out." So I got out. Well, at that time 1967 seemed a long way away, but it is here now. And just when integration started, we suddenly got personnel people who realized that this thing we projected for so long was going to happen in their service, and somebody had to do something about it. Well, it is too late to do anything about it because the chaps have all gotten older by 20 years or more, and they were going to go. And what was foremost in my mind—and I think in my colleagues' minds—was that if we do nothing else, we have to leave the new generation—the new military generation—with a sound and solid organization, which incorporates the best of everything we know, so that they can inherit this plant and progress it forward slowly. Evolution takes a long while in the military, we are all stupid and slow and, you know, it takes a little while. But this was the intention. What I am concerned about now is that unless we tidy this up—my 1970 critical date still stands, and I doubt whether you are going to be able to tidy it up in three years—you are going to leave the new breed, the youngsters—I call them youngsters though they are not young any more—with something that is unmanageable, when they have no experience—there are no books on how to do this. At least we were able to lay back on our experience. And the danger or trap that they will fall into, is that they will confuse peacetime administrative necessity with fighting requirements. I have seen this hundreds of times. Let us take, as an example, Petawawa, where you have five or six units—the number is of no consequence. Each one of these units is a fighting unit and they are designed, equipped and organized to fight seven days a week, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year—they are scaled for this. They have a great number of cooks, for example. Well now, it is a very tender and easy trap to fall into to say, "Surely you have a surplus of cooks—you have far too many cooks. Why not put all the cook houses in one kitchen in Camp Petawawa and save 50 cooks?" Sure you can—sure; your computer will show you this. It is much better to do it this way. But what happens when you have to go to war—and you may have to go tomorrow. They lose sight of these things. This is the type of thing I am referring to. We had hoped to leave them firm, solid establishments, based on everything we knew—make a decent tidy handover to them and then pat them on the heads and say good luck to them. I am concerned that we are not going to leave them this tidy thing, and they are going to flounder. Now when they flounder they have got to turn to something, and in desperation they will have to turn to the people who know, and continue to know, the United Kingdom, the United States; and if these contacts disappear you are in serious trouble—you are apt to end up with something like the person who arrives at the office at quarter to nine but really does not know what happens when he gets there, you know.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well I would agree with you thoroughly, because I know from my own experience that there is a terrific difference between actual combat and what you learn as a result of fighting, and what you learn from text books and, let us say, the ordinary barracks life. Now, in view of that, I take it that

your position would be that at the present time what is most essential is a pause, in order to consolidate before going any further in regard to doing away with the navy, the army and the air force and forming this single unified force?

Mr. MONCEL: I suppose so. I honestly do not know what to do because the thing is in such a distressing state in my mind. I think it is possible to conceive of an organization which would give the people the breathing space I believe they all urgently need before this not very clever solution is forced down their throats. For example, if you want a Canadian defence force, in that case, call it that. And if you organize it on a corps basis, there is no earthly reason why you cannot have the Royal Canadian Corps of infantry, as you have now; why you cannot have the Royal Canadian Armoured corps as you have now, and the Canadian Medical corps as I have described. And if you have these, is there any reason why you cannot have a Royal Canadian Navy as one of the corps—and indeed a Royal Canadian Air Force. You need every ounce of goodwill among the professional fighting officers that you can possibly muster. Why make enemies of them? Make allies of them. You need this talent—you really do. If you can get through the next few years with something that will ensure this co-operation, I think you might be able to pull it out of the fire. I suppose a pause is the answer, but I think a progressive pause, if there is such a thing—something like that.

Mr. HARKNESS: To revert to my first question, but to get at it from the opposite direction: what roles do you think the single unified force, as envisaged by this act, would be able to perform?

Mr. MONCEL: I think if you want some form of intervention and peace-keeping on a minor scale, if you are satisfied with that and do it in conjunction with other countries, that you could have a unified force and do this thing. But, bear in mind the size of it.

I read in the press somewhere the other day that we might be interfering in something like the Santo Domingo situation. The kind of force that Canada can sustain alone, abroad, on a protracted basis, on a decent battlefield day, fighting at what we called FFC rates, is about a battalion. This is what you could support by yourself—about a battalion, and keep it fed, supplied, housed, maintained, build your air strips and do everything else with it. A force of this size is about what you can support by yourself. If you do it in conjunction with other people—and everything we have done has been in conjunction with other people; our forces in Cyprus and Gaza are supported by other people—you can obviously make a greater contribution. I do not know if that answers your question.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes. It really leads to the next point that I wanted to ask you about, the ability or otherwise of this projected unified force to co-operate effectively with our allies. I think everybody accepts the fact that you have just stated really, that Canada cannot defend by itself; it has to have allies—and the two allies in particular that we have worked with principally in the past are the United Kingdom and the United States. In your view, would this projected single unified force be able to co-operate and work with all of our allies in NATO, but particularly with these two with which we might be working more closely than any others. Could the projected force co-operate and work with them nearly as effectively as the type of force that we have had?

Mr. MONCEL: No, and for a few very simple reasons. Sailors within the alliance spoke a common language which sailors understood—I never understood it, but they did; and their communications and procedures were geared to work inter-navy. Now, we complain that the Canadian navy overlooked the Canadian army and that they were not able to operate properly with them. That is perhaps a valid argument, and we were taking little steps to try to improve this situation. What is happening now is that we are inventing a new Canadian vocabulary. When my old friends who I occasionally talk to tell me what is going on, I cannot understand them now. Unless Canada can bring the world along with this, they are going to have invented a vocabulary which is going to cause everyone else to have to react to them. I just do not think we are big enough to get away with this. This communication in a special sense is going to be lost, the tighter the force gets. The more the navy is forced into carrying the soldiers up and down the coast of Nova Scotia to the exclusion of everything else, the exclusion of going to sea; the more their equipment is rationalized with the army equipment; the more out of phase they get with allied navies because the other allied navies are too big, perhaps you are going to be at a disadvantage.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, I must say that I thoroughly agree with you. I asked the question particularly because I asked the same question of the minister and the present vice chief of staff, and their answers of course were that the ability to co-operate would not be impaired at all, which I disagreed with and still disagree with.

Mr. MONCEL: This is their opinion and I hope they are right.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, gentlemen, it is after six o'clock. I think that it is the wish of the Committee to continue this evening. If so, we will adjourn until 8 p.m.

EVENING SITTING

MONDAY, February 20, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, when we recessed just after six o'clock, Mr. Harkness had the floor and was in the middle of his questioning. Mr. Harkness?

Mr. HARKNESS: I am afraid that I have forgotten the thread I was following. However, there was a point which came out this afternoon with regard to flexibility about which I wanted to ask you something, General. I think you made the statement that as far as the fighting end of our defence force is concerned, the proposed unification process would result in a great deal less flexibility than we have possessed up to the present time. Mr. Deachman was questioning this particularly and, as far as I could see attempting to prove some disparity between what you said here this afternoon and what you wrote in an article he was dealing with. Now, does this not basically come down to the difference between flexibility from what you might call the administrative and the command points of view on the one hand, versus the ability of the fighting elements of your defence force on the other, to perform the functions which may be required of them?

Mr. MONCEL: I suppose you would really have to have an agreed definition of flexibility. This is a much abused and over-used term and it depends in which

context you are using the term, I suppose. In the sense that I am using it, I think what I am trying to say is that if you train the force basically to fight to the exclusion of everything else, inherent in the business of training to fight is the discipline, equipment and training that enables you to do almost anything from running the Governor General's tea party to fighting a battle. The more that you specialize this and the more you get away from the simple-minded approach of training it only to fight, the less flexible you become. For example, you do not need to have a fully trained fighting officer or fighting man on Cyprus at this moment. You could recruit a much less highly trained person to do that specific job. In fact, many countries do it this way in their UN contributions. The trained fighting officer takes this kind of work in his stride, but he can do other things. I think this is really what is in my mind as the basis of flexibility.

Mr. HARKNESS: I had thought that probably also in your mind was the fact that with the type of organization we have had of a navy, army and air force, you were in a position to meet a very considerable number of roles, but if you came to a unified force which, as you said earlier this afternoon, would be adapted specifically to carry on a sort of police role, you would be in a position where you could not carry on a lot of the other roles. Therefore, your flexibility from the fighting point of view would be very considerably reduced.

Mr. MONCEL: I think this is so. I think this is the intention of what I was trying to say. If you train your navy as a deep-sea fighting navy, the function of carrying chaps from a to b in a transport role is something they can take in their stride, but if you start to specialize more and more in the transport role you will suddenly find that they have lost their fighting capabilities. This would be my worry.

Mr. HARKNESS: On the other hand, what you have said is that the integration process which is taking place has improved flexibility from the administrative point of view.

Mr. MONCEL: Yes, indeed it has.

Mr. HARKNESS: This is one of the points I want to get clear, because I think there was a considerable amount of confusion in Mr. Deachman's mind and probably in the minds of other members of the Committee with regard to what you said as far as flexibility is concerned. One of the things I think both you and I have found as a result of past experience is that there is a terrific difference between the administrative end of things on the one hand and the actual fighting operation on the other.

Mr. MONCEL: I will not argue with that.

Mr. HARKNESS: In speaking of the present plan of unification, you stated that you rejected the present plan out-of-hand. Could you tell us why? In fact, I think you mentioned that it was one of three or four or more possible plans. As I put down your words, you said: The present plan I reject out of hand.

Mr. MONCEL: Yes, because if you are going to do it—if you are determined to unify and are prepared to accept the consequences—you might as well unify it properly and not skulk around the edges of the thing and just do a little bit. If you are going to do away with the navy, well, then, for goodness sake do away with it properly and do not have chaps dressed in one uniform at one time of the day and another one in the evening, and do not give them options about whether

they are going to be colonels, captains or commodores, or anything like this. And do the same thing right through the piece. When you are prepared to do this, you have to be prepared at the same time to rekit right throughout the whole bit, and not just change one uniform at one time.

You can do it, as I see it, in two possible ways. You can either form a single force made up with a series of branches, rather like the air force or the navy is built up today, or you can organize it on a corps basis—one way or the other. Either way will probably work, but in either event I suggest that whoever does it should try to ensure that they link in with somebody, preferably the United States, who talks their language. The only force in the United States that anywhere near approaches this unified force is the United States marines. If you want to form a band of Canadian marines, I suppose it could be done, but this should bear a striking resemblance to the marines which everyone knows, who have taken 150 years to build up a very real tradition, and we need this. We need someone with far, far more experience than we have to lean on, and I am not attempting to be un-Canadian or anything else.

In the army our fighting experience, despite a spendid effort in two world wars, is very limited indeed. We did no major withdrawals. We did no desert fighting, other than a few individuals. We did practically no fighting in the jungles. We did very, very little, if any, combined operations. We really came into the war, insofar as Europe is concerned, when the thing was running, as you well know, and it was not too difficult to command under those conditions. We have not had the breadth of fighting in the army in a sufficient number of fields and under a sufficient number of conditions that we can really say we can stand on our own without a lot of advice from a lot of other people.

Mr. HARKNESS: To a considerable extent, too, of course, this comes back to what you said earlier today, that without the logistics support of allies it would be very difficult for us. In fact, I think you said we could not keep more than one battalion group operating indefinitely.

Mr. MONCEL: About that size, I think. I am talking now about some place further removed than from here to Rivière du Loup, or something like that. I mean "X" country, where we have to transport the supplies. On the long basis, this would just about exhaust us, I think.

Mr. HARKNESS: In effect, in order to produce any reasonable defence effort commensurate with our population, our manufacturing ability and our general economic situation, we have to operate with allies.

Mr. MONCEL: Yes, unless you want to spend a great deal more money. You have got to be able to invent some roles—that is the big problem, trying to find an enemy. You sit down for hours with a blunt pencil and a piece of paper and say, who am I going to fight? The only kind of work planners can do specifically, with the chance of the thing coming off, is offensive planning. Even this has it drawbacks, as some offensive planners learned to their dismay in 1945.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, as far as our planning during recent years is concerned, has it really all been predicated on the basis of our acting in conjunction and in co-operation with other people?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes, entirely, I would say.

Mr. HARKNESS: And not acting on our own under any circumstances?

Mr. MONCEL: I cannot recall any thoughts that I was involved in that suggested we were going to do something by ourselves.

Mr. HARKNESS: In other words, all the probabilities are that if we are engaged in any war-like operations it will be in conjunction with somebody else.

Mr. MONCEL: This, I think, it is fair to say.

Mr. HARKNESS: Now, I would like to ask you about one or two specific things as far as this bill is concerned. One is a matter which you have just touched on, and that is the universal or common rank structure proposed. Do you see any need for that as far as the navy or the people who are engaged in naval operations are concerned?

Mr. MONCEL: No.

Mr. HARKNESS: Do you think anything would be gained by it in any way whatever?

Mr. MONCEL: Not the slightest bit. I think a great deal would be lost. The only justification that I have ever read in the past on this was that it would make things administratively more simple. I suppose the logical extension of that is that it would be a hell of a lot more simple if they were all the same size, wore the same size hats, the same size boots and same went to the same church, if any.

An hon. MEMBER: May I ask a supplementary question here?

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, just let me finish. There would be no administrative advantage, really, that you know of in having the ranks in the navy the same as the ranks in the army and the air force?

Mr. MONCEL: No, it is the same numbers. It is no different from having Anglicans and the rest of them.

Mr. HARKNESS: In other words, it is an example of unification for unification's sake, essentially.

Mr. MONCEL: I am not quite sure what the object of the exercise is—why you begin to even want to do it. You have to be terribly careful about these things; they sound good when you say them quickly. Could I give you an example of that? Somebody handed me a piece of paper—

The CHAIRMAN: By all means.

Mr. MONCEL: I am told that you had a chap here called Patrick and this is allegedly from page 4 of what he said—I do not know if he said it or not.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, I do not know either. I was not here either on Friday.

Mr. MONCEL: Well, perhaps if he did not say it somebody will tell me. He said that the reduction from 346 trades in the three services to 97, which came about only because of the unification process, is nothing less than a masterpiece of personnel management. Did he say this?

An hon. MEMBER: Yes.

Mr. HARKNESS: I see it printed here in a copy of his brief.

Mr. MONCEL: Could I take about three minutes to discuss this masterpiece for you?

We have 346 trades in the three services. Now, each of these trades is backed by a specification, and they are called by different things, but essentially it is a

job analysis of what a person with this trade is supposed to be able to do. It is a very useful document. It tells the trainers to what standard they should train this particular type of fellow. When you are demanding reinforcements or replacements you can demand by this specific trade. If you want a loader or wireless operator, you get this chap; it is a job specification. Now, it is extremely useful at all times during the course of a decade or so—or perhaps more often—to review these things; to make certain that you are not over-training. There is a tremendous tendency in peacetime to over-train. You have got more time and you tend to embellish the thing. You make the chap really far better than he need be for his actual job. In a sense I suppose this is a good thing—it is a peacetime hazard.

When we came along with integration we had a splendid opportunity to take a look at the whole trade structure right across the piece, so we started this exercise in training. We found that on the 346 trades, a great number had things in common and somewhere in the course of one of the briefings these magic figures of 346 to 96 came out. I thought the figures were 312 and 100, but this is of no consequence in this magnitude. Everybody starting scribbling furiously—346 to 97; is this not wonderful? And before long the whole object of the exercise changed; a masterpiece—we have reduced 346 to 97.

Let us look at what happened. Let us take one element out of that. You had some 20-odd bandsmen of different types—euphonium player, base drummer, kettle drummer, triangle player, and so on. We did away with all the 20-odd bandsmen and we produced one—a musician. That is all. Here is a reduction from 20 trades to one trade, is that not right? Well, the first thing you have got to do, of course, is take the one musician and put 20 different little dots beside him to distinguish between a triangle player and a euphonium player. Otherwise, when you demand musicians you are apt to get a band of brass drummers. So, you take the 97 and put the required number of dots beside them and add them up, and you get 346. This is a miraculous piece of personnel administration. All I am saying is for goodness sake be careful of these ruddy charts. They are dangerous as hell, you know.

Mr. HARKNESS: I think you illustrate that point very well, indeed, General Moncel.

Mr. WINCH: I have one supplementary question. I thought the right time to ask it was when you were mentioning the ranks, because when General Foulkes was here the other day he said he would not like to be called an admiral, and I noticed the other day you made mention of a captain of a ship being called a colonel. In case I have some misconception here I would like to get it cleared, and I am certain that you feel the same way. In the Minister's speech on December 7 he had this to say with regard to ranks, as reported at page 10834 of *Hansard:*

> The bill would enable the minister to prescribe alternative titles of rank to those used officially for documentation, pay, etc., and state the circumstances under which they might be used. It is my intention to authorize members of the Canadian Armed Forces to use rank titles traditional to their former service.

Have I got it wrong? Does this not actually mean that a captain on a ship is still the captain, or the colonel of a regiment is still a colonel, or have I got some

misconception of this? That is the way it was stated and that is the way it is printed.

Mr. MONCEL: As I understand it, that is what they mean. We had one wild-eyed discussion one afternoon where everybody with a Scotch name could wear a kilt, regardless of what service he was in. Fortunately, it never came to anything. As I understand this, if a fellow is promoted to a rank, he is promoted to one of the ranks or equivalents that are listed in that book.

Mr. WINCH: Well, I do not see that in the statement of the Minister; that is the reason I asked.

Mr. MONCEL: Well, if you read it again you will see what it says.

Mr. WINCH: There is just one paragraph which is headed "Military Ranks" and I read all but a couple of sentences of it.

Mr. MONCEL: It is in one of the sentences that you read.

Mr. WINCH: It says:

> The bill would enable the minister to prescribe alternative titles of rank to those used officially for documentation, pay, etc...

Mr. MONCEL: That is right. The ranks that are used officially for documentation are army ranks.

Mr. WINCH: Yes, but it does say then—and this is actually the sentence I was after:

> It is my intention to authorize members of the Canadian Armed Forces to use rank titles traditional to their former service.

Does former service, in your estimation, mean that if you were a captain you are changed to something else, or does a service mean the Royal Canadian Navy? Perhaps that is where the misconception comes in.

Mr. MONCEL: It means you are promoted to captain in the navy, your documents show that you are promoted to colonel—which is the official thing —but you can continue to call yourself a captain.

Mr. WINCH: Because you are in a service.

Mr. MONCEL: Yes, I presume this is what it means. Presumably, if you are a really keen integrationist or unificationist, you could call yourself a colonel. I think Landymore brought this out—at least, I gather he did. You could get the astonishing position where a ship is commanded by a colonel with nine captains, or whatever number they have on board, and yet some chaps will hold out, calling themselves lieutenant commanders. How on earth would you make a signal? I would not know. In short, either do it or do not, but do not leave these little frills hanging. If you are determined to call them colonels well, for goodness sake call them colonels. Do not hedge around it.

Mr. HARKNESS: On that very point, my reading of the bill is that if a man is a commander in the navy and, after the bill comes into effect—if it does in this form, and I certainly hope it will not—he were promoted to colonel on the official designation, he would have to call himself a colonel. If he remains a commander he could continue to call himself a commander, but if he is promoted then he has lost that option and he becomes a colonel whether he wants to be or not.

Mr. MONCEL: This may be another interpretation.

Mr. HARKNESS: This is certainly my interpretation of the way it would work out.

Mr. MONCEL: I cannot interpret it; somebody no doubt can. This seems to be sloppy administration.

Mr. HARKNESS: As you said, I think it would result in an absolutely chaotic situation and one in which everybody would be confused most of the time.

Now, one other point. The bill we have before us provides that enlistment for other ranks will be for a five-year period and that re-enlistment will be for an indefinite period, and may be terminated at any time on six months' notice. Admiral Landymore pointed out in his brief that this could result in a group of tradesmen, or several groups of tradesmen, who perhaps had the opportunity of getting more money on civvy street, or because they had some particular grievance, all giving their six months' notice together. Then you would be faced with an extremely awkward situation in which, possibly, you could not put any ships to sea. If these people all left at the same time you would naturally not have enough replacements under training to take their places. What is your view with regard to this particular type of re-enlistment provision?

Mr. MONCEL: I would be against it. I just cannot imagine what Landymore is alleged to have said coming true in the service I knew, but it is a possibility, I suppose, but it is hard to imagine.

Your great problem is that if you make it possible for people to go too easily you are apt to find yourself in very serious trouble. We have no guaranteed intake on a voluntary basis. It is extremely difficult to plan when you do not have the slightest idea how many troops you are going to have six months from now. In the United States it is relatively easy. You are invited by the government to come and serve, and it is not too difficult to sit down and estimate how many you are going to have in the force at a given date.

From our point of view we keep them, in large measure, by goodwill, but we also have a contract. The chap is signed up. Now, in the course of our business you have to do a number of unpleasant things. This is part of the business, and you do unpleasant things because you are told to do them, and if you do not do them the penalties are very, very severe indeed. By design, if everyone has the option of saying on six months' notice, "I will soldier no more," you are apt to get into trouble because every time you get an unpleasant posting you say, "Thanks very much, I will not take this one," and off you go. I am a bad one to be stating this case, because I suppose I did just what I say should not be able to happen. We were brought up to believe that in the officer corps you served at the Queen's pleasure, and if the Queen is displeased with you, you go, but not until then.

We went through this argument in great detail when we had the difficulties with the pilots and the rest of them and we had to buy their services. This is wrong. Most of us felt that the real solution to this problem was to say, 'congratulations, you have a contract which says five years. Now, get in the aeroplane and fly it. If you do not fly, you are in the bastille. Apparently this is not to be the case. I do not know how you can maintain discipline when a chap can say, in the midst of a contract, "I quit,"—on a voluntary basis; with conscription, of course, it is very different from that.

Mr. HARKNESS: In other words, it poses the threat at all times that you may lose sufficient of your perosnnel that you can no longer carry on effectively.

Mr. MONCEL: Indeed, and there is a lot to be said for not doing it. It is a terribly difficult question. I have the greatest sympathy with you in this sense, on the basis that the chap who is dragooned into staying to fulfil his contract is really an unwilling operator. He spreads alarm and despondency and you are far better off to get rid of him. In certain cases this is probably true, but you must remember that forces of tremendous size like the United States forces operate quite satisfactorily on the basis that everybody is to go. Nobody wants to go and do this wretched business, but is has to be done, and this is where you have to generate questions of pride and questions of loyalty. So far, in my experience, you have never had to resort to these punitive measures that I suggest, because a chap in the Black Watch, by tradition, would not do it. They have not done it for 300 years and he is not going to be the first one to do it. These are some things that sustain, and these are the things which I am terrified we are apt to throw away just a little lightly, and we have too few of them.

Mr. HARKNESS: Thank you.

Mr. ANDRAS: General Moncel, when did you choose to retire from the forces? What is the exact date?

Mr. MONCEL: I think July 16 was the official date.

Mr. ANDRAS: What year?

Mr. MONCEL: Last year.

Mr. ANDRAS: Yes, 1966. Now, sir, today and on previous occasions when witnesses have been called before us, we heard a considerable amount about inadequate internal communications from the headquarters staff to the people in the field, and I think you got on this subject again this afternoon. Would you agree that the people in the command did not know what was going on or what the objectives were, and if so, what did you do, for instance, when you were Vice Chief of Staff about that situation?

Mr. MONCEL: If they did not know it was my fault, in some large measure.

Mr. ANDRAS: Then you would—

Mr. MONCEL: And they did not know.

Mr. ANDRAS: They did not know? There was considerable newspaper publicity, the White Paper was widely distributed, and I ask you this question: Did you see the statement put out on April 2, 1964, by the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Hellyer, and the Associate Minister of National Defence, Mr. Cardin, to all the armed forces personnel and Department of National Defence civil service?

Mr. MONCEL: I cannot recall what the document said.

Mr. ANDRAS: I would just like to read to you a couple of excerpts. First, from paragraph 6 of that document:

> The third and final step will be the unification of the three services.

then it goes on to say later,

> It is reasonable to expect that it will be three or four years before it will be possible to take this action.

and that three or four years dates, of course, from the date of this which was April 2, 1964. And again in paragraph 7 of that communication it says, quite plainly:

...the end objective of a single service is firm.

Knowing this, sir, from this declaration of April 2, 1964, knowing what the ministers intended, knowing the approximate time they expected to take, and considering the bitterness with which you now attack the plan, why did you actively take part in it?

Mr. MONCEL: I took part in it for the time I did in the mistaken belief that possibly I could have some influence and attempt to slow it down so that I could begin to compete with it. On no less than six occasions I went to my chief and said "I can go on no longer", and in each case he told me, "Wait it out, you have simply got to stay", and I was gullible and I said, "All right, I will wait it out", and I hung on for another month, and another month, and another—the same type of intervention, and we felt that surely somebody must listen to what we were trying to say. Finally, it was apparent that the lines were really gone and then there was no point; so I went to my chief and said, "I am out".

Mr. ANDRAS: Switching a little bit now, you have probably read or heard that Admiral Landymore said before us he felt the establishment of Mobile Command could lead to—as I think he described it—an overnight military coup and the establishment of a military dictatorship. My first question on that is: did you, as Vice Chief, have anything to do with the creation of Mobile Command?

Mr. MONCEL: Of course I did.

Mr. ANDRAS: Secondly, would you agree with Admiral Landymore's contention and warning?

Mr. MONCEL: I did not hear him say this. I cannot believe he said just that.

Mr. ANDRAS: Well then, you would disagree with it, sir? He did say it.

Mr. NUGENT: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, I get a little tired of this. All Mr. Andras has to do to be fair to the witness is to read from Admiral Landymore's brief the words he said—not this man's interpretation of it—and then ask the General. I think that is the only fair way to proceed. Certainly, asking him whether he agrees or disagrees with Mr. Andras' conception of what Landymore meant is most unfair, and I do not think it should be indulged.

The CHAIRMAN: It might clarify matters if you do read this.

Mr. ANDRAS: Well I will simply put the question. I do not have the brief here, and I am quite aware that I am paraphrasing. The implication was that this Committee should look into the matter because there was a danger of a military coup overnight by either the Commander or Mobile Command—

Mr. MONCEL: There was a danger of a military coup?

Mr. ANDRAS: —or the Commander of Mobile Command in collusion with the Defence Minister.

Mr. NUGENT: Unexaggerated, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: If you have it before you, will you read it?

Mr. NUGENT: All right; it starts at the bottom on page 10—

> Mobile Command is too large and so is Maritime Command—Mobile Command should be given a three way split into East, West and Central Commands.

> Mobile Command is not only too big. It is dangerous to our democracy. If ever a Commander of that Command decided to set himself up to control this country of ours, he has a ready made organization to achieve it. If a Minister of National Defence and a Commander Mobile Command got together, we could have a dictatorship overnight. As Members of Parliament you should contemplate this organization with some alarm.

That is the brief.

Mr. ANDRAS: I appreciate the exactness of Mr. Nugent's intervention. I just simply ask you: Do you think this is a—

Mr. MONCEL: I think what Landymore says is probably correct. If you have a chap who wants to do this, he has the resources. But, "if"—I cannot conceive of this.

Mr. ANDRAS: It is an "if" that exists with any military force, in the country, before or after Mobile Command, reorganization, or anything else? Is that not the case? It is a very big "if".

Mr. MONCEL: No. I think I see what Landymore was after. Now, there is this slight difference: The old organization was so truncated and split that one man could really not have done anything. He would have to bring along about seven others with him.

Mr. ANDRAS: You, sir, were active in the planning and formation of Mobile Command while you were Vice Chief?

Mr. MONCEL: Oh, indeed I was, yes.

Mr. ANDRAS: Now, sir, with the knowledge of the objectives stated in the White Paper and the Minister's statement of April 2, 1964, would you have accepted the position of Chief of Defence Staff if it had been offered to you?

Mr. MONCEL: It was never offered; so it was never a thought in my mind.

Mr. ANDRAS: Would you have accepted it, though, knowing the plan that was described in the White Paper and the statement of April 2, 1964?

Mr. MONCEL: I do not think I can answer that.

The CHAIRMAN: I think that is what we call a hypothetical question.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, a lot of hypothetical questions were put here tonight which were alone.

Mr. ANDRAS: Well sir, I have to state the confusion between the position you take today and the position you placed before the staff college in you article that appeared in the Canadian Army Staff College Journal to which my colleague, Mr. Deachman, referred this afternoon. You have also indicated today that you were one of the architects of the plan that we are examining—

Mr. MONCEL: Let us be clear on this thing. As I understand it, what we are examining today is a statement that appears in the preamble to Bill No. C-243, or whatever the number is, which says, that the time is now ripe, or something like that—

Mr. NUGENT: What is that, I wonder?

Mr. MONCEL: This is a copy of my article, which I am delighted to see.

Mr. MACALUSO: Perhaps we could have it tabled, Mr. Chairman, and copies run off for all members of the Committee.

Mr. HARKNESS: This is the first time you have seen it in print?

Mr. MONCEL: I wrote this out somewhere; it says in the explanatory notes to the White Paper that

> Since that time the planning required for the integration process has continued and it is now considered appropriate to proceed to the final goal—

This is, as I understand it, the object of the exercise. All I am trying to say is I do not think it is appropriate to proceed to the final goal at this stage.

Mr. ANDRAS: And yet, this article appeared within the last year. It must have represented your views at that time. I submit to you sir, that no matter what your qualifications or reservations are today in the evidence you have given us, at that time you presented it as Vice Chief of the General Staff to the Staff College which was attended by many of the future senior officers of the armed forces of Canada who could only have interpreted this as your point of view. I have read it quite thoroughly—and I am a layman, I admit—but I can only take out of it an enthusiastic endorsement of the principle of integration and unification.

Your last closing remark in there—

Mr. NUGENT: What sort of unification was specified?

Mr. ANDRAS:

> In the final analysis perhaps integration is the wrong word altogether and it is "unification" of which we should speak—one force with many facets operating at the will of one commander in the fulfilment of one national defence policy.

That is what you described in principle. The staff officer who read that would most certainly respect your opinion and, I would think, take it as an enthusiastic endorsement of the general plan that is before this Committee and the bill that has been presented. My question is—

Mr. MONCEL: Just clarify this, please. It is "an enthusiastic endorsement of the process of integration"—"enthusiastic"—I meant it; I wrote it that way.

Mr. ANDRAS: The word "integration", you go on to say, should have been called "unification" which is "one force with many facets operating at the will of one commander in the fulfilment of one national defence policy", which is basically what we are delaing with now.

Mr. MONCEL: I did not say "should"; I said "perhaps".

Mr. ANDRAS: Well sir, we can argue about whether the "perhaps" applies to the phrase: perhaps it should have been unification used instead of integration. I am being quite sincere when I say, in the light of further comments throughout your whole document, that it is an enthusiastic statement of the principle of unification—"one force with many facets operating at the will of one commander in the fulfilment of one national defence policy". I cannot see how you can turn against that now.

Mr. MONCEL: Well, this is what any author has to go through when his work is being interpreted. I meant what I said and I stand by it.

Mr. ANDRAS: Well sir, with the greatest respect to you, I just cannot understand this. I must ask you, because this is such a serious matter before us, what really has happened during this last eight months to cause you to repudiate

the enthusiastic endorsement of this program which appears in your article of last year?

Mr. NUGENT: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, I want to know wherein what has been read as this gentleman's writing of what he calls unification is a program now before us in the White Paper. I can see nothing there and I think it is very unfair to the witness to suggest it, since he has already told us four different plans of unification. If you want to proceed with the concept, I want to know where Mr. Andras gets the idea that it is an enthusiastic endorsation of the plan presently before us. First of all, when he wrote that, did he have in mind the plan of unification now before us and if so, was that what he was endorsing so enthusiastically?

Mr. WINCH: The General is more competent than you are. This is the same party that thought I interrupted too much.

Mr. ANDRAS: Well, Mr. Chairman, you must deal with the point of order, of course, but I suggest that General Moncel is quite capable of answering my question as put to him, based on what I tell you is my interpretation of this article that he wrote in 1965-66. I am just asking what really happened during this last eight months to have you turn against this to the degree that you have—a complete turn around; a complete flip-flop of your ideas and views on this question of leading to a single unified defence force?

The CHAIRMAN: On the point of order that has been raised by Mr. Nugent, it would appear to me, in the interest of answering and clarifying Mr. Andras' question, that perhaps the witness would like to answer Mr. Nugent's question first of all and then proceed to—

Mr. MACALUSO: I submit, with all due respect, that there is no point of order and the questioning by Mr. Andras certainly is in order, and I suggest that you must let the General decide about answering it. He is more than competent, as he has shown today, to answer questions.

The CHAIRMAN: I am sure Mr. Andras' question is in order.

Mr. MACALUSO: That is the only point at issue, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: I thought perhaps he might like to take Mr. Nugent's suggestion into account.

Mr. MONCEL: I will answer whatever way he wants; I do not mind.

The CHAIRMAN: Then will you proceed with the answer to Mr. Andras' question?

Mr. MONCEL: Ask me your question again so that I can understand.

Mr. ANDRAS: I am saying sir, that this document—and I could go into page after page, quotation after quotation—certainly leads one to believe that you were very much in favour of the plan which was written after the White Paper, and after the April, 1964, statement that it was going to be a single defence force. But now, in your statements today, you have completely reversed your position: you flip-flop back to a position that you do not endorse this program. You have attacked it on the basis of it being a distressing state of affairs: you said it will prevent us from being able to co-operate with our allies; you have used many phrases to describe your dissatisfaction with what, generally speaking is the same plan that you endorsed in this issue. Now, I am asking you sir, what really happened in this past eight months to have you change your mind—

Mr. NUGENT: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, I object to this suggestion "the same plan he endorsed"; there is nothing to indicate that in what Mr. Andras has read. If something in the article indicates that what General Moncel apparently endorsed at that time is the same plan that we are considering now, then it is fair to ask that question, but I do object most strenuously to this suggestion of trying to mislead the witness into saying he took this position.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, I think the calibre of the witness are questioning, would make it impossible to mislead him. I think he is more capable of answering the question than anybody else here.

Mr. NUGENT: It does not make any difference—it is the quality of the question asked and the tactics used.

Mr. MONCEL: I am not misled.

The CHAIRMAN: On this point of order, I think when the witness is answering this question he will cover the points that have been raised by you, Mr. Nugent.

Mr. MONCEL: This was written as, and was meant to be, an article expressing enthusiastic support for the program as I knew it, and I still stand by it. I could not possibly have supported the unification plans as of today, because I have not written it yet. Nobody knew the plan for unification at the date this was written. There was not one, except in certain people's minds. There was no military plan for unification on that date.

Mr. ANDRAS: If you had continued as Vice Chief or as Chief of Defence Staff, then you would have written a detailed plan for unification which you would have expected to carry out in that capacity?

Mr. MONCEL: The reason I left is because I could not write such a plan.

Mr. ANDRAS: Well sir, I simply cannot understand the change. I know there is a lack of communication here—a lack of understanding—and I am being quite sincere. I think it is entirely pertinent to the decision that we in the Committee must take to try to clarify it, even if it simply is to remove any doubts that might be there about your motives in changing your mind about this.

Mr. MONCEL: Perhaps I can help you. In my experience we had two—I think it was two—formal meetings with the Minister to discuss unification as such, the next step in this bill. At the first meeting, when my chief was away and I was acting chief, the defence staff were summoned and we were summoned with our subordinates, like a band of schoolboys. And the Minister asked each one of us in turn, subordinates first: "Are you, or are you not in favour of integration?" And they all stood up and said their piece. When he came to me, I said no.

An hon. MEMBER: Are you referring to unification?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes, to unification. Two of my subordinates were at this meeting, and afterwards I called them in and said: "Now, you spoke up and said you were in favour of unification, did you not?" They answered, "Yes, sir." I then said, "All right, you now have the power, here is the pen, what are you going to do? Write me the plan." And they all said: "We do not know what we are going to do, but we are in favour of it." I said: "Well, that is fine, that is great, but it is damned irresponsible, and some day you are going to have responsibility; some day you are going to find out what it is like to have it. Because it is a very different aspect when you hold the pencil that can sign it. Someday you are going to own this pencil." That was the first meeting.

The second meeting took place some weeks later, again when my chief was away, and I was summoned and told to produce the defence staff and my subordinates again to discuss unification. I spent a very long time with the Minister at that stage, on a Friday night, telling him that with the greatest respect this was the wrong way to do business. You do not call your subordinates in to defence meetings, and prime or pump or question their superiors in front of them. It is never done, it breaks down the system. And he agreed that perhaps we would try it once more, but this time we would just have the members of the defence staff—the principals, the chaps who were responsible, the four branch heads. So we met and had a useful, free and frank discussion, and for the first time, out of all this maze of paper and the rest of it, some of us began to get a glimmer of what he wanted—for the first time. And that was the last meeting we ever had.

I tried on at least 20 occasions to provoke another meeting, and the defence staff of my generation never met again on the question of unification not ever, as a defence staff. Yet, during all that period, my subordinates were being dealt with directly. Now, is there anything more you want?

Mr. ANDRAS: Can you give us the dates of those meetings, General Moncel?

Mr. MONCEL: I am sure somebody can get them; I have not got them.

Mr. ANDRAS: You have not got them at hand now, then? Well sir, I still cannot understand the change. I have not been able to grasp the specific reasons for your change.

An hon. MEMBER: What change?

Mr. ANDRAS: The change from his paper in 1965 to the criticisms of the plan that have been given today. It has raised many questions and, simply because I cannot understand it, I am going to raise the matter and question the Minister of National Defence and the Chief of the Defence Staff when they appear before us. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MACALUSO: In some of the answers you gave earlier you stated that a single force with one commander could work if there were a change in commitments. I think I am paraphrasing, but that is the gist of your answers, and of our present commitments. And yet, referring again to the paper that I tabled which is before you, you state at page 6, in referring to a national defence policy:

> As my readers will know, this policy was set out quite plainly in the Government White Paper on Defence 1964. We must understand that this statement of policy is not an outcome of integration, nor is integration an outcome of this policy. As I have attempted to explain, integration is merely a means to achieve and end—a way to fulfil defence policy in the most efficient manner.

You keep referring to defence policy, and I assume you are referring back to the defence policy set out in the Government White Paper of 1964.

Mr. MONCEL: I would think so, yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: Again I must come back to what Mr. Andras came to, which is the last paragraph on page 9. And I also question this because I think you will agree with me—this paper shows it, and what you have said here confirms it—that you are using integration and unification as the same term. In your mind it is the same term, if I might read your mind that way.

Mr. MONCEL: What I really should get for you, you know, is the chap who wrote the paper.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, you said that you wrote the paper, sir. It has all been very humorous, but I am afraid I am getting a little more serious at it. You have explained to us that you have been the architect of many of the plans—four plans. You explained to us that this is your paper, that you accepted it at that time, you believed in it when you presented it, and you still stand by every word that you said in it today.

Mr. MONCEL: That is right.

Mr. MACALUSO: So, I come back to that last paragraph again:

> In the final analysis perhaps integration is the wrong word altogether and it is "unification" of which we should speak.

That is one sense; that is why I am saying you are interchanging it. And then:

> —one force with many facets operating at the will of one commander in the fulfilment of one national defence policy.

And every time you refer to a defence policy in this paper, you are referring to the words which you used:

> —this policy was set out quite plainly in the Government White Paper on Defence 1964.

Is that correct?

Mr. MONCEL: I believe it was, sir.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, then, in this paper, unless I read it wrongly—and I do not think I have been reading it wrongly because I have been going over it quite thoroughly today—you state to this Committee that we cannot fulfil our present commitments with one single force. This is what you have agreed with. And yet, in this paper, you state that you cannot fulfil those present commitments as outlined in the White Paper, which are the same commitments that we have today and which we had in the past. Therefore, in my mind, sir—and correct me in this—it is a contradiction. You are going full circle. You say we cannot keep our present commitments with one force, and yet you say in here we can keep those commitments and you are referring to commitments in the White Paper which have not changed. Is that not correct?

Mr. MONCEL: That is correct. With an integrated force of the right size and shape, I think you can fulfil the commitments. This is the essence in which I was writing. Then I went on to say—and I think you read it out five times for me—it may be that integration is the wrong term, and what we are really saying is unification.

Mr. MACALUSO: What you are saying, sir—those are your words. I want to get to page 9 again and I suggest, sir, with all due respect, that perhaps you are a little guilty of what you were preaching to the young officers at the time. You say:

> I must stress, however, that we must not allow integration to become our whipping boy. Far from being the cause of our troubles, it is their best cure.

And as I say, with all due respect, I believe from what I have heard today that you have been coming full circle, around and around and, in view of this paper,

that you are using the interplay of the term integration and unification as, perhaps, your own whipping boy. I agree with what Mr. Andras says; I also believe that there has been a complete flip-flop; a complete turn-around from your view when you gave this paper. Now, if you believed in these matters, as you state, at the time you presented them, and today you state that you still believe and stand by every word here, I also am at a complete loss to understand your change of mind. I feel that perhaps there is more behind it than what we have heard, and I would like to know whether this is or is not so. I, for one, am at a loss to understand that position.

Mr. HARKNESS: Churchill said, only God can give understanding.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, Mr. Chairman, perhaps few of us are lacking in that regard. But certainly I am here to be able to understand and I hope the witness can clarify the situation, because certainly I do not believe it has been clarified to date. With due respect, General, I might say that a doubt has been left in this matter of the complete turn-around.

Mr. MONCEL: I see. Well, let me see whether I can clarify the doubts; that is really what I am here for. There has not been a complete turn-around. I have been accused of a lot of things in my life but never before of flip-flopping, whatever that means; it sounds very undignified.

Mr. MACALUSO: I do not mean to be undignified. Let us say you are on a merry-go-round in that regard. Is that all right? That is a more dignified term.

Mr. MONCEL: I will not levy that for a moment. I say it now, and I will say it again—what I wrote here, I believe. And in the particular sentence on page 9, if that is it, I am not using integration as a whipping boy. There was a tendency amongst a lot of people to do so, probably due to inability on my part to get the message across properly. You see what difficulty I am having with you; you can imagine doing it to a hundred thousand.

Mr. MACALUSO: I would say, with a few of us, General.

Mr. MONCEL: There was a tendency for a lot of chaps to blame all of our problems of the day on the advent of integration. What I was trying to say was that integration in itself was not to blame. The problems that we faced at that moment—and they were very real ones—were with us, in any event. They were problems that arose. We were much better able—much better able—under the integrated staff system, to solve these problems than we otherwise would have been.

Let me explain to you what I am trying to get at. We used to have a thing called the tri-services pay committee. We wanted to develop a modern pay system, a decent one. We still had chaps in the army, literally on high stools, scribing away with pens—five hundred of them, sitting here. As a soldier it disgusted me. I wanted to modernize the pay system, and we tried—I do not know for how long, I suppose it was 10 years—and every time I got up as far as the Minister or the Deputy Minister, with a solution, he would say: "Robert it looks great, go back now and sell it to the Navy and the Air Force." So, back we would go and we would start. They had ideas about pay too, and anybody would integrate their pay system with anybody else, provided they integrated with you. And it just was not going to happen. And when I say it was 10 years, I think it was longer than that—I think it must be 15 years—and we got nowhere. We had no decent equipment simply because we could not come to an agreed solution.

When I became Comptroller General, we formed one pay organization, and we sent the team around the world listening, and examining all the best pay systems in the world, and within 6 months we produced a pay system for the force which, I believe, is unchanged to this day, and the computer, I believe, has now been ordered and is coming in. And this is great, and this is what I was trying to say: our problems are with us, in any event, but with the integrated system in certain conditions, you are much, much, better able to solve them. We undid more tangles in this regard in a matter of weeks than we had done, or had been able to do, for months.

Mr. MACALUSO: I say in your example, sir, that you could have used the words "unified system" instead of "integrated system", just as easily.

Mr. MONCEL: With no problem at all.

Mr. MACALAUSO: I say that you are using both as the same term because on page 5 you state again:

> Not only have we accepted integration as a philosophy but we have introduced the modern management techniques which unification has permitted us to use.

Therefore, you can understand why I keep saying that you are using the terms integration and unification to mean the same thing.

Mr. MONCEL: Possibly in this context they could have been.

Mr. MACALUSO: Yes, possibly, as you wrote it. Now, may I ask on a further—

Mr. MONCEL: Did I clear your mind on what I tried to mean by the whipping boy?

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, to a certain degree, but it is not quite what I am referring to—

Mr. MONCEL: You are not satisfied?

Mr. MACALUSO: No, I am not, General. Let us get back to Mobile Command. Perhaps this has been stated before, but whose concept was Mobile Command in this system?

Mr. MONCEL: The original responsibility for it is mine.

Mr. MACALUSO: It is yours? We can say that you are the architect of it?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: And being the architect of it, were you ever offered command of Mobile Command?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: By whom?

Mr. MONCEL: By the Minister.

Mr. MACALUSO: When was that?

Mr. MONCEL: I cannot remember.

Mr. MACALUSO: Did you refuse to accept it, or did you agree to accept it? I gather you resigned, so you refused to accept it. Is there any particular reason that you could tell this Committee why you refused to accept the command of Mobile Command?

Mr. MONCEL: I have told the Committee that I had decided to leave the force.

Mr. MACALUSO: That is the only reason you refused to accept command of Mobile Command?

Mr. MONCEL: It was not a question; I was out of the force.

Mr. MACALUSO: Was this offered to you after you resigned, sir, or before?

Mr. MONCEL: No, you have got the wrong point. I left the force, as I told you, because I felt I could no longer loyally continue to do my duty.

Mr. MACALUSO: When was the offer made to you, before or after you put in your resignation, sir?

Mr. MONCEL: I think it was before.

Mr. MACALUSO: Before I am going to quote from a document which I will identify. I will ask you if you will agree with this, and I quote:

> The existence of three or more separate services in modern national defence forces is an illogical relic of the past perpetuated by inflexible thinking, vested interests and individual service fear of extinction.

And then it goes on:

> —modern conditions call for a single service.
>
> A clear distinction of roles for each service is no longer possible—the navy uses aircraft to support its surface and sub-surface operations, the army uses aircraft for transportation, observation and close support, and the air force requires both land and sea protection of its bases and supply routes.
>
> As time passes this overlapping of function continues to increase with resulting waste in research and development programs, manpower and time. New weapons and ideas which do not fit into old concepts of service functions increase this problem daily.
>
> The development of a single, unified service would lead to increased efficiency both in logistics and operations.

Did I read it too fast, or would you agree?

An hon. MEMBER: What are you quoting from?

Mr. MACALUSO: I will identify it. Would you agree or disagree?

Mr. NUGENT: It was identified before.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, I would ask your protection from this inane badgering from the member opposite.

Mr. MONCEL: I think he went too fast for me to absorb it. I do not recognize this one at all.

Mr. MACALUSO: This comes from a document prepared by Captain J. G. Forth and which is also in the Canadian Army Staff College Journal (1959-1961) on the topic "Unification—Why, How, When".

Mr. MONCEL: By whom?

Mr. MACALUSO: Captain J. G. Forth.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order. I thought from the way this question was put, and I am sure the witness did also—Mr. Macaluso very carefully laid the ground that way—that he was indicating to this witness, until he revealed the author, that this is something that he wrote—

Mr. MACALUSO: I will not even answer such a stupid remark.

Mr. NUGENT: I think it is only fair, when he is going to quote from a document, that we know the source so that we may all follow and understand it.

The CHAIRMAN: On that point of order; I cannot really accept that, inasmuch as he was asking whether the witness would comment on that statement that was made, and this is not unusual in this committee. We have had a number of such occasions before. He has identified the document—

Mr. MONCEL: I did not think that those were my words.

Mr. MACALUSO: I did not ask whether they were yours, sir; I asked if you agreed or disagreed with those words.

Mr. MONCEL: I would like to have it read again, now that I can put my mind to what you are saying.

Mr. MACALUSO: Does it make any difference whether they are your words or someone else's in order to agree or disagree with them?

Mr. MONCEL: It makes a tremendous difference.

Mr. MACALUSO: I think that is a complete answer in itself, sir. I will give you another quotation, this time from Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery, and I quote:

> If the United Kingdom were today a recently created state organizing her fighting forces it is inconceivable that they would be separated into three services.

Would you agree or disagree with that remark, sir?

Mr. MONCEL: I would disagree.

Mr. MACALUSO: You would disagree?

Mr. MONCEL: Sure. This is the same chap who said we should have all bachelors in the Army.

Mr. MACALUSO: It might be more fun, who knows? I would not know.

Mr. MONCEL: One of the cute little things they used to bring out all the time was the remark by this famous airman who said there should be one service. This was quoted ad nauseam until I tipped somebody off and said, "For God's sake be careful what you are saying, because what this chap is saying is there should only be one service and it should be the Air Force".

Mr. MACALUSO: I am only concerned with your answer to the Viscount's statement. I am only going to ask one last question. Getting back to your own paper, sir, you state:

> Integration means different things to different people.

Mr. MONCEL: That is very apparent.

Mr. MACALUSO:

> Clearly, the meaning we in the Canadian Forces ascribe to the word is something quite different.
>
> —in practical terms the process of integration can be but a means to an end and not an end in itself.

And you say further down:

> What, then, is this end that we seek? Expressed in the simplest terms it may be described as the ultimate in military efficiency in terms of Canada's Defence Policy—

Do you still stand by that remark?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes, sir.

Mr. MACALUSO: That is all I have, thank you.

Mr. LANIEL: General, many of my questions have already been asked. I do not say they have been answered but they have been put. I am neither a military expert nor a strategist, but I have been asking myself some questions on the end result of all this so far as military operations are concerned. I will start by referring to the White Paper where the priorities are laid down as to defence policies for Canada. Do you think from a military standpoint—not politically—that these priorities are of the type that could be met by a force the size of Canada? Are they met with the present set-up or were they met even before this time?

Mr. MONCEL: No, not really, because if I recall correctly we were invited to do everything we had been doing and, in addition, do these other things.

Mr. LANIEL: Do you mean that we should drop some of these commitments or some of these priorities?

Mr. MONCEL: I am not saying we should, I suggest you may have to. This is supposed to be a living document, you know; these priorities vary with the year, with conditions and with time, and what was valid two and a half or three years ago when this was written needs to be under constant review. This is where you must have the resources to adapt to these changing circumstances and, of course, the circumstances to which you can adapt are prescribed by the size of the forces you are prepared to support. If you have a fantastically large defence force, then obviously you can indulge in and enjoy a wide range of commitments. As your force shrinks in size, you become limited, politically, by the size of the force you have.

Mr. LANIEL: Did I hear you say that with a force of 150,000, we could then think of unification and the maintenance of our commitments?

Mr. MONCEL: No, I did not say that. I said to fulfil the roles as prescribed in the White Paper, by my estimate it would require a force of about 150,000 and a budget of $2 billion.

Mr. LANIEL: Even with the present set-up?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes.

Mr. LANIEL: But taking into account the fact that politically, this country is committing itself more and more to police force work, peace keeping, peace restoring and all that, and also taking into account the fact that the defence budget is a quarter of our annual budget and there is no tendency to increase that, how can we do this?

Mr. MONCEL: We cannot.

Mr. LANIEL: So, we cannot fulfil the commitments that we have put forward in the White Paper with the present force?

Mr. MONCEL: Strictly speaking, today it is down to what, 104,000.

Mr. LANIEL: From this I conclude that unification will not be the thing that will prevent us from fulfilling these commitments and reaching the—

Mr. MONCEL: Oh, it might well be. It might well be the kiss of death that will just make it absolutely impossible to do it.

Mr. LANIEL: I have never been in the field. I was in the Air Force during the war and then I went into anti aircraft after the war in the militia, so I did not get

very close to what was happening below, but I have been asking myself some questions and wondering what difference to our commitments will it make if we make our force more mobile and if we equip our Air Force with tactical planes?

Mr. MONCEL: Highly desirable.

Mr. LANIEL: And if we provide some available air and sea lift.

Mr. MONCEL: Highly desirable, but you do not have to unify forces to do these things.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, would Mr. Laniel permit a supplementary question on this direct point at this stage?

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Andras on a supplementary.

Mr. ANDRAS: General Moncel, your recommendation that we have more tactical aircraft; your recommendation that the budget for defence be $2 billion versus the planned budget of one and one half billion and with the two percent escalation; your recommendation that the force be approximately 150,000 versus what the limits are now; how do you reconcile that again with this statement in your document, and I read from page 2 of the recommendations that you made:

> I have done this to stress the limitations which govern our capabilities and within which we must operate. Without these constraints my definition would be meaningless, for it would lead us into a never-ending effort to increase the size of the forces ad infinitum on the grounds that the more we have of everything the more capable we must become. I have no doubt that we would: but such an irresponsible approach can scarcely be regarded as a rational one. Unlimited expansion is simply not open to us; nor is it desirable. On the contrary, we must work within the quite finite limits which the Government sets from time to time both upon the manpower of the forces and upon the expenditures which they may make for materiel.

And yet your recommendations are to go up to 150,000 and $2 billion.

Mr. MONCEL: No, no, I did not recommend it, I said if you want to do what you say you are going to do, it takes a force of this size. This is a far different thing than recommending it.

Mr. ANDRAS: Then you go on to say, knowing that this is probably not possible:

> It is within the confines of these constraints and ceilings that we must bring the problem into focus and seek our solution.

And this leads into your paper on unification.

Mr. MONCEL: Sure. I suppose what I am trying to say here is that the government has given us a whole lot of things to do. We have been given a ceiling on manpower and we have been given a ceiling on money and what we have to put every effort into is in finding the most effective and best system to operate within these constraints. There is no point in saying, "If we only had this much more how much easier it would be". This is no solution. I believe I used the word irresponsible; I think it is an irresponsible solution.

Mr. ANDRAS: Yes.

Mr. MONCEL: I do not really see the connection between this and that.

M. ANDRAS: I simply say that you go on; that is the problem which you must meet.

Mr. MONCEL: It is.

Mr. ANDRAS: You say that this is the problem we must meet, we must confine ourselves within the limits.

Mr. MONCEL: That is right.

Mr. ANDRAS: Dollars and people, and we have to find a plan that is going to be the most efficient within it, and then you go on with what in my opinion is a recommendation for the program we have before us.

Mr. MONCEL: As a means of approach at that stage, it was.

Mr. ANDRAS: This is just a year ago.

Mr. MONCEL: Indeed, and it was valid, I would say, up until about seven months ago. The technique of doing it is a very different thing from weighing the commitments. Some day—and I have said this several times—you are going to have to face up to the fact that when you do a thorough analysis of this you are going to find that you do not have a sufficiently large force. The answer I got every time was, "Oh yes you are, go back and work it out again". Some day you are going to have to face up to reality. This is really your problem rather than mine; it is the government that commits us to these things, not the military.

Mr. LANIEL: I still ask myself questions about the point that I was trying to make earlier. We have our air division in Europe and it is committed to the role of strike reconnaissance. We also have a brigade which is part of a big force. Even if our brigade goes into an operation, it is going to be tactically supported by someone.

Mr. MONCEL: Yes.

Mr. LANIEL: I do not know anything as far as commitments and arrangements in NATO are concerned, but let us for the moment say that tomorrow Canada develops a tendency to drop out of the strike-reconnaissance role and uses its Air Force to give tactical support to the brigade. Someone else will do the strike-reconnaissance and we will take the place of someone else in the tactical support role. Is that not true?

Mr. MONCEL: I do not know if it is quite that simple.

Mr. LANIEL: Well, I do not know, I am asking you.

Mr. MONCEL: You see, it is a complicated question. We made a commitment to provide strike-reconnaissance forces and maintain them at a certain level and we have fulfilled this commitment. As far as I know, we are still fulfilling this commitment. If you want to change that commitment then we have a new set of factors. I do not think I would want to discuss whether or not you should change that commitment.

Mr. LANIEL: I do not want you to discuss that.

Mr. MONCEL: This is government policy which only those in authority can really sensibly discuss. As long as you have that commitment you obviously have to stick by it. If you want to change the commitment, then we have a new set of factors.

Mr. LANIEL: Yes, but, you see, according to the White Paper we seem to be trying to build up a small sized but a more flexible force in Canada, and to me this means that the Air Force can do more than strike-reconnaissance and the Navy can work more closely with some kind of a mobile force in its operations. I

see all three services working at some kind of a rotation basis. If we have two brigades out here and they are being trained to become more mobile, I assume that the men of that brigade, when they are rotated to either our main brigade in Europe or even to mobile command, will have a better general basic knowledge than someone who is just trained to be idle in Europe and is being used as a deterrent and waiting for the enemy.

Mr. MONCEL: I would not admit for a moment that the forces in Europe are idle, they do rotate. Every year about one third of that force is brought home and replaced by another part of what you described as the idle force here. This rotation takes place. If you follow the ten year pattern of an infantry battalion you will find that a chap will do about two years in Germany, he might do two years in Gagetown, a year out in Cyprus, right around the course. He gets a bit of everything.

Mr. LANIEL: Then what harm will unification do as far as that man is concerned?

Mr. MONCEL: This, I suppose, is one of my points. You cannot unify this chap. He is doing a specific military job and he does not need sailors or airmen to do this job.

Mr. LANIEL: You said that we have to stand by our commitments, but do you think the government should define or establish its priorities or its long-term defence policies only on the commitments? May it not also take into consideration the possibility of an alternation or a change in these commitments?

Mr. MONCEL: Oh, indeed, and I think the White Paper did this very, very adequately. It is probably the best statement of the Canadian commitments and undertakings that has ever been published. It says it very, very clearly and it also says that it is not immutable; this will be under constant review and it will change as it goes along. I think this is a good thing, as long as you do not try and interpret it too literally, you know. It is like everything else, if you want to take a legalistic approach to the thing.

I had a commander once during the war who did not last very long and this was his approach. Every time you gave him an order he wanted it all written down so he would know precisely what to do. The great problem with trying to write everything down, is that it is not what you write, it is what you do not write that matters. We are essentially trained, having been told the object of the exercise, to use our heads in an attempt to achieve it. The White Paper essentially states what the object is and essentially what we are trying to do in our own stumbling way, I suppose, is to produce the most effective and best defence force for Canada. We had no other object; there never has been one.

Mr. LANIEL: I conclude from what you have said that you are not against unification. You might have different feelings, but that is what comes to my mind. I am wondering what part of the challenge scared you that much? Was it personal feelings?

Mr. MONCEL: None whatsoever.

Mr. LANIEL: Or individuals?

Mr. MONCEL: I have no emotions. What I have attempted to say is that I was convinced if you were to press forward with this thing in the time frame that was required, a matter of six to seven months, that we simply could not do the staff work to bring it about. Besides this, there was still a great deal to be done

to think it through. We did not have a plan. As far as I can see, we still do not have one. It has become unification for unification's sake, I think.

Mr. LANIEL: Yes, but you must admit that there is a political problem involved because of the fact that two words were used, unification and integration.

Mr. MONCEL: I am terribly aware of it and I am terribly sympathetic.

Mr. LANIEL: There was a problem that came up which was plainly political: everybody was scared of unification, as the term was used—

Mr. MONCEL: I trust you are using that term loosely. No one was scared.

Mr. LANIEL: Well, they insisted there be an act of government before any further steps could be taken. This does not mean that the services will wear a new uniform tomorrow and everything will be very nice from then on and all the problems will be solved. The Minister said, as you did, that this plan is not immutable and it is not a blueprint; it should be used as a guide, not as a final blueprint.

Mr. MONCEL: It is the only way you can approach it. If you start to govern your entire life by attempting to interpret the full meaning of every sentence in this thing you can drive yourself up the wall and you will never get anything done.

Mr. LANIEL: The only thing I do not understand is that with your decisiveness, your experience, the way you express yourself and the leadership you evince, I ask myself why did you not stay in and implement this program?

Mr. MONCEL: Because I could not. As I tried to explain, I do not believe in it.

Mr. LANIEL: I am not sure about that. You have not made that clear. That is all.

Mr. ORMISTON: General, in your role as Vice-Chief of Staff, when you were supposed to escalate this unification, did you find yourself in the position where you asked yourself what would happen if you had to commit this unified force and how you would support it? We have always relied on our reserves in the past and would they not be placed in a very new invidious position if a force of this nature was committed without having tried and without having laid down any program for training reserve specialists to occupy the positions which would be knocked out? Did this not bother you to some extent?

Mr. MONCEL: Not really, no. I would not admit for a moment there was not a plan to train the reserves. I think the training of the reserves is in very, very good hands. The difference between the reserves in this context and the way that perhaps you and I used to know them is that when I joined up, if I remember rightly, the force was 2,476. Our whole being was motivated toward raising the reserves up to a fighting standard. This changed when we went into what was then popularly called the "forces in being" concept, and the government made a tremendous step when it went from the post-war force—just prior to Korea we were down to about three battalions, I suppose—and we literally doubled the force almost overnight and since then we have kept it up. The Army was around 40,000, 45,000, and at one stage it was 50,000 odd plus.

The whole purpose of this "force in being" was that so far as we could see—and who can really see—we could meet most of the foreseeable commitments with the professional soldiers and would not have to call on the reserves. This was the object of having standing forces. This is a fairly comp'icated

business, which everybody should know if they do not know. The fact is that we raised an expeditionary force and went off to fight and did relatively well. You must remember that we had a long waiting period during which that force really was built.

I do not know if any of you were in the abortive run into France in 1940. I was, and we came out of that with a great rush. This was a far different force than we brought back three and a half years later, believe me. I suppose what I am trying to say is that from the way things appeared it looked, with the standing forces which we had in peacetime, as if, along with the professional forces, we could meet, full-time all of the foreseeable commitments. Now, against the possibility of not being able to foresee everything and against the possibility of an expansion of the forces being required, I think we had laid adequate plans to bring the reserves into it. There is one trick, though; you have to make sure that you have sufficient equipment. There is no point in just raising the chaps and not having the gear with which to arm them. We simply did not have, and do not have, this kind of equipment.

Mr. ORMISTON: In these days of what you might call "instant war" can we depend on, say, 49 days training of a reservist to take the place of a fully-trained soldier in the event that he is required?

Mr. MONCEL: If that is what you want to do, you can take many, many civilian trades which are comparable to ours and replace soldiers within a matter of a couple of hours, in very large measure, and free soldiers to get on and do it, and I think this must be your first approach to it. Every soldier driver that we have in Canada could be replaced by a woman at once, pending the building up of more to go and this would free all those chaps to go off. We are a modern country and we do not have to start from scratch with a lot of these trades. We have a relatively highly sophisticated industry behind us. The problem, really, is the equipment rather than the men; equipment and time.

Now, what you and everybody else has to judge is whether you are going to have a conflict in which Canada's commitment would be greater than she could meet with her standing forces. The standing forces have been scaled to prevent this from happening. That is to say, that in conjunction with others we have sufficient forces in being and reasonably well equipped—although it is never properly equipped, we always like more—to meet this. But we were far short of being able to do a full-scale mobilization up to five or six divisions. This would still require a great deal of time and a great deal of equipment. I do not think you could ever make a case for having this kind of an immediate back-up. It would be terribly expensive and there have to be the restraints that I have tried to mention. You have to try to live within these things and do the best you can. It is a very difficult problem.

Mr. ORMISTON: I have an entirely different question, General. At the present time, under this unification scheme, how do you see the role of the conference of defence associations?

Mr. MONCEL: I would hope it would continue to play a very, very real and important part. Here again, the difficulty is going to be one of communications, and it occurs in exactly the same way as the more unified you get the more problems you are going to have in dealing with your allies and the more problems you are going to have in communicating with the defence associations, unless they also come into this scheme as a unified force.

Mr. ORMISTON: Are there any plans along those lines at the present time?

Mr. MONCEL: I do not know. You had better ask somebody who is doing them now.

Mr. ORMISTON: When you were in a position to know?

Mr. MONCEL: When I was there we had done the last major re-organization of the militia, and this was going to be it for a while.

Mr. ORMISTON: Thank you.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I just have one or two questions, General, because most of the ground has been covered. I wonder if I could ask a question which, in a sense, is supplementary to an area you got into earlier in the day when you were dealing with dollars and cents. I am rather curious about the fact that we are tied to what is known as a frozen budget with reference to our armed services. I gather, inasmuch as you were released on July 16, that you have now finished your sabbatical leave?

Mr. MONCEL: No, I have not.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Do you have much longer to go?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes. At the moment I am seconded to the Prime Minister's office, so my leave has been postponed. I do not finish my sabbatical until, I would think, about a year and half from now.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Then perhaps I should not ask you this question, and if you do not wish to answer it I will quite understand. I was wondering if, as an individual you believe first of all that this principle of a frozen budget is a viable one in terms of Canada's posture in the world today? Secondly, if you believe it should be frozen, should it be frozen in terms of its dollar content or in relation to our budget or to our gross national income, or some other such measuring device?

Mr. MONCEL: This is a very, very difficult question to answer. I certainly do not necessarily favour this idea of tying a defence budget to a gross national product. I think you have to tie your defence budget to your requirements. Despite what your gross national product is doing if, in the government's wisdom, they decide that their defence requirement is falling, well then, their defence budget should fall. By the same token, if in their wisdom they decide they need more defences, regardless of what the gross national product is doing, the defence expenditure must rise. Now, that is one side of it.

On the other side of it, the danger with the frozen budget is the present one, and when I left I think it was $1.5 billion in 1964, accruing at 2 per cent. The great difficulty with this was that the cost of most of the military hardware and our personnel costs, and everything like that, were rising annually anywhere from 10 to 15 per cent. Hence your $1.5 billion was depreciating at a rate that you could not afford. So, rather than being able to be progressive you were constantly, as you made your projection along the line of a fixed budget and you weighed the projection against the program, you are back to square one, they crossed over. What do you do when they cross over? You either cut the commitments or you increase the funds. This is nothing new. My goodness, we have been doing this every year for 25 years. Does that answer your question?

Mr. FORRESTALL: Yes, it does. Thank you. I did not mean to get you into an area, perhaps, that was a little touchy, because it is another area of decision. However, this leads me to one other question. Do you feel that it is just possible

in our deliberations in consideration of the bill as it is now before us that we have the cart before the horse and that possibly we should be considering in the open forum of the house or in the open forum of the country whether or not what unification would accomplish is—in terms of the military aspects of foreign affairs—what Canada should be doing or, indeed, what the people of Canada want our military to do or, conversely, is this basically a military opinion? Should the military advise the body politic on generally what our military role should be, or does it work the other way around? I recognize the ambiguity of that question.

Mr. MONCEL: I am not an expert on government procedure and who should do what to whom in this particular matter, but the traditional role of the military is to be responsive to the wishes of the government. This is the rule. Obviously they have a very real role to play in offering professional advice to those members of the government who are charged with the responsibility of that particular aspect of it and they do this in a very able fashion.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I gathered this, and the second part of it then is that you have expressed the feeling that possibly the White Paper, as a statement of current objectives is well written and well stated. It is one with which I agree. Are you suggesting to us—because this is the inference I have drawn—that possibly those objectives are out of date or out of tune with what is contemplated by the bill or what you believe in your professional capacity unification would permit us to do? Are our present commitments too extensive in terms of unification? I am just trying to put it the other way around.

Mr. MONCEL: I think our present commitments are too extensive, in terms of the effort we are prepared to put into the defence force, to fulfil the commitments properly. Like everything else, I think these commitments must be kept under constant review. I am certain the military are doing this and no doubt they are advising the people responsible for this of the problems involved. There is a limit to what you can do with so much. The great trick, I suppose, is to realize just how far you can stretch this.

Mr. FORRESTALL: But do you believe that we are doing enough?

Mr. MONCEL: In the defence field?

Mr. FORRESTALL: Yes?

Mr. MONCEL: I suppose it depends on what you want to do. I think if you can fulfil the roles that are stated in that paper that you will have made a very real contribution to our part in the world. This is a pretty ambitious program.

Mr. FORRESTALL: This is where I have conflict as well. I agree with the objectives set out in the White Paper but, like yourself, I am not at all certain about the capability of the—

Mr. MONCEL: Yes, this is a very real worry. Somebody has to face up to the reality.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Thank you very much, General.

Mr. MCINTOSH: General, I was very much interested in a statement you made a few moments ago. You were speaking of the second meeting you had with the Minister on unification and you said that it was at that time you got a glimmer of what he wanted. I am not being facetious in asking this question, but has that glimmer ever burst into a bright light? Did it dawn on you just what he wanted? Was that one of the reasons that you decided to retire?

Mr. MONCEL: No, it came more as a faint flicker rather than a bright light, and I waited impatiently for weeks to attempt to bet the light turned on so I could get on with it and find out what was required.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I think that is one of the problems we are having at the present time and it was one problem that we had with the Minister's speech. He went on at great length to assure us that our fears were unfounded. We thought there would be a change in the services and he said that this system will not be changed by reason of unification; we will certainly continue to have the infantry regiments, and so on. This was quite an assurance to me that there would be no change in our three forces as we know them. However, he ended that whole paragraph with these words, "Until the force structure within the united forces is developed". I cannot understand what he is trying to get at by unification, and so far I have not been enlightened. Now, to continue with what you said a few moment ago, you also said that the purpose of the White Paper is essentially to produce the best defence for Canada.

Mr. MONCEL: This was my interpretation of it.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Yes, and it is my interpretation as well. I was wondering about the formation of this new peace-keeping force. What role would this force have in the defence of Canada? Was it ever intended that it have a role in the defence of Canada or was it a force that we could dissipate for some other reason?

Mr. MONCEL: I think the word "dissipate" is possibly the wrong term. It was not so much a question of creating a force that would be used specifically for this purpose, I think it was mainly a question of attempting to equip a force so that we could be more quickly responsive to this type of demand, and at the same time have a force which could usefully fulfil our North American commitments, which are very real commitments.

Mr. ORMISTON: You also refer to commitments but maybe we should call it roles; the commitments or roles that we have now in *Nato, Norad,* and so on. Did you at any time discuss with the Minister the fact that we could opt out of any of these commitments that we have at the present time?

Mr. MONCEL: I will not discuss this.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Could I ask you if you now believe that the only defence that we then have for Canada is on a continental basis?

Mr. MONCEL: Do I believe this?

Mr. MCINTOSH: Yes?

Mr. MONCEL: Oh, goodness, no.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Do you believe that Canada could defend herself

Mr. MONCEL: No, no, no. I thought you meant by that that the North American continent, looked at as a continant, could defend itself and hence should withdraw to the continent.

Mr. MCINTOSH: No, the only possible defence for Canada now is on a continental basis, in alliance with some other country like the United States.

Mr. MONCEL: I think it goes much further than a continental, it goes on an international alliance basis.

Mr. MCINTOSH: But I was referring back to your statement, and you said the purpose of the White Paper is for the best defence for Canada and we are talking about our defence forces.

Mr. MONCEL: Yes, but defence, of course, takes many guises. I would say even the ill-fated international commission in Viet Nam, of which I was a part at one time, was in some way contributing to the stability and hence the defence of Canada.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Did you ever envisage at any time Canada opting out of these alliances

Mr. MONCEL: This would not be for me to decide; this would be for somebody else to decide after a great deal of thought. This type of thought is constantly being generated in the military, whether this is good or that is good, and it is reflected to the responsible people who can and indeed should make these decisions. I do not think I am competent to talk about it.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You would not care to suggest whether you would advise such an action or not.

Mr. MONCEL: No, I would prefer not to comment on that.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I had a lot of questions based on other testimony but most of them have been answered. General Foulkes in his testimony stated, "I cannot tell the difference between integration and unification." Now that has been the problem, I think, with a lot of the members as well as a lot of the witnesses.

Mr. MONCEL: Yes.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You mentioned in one part of your testimony today that integration was the first phase.

Mr. MONCEL: This was my understanding of it, yes.

Mr. MCINTOSH: The first phase into unification?

Mr. MONCEL: Into perhaps unification, but surely unification weighed against the commitments. You have to take a look at everything you do, every role or every commitment. You have to ask yourself if I unify this—if that is the term—will it make our participation in this particular role more effective? Now, if the answer is yes, then you probably have a good case to integrate or unify that particular function. If the answer is no, then you have to think seriously about it before you can say, "Well, let us unify it anyway." This is what I am trying to say.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I think we all have a different definition or understanding of the term unification. I will go back to the first question I asked you about that glimmer of what the minister wanted. Could you tell us briefly what you thought the Minister wanted by unification?

Mr. MONCEL: What I essentially got out of the meeting was that we did not want a system based on the army corps, we did not want a single uniform right throughout the piece, we did not want to lose any of the colour and we wanted a new name. That was about it, I suppose, boiled down to its essence. Obviously I had to go back to the drawing board. In my own silly way I thought that we wanted a unified force in the best sense and I suddenly find that you do not quite want that, you want to preserve the colour and traditions of the mess dress, Jack in the country, that sort of thing. So, as I say, back to the drawing board. So, to me it could not really bring the scheme to fruition in the organizational sense. Then when I was told that we were going to do it in a matter of months I simply said, "I cannot and, indeed, will not", and I did not.

Mr. McINTOSH: A former witness said that there was too much emphasis in Bill No. C-243 on tidy administration and not enough emphasis on the combat troops, do you agree?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes, indeed.

Mr. McINTOSH: That is the end of my questioning.

Mr. MONCEL: This is a terribly tender trap, and one which it is very easy to fall into in peacetime. It is terribly difficult to measure fighting efficiency, terribly difficult. You tend, if you are not careful, to lay too much stress on administration. I had a brigade down in Gagetown and in 365 days I was inspected administratively for 389 administrative days. This means there were two different types inspecting me at the same time on everything from the stamp account to the number of bootlaces I had. Not once in 18 months did anybody come down to see how I could fight. You know, you have to watch it; you can get off the track.

Mr. McINTOSH: This I think is what we are doing.

Mr. MONCEL: Well sure, terribly carefully.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh has finished his questioning. It is 10 o'clock. Mr. Nugent and Mr. Macaluso are the final questioners.

Mr. NUGENT: I only have one question. I would prefer to wait until tomorrow, Mr. Chairman, for the very simple reason that I have traveled all night from the west and I really do not feel very sharp. I would hate to think that we have a good witness like this and—

Mr. MACALUSO: I am sure with your knowledge and understanding and comprehension—

The CHAIRMAN: Are you sure, out of consideration for the witness, that you would not like to question him now? He has appeared here voluntarily and he has given up his day so far. I do not know—

Mr. MONCEL: I have things to do. I would prefer to stay on and knock it off.

Mr. MACALUSO: Perhaps Mr. Nugent, as a courtesy to the witness, would finish his questioning this evening.

Mr. NUGENT: I want to clarify a few things, if I may. I know we have had much to say about the meaning of words, etc., but I have thought many times that we have not been precise enough or concise enough in our understanding. For instance, Mr. Laniel, in a question to you just a few minutes ago, mentioned that our present plans are not immutable. He was talking about the White Paper, but I would think that if you were talking about the present bill before this committee that that plan is immutable. Is there not a difference? What we have under this new bill is a firm stand committing us to one course of action, but the same cannot be said about the White Paper.

Mr. MONCEL: I cannot really answer that. I presume that the drafters of the bill had something in mind; whether it is immutable or not, I could not say.

Mr. NUGENT: I wonder if we can discuss this term unification for a little while. Certainly from some of the things you wrote and from your statement it appeared that it was at the last meeting of the defence staff with the Minister that you got a glimmer of what he meant by unification. Is it fair for me to conclude from your remarks that up until that time any use you made of the word unification was not likely to be what the present bill indicates as unification?

Mr. MONCEL: Oh no, I would not think that is fair at all. I foresaw the possibility, given time, that we might well be able, quite honestly and effectively, to bring into being what I understood to be the long range ultimate aim of the White Paper which was a unified force, and this could be done without any rancor, without any problems and when the situation would have been right and the definition and the design of the force that we were aiming for would have matched it, and it would have been just as easy as falling off a log. I was using the term unification in the sense of a single force. I go back to what I said previously, that if your commitments are such that it is proper to have a unified force, then unification is a good thing. However, you have to know what kind of a plan you want, and by drifting into it bit by bit defence staffs and the people concerned are now going to be faced with all kinds of the same problems that I was faced with in the initial days of the White Paper. A chap is going to catch you on one of your visits and say "What does it mean?", and somebody is going to be jolly hard put to explain it to him.

Mr. NUGENT: Even when we have the bill before us, General, with one unified force, and depending on the form and shape that the force will take, how it is drawn up, etc., when you look at that bill the word "unification" means several different things. Is that right?

Mr. MONCEL: From what we have gone through tonight I can see how it could, yes.

Mr. NUGENT: You have already told us that you were responsible for four different plans of unification. Is that correct?

Mr. MONCEL: Outline plans, draft ideas of how you could build a unified force, an architectural sketch, a rough idea.

Mr. NUGENT: Depending on which plan was followed, if any of them were, would you not end up with a different type of force for each plan?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes.

Mr. NUGENT: So that it would be fair to say, then, that even on the plans you drew each one had a different meaning for unification?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes, very likely.

Mr. NUGENT: And each one of these meanings received a different amount of support from you or your colleagues in defence staff?

Mr. MONCEL: Very much, yes.

Mr. NUGENT: You have told us, when it came to these plans, that they were yours, but I would like to delve into that just a little, if I might. Were each one of these drawn by yourself personally and are they all your own work?

Mr. MONCEL: In the major ones the essential drafting, yes. You have to do it yourself. The way not to do it is to haul in your wretched staff and say, "Give me some ideas". I think if you are going to run the thing you have to get the basic idea and then by all means turn it over to them to scratch it out and fill it out and put some flesh on the bones. If you do not do this you can never defend the ruddy plan.

Mr. NUGENT: You are responsible at least for each one of the plans?

Mr. MONCEL: I certainly do not deny responsibility for them.

Mr. NUGENT: How is it that you started out to draft these plans? Was it your idea that we should come up with some plans for unification or did you feel that

it was your duty to present this bearing in mind the sort of policy that was being pursued or that was being aimed at in the future?

Mr. MONCEL: It was really on the basis that there was so much talk that unification was coming much more quickly than we thought and this planning was within my purview, that it seemed to me I had bloody well better get at it and see what we can do to make these statements come true.

Mr. NUGENT: General, let me put it this way. As you were responsible for planning and it appeared that policy was going this way, then it was your duty to draft some plans to meet the foreseeable policy whether you believed in it or not?

Mr. MONCEL: This is right.

Mr. NUGENT: So, the fact that you drew up plans does not mean that you conceived the idea and presented it as the way we should go?

Mr. MONCEL: No.

Mr. NUGENT: I think you told us that of the four plans, apparently the one now being—and I say apparently—followed by the government is a plan that you rejected out of hand?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes.

Mr. NUGENT: Then a fair inference to draw from that is that of all the plans this one is the least suitable?

Me. MONCEL: I think so. It is in my opinion.

Mr. NUGENT: Can we follow this up a little bit, then. Among those people who were assisting you to draft it or whom you consulted and who played a part in it and who, like yourself, would be, shall we say, privy to all the considerations in weighing these plans, did you find yourself standing alone in that opinion?

Mr. MONCEL: No.

Mr. NUGENT: Did you have general support as to the possibilities of these plans?

Mr. MONCEL: Well, "general" is a pretty odd term. This thing never got really loose, this was an in-house plot that we were trying to work out. This never got published in the form of, "This is Plan A. This is Plan B". This is planning in its most elementary stage. It is simply to get the feel of what you are trying to do.

Mr. NUGENT: This is planning in its most elementary stage which takes place just a few months before we have a bill that commits us to setting up a force, General. Do you mean that that is the greatest extent of the planning that was produced before we presented this bill?

Mr. MONCEL: No, I cannot say that, because they have had six months since I left. I know that they have been working hard at it.

Mr. NUGENT: But so far as you are concerned, your opinion now is that the plan that they have been working on since you left, which is a plan that contained the best opinion you could get from all the help you had in your position of responsibility for planning, that of all the plans, if you wanted to do it, this was the worst.

Mr. MONCEL: Yes.

Mr. NUGENT: Have you had any reason to change your mind since?

Mr. MONCEL: No.

Mr. LANIEL: May I be permitted to ask a supplementary question? Did you read the bill ?

Mr. MONCEL: No, I only read the explanatory notes. The bill is not the plan, if you see what I mean.

Mr. NUGENT: If I might, I want to reiterate a couple of points for just a few minutes.

Because unification means different things depending on which plan you follow, any time that you used that term when you were talking about unification, integration, etc., was the term ever used with any conciseness?

Mr. MONCEL: No.

Mr. NUGENT: Was there any reason why Mr. Andras, for instance, referring to something you said a year ago where you used the term unification, should say that unification, as the Minister now envisages it, is what you recommended a year ago?

Mr. MONCEL: I did not recommend it.

Mr. NUGENT: A year ago you were not in favour of what he now envisages?

Mr. MONCEL: I never said this anywhere.

Mr. NUGENT: There has been no change in your attitude?

Mr. MONCEL: None, no.

Mr. NUGENT: Admiral Landymore said a few things and some of them have been referred to, but I thought by way of preface I would simply say that in the committee day after day we have run into this same difficulty, that not only are the terms integration and unification being very confused, it is obvious now that even when we use the term unification—and this applied at least until the bill came out, and even from the time of the bill it is not clear what unification means—we must be very careful to define the term each time we use it. Could I now use the term unification—as I think Admiral Landymore used it—as meaning a single unified force as you have described it and doing away with the three separate services, and would you then agree with this statement near the bottom of page one of his brief:

> Under questioning, the proponents of unification invariably fall back on the advantages of integration to support their stand. As far as I can determine, not one single argument indicates that unification will provide either economy or increased efficiency.

Mr. MONCEL: Do you want me to comment on this?

Mr. NUGENT: Yes.

Mr. MONCEL: You have to have a definition of unification. If you mean the unification of the internal communication systems, the signal systems—

Mr. NUGENT: Let me start with that, if I might.

Mr. MONCEL: If you mean that then Admiral Landymore is wrong, there were real economies effected in that.

Mr. NUGENT: Those are what he referred to as integration.

Mr. MONCEL: Yes, well, in that sense—

Mr. NUGENT: Unifying command, unifying the pay system; this was integration as he was using it.

Mr. MONCEL: Real savings.

Mr. NUGENT: A little later on he goes further in defining unification, and he deals with some of the steps of integration. The concept of unification that he used and which I think is accurate is that concept of unification, not as a step to integration but the necessity of wiping away three separate forces and having only one force as a necessary step in itself. Could you then agree with this argument?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes, if you take it in the context of our present roles and commitments. If you want to change the roles and commitments, I can design you a unified force that will do the job.

Mr. NUGENT: He presented one other argument on the urgency of adopting the Minister's present plan, and on page 10 of his brief he deals with several criticisms of integration:

> First:—Materiel Command is not living up to expectations.
> Second:—Training Command is a luxury we cannot afford.

And his last sentence in that respect reads:

> —has not been a success and should be reduced to functioning in relation to basic training and common training outside the purview of operational Commanders.

And then he details several cases where integration is not working up to expectations. My question is simply this. In relation to the steps toward integration that were taken and which you are aware of and which you so enthusiastically supported, do you have any reason to believe that all the planning was faultless and that all the refinements are in—

Mr. MONCEL: No. Goodness no.

Mr. NUGENT: Can you see any advantage that could be gained—even considering implementing some scheme of unification—or that we might get great benefit out of by stopping and studying integration steps for a while to see where we could proceed further?

Mr. MONCEL: Oh, I think there is a very real advantage in this, yes.

Mr. NUGENT: Do you agree with Admiral Landymore that in trying to implement unification—as presently envisaged—before we have worked out some of the bugs in the integration steps that have already been taken, that it will necessarily slow up the correction of some of the faults in some of the integration steps that have been taken?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: Where does it state that?

Mr. NUGENT: It states that on page 10 of his brief. Would you say if it does slow up an existing fault that this is necessarily going to cost more money?

Mr. MONCEL: It is not going to cost any less.

Mr. NUGENT: Can you find any reason why any of the planners or proponents of unification, as envisaged in this bill, should feel that any possible benefits would not be so great if we wait a year or two, or even five years, to implement them?

Mr. MONCEL: I do not know why they are in such a rush. I think the greatest possible argument for not rushing the thing, and unfortunately it is getting late

now because there has been so much fuss made about it, but you may recall this afternoon I was speaking about this critical period between now and the 1970's. Had you shelved any talk of unification and the doing away with the three services as such, you could have—and we tried to do this, I suppose—salvaged the people who had been brought up under the old system and mined all these people out that you needed and kept their best output going until such time—they will all be gone in another five years—as the plan might have been stable enough, without this threat of unification hanging over their heads, to have pulled the thing through. I think this is the real thing. In my time, as long as you could produce the integration plans without even mentioning reception. As soon as you started to talk about unification,—if you did not have the answers to it—that is when you got yourself into deep, deep trouble with the troops. At least, I did. Perhaps that is why I was not very successful at it.

Mr. NUGENT: Do you feel that the present state of morale under this threat of unification is going to have an adverse effect so that even the attempts to repair some of the faults of integration this far are not going to be as successful as they would have been or go forward as quickly and smoothly as they could have?

Mr. MONCEL: It is terribly hard to say. All my wishes, all my hopes and all my prayers are that none of my fears will be realized. They have very, very able people doing this and I am hopeful, if they go through with it, that they can bring it off. From my point of view they will get every support I can give them.

Mr. NUGENT: One last question, sir. Do you think, from your knowledge of men and how they react and the confidence they have in their superiors, that it might be a general assist to morale and help the men to enthusiastically do what must be done in this program if the plan were to be delayed for a little while so they would have time to get used to it, to adjust to it, and to present it in a way they would have more confidence in it?

Mr. MONCEL: I do not know. It is a very, very difficult question. We have gone so far with this that it may be that if there were any indication now that they were going to stop it that it would just cause another schism in this whole business. If a number of senior officers have been saying that this is the answer, and if the government rules that this is not the answer and they are going to delay it, then presumably they would have to retire. Where do you stop? I really do not know the answer to that question.

Mr. NUGENT: Just for clarification of that, if I may, do you think it is quite possible that there are a number of officers who have refrained from retiring in the hope that it might be held up and they would not find it necessary to leave, as you did?

Mr. MONCEL: There might well be, I do not know. I cannot give you an answer.

Mr. NUGENT: Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso you have one question?

Mr. MACALUSO: Yes. I have added another one.

In each one of these four plans which you evolved, General, the end result ended up in a single force with a single commander, is that true?

Mr. MONCEL: A single Chief of Defence Staff, yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, that is what we have now. But the end result was a single force with one commander?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: I was very interested in your last remark about your hope that the present defence staff can pull off the plan that is put before them now and you seem to express a great deal of confidence in them, if I understand you correctly, and you give them every bit of support. I find in another statement that if it is not proceeded with it will cause a schism in morale, and everything else. So, I will ask you this. If you were the Chief of Defence Staff at this time and you had—

Mr. MONCEL: I would not have lasted this long!

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, let me finish my question, sir. If you were appointed to the position of Chief of Defence Staff at this time, in General Allard's place and you had a staff that was energetic and had drive and they came to you and said, "We have a plan—and we will assume that this is the plan—we want to go ahead with it, we are enthusiastic about it and it is government policy that this plan be put into effect", from what you have said now would you give thm the authority to go ahead with it?

Mr. MONCEL: I just do not know.

Mr. MACALUSO: It may be difficult for you to understand that you would make that answer, sir.

Mr. MONCEL: It is terribly difficult.

Mr. MACALUSO: Why would it be? You state that here is a plan and they come to you as their chief. It is your yes or no that puts this ahead.

Mr. MONCEL: Which plan?

Mr. MACALUSO: This present plan that we have in the bill. This present plan that is before them. They come to you and say that they are enthusiastic about it. You know they have the drive and you seem to have the confidence in the men there. They want to go ahead and they say, "We have a plan, let us go ahead with it." Would you "Yes, go ahead with it," or, "No?"

Mr. MONCEL: I cannot answer the question.

Mr. MACALUSO: That is very hard to understand.

Mr. MONCEL: You see, by the time you get a plan up to the chief in this business you do not suddenly surface one morning and say, "I have a plan." You talk this over—

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, let us assume that every step was taken, sir, but this plan is the one that came forward. It went through all the steps of screening, and so on, every step that has to be taken, and it came to you and your men wanted your final decision, would say, "Yes, go ahead", or, "No"?

Mr. MONCEL: I would want some more details, I think.

Mr. MACALUSO: I am saying assuming you had all the details, sir, and this was the plan that came forward.

Mr. MONCEL: Which plan?

Mr. MACALUSO: The one we are now discussing in the bill.

Mr. MONCEL: This is not a plan, this is simply a bill to amend a couple of acts.

Mr. MACALUSO: All right, then, the plan that has been forward by Air Marshal Sharp—

Mr. MONCEL: I did not see it.

Mr. MACALUSO: You did not see it?

Mr. MONCEL: No.

Mr. MACALUSO: You did not see the brief presented by Air Marshal Sharp or the brief presented by Air Marshal Reyno? You did not see the plan they set out before us at all? Then how could you come here and make statements on something you have not seen or heard?

Mr. MONCEL: I read Air Marshal Sharp's evidence.

Mr. MACALUSO: Where, sir?

Mr. MONCEL: In the minutes that were published.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, the minutes had the brief that he presented to this committee printed as an appendix.

Mr. MONCEL: I did not hear it, I read it.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, it is the same thing.

Mr. MONCEL: Yes. I wrote a good part of it, if I remember correctly.

Mr. MACALUSO: Fine, that even helps me. If that plan that he presented to us came to you as Chief of Staff would you give these men who want to go ahead with it the authority to do so or not?

Mr. MONCEL: If this situation had six months ago, which it did not, I would not have, no.

Mr. MACALUSO: Assuming you had been made Chief of Defence staff you would not have given the go ahead, is that correct? Is that what you are saying?

Mr. MONCEL: No. If I had been made Chief of Defence Staff and I was still Chief of Defence Staff, presumably things would be taking a different turn.

Mr. MACALUSO: In which way, sir?

Mr. MONCEL: In that if I was still Chief of Defence Staff we might not be presenting this plan.

Mr. MACALUSO: Let us not talk around it, sir. I am putting the factual point to you that this is what came up. These men are all enthusiastic about the plan as set out by Air Marshal Sharp and Air Marshal Reyno, and it was your decision, they come to you say, "Now, we want to go ahead with it, we are enthusiastic". They want to drive on to it and the decision is yours.

Mr. MONCEL: Yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: Then I assume that you would say, "No, do not go ahead with this plan".

Mr. MONCEL: No, I think the now vice chief and I have gone through this many times. I would have said, "Much of it looks good; back to the drawing board".

Mr. MACALUSO: So, I can assume you would say, "No", sir. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you very much, General Moncel, for coming and also for staying so late. The committee is adjourned.

OFFICIAL REPORT OF MINUTES

OF

PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

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Translated by the General Bureau for Translation, Secretary of State.

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,
The Clerk of the House.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament
1966-67

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. DAVID W. GROOS

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 23

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1967

Respecting

Bill C-243, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and other Acts in consequence thereof.

WITNESSES:

Air Marshal Clare L. Annis, O.B.E., C.D. and Air Vice-Marshal M. M. Hendrick, O.B.E., C.D.

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25814—1

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. David W. Groos

Vice-Chairman: Hon. Marcel Lambert

Mr. Andras,	Mr. Hopkins,	Mr. Macaluso,
Mr. Brewin,	Mr. Langlois	Mr. MacRae,
[1]Mr. Churchill,	(*Chicoutimi*),	Mr. McIntosh,
Mr. Deachman,	Mr. Laniel,	Mr. McNulty,
[1]Mr. Fane,	Mr. Latulippe,	Mr. Nugent,
Mr. Forrestall,	Mr. Legault,	Mr. Rochon,
Mr. Foy,	Mr. Lessard,	Mr. Winch—(24).
Mr. Harkness,	Mr. Loiselle,	

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

[1] Replaced Messrs. MacLean (*Queens*) and Ormiston on February 21, 1967.

ORDER OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

TUESDAY, February 21, 1967.

Ordered,—That the names of Messrs. Churchill and Fane be substituted for those of Messrs. MacLean (*Queens*) and Ormiston on the Standing Committee on National Defence.

Attest.

LÉON-J. RAYMOND
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

25814—1½

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, February 21, 1967.
(41)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 10:05 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Groos, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Brewin, Deachman, Forrestall, Foy, Groos, Harkness, Hopkins, Lambert, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laniel, Legault, Lessard, Loiselle, Macaluso, MacRae, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon and Mr. Winch—(21).

Also present: Messrs. Bell (*Carleton*), Churchill, Fane, McCleave and Mr. Richard.

In attendance: Air Marshal Clare L. Annis; *From the Department of National Defence*: Air Marshal F. R. Sharp, Vice Chief Defence Staff.

The Chairman introduced the witness, Air Marshal Clare L. Annis. Air Marshal Annis outlined his Service career for the Committee and made an opening statement. The witness answered questions during the remainder of the sitting, with particular reference to such subjects as the integration of the Technical Services Headquarters Organization, logistics support and procurement policy.

The questioning of the witness continuing, the Committee adjourned at 12:30 p.m., until 2:30 p.m. this day.

AFTERNOON SITTING
(42)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 3:35 p.m. this day, the Chairman, Mr. Groos, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Churchill, Deachman, Fane, Forrestall, Foy, Groos, Harkness, Hopkins, Lambert, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laniel, Legault, Lessard, Loiselle Macaluso, MacRae, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon and Mr. Winch—(22).

Also present: Messrs. Chétien, Kindt, Mackasey, and Mr. Régimbal.

In attendance: Air Marshal Clare L. Annis; *From the Department of National Defence*: Honourable Léo Cadieux, Associate Minister; Air Marshal E. M. Reyno, Chief of Personnel.

The members continued the questioning of the witness, Air Marshal Annis, throughout this afternoon sitting.

At approximately 5:55 p.m., the Committee completed its questioning of the witness. The Chairman, on behalf of the members, thanked Air Marshal Annis for his appearance before the Committee in connection with *Bill C-243*.

The Chairman read a telegram dated February 20, 1967, addressed to the Clerk, from Rear-Admiral W. M. Landymore. The Committee agreed to table the telegram (*Exhibit 2*).

The Committee adjourned at 6:00 p.m., until 8:00 p.m. this day, when the witness will be Air Vice-Marshal Hendrick.

EVENING SITTING
(43)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 8:10 p.m. this day with the Chairman, Mr. Groos, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Churchill, Deachman, Fane, Forrestall, Foy, Groos, Harkness, Hopking, Lambert, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laniel, Legault, Lessard, Loiselle, Macaluso, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon and Mr. Winch (21).

Also present: Messrs. Chatterton, MacInnis and Nasserden.

In attendance: Air Vice-Marshal M. M. Hendrick; *From the Department of National Defence*: Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister; Honourable Léo Cadieux, Associate Minister; Air Marshal E. M. Reyno, Chief of Personnel.

The Chairman introduced Air Vice-Marshal M. M. Hendrick, who outlined his Service background and then made an opening statement.

The Committee questioned Air Vice-Marshal Hendrick for the remainder of this evening sitting, on a variety of defence matters in relation to Bill C-243, under consideration.

The Clerk was instructed to obtain copies for the past month of a daily communiqué for serving personnel, issued by the Directorate of Information Services, Canadian Forces Headquarters. The Clerk was also instructed to obtain copies for the members of a Ministerial letter dated Apri 2, 1964 entitled *To All Members of The Armed Forces and Employees of The Department of National Defence.*

The questioning of the witness was completed at 10.30 p.m. and the Chairman thanked Air Vice-Marshal Hendrick for his appearance before the Committee. The Committee adjourned until 3:30 p.m. on Wednesday, February 22, 1967, when the witness will be Lieutenant-General F. J. Fleury.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

TUESDAY, February 21, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we have a quorum. Our witness this morning, Air Marshal Annis, has responded to our invitation to appear. He will answer any question members of the Committee wish to put.

Mr. WINCH: May I ask, Mr. Chairman, if the Air Marshal has a brief or if he has any comments to make before questioning.

Air Marshal C. L. ANNIS: No, Mr. Winch. I have never been to such a hearing before and I do not quite know how you start. I understood that it was proposed that I give a résumé of my career, and it has been suggested that if I made a short statement at the begining it might simplify or provide a basis for further questioning. Would that be satisfactory. I am at the disposal of your Committee.

Mr. WINCH: If there is no brief perhaps a statement by the witness would be helpful. I always have felt this way.

The CHAIRMAN: Other witnesses who have appeared before us have given a summary of their experience and career, and I know this would be helpful to the Committee. Air Marshal Annis, you may begin.

Mr. ANNIS: Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin by saying that I was invited. I have no thundering great desire to air my views. I did not ask to come, but having been invited I am delighted to be of whatever service I can be to the Committee.

In so far as service history is concerned, I am a mechanical engineer from the University of Toronto. I trained to be a pilot, starting in 1936. During the second World War I served rather extensively on anti-submarine operations and for a period I was Director of anti-submarine warfare at Air Force Headquarters. I then went to Bomber Command, did a tour there, and then returned to Toronto where I was the first chief instructor of the RCAF Staff College. I set it up on its postwar six months and one-year long courses. Then I went to Air Force Headquarters as Director of Operations, and up to the Director of the Joint Staff.

I worked under Mr. Claxton for two years, acting as secretary to the Chiefs of Staff and Director of the Joint Staffs at that period. Then a year at the Imperial Defence College; acting Air Officer commanding, Air Defence Command, for a year; Chief of Telecommunications at Air Force Headquarters for two years; Air Officer Commanding Air Materiel Command, until 1962. I returned to Air Force Headquarters as Vice Chief of the Air Staff, and on the first of August, 1964 I was appointed Chief of Technical Services for the Canadian Defence Forces.

I retired on May 28, 1966 because of having reached compulsory retirement age.

As Chief of Technical Services the major areas over which I exerted my management covered the fields of development, engineering, procurement, supply, maintenance, transportation, communications, electronics and construction engineering for the Canadian forces.

I would like to suggest to the Committee that this technical services area is perhaps the most fundamental of all in importance in answering the question of whether or not integration and eventually unification can be achieved.

I took this job as Chief of Technical Services when it was offered, and I would like to base most of my opinions on the experience acquired during that period, if I may. When offered the job I accepted it because, like a great many other officers in all of the services, we had for a long time been very conscious that there was much duplication among the three services in the matter of the supporting services—the supporting career field, supply, medical services, public relations, and all that type of thing having to do with the non-combat field. The great debate among chiefs of staff and would-be chiefs of staff was whether or not a service chief could yield up direct control over his supporting services and still have an efficient service. Each chief tended to claim that unless he had direct control of his own supporting services, he would not get the professionalism peculiar to the environment, the devotion or the rapidity of response. This has been the argument all along against integration.

I, along with many others, as I said, was conscious of this and felt that there was a need to experiment and see as best we could what was the truth. The case was put up, more or less, that Canada was in an ideal situation for conducting such an experiment, being, as we were, large enough in our forces and in our commitments that our experiences would be of real interest to the larger other powers, yet we were small enough and our commitments in defence of the western world were not so important that if our experiment failed, it would not be disastrous.

I was led to believe that the approach would be a relatively cautious one, akin to how a normal experiment would be conducted, step by step, consolidating each step as a success was achieved—and if there was success, then move forward, with unification the ultimate possible goal, but not necessarily the goal, with a willingness to turn back or to halt when it seemed apparent that a safe distance had been reached.

In case you ask me what I felt when I left, I left in a sense of frustration. I felt that we were going too far too fast and were not taking the necessary precautions of examining and consolidating as we went. Also, the task of integration had proven an immense extra commitment. We were in effect, being asked to try to stick a size 11 foot into a size 7 shoe in a very short period of time without breaking the boot. It was in a sense an exercise in the impossible within the framework of the commitments at the time and the manpower and other factors.

To disgress a little bit, I said earlier I felt that the ability to integrate and perhaps to unify the supporting services in one area in which success had to be achieved in order to make unification possible. The other, I think, is at the very

top of the services—the question of integration or unification of the top command.

There are just about two comments I would like to make, and perhaps that is all I am qualified to make in this connection. I think there is in the present structure a real weakness; that is to say, the Defence Council at the moment comprises a minister and an associate minister sitting at the head of the table, a chief of defence staff and a vice chief of defence staff and usually a third three-star officer of the missing service. I think it is important to recognize that the Vice Chief of Staff is at Defence Council not because he is Vice Chief but because he wears a uniform of different colour to the Chief, and the third officer is there because he wears a still different uniform, representing a different professional background. The purpose ostensibly, it is said, is to enable the Minister to get direct advice on the three environments. This is true, but it produces a very awkward situation. You will recognize that all major matters are first discussed in committee presided over by the Chief of Defence Staff. The same officers have the opportunity there to put forward their views in order to reach a military decision on what will be recommended to Defence Council. There those same officers have put forward their views as heads of the particular branches of Canadian Forces Headquarters, and the Chief has made a decision in his mind eventually what recommendation he will make to the Minister at Defence Council.

In meetings of the Defence Staff on many occasions—perhaps most—there is rather sharp differences of views among the officers giving advice to the Chief of Defence Staff. Nevertheless, when the Chief has made a decision that binds all. When we reappear in Defence Council, the lid is lifted off again. An officer who has failed in his advice to the Chief of Defence Staff is invited literally to give his views independently of what the Chief's views are. This puts the Chief in an extremely difficult position and certainly complicates his relations with his senior officers. It is rather saddening for a branch chief, as I was, to see the difficulties into which the Chief of Defence Staff is put by this situation. I do not know what a Minister would think if the Prime Minister had a meeting on a subject and had, along with the Minister, his two other principals, and by-passed the Minister and put all of them on equal status in giving opinions when the final decision was made. It is analogous to that sort of situation. You can judge the embarrassment in which it places a Chief of Defence Staff and his principal officers.

Another matter that has troubled me for a long time is what seems to be the principal accusation that has been made by politicians in general, if you will forgive me, against the utility of the Chiefs of Staff organization, in that, it produced unacceptable amounts of service rivalry. I think this accusation is unfair and rather specious.

As I mentioned, I served for two years as director of the Joint Staffs; working under Mr. Claxton. I have always felt that the Chiefs of Staff did not want to fight over roles and slices of the defence budget, but by its own action the government forced them to compete. In effect, each year the government flung onto the table an allocation for defence, a billion and a half dollars, $1.8 billion and this sort of thing, normally with only very limited guidelines to policies, and thus put the Chiefs in the inescapable position of having to compete. The rules were more or less: May all three chiefs get a share but the man with

the best case gets the biggest. I think it very much within the capability of government to set defence policy much more completely than was ever the case when there were three chiefs of staff, and thus spare the chiefs from having to engage in sharp rivalry. I believe our governmental performance was the basic shortfall, not the chiefs of staff organization per se.

To give a summary of my views, just what they are without necessarily explaining why, I would be willing to answer and give examples as to why. I believe that on the empirical evidence thus far available, as the result of our integration experiment, does not let justify that a jump now into unification would be a successful venture unless we are satisfied to accept a lot of limitations. I think that one of the limitations would be that the viability of any unified defence force would depend on the continuing existence in the United States of three separate services. I really think the same thing holds true of the United States marines. It is only the existence of the United States navy, United States army, and the United States air force as separate entities that makes possible the basic technologies and professionalisms in weapons and tactics in the environments of sea, land and air which makes the United States marine corps possible as a meaningful triphibious force. I think that statement is pretty well incontestible.

I think that unification, certainly at this stage, without a lot more preparation, could be achieved but it would mean destroying most of the combat capabilities and versatilities now, or at least until recently, existing or inherent in the Royal Canadian Navy. I think it would mean destroying in the longer term the ability of the unified force to retain a meaningful air combat capability or, in fact, any significant combat capability except for ground attack.

I had some beliefs as to what is the better course of action but I do not think this is the place or time to air them.

The CHAIRMAN: This is something that may be brought out later on.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. While I do not think there is yet sufficient favourable evidence to justify totally abolishing the three services, I do believe integration is the right direction in which the service should be moving and pressing their research to move further.

In the matter of opinion within the services—there has been quite a lot of it—I think if a free vote was taken among just those now serving in the actual combat career fields—I mean the actual weapons operators, the hard core of the military: in the navy the deck officers and men who fight; in the army, the infantry, the artillery and the armour, and in the air force the combat air crew, not the transport air crew who have a somewhat softer life—plus those career fields which actually put their hands on the weapons design and maintain war ships, battlefield weapons and combat aircraft—let us say, if we took a free vote among the teeth, I think that it would be very much against unification.

These people are the true professionals of the environment in which each is trained to do combat. They are the fish, the birds, and the beasts. The colour of the uniform worn in each case is the traditional colour of the environment to which he is emotionally and professionally attached and to which the colour of the uniform signifies his profession.

On the other hand, a free vote among all those engaged in the remainder of the supporting career fields, that is to say, supply, accounting, medical, transpor-

tation, public relations and so on, would I believe result in a strong majority in favour of unification. For a variety of reasons, which I will not go into, these supporting services or tail would gain a great deal in many ways. In any over-all vote among all service personnel, I suspect the majority might even favour unification. This is because in our present forces the tail tends to outnumber the teeth.

Thus, I believe our Minister may be correct when he suggests that unification has large popularity within the Canadian forces. However, I believe this popularity is to be found predominantly among the tail. It has been argued that very great amounts of integration are possible among the career fields which support the teeth—that is to say, among the non-combat career fields—which great savings in manpower without loss of efficiency, quality and promise of support to the various types of combat units and formations. I agree that there is very considerable potential in this direction, indeed. But based on my experience, as Chief of Technical Services, it is very much less than any casual examination would lead one to suspect. In general, it is these various supporting services themselves who give the optimistic estimate of it. In my opinion, they tend to be substantially over-optimistic. The basic reason is, of course, that it is very much in their self-interest to do so—and I can give you examples. I think it is important that you should insist on examples as a result of a statement like that.

As a sort of summary of summary of my views, I believe it would have been quite possible to go down the road toward unification a long way, perhaps eventually even to unification itself, without all the internal turmoil and hardship which the services have had to endure over the last two years, if we had been allowed to handle the immense additional burden which has descended on the services as a result of this integration exercise at a pace and, with the resources compatible with what has been demanded. The result has been severe over-loading to the point that great hardships have been imposed on most of those in the services, the great majority of which I believe were not really necessary. Word of this has of course, spread widely and I am saddened to think that other nations which might have embarked on integration programs of their own may now recoil from doing so because of the rather bad reputation I fear our Canadian conduct of this experiment has acquired. If so, it is a pity because as I said at the start, integration is certainly the right direction for the services to be moving and they should be kept pressing to carry it as far as they can sensibly go. I would be happy to go on to unification if only we could follow a relatively safe path into it and be fairly sure before we jumped that we will land safely. That, Mr. Chairman, is all I have to say on my own initiative.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Lambert is the first on my list.

Mr. LAMBERT: Air Marshal Annis, starting back with the date of Bill C-90, with its effective date of August of 1964, the getting together of the new branch heads and the planning for integration, then the getting together of the functional commands, could you tell us in your estimation whether integration kept on at an even keel and proceeded properly and if not, where did it get out of step? Is there any particular sector where you feel that integration as such has gotten out of step, bearing in mind what you have just now said too about the speed with which integration went forward.

Mr. ANNIS: Mr. Lambert, if I may, I will reply strictly on my experience as Chief of Technical Services, the impact there and where we broke down. Essentially, as I interpret matters, the Minister promised the public that he would lop off one third of the headquarters staff at Canadian Forces Headquarters first. At the same time he would increase the procument of capital equipment by a substantial amount. I think it was 20 per cent—that sort of figure which was mooted.

For us in the technical services, it meant that we had to be prepared to increase our activities in the design, development, procurement, supply and what not field, in order to bring this new equipment in—this proportional increase of staff, and at the same time reduce our manpower, and especially our senior most experienced manpower by 30 per cent, and in addition, accept the enormous task of reorganizing the technical services. I believe the technical services was around 60 per cent of the total Canadian forces—a mixture very heavily infused with the civilian element as well. We organized at that stage—in the beginning—in a totally different way. Our first problem was to find the manpower to be set aside to do the studies because it was very complex: there were numerous studies required and these were of a nature that demanded our best minds. At the same time we were being confronted with the task, as I have said, of increasing our technical activity very substantially and keeping going, like we had, the existing people who were deployed all over the world—continuing our support of them, and finally doing it with less men by quite a margin. This is where our problem began. We just did not have the manpower to carry us over the reorganizational hump onto the other side.

Mr. LAMBERT: As a result of these problems in integration, what is your opinion of Canada's capability today in the event that a crunch were to come off—that we had to move into gear because of some crisis. Would our supply services be in a position to equip and maintain, shall we say, the fighting team?

Mr. ANNIS: In a crunch?

Mr. LAMBERT: Without, say, almost a year's notice or something like that. What would be the response or the degree of response of our technical services to an emergency?

Mr. ANNIS: It is sort of hard to estimate. They would work like thieves to accomplish it; they would break themselves, if necessary, to do it. How much they could do—they are in a very awkward position now. It is very awkward posture to pick up a surge type of load and digest it, certainly without reverting back to full-scale operations—abandonment for the time being of their studies and those people employed on studies of a new posture, and reversion to the three single service system which are, in fact, still in being and will have to remain in being, I would judge for another four or five years yet. The new system is not yet designed; it is a monstrous task that they have taken on—a monstrous task. Believe me, it is a monstrous organizational and programming task for computer systems. The existing service systems are continuing—they are carrying the supply to the existing forces, which a study group is working on a new system to be introduced, which will be common to all three services. The real problem for them is going to come when they try to introduce that system. If you take away a great proportion of those who are running the existing three systems to train them, and then introduce the new system, and

at the same time not permit our forces in the field to starve for lack of supply and maintenance materials—

Mr. LAMBERT: On the basis too of, shall we say, the government's intention of having unification, in the narrow sense, come off, this would be an added burden.

Mr. ANNIS: It would greatly exacerbate the situation undoubtedly, yes. It is another organizational jump of sort of quantum size.

Mr. LAMBERT: In your opinion, can the forces stand this.

Mr. ANNIS: Mr. Lambert, I think they can stand anything. They are trying their best. It was my experience, up until I left, that they were trying their best to achieve as much integration as possible. They are conscientiously trying. They regard it as an experiment and at the moment they are, in a sense, disorganized because they are organized to conduct an experiment.

Mr. LAMBERT: What I am concerned about is that degree within integration. But then, are they in a position to stand unification on top of this.

Mr. ANNIS: Not without further disruption. It is, itself, an additional problem, yes.

Mr. LAMBERT: What effect will this additional disruption have on the efficiency and viability of our Canadian defence forces.

Mr. ANNIS: I can only guess. I know no better than anyone else, but it would be a very difficult position. What men can do in an emergency is remarkable. If we had a real emergency appear on the horizon I guess we would reorganize quickly in some direction and posture deemed most applicable to the situation and probably accomplish a great deal. But it would probably be a lot less than we would have been able to accomplish had we not been in this disarray at the beginning of a hypothetical crisis.

Mr. LAMBERT: May I briefly turn to one other point which you have made, namely in connection with your criticism of what I felt was an over-emphasis on the competition between services for equipment, men and their positions. You definitely stated that it was because, shall we say, the procedure which was adopted, that the government merely deposited on the table the pie. They indicated the size of it, and then it was up to the services to sort it out because there was very little in the way of guidelines or determination of defence policy.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. LAMBERT: You have diagnosed the trouble. This is a point which has concerned me a great deal. I do not think myself that it has been cured under this reorganization, and I would like to have the benefit of your views in this regard—you having experienced it, being at the top.

Mr. ANNIS: I witnessed this for quite a few years because I was at air force headquarters for an astonishing proportion of my career, and I was acting as Chief of Air Staff during the period of the autumn of 1963. By this time a lot of the guidelines of the White Paper which had not yet been published were available to the chiefs. It was one occasion when we had a lot of guides. I was impressed with the ease with which the other two chiefs and myself as acting chief, were able to arrive at a program without having a fight, without having to

compete with each other, without having to rush into a closed room and work on a scheme that would give us the best presentation to the Minister or to the chiefs in order to win a bigger slice. We had had opportunity on occasion to work from a set of guidelines given to us. I had not seen this quality of guidance given ever before—dating back to 1949-1950, the Korean war days. I felt that the Chiefs of Staff Committee, had they been in existence still, certainly that year would have escaped criticism of having competed with each other and had the word of their competition flow back down the line to the midst of their respective services.

Mr. LAMBERT: Outside of the provision of an annual white paper which, in essence, is produced also by the services, do you think one could set up an organization to give you these guidelines—and this is coming from the top, from the civilian side.

Mr. ANNIS: Mr. Lambert, I think the answer is Yes. A great deal of the chiefs' competition was over the supporting services—the money for them and their activities. To move over to sort of a positive approach, rather than criticisms.

I would feel that, first, we should take in the integrated commands—they make excellent sense, each with a mission or group of missions: mobile, maritime, air defence, materiel.

Secondly, I would feel that we should re-establish the chiefs with just the hard core forces—the actual combat personnel, and give them a clear field and those who actually design, develop and maintain those weapons and, perhaps, a very limited number of additional type of supporting devices—a very intimate type.

Third, I think we should limit their roles and responsibilities very much like the Americans have done. I have lamented that the work of the Americans who have done so much study of integration, so much work on it and are so far ahead of us in this, has still been ignored up here in Canada. First of all, all American commands are integrated—every one, and no chief of any United States force has any command or control over any combat force. His role is strictly to procure, equip, train and furnish to the integrated command personnel and equipment ready to be trained into combat and carried on in. I think that is the sort of responsibility our chiefs should have, to procure, equip and train and hand over to our integrated command—our own or international integrated commands—such personnel and equipment in such a state and I think this is very logical. In fact, this is what we do in air division—in the brigade. As a nation, we furnish to SACEUR forces which are properly equipped and then they go on into integrated training as an integrated team there. It is somewhat similar in NORAD.

Fourth, I would suggest that we experiment thoroughly with integration of the supporting forces including performance tests—and I could talk about that for quite a while because it is very important. And having experimented thoroughly with how far one can go with integration of the supporting forces and whether or not in an integrated form they can give adequate response to the chief of naval, army or air, in their combat roles, then make a decision of whether to go on to unification. I still think unification might be possible—it could very well be—but we do not know.

Mr. LAMBERT: Sir, where would you envisage the position of the chief of each of the services within the present framework? I know what you are getting at and what some other witnesses have said. There is nobody to speak for the army; there is nobody to speak for the air force, and there is nobody to speak for the navy.

Mr. ANNIS: That is true.

Mr. LAMBERT: No senior officer as such.

Mr. ANNIS: As a chap who is responsible for combat, which is all the services exist for. That is all they exist for really. One hopes not to use them that way but that is what they exist for.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, somewhere along the line there is some difficulty in respect of fitting them in but I do not think it is here. Really what I was getting at was the organization which would give the chief of defence staff and the chiefs of branches their guidelines. I am speaking really now of policy set down by government.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. LAMBERT: Is it through a fully-fledged defence council on the pattern of the British? Is it perhaps a much stronger component of civilians completely detached, in the minister's office, or is it a beefing up of the facilities available to the cabinet defence committee, or just at what level?

Mr. ANNIS: I am only worried, as a military officer, about the quality of military advice given to the cabinet. That is our task. We give our best military advice and we know that external affairs and other departments will put in theirs, that the cabinet will meld it and make a policy decision which will come back and which we will obey. This is our training; this is our belief.

In so far as the military organization is concerned within the Department of National Defence, I visualize still a defence council with a minister, of course, as president or chairman, chairman chiefs of staff and three chiefs, in this limited way I have described. One of the criticisms of the chairman, chiefs of staff, erstwhile, was that he lacked power. He lacked adequate authority. One of the ways, I think, is to give him control of the supporting services. That sure is giving him power because the capabilities of the combat forces depend almost totally, so enormously, on the availability and capabilities of the supporting force. I think it is a very useful role for the chairman, chiefs of staff to perform. The wide allocation of supporting forces in combat or against future postures to the respective services or environment is a matter of very, very senior judgment. But essentially, to answer your question, again very briefly, it is a minister, a chairman, chiefs of staff and three chiefs as the basic body advising cabinet, or cabinet defence committee or the like.

Mr. LAMBERT: But where is the authority? Is it the minister, as it stands today, or is it a defence council that has authority. This is the point.

Mr. ANNIS: In national defence, the minister in council. The minister is always our authority. All we are worried about is getting good advice to him. It hurts a military man to give lousy advice. It comes back on you for years. All we would care about in national defence is making sure that the minister got the best advice, and to the best of my knowledge every chief of staff has given to his

minister the best advice he knew how, and then he sat back waiting for a decision by the minister or minister in council or those who guided our minister.

Mr. LAMBERT: All right, Mr. Chairman, I have used quite a bit of time so I will yield now.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, my first question may seem a little bit long but I will try to boil it down. I will read it very slowly because I wrote it out here. Are you opposed to unification as set forth in the bill which is now before this committee and the House because of the principle or the timing and a lack of sufficient period to consolidate and correct integration changes and the introduction by legislation of policies such as the common uniform and rank structure that might better be left to a natural evolutionary process?

Mr. ANNIS: My answer is simply that I am not opposed to unification in principle. I am opposed—perhaps that is not the right word—I am unhappy with—that would be a better way of saying it—the pace which I consider indiscreet, rash, not really good management.

Mr. WINCH: Thank you. From your lengthy experience, would you say that a single service is not applicable and cannot be made to work in view of the present Canadian government commitments, whether it be NATO, NORAD, Cyprus or elsewhere?

Mr. ANNIS: I think a single service could be made to work if the commitments were small enough—narrow enough. But, again, do you recognize that we have additional commitments in this country beyond what we ever had before. You recognize that back in the days when NATO was coming into being the policy adopted by the middle powers, including Canada, was that we would deliberately unbalance our forces in order to be interdependent, in order that NATO would have a balanced force as a whole. This is the purpose and we contributed to that. We unbalanced our national forces and have proceeded in the intervening years until about 1962 or 1963, when peacekeeping began to emerge. I suppose it emerged officially when Mr. Pearson went down to visit Mr. Kennedy at Hyannisport. I guess that is where peacekeeping talk began to solidify.

Mr. WINCH: May I put it a different way then.

Mr. ANNIS: Peacekeeping for Canadians is based on go-it-alone, as I understand it because if we accept assistance from a larger power it would compromise, in the world's view, our independence of action. So we move over to a posture which in this particular field causes us to be totally independent rather than interdependent. Secondly, our NATO commitment in North America was the Atlantic community—that was the scope. The White Paper, when it talks about air play, said anywhere in the world. There is a brand new set of theatres. Most of it took us away, not only in length—great over water jumps—but it took us from the northern hemisphere, where the climate and what not is akin to our own, to peacekeeping activities in these spots where the people are greatly underprivileged—the hotter zones. So we had a different type of burden descend on us. In other words, we had an enlargement not only in size but in variety and in the scope of our commitments. At about this same time the additional burden of reorganizing ourselves into an integrated posture, at a pace beyond our ability to digest it, was thrust upon us.

Now, to bring all this back as to what could be done with a unified force, I suspect if we were willing to reduce our commitments or are able to, a unified force might eventually be successful. There is bound to be a long period of adjustment. I would estimate it running into 1973 or 1974. It is a long time.

Mr. WINCH: You are now coming to what I am hoping you can, perhaps, give us a more direct comment on. You have read and you know the White Paper?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. WINCH: In the White Paper there was set forth the commitments of the Canadian armed forces and to the best of my knowledge—and I think I can say "our" knowledge—there is no change in the commitments at the present time by the introduction of this bill. Would you say that the maintenance of those commitments in the White Paper still in effect would not be possible under a single unified force and that if we had that there is a required adjustment in the role of our Canadian forces in order to achieve the purport of this bill?

Mr. ANNIS: That is quite a question. If we could be sure—again we are gambling with our allies—that they were not going to be confronted with a crisis, or if we felt that it would not be unfair to them to ungird ourselves very substantially, we might get by with at least keeping up a facade of maintaining our commitments both to NATO and those about which we have published our willingness to do peacekeeping operations. This is a national type of decision; this is out of my realm. I am not suggesting what the government should do about its commitments; that is your business. But, if the government felt that it was bound to maintain a high degree of readiness posture throughout then I do not think we could carry on this unification exercise at the same time. I do not.

Mr. WINCH: Just one more question. Would you tell us, sir, just when you were chief of a technical service?

Mr. ANNIS: I was appointed officially August 1, 1964 and I retired officially, May 28, 1966.

Mr. WINCH: That leads to my question then, which I think will be in order. You mentioned in your opening remarks that when you were in that position you were in charge of procurement.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, until now—to the extent that DND—

Mr. WINCH: Yes, I know, but I would like to get some information and perhaps other members feel the same way. Policy on procurement is laid down by the Department of National Defence. You were in charge of procurement but my understanding is that the actual procurement was done by the Department of Defence Production. Now would you please tell us how these three were correlated and what your experience was?

Mr. ANNIS: All sorts of people have asked that question, including people who come in to do studies on our organization—I mean to advise us on how to organize better.

Mr. WINCH: Am I right on those three phases?

Mr. ANNIS: You are.

Mr. WINCH: How did they operate, and how did you find them?

Mr. ANNIS: Procurement of new major equipment is a job all by itself because one is dealing with the future. One makes a decision today to take the actual step that commits you to procurement and it will be, perhaps, five years before the first of the items enter your inventory. So it is a long-time business; it does not happen in a minute. The statement of the requirement comes from the vice chief side of the House—the operations side of the house. They decide the operational characteristics they want and, to a degree, the timing. We, on technical services, had the responsibility—

Mr. WINCH: First of all, does the government decide that then after the chief of staffs and tells him what he can do and what type he can purchase?

Mr. ANNIS: Well there is sort of a rolling situation in which a policy has been partially developed of what a future posture wi'l be. Then, based on either estimates, hard facts, or guesstimates—any one—the vice chiefs branch do study possible combinations of requirements because they have to make provision for various situations—they do not know what the government will finally decide—and in this they name operational characteristics that they wish. Speaking of an airplane, for example, they will name range, performance, load carrying capability and so on and so forth. It is the role of the technical services in National Defence to give technical advice on capabilities and so on and to go to Defence Production and get advice from them on manufacturing capabilities and the like—and we are the follow through in which this data flows to the defence staff or defence council. A recommendation to procure will eventually go forward to government, and a decision to procure will be initiated. We in the technical services are then confronted with the task of writing out the buying specifications, and this is indeed a very complex task. One talks about farming out contracts to industry but one of the most difficult tasks is writing out the technical specifications that form the basis for the contract. This is our task. When it is completed it is passed over to defence production who then ask for bids against that contract and the procurement process begins.

We in the meantime, maintain watch over the manufacturer to see that his quality of production and manufacture meets the specifications which have been set, and eventually we accept it into inventory, having examined it to see it does meet the specifications, and only then do we pay for it. Once it is in inventory a different cycle altogether begins, that of using it. Some year or two before the materiel enters the inventory, the Materiel Command has computed the rate at which spares for this equipment will be consumed in operation. They start their cycle of provision of spares to operate the equipment and to repair it.

Mr. WINCH: I have only one short question now on the same matter and then I am through, Mr. Chairman. As chief of technical services, having consulted with all your experts and subordinates, you reach the conclusion that a certain type of aircraft would best meet the need?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. Winch: You recommend that to the minister. If the minister does not accept your recommendation are you told why, or is there any further discussion? Or, were you told why? In other words, it was a political decision, not a military one. I am just trying to find this out.

Mr. ANNIS: It is part of military advice. The actual channel of recommendation is this. As Chief of technical services, the statement of the operational

characteristics came from the vice chief. My task at that stage was to advise him, and he and I, as a team, went to our chief of defence staff at defence staff and we made our recommendations to him with other people around as well—the chairman, defence research board and what not, the deputy minister and so on, present. It was a chief's decision as to what to recommend to the minister—a chief of defence staff decision, of course because there is only one chief. There should only be one chief of a service or force. It was his decision in council or in his staff meeting as to what would be recommended to the minister to buy. He goes forward to the minister in defence council and makes his recommendation. Therefore the discussion widens.

Mr. WINCH: But would you know, on the chief's recommendation, whether or not he was going on the recommendation that you made on the advice of your staff?

Mr. ANNIS: No. The chief could very well turn it down and say: "Go back to your drawing board and work some more. It does not meet the requirements." But eventually, if there is a need for some sort of equipment, for example, a new airplane to fit a certain type of role, he will be satisfied that this is the best proposal he could make from a military viewpoint, and he will carry it forward as an item of defence council at which the minister presides. I do not think the minister is under any obligation to tell the chief, or me, or the vice chief, why he turned something down. At times he has and at times he has not. If he accepts it, we figure we have done a pretty good job and, if not, we figure there is something wrong with our work or there is some other good reason on the part of government.

Mr. MACALUSO: Air Marshal Annis, I noticed a recurrent theme in your answers to questions. As I have it—and correct me if I am wrong—you stated: "I believe it is possible to go down the road to unification a long way, perhaps to unification itself, if allowed to handle the immense additional burdens first,"—the severe overloading. And then you go on: "Integation is the right direction for the services to be moving and should be kept pressing on".

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: "I am happy to go to unification." Again, you say: "I think unification may still be possible; A am not opposed to unification in principle: I am unhappy with the pace". That really summarizes your whole context of this problem that we face.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, I think that is a fair statement.

Mr. MACALUSO: The pace of moving from—and these are interchangeable words—

Mr. ANNIS: It is not entirely pace. The pace plus constant examination of where we are, and moving onwards only when we feel we have a firm foothold where we are.

Mr. MACALUSO: Yes, I realize that. You say you are not opposed to the end result,—

Mr. ANNIS: No.

Mr. MACALUSO:—integration into one single force, one rank, one uniform. This is the way we seem to be looking at unification.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: May I ask you, first, are these alternating terms. How do you differentiate between these words.

Mr. ANNIS: We still have no definition for unification. Each person has his own visualization of it. I visualize it as a service in which anyone, when asked: "To what do you belong," replies: "I belong to the Canadian Defence Force" in the same way a person would say that he belongs to the Royal Canadian Navy or the Royal Canadian Air Force.

Mr. MACALUSO: I take it in principle you are not opposed to this concept?

Mr. ANNIS: No, no. If it can be shown that we can, by hook or by crook, demonstrate at all satisfactorily, before the event, that it probably can be made to work, I am all for it.

Mr. MACALUSO: Then you said that you think that it can be made to work provided certain steps of integration are followed through and pressed onward —certain aspects that you have outlined.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: Now, I understand that it is your belief that integration is the right thing in the supporting services and that this has to be achieved first before you can move onto the single force concept. Is that correct?

Mr. ANNIS: Not quite. Let me illustrate in a slightly lengthy answer what I think.

Mr. MACALUSO: I asked you that because you state: "I feel the ability to integrate and unify the supporting services has to be achieved in order to make unification possible."

Mr. ANNIS: I beg your pardon?

Mr. MACALUSO: Your words were: "I feel the ability to integrate and unify the supporting services has to be achieved in order to make unification possible".

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: That is why I asked you the previous question.

Mr. ANNIS: I do, yes. Let me give an example. I mentioned the technical services. Most of them are supporting services; some of them are indirect. I will use the construction engineering career field as an example because it has the least complications. The navy's idea of a construction engineering officer is a chap trained and qualified to construct docks, jetties, wharves, cradles, underwater caissons, and accommodation aboard ships. He is, in a sense, a partial ship constructor and also responsible for constructing offices and quarters.

The army's idea of an RCE sapper is that he should be able to lay down minefields, pick them up again, build kennel-type bridges by the book, quickly assembled under fire, do demolitions, build roadways, be able to take tanks through forests or over obstacles, water purification and the like, and also to build offices and quarters.

The air force's idea of a construction engineer is a chap who is able to build cantilever arch hangars, runways which are about 4 feet deep, ballasted and straight as string—whether a bump gets in the way or not, radar stations, big

holes in the ground like at North Bay and offices and quarters. The common factor in here seems to be offices and quarters. Now, in respect of utilization by each service, the approach was quite different. The navy tended to use the ship constructor and as a sort of an adjunct to him was the construction engineer—and they had relatively few construction engineering people in their service. In general, the career opportunities of these people are either as civilians or, if they are military, they are very limited. They stayed and they served almost totally in construction engineering employment.

In the air force a very similar situation prevailed. The air force had for many years by far the largest construction program. Their construction engineering corps or career field was modest in size and the officers in it almost invariably served virtually their whole career in actual construction engineering. As such they tended to be very comparable to the civilian professional construction engineer.

The army had a very different approach for a very good reason. In general, the senior officer can learn all there is to know of the sapper field in a few years—one or two tours in the field. What is more, it is done in the battlefield, where they are trained primarily to be operative. Thereafter they are free for a much wider employment in their service. As of February 1964 or thereabouts, if I remember my figures correctly and I am not entirely sure, the ratio in the army, navy and air force of officers serving in the air force construction engineering, the navy construction engineering and the RCE field were 15 army, 2 navy, and 4 RCAF. I think that is about the ratio. By and large the navy and the air force construction people were much more professional as constructors. The army officer, by virtue of his much wider tours of postings, tended to be a much more experienced military officer, especially with qualifications for higher rank because he had seen his service from many more angles than from the sort of parochial station of construction engineering. So here we have the problem of how do you produce an integrated organization. How do you do it? This is the question. I do not know the answer yet, and I do not think you do. At least, I do not, and this is what we have to find out. The object of the course is that we bring a boy in—I am talking about our officer element first—from somewhere, university maybe or R.M.C., and if so, we have to establish the minimum qualifications he should have. Then the next thing is what sort of course should we give him? Should he go through a navy constructor course and then into an entirely different field of army construction engineering training and then off into air force? Then when he is finished that, how shall we employ him? Is it wasteful—to do what? Then when it comes to career progression, should we use the army approach which allowed their RCE officers to compete for senior rank in any branch? Or, should we use the air force and navy approach, which was very suitable to their service, of keeping a small career field and virtually all the officers which they had in that career field employed in that function. Now, the question is, if we have such an integrated service the only thing common being building offices and quarters, what sort of support could they give a Canadian operation, or integrated with some other country, in navy, army or air or all three? How prompt and how efficient would we be? Are we wiser to go ahead with an integrated structure, with people who are sort of jack-of-all trades, or are we better off to train and instruct our construction engineers specifically for support of a function or role? We do not know yet what the syllabus should be.

We do not know quite what the answer is. When we do decide, we will not know how efficient they are until after they have had some trials—it will take a while. And yet the Navy and the Army and the Air Force are all very dependent upon quality and good support in the construction and engineering field. It is an essential supporting service, and there are lots more of them—I mean the simple ones. The other ones more complicated.

Mr. MACALUSO: This is where you say that integration is the right step but it should be pressed on with. Is this an example of a field where you feel it should be pressed on and tested.

Mr. ANNIS: Pressed on and tested. We are just working out plans of how to integrate the like people from the three services into a single supporting package. The doctors were easy by comparison.

Mr. MACALUSO: I am very pleased with the information you provided as far as the United States experience is concerned. It bears repeating. Perhaps we are not too well aware of how far they have gone. You say they have gone even further than we have as far as integration is concerned.

Mr. ANNIS: Exploration of the problems, I meant to say, or should have said. That is what I meant to say. And in some respects the actual work itself.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well you said that all US. commands are integrated and that no chief has any command or control over any combat force.

Mr. ANNIS: That is right.

Mr. MACALUSO: His role is strictly to procure, equip, train and furnish to the integrated command personnel and equipment.

Mr. ANNIS: Ready for battle training.

Mr. MACALUSO: I only have one last question, Air Marshal. You mentioned something in your statement of balanced forces in NATO. Are you prepared to let us know what your views are as to whether Canada did the right thing in contributing to a balanced force within the alliance or whether it was not the right thing.

Mr. ANNIS: Do you means to unbalance our forces.

Mr. MACALUSO: Yes.

Mr. ANNIS: Well, it is a generalization. I never would like to argue with success. I think NATO has been a success. Perhaps it has achieved its purpose; I do not know. Perhaps it is finished achieving its purpose; I do not know. I think it was a success.

Mr. MACALUSO: Admiral Brock stated that Canada was the only country naive enough to swallow hook, line and sinker, the American philosophy of balanced forces within the alliance. I gather from your statement, since it was a success that this would not exactly be so.

Mr. ANNIS: Other nations unbalance their forces too. The low countries did, I think, and Britain to a degree.

Mr. MACALUSO: We are not alone in that then.

Mr. ANNIS: No.

Mr. MACALUSO: Thank you very much, Air Marshal.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Air Marshal Annis, I was very interested in a statement you made a moment ago about the specialization of professional personnel and so on. Let us take the case of any big city construction company which is accustomed to bidding and contracting for the construction of houses, factories, hospitals, bridges, roads and the like. Is this not a unified organization whose personnel are ready to adapt themselves to a very wide variety of tasks and so on, and is this so much different than the cases you are referring to here.

Mr. ANNIS: Canadian defence policy has for a long time been to utilize our civilian capability as best we can. The in-house—the in-service role is pretty well limited to the setting of specifications, the supervision of performance and the acceptance into inventory of work done by civilian contractor, by and large. That is not true of the battle field, of course, nor in many cases, in respect of the very distant points, or in some cases where things are relatively small and have a high degree of security. In general, the services contract the actual work out, but they have the task of writing the specifications and having an intimate knowledge of the performance of the contractor, the language and the trade, and so on.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I really wanted to question you for a moment or two in connection with some remarks you made about going too far, too fast—and other people have mentioned the same subject. You have some hesitancy about this because in some of your statements your are saying: We should be pressing on with integration and into unification as far as it is feasibly possible. I think I am quoting you correctly.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Earlier, in your remarks, you expressed the view that we were going too far too fast, so I can only assume from this that while your are prepared to press on, you believe we have pressed on beyond what are considered to be reasonable limits, in your estimation.

Mr. ANNIS: Pressing too hard. I have meant an inexorable sort of strained pressure, but not a crushing pressure, which I feel is what has been exerted thus far.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I want to discuss this in terms of readiness. Although maybe the word "readiness" was not used, I think you indicated that if we found ourselves dealing with a surge, we would have to regroup in other ways, would not be able to carry forward with the existing integrated or unified forces, and so there is a lack of readiness in certain areas. Can you amplify where there is a lack of readiness whereby we would not be able to respond to a surge?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, I think I did describe them. It was the fact that the services have been and still are confronted with the additional commitments, the commitment of being unbalanced and interdependent, and dependent—that is a new one, world wide—and taking on this huge re-organization and adjustment task. All these studies—the sort of study that I described in the supply service, for example, which will take years—will have to be abandoned, and the people who have been set aside doing these put back into the immediate problem of reacting to the emergency. As I mentioned in supply, for example, air force materiel is being demanded and supplied through an air force system still, and will be for some years. The army materiel, peculiar to land, is being demanded and supplied through that system, and the same way with the navy. Those systems would

have to spring back into a larger scale operation. This is the sort of thing. In the meantime, we have serious shortages in manpower, not primarily on account of integration and unification, but because of this wartime age group that you know are retiring.

Mr. DEACHMAN: In this logistical area, if we have understood previous witnesses, very complex building of completely computerized inventory and logistics system is taking place, and an old system or a standby system is going to have to pretty well remain in operation, or at least some aspect of it, until we get to the end of the trail; and if we also understood correctly, this is one aspect of integration which is going to take a long time before it is in full operation.

Mr. ANNIS: Oh, yes. It will cost a lot too, to bring it into being. I think it may be worth while. It will pay for itself after ten years of operation, I suppose. I do not think Treasury Board will accept it until they have a pretty good guarantee that the investment in new techniques, equipment, training, and the like, will be recovered by future savings.

Mr. DEACHMAN: You do not disagree with the target, then?

Mr. ANNIS: No. It is a very desirable target—it is very desirable but, to a degree, it is like hanging a bell on a cat. Can you get it hung on?

Mr. DEACHMAN: Do you see dangers in the capability of the standby system to maintain readiness until we reach that target, or is that functional?

Mr. ANNIS: Well, as a Chief of Technical Services, looking as impartially as I could—and I think quite impartially—at navy, army and air force organizations in the technical field, each was tailored to the existing navy, army and air force structure. I thought they were basically very good systems and quite economical. The navy, especially, was packaged astonishingly well. They had men wearing two and three hats to do a job and had trained themselves so well that they were astonishingly proficient in this form. They have been torn to pieces now and sort of extended. I do not know how they would reassemble themselves in this very intricate structure that they had, which was working surprisingly well. I think they could probably do it if they could find the trained manpower to fit back into the slots to do this type of work. How long it would take, I do not know.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Do I understand then, that there is not a logistics capability now in the navy as a result of this. In fact, are you saying that the logistics capabilities of the navy have been damaged by the process of integration?

Mr. ANNIS: I think they are accomplishing the essentials. You started off by asking about the problems of a surge-load.

Mr. DEACHMAN: This is right.

Mr. ANNIS: Their operating forces have been reduced somewhat insofar as I know I am the wrong person to answer this question. You should, I think, really get the Chief of Supply or someone else up here to answer that question. But as far as I know, navy is receiving its essential supplies pretty well on time. I cannot give a knowledgeable answer beyond that because I do not know.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Well, as a kind of a summary question to this point, are you prepared to say that, logistically, we are less capable of bearing a surge-load

now than we were, let us say, in 1964, at the time the White Paper was promulgated.

Mr. ANNIS: Oh yes, but this was part of the calculated risk that we would discommode ourselves in order to conduct an experiment. I think this was a calculated risk. We have lost a lot of manpower; we have done a lot of reorganization; we have decoyed a lot of people away from their normal tasks and left the stages vacant while they did studies on how to solve these new problems. For this reason, the erstwhile systems are not manned, do not have nearly as large a capacity, and because of the double training and what not, have lost a good deal of their old-time efficiency. This is all true. But it is not unnatural; it is just how things are. It is part of the price of conducting a very large deal experiment.

The CHAIRMAN: A necessary experiment.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I had one question here on the Defence Council. If I understood you correctly, I think you sadi that the Defence Council had lacked all-round representation. I think that was the tenor of your statement.

Mr. ANNIS: No, that was not what I meant. I meant that it did have all-round representation. It had the chief coming from one service, a vice chief from another service, and a third officer, who was not the vice chief but wore a third colour uniform, and this is how the three service representation was achieved. But the price of having it was to put the Chief of the Defence Staff in a position where he found himself being bypassed in that the Chairman considered all three as sort of equal in their advice, whereas, by his terms of reference, the Chief of the Defence Staff should be the one and the only speaker who advises the Minister because each of these officers had previously had an opportunity to air his views before his chief, in a closed session, with others present. The Chief offers his advice, and when that is finished the chief normally goes forward and says, "This is my recommendation to you arrived at in council with my officers." Our whole training is that in council you argue your case as best you can and the chap at the head of the table listens to everything, and finally says, "Having heard everything, this is our decision. Agreed?" And those who argued against it, agree, and thereafter they are part of the team. This is what happens. But then you go up to Defence Council; the lid is taken right off and the chief is exposed. When the Minister asks one of the vice chiefs or the officer what they think, this officer is bound by duty to say exactly what he thinks, and it may be the same again—the arguments which he expressed unsuccessfully to his chief in the previous session. It puts the chief in a very difficult position and it puts the officer who is asked in a very difficult position, and it does not help make a team of the chief and his senior. They are forced into strained positions in this sort of situation. I do not like it.

Mr. DEACHMAN: One of the arguments that has been put forward to us is that when you have a single chief then the minister is only hearing the word from one chief whereas, previously, he had three chiefs to whom he could listen, and he could draw his judgment from what the three service chiefs said. It was my opinion, listening to witnesses here and reading what the minister has said about this, that the function of the Defence Council, and the reinstitution of the Defence Council as a body which met regularly was to provide the Minister with

the opportunity of tapping in on the system in a more general way and I just wonder whether or not—

Mr. ANNIS: He did. It put the Minister in an excellent position but it put him in the position of being Chief of the Defence Staff, because really there is no difference in the views of the three officers perhaps most involved, or in what they say to their own Chief or the Minister. The same discussion takes place all over again, but this time the Minister is in the chair, and it is the deciding council as far as national defence is concerned. The Minister gets excellent advice but he gets it as though he were the Chief of the Defence Staff. He gets the same advice, but then there is a bit extra thrown in from other visitors.

Mr. DEACHMAN: This would depend on at what stage something is aired. If a matter was coming up for decision and if it were aired at the Defence Council level before decision is taken, then all arguments could be heard in respect of this matter and I cannot see how this would work against a viable system.

Mr. ANNIS: It is disruptive. This arrangement is disruptive of harmony within the Defence Staff and it is true if the Minister wishes to attend the Chiefs meeting—and we have had this through once—then I suppose it would be workable. But you have to recognize the situation that the procurement of a new ship, or a new battlefield weapon, is a subject and the effect of it is disruptive on a budget—something else has to go—and environmental views are starting to come out and the Chief of Defence Staff sits at the head of the table and each one is asked to say his piece, including the Chairman of the Defence Research Board who is there, and the Deputy Minister, and so on, and the people give their views as best they can on military factors. A decision is reached because the Chief is in the chair and he says at the end of the discussion of that subject: well, this is what I think, and it goes down in the minutes as a decision and the people, all having had a chance to say their piece, abide by it.

Then the Chief's responsibility is to make a recommendation to the Minister in a Defence Council meeting, so another group assembles and this time the Minister is at the head of the table. The Chief of the Defence Staff is there, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff is there, because he is wearing another coloured uniform, and a third officer—during my day, Admiral Dyer, because he was Navy and Chief of Personnel—always was present, in order to get a third view.

Discussion starts off on this subject as though it had never taken place before. The Chief says: I recommend this to the Minister. The Minister says: all right, then what do you think, brown uniform, and what do you think, blue uniform? And the blue uniform chap is compelled to say what he thinks because his duty is to give the best advice he can. Perhaps you are then found arguing against your Chief in front of the Minister. It is kind of hard when you get up and leave if there has been a strained subject, and the feelings among the Defence Staff can be exacerbated by the situation.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Let us go back to the Minister's address on second reading in which he said:

> It has become the practice to have the branch heads attend meetings of defence council regularly as well as some assistant deputy ministers. The deliberations, therefore, of members and those in attendance provide a valuable blending of military, scientific and financial advice. The elements for a more co-ordinated interdepartmental approach to defence

problems exist in the defence council and consequently arrangements have been made for participation by representatives of other government departments on issues of interest to them. A senior officer of the Department of External Affairs attends regularly and this has proved to be a valuable link with that department. It is also a clear indication of our determination to ensure that Canadian defence policy is based upon and is designed to support Canadian foreign policy.

If, in the consideration of objectives and commitments and goals, and political advice and financial advice, and so on, the Minister must thread his way through this maze, what better way is there to do it than through a Defence Council or some committee such as this? In other words, if the Defence Council were not there, would you not have to invent it?

Mr. ANNIS: I am not criticizing and if I sound as though I am, forgive me. I have no intention of criticizing the quality of discussion in Defence Council. In fact, all these views have been put in and it has been very good discussion. I really have not criticized the great majority of decisions taken at meetings of the Defence Council that I have attended. But, I do say that this arrangement is very, very hard on the Defence Staff. It is a good way to break up a Defence Staff some day. It is hard on the Chief of the Defence Staff suddenly to be reduced a rank and put as a co-equal in front of the Minister with his Vice Chief and his Chief of Personnel. It is very hard on him and I think that if one wants to have a viable Defence Staff some other way should be searched out.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I think that is a question we can very well explore a little further with General Allard and the Minister when we have them back before us soon, and I thank you very much, sir.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Air Marshal, I think I should say that I was very pleased to hear you make one statement, at least, when you said—and I believe these were your words—that "the defence structure exists for combat service."

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I think if we go on that premise we are thinking along the same lines.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, indeed, sir.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I think possibly that is the feeling of most of the members on this Committee. However, when you were giving a definition of what unification meant to you it sounded very simple, and I think you used those words—it was very simple. If I may paraphrase again, you said that it just meant that a man said: I now belong to the Canadian forces rather than to the Army, or the Navy or the Air Force. Where did you get your definition from? I could accept that if that was the official definition of the word "unification." I say this because there has been so much confusion in this Committee over the definition of the two terms "integration" and "unification". In fact, General Foulkes said: "I cannot tell the difference between integration and unification." If they both mean the same thing, then perhaps we are having too many meetings on this, but I would like to find out where you got your definition.

Mr. ANNIS: Out of my head, I suppose; just as a result of being compelled to contrive one for myself. I do not think I am telling tales out of school when I say

that the same bewilderment has persisted in the Defence Staff, the Defence Council, and probably elsewhere. I think each person has been compelled to contrive his own interpretation of what the words mean.

Mr. McINTOSH: Did you at any time get that definition from the Minister or the impression that was what unification meant?

Mr. ANNIS: Not consciously, no.

Mr. McINTOSH: We have been trying to find out what he meant by his definition of the term, and I will repeat it again. He said:

Unification is the end objective of a logical and evolutionary progression.

That seems much more complicated than your definition.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, it is. The question is when to make the jump. You see, I keep on feeling that integration is best exemplified in the commands where Mobile Command, I suppose, is the best example. It has officers wearing different coloured uniforms, filling various appointments on the staff, and looked at from an organizational viewpoint it is an entity; it is a viable staff organization made up of officers performing their duties as Chief of Personnel, or Chief of Communications, or what not, irrespective of his uniform or his background. To me, that is integration. Successful integration presupposes that the previous training of the incumbents of each and every position on such staffs has been adequate.

Mr. McINTOSH: I think there is a quite a lot of agreement in the Committee on the definition of the term integration. I think we all agree that some of that is needed.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. McINTOSH: But with your definition I would ask you, Air Marshal, what was the reason for so many senior officers resigning over this term if it is a simple as you say it is—just changing a name?

Mr. ANNIS: I think frustration—all around. First of all, there was this impossibly large task to be done in this impossibly short time. I think every chap in uniform was doing his best to make integration a success. It was put up to us as an experiment and we felt that other nations were watching and every one in uniform was most anxious that if it failed, no one—no one—would be able to say that it failed because the military did not do their best to make it succeed.

This is how people in the branch over which I presided approached it. Their efforts to make integration work as best they could were universal. I was inspired by the quality of performance and the sincerity. The tasks for us of the technical services were huge. We saw a continuing uncertainty, unrest, and unhappiness among our people with no real solutions in sight and we were powerless to help because of the pace.

I was not invited to stay, but I would have left the service anyhow when the time came to retire, because I feel that I have been a senior officer for a long while and it was time for promotion. But, nevertheless, I have to confess I was glad to leave, in a sense. I had never expected I would be, but I was because of a sense of frustration in achievement of something we were most anxious to achieve. We accomplished a great deal. I am proud of what we accomplished, but it was nothing compared with what had to be done to prevent all this unhappiness within the team.

Mr. McINTOSH: Was there general agreement amongst all your friends—I suppose I can call them that—in the senior officers on the general definition of unification, or were they frustrated because they did not know what it was, or what was meant by it? I ask you that because in the Minister's speech which has been referred to before, he said:

> This system will not be changed by reason of unification. Certainly we will continue to have—

the Army, Navy and so on, and he goes on at great length. He makes many statements in his speech that there will be no change but, at the end of it, each time he says this, or words to this effect:

> —until the force structure within the unified force is developed.

Now, this is where we get frustrated. This is what we do not understand. What does he mean? If he means, as you say, just the simple matter of changing the name, then I think we can go along with it.

Mr. ANNIS: My estimate has always been that he has meant something modeled on the United States Marine Corps; just that. That has been my idea. This is what I visualized when I thought: well, what would it look like? It would look like the United States Marine Corps.

Mr. McINTOSH: Reference was made to the White Paper, Air Marshal, and you referred to Canada's policy prior to, say, 1963 or 1964, and you said it was an interdependent policy.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. McINTOSH: Dependent on our allies?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes. They, in part, depended on us too, of course.

Mr. McINTOSH: And you subscribed to that policy?

Mr. ANNIS: If you are part of a team, yes; that is the definition of a team.

Mr. McINTOSH: Do you believe that the only defence possible for Canada is some form of collective defence?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, indeed.

Mr. McINTOSH: I am all for that. Then a little later on, in referring to the peacekeeping forces, I got the idea from what you said that there was a suggested change in our policy; you used the words, "go it alone".

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, this has been done. I do not think I have ever seen this in an official document, but there has been a tacit understanding in our department among the military and, I suppose the civilians—all the elements—that if Canada is to play a peacekeeping part meaningfully, it is essential that she be able to do it independently; to arrive at some location on her own, sustain her forces there and, if necessary, come out of there. In other words, to accept help from some outside power—for example, the United States—in the form of the loan of forces and equipment to get you there and sustain you, would compromise the regard in which we were held. Therefore, if we are going to perform on behalf of the United Nations, or in some other peacekeeping role, we have to be able to be self-sustaining.

Mr. McIntosh: In other words, it was suggested to you then, sir, that Canada would now, or in the future, have a dual role.

Mr. Annis: It would amount to that, yes.

Mr. McIntosh: Or was it suggested that we opt out of these collective alliances and just perform a single role?

Mr. Annis: No, this has not been suggested to us; this is strictly a political and technical matter. We, in the military, all have views on it, but we are trained not to have views that are meaningful.

Mr. Brewin: May I ask a supplementary question? In the past, certainly all our peacekeeping roles have not been "go it alone"; they have been supported by other nations. I just wonder, sir, where you get this idea that a peacekeeping or an intervention role would necessarily be independent of support from other countries? I can understand that an intervention force can be committed by the decision of the Canadian government if the circumstances arose, rather than its being a static commitment. But I just have not been able to follow from where you deduce this idea.

Mr. Annis: To be more specific, I suppose, it suggests that we could not accept help from the United States.

Mr. Brewin: Why not?

Mr. Annis: Because this is our basic source of supply. To have our forces airlifted, for example, by United States aircraft to somewhere in Africa, or the Middle East, or the Pacific Archipelago, would not, I think, help to maintain the regard in which we are held; it would look as though we were, perhaps, a pawn. I do not know; I speculate here.

Mr. Brewin: Then I ask you this question: Would it not seem a little difficult, if not completely unfeasible, for Canada to be dispatching troops without at least the tacit support, if not the active support, of some of the great powers including the United States in particular.

Mr. Annis: I am out of my depth here, really, sir. This is more of a political question. I have been aware that our departmental planning has been postured towards a capability to get there ourselves, sustain ourselves with a balanced force of sea, land, and air and, if necessary, extricate ourselves.

Mr. Brewin: Thank you very much. I am sorry to have interrupted your line of questioning.

Mr. McIntosh: To get back to my previous question, Air Marshal, I take it from you that there was no suggestion, then, that we opt out of the collective defence that we are now in, or our alliances; but the suggestion was made that we have a dual role?

Mr. Annis: It has not been suggested to the military to my knowledge. It has been apparent, in Defence Staff and elsewhere, that we have had to deal with two quite separate problems; one of maintaining the sort of forces necessary for our NATO commitment, and a quite different problem for the peacekeeping role.

Mr. McIntosh: Could I say, then, that in effect you did have two roles.

Mr. Annis: Oh, yes, indeed.

Mr. McIntosh: Now, in order to carry out these dual roles, we were told yesterday by General Moncel that he felt we had to have a force of 150,000 men. Do you agree that to carry out these dual roles we would have to have that many?

Mr. Annis: I would suspect it would be of that order; certainly larger than the 90,000-odd that we have now—certainly much larger. These roles are quite different in their nature. The combat role in which one is centred on a European theatre is sophisticated—probably General Moncel has said it already—and one that requires a type of weaponry for all the services that is highly sophisticated and damned expensive. The peacekeeping role tends to be an observing role, where one uses light-weight equipment designed to impress those would-be belligerents that they are being watched.

Mr. McIntosh: What you are trying to tell me is that in order for Canada to carry out the roles that she has now committed herself to, she is roughly 50,000 below the requirement to make those roles effective?

Mr. Annis: I would not know whether the figure of 50,000 is correct but I would say that it is a significant additional commitment that could not be managed well with our existing numbers.

Mr. McIntosh: We will forget the numbers. Were you aware of any problems that existed in recruiting while you were at headquarters here in Ottawa?

Mr. Annis: Oh, yes; they were well known to us and to the public.

Mr. McIntosh: Had you tried every possible means to accelerate the recruitment?

Mr. Annis: Yes, the Department had taken a considerable number of steps to increase the appeal; actually going out and saying they were increasing pay, or promising it first a long while ahead and then going ahead and increasing it, and the like.

Mr. McIntosh: If Canada is effectively to carry out this dual role that we have been talking about—although you may not agree with this term "dual role" —bearing in mind the problems that you had in recruiting when you were on the General Staff, and I suppose you implemented every inducement that you possibly could, would you agree that we have to resort to compulsory military service, or to conscription?

Mr. Annis: I would not know; but I would say this: essentially the problem lies in ability to recruit the combat officer, the infantryman, the gunner, the artilleryman, the pilot, and the deck officer in the navy. They are the ones who take the brunt. For those who are in the supporting services, an altogether different inducement exists. If I join the services, it is a very good way to get excellent training enroute to civilian life, and all sorts of things; it is a different story.

Mr. McIntosh: We agreed when I started my questioning that the defence structure exists for the combat services; in other words, the very people that you are saying we are having difficulty in getting. Is that right?

Mr. Annis: Yes.

Mr. McIntosh: Then the defence structure as we have it now, or under unification, is more or less not going to be capable of doing the job it was set up to do.

Mr. ANNIS: I think the unified structure would experience its greatest difficulty in recruiting people in the combat career fields, because it is the uniform and name of service that designates them as unique. The person who is a construction engineer, the doctor, the accountant, and so on, all have an opposite number in civilian life. There is no opposite number to a combat pilot, nor to a gunner, nor to an infantryman, nor to a deck officer in a warship. A warship and a submarine are not cargo vessels, nor are they the *Queen Mary*; it is quite different. These people who are going to operate these weapons—not transport aircraft, but weapons—have got to fight to master an element in the first place, and then master some other professional warrior in that element. You have got to win, or you get killed in this racket, and you have got to be prepared for it. This is what every person who takes an oath has to be prepared to do. He hopes to God it will never happen, he hopes he will never have to fight, he hopes his presence will prevent war; but there it stands, and this is his badge of professionalism. He is part of that environment. He is going to live, or maybe die; maybe his father died or his kids may die in it. These are the people that are the hard core of the military; they are what the military is.

The supporting services, God knows, are extremely valuable. I am not deprecating them in any way; their value is tremendous. But they are supporting services, and they do have opposite numbers in civilian life, and their service training has a much more applicable value to them in civilian life, and so on. This is the problem area of getting people to come in and become infantrymen. After an infantryman is about 30 years of age, he cannot run up and down hills fast enough to compete with kids who are 22 years of age. He goes to look for a job and they say, "Well, what did you do?" He says, "I was trained as an infantryman". The employer says, "Well, how can I ever employ an infantryman in my plant?". This is your problem. Yet, they are people who are willing to pay, if necessary, something that you cannot value—their lives.

We have the problem of paying them; inducing them; rewarding them; giving them status, including a uniform and a colour that says they are professionals in something; this is the group to which the colour of uniform really matters. The doctors are vital to our services, but they are not necessarily attached to the sky or under the sea.

Mr. MCINTOSH: To sum up your remarks, do I take it that you feel it is necessary for the combat fighting troops in the submarines, in the airplanes, in the infantry, in the armour, and so on, to be identified in some manner?

Mr. ANNIS: These people already have their uniform; but if you take the construction engineers out of the navy, army, and air force and put them together, they do not have a uniform yet. They came: from navy, army, and air force, and they are dedicated to support all three, but those fellows do not have a uniform yet. So, they are looking for one; they are all for a new uniform. But the fellows who live and die on the sea who are inextricably attached to the war ship—they built it, they designed it, and they operate it, and so on—and the airplane, have a uniform and it is being taken away from them.

Also, to get into the inside of it, the military is a pecking order as well, like everything else in life. The military is a microcosm of life at large. It has a flock of career people, and there are different feelings among pilots and accountants, just as there are among doctors and accountants. Certainly they have different

slants of view and attitudes towards the same thing. In the military, the top of the pecking order is the combat man. He is what the service is; he is the hard core. He has had taken away from him his control over supporting services, which he knows were brought into being to support him in his hour of need in combat. The control of these people has been taken from him, making them stronger.

Unification of doctors made them a much more powerful organization than when they were fragmented into three services, believe me. They became a guild; a trade union. They became a power and a different type of chap to deal with, and much more difficult for the Minister to deal with, in rank structure and pay and so on. They were a guild and they were backed up by the medical organization of the nation; they had some support.

So, here is the man who is the hard core at the top of the pecking order in navy, army, and air force, losing his uniform, losing his control over his supporting services, and losing his inducement ever to come in the service. This is his problem and this is our national problem in recruiting men today, and it will continue so until some way of getting the hard core of men in, and keeping them in, and keeping them happy, is achieved.

Mr. McINTOSH: I do not think, Air Marshal, that we can group personnel of the defence structure into which are the most important, and so on, but we can establish a list of priorities, and I take it from what you have said that the person we should consider most at this time under this bill, under any change, is the combat man.

Mr. ANNIS: Oh, yes, this makes them different from anything else there is.

Mr. McINTOSH: Do you think that unification does this?

Mr. ANNIS: I think the loyalty of Canadian officers entering the services probably could overcome even this handicap, if they were given time and if a system of recognition and reward could be worked out. I think it might happen, but to jump right into it with this little bit of preparation is incredibly hard on the combat career fields in the three services.

Mr. McINTOSH: General Foulkes said that tidy administration—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh, do you have a lot more questions?

Mr. McINTOSH: No, I think I can finish up in three questions. I may want to go on again. General Foulkes said that tidy administration seemed to be the predominant feature of the unification bill and that combat troops should not be pushed around or treated like punch holes in a computer card just to make it easier for the administrative officers. Do you feel too much emphasis is put on administration in this bill, and not enough emphasis on the combat troops?

Mr. ANNIS: As you said, sir, in a sense, despite what I said about pecking orders, they are all equal. As a member of the technical services whose role was support, may I say we got our satisfaction out of giving good support to the combat services. This was our satisfaction for the period I was serving there; this was it. We felt that by introducing some of these computerized techniques and other things, we could give better support. Provided the rate and scale of adoption of these techniques is within our capabilities, I am all for it. Again, it is a matter of a sensible rate. I rather feel that, considering the expansion of other

commitments that the Canadian defence forces voluntarily and involuntarily took on, the additional task of integration limited our ability to adopt a lot of these techniques as rapidly as we are trying to do right now.

Mr. McINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, Admiral Landymore's brief expressed some concern, and he felt the commanders had some concern, about the operation of Materiel Command—

Mr. ANNIS: Oh, yes.

Mr. McINTOSH: — and about the Maritime Command. I will not go into that right now, but if I have a chance to ask you some other questions later on I will do so. I would like to bring out these concerns that Admiral Landymore had.

Mr. ANNIS: May I just say one thing? His concerns are really legitimate, and until the supply system can satisfy the commanders that it is going to give a good performance, the field commander will always worry, and justifiably.

Mr. McINTOSH: I agree with you. Mention was also made of the exercise Fallex. Can you tell us what this exercise was, and can you tell us anything about the official report on the exercise, whether it was satisfactory, or unsatisfactory?

Mr. ANNIS: I do not know, sir. I expect you are referring to Fallex 66. My total experience with Fallex was in 1962, and the Cuban crisis appeared right afterwards, so even what we learned, I rather forgot.

Mr. McINTOSH: If I had time, I would go into the one I referred to. I do not know what it means and we are trying to find out.

Mr. ANNIS: I do not think it bears too greatly on the subject we are discussing today sir, if you will forgive the opinion.

Mr. McINTOSH: I will not press it, then.

Mr. HARKNESS: The Technical Services Branch which you headed up, I presume was formed originally by just taking the technical services from navy, army, and air force, and putting them in together and, from there on, starting to try to weld them into one organization. Had that really been done to any extent by the time you left, or were you still really operating the three services in one organization? In effect, were they still operating to a large extent on the old system?

Mr. ANNIS: We were about half way. It was a huge task, and I do not know whether the Committee would like a description of its nature. I do not know quite how to answer. I do not want to propel you into an inescapably rather lengthy description of what the situation was. It was fascinating to me, but it might not be to the Committee. I think I can limit it to about three or four minutes, but it would be that sort of thing.

Mr. HARKNESS: Could you just answer the question in as short a way as possible as to what extent integration of these technical services had actually taken place?

Mr. ANNIS: It had gone quite a piece, sir, and had at that stage produced perhaps more disruption than a smooth-working new system. It was because everybody was having to learn something quite new and very different, and operate in a very different organization, and had not yet had time to do it. The

framework of the organization had been spelled out, but the procedures, in other words, had not yet been completed, and certainly the training of the people in them was just a little way along.

Mr. HARKNESS: You stated, of course, that the logistics organization of the navy, particularly, had been disrupted, and the same thing would be true of the other two services. As a result the whole logistics back-up for the services is less effective than was the case before this experiment started. How long do you think it would take to build an effective integrated system which effectively could look after the logistics needs of a unified service?

Mr. ANNIS: I do not know, sir. The Americans have been trying to do it for a long time, and they have not licked it. I think industry has done it to some degree. Essentially what is being sought is a utopian sort of thing. I think it is within the state of the art of computers to do it, provided we are going to buy the computers, pay for the communications lease line, train a lot of people, and pay them enough to keep them, because they are the very sort of people that industry wants to pry out of the services, and who keep on flowing out. So, it is an imponderable. But essentially, the system that exists in the air force today is a central computer at Rockcliffe, tied to the air force's depots at Edmonton, Toronto, and Moncton.

Mr. HARKNESS: This is for supply?

Mr. ANNIS: This is for supply, but logistics is supply, maintenance and transportation. These depots are wholesale or bulk depots. A person who wants to get a piece of air materiel and who is in Zweibrucken, Germany, sends a message on a certain form that goes straight into the computer at Rockcliffe. He says, "I want seven of so-and-so". The computer searches through the total inventory, because it has on its tapes a record of what is held at all those three depot complexes including certain of the repair depots, and it picks out the best located depot and ships the oldest piece of equipment that will satisfy the user. Then, having picked it out, it sends a message to the appropriate depot saying, "ship it", and the unit gets it.

This is a centralized inventory control at wholesale level. However, it is quite possible today with the existing system that a station at Uplands could demand something that is not in stock in any depot. The computer would say, "It is not in stock" and put an order in to industry to get a re-supply whereas, in reality, there may be quite a few at Rockcliffe which is just a few miles away, and some more at some other base such as Bagotville, and the computer did not know that they were anywhere in the system. Usually the things that are in shortest supply are the newest things and, therefore, the most precious, and so it is important to know this sort of thing.

The hope is to produce a centralized inventory that reaches from the wholesale level down to the retail level, which is what the stations are; they amount to big retail outlets, and the units that sit on the stations are akin to householders. It is hoped that in future the computer will have a record so that when a demand comes in from Zweibrucken for an item, it will even know that it has to go to a station to pry it out and send a shipping order. That is a very complex thing to arrange. It requires a lot of reporting by stations of what they have; it requires installing on the stations very complex equipment to automate that sort of thing. This can be done, but the question is: Do we have enough

money, enough manpower, and enough time to do it? If we have all, I presume a suitable system can be devised, the equipment bought, the people trained —because it is all brand new—and cut in bit by bit by about 1972, about five or six years.

Mr. HARKNESS: In other words, you think it would take five or six years to develop an effective supply and general logistics system?

Mr. ANNIS: It took us from 1956 until January, 1961, I believe it was, to start the beginning of automatic operation of the RCAF system which is confined to the wholesale level only, with one service. That is about the only basic figure I can quote. It is a much more complicated thing when we have three services putting their hands to the wheel. Perhaps they could do it in the same space, but I doubt it. I think it would take until 1972 or 1973 if they are lucky, sir.

Mr. HARKNESS: If you abolish the three services as they exist to form this single service, how much more time would they require to be able to meet the requirements of this new force which you visualized as being a force something like the United States marines?

Mr. ANNIS: I cannot answer directly, because you are asking me terribly complicated technical questions; I suppose you recognize that. The inventory of materiel of the Canadian defence forces today includes four types: peculiar to ships and the equipment aboard ships—deck suits and what not; peculiar to ground environment; peculiar to air, and common materiel. About 20 per cent of the materiel in the Canadian defence forces industry today is common to the three services—about 20 per cent by volume and about 10 per cent by value. The other 80 per cent is peculiar to one or another of the three environments.

Just having a big airplane accounts for perhaps 40,000 catalogue items in itself. So, even in an integrated force you still have to maintain an inventory tailored to the environment in which the equipment is operated and a fourth inventory for common equipment. I do not think it would change the nature of the problem very much The problem is that to issue and dispose of, replenish, and so on, peculiar to air materiel, requires a technician who is familiar with it by sight. I do not think one can afford the luxury of training a person to be really adept in the identification of air force materiel, and then call him off and have him try to identify ship materiel; it slows things down.

So, it is not the technical problem so much as the problem of what would you gain by putting people all into one uniform? You would still have to tailor the people peculiar to sea, peculiar to land, and peculiar to air, and then you would have this common area. If a person from any one service learned to identify common materiel, he would be in the same position in any other service, because they all use it, if you follow me.

Mr. HARKNESS: In effect, you are saying that you still really have to have a navy or its equivalent, an army or its equivalent, and an air force or its equivalent.

Mr. ANNIS: The point is that you have to have inventories that are the same thing, yes, sir.

Mr. HARKNESS: Therefore, what advantage is there in doing away with the three separate services, and throwing them into one?

Mr. ANNIS: There are a lot of advantages in integration. I suppose Mr. Hellyer—

Mr. HARKNESS: I am not talking about integration; I am talking about unification and of forming a single unified force, I think it is called, rather than having three services as we have at the present time.

Mr. ANNIS: Well, integration and unification will produce the same answer. The things we have not had, and do not have totally yet, is a common language for the same thing. You can call a thing an annulus, a washer, a shim, a spacer—in three different services or five different services—and it is the same thing; it is a flat disc with a hole in the middle. You can catalogue it differently in three services, and you buy a lot more of that item than you need when you put them all together in one heap. So, through a common language for material, common words for demanding—the air force says demand, the army says requisition or the navy says requisition—common indicators for urgency, these are the benefits of integration or unification. I think it can be done under integration without going into unification.

Mr. HARKNESS: This is the point I am getting at. The advantages that could accrue from an integrated logistic system have nothing to do with throwing the three combat elements into one organization.

Mr. ANNIS: I guess not. There are other imponderables, and these are peculiar to the airmen. For a long time it has been an imponderable whether a pilot and navigator—air crew—effectively and economically could serve aboard ship, over the sea, and in the air type of roles. Back in 1946, or so, we tried an experiment called the paragon. We tried to see if we could get an air crew and train them to be a paragon—a master of all trades—that is to say, the bomber field, air defence, transport, reconnaissance and the like. It broke down; it was uneconomical to untrain so that we could start them off in a brand new field.

A moot question still remains of whether the navy should have pilots of its own. This I do not know. At the moment the integration has pulled all the pilots out of the navy and the army, and put them together under one package where they are a professional group. In many ways they are a much more powerful and better organized group than ever before, as witness what happened in the pay business a little while ago. But, whether this is the right answer or the most economical one, I do not know. And to a degree, regarding the question you asked, the answer to it depends on the solution to the problem I have raised. I do not know whether I have helped you or not; I think probably I have confused you.

Mr. HARKNESS: I would take it from what you say that it is going to take 5 years or more to build up an effective logistics system. Do you believe there should be a pause at the present time to consolidate before further experiments are carried on?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes sir. I still feel there is need for more experimentation, perhaps at the very top—at the top departmental and general policy making level—and of the ability of the supporting forces to identify their opposite numbers in each of the career fields and to unify themselves into viable packages which are able to give satisfactory support to the combat forces in each of the environments; sea, land and air. You feel the sorting out of what are the supporting services is not yet accomplished, and there is some very, very tricky regrouping throughout career fields to achieve this.

Mr. HARKNESS: Let us take a specific example: When you were head of the Technical Services Branch we will say the army—your background was entirely in the Air Force—wanted a new anti-tank gun of some sort. Who would you depend on for your advice in putting up this requirement to the Chief of Defence Staff?

Mr. ANNIS: Oh, I would say an army officer, of course.

Mr. HARKNESS: At what level would this army officer be on your staff?

Mr. ANNIS: The highest one available. He would be a one star—a brigadier.

Mr. HARKNESS: And he might or might not be an artillery expert, and might be almost in the same position as yourself with regard to knowing what would be the best type of anti-tank weapon to secure.

Mr. ANNIS: He had quite a variety on his staff. We are now talking of the engineering sub-branch of the technical services. It was organized, as you will recall from the charts, perhaps, into peculiar to sea, peculiar to land and peculiar to air engineering divisions, headed by a one-star officer in each case from each service, wearing that colour of uniform, and within his division he had specialists, probably at lieutenant-colonel level at the very lowest. At full colonel level he would get the technical experience that he sought. It was done on my side of the house if the problem existed, or perhaps the vice chiefs. It was the person who advised the Minister; the senior officer was still the same rank.

Mr. HARKNESS: In your own shop did you have anybody in most cases, such as the one I mentioned, who was sufficiently expert really to give the proper advice with regard to what should be bought?

Mr. ANNIS: From a purely technical view point, yes sir. I believe that at one-star rank a person probably reaches the apex of his technical experience. Thereafter, at two-star, three, and so on, employment is primarily in administration in a broad sense—the management of groups, and resolution of strategic type problems. In fact I think, perhaps, colonel level may be the apex of technical proficiency. I got adequate technical advice, but it is the other side of the house, I think, that I laboured.

Mr. HARKNESS: From the operational point of view?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, the operational side.

Mr. HARKNESS: Now, would the force that you visualize we are aiming toward which, in your view, would be something similar to the United States Marines, be able to carry on the present roles which the defence forces have to discharge?

Mr. ANNIS: No, sir. I think they would depend on the existence in the United States of an independent navy, army and air force, as I have already said. This is where the professional and technical know-how would have to come from. It would not come from anywhere in Canada; we would not have the base to produce it. Even today a very great deal of our technical weapons and combat know-how comes straight from the operations and experiences of those three services. They tend to be—

Mr. HARKNESS: With the type of forces which you visualize we are moving toward, do you think we would be much more dependent on the experience and developments, and so on, in the United States and other countries than we are at the present time?

Mr. ANNIS: Oh, undoubtedly—very much. Our environmental know-how would be so diffused that I think the problem of gathering it together and consolidating it would be much more difficult and it would be much less meaningful.

Mr. HARKNESS: Another way of stating it would be that the degree of our expertise in the sea, land and air environments would be reduced.

Mr. ANNIS: Oh, yes sir; it would be suppressed.

Mr. HARKNESS: So that, in effect, really we would have a much less effective force.

Mr. ANNIS: I believe I volunteered earlier that a unified force probably is limited to a simpler type of role than is possible with individual services existing.

Mr. HARKNESS: If we are going to have a force such as this, do you think that it could operate without logistic support from other countries?

Mr. ANNIS: This is why I assume the experiment in integration of the supporting services is being conducted—to find out. I do not know sir.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, on the basis of your experience I think you must have some reasonable idea. If a force we will say it is a combined naval, army and air force—were sent off to take part in a war such as the Korean war, or something along that line, consisting of 20,000 people, would we be able to support that force?

Mr. ANNIS: Logistically, probably yes, but in a combat way less and less; I think the navy especially would lose its capabilities. It suffers, and it endures a hardship as a service, far more than the other two. I think the air force probably would have its roles and opportunities to gain a widespread meaningful combat experience limited more. The army, perhaps, is the service in this unification that would gain the most and probably they would retain their capability. They would have better opportunity to retain a fairly broad span of a ground force capability, compared with—

Mr. HARKNESS: But my question is this: Could we, from a logistics point of view, maintain an operation and a force of that kind, for more than a week or two?

Mr. ANNIS: Oh, I think yes, sir; from a logistics viewpoint, I think so. I cannot answer definitely, because we would have to describe the scenerio of what the deployment involves before I could answer that. We have had a lot of trouble within the Department of National Defence in visualizing what the scenarios would be at the far end in a peace-keeping operation. We have had very little experience; Cyprus is one, and it was extremely simple. It is an observing peace-keeping mission. It is the same as the administrative one in the Congo, so we do not know.

Mr. HARKNESS: Our forces in all these places really are being supported by other people, to a large extent. In Cyprus we are drawing our support from the British bases which are situated there.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. HARKNESS: In other words, we are not supporting that force ourselves from a logistics point of view.

Mr. ANNIS: Do you ask the question, could we? I think, perhaps we could, but it is more convenient not to. I judge sir, you are thinking of a more complex and perhaps more combatant type of peace-keeping or overseas operation.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes.

Mr. ANNIS: That is where one would need a much better description of the theatre and the nature of operations in intensity and distances before I could even begin to give you an answer.

Mr. HARKNESS: General Moncel told us yesterday that in his view, without any assistance from allies and entirely on our own, that we could support indefinitely not much more than a battalion group.

Mr. ANNIS: I guess that is about right. If you had a battalion group in a fighting posture I would say that is about it. I think he is about right.

Mr. HARKNESS: Therefore, the question I asked first, whether we could send this force of, say 20,000 men which you visualize to some place overseas and support them—

Mr. ANNIS: It is out of the question sir; 20,000 men is miles beyond our capabilities. We would do very well if we took over a battalion group with some supporting services; we would be hard pressed to get them there and keep them there.

An hon. MEMBER: Oh, no.

Mr. ANNIS: Oh, yes. That is a pretty big test.

Mr. HARKNESS: All right, thank you. I see it is 12.30.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, with your permission we shall adjourn until 3.30 this afternoon.

AFTERNOON SITTING

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, when we adjourned at 12.30 I believe Mr. Harkness had just finished his questioning and Mr Andras was the next on my list.

Mr. ANDRAS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Air Marshal Annis, setting aside for the moment the question of timing in this matter of unification, and recognizing that it has been stated that this is an end objective, it would be helpful to me, sir, and perhaps to other members of the Committee, if you would permit me to express my understanding of some of the salient features of unification and then you can correct me or confirm if my understanding agrees with yours. Secondly, at the same time, in this general area of questioning, you would indicate on each point whether or not you agreed in principle with the matter. I am just going to express what I feel are my understandings and you can correct me—I would much appreciate it—and secondly perhaps you could indicate whether you agree or disagree with them as principles.

Air Marshal C. A. ANNIS: I hope you understand that it will be my impression of what unification is. I do not declare myself as an authority.

Mr. ANDRAS: Certainly I am not either. I am much more recently involved in this than you, believe me. But if you will follow me now, I think we can probably go along together a bit on this.

It is my understanding that unification boils down generally to these points: The existing three separate forces—navy, army and air force—would be absorbed into one single force to be known as the Canadian Armed Services. There will be a single walking out uniform, but on this uniform there will be identification of the particular branch of the service to which the serviceman belongs, through lapel badges, or shoulder flashes, and unit and branch identification, and that sort of thing—a single walking out uniform common to all.

Mr. ANNIS: I would like to interject here. I am unable to answer that question because I do not know. Uniforms were not in the area for which I was responsible while serving. A good deal has happened since last May. Definitive decisions have been taken. I am sorry, I cannot answer that because I do not know.

Mr. ANDRAS: I just wanted to say that this is now my understanding from the information that has been given out or second reading of the bill—

Mr. ANNIS: This is what I understand; but it is from the press and the general media which are reaching the public.

Mr. ANDRAS: But from those areas of communication or information, you would agree that that seems to be what is meant?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. ANDRAS: Further, on this question of uniform, that the environmental clothing will not necessarily be changed. The fighter pilot will still wear a particular type of equipment—

Mr. ANNIS: I believe that is very true. It will remain as is.

Mr. ANDRAS: That is one feature.

The next one which I understand is involved is that there will be interchangeability of supporting forces personnel where the commonality of trades is great enough to make this practical and desirable.

Mr. ANNIS: I believe this is the objective. If it is not, it would be a very good one. I am quite sure that it is the objective.

Mr. ANDRAS: It is, in fact, one of the more pertinent arguments in favour of unification, is it not?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. ANDRAS: Furthermore, it is my understanding that at least combat people will not be transferred from a unit in one branch to a unit in another branch. For instance, the sonar man—if that is the proper nomenclature for this new job—in the navy, highly trained in a specialist field, would not be transferred to a tank regiment or to an air force operation; a fighter pilot would not be transferred to the infantry; an infantryman to ship duties, nor a tank driver to the air force. In the sense of what we call the combat trades themselves these men would not be transferred from one branch to another. That is my understanding.

Mr. ANNIS: I believe it would be the intention not to do that. It would not make much economic sense to "untrain" a man nor do I think it is the intention in the civilian trades to transfer doctors to being accountants or accountants to being in supply. There are 20 odd carreer fields in the service. Each of them is pretty well—

Mr. ANDRAS: Although doctors in the practice of their profession would perhaps be part of this interchangeable group that might move from the air force to the navy or the army.

Mr. ANNIS: The doctors are already in a single service, as are the dentists and they look after the medical needs of all three services at the moment.

Mr. ANDRAS: Therefore, that type of man would be classfied as in a supporting service, but the combat man, or the sonor man, or the figther pilot, would stay within his environment unless he were so talented that he became a senior commadern, or something of that sort.

Mr. ANNIS: I think perhaps you want to use the words "career field." Would that be a more descriptive term?

Mr. ANDRAS: Yes.

The CHAIRMAN: Do you have a supplementary, Mr. Lambert?

Mr. LAMBERT: Air Marshal, could you tell me how you can take a regimental medical officer who has been trained in infantry or artillery and convert him into an air force medical officer, or vice-versa, take a medical officer who has been in an air force hospital and make him a regimental medical officer?

Mr. ANNIS: I am not a doctor I think it would involve considerable additional training, but I think it could be done. The question is whether the extra training is worthwhile. I do not know that.

Mr. LAMBERT: Let me put it to you this way, that it would take over a year of tactical training, because the regimental medical officer has to be as good on tactics as his commanding officer.

Mr. ANNIS: If I may explain my interjection, when it was mentioned that there would not be a planned interchangeability among the career fields of the combat trades, I think the same plan—and for the same reasoning—would inhibit a large scale interchange among other career fields. One would not take someone who had enlisted as a lawyer and employ him as an accountant.

Mr. ANDRAS: I think I qualified that by saying that my understanding was that the interchange would take place in supporting personnel where the commonality of trade is great enough to make this practical and desirable. That is the reservation I made.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes; I agree.

Mr. ANDRAS: If I may continue, then, I further understand that fighting units will not lose their identities as battalions, squadrons, regiments, ships, and so on. I will quote this directly, if I may:

> Moreover, a single service will involve no change in the organization of these force units into formations such as brigades, air wings, or squadrons of ships.

This is again my understanding. Does it generally conform to your knowledge of the situation, or the plan?

Mr. ANNIS: You see, this presupposes that a ship, for example, is just people of the combat career field. A ship is different. A ship goes to sea and becomes a sort of floating base and it takes its own support personnel with it and willy-nilly for lack of space on the ship and whatnot, the ship people do double duties. You see, one finds cooks manning anti-aircraft therefore, you are partly right; it is applicable to the extent that it can be. But a ship is different from an air squadron. An air squadron is basically just air crew and a little wee bit of what they call "first line maintenance"—these people who fill the gas tanks, inflate the tires, wash the airplanes and do simple maintenance. A ship is a different matter. When you say a ship retains its identity, the people in the ship are different from those—

Mr. ANDRAS: Quite so. What I am really getting at is that the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders—if you will forgive me for plugging my own former battalion—will stay the Queen's own Cameron Highlanders; The Royal 22nd; The royal Canadian Regiment; The Princess Patricias will stay with those names. The HMCS *Ontario* and so forth will stay with their names. In other words, the fighting unit itself will retain its identity.

Mr. ANNIS: We are in trouble with definitions now. I understand that from an army viewpoint a fighting unit is a little more than a battalion; there are certain supporting arms. A brigade is about the beginning of a unit, and there, one has a beginning of the mix of the combat end and some of the supporting troops of the formation as well. We are saying Yes in so far as the combat personnel are concerned; they will retain their identity as an environmentally trained group in their unit—ship, squadron or brigade, which I guess, is the smallest unit.

Mr. ANDRAS: Yes. Thank you.

Mr. ANNIS: But only the air force unit is composed almost totally of combat personnel. The brigade is a mix, has trades which are capable of being integrated, and so has a ship—even more. The infantryman in the infantry brigade or the armour man in the armoured brigade are pure fighting men. I agree with what you are saying; it is generally true. There are some few people involved to whom it is not entirely accurate. I would go back to saying you are partly right, or mostly right.

Mr. ANDRAS: And those exceptions would be going back again more to the supporting units which are far forward in terms of combat units?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. ANDRAS: There is a degree of commonality there, too, so they might be interchangeable?

Mr. ANNIS: Oh, very much so.

Mr. ANDRAS: The next stage, as I understand the salient features of the unification program, is the single rank structure, again with some modifications which the Minister has expressed?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes; the modifications, I think, deserve a term a little more complex than "some." They tend to be profound in their effect on, I think, the navy. They will have a different impact altogether on the air force. But certainly a common basic designation and a comparability of ranks has been established, and will, I think, be refined.

Mr. ANDRAS: One of the final salient features, as I understand it, would, of course, be the single chief of defence?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, indeed; it is perhaps the most significant single feature of all.

Mr. ANDRAS: Generally speaking, as a layman, I have covered what I feel are the salient features of the unification plan, and we are not far apart in our understanding of it. You have expressed some reservations, I think, about certain aspects of it, but, generally, there it is.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes. We are always in trouble with definitions here but in general you have expressed it as I understand it, yes.

Mr. ANDRAS: Now, sir, I move on to an area that has been cleared up a bit, but I would like, at the risk of repetition, to talk about the timing on this. You have, as has been brought out, given some indication that, on the one hand, we should press on with integration, yet you object to the speed, on the other hand. You say—this may not be exact, and I am not attempting to put words in your mouth but more to paraphrase it—"I am not opposed to unification but the pace is too fast".

Now, may I present this thought—

Mr. ANNIS: Not quite; really what I am objecting to is that the proposal to jump to unification is too soon. I do not think we have enough experience, or enough empirical data, from results of integration thus far to risk the great big hop into a unified state.

Mr. ANDRAS: May I present three points of view on that one aspect and get your considered reaction to them? First of all, Mr. Lambert this morning expressed concern about the ability to support combat troops if a sudden emergency were thrust upon us during the re-organizing and what we might call the transitional stage of integration. It just occurs to me that perhaps any major re-organization carries with it this time danger. There is a danger point during that re-organization. One must go back and say, "Is re-organization necessary at all"? But once it is decided that it is there is a period there, an hiatus, in which there is some danger of a sudden emergency arising where we might be vulnerable.

Now, I present to you the thought that the longer that transitional stage takes the longer that danger will exist, and that therefore, having decided to make a major change—again with a reasonable, considered approach to it—should it not be pressed vigorously through to conclusion to reduce that time risk?

Mr. ANNIS: I think the alternative, and perhaps more foreboding, situation is that the faster you go the deeper the abyss into which you sink and the steeper the wall when it comes to climb out. It might be too tall ever to climb out.

Mr. ANDRAS: But the closer to the end of the road you get, in the sense of coming back again to an efficient operation—in other words, if you are starting down the path you had better get to the end.

Mr. ANNIS: There is an optimum. It is like two curves crossing. There is an optimum rate, I agree. Too slow would prolong, and too fast would exascerbate

to perhaps an undesirable degree. I feel, balancing these two considerations side by side, that at this stage the pace is too fast, because it engenders an unacceptable danger of falling right into the chasm.

Mr. ANDRAS: But on a parallel danger, accepting that re-organization does cause disruption, the sooner this disruption is overcome and it settles down again, the sooner this risk is reduced?

Mr. ANNIS: With the qualifications I made, yes, indeed.

Mr. ANDRAS: Then I would suggest to you that this bill before us now, which is a follow-on to Bill No. C-90, which was the first on the integration authority, seeks legislative authority to proceed with the next stage of unification.

Now, Air Marshal Sharp in his presentation to us at the beginning of our deliberations here—and other witnesses have confirmed this—has said that it will take several years to complete this unification stage. In fact, I remember the mention of target dates as far forward as 1972 in some segments of the program.

Now, without the bill before us, Bill No. C-243, there is no authority whatsoever to begin the next stage, because Bill No. C-90 applied only to command integration. Therefore, it seems to me that seeking this legislative authority does not necessarily imply that the crash program follows right on the heels of that, on the day the bill is passed in Parliament—if, as and when—and that we suddenly shoot everything in the air and get into total unification. Air Marshal Sharp presented what was to me the very valid thought: All right, integration still has to be smoothed out yet, but we are approaching that rather vague area where the integration crosses into the single force, single uniform concept, and so on, and so we have to stop now right in our tracks. Although the total plan was obvious from 1964 that we were going to go—the end objective was firm, it was said—we need the legislative authority now, but this does not necessarily mean that it is just going to be proceeded and done without planning. We are seeking legislative authority to take the next step.

Mr. ANNIS: I think I would agree that the experiment, or the exercise, of integration towards unification is at a crisis stage. Either one moves back—we have run, I think, too far, too fast—to where one can plan on retaining the identity of the three services, whether under a single chief of staff or three chiefs of staff, long enough to acquire substantial and practical data on the capability to produce efficient supporting services, or one is going to plunge ahead recklessly without that data. This, it seems to me, is the position at which the exercise is now. Either they go ahead willy-nilly and assert an implacable objective to reach full unification, even though it may take five to seven years to do it, or they back off and study the capabilities of acquiring a viable, integrated, or perhaps even unified, set of supporting services.

Mr. LANIEL: May I ask a supplementary question on this?

Mr. ANDRAS: Yes; if I may continue after the supplementary question, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LANIEL: Do you agree with what General Moncel said last night that at this stage turning back, or stopping, or even pausing, may have just as bad an effect as would carrying on?

Mr. ANNIS: I do not know in what context General Moncel said that; but if I—

Mr. LANIEL: He was relating it to the people involved.

Mr. NUGENT: He was talking about morale.

Mr. LANIEL: Yes; he was talking about the senior officers.

Mr. NUGENT: He was talking about morale, in reply to my question about whether it would pick up if we stopped now. He thinks the damage has been done to morale in the pause. I think it was in that context only that he made that remark.

Mr. LANIEL: Yes; well, it is in that context that I want to ask the question.

Mr. ANNIS: I will refer to a remark I made earlier this morning, if I may, at which time I said that it was of great importance to the military to learn whether a chief of staff of a navy, army or air force could get an adequate degree of supporting services from integrated services. This was the question. I went on and said that I believed it necessary to press onward with this experimentation in the re-organization of supporting services. I consider it necessary to press on with that. This, I believe, is integration in this direction.

In that way I agree with General Moncel. We should not stop. This, in my opinion, is a very valuable experiment. There is need to do something about integrating our supporting services, or seeing how much we can do.

We are just at the start of the exercise, but it seems to me at this stage a decision may have been taken that the integrated supporting services are going to be so efficient that we can safely conclude that we will have a viable type of support. I do not think that stage has been reached at all. We have not had any impirical data yet on the performance of construction engineers, for example, in an integrated structure. We do not know. This is the point.

I certainly agree with pressing on with the experiment.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, if I may continue—

The CHAIRMAN: Another five minutes is all I can give you.

Mr. ANDRAS: Well, sir, I think considerably more than five minutes has been taken up by others.

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, I know; it has been deducted.

Mr. ANDRAS: I will do my best to conclude.

First of all, along that same line, then, I am suggesting that the sooner we press on with integration itself then the sooner we will get over this risk of being caught in the middle of a major re-organization.

Secondly, the bill is seeking legislative authority to proceed now, but that does not necessarily mean that it is going to happen the next day.

My third point, which was brought out by the supplementary question and Mr. Nugent's comments—and I think by other witnesses who were not unfavourably disposed, suggested that there is a need to clear the airnow,; that there has been too much discussion about this and that the people in the forces, and those who might be going to join the forces now, should have a clear-cut vision of what the shape is going to be.

I suggest that this is another reason, looking to the morale factor; for making the decision now even though it is legislative, and that a very orderly process can take place after that in the sense of actually implementing these plans.

Mr. ANNIS: If you will forgive me, I do not think the boy joining the forces thinks that way at all. I think the boy joining the services thinks: What is in it for me in my career field? "I am going to join the air force to be a construction engineer", is what he thinks. Where will it take me? What will be my career prospects in that career field? What will I be responsible for? What training will I get? What will be my status relative to the accountants, to the gunners? This is what he worries about. He does not take the profound approach at all. At the moment our personnel people are not even able to answer these questions.

Mr. ANDRAS: That is exactly my point, sir. The fact is that the re-organization is in the air, and it should be—

Mr. ANNIS: It has nothing to do with unification at all. Integration of the medicals is nearly finished now. They have produced an organization—not necessarily very satisfactory to the combat commanders—which we can say is integrated, or unified, whichever you like. A person entering the Canadian medical career field has a pretty good idea now of what sort of entry qualifications he has to have, and what sort of career prospects there are. This, by and large, is about as far as the entrant thinks, in my opinion.

Mr. ANDRAS: Sir, you retired in May of 1966, which would be just under a year ago?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. ANDRAS: You retired after a very distinguished career.

Air Marshal Sharp in his testimony referred to what seemed to me to be some rather comprehensive planning that has been done and is under way. For instance, we are now in the middle of a pilot study assisted by a Canadian firm of consultants on financial management; a comprehensive job analysis program has been initiated by a full-time staff of service experts; an increasing number of management engineering studies have been performed. The total in 1965 and 1966 was some 530 different studies. I will not bore you with repetitive detail, but this is chock-full of what, to me, are reassuring indications of a very, very professional management approach to and analysis of the problems, and that it has been well thought out. Prior to your retirement, did you have access to these studies, or have you seen any which have been done since?

Mr. ANNIS: I was party to the initiation of a substantial number of them.

Mr. ANDRAS: But many would have been continuing and have reached completion since?

Mr. ANNIS: Oh, yes, indeed.

Mr. ANDRAS: Thank you very much.

Mr. NUGENT: Sir, perhaps I might first clear up what appears me to be a very grave misapprehension in Mr. Andras' approach to this problem. I thought it was underlined by one of the first statements you made, sir, when you talked of the integration "experiment". I believe your words were that it does not justify the belief that the jump into unification would be a successful venture. I believe that is the way you expressed it.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, I think that is right.

Mr. NUGENT: In other words, this is not a move from the integration methods that have been used and studied into a continuation of unification, nor is it legislation necessary to finish that, but it is a new jump, and a different departure, is it not?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, I think it is. I am wallowing in this field, too. It is in the semi-legal world that I do not understand too well.

Mr. NUGENT: Well, sir, it seems to me that in this Committee we have, perhaps, been concentrating on unification and what it means, and therefore we have a good deal to learn about integration and about what has been going on.

Perhaps if I asked you a few questions on integration it might give us a better understanding. For instance, we have heard of this "experiment" in integration. As I understand it, to begin with, integration—and I am certainly no expert—is really a series of experiments, and the various supply services such as medical, pay, food, clothing and supplies, have been looked at and studied with the objective in mind of saving money and to see whether duplication can be avoided—whether they can be integrated as a service in order to cut down on duplication and therefore save some money in administration expense.

Mr. ANNIS: Very much so, yes.

Mr. NUGENT: Now, this is the general plan of integration that has been pursued?

Mr. ANNIS: I think that is why, too.

Mr. NUGENT: So that for each service there has to be a survey made to see how it works, what sort of personnel it has, the environment and so on, and then at least a theoretical plan drawn up of a new sort of structure to see how it might be done in all the armed forces; and then a comparison made of the new and existing structures, to see how far it would apply and whether, in theory, it would result in a saving in personnel or money? Is that the process?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes. The stage at which the exercise is now has retained the identity of the three services; that is to say, of the people in them. It has established integrated command and integrated headquarters. The key feature is that it has retained the uniform identity and the professional identity of the combat troops of each of the services. That is what it has done. Unification promises to eliminate this group, whose morale, as I say, is particularly associated with the environment in which they are inextricably involved and whose uniform and badges denote their professionalism in it.

As I see it, the chief problem in unification is the removal of the uniform and the professional badges of those groups. I do not think it affects the supporting troops at all, or seriously.

Mr. NUGENT: This is why I wanted to clarify "integration" in my own mind, and to establish, first of all, that integration is not necessarily a complete over-all plan; that, in other words, there are various pieces of integration and each is a separate experiment in itself to see how it would work. Is that not true?

Mr. ANNIS: There are, as I have said, some 20-odd career fields. I guess that sort of number will work out when you take infantrymen, armourers, gunners, sappers, pilots, doctors, and so on. Each of the three services has, as its hard core

its combat people and before integration each of them had its own array of supporting services. The unease existed because each of the combat environment supporting services was quite similar to the others. One hoped that one could eliminate the duplication in the supporting element, and this is a very worthwhile hope.

Mr. NUGENT: Yes, sir.

Mr. ANNIS: Whether there is unification or integration, one is going to do the same sort of experimentation with the amalgamation of these career fields which comprise the supporting forces. That is the key point.

Mr. NUGENT: Right, sir. Now, the point I wanted to clarify is that each one of these career fields or supporting services presents a different problem?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, it does.

Mr. NUGENT: It necessitates its own study.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. NUGENT: And would perhaps have, in many ways, a different sort of solution, with a different organizational structure to take care of the differences in the problems met?

Mr. ANNIS: I agree.

Mr. NUGENT: And some of these planning studies, would perhaps take longer than others. Some would run into more technical difficulties and some, it would be found, would give greater economies than others?

Mr. ANNIS: It might help if I gave an illustration. May I Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN: Please do.

Mr. ANNIS: Let us take, for example, the technical services field and the problem of emerging with a supply career field. The word itself meant different things to the three services before integration.

The air force had a list of supplies. Supply meant those things which had to do with provisioning, procurement, warehousing and the like. However, it defined only material, and it did not apply to food. That was the air force. It entered the integration in that part.

The navy had a career field which was supply and accountancy. A person was trained in both fields. If the decision is taken to establish in the integrated or unified service a single career field called "supply" then all the naval officers will have to decide which way to fall, because they obviously cannot be both in the integrated services.

In the army there was a corps called the Ordnance Corps, which looked after a great deal of the supply activities. But, in addition, there was another one, supply and transport,—the RCASC—who were responsible for the supply function in quite a range of materiel, and, in addition, had a good deal of responsibility for food. Part of this responsibility for food lay in the procurement, warehousing and distribution and accounting. Another part lay in the preparation of food, in what you might call the dietetic aspects of it.

Therefore, if we want an integrated supply field the air force is set. It has this field. The navy has to split their officers down the middle somehow and fall off into one field or the other. The army ordnance corps can go in as a package,

but the supply people have to split first of all horizontally, and those who do the food preparation will disappear off into the medical branch; those who were in the supply business would have to be cut vertically and some of them would go off into the food supply and others into the materiel supply. Therefore, we have quite an assembly problem in establishing a new career field in one.

Then we have the problems of standardization of techniques and language. What will be the training syllabus when a person in the supply field suddenly is responsible for supply to ships at sea, air bases and army deployments, rear and forward areas and the like? One has to do quite a bit of pondering about what kind of syllabus to establish, and what sort of a career they may follow. This is the problem in the supply field.

When one moves over into the communications and electronics field it is perhaps more complex. I described to you earlier this morning a bit of a problem in construction engineering. This is the sort of thing that has to be done; and it is independent of whether there is a unification exercise or an integration exercise going on.

Mr. NUGENT: The reason for my question is that I think the government has approached this problem of unification by suggesting, or at least the public seems to have the idea, that integration has proven to be such a big success and has gone along so well and has proven itself so well that we could now have unification as the end result and that we should tidy it up and finish it up.

Perhaps we should just examine it and see if that is so. I found it rather surprising this morning how far we had yet to go to finish the experiment in integration, and the purpose of my questioning, sir, is to underline the point that, far from being a complete and proven success, ready for the next step, we are—would it be fair to say—only really now beginning the actual work in integration? The theoretical plans may have been drawn up in some areas but in others the plans have not been evolved to carry it through. Therefore we are far from being finished with the integration experiment; we are in the middle of experiments and some are in a very, very embroiled stage.

Mr. ANNIS: In my opinion that is true; that is a fair statement.

Mr. NUGENT: Yes; and you have said that in the technical services, for instance, the integration process will take three of four or five years. In other words, I imagine that, in some of the technical services supplied, although there might have been a preliminary plan some tentative probing has revealed that even new plans need to be devised, or new arrangements made, if they are going to be integrated? They have not started to implement any of them yet in some fields.

Mr. ANNIS: It is a little further along than that.

Mr. NUGENT: I want to put it this way, if I may, that the providing of a medical service for all three services was a comparatively simple integration problem compared to what you are now running into in the technical services?

Mr. ANNIS: It was not easy. They spent some years getting their trades and what not sorted out. What they ended up with was something that was a surprise to me. It was not quite what I thought we wanted in the military.

Mr. NUGENT: They started with an idea and it took them years of experiment. Would it be fair to say that in the technical service field you might have four or five branches that would create the same number of problems and require the same amount of experimenting?

Mr. ANNIS: Oh, yes; each of these major career fields, when established, will be a problem in itself.

Mr. NUGENT: I have had the feeling that this Committee has been concentrating too much on the question of unification and that it might be wise to look at some of the problems, and understand the status, of integration.

I will put it this way. It seems to me that the government has said: "Well, we laid the foundation and built the base and integration has proved itself. Now let us put the building of unification on it". I have the feeling that we have planned the footings and have started some of them, but that it is a little early to start putting a building on what we have now? Is that a fair analogy?

Mr. ANNIS: It is rather like that, yes; it is that sort of uneasiness I have.

Mr. NUGENT: I was intrigued by what General Moncel said yesterday when he mentioned that in some of the planning, or studies of personnel, in trying to eliminate some of the fat and avoid duplication, he found when he came to the navy that some fellows were wearing about 17 hats. I think you said this morning that they were wearing three or four hats.

Mr. ANNIS: I think that about four is the maximum I have ever seen and that was unusual.

Mr. NUGENT: Now, the problem would appear to be this, sir, in integration, that if you are going to eliminate some of the fat and you find in your integration scheme to set up a combined operation in this service for all three that the personnel in the navy are already doing two or three jobs, it would seem that there is very little fat that has to be eliminated in the naval part of it.

Mr. ANNIS: The navy is a small service of 20,000 compared to roughly 50,000 in each of the army and air force. They were compelled to extemporize in their supporting services and they, of course, have a quite different structure in the proportion of civilians. The navy had to be different because it operates differently. It is different.

Without giving a lecture I cannot convey to you just what the differences were. They were quite unique and quite different. The only way to put the navy on what you might call a standardized footing with air force and army in some of these supporting services was to tear it apart and have them wearing just one hat and put the other two or three hats aside, so that some of their jobs went unfilled. It was that sort of problem.

Mr. NUGENT: Therefore in some of the fields in the navy where you had a man wearing two or three hats, standardization of the service meant that they were going to have to separate the functions and have two or three men doing this one job if they were going to fit in with the integrated supply service?

Mr. ANNIS: We were not quite as inefficient as that, but we certainly had to change their career fields and their employment dramatically, and sometimes it created consternation when it was imposed on them.

Mr. NUGENT: When this new integrated scheme came along it would have a considerable effect, on them, I suppose. General Moncel said that he was amazed at the efficiency, and I think you said they were very efficient. There was great disruption. The purpose was to cut the fat out of the services generally, and yet we find that there was no fat, comparatively speaking, to be cut out of the navy. So that there was disruption for very little effect? Is that the sort of attitude—

Mr. ANNIS: I think, to do them justice, that they were very well organized in the technical services—very efficiently and very compactly. They had just gone through a 4 or 5 per cent trimming the year before in their service and in their civilian personnel. They certainly had no fat with which to go over this organizational hump.

Mr. NUGENT: The purpose of this exercise, of course, is to cut out fat or to cut down on administrative costs. As our Minister says, the scheme is to cut down the administrative costs to make more money available for equipment.

Mr. ANNIS: Excuse me, may I qualify what I said a little bit? That would be unfair to integration. There was still duplication in what the navy was doing in each of these fields, to some degree. Although there was a reduction in the naval efficiency I suppose it was partly offset by the fact that certain duplications among the three services were eliminated. I think it would only be proper to record that.

Mr. NUGENT: But in the eyes of a naval commander the re-organization would be justified only if the reduction in the duplication did not result in an increase in other administrative costs. Therefore he could see a net gain of sufficient worth to justify this disruption of what they were already so skilled at doing.

Mr. ANNIS: It is rather difficult to totalize. There were some losses and some gains. I think, in the navy's case, the penalties imposed on them outweighed the advantages that the navy, as a function, acquired. I think that is true. They were penalized. I think the air force was—

Mr. NUGENT: Perhaps because of some of the minister's statements about a revolt of the admirals and because of some of the misconceptions I thought it was time to be fair to the navy. There is a certain understandable difference in the approach, perhaps, of a naval commander from what there would be in the army, because the advantages of some of these integration schemes would certainly be less evident to a naval commander than to an army colonel?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes; his international language is so different. He has a much wider psychological and technical jump to make to consolidate even the supporting services with army and air force.

Mr. NUGENT: I believe we have had some testimony that, as well as the supporting services, such things as the new integrated training command have not yet worked out satisfactorily. In other words, though the idea may be right it takes a certain length of time to establish this and iron out the bumps. Is that correct?

Mr. ANNIS: I am unable to say how far advanced training command is now in its organization. It was in a pretty embryonic state as of last May. I believe they have made some substantial progress at least in their planning.

I would say this, too, that the objective of training command is, by and large, to do the very basic training that is common right across the board, and also to do some of the peculiar to sea, peculiar to air and peculiar to land training that is semi-basic. The actual operational stage, both technical and combat, will be done in the combat or functional command.

Mr. NUGENT: So that here it seemed to be a good idea, because everybody does training. The theory of having one command doing all the training sounds like a marvellous opportunity to save money and avoid duplication. Then when you start to implement it you find that only a very small percentage of the actual training of personnel is similar, or identical, so that it can be handled by one training organization.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, sir; but, if you will forgive me, there is some. The objective of the navy is not to do more than that some that is common; but for the remainder they have a very difficult problem because the troops are out at sea so much. They have the cyclical problem of ships coming and going.

Mr. NUGENT: The problem then, sir, becomes this: You go to the trouble and expense of planning, setting up and manning a new general training command that is going to attack only a small part of the training problem. The savings in that small part have to make up for the cost of setting up that command and the cost of the organization and the disruption, etc., before it can justify itself. That is dealing with only a small part of the training command.

Mr. ANNIS: If you will forgive me, I think you are under somewhat of a misapprehension in your understanding. I do not think there is an intention to do this common basic training of naval inductees very far away from the existing schools, and there will not really be much of an investment imposed on the navy in this. It will be something that they may get gratis, so to speak.

Mr. NUGENT: The point is that Admiral Brock said that it has not been a success because they have tried to go too far. He suggests that it should be reduced to functioning in relation to basic training, and to common training outside the purview of operational commanders.

Mr. ANNIS: I think that is what is happening, but I stand to be corrected. I am not an authority in this field. That question really should be put to officers who are really up to date on that. On the more technical training I can give you the answers I have given you, but not much more than that.

Mr. NUGENT: The main purpose of my questioning this afternoon, sir, is to try to clarify, and put into perspective, the situation of integration. You have given us some examples, in your technical services field, of the length of time it has taken, and so on. We have discussed the ease with which it was done in the medical services even though that was complicated. In every field where integration has been applied we have found problems, have we not?

Mr. ANNIS: We have found problems and we have found dangers. I think the product of integration, or unification, of the career field sometimes turns out differently from what one expected. From a military viewpoint one of the main reasons for having a medical service is to deal with those medical problems peculiar to air medicine, underwater medicine and combat medicine. Clinical medicine is, to a degree, not an over-riding consideration from a combat commander's viewpoint. Certainly I think the medical people already know of this view, and do not like it.

The result of integrating our medical services has been to produce a medical organization which is almost totally clinical. This is medicine for medicine's sake. This is what doctors like. They like clinical medicine. This is their field and it has widened out and produced an interesting career, to the point where they not only look after healthy people who have been screened and enter the services and who, when they become unhealthy around age 55—like me!—are tossed out, but they are taking up pediatrics and geriatrics and so on at the other extreme. This has become a clinical service. So that in the integration business one is apt to end up with a product a little different from what you expect.

Mr. NUGENT: I did not want to get into the technicalities of any service. I wanted to clear away some of these misconceptions on integration and the idea that because integration works here we just take it and put it in another place. There is no such thing as: We have integration and it is going to solve all our problems. Each part or each application of the idea of re-organization is a different problem in itself. Am I substantially accurate in that?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, each career field has to sort out things which are common and concentrate on getting common handling of those, and find those things which are different and take care of the problems there.

Mr. NUGENT: Have I run out of my time? I have only one or two questions.

I think you said this morning—and General Moncel said it yesterday—that you were very, very proud of what has been done in this field; that the senior officers, the planners and their assistants carrying out the services had conducted themselves very well and had done their utmost to make these schemes of integration work?

Mr. ANNIS: Oh, yes.

Mr. NUGENT: And you are satisfied in your own mind that they have done everything that could reasonably be expected of men who want to be proud of the way in which they do their duty?

Mr. ANNIS: I do indeed; yes, sir.

Mr. NUGENT: I suppose that when you were planning there would be honest differences of opinion on whether it would work here or there?

Mr. ANNIS: Oh, goodness, yes. It was difference of opinion without rancour. It was a good type of difference of opinion.

Mr. NUGENT: The resistance, then, is not a case of officers digging in their heels but of co-operating once they have put forward what their objections are, or their view on the dangers in it. It is a case, pretty generally, of co-operating once the plan is accepted?

Mr. ANNIS: I will say again what I said this morning, sir, that each career field in the services, even as each career field in civilian life, has different attitudes towards a similar problem. Within the services the various career fields have a great many opinions. I think each person in civilian life, or in the services, tends to approach a career from a selfish viewpoint, saying: "What is in this career for me"? This has been the approach all the way through.

Mr. NUGENT: One last question, if I may, sir.

There has been a suggestion, even before this Committee, that part of the reason for our not having proceeded further is that some of the officers started to

make a fuss about unification and were fighting the Minister and fighting progress. Is there any justification for that sort of attitude, that you saw?

Mr. ANNIS: Well, as the exercise continued people worked very hard. They worked as hard as they could; but as I said this morning there was an overload; there was frustration through inability to handle all these commitments which were on the plate at the same time. Considering the number of people available and the guidance I think they did astonishingly well; but in an absolute sense it was far short of the ideal. There is much yet to be done. I can say, yes, they worked very hard and did wonders, but they were still unhappy.

Mr. NUGENT: Thank you, sir.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, could I ask one supplementary question arising from Mr. Nugent's question?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, do.

Mr. ANDRAS: Air Marshal Annis, General Foulkes published an article in 1961, and I would just like to ask you for your comments on this statement that he made. On the question of service rivalry he said:

> After my nine years as chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, trying to co-ordinate the rival services, I am convinced that we can't achieve much more by the present road. Attempts to integrate the three services by persuasion have been going on ever since 1945. They have woven a huge spider's web of committees, which are rather like foreign ministers' meetings where rival powers try to reach a compromise.

The implication was that there definitely had been a detrimental effect brought about by the rivalry between the services.

Mr. ANNIS: I can remember when I was secretary to the chiefs of staff back about 1950 being tossed out by the chiefs so that they could fight. They did not want me to be hurt. There was a great deal of freedom among them, and they could. They had, by and large, substantial sums of money, a big war just behind them, and the like. The metamorphosis in 10 years among chiefs, their attitude towards each other and their willingness to co-operate, was remarkable. I think what General Foulkes said might have been true 15 years ago. From my knowledge of many chiefs in recent years, here and elsewhere, I think it is quite untrue today. The modern chief of staff is trained in team work. In fact, he is pretty well judged on how good a team player he is with his brother services.

Mr. ANDRAS: Thank you.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Air Marshal, I just want to thank Mr. Andras for his interpretation of "unification" and for the reassurance to the Navy that indeed they are not going to lose anything and are going to remain as they are. I am afraid that is not quite the way I or the RCN interpret it. They have some fears, too.

I want to ask just one question, Air Marshal, on something which has been referred to but has never really been dealt with, I hope the other members of the committee will bear with you, because I am asking you to use what time I have available to let your mind ramble a little and tell us about the United States' experiment, from your own understanding of it, from reading and, I am sure, from having had some direct dealings with the American forces.

What has been their experience in the terms of what we may be trying to accomplish? Have there been lessons that have been brought to the fore in the United States' experience that we have looked at and discarded, or accepted and adopted? Is there a tremendous fund of information and knowledge and results from various types of studies that we could be using? Are we tending to ignore it? On the problem that we have before us can we gain in the future from the United States' experience?

I do not want to put you in the position of having to make a 10 or 15 minute speech, but perhaps there might be some questions that will arise out of it.

Mr. ANNIS: Well, thank you for the compliment. I could not really make a 10 or 15 minute speech.

Militarily, the United States, of course, is almost a different world from us. Their size, their budget, their complexity, their abilities, their areas and spans of activity, in each of the services are of total orders of magnitude beyond anything that we in Canada have. However, they, too, have been worried about duplication in their supporting services.

As I mentioned, some 10 years ago they did organize all of their combat commands into integrated commands, and the commanders of these commands report directly to their joint chiefs of staff, which is what they call their chiefs of staff committee. The chiefs of the individual services, including their Marine Corps, are able to participate in decisions to employ the integrated commands by way of the joint chiefs, but only as a member of a corporate body.

Additionally, they have spent a good deal of time identifying these commonalities among the supporting services, on the commonalities within the supporting services which exist among all services. I think they have nine agencies altogether which have been extracted and operate, but they belong to a fourth service sort of thing in each of these fields. To take supply as an example, the United States Air Force has a supply organization of its own, and handles only those things which are peculiar to air. The navy and the army are very similar. Then there is a defence agency which looks after the bulk-buying of commonalities and does a good deal of the distribution. A very similar sort of thing exists in communication, in transportation, and the like.

The other feature which is significant in the United States' structure is one I mentioned this morning, the limitations imposed on the responsibilities or the powers of the chiefs of staff, and the changing of their responsibilities to the acquiring of personnel and equipment and furnishing them to the commands. I think that, in a nut shell, is a summary.

There is a great deal of duplication in the United States forces still and of which they are very conscious, but I have been told by very senior officers in their services, including the senior civilian officer, that they have refrained, as a result of deliberate decision, from further integration. They have, in other words, retained such duplication as there is in the belief that it enables a degree of responsiveness to the environmental components of these integrated commands that would not be possible otherwise.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Do I draw the right conclusion the various environmental components are sustained in order properly to service the integrated functional unit?

Mr. ANNIS: Well, to take a command, of course, by far their most active command now is in Viet Nam. It is a command under an army commander and he is in an integrated headquarters and has control over all the forces there. The forces comprise various combinations of air units, ground forces and combat units, navy units and marine units. The defence supply agency has certain responsibilities for overall supply to the individual services, but the individual services supply organizations have, by and large, the responsibility for supplying the naval, ground force, and air components respectively.

Mr. FORRESTALL: In any of your planning, for example, in those areas with which you are most familiar, did you draw on any of the United States' experience to assist you?

Mr. ANNIS: By far and away the main one has been in the field of cataloguing identifying and handling their material. There they have been of enormous assistance to us.

Of course, they began this operation back in 1948 in a casual sort of way; Congress gave them a real boost from behind in 1951, and they worked like beavers and finished it in 1959. We are not finished yet in Canada, by quite a piece, although we have made a lot of progress.

Mr. FORRESTALL: In reference to this particular field of cataloguing, did some of your people actually go down, on did you yourself go down to the States, or did people come up here with actual direct—

Mr. ANNIS: What is called the United States Federal Cataloguing System, was adopted by NATO and then became known as the NATO Cataloguing System. All the countries of NATO have now adopted it and all of them have benefited enormously from United States' help which has been very freely given. Of course, we had people go down to take the course there, as did a lot of other nations.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Then there is not too much that the United States' experience could perhaps teach us, that we have not put ourselves in the position of taking advantage of?

Mr. ANNIS: Not really; it is a quite different arrangement there, just in magnitude. But they are as conscious as we of duplication. They have investigated this throughly and the decision that they have made to retain single services are deliberate and as a result of study and re-study.

Mr. FORRESTALL: That is fine. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Lambert, I do not know whether you had finished when you—

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes. I had.

Mr. MCINTOSH: May I say to the witness, Mr. Chairman, that I am very grateful for his testimony because it has given me the key to many puzzles. It has given me the key to this mysterious word "unification". I think it is a red herring.

Before I go into this and tell you what the key is, could I ask you if you had any experience similar to that of General Moncel with the Minister when they were called into the Minister's office on, I think he said, two occasions, and when he was very embarrassed that the Minister asked his subordinates whether they

agreed with unification? He wanted the subordinates to answer first before he asked the Commanding Officer.

Mr. ANNIS: No; I was exposed by the Minister to no embarrassing situations.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, the key that I am referring to is the point you brought out that there is a dual role for Canada, one to fulfil the commitments that we already have with the alliances, and the other one of having peacekeeping forces. This, I say, is the key, because now I understand what the Minister meant in his speech where he seemed to contradict himself so many times. As I mentioned this morning, he said: "The system will not be changed; we will continue to have armoured regiments and everything else," but as I said he always ended up with something like this: "Until a force structure within the unified forces develops." To me that means that he is going to opt out of something. I would say that in the alliances that we have at the present time we have only one role. He did not seem to be too concerned about requiring 150,000 men to fulfil both these roles.

At any time when you were on his staff did he indicate to you that Canada should have only one role—the role of peacekeeping?

Mr. ANNIS: If so, it would be a privileged communication, and I would be unable to answer it; but I think it is not unfair to say that he did not make such a statement sir. I think it is quite proper to answer that.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Would you suggest, then, after reading the Minister's speech and hearing everything that you have heard about unification, although no one seems to have the same definition of it, that this is what he had in mind, after he contradicted himself in his brief on numerous occasions. In fact, to many of us he seems to have said yes and no at the same time. However, he always ends up with saying that until the force structure within the unified force is developed, we will have all the services as we understand them now; but when we come down to this one role of peacekeeping, we will have no navy, we will have no army, and we will have no air force as such. Would you agree with such a role as that?

Mr. ANNIS: I am going to say I do not know. In so far as to whether I agree, as a private citizen it is my impression that the extent of need in Europe is waning, and whether it will disappear altogether, I cannot say. So if we are going to maintain a modest military force in Canada, the possibility of us having a larger amount of resources for application to peacekeeping would be not illogical. Whether this is a good plan, I do not know. For so long as we have responsibilities to perform in NATO, I judge the government's intention is to continue them. I have no reason to believe otherwise.

Mr. MCINTOSH: With that I will agree. But if the premise is as I concluded from what you said today in testimony, that Canada in the future, six or seven years hence, by 1972 or whatever the target date is, is only going to fill the one role, the only role that we can fulfil without compulsory military service or conscription, then perhaps we should be debating now these various roles rather than this mysterious term "unification". I would ask you, sir, if it does come to pass that this is the only role for Canada, if we are going to leave the defence of our country to the Americans, what would happen to your pride as a past officer and ours as civilians as to the sovereignty of our country? Do you think it would be good?

Mr. ANNIS: I find it a very difficult question even to grasp, if you will forgive me for saying so. I said earlier that I felt a unified force would be unlikely to handle a wide variety of roles. It would be much more difficult for it to handle a wide variety of roles, than it would be with the retention of three distinct forces, navy, army and air force, in the emasculated form that I described. But what the future will be in the way of military threats, I do not want to predict, I think it would be proper for me to say that I am a Canadian and I believe, as a Canadian, that I am anxious to see our country do its part, whatever that part is. I come to a halt there. I cannot say much else.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, I will come to a halt there. I had a lot more questions to ask the witness, as I told you this morning, about Materiel Command, Maritime Command and so on but it is possible we can bring those out at some other date. I do not think Mr. Churchill has had an opportunity.

The CHAIRMAN: No. I have him on my list now, followed by Mr. Fane.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I would like to say something also about computers. Which button on the computer do you push—and I am not ridiculing computers; they have a useful purpose—if you want a pipe band for your unit. If you push a certain button do you get all drummers or saxophone players or a pipe band. This was referred to yesterday by General Moncel. He said the classification was reduced from 346 to 97; that you have one classification for bandsmen now instead of the 20 classifications you had before, but you also had to have some other designation to say what type they were. I could go on and mention cooks, like General Moncel did. However, I will withhold those questions, Mr. Chairman, until another witness appears.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, from what I have heard from the witness today, along with what I heard of the testimony given by General Moncel and General Foulkes, the three of them together have shot so many holes in the structure erected by the Minister that it is getting to be pretty shaky. I would like to ask this question of the witness. When were you launched on the unchartered sea of integration? When did this start?

Mr. ANNIS: I was given advance warning about the first of June, 1964 that I would be assuming the appointment of Chief of Technical Services on the first of August, 1964.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Was that prior to the publication of the White Paper?

Mr. ANNIS: No. The White Paper was published about the 30th or the end of March, 1964.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Oh yes. Other than the Minister and the Associate Minister have you had the opportunity of discussing the proposed reorganization with other Ministers of the Crown or with the Prime Minister? In other words, have you met with the Cabinet committee on defence at any time?

Mr. ANNIS: No, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Did you expect that unification would be pressed forward at this time, or was there any advance notice that that would happen?

Mr. ANNIS: No, there was no advance notice. I suppose there were straws in the wind perhaps but one would have had to interpret them accurately to guess correctly.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You did not foresee that unification was likely to be proceeded with in the Fall of 1966.

Mr. ANNIS: No.

Mr. CHURCHILL: And pressed to a conclusion in 1967?

Mr. ANNIS: No. It was possible. It was obvious that it depended on how the Minister weighed the progress that had been made thus far.

Mr. CHURCHILL: During your term of office, did you have several opportunities to indicate to the Minister the difficulties that you were facing in integration.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, indeed. Yes, indeed, and I asserted them.

Mr. CHURCHILL: And did you suggest to the Minister that it might take several years in order—

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: —to bring the thing to a conclusion?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, sir. I pointed out the magnitude of the task we had in technical services and the limited resources to accomplish so much in so little a time, and that we had really acquired very little empirical data as yet.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Were you kept fully informed of the various changes that have already been instituted or were you taken by surprise by various statements of policy issued by spokesmen for the Minister?

Mr. ANNIS: No. I was kept adequately informed, I believe, sir, consistent with my duties at Canadian Forces Headquarters.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Do you see an increase in the fighting efficiency of the armed forces through unification?

Mr. ANNIS: No, I do not, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I was pleased that you and other witnesses have pointed out that the object that is being aimed at is to provide combat forces. If unification in your opinion and in the opinion of other experienced senior officers does not increase the fighting efficiency of our forces, what purpose then will be served by unification?

Mr. ANNIS: By unification—

Mr. CHURCHILL: A single service, a single uniform.

Mr. ANNIS: As compared with integration in the form I described, for example, do you mean?

Mr. CHURCHILL: No, unification—single service, a single uniform. If you see no improvement in the fighting efficiency of our forces by that step, what purpose do you see in unification, if any?

Mr. ANNIS: I do not see a great deal provided one is successful with integrating fully the supporting services and the top command structure.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You talked this morning about the construction engineers in the three services and pointed out to us the great differences among those three. Do you seriously think that it is possible to unify that rank of the service? It would seem to me that supermen would be required in order to have the technical knowledge available.

Mr. ANNIS: Paragons.

Mr. CHURCHILL: A paragon. There may be people like this in the services; we do not notice them in parliament. If they are in the services, will they emerge from your study of this?

Mr. ANNIS: They would be hard to get and hard to keep, I think, sir. There would be quite an investment in training them.

Mr. CHURCHILL: What is the length of training for a construction engineer, for example, for the army, after he has completed his university work, and so on?

Mr. ANNIS: I should know the answer to that but I do not, I am afraid, sir. I do not know.

Mr. CHURCHILL: If you then have a trained construction engineer in the army and you expose him to the training for such a work with the navy, that would take a fair amount of time, would it?

Mr. ANNIS: I would believe so from what I have seen of the navy constructors. They are quite professional in a specialized field. I do not see any point in retraining a chap who is experienced in the sapper work to be a navy constructor, and I doubt somehow if it would happen. However, I do not see how the career fields can be managed without interchange. I do not know the answer to that question. This is one that troubles me still, Mr. Churchill.

Mr. CHURCHILL: That is perhaps one of the reasons that you are suggesting a pause—

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. CHURCHILL: —of five years—in order to consolidate and plan ahead which is essential.

Mr. ANNIS: I think we have to bring in some inductees into that integrated field because there is now an integrated construction engineering career field in the Canadian defence forces. We have taken the people from the navy, the army and the air force and rolled them into a bundle. We have had just a few who have come in new. We have had very little retraining, very little cross-training of the erstwhile air force personnel in army or in navy roles and so on. We have never had them tested under pressure yet. We do not know how they are going to perform. Their work at organizing themselves into a structure looks very good, but we have not had this machine running. We do not know whether it fits or not.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Other people have pointed out that there seems to be a great emphasis now on training for careers with the sole exception of training for fighting. Is that about what is going on?

Mr. ANNIS: Well, I admit, sir, that those in the supporting fields have a much more attractive prospect when they retire. They do have a comparable career field in civilian life with which they can maintain professional contact and the like, on whose resources they can draw and with whom they can participate as a part of a large entity. It is an identification problem.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Is information going out to the officers in the three services with regard to the careers that are open to them? Is there a certain amount of publicity in that connection in order to encourage applicants?

Mr. ANNIS: I think Air Marshal Reyno was before you last week and he could have given you the up-to-date answers on how firmly the career fields have been identified and spelled out –specified, and what progress has been made in introducing training in those fields—both the training of new inductees and the cross-training of people who have been taken from somewhere and put into those fields. I do not know.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Somewhere along the line junior officers would have information put in front of them with regard to future careers.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes. This, of course, has been a bugaboo—it was until I left—in the recruiting program. A young chap would go up to the recruiting office and say that he was interested in being a construction engineer, for example. He would ask, "What is the career field? What is the career progression. What are my initial courses which I will be taking and so on?" The recruiting officer could not answer those questions. As a result, many a young man turns away and says he will go somewhere where they know the answers. I do not know whether the recruiting officers know the answers yet or not.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It would be interesting to have some recruiting officer inform the Committee as to whether attention is drawn to the actual fighting that the men might be called upon to perform. Is that posted as a career?

Mr. ANNIS: No. I think, for example, that the infantry man's role in the career field has been pretty well defined and will not change. The weapons that he is given and the tactics that he will be taught I suppose will change, but the general purpose of infantrymen will remain. I do not think that the infantryman today or the infantry officer is able to be too confident of just what his career progression will be—nor the artillery man, nor the armoured chap. Even I think the air force pilot, for example, can recognize that his career is shrinking quite rapidly—the amplitude of it. The span of choice is shrinking, although, of course, I think it is in the minds of most pilots eventually to end up in Transport Command. It is not a combat command; it is a support command and has a very powerful comparable organization in the civilian field.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I have just one final question, Mr. Chairman. Are you familiar with section 17 of the act which deals with the formation of a special force? It indicates that under the proper authority—that is the Governor in Council—there may be established and authorized the maintenance of a component of the Canadian forces, referred to in this act as a special force, consisting of officers and men of the regular force who are placed in the special force being conditions described in the regulations. I take that to mean that once unification has been brought about, officers and men may be shifted into a special force and not necessarily retained in the units that the Minister has talked about retaining—that is, the navy, air force and army personnel could all be shoved into that special force and lose their identity? Have you studied that section of the act?

Mr. ANNIS: No, sir. I am unable to answer that. I do not know.

Mr. CHURCHILL: That is all for now, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FANE: Air Marshal Annis, I will preface my question by saying that I noticed that several times you talked about one, two and three star generals. Is that because of your association with the American forces, or has that become a *fait accompli* in the Canadian forces?

Mr. ANNIS: The quickest way, sir, to describe the general ranks, including Canadian ranks, is to use a handle, as the Americans do. One star is a Brigadier General or equivalent; two stars, a Major General; three stars, a Lieutenant General, and four stars a full General and the equivalent. To say that he is a two star means that is either a Rear Admiral or Air Vice Marshal. We just say it that way because it is quicker.

Mr. FANE: Several of the other witnesses have also used that nomenclature, and I was wondering when it became effective in the Canadian forces, or whether it was in preparation for handing your forces over to—

Mr. ANNIS: Just a handy term—a quick way of using a term to apply a rank to the three services.

Mr. FANE: I am very glad to hear that. Did I understand you to infer that Materiel Command, as it is now constituted, was not able to handle the supply business for the navy, the army and the air force.

Mr. ANNIS: No, sir. In the question that was put to me, I think by Mr. Harkness, I believe he used the word "Crunch".

Mr. FANE: Yes.

Mr. ANNIS: It was a crunch game. And I think I used the words "surge loading". I explained that at the moment there are three separate systems operating within Materiel Command. It is still using the navy system to supply navy material, the army system to supply ground force material and the air force system to supply air force and the common material. Those systems exist, and they are able to handle, I believe quite well, the standard average load at these times of rather low rate of activity. They are in addition being called upon to perform these studies and other matters or reorganization. My qualms arose in their ability to handle the surge load or the crunch.

Mr. FANE: I see. I keep wondering how hard it is going to be to backtrack to get back on the track again, if and when it is found that the unification experiment is not going to pan out. If it fails, how much difficulty will be experienced and how much extra confusion will there be, if we have to back track?

Mr. ANNIS: This morning, sir, I believe I described my understanding at the beginning, that it was an experiment, that it might even fail, but we were conducting an experiment because we Canadians were in a particularly fortunate position of being able to do so. If we succeeded it would be of value to our friends, and if we failed it would not be disastrous to them. I guess if this is the mood, it was a calculated risk. I suppose if our experiment failed it would not be disastrous to the western world. It would be kind of hard on our ego. But even so, I feel that as a matter of personal philosophy, a failure is not such a terrible thing if people all around see that the person who failed learned the proper lessons from it. Maybe even the difficulties we have had, and the successes too, will be of value to other countries. I think we are contributing something even if we fail. I am not suggesting we will.

Mr. FANE: I am very glad to have that answer. I think you remarked that the real weakness in the whole unification process comes from the top because of the inadequacy, if I understand you correctly, of the defence council? I do not mean that they were not able to do their jobs. I mean that it is not set up properly now.

Mr. ANNIS: In my comments on the Chiefs of Staff, I said two things. I felt that the comment that is so often levelled against the chiefs, that they quarrel too much, was really unfair to them, that they were compelled to quarrel; and I also commented on the existing Defence Council and said that a weakness of its constitution was that it put the Chief of Defence Staff and his senior officers in a difficult position. I tried to clear the impression that had got about, that I was criticizing the decisions made by Defence Council. I feel that from the Minister's viewpoint he is getting very good advice, but the way he gets it is very hard on the Chief of Defence Staff.

Mr. FANE: I agree with you. I just wanted to bring that out again.

I must say, Mr. Chairman, that I have learned a lot from Air Marshal Annis' presentation today, and I know that I am safe in telling you that I felt a great deal the same way as he does. Thank you.

Mr. NUGENT: Air Marshal Annis, there are two problems that I think affect us generally: First, is unification a good move in any event and, second, if we were going to do it—if it is a good idea to bring it in—is now the time that we should do it? I would like to address myself to that second part. You have already indicated that you feel that we are moving too far too fast. Can you think of any reason—perhaps we should start in that way—that unification should now proceed? Is there anything that unification could give now that we could not gain the benefit from five years from now, if there was going to be a benefit?

Mr. ANNIS: I do not think it is necessary now, no. It is not necessary now.

Mr. NUGENT: Bearing in mind Mr. Andras' questions—

Mr. ANNIS: I think, in other words, that the essentials of the experiment can continue without having to go over to the unification posture.

Mr. NUGENT: Right. So unification is in itself not going to suffer by waiting to be brought in, and the integration experiments are not held up because we do not have unification?

Mr. ANNIS: That is my belief.

Mr. NUGENT: I wonder if you would agree—

Mr. ANNIS: Not impossibly held up. I grant that unification would simplify some administrative things a bit but I think that the penalties of adopting that posture would be too severe.

Mr. NUGENT: Would you agree that one reason for not going ahead with unification now is that we do not have enough information yet from the integration experiment to have confidence that unification would be a success?

Mr. ANNIS: You mean that the Committee does not have enough information?

Mr. NUGENT: Well—

Mr. ANNIS: I think, whether or not the Committee has the ability to get this information, if you went to the director generals of these career fields, the director general of supply, the director general of construction engineering, and question them as to just how far they have gone along you would get those answers. I do not know.

Mr. NUGENT: So far as you know, have we gone far enough with integration that you have confidence that unification would be a success?

Mr. ANNIS: My opinion is the sum of the opinions of the directors general who were presiding over the endeavour to integrate these various functional fields; supply, construction engineering, transportation, maintenance, communications and electronics. Each of them was confronted with his own particular task of trying to identify in the three services the people who belonged in that functional field, of finding a way of getting them transferred into it somehow, and of establishing a basic syllabi, criteria and the like.

Mr. NUGENT: Would you agree that adding unification to the present load of the planners and so on at this time would cause more organizational turmoil and would seriously retard the correction process—of correcting those things that we now need to fix up in integration?

Mr. ANNIS: I do not think that it would create much additional administrative load—I cannot see that it would, but it would create a lot of dismay.

Mr. NUGENT: "Organizational turmoil" are the words Admiral Landymore used.

Mr. ANNIS: It would create a good deal because it would involve the uniform question, badging and a lot of that type of thing.

Mr. NUGENT: It was Admiral Landymore's opinion—

Mr. ANNIS: I am not sure of this answer.

Mr. NUGENT: —that it would retard the correction process in integration.

Mr. ANNIS: Undoubtedly it would produce in the combat career fields a lot of dismay because it would take away their professionalism for the time being, and I guess they are not ready for it yet. It would abolish all hope of the three services, and if one wanted to undo again, it would be a much more difficult process to undo in case of lack of success. As I said, I do not think we Canadians are going to fail at this, but we might.

Mr. NUGENT: That is perhaps another reason that we should not do it now—a lack of clear proof or further evidence, should we say, in respect of the integration process. It is simply going to be so hard to reverse, it would seem more prudent to wait until we have more evidence before taking such an irreversible step.

Mr. ANNIS: I have said this fairly often, and perhaps to the point of ad nauseam today, sir.

Mr. NUGENT: Would unification now, in your opinion, throw doubt on our ability to carry out all our commitments in the White Paper, or would it necessarily mean that our role would have to be confined to one concept?

Mr. ANNIS: No, I do not think that unification per se would change the picture much, provided that we continue with our experiment in integration, which I heartily support. I heartily support the direction we are moving in. As I said at the beginning, I think that we, in the military, must eliminate this duplication and see how far we can go in integrating these supporting services, and see if the individual services can operate successfully and get the quality of support that they need from integrated supporting career fields. I believe in this.

Mr. NUGENT: You believe in continuing the integration experiment?

Mr. ANNIS: I do in continuing the integrated commands—retaining them, and a lot of these things. I believe in this heartily.

Mr. NUGENT: You have mentioned the tremendous load put on and the excess speed making the load even more difficult to bear. Would not adding unification to our present integration experiment throw an even heavier load for a longer time on these overworked people who have to cope with this?

Mr. ANNIS: I said before, sir, that I cannot see that. All I really can see is a heavy impact on the morale problem of the combat career fields themselves, and that is all.

Mr. NUGENT: I wonder if your comment would be substantially different than a field commander such as Admiral Landymore, who told us that in his opinion—and I quote:

> Mobile Command is too large and so is Maritime Command. They have been created due to the adoption of a functional organization. The resultant large commands with vast geography to contend with makes them both unwieldy and uneconomical. Maritime Command should revert to its former East and West Coast Commands.

Do you see a reason for that?

Mr. ANNIS: Actually *de facto* Maritime Command operates largely in sort of two commands, with the major headquarters in Halifax and then the west coast. Mobile Command is a large command, but based on American standards, for example, it is tiny. I think the alternative to a single functional mobile command would be a flock of area commands, such as the army have just abandoned—and I think that is a much more expensive alternative. I think the best alternative has been chosen.

Mr. NUGENT: You experience largely has been at headquarters, has it not?

Mr. ANNIS: Oh yes. I have been there more than I cared to, but that is the way the cookie crumbles.

Mr. NUGENT: Would you find it quite often the case that those whose background has mostly been in the command area—away from headquarters, have quite a different viewpoint on organization than those who have spent many years in headquarters.

Mr. ANNIS: A headquarters man, I assure you, can leave national headquarters, go to a command and change his attitude overnight. I think anyone who has done that will bear out what I say.

Mr. NUGENT: That is all, sir.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Laniel, you are next.

Mr. LANIEL: Air Marshal, you said that some of the aims or objectives of unification, as they are regarded now, could be reached and are being reached by integration alone.

Mr. ANNIS: It is a path too toward unification, and one might even get that far.

Mr. LANIEL: Do you feel that in the process of integration, at certain stages or levels, the rivalries between services can be an obstacle?

Mr. ANNIS: I do not think service rivalries now are a problem at all, sir—not in the face of a government directive to do what we could in integration and to get as far as we can toward unification. My basic qualm is whether it is safe to make that sort of jump now—Why do we need to? I do not believe in doing things that we do not have to until we are sure that we can do them—or surer that we can, at any rate.

Mr. LANIEL: You have put emphasis on the difficulty that might arise in the transferring of personnel into an equivalent category in another service or environment of another service, because of the differences that might exist in the real operation of the work.

Mr. ANNIS: If you will forgive me, I will repeat that my chief concern is with those in the combat career field—the deck officers and the ratings who are the armament and that type of rating in the navy, the infantry, artillery and armour of the army, and the air crew of the air force. These are the people who are the hard core—they and those who do the maintenance—in each of the services. They are the people who would suffer most by unification. They would lose their uniform and their other sort of identity, and they are the people whose morale problem is most difficult because, as I said, a uniform is being taken away from them and nothing to replace it that is meaningful. This is the area of recruiting; one can offer them a career, but it is rather short and these fellows, especially the soldiers, have to be healthy because at age 23 or 24 they are finished as combat people. They are too old to fight, to run up and down hills, crawl under fences and what not in combat, with 20 year olds competing. Therefore it is the worry about the morale and the difficulty of acquiring into the services and retaining the hard core people that I worry about. Unification, in my opinion, would have a very difficult psychological impact on them. I think given more time, more confidence, that the supporting services in integrated form can give them the support they need and this sort of thing—given time, their morale could perhaps stand the buffet that would come by unification. It might even happen that the time would come when we could safely say. "We are going to unify", and a gasp of dismay through these trades would just not occur.

Mr. LANIEL: I do not think you have tried to pinpoint any strong points at combat level where unification would be an advantage. I have two examples that have been put forward by General Foulkes in his paper of 1961. I am wondering if these things happen in our services—I will mention these two cases—even these days, and if unification would not be the solution to these problems. He says:

> In 1958 we had to disband the anti-aircraft artillery regiment... The regiment included many technicians with tradesmen's skills in radar and electronics who had several years' service ahead of them before they went on pension. The Air Force was busy at the same time recruiting people to man its new radar stations... Air Marshal Hugh Campbell, chief of the air staff, fully agreed with Lieutenant-General Finn Clark, chief of the general staff, that the surplus army men, who had been trained in the same skills, should be taken into the Air Force jobs. The "brass" pushed the idea, but it still foundered on the basic rivalries and vested interests of the different services.

That is one example. There is another one in the case of our pilots in Europe who are flying the F-86s and the CF-100s. When we turn over to these F-104s for the strike reconnaissance role, we reduce the number of our squadrons to 8 from 12. General Foulkes says here:

> It looks as though the RCAF's switch to this new role in NATO will leave at least one-third of the pilots and ground crews of the present air division without a job.
>
> At the same time both the Navy and the Army need men of just these skills. They are now advertising for new recruits whom they will have to train. Will they save the expense of training and absorb the RCAF men who already have the necessary skills?

At that time it was an actual question. We were also told by a witness here that from the time a would be pilot joins the service, until he is sitting above a nuclear warhead he has cost this country $500,000.

Mr. ANNIS: The price has gone up a bit since I last heard it, but it is still a very great deal. That part I admit.

Mr. LANIEL: Do you see situations like this happening?

Mr. ANNIS: There is no question that if integration were in the services—

Mr. LANIEL: This could not be corrected by integration alone?

Mr. ANNIS: No; this is a very different type of problem. I do not think integration or unification bear particularly on this. They perhaps could have assisted, but one has always the problem—you have it between departments here in government—of a person of a certain wage group moving across and trying to find a job in another department. He displaces and it complicates the problem there. It is this sort of thing that exists of course in the three services. Integration and unification would be palliatives toward reducing the frequency of this, but they would not be a panacea in my opinion.

Mr. LANIEL: This morning and this afternoon, you accepted from Mr. McIntosh the term "dual role for our forces"—

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. LANIEL: —in the sense of our commitments in Europe, within NATO, and I imagine even in Canada and NORAD and the other part of it which is our contribution to peacekeeping, peace restoring and police force operation within the United Nations. How far back has Canadian government policy been oriented in the direction of that dual role?

Mr. ANNIS: The dual role?

Mr. LANIEL: Yes.

Mr. ANNIS: I have only become conscious of a substantial government interest in peacekeeping as such since about 1962. There is no question that the Canadian forces participated in peacekeeping operations before that—and very well. They have kept a standby battalion and other forces available for such situations. But in respect of orienting the forces, equipping and supporting them with means of rapid transport, this sort of emphasis was not developed prior to about 1962, as I recall.

Mr. LANIEL: But it was before the White Paper?

Mr. ANNIS: Oh yes, to some degree.

Mr. LANIEL: Is there anything else in the priorities put forward in the White Paper, as far as our defence policies are concerned, that we were not committed to—let us say, the protection of Canada?

Mr. ANNIS: Our roles have been three. They have been the defence of Canada; our commitments to NATO, which includes NORAD in our Canadian interpretation, and support of the United Nations. The peacekeeping role has sort of crystallized and hardened in support of the United Nations. In my opinion, it has been a more definitive effort to demonstrate our support of the United Nations.

Mr. LANIEL: You said that to jump to unification would weaken our forces.

Mr. ANNIS: The morale, I think—do you mean at this time?

Mr. LANIEL: Yes.

Mr. ANNIS: We are worried about the combat career field?

Mr. LANIEL: Yes.

Mr. ANNIS: Therefore, it would tend to weaken us over all.

Mr. LANIEL: To make a general review, what is committed now to NATO is actually one brigade in Europe, two brigades in Canada in reserve, one batallion to Mobile Command, one air division, and also our contribution to the ASW role—SACLANT. What is committed to NORAD besides that?

Mr. ANNIS: Our support of radar stations plus three squadrons of aircraft and two of bomarc, I believe.

Mr. LANIEL: Do we have, at this stage, anything definitely committed or earmarked for peacekeeping participation?

Mr. ANNIS: There is an earmarked group—batallion size, I believe.

Mr. LANIEL: There is no catch to my question.

Mr. ANNIS: No, no; I am not certain of the figures, but I believe there is.

Mr. LANIEL: The reason I was asking you these details is that I do not see how the fact of earmarking a brigade or batallion group to peacekeeping operations would really disorganize our forces' commitments. My views are that peacekeeping and the deterrent in which we participate are two different things, and I do not see how at one moment or another we will be confronted with our forces being in the process of peacekeeping at the same time as they are confronted with a major war.

Mr. ANNIS: In this connection I am in a bit of difficulty with security and I do not know how freely I may speak—not very freely, I think. Our NATO commitments involve more than just the forces we have in Europe; it involves certain assignment of forces which we have to maintain in a specified state of readiness to be available for active employment. Whether or not this is liable to happen, is one matter; but the other one is that from a legalistic viewpoint this is a commitment to which Canada has subscribed. It does inhibit the freedom of deployment elsewhere of this number and types of forces that have to be held in reserve for the NATO commitments, if you follow me. It is what is left that is available for employment elsewhere—and that is also a commitment of sorts. In regard to both things happening at once, I agree there is a great deal of room for debate, but that is outside of my purview to discuss.

Mr. LANIEL: I am no expert myself, but I personally do not think—especially these days with the political and military evolution that we see throughout the world—that our commitments should stay inflexible. There have been changes in NATO in the past few years. Look at the attitude that France has taken, let us say—its decision to take over control of its troops and its territory. Also, it stated in a newspaper yesterday:

> A British official said today it would be only a matter of months before a substantial portion of the 50,000-man British Army of the Rhine was withdrawn—

from NATO.

I think there is an evolution and I am wondering why Canada should sit and say: "Well, nine years ago we committed ourselves and we will wait and see what decision the British and the Americans will take and what they will ask from us". Why not look forward and be ready to say that we will keep a brigade up there but that brigade will be supported or partly supported by our air division and you put someone else in the striking role.

Mr. ANNIS: Sir, I admit the validity of the questions you are raising, but you have manoeuvred me into the political field. I am not competent to discuss what I think Canada should be doing in political undertakings. My role, I think, is to describe, as best I can, my opinions of military capabilities in certain organizational arrangements of our forces. I regret it, but I should not.

Mr. LANIEL: You are in a bad position—I know that—because of the fact that your comments have to be related to the situation as it is now. But you are also giving the impression, and you are also stating, that if we unify today or take any similar action that would disorganize the present setup, we are weakening our forces and we will not be in a position to fulfil our commitments the way they were accepted nine years ago.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh has a supplementary question.

Mr. LANIEL: It is all right.

Mr. MCINTOSH: The analogy my colleague used, Air Marshal, I would suggest is not a fair one; I think it is generally understood that in a conventional war Great Britain or the United Kingdom can defend themselves. However, I think it has been established here in your evidence today that Canada is not in the same position. Therefore, the action of Great Britain in withdrawing their forces to defend themselves at home is not the same as Canada withdrawing their forces. We must belong to a collective system of defence, and I suggest perhaps so must Great Britain, but not in the same degree.

Mr. LANIEL: In a case like that I would say that we could forget about the rest of the world; if we cannot adjust our engagements or commitments to make our forces more flexible, then at least we will be able to fulfil an open spectrum of uses. In the White Paper we refer to the defence of Canada. I know that we will not be able to defend Canada alone, and Canada will not be attacked without someone coming to our rescue, but the political situation might change. In past wars, the United States were late coming in; they did not want to get involved for all kinds of reasons. We might have frontier trouble in the north—we do not know. We have China, nobody knows what is happening over there. We might have to support a troop somewhere.

Mr. ANNIS: I think though, earlier on, we recognized that the integration toward unification exercise has added an additional commitment on the Canadian defence forces and that our lessened manpower for one reason or another has reduced our ability to do all these things. We have had to spread our resources thinner, and this is a calculated risk. I do not think it is an unexpected development; I believe our government has caculated that the risk we take is perhaps worthwhile in the value that the result of this exercise might contribute to our allies. This is their decision, I am not prepared to quarrel with that. It am merely saying that the integration exercise has added a great deal of additional workload on the military, and their military capability for now and quite a period, I suspect.

Mr. LANIEL: Thank you.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Air Marshal Annis, you said that on defence council the three services should be represented. Do you still maintained that.

Mr. ANNIS: I think it would be desirable in order that the minister get military advice on as broad a basis as possible.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Let us say that the naval representative on that council is a naval engineer; he is promoted to rear admiral or admiral of the fleet, and then he is on the defence council. Suppose one day the minister needs advice on naval gunnery; do you think that the minister then should ask that engineer about naval gunnery, or should he go lower down in the echelon and find a gunnery expert in naval affairs who could really tell him the score.

Mr. ANNIS: No. The Minister, I would think would ask the senior officer and depend on the senior officer to get hold of the expert gunner and either give a very accurate communication of what the gunner expert has said or else bring the gunnery expert along. Senior officers are supposed to become senior because they have enough sense, when someone senior to them, such as ministers, ask their advice, they gather together the authorities and get the advice from them.

Mr. LANGLOIS: I realize that, but at that time he has to seek this information for the minister from the lower echelon.

Mr. ANNIS: I would doubt that a senior officer would be competent to give the answer on a highly technical question. In general, it is the chap in his thirties or forties today, who is the real expert on technology; it is the man in his forties and fifties who is experienced in weaving together the advice from a lot of expert sources. In general, the senior officers, in the presence of the minister in council, come in carrying with them a compendium of technical advice which they have gathered, summarized and distilled, and they give that to the minister. If the minister wants a particular answer to a particular technical question, usually the expert himself is brought in or the expert's answer is brought in—either one or the other.

Mr. LANGLOIS: But you do not deny the right of the Minister to go and get the information wherever he think he should get it in the service.

Mr. ANNIS: Oh no, but in any hierarchial structure it is exceedingly hard on a person part way up the structure to have the senior bypass him, go right by him and ask someone else—this is the problem—because it produces a morale problem for the officer who has been bypassed.

Mr. LANGLOIS: Somewhere along the line you spoke of uniforms, Air Marshal—correct me if I am wrong—and you said that you were for one uniform for all non-combat forces: support, supply, administration information services and so on. Is that correct?

Mr. ANNIS: I do not think that I said—because I do not believe it—necessarily the same uniform for all these support career fields—although it is probably more economical to have one. All doctors, for example, I think should wear one uniform, one style; all engineers should wear one colour, and so on.

Mr. LANIEL: How many uniforms would that represent?

Mr. ANNIS: That would represent 20 different uniforms, which I think is too many. Perhaps a single uniform with an appropriate badge would be a better way.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): But you said that the three services should retain their uniform as far as the combat people are concerned, that infantrymen should retain their uniforms as well as the sailors who are on ships.

Mr. ANNIS: My private opinion—and it is an emotional one now—is that the air crew and the people who are directly associated with airplanes should wear a colour that to them is meaningful—their professional badge, which is light blue; and the sailors, dark blue and white. I think that the gunners, the infantrymen and the artillerymen might each wear a different uniform but they might finally get together and settle on one. That is the sort of thing they have been bothered with for years.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): But when they are in combat they do not wear those uniforms.

Mr. ANNIS: No.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): In combat they wear coveralls or overalls or whatever you call them, so when do they use those uniforms.

Mr. ANNIS: The walking out uniforms? If so, they wear them for walking out. It has been my experience that the public wants to see the variety of uniforms. All my friends, especially the ladies—no; that is the wrong way of saying it—have been fascinated. I think perhaps one of the major appeals of the military has been the variety of uniforms. I would rather suspect that a single uniform right across the board for walking out is something that they would consider drab.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Am I to understand that you want to distinguish, for the public, between the ones who perhaps are going to be killed and the ones who are behind a desk? Is that the reason and, if so, do you think the people behind the desk would like that?

Mr. ANNIS: I said earlier, there is a pecking order in the military; the combatant is the top dead centre. But we also said that in a sense all of the people in uniform are equal in their importance. It is true that each of these career fields is there because it performs an essential service, so in a sense they are all equal.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Then they should not have a different uniform.

Mr. ANNIS: Except that the combatant, in general, is exposed in a way—he is trained to be exposed; he is expected to be exposed—which is different. I mentioned that in a ship the non-combat trades get carried into battle. In the army the non-combat career fields operate in the battle fields and do deeds of great heroism, but they are sort of above the normal course of duty. For the infantrymen, getting killed or wounded or taking great risks is in the course of duty, so there is a difference. Within the services it is recognized that anyone in the combat career field is in fact deliberately exposing himself to other risks, although his comrades who are called upon are often as brave or braver. I am not in any sense derogating the supporting services; they are very precious.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Air Marshal, yesterday we had, as a witness, General Moncel, who said that there is too much management in the forces and not enough leadership. Because you, yourself, have had a lot to do with management, research and programming, would you please comment on this?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, I think perhaps we have our eye off the ball somewhat. It is easy to get fascinated by technology, neat and tidy figures and cost effectiveness, but the fundamental purpose of the military has to be recognized. The role of the military is really, you know, to kill, destroy, devastate. This is what they are called upon to do in the darkest hour. It is what one tries to avoid saying and hopes will never happen. But a military who are not trained that way will never be able to keep the peace. I do not think Stalin, who is reputed to have said: "How many battalions has the Pope?" would say, speaking of an army, "How many people are there in their accounting career field?" So the role of the military is to destroy; it is combat. War, itself, is an emotional business. It is emotion so deep that people have lost control of their emotions. That is what war is. It is emotion that creates heroism—it is leadership that does it, and it is young people who do it—kids by and large, 18 to 25 years of age, who are in the fighting lines and exposing themselves. It is they who are looking for the leadership and for those things that inspire them—examples and the like. I do not think that a fighting force is going to be efficient and in the hour of need, if called upon, do the things the country is hoping they would be able to do—I do not think they will be inspired by computers, management and the like. A lot of these other things are fundamental but you have to put first things first. If the combat forces, troops and the like, are good enough the supporting forces get tremendous satisfaction out of supporting them and the whole question of morale rises on this leadership. It is exerted by individuals and it is also exerted by the combat people as a whole—your phalanx of infantrymen, your gunners, your pilots and your deck officers doing these things that inspire everybody. I agree with General Moncel.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Do you not think that the people we have now on the defence staff, if willing to do the job of unification, should be given the green light to go ahead, and that we should encourage them in their delicate task?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes; I am all for encouragement, but I do not want to be party to encouraging them to doing something rash which I suspect later they might be sorry for—in other words, going faster than is prudent; going farther than is prudent.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): I am not referring to going fast or slow. Do you not think that they should go along with the program?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes. I have all along supported this and I believe in my heart there is need to see how much integration we can do, and unification if possible—if possible. I am not at all sure that unification is possible, but if possible, yes.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Sir, I have one last question. This afternoon and, I think, also this morning, you referred to one star, two star, three star, and four star generals. In replying to a question of Mr. Fane's not very long ago you said one star was a brigadier general; two star was a major general; three star was a lieutenant general and four star a full general or their equivalent. Is that not unification?

Mr. ANNIS: No. The words "or equivalent" in itself, I think recognize the fact that there are other ranks which mean the same thing.

The CHAIRMAN: That seems to conclude the questioning of Air Marshal Annis. I know that all members of the Committee want me to thank you very much for taking so much of your time.

Mr. ANNIS: Thank you, sir. It has been a privilege, gentlemen, to appear. I sincerely hope that I have been some help. I have been as honest and impartial as I know how.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, the Clerk has given me a six page telegram from Admiral Landymore. I would like to have your permission to table it or, if you would like me to read it, I would be glad to do so.

As hon. MEMBER: Mr. Chairman, how long will it take to read it?

The CHAIRMAN: It will take about three minutes. It is addressed the Clerk of the Standing Committee on National Defence. It states:

> Sir I would be grateful if you would invite the Chairman of the Standing Committee on National Defence to read this telegram into the record Stop Referring to a point raised in the Defence Committee Hearings on the sixteenth of February 1967 by Mr. Deachman with reference to my statement that in addition to the Chief of Defence Staff and the Chief of Personnel two members of the Defence Committee knew of my compulsory retirement on the twelfth of July 1966 that is before I answered questions of the press on the fifteenth of July 1966 I would like to assure the Committee that the statement I made was truthful and accurate as far as I know and that I had received assurance from Admiral Welland on the ninth of November 1966 that he would testify to this effect if necessary Stop In the early evening of the twelfth of July 1966 in a brief meeting at my request in my hotel room in the presence of my wife I told Mr. Groos of my compulsory retirement and the early retirement of three other admirals and of the censorship of my brief to the Parliamentary Defence Committee in June 1966 Stop I thought these matters so serious that I asked him to arrange for me to see the Prime Minister Stop When I was in Ottawa for two nights in September 1966 Admiral Welland came to my hotel room and volunteered the information that Mr. Groos and Mr. Deachman had come unannounced to his house late on the evening of the twelfth of July 1966 and got him out of bed in order to confirm the news about the early retirements of the admirals Stop When I arrived in Ottawa by plane on the morning of the twelfth of July 1966 I met Admiral

Welland in National Defence Headquarters and he told me that his retirement had been arranged over lunch with the Minister on the eleventh of July 1966 the date of his leaving the service to be not later than January 1967 Stop On the afternoon of the same day before my own appointment with the Minister Admiral Stirling told both Admiral Welland and myself that he was to be retired early the date to be arranged in due course Stop Before leaving headquarters for my hotel room I told Admiral Welland that I had been compulsorily retired the date to be announced by the Minister when he returned from a trip to Paris Stop At the same time I told Admiral Welland that I had learned of Admiral Burchell's request for early retirement from the Chief of Defence Staff when I reported my own compulsory retirement to him Stop I am prepared to testify on oath to the above Stop If there has been any misunderstanding I regret any inconvenience to the Committee members Stop I have no desire or intention of attacking the reputation of any of the principals concerned Stop My reason for referring to the matter was in order to clear my name of the accusation that I had called a press conference and been fired for so doing when in fact this was not the reason for my compulsorily retirement.

It is signed "Rear Admiral Landymore." May I have your permission, gentlemen, to table this?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, it is almost six o'clock. Our next witness will be Air Vice Marshal Hendrick and I would like him to appear, if he can, at eight o'clock.

EVENING SITTING

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I see a quorum.

We completed questioning the last witness at 6 o'clock. Another witness here tonight who has been waiting is Air Vice-Marshal Hendrick. If Air Vice-Marshal Hendrick would be kind enough to join me up here, I will ask him to start by giving us a summary of his experience, which I think has been customary in the case of other service witnesses. I understand he has no brief, but is prepared to answer any questions the Committee wishes to put to him.

Mr. FOY: Mr. Chairman, if I may interrupt, we have already been given the Air Vice-Marshal's brief; it was passed around this afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN: Was it? I did not realize that.

An hon. MEMBER: I did not see one.

Mr. FOY: I do not know where it came from.

Air Vice-Marshal M. M. HENDRICK: Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen, I thank you for the privilege of attending here. I presume the reason I am here is because I have been connected with the armed forces since 1927; in the early times with the militia, the C.O.T.C., and since 1934 with the permanent air force.

My career has included specialization in electronics; being in charge of the technical services in the air force; a couple of duties of a diplomatic nature in Washington; and finally as the commander of our air defences.

Since September, 1964, I have been retired and, therefore, I will speak to you from the point of view of someone whose intimate knowledge of what has been going on ceased as of September 1964, but who has maintained contact, through his friends in the service, with the feelings and sentiments of my colleagues that were who are still in uniform.

I would like to comment on the subject at hand under two main categories: first of all, on the plan itself and the errors, or questions, which it raised in my mind as a serving officer at the time it was issued, and, secondly, the impact of the last two and one-half years, as I understand them, on the men in uniform.

When the White Paper was issued in 1964, I was in charge of air defence and I read it with a certain amount of amazement. Because of the background of a serving officer at that time and the way that things had been done, I did not, in my innocence, imagine that it would survive as a plan beyond the first technical scrutiny which it might have been given by the staffs concerned, because it was quite self-evident that it was written backwards.

It made an assumption that a unified force was all right and a good thing, and then it proceeded to work out the way to get there. There is some justification for that assumption on my part, if you read page 32 of the speech of December 7, where it says:

> The White Paper...would not have recommended integration as a first step...if we had not been certain of the improved capacity of a unified force to meet the demands of modern warfare.

No serving officer in my day would have accepted that as axiomatic under any circumstances, and I would be, and still am, quite uncertain of what studies were made to arrive at that conclusion. I think I would be interested, to know as a citizen, and I am sure many other people also would be, who did the studies, where they came from, and how that conclusion was arrived at, because it is the fundamental cornerstone upon which the whole argument rests. When you start with an assumption that is false, then the whole structure becomes slightly wobbly. But apparently my innocence was too great at the time, because what I had assumed would have been examined in the normal manner was not actually carried out.

I think it is important for you to try to understand, in this respect, the viewpoint of a serving officer. I do not believe many people on the Committee, or in the public either, really understand the relationships between a serving officer and his civilian masters. We are, by tradition and by direction, an anonymous group. We are non-political; through all my career it has been my indoctrination that we carried out the mandates of the then government to the best of our ability, in a technical manner, having regard to all the facts as we knew them, and doing the best we could. It was not our business to worry about the politics; we left that to our Minister, and to our civilian heads. But, in my view, there was a reciprocal responsibility; if we made this division of duties, we also had a feeling in those days—a very strong feeling—of confidence that our judgments, our advice, and our technical know-how would be given due consideration by our political masters. The machinery was there for this purpose, and there was

consultation. Any of the times I was in the headquarters prior to the present regimes, as far as I can remember, the technical advice and the military opinion, of the Chiefs of Staff was given fair consideration. If it was overruled, as far as I understand it, it was for reasons of economy, economics, politics, strategy, or some other overriding reason for which the military factors had to be subordinated. Of course, none of us would take any quarrel with this whatever.

It is my feeling, from the observations I have made since September, 1964, that the military opinions have not been quite so thoroughly viewed, or given quite the consideration they have been given in the past, and this is a worrisome thing, because there are some very distinct fallacies, I believe, in the proposals we have. I refer not only to unification, but also to integration.

The first fallacy, which should have been almost self-evident to anyone working in the services at that time, was that there was enough waste and duplication to make substantial monetary savings by their elimination. I had just gone through a number of years of observing us attempt to maintain our defence effort with a constant number of dollars in a condition of inflation, and the only way this was done was by imposing economies and efficiencies to the maximum possible degree. This was a continuing process, and had been going on since the 1950's; it was not by any means novel.

The result was that we were squeezed fairly dry, and I could not see, as a commander, how I could carry out my particular role of the air defence to meet the commitment as I understood the commitment to be with very much economy, and do the job. I was reasonably certain that the same conditions applied to the other operating commands.

Also I had observed the effects of integration on the subsidiary formations. I observed an attempt in 1947 to put the motor transport together which lasted six months, and failed for technical reasons. I had observed the padres being integrated; the net result, of course, being more padres than we had before. I had observed the medical corps in the throes of integration, in which aviation medicine ceased to be recognized as a specialty, and the response of this supporting arm to the operational element became less effective.

I knew of the concern of my colleagues in uniform who were doctors about this change in their careers. I know a number who, as a result of their concern, are now working for the space agency instead of working for Canada. So, I did not think the integration of medicals was too effective a program at that time.

I had a hearty suspicion of integration as a means of economizing. It was not a new idea at all. Then, when I looked at the common support arms, which are the ones where everybody agrees that integration is most effective, I found about 20 per cent of our effort is in support arms which are common to all the forces. You have common food to some degre, and you have some common clothing; you have some common stores, like screwdrivers and so on, but most of your technical support and logistics support is specialized to the fighting arm. If you have a store full of spares that suit the tanks, they are no good for the submarine and certainly they will not fix the airplane. Therefore, the logic of putting all this in a common pot did not appeal to me as a serving officer who had to handle this logistics; it did not make any sense at all, and I failed to see where economies would result from it. I think the fact that the waste is not there to be squeezed out is probably proven by the observations that two years later the defence budget is still at the level it was before, in spite of the fact that we are 17,000 or 18,000 men less than we were at that time.

There is a second fallacy that worried me as a serving officer at that time, and still does, and that is the basic assumption that expertise can be dispensed with. If you put people in a common pot, you are deciding that they are of a common character and you are by implication, denying the necessity of specialization. That argument was made quite strongly a couple of years ago, and it is interesting to note now that it is intended that specialists will be recognized at certain levels. In fact, if you look at the list of special trades, you find in the back of this book that not only are they specialists to their discip'ine, such as engineering or supply, but they are specialists to the fighting arm within that. I notice that we have a number of types of electronics people labelled "sea", labelled "air", and labelled "army". They are specialists within the role of electronics. Of great interest to me this afternoon was the reference to this business of transferring the artillery radar man to the air force radar man. The training required to do this certainly would be a year or more. These people are not interchangeable at the drop of a hat, and even your career fields, as now specified in your group plan, bear this out very strongly.

I even believe that expertise as it applies in the combat arms between the sea, land, and air, is not interchangeable. It is a career in itself to learn to be a fighting man in any one of these media—to handle properly the technical weapons and learn the organization necessary to achieve the military objective in any one of these fields; you cannot make a jack-of-all-trades. Apparently it is not the intention in the short run now to do this.

In my view, this expertise also is essential at the top level. I would support Air Marshal Annis, if I understood him correctly this afternoon, that the expertise is necessary at the very top policy-making level to which it can get. This was provided by the Chiefs of Staff, and so I saw their disappearance with great regret; I believe that it was a backward move and diluted the competence of the advice which could be given to the government.

It is one thing to take the word of a technical expert who is four levels down, but that expertise which is quite finite in its application has to be filtered through the judgment and experience of a Chief of Staff if it is to be of meaningful value at the policy level. Otherwise, you could say that it is the captain and the major expert who establish the policy. The expert's view is quite different from the leader's view—from the head man's view—and if you have a Chief of Staff who has come up through the services he can interpret his own experts in a far more rational and sensible manner and he can frame his advice, with their help, in a more accurate and proper fashion than can be done by anyone who has not had this background. I believe, therefore, this expertise is essential at the top and the bottom. Any attempt, as this appears to be, to dilute that expertise is bound to have a bad effect on the efficiency and competence of our forces.

There is a third fallacy behind this. That is the belief, as is evidenced by the concept of a Mobile Command, that you can have a universal weapon. I suppose the best example of a universal weapon, or an attempt to get one, is the CF-5 airplane. The CF-5 airplane, as far as I am told and believe, was not chosen by the military; it was chosen for other reasons. It is a cheap airplane, as airplanes go; that is probably one reason for its choice. It is a good flying machine, but I have yet to find a competent airman who believes it has a good weapon system,

and that is what it was purchased for. It is interesting to me to note that among the plans laid down here—I think it is even in the White Paper—it is suggested that these airplanes could be used, if necessary, to support the air defence back home, in spite of the fact that they are designed to give close support, I believe, to the army in Europe. A statement like that is so obviously ridiculous to any airman that he cannot believe it. If an airplane is designed to do one military role well it will not do another one, and if you make it do all military roles it will do none of them properly. This is a matter of physics; this is a matter of design; this is a matter of weapon systems, and so on, and you cannot talk around it. So, what we are doing by this concept of a universal weapon system—an airplane which can be used everywhere—is leading ourselves up the garden path, and we are hoping that the enemy does not have a good airplane to oppose us, because all we have is a flying platform that had better be protected by somebody else.

This concept of a universal weapon system, in my view, is a dangerous one. It set the basis, apparently, for this desire to form a force which will be compact, be universally applicable anywhere in the world, and do any task it is called upon to do. I do not believe that this can be done in a military sense in any adequate way, unless the task you propose to do is a very simple one.

If you are talking about a police force, then you do not need an elaborate force like Mobile Command; you just will need some jeeps, some whistles, and your presence. But if you want to fight your way somewhere, I suggest you have to have the weapons that are designed for the theatre where you are going. That seems to be the evidence of military operations thus far and I suggest, therefore, that our concept that we can have a cheap and universal armed force of any kind is military nonsense.

There is a final fallacy which appears in this concept of where we are heading, and that is that we can operate by ourselves. We can operate by ourselves only if what we do is very, very simple indeed, as I have implied before. It has been our tradition, because of our size and our capability, that our strength and our safety heretofore has lain in our alliances; in our co-operation with a larger, richer and stronger ally. That is the basis of the NORAD agreement, of course, and the NATO alliance. When we get out of this and try to do things by ourselves, either we have to shoulder a terrific bill or we have to do something very simple, indeed, and we leave the real defence of the country to somebody else. As an ex-officer and as a citizen, I do not like the idea that we, as Canadians, with our technical ability and our wealth relative to the rest of the world, should let someone else defend us. I think we should do as best we can to hold our heads up on the international scene.

These fallacies, of course, have all been mentioned before, and I would like to confirm that I have read the TRIO brief and the brief of the Maritime Command, and I agree with them both. I have read what the press says, and I agree with what General Moncel told you. I have read public statements by Brigadier Malone of the Winnipeg Free Press, in which he has produced, I believe, an excellent argument in favour of expertise at both the top and the bottom, and I bring that pamphlet to your attention. So, I will not say any more about these things because they have probably been said too often.

But I would like to say one thing to try to give to you some feeling for what I believe to be is in the minds of the officer in the fighting forces today—the manager, the intermediate lad, the man whose career is half way through—who

is subject to these policy changes and is confused. The first thing that we must remember about these people is that they are volunteers. If you are a volunteer it means that you do it because you believe in serving your country and you have certain ideals and you like to be treated as an intelligent person.

As such an officer you look around yourself and you see this argument going on and you sense the military inconsistencies in it, and you wonder what has happened to your leaders. At the same time your unit is subjected to a considerable amount of administrative confusion. You find that you have trouble getting the simple things done that you used to do and you get the distinct impression that the boys in Ottawa are pretty busy at something because they cannot seem to pay too much attention to you, and things are even worse than they usually are. Then you see that a lot of your senior people, for whom you have some considerable respect and whose shoes you might hope to fill some day, are leaving under rather unusual conditions in large numbers. You have respected their judgment and you wonder why they have to be suddenly dispensed with, short of the normal term. It may help promotion, but certainly it is an unusual situation and it does not help your morale much or your career possibilities to think that for some reason that is a little bit uncertain to you all these people suddenly have to quit.

Then you find that the system of promotion is being changed. Once upon a time there was a promotion board at the command level and then there was one at the headquarters level and you knew that your fate—your career—was in the hands of a board of seven or eight officers in your area, one or two ranks senior to you who knew you, and their decision was validated by a higher board. That system worked very well for a number of years, as far as you could tell. People who were promoted, as far as you could see, held your esteem; you very seldom saw a fellow promoted that you did not believe should be promoted. You did not get promoted yourself fast enough, of course, but that was incidental. But you had faith in the system and you felt that it could not be dominated by any outside factors.

And now you wonder; it is all centralized in Ottawa, and it becomes noised abroad in the officers mess, and there is a feeling in the air that you had better keep quiet and not say anything. If you open your mouth and indicate you do not like what is going on, you had better watch your career. Now, this feeling is well held by people. I have heard it from a number of my people in no uncertain terms. There is a feeling of repression; there is a feeling of concern that unless you toe the line you have had it. Now, that is a very unhealthy situation for any young man to feel he is in. Free speech is supposed to be proper in this country.

Then we find an official bulletin coming out that begins to tell us what is going on. It comes out every day now: It comes to the station; it tells me what is happening in this business; it keeps me informed. But it starts out by telling me in the first issue: "Do not pay any attention to the radio, the television and the news, the papers and all this commotion that is going on. We will keep you informed about what is really happening." That is the official word. So, now I am going to be given the word officially—I cannot even look at the newspaper. I am not supposed to give it any weight; I am to stop thinking for myself.

I was told this, now, and I think perhaps, the Committee should find out for itself and should ask the question, because the Committee is the only one that really can. I cannot. But, I am led to believe that on one occasion, at least, when

a very senior officer was sent to a conference to tell the boys what was going on—to help allay their concern and to tell them what the policy was and help them with their problems—that the order came out that no questions were to be asked and there would be no discussion of the subject after the briefing was given. I cannot believe that that would be done, and I would invite the Committee to find out, because it is a fantastic thing that this attempt would be made on a free, democratic, volunteer force.

Some of my colleagues who are retiring, I find, show me their dismissal orders. They come in a mimeographed letter, signed by some junior person. "Thank you for your services, old boy; what are twenty years?"—you know. Not even, as it used to be one day, a nice letter from someone senior with a crest on it saying, "Thank you very much for twenty years' service. Sorry you have to go, but at least you did a good job while you were here". No, sir. It comes on the flimsiest, blue mimeographed paper. This is the thanks I get for my twenty years service. I say to myself, "This is a funny way to treat a volunteer force".

I do not know whether this means anything or not, but I am getting suspicious by now; I have a feeling that someone is trying to brainwash we. I find, by golly, not longer ago than last month we formed a Directorate of Information Services for Internal Information. Now, by golly, if that does not sound like Mr. Goebbles' outfit or Mr. Stalin's—we have got to put a commissar with every member of the force to make sure he behaves himself, to make sure the guys get the right word. Information Services for Internal Information—this, I am told, is what happened. I have not seen it, but I suspect the Committee could find out the facts. It really shakes me as an ex-serving officer.

And so, what do we find? I find my colleagues are quitting, and I am beginning to think I should quit too. I am in a volunteer force and I do not like to be kicked around, and I do not like to have my conditions of service changed without at least having a chance to say something about it, or to learn why, and have it make sense to me. All along, up to this point, I have always understood what the service was doing because I needed to understand to be a good officer. Now I am baffled, and I think it is time that I was unbaffled.

Some of my colleagues are not going to quit right away—they cannot; they have grocery bills to meet. They have an investment in their pension and they will wait until they can get out with a minimum financial burden. But I would suspect that there is going to be a continuing exodus, and it will be from the boys that are the smart ones, the boys that are experienced, the boys that are the real volunteer corps of our services, and you will be left with the people who do not think for themselves and cannot get a job anywhere else. I deplore the way it appears a volunteer force appears is being treated. It is very, very discouraging in this democracy.

So, I look at the situation and I see a trend to disarm the country, because it is obvious that NATO commitments and the NORAD commitments are dying. The reason is there has been no replacements for their weapons, and you have to replace the weapons in a continuing manner; otherwise, the commitment dies. So, even though it is not said, even though it is simplied we are going to keep these things up, you can see the straws in the wind. The weapons are not being replaced; the alliance comes up for renegotiation in two years; there are press releases suggesting that we are going to pull out, so if you are a clever young

man, then you say, well, I guess, we are going to end up with just this Mobile Command. I do not know whether I like that or not because I do not know whether I can see it doing a real job to protect the country.

For these technical reasons and for this particular concern I feel that the lad in uniform has, I am very sorry that this program is so full of question marks, and I would hope that they could be resolved before any irretrievable steps are taken in a formal manner. You see, the serving officers train to solve a problem by analysing all the facts first; putting all the alternatives down, putting a dollar sign opposite them and recommending what appears to be the most sensible, expedient and economical solution that meets the military need. He is not used to having the target and the goal determined first and the background filled in later, and it baffles him.

I would hope, therefore, that after lengthy discussions of this kind a couple of things might happen. I would hope the Committee might, in some way, get the opinions of the serving officer in the middle of this commotion—the man who is going to have to make it work. This has never been done before and it is a very difficult thing to do. But is it really fair for this group to be allowed to remain anonymous, to have no say whatever about what is happening to their services and to their careers, when they have experience and knowledge and can bring to bear upon the subject really significant facts which can make the plan work or not make it work?

It would be a wonderful thing if the Committee, in some ingenious way, could get some kind of sampling of what these lads really think about what is going on. I think you owe it to them, instead of imposing it upon them under conditions of great uncertainty and saying they have to make it work. Of course, I would hope also that the expertise could be re-established at the Chiefs of Staff level, so that the type of military judgment which could be given for the consideration of the government would be of a complete, allround and thorough character.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Winch is first, followed by Mr. Harkness and Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, I think my question has been partly answered, but I will put it specifically.

Air Vice Marshal, you will remember that you and Rear Admiral Landymore were questioned by Mr. Lynch on the program known as *Twenty Million Questions* on November 2 last year. You made one comment there which interests me considerably, and I would like to ask you to explain it a bit. This, by the way, is a verbatim report of that program. In answer to a question that was put by Mr. Lynch you had this to say and I quote:

> Instead, we are being confused by the smoke-screen of re-organization, of integration, which nobody understands; and of unification, which people understand even less. This is the smoke-screen, and behind this is this very important policy change in our defences, which I believe should be properly aired so the people understand what is going on.

Now, there is the definite statement that the plan of integration and unification and, therefore, the bill before us is a deliberate smoke screen to hide important policy changes. Would you tell us what, in your estimation, are the policy changes going on for which the smoke screen is being spread?

Mr. HENDRICK: The policy changes, in my view, are there by implication; by the withdrawal from NORAD, the withdrawal from NATO, and the concentration of our efforts in the support of the United Nations. This seems to be inevitable from the events that are taking place and the equipment policies that are going on.

Mr. WINCH: That is bringing it to a head. You say, "seems to be inevitable". You do not, therefore, accept the statement in the White Paper nor the Minister's speech on second reading that even with the changes of integration and unification, Canada is going to maintain its commitments to NORAD, to NATO and elsewhere. You do not accept those statements as a fact.

Mr. HENDRICK: I do not see how they can be done at the same level that they are being done now, by any means. Our commitments are specified at the present moment in terms of force levels, as I understand it, and I do not understand how they can be maintained with the organizational changes which appear to be in the wind.

Mr. WINCH: So you take it, therefore, from what you said now and what you said on this program, that all we have before us now is a smoke screen to hide the fact that although they say they are not going to do certain things, actually they are going to do them. Can I take any other implication from this, and what you are saying now.

Mr. HENDRICK: I am afraid I am suspicious about it. Yes, I am afraid I am. Naturally, I cannot speak about what people have in mind because that is impossible, but when you see a situation presented which is full of inconsistencies and difficulties you are worried about it, I must say. I cannot see how we can continue to do everything we have done before and form a new force, which we are going to do with the Mobile Command; cut 10,000 people out of the environment; save $100 million and do all this together. I cannot understand how this can be accomplished. This is my worry.

Mr. WINCH: Is it your opinion, if integration is followed through to its conclusion and then followed by unification, that for those procedures of policy to give us national defence forces a change in role for our national defence forces will be required?

Mr. HENDRICK: Ultimately, I believe so. I do not see how it can be avoided.

Mr. WINCH: Thank you.

Mr. HARKNESS: On this same matter of roles, the roles laid down in the Defence Paper more or less have been the general aims and objectives of defence policy for quite a number of years. Do you think that they can possibly be met by the projected single unified force which the bill before us would bring into operation and the disappearance, concomitant with that, of the present navy, army and air force?

Mr. HENDRICK: I share the problem of most people; I do not see what the pattern of the integrated force is going to look like because really it has not been spelled out in enough detail for me to get a feel for it. Certainly it is going to be very awkward to work with our allies if our force structures are different from theirs and, apart from that, until I see the pattern of the forces and what they look like in detail it is very hard to say whether this can be done or not. What this integrated force is going to be like is much too nebulous, in my view.

We hear that the soldiers, sailors and airmen are going to be preserved in their units and have their working uniforms and dress uniforms as they do today. Some common support services may or may not be in common uniform. I am not sure how they are going to be acted on. I have no idea how the support forces which serve the fighting arm are going to relate; whether they are going to be preserved as part of the fighting arm, or whether they are going to be integrated as part of the support. The whole thing is extremely confusing in my mind. I must say, and luckily I am a little far away from it, but from what I have read and what I have seen, I am baffled as to how it is going to be done.

Mr. HARKNESS: Would you agree that in order to carry out the roles at present laid down for our defence forces, a navy, an army and an air force of some sort is required, whether you call these forces by that name or not?

Mr. HENDRICK: I do, indeed, I believe that the existence of fighting forces in the media of the army, navy and air force, by any name, which are unique and trained and not interchangeable with the others, will always be necessary in a military force.

Mr. HARKNESS: Do you see any advantage in doing away with our present three forces and putting them into one force called just a defence force?

Mr. HENDRICK: Not the slightest bit; it baffles me completely. I think the economies could be achieved by much more simple means and I do not understand the advantages of this proposal at all.

Mr. HARKNESS: What are some of the disadvantages that you see in it?

Mr. HENDRICK: First of all, if you preserve the fighting forces in the shape it is suggested you are going to, I do not see why you should change their identifications, their appearances and their symbols. There is a lot to be said for loyalties and traditions and the things which motivate men to go and take hazard. This is a long, historic thing and everybody, I think, will accept it and there is no reason to change these motivating things.

I think it is also essential for the fighting man to have a leader—someone he can look up to—a leader whom he knows has been through the mill; somebody who he can identify as part of his team. That is why the Chiefs of Staff being done away with for an army, a navy and an air force is such a sad thing, in my view. The junior officer, the airman, the soldier or the sailor does not have his outfit that he can look up to and, if he is an officer, even aspired to succeed. All this is part of having a viable force that has an esprit de corps and a purpose. It has been done this way for many, many years and there are very good reasons for it and I do not see what we gain by upsetting it.

Mr. HARKNESS: In the matter of the Defence Council which you just mentioned, which used to be the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff and the three Chiefs of Staff, its present composition in practice, as we have now heard in evidence during the last two or three days as far as the military end of it is concerned, is the present Chief of the Defence Staff, and the Vice Chief, because he comes from another service. And then they bring in another officer who may be head of personnel, or head of technical services, or something else, who is from the third service. I think this is a patent attempt to try to substitute for the old organization we had when we had three chiefs. What would you think of its effectiveness in comparison with the previous system where you did have three chiefs, each the head of one of the three services?

Mr. HENDRICK: I certainly believe the organization with the three Chiefs of Staff as the certain heads of each service was the right way to do it. At the present moment you have a functional headquarters, I believe, in which you have heads of personnel, technical services, operations, and so on, and it is inevitable that those particular gentlemen will be one-third effective, in my view, because two-thirds of the subject matter with which they deal has not been in their background. They cannot help it; that is the way they have been trained. Therefore, if they want the expertise for the other two-thirds of their responsibilities they have to go down the line to get it, and they do not bring to bear a meaningful experience upon the advice they get.

I think it is fair to say that the soldier, the sailor and the airman are different individuals. They are trained differently from very early youth, they think differently, they are all essential to a good armed force and they work together, but they are not the same people and they do not bring the same sense of judgment on a given military problem as their colleagues will. If you want to get the best answer I think you have to meld the three views in the best possible way and you only do that by having the very senior people do it for you. I do not consider that interservice rivalry or squabbling about a thing like that is as serious as trying to find the best military answer, which is a very difficult thing to get at the best of times. So, you put three people with the very best experience you can get together, and have them produce the best compromise or the best solution to a difficult situation.

When you substitute the Chief of Personnel sitting alongside, or the Chief of Technical Services, he is expert in one-third of the problem, but in the other two-thirds he is not nearly so competent. Specialization, I believe, is important right down the line from the very top to the bottom, and when you forget that all you are doing is producing the jack-of-all-trades concept and diluting the competence of your staffs.

Mr. HARKNESS: I was very interested in what you had to say about the CF-5 aircraft. You stated that it was not chosen by the military. I think the decision to secure this aircraft probably was taken while you were still head of Air Defence Command. Were you consulted with regard to this air craft, or was your advice sought?

Mr. HENDRICK: No, sir.

Mr. HARKNESS: Do you know of any other RCAF officers whose advice was sought with regard to choosing this aircraft?

Mr. HENDRICK: From my knowledge, I cannot answer yes or no to that, because I do not know enough about what was going on in Ottawa at that time. I am sorry.

Mr. HARKNESS: But not to your knowledge?

Mr. HENDRICK: Not to my knowledge.

Mr. HARKNESS: Can you tell us anything further, from your own knowledge, about the basis on which this aircraft was chosen?

Mr. HENDRICK: Not from my own specific knowledge. I would only be what I have been told by my colleagues. I know that preference from the operational requirements people was for a Phantom at the time which cost three times as much, and I would presume that the combination of circumstances of price and

the ability to have a joint production-sharing deal were probably the dominating factors. Of course, there is nothing the matter with either of those requirements, particularly production sharing. It is a very, very wonderful thing to do and I believe very highly in it, but it would have been much better if the airplane had been militarily more sophisticated.

The airplane is supposed to be sent overseas to support our army, and yet it takes a tanker force to get it there. If you add the price of the tanker force and if you keep the tanker force in training, which you have to do to meet in the middle of the ocean two or three times in the middle of the night—two airplanes per tanker—this is not done easily, and you end up with a very sophisticated system to get those airplanes across the ocean. It may not be so cheap after all.

Mr. HARKNESS: A very expensive one.

Mr. HENDRICK: A very expensive one, yes.

Mr. HARKNESS: What function or role, if any, can this aircraft carry out satisfactorily?

Mr. HENDRICK: I cannot tell you. I am told it is a very excellent airplane for flying practice. Beyond that I am not sure. I do not think it carries enough in the way of conventional armament to make a sufficiently loud bang to justify taking it anywhere. It will not carry atomic weapons. It may be a good gun platform—it probably is—but that is a pretty sophisticated and expensive way to carry a machine gun around the sky.

Mr. HARKNESS: In other words, under modern air conditions you do not look upon it as being effective?

Mr. HENDRICK: I am informed it does not have the room or the weight-carrying capability to take all the sophisticated equipment that is necessary for a modern airplane. A modern airplane has to have an awful lot of black boxes in it if it is going to be any good against a sophisticated enemy, and I am informed that this will not go in this airplane. It will not take the combination of weights and quantities that are necessary to make it a really modern airplane. You do not fly these airplanes today by the seat of your pants. You cannot put a man and some gasoline in an airplane and have an effective fighting machine anymore. It is a much more sophisticated and complicated method. That is why I mentioned I am quite sure the airplane would be no good for air defence because of the gadgetry that must go inside it in order to do the job. This involves a matter of space, weight and many other technical factors.

Mr. HARKNESS: You mentioned the officer in the—

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, I wonder if Mr. Harkness would permit me to ask one supplementary question? I noticed this aircraft has been used in Viet Nam and I also noticed the Dutch have just bought 105 of them, I think it is, from Canada. In the light of what the Air Marshal has said with regard to this, I wonder if he would comment on these two facts? It is not as if we were making this mistake alone. Apparently we are plunging off into idiocy in the company of some pretty classy friends.

Mr. HENDRICK: You are right, our NATO Allies have great confidence in us, too. They might easily follow our mistake because we did it. Also the airplane happens to be closer to home when it is with them and its range is not so important.

Mr. HARKNESS: In your remarks about the officers in the intermediate slots today, you said you thought it would be desirable for the Committee to get the views of some people of this kind. Do you know any way in which that could be done by the Committee without the officers concerned being in serious danger of being fired or otherwise summarily got rid of?

Mr. HENDRICK: It would be a very difficult thing, indeed. I do not know whether the Committee has the power to give them some assurance of this kind. They would have to be brought in and put under oath, I would think, and required to do something which has never been done in Canada before, which is to comment on policy. This has never been done before and it is, generally speaking, not a desirable thing to do. But this is an unusual circumstance, possibly, and some way of sounding them out should, I think, be attempted.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, might I interject here? This might be a good time to read into the minutes Beauchesne's paragraph 314 and 315.

The CHAIRMAN: I do not happen to know them from memory.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Neither do I but I have them here. I could paraphrase but I do not know what the words are.

The CHAIRMAN: Perhaps we could do this some other time, having made a note of the fact there is such a thing.

Mr. MCINTOSH: It might assure them they will not be fired or should not be fired because of the information they give to the Committee.

Mr. NUGENT: That is the assurance in Beauchesne that witnesses before this Committee are under the protection of Parliament.

Mr. HARKNESS: As far as that is concerned there is also consideration of their future promotion possibilities which, in most cases, would be just as important.

Mr. HENDRICK: It would be a difficult thing.

Mr. HARKNESS: I was wondering whether you had any idea at all of how this evidence might be secured and, at the same time, these people protected both from their promotion and job security point of view.

Mr. HENDRICK: The only way I can think of is there might be some, as I have mentioned, who have already decided to leave and the extra foreshortening of a few months might not be too significant for them.

Mr. HARKNESS: Otherwise, people who have just left in the last month or two might serve the purpose just as well if we could secure some of them?

Mr. HENDRICK: Oh yes, certainly.

Mr. HARKNESS: You mentioned something about the promotion system having been changed and that it is now centralized in Ottawa. I presume it is worked to a large extent on a computer system, or it is hoped it will be worked on a computer system, from what we have heard. Do you think it is really possible to select the best officers for promotion on any basis other than assessment by the people who have been in immediate command of them over the years?

Mr. HENDRICK: There is no perfect promotion system in the world, but the best one must include the opinions of immediate superiors as one of the inputs, certainly.

Mr. HARKNESS: You mentioned that an official bulletin comes out every day now to give the undiluted and pure truth to the troops. How long has that been going on?

Mr. HENDRICK: I do not know how long it has been going on. I have seen a copy and I know it exists, but that is all. I think it is a daily communique of some kind. It is very good from what I have seen of it.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, I think, members of the Committee should have copies of this for the last month. I would make a request at the present time that they be filed with us.

The CHAIRMAN: If we could get some idea of what it is called—

Mr. HENDRICK: I am sure the Directorate of Information Services for Internal Information would know about it.

The CHAIRMAN: We will ask the Clerk to try to get hold of a copy of it.

Mr. HARKNESS: I presume this is put out by the Directorate of Information Services for Internal Information which you have mentioned?

Mr. HENDRICK: I do not know whether that is so or not, Mr. Harkness. I do not know who puts it out. It comes from Ottawa, I believe.

Mr. HARKNESS: How long ago did you hear of this Directorate of Information Services for internal information?

Mr. HENDRICK: Oh, within the last couple of weeks.

Mr. HARKNESS: Has it actually been formed yet, or is it just projected?

Mr. HENDRICK: I cannot tell you that specifically, with accuracy. I believe. it has been formed, though. I believe there is a man actually in the post at this point.

Mr. HARKNESS: Those are all the questions I have at the moment.

Mr. MACALUSO: Supplementary to that, if I may, Mr. Chairman; Air Vice Marshal, where did you get your copy?

Mr. HENDRICK: I did not have a copy.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, where did you see it?

Mr. HENDRICK: I was shown it by one of my friends.

Mr. MACALUSO: Where did he get it?

Mr. HENDRICK: I guess he got it from one of his friends.

Mr. MACALUSO: But no one knows the heading on it?

Mr. HENDRICK: I did not look at it with that accuracy, I am afraid.

Mr. MACALUSO: Was there a stamp indicating where it came from?

Mr. HENDRICK: I was told that it came from Ottawa and that it was standard issue which told people what was going on.

Mr. MACALUSO: It would be interesting, if it exists.

An hon. MEMBER: What do you mean?

Mr. MACALUSO: I say if it exists as a daily communique. I am sorry; this is what I am referring to. Not whether the document he saw exists; I mean if it exists as a daily communique.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Air Vice Marshal, I would like to ask if you would mind reviewing for us your military career as other witnesses before us have done? Could you tell us when you enlisted, and so on?

Mr. HENDRICK: I did, very briefly, when I came in. Does the Committee wish more detail?

Mr. FORRESTALL: I must have been way off. Either that or you did it very briefly because I did not hear it at all. I am sorry. I want to thank you then, for one or two points you did make quite frankly and quite publicly because of the hundreds and hundreds of letters I received which have been marked confidential and there has, indeed, been an awareness or concern on the part of the authors of the letters, whether they came from the husband or the wife. Generally speaking, they are from middle ranking people both at the commissioned level and the non-commissioned level. I refer to navy ranks of the petty officer section, the third class leading seamen, lieutenants and lieutenant-commanders and so on.

In your remarks you attempted to explain what is in the minds of these men. There was a lot of concern about why their superiors were leaving the services. Could you elaborate on that just a bit? I am rather concerned about the effect on a middle ranking man when he sees that someone he may have been serving with for a year or two, and in whom he has a lot of confidence and trust, finds it necessary to leave. What kind of effect does this have on his day-to-day ability to conduct his responsibilities?

Mr. HENDRICK: I do not think it affects the day-to-day carrying out of his duties in any way. I think it just worries him with regard to the possibilities of his own career. It gives him concern about his views, I suppose, on the senior management of the system. The scuttlebut says, these lads are fired. So you ask yourself, why? If it can happen to them, maybe it can happen to me.

Mr. FORRESTALL: You suggest this has had some effect on them. Has it affected their moral? You say it has not affected their work.

Mr. HENDRICK: Yes, I think it affects their morale. It is all part of having confidence in the system of which you are a part; that it appears to work in a manner which you understand, and that equity is preserved.

Mr. FORRESTALL: This is as real as it is at once intangible?

Mr. HENDRICK: That is right.

Mr. FORRESTALL: You went on to talk about their promotional opportunities and what appeared to be their acceptance of and confidence in the old system where promotions were somewhat related to the capacity of the immediate superior to make a valid judgment, and the muddling of that and the removal of this type of decision to an impartial or mechanical rubber stamp somewhere distantly removed from them. How does this affect them? Would you again say it has the same effect? Would it affect their morale? Would it have the effect of their perhaps losing a little bit of confidence in themselves by having no tangible target to please, if that is the way of expressing it?

Mr. HENDRICK: No, I think it is a hope the system will be as foolproof, and as fair as possible and that they will get a reasonable evaluation along with their fellow officers. I think they would have more confidence if this were done by a committee of their peers, or next up the line, at least.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Something they remain in touch with?

Mr. HENDRICK: Yes.

Mr. FORRESTALL: This also has been removed; I was not aware of this.

Mr. HENDRICK: I am not aware of the automation you speak of. All I believe is that the promotion procedure has been centralized as part of the integration program.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Did you feel, as a serving officer—I am curious about this; it has been raised by many people with me—that when you joined the air force you entered into some kind of a moral contract with the RCAF as opposed to some broad defence force?

Mr. HENDRICK: Oh, definitely. I joined the RCAF because it was the air force and not for any other reason. I was not interested in anything else. I had served with the artillery and I did not like the artillery that much. You had to groom horses, among other things. I much preferred the air force. I went into the air force because it was an air force. When you got a permanent commission, my understanding was that as long as you minded your business you had a contract to serve till you reached your retirement age, barring catastrophe or something of that sort. It was a firm commitment as part of your service, that they would use you for this length of time.

Mr. FORRESTALL: What would your reaction be if you were back down the ranks a little bit and found yourself faced with a very real possibility of being transferred to another force, or to another element, without any consent on your part, other than your desire to remain active. The Act says that your commission is deemed to continue in what they call the Canadian force. How would you have reacted to that a few years ago?

Mr. HENDRICK: I would have been quite annoyed if I had not been given a choice.

Mr. FORRESTALL: What about the men? Have you ever heard any of them or some of them say anything to indicate this might rankle a little bit?

Mr. HENDRICK: No, I do not think I have. I honestly cannot say that phrase, the way you put it, has been put that way precisely.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Have you heard them discuss it?

Mr. HENDRICK: No.

Mr. FORRESTALL: It is a meaningful thing for you to have joined the air force.

Mr. HENDRICK: That is right.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Now you are going to be asked to join something else. You spoke once about what you believe might be some kind of a continuing exodus. Indeed, I agree with you; I have great fears for what might happen, at least in the navy. This is one of the reasons. Is that a fair statement?

Mr. HENDRICK: I think it is, yes indeed. I would not be at all happy to be transferred to another service. I do not think that I would worry too much about changing my suit particularly, but I would want to feel that I was still part of this viable entity—an air force that had the personality, entity and integrity of itself, that had its own leader and had its own roles and was manned by people who understood it and its problems.

I would not like to have to go into some kind of composite organization where somebody was telling me to do something who did not know what he was talking about. I give you an example: I asked to have my airplane, which was to fly through all the civil aerodromes of North America if necessary—Dakota, shall we say—I fitted out with VOR so that it can fly properly in bad weather in all the aerodromes. So I sent in my little chit to Ottawa saying this was my operational requirement, this was my aeroplane, please could I have some of this stuff. Back came an answer saying: "You cannot have that stuff, but we will give you something else; we will give you TACAN, because it is just as good and besides we are standardizing on TACAN." Now, I know perfectly well the fellow that told me that does not know one end of himself from the other, because TACAN just will not do what I want it to do. But, I got this answer back and thought: "what is the matter with the staff up there, for goodness sake? What they are giving me will not do what I want it to do, and the fellow ought to know it, he is the expert." This does not help your morale either, when you feel you are mixed up with a group that do not know the details of what they are supposed to be handling.

Mr. FORRESTALL: The interchangeability is just not there; you just cannot get into the retraining. You continued, and with this interchangeability you suggested it was true, certainly at many of the technical levels which, in one sense of our discussions, are support levels, I suppose; they are supporting services. This is equally true at an operational level. Is this your—

Mr. HENDRICK: I am sorry, I missed you there.

Mr. FORRESTALL: You mentioned the inability of achieving an acceptable degree of interchangeability at technical, and some of the other levels. You cited the loss of our air medicine career field people, and one or two others. But this is also true, is it not, at the pure operational level?

Mr. HENDRICK: It certainly is, yes indeed.

Mr. FORRESTALL: The commander of a ship has got no business on an airfield, and vice versa.

Mr. HENDRICK: No, I think that is right. The services are unique, as I have said before, in their fighting capability, their ability to do it, their point of view which makes them a good fighting man, and everything else. The army thinks in terms of miles, the air force thinks in terms of thousands of miles, the sailors think in terms of ups and downs and getting sea sick and so on—it is quite a different business.

Mr. FORRESTALL: This would hold true too, I suppose, with those delightful people who fly on and off ships. There is relatively little that is interchangeable between the skills achieved by a man flying a tracker off the decks of *Bonaventure* and a man climbing into the seat of one of these CF-5's.

Mr. HENDRICK: It would take a fair bit of re-training.

Mr. FORRESTALL: It would be rather costly, would it not?

Mr. HENDRICK: Yes it would. Landing on a carrier is quite a specialist procedure, and the average aviator cannot do it.

Mr. FORRESTALL: My time is running out, but I have just one last question, which Mr. Harkness touched and on which you started to elaborate on a bit.

What, in your opinion, are the shortcomings—because we have not been able to get any details or extensive answers to this question—of the CF-5 as a piece of equipment? Have you ever flown one?

Mr. HENDRICK: No, I cannot give you chapter and verse on that with adequate accuracy, because this calls for intimate engineering knowledge of the airplane which I do not have.

Mr. FORRESTALL: You just do not have any knowledge of them?

Mr. HENDRICK: No.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Were you serving when the decision was made to—

Mr. HENDRICK: I am not quite sure when it was. I went out in September, 1964, and it was done in Ottawa and I was not party to what was going on at all in Ottawa. So I cannot tell you whether I was or whether I was not.

Mr. FORRESTALL: That is fine. Thank you for now.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): I have a supplementary question Mr. Chairman. You are sure it is no good?

Mr. HENDRICK: I have been told by people who I believe know properly, that its range is limited and that its weight-carrying capability and ability to carry sophisticated equipment is limited. So, therefore, its adaptability for many roles is limited. It is not "no good", no.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): It was not meant for that, so it is good.

Mr. HENDRICK: Well, it is not an either or thing, you know.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Well, is it not good, or good, or what?

Mr. HENDRICK: Well, if you want to put it that way, but I would not put it that way.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Thank you.

Mr. ANDRAS: Air Vice Marshal Hendrick, there was some discussion a few minutes ago about the possible weaknesses in the promotion system, I think more applied to officers, but I assume the same general principles or objections would, in your mind, apply to other than officers. You said there is no perfect system, but you emphasized that there should always be the personal assessment by a senior officer one rank or two up. Where, in the present program that we are looking at, is there any suggestion—even in spite of the fact that personnel records will be computerized—that the element of personal recommendation or consideration will not be given by one senior in rank?

Mr. HENDRICK: I think the essence, as I understand it, is not that your commander recommends you—that is part of it, certainly—but that a board of officers at your intermediate level deals with you. It is the multiple personal opinion that is a rather good thing in this respect, I believe.

Mr. ANDRAS: Then you would not subscribe that this, as was suggested, is simply reduced to a computerized, very impersonal kind of operation?

Mr. HENDRICK: No, I did not say anything about computerizing it. I merely understand that the Board, or whatever the machinery is that does it, or the judgments of the people is at the senior level now, and removed from the field where the man, in fact, was serving. In the old days there were two of these echelons you went through; two filters, if you like.

Mr. ANDRAS: I am not arguing; I am simply seeking information. It is your impression, then, that now the field commander of any particular person is not consulted.

Mr. HENDRICK: No, it is not that the field commander is not consulted; I am sure he is. It is that there is no board of officers at that level to support him, if you like, or to help him in his assessments.

Mr. ANDRAS: Again, there was some discussion a few minutes ago about the use of carrier plane pilots versus fighter pilots flying other aircraft, and so forth. The implication I got, and certainly I am imperfect at these things, is that carrier plane pilots might be interchanged with fighter pilots in the air force. Again, this is not my understanding. Do you have any accurate information to indicate that there would be that kind of interchange?

Mr. HENDRICK: No, I do not think I intended to give you an impression of such interchange. I said, I believe, that landing on a carrier was very difficult and special training was necessary for it. It was not a matter of interchangeability at all.

Mr. ANDRAS: If there is not any indication of interchangeability in that area then the fear that there would be a lot of money wasted in training a carrier pilot and then having him switch to a fighter pilot is not really relevant.

Mr. HENDRICK: No; I do not believe I brought up a matter of that kind at all.

Mr. ANDRAS: There was some in the cross-exchange, that is all. Now, sir, you mentioned—and I sensed a great deal of national pride in this, which I certainly share—a frustrated feeling about the idea that we should let someone else defend us. We would all share in this as a matter of national pride but again, as a matter of degree, with 20 million people and a very vast geographic territory, can we really defend ourselves by ourselves in this country?

Mr. HENDRICK: By no means. We must have allies, and how much we contribute to the joint effort is entirely a matter of government policy. I have no views on this, save to feel that we should as much as we properly can, as you would in any club; you would want to pay your dues.

Mr. ANDRAS: Would you recommend, sir, as an alternative to any plan that is before us—integration or unification—carrying on the same general pattern that existed before 1964, which I think we all accept would require perhaps a substantial increase in defence spending in this country? Would you recommend consideration by parliament of a substantial increase in our defence spending in Canada?

Mr. HENDRICK: I am not in a position to recommend anything of that nature. It is a matter, I think, of a requirement to defend ourselves, and what military resources are needed to do this. And then it is up to you gentlemen to decide, on behalf of the country, how much of the tab you want to pick up.

Mr. ANDRAS: Well, there is a question of precedent there; which comes first?

Mr. HENDRICK: Historically, it is not the limitation money because, after all, we have not got a bottomless pit. If the limitation is the money, then you have to reduce the roles if you have not got the money to go round.

Mr. ANDRAS: And fit the force and everything else into a compromise negotiated approach to a defence budget with some relevance to our ability to stand that gaff. Do you think we spend too little in this country expressed as a percentage of our gross national product, or any other yard stick you want to use? You mentioned that we are a wealthy country, which implies that we could stand more.

Mr. HENDRICK: I suppose if you compare our efforts with the rest of our NATO allies, we do not stand out too remarkably at the top of the pile. We are somewhere between Italy and Greece, I think—somewhere down there.

Mr. ANDRAS: Then you would say we should spend more money on that basis?

Mr. HENDRICK: Yes, I believe we should do more in our own defence per capita.

Mr. ANDRAS: You believe that a billion and a half, with the escalating clause for inflationary measures, is not sufficient?

Mr. HENDRICK: You have choices, of course. I believe we should defend ourselves with our American allies in a way which is mutually agreed. If the defence of North America is top priority and the defence of NATO is second, perhaps you want to taper down on the defence of NATO. I am not in a position to assess the strategic alternatives at this point. If you make a choice that you must limit the amount of money that you spend, I submit, under the conditions today as you have suggested, that you have to trim your force or trim your roles.

Mr. ANDRAS: But you do say that in your opinion, without going into the method that would be used, generally speaking and as a principle you would support a higher expenditure on defence in this country?

Mr. HENDRICK: At the present moment, I believe so, considering the effort of our NATO Allies with which we are partners.

Mr. ANDRAS: Have you any idea, sir, how far you would want to go, in ball park figures, in increasing our military budget?

Mr. HENDRICK: No, I am not qualified as this point on such short notice to give you an opinion on that. That is a very complicated and difficult thing.

Mr. ANDRAS: And for instance, which is directly relevant, how many people we should have in our forces?

Mr. HENDRICK: That will flow automatically from the tasks that we pick up.

Mr. ANDRAS: Sir, again, in my opinion—one man's opinion—it appears to me from the evidence you have given and the statements you have made that of the witnesses we have heard, certainly you would be one, along with perhaps one or two others—I almost go so far as to say, more so than others—who holds an opinion that is actually critical of integration; that is, the process of combining field commands and defence headquarters command. To a degree greater than, perhaps, any other witness we have heard, you seem to be against even the stage of it, let alone the further stage that is before us now in the question of unification. Have I interpreted you correctly?

Mr. HENDRICK: Not completely, no. The thing that I would prefer to see changed is the disappearance of the Chiefs of Staff themselves. There is nothing

the matter at all with integrated headquarters and integrated functional commands and that sort of thing which has been going on. This has been a standard military pattern for a long time in many parts of the world. The putting together of common support services also is sensible, but I think the point where I would take issue with the the general understanding is that the percentage of total support which is truly common is relatively low. I got the impression today that we were talking about most of the support services being integrated. The implication being that most of them were common.

I do not believe that is true. An awful lot of the support services, particularly in the logistics part, are very peculiar and particular to the force; they have to be responsive to the force and they are almost part of the force. It is a very difficult thing to draw the line, as you know. You have first line maintenance; the fellow who fills a gas tank on the field has got to be part of the force because he does it even under fire. If you work back you would get to a point where, perhaps, it can be common, or not part of the combat force, but most of the support forces of a technical nature are peculiar to the force they support. I do not know the percentage of the common element, but I suggest that perhaps 10 to 20 per cent of our total support forces would be truly subject to integration in the sense that they are common; supplying the food; the construction of a building, provided you have a section you can take out to do construction of bridges under fire and a few things like this. It is not a simple business so I would not hold against that at all.

Mr. ANDRAS: You made the remark—I have not made exact notes and I certainly stand to be corrected if I make any paraphrasing error—that the expertise at the staff level should be re-established. This could leave a big question hanging in the air. Does it, by any chance, imply that you lack confidence in the present serving staff officers?

Mr. HENDRICK: I have no knowledge to give me reason to do that.

Mr. ANDRAS: That was not what you meant by that, then?

Mr. HENDRICK: No, no; not in their ability; not in their competence as individuals, but I would have concern about their ability by virtue of their training and background. If you are trained in a certain specialty, you just do not know as much about the other specialties, no matter how good you are. It is not at all a function of the individual's incompetence or anything of that sort—it is the individual's background. If you want an expert he has to go through a certain amount of years of indoctrination.

Mr. ANDRAS: Let us go back to this problem of budgets, costs and so on. When you were a serving officer—I believe you retired in 1964 or 1965?

Mr. HENDRICK: Late in 1964.

Mr. ANDRAS: At that time, sir, did you feel that some fairly drastic measures for reorganization of the total defence forces were required, considering the costs—one can argue about the degree or the exact dollar figures—and recognizing the trend of an ever increasing portion of our budget being spent on pay and allowances, operating expenses and maintenance as opposed to capital equipment? Did you feel that some answer had to be found that might be of a rather drastic nature?

Mr. HENDRICK: Yes, I would agree that, as you say, the percentage of money available for equipment was slowly going down and down, and there had to be some answer.

Mr. ANDRAS: There had to be some answer?

Mr. HENDRICK: Yes, and my answer would have been to reduce the role that we were doing or reduce the forces somewhere, not to change their organization or their nature, but to reduce the effort so that it matched our dollars; not change the nature of it, but to reduce its extent.

Mr. ANDRAS: And reduce the number of people in the force?

Mr. HENDRICK: That would probably follow, yes. It would have to. The only way you can save money is to reduce men, really, when you get down to it.

Mr. ANDRAS: General Foulkes appeared before us the other day, and I cannot remember the date to which he was referring, but he did indicate that some fairly drastic plans for unification or integration—and I do not want to fool around with these words—but a general single force concept had been presented. It is not that new a thing. I think he mentioned that at the time Mr. Pearkes was the defence minister he had presented a program with that principle. I do not the country, the services and so forth.

What I am really getting at in a roundabout way is that any such major comment, the minister then said, "Well, it is a pretty fascinating idea; it is a pretty courageous idea; it is a pretty drastic idea; I do not think we will try it". The implication I got was that it was just a little too radical to be accepted by know the great detail but he had that principle in mind and, as I remember his reorganization would run into resistance to change, resistance by virtue of built-in and quite understandable traditional reaction, the pride of service—all these sorts of things—but is it not very natural that such a major overhaul would run into quite a bit of opposition? It apparently did because the minister at that time anticipated that it would be too much and, as I understood it from General Foulkes' remarks, he dropped it.

Mr. HENDRICK: Of course, it is natural that any drastic change will be subject to some concern, and the more so if the people concerned believe that there may be another answer which is not quite so drastic. It does not necessarily follow that in order to keep our budget within a certain figure in our defence effort, this was the way to do it. There are other ways as well that might be less drastic and it would be interesting to know how many alternatives were looked at and discarded for good and sufficient reasons, leading to this rather unusual solution being adopted. It does not necessarily follow that it is the only solution to get the answer.

Mr. ANDRAS: But almost any drastic change—

Mr. HENDRICK: It does not have to be drastic.

Mr. ANDRAS: This does not relate just to the military.

Mr. HENDRICK: No, of course. Philosophically speaking, I certainly agree.

Mr. ANDRAS: When a corporation or any organization that is used to going along a certain way, and so forth, suddenly or even on a gradual basis considers a change, there is just resistance to the *status quo*, is there not?

Mr. HENDRICK: Of course, you must not forget that the services themselves have a long history of continuous change. They are never static. There is always a reorganization of some kind going on to meet the circumstances of the day. Every year or two some change or other comes into effect, and they are trained to accept change for this reason. This is not novel. Change in itself is nothing to bother a service man. He lives with it. It is only when the change does not seem to make as much sense to him as it might, or he does not quite understand it, that he gets concerned.

I do not know how many reorganizations I have lived through in my service career. The pattern is never the same for any three years in a row. It is seeking to get the best solution for the situation at the time but none of the changes are drastic; they are evolutionary. You have something wrong and you try to fix it with a minimum of comotion. You just make a change that will fix that problem and hope it will not create more problems than it fixes.

A military organization is a very sensitive thing. So many things are interrelated and it is a terribly complicated thing to deal with, and I do not think humans are smart enough to start in from square one and put up a perfect organization. The only way you can get a good organization in a sophisticated and complicated human endeavour is to take it the way it is and change it as little as possible, letting experience work its way along slowly. If you start in with a master plan and turn things upside down, you are not smart enough to do it.

Mr. ANDRAS: The program, as we have heard, on unification—integration was announced formally so that all the forces knew. There was an all-member of the armed forces letter sent out on April 2, 1964: there was the White Paper; there was a great deal of newspaper coverage based on the White Paper and on this communication, and so forth and that probably would be the more public official notice of it. It indicated that three or four years hence probably there would be a further move toward unification to a single force. It was quite definitely stated that there would be change and adjustments, but the end objective was a single force and, generally speaking, in that sense it seems to be on target.

That was in 1964; this is now 1967. The plans presented to us these last several days and speeches before that would indicate that the unification, if I may use that word—which I am quite sure you do not like, having read some of your articles—is planned to take place over the next five years or so. There even is a target date of 1972 for some of the end objectives, and so on. That it adds up to eight or nine years. You suggest that it should be even more gradual than that.

Mr. HENDRICK: No, I think I would suggest that it should be less drastic than that.

The CHAIRMAN: You are getting to the end of your time, Mr. Andras.

Mr. ANDRAS: May I ask just one more question?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes.

Mr. ANDRAS: You have mentioned that really there has not been a great deal of service rivalry. Is there not a great deal of historical evidence of service rivalry, not only in our country but in other countries! For instance, recently I

believe the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force had a pretty terrific battle between themselves about whether they would get carriers of aircraft. The end result was that the navy minister resigned and the First Sea Lord resigned. General Foulkes made the point the other day that there was quite a hell of a job in getting co-ordination between the three service heads, so it really seems to be a fact that there has been quite a bit of service rivalry and this must thave been a real problem.

Mr. HENDRICK: I think it is an inevitable problem, but I do not think you do away with it by doing away with the protagonists because each represents an alternative military solution to a given problem, and the essence of your problem is to find the best of these three, or what combination is the best. The only way you can do it in any human endeavour where a situation like this occurs is to allow for this exchange, which you call rivalry—this debate or this healthy interchange of views and measurements—to come up with the best answer. You can call it rivalry if you like but how else, in human endeavour, can you solve a complicated problem? You cannot solve it by taking two of the protagonists and throwing them away and having one answer only because you have not considered the other two. That is an arbitrary way of doing it. That does not necessarily mean you will get the best answer.

Mr. ANDRAS: One of the disadvantages of this most interesting conversation is the Chairman glaring at me for time, so please mark me down again, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso, did you have your hand up before or were you just pointing out that Mr. Andras wanted to speak?

Mr. MACALUSO: No, I was not asking to speak.

Mr. LANIEL: From what I have gathered up to now, I have the impression that you even believe in integration in the sense that it has been envisaged as a means to save money and to improve our administration, and better to co-ordinate the support element of our forces, and so on. Am I right in expressing it this way?

Mr. HENDRICK: Not completely, no. Integration is such a complicated subject. I said I did not believe in the elimination of the three Chiefs of Staff, but there are other elements of integration which are acceptable and sensible in the common support services, and I made the point that the percentage of support which was common was relatively small and, therefore, the amount of integration which I would consider appropriate probably is not as much as is considered necessary by this proposal. I differ in degree, shall we say.

Mr. LANIEL: Do you feel that many of the improvements that have been started could have been done even without integration of commands?

Mr. HENDRICK: Yes, many of them could, I believe. To me the business of having one service look after the interests of another as we did in the case of common purchasing of food and common purchasing of medical supplies; having one service run a hospital in place of the other two; having the MT pool in Ottawa—it used to be run by the army—for everybody, was a very simple way of avoiding duplication without touching the basic organization.

Mr. LANIEL: You said that these improvements started years ago.

Mr. HENDRICK: Yes.

Mr. LANIEL: But do you feel they went fast enough or that perhaps integration would be a definite step towards acceleration?

Mr. HENDRICK: I think they could have been accelerated but I am not sure that integration was necessarily the way to do it in every case. In many cases you could do it and get the economies you are after without the integration procedure. But each one has to be looked at on its merits.

Mr. LANIEL: Did you participate personally in the preparation or planning of integration?

Mr. HENDRICK: No, sir, I was in the field at this time and knew very little about it.

Mr. LANIEL: You said that you made up your mind because you did not feel that you—I am trying to put in my words what you said—could carry on in your duties and your responsibilities with the set-up that was brought forward through integration concerning, let us say, the relationship between senior officers and the civil authorities. You complained that since this government has been in office the situation has deteriorated in connection with the acceptance by civil authorities of military advice, because you did say at one point that miltary opinions were given fair consideration before this government came to office.

Mr. HENDRICK: My experience in Ottawa, when I was in Ottawa, was that this was so; that is to say, that military considerations seemed to receive their fair weight. I have no personal experience in Ottawa with the latest regime. I have only to go on the feeling which I have picked up in the services from my contacts, that people's advice was not given quite as much consideration as they had hoped it would be.

Mr. LANIEL: You give me the impression that you think it is better to do things the soft way; as you said—to seek to get the best solution with the minimum of commotion.

Mr. HENDRICK: Yes.

Mr. LANIEL: Is your feeling influenced by the close date of your retirement age? You were born in 1910, were you not?

Mr. HENDRICK: That is correct.

Mr. LANIEL: When you were retired in 1964 you were 54 years and five months old.

Mr. HENDRICK: That is right.

Mr. LANIEL: Did you feel the challenge was for the younger generation? You spoke of an exodus of senior officers but you did not relate that exodus to the fact that many of our senior officers had served in the last war and were coming close to retirement age.

Mr. HENDRICK: I was referring to those who retired before their date. I was one of those who retired when my proper calendar date came along. In this respect, I suppose I was fortunate in not having to make this decision because time helped me out of the service before I had concern. I was in the field and I had merely to keep my troops' morale up and my command working well and that was my only problem. I was not involved in the Ottawa reorganization at all.

Mr. LANIEL: You were at St. Hubert?

Mr. HENDRICK: Yes, I was at St. Hubert.

Mr. MACALUSO: May I ask a supplementary here, Mr. Laniel?

Mr. LANIEL: Yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: Do I understand, Air Vice Marshal, that you had nothing to do with integration planning at all, as you just said?

Mr. HENDRICK: That is right.

Mr. MACALUSO: In fact, everything you have is second hand information, rather than direct information from Ottawa.

Mr. HENDRICK: It is not first hand experience about the planning of integration. That is true.

Mr. MACALUSO: Thank you.

Mr. LANIEL: Because of the time I will skip some of my questions. They might be questions that have been asked before of other witnesses we would arrive at about the same answer. But I want to come back to one point: In your opinion, how much does it cost to train a pilot from the time he joins the service until he reaches the air division?

Mr. HENDRICK: I cannot tell you from my experience. I know that the timing is something of the order of two years.

Mr. LANIEL: You see, what I am concerned about is you seem to give the impression that taking a pilot coming off a role like a strike reconnaissance role, or anywhere else, and transferring him to the navy, or to a naval air operation on a carrier, does not mean too much of an economy of money. How much does it cost to take a pilot and bring him to an operational training unit? It must cost a few thousand dollars.

Mr. WINCH: Five hundred and seven thousand dollars.

Mr. LANIEL: That is not what I mean. I mean up to OTU where he is oriented in one direction or another because—

The CHAIRMAN: About $175,000.

Mr. LANIEL: Well, I do not know; I am not taking these figures, the record will show them, but I believe this might be a place where, on some occasions, money could be saved.

Mr. HENDRICK: In common training? Is that the point you are making? Training people up to a certain point in one school or by one service?

Mr. LANIEL: Yes, but I am asking is the navy spending more money in taking a recruit and bringing him up to either ASW role or right on a carrier, in comparison to the navy taking an experienced pilot that was doing another role?

Mr. HENDRICK: Certainly it is easier to convert an experienced pilot, but he still has to be converted.

Mr. LANIEL: It does not take too many weeks.

Mr HENDRICK: Well, I do not know how long it takes to train a man to work on a carrier, but I do know that it took over a year to train a man for the air division and the man that you put into the pipe line was a man who was already a qualified jet pilot.

Mr. LANIEL: Yes, but this is with very, very sophisticated equipment.

Mr. HENDRICK: Well, the navy has sophisticated equipment too.

Mr. LANIEL: Do we have that kind of equipment on a carrier?

Mr. HENDRICK: I think we do. The Tracker airplane is full of all sorts of sophisticated equipment. Landing on a carrier itself is not easy, especially under operational conditions with heavy seas, and so on. It takes a great deal of training.

Mr. LANIEL: Well, during the war it took three months.

The CHAIRMAN: It is a lot different now.

Mr. HENDRICK: But the conditions under which they operate are far more rugged now than they used to be.

Mr. LANIEL: From your wings to flying a seaplane?

Mr. HENDRICK: Yes.

Mr. LANIEL: Catalinas and so on.

Mr. HENDRICK: Oh, yes. The art has become a lot more sophisticated by virtue of the tasks we have and the devices needed to fly.

Mr. LANIEL: Well, I will stop there.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Air Marshal Hendrick, I was very interested when you were discussing the Director of Information Services for Internal Information, and your suggestion that we might possibly have a Dr. Goebbels in our midst. I went out into the hall to see if I could get a telephone book and find out whether Dr. Goebbels had got to that level in the staff organization where he had a telephone, and while I was there I ran into the man himself, standing in the hall. He is a tall young fellow and was drinking coffee out of a plastic cup. He said he is the Director of Information Services for Internal Information, so you are quite right—he does exist, and he was right here in the room with us.

He was recently appointed by the Director of Information Services to hasten and improve the dissemination of information within the services as a result of criticisms made directly to this Committee and criticisms made in the House of Commons that insufficient information is getting out through the services, and so on. In view of those criticisms, some of them levelled at the government by witnesses here, I wonder whether you still think this is a dangerous trend and we really have a Dr. Goebbels in our midst, or whether this might not prove to be a very useful young man in the information services who will improve something that was lacking and which we really want?

Mr. HENDRICK: I think it all depends on the quality of the information he issues and I am much reassured that his name is not Goebbels and that he looks like a good young man.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Thank you very much.

Mr. LAMBERT: May I interject a supplementary question? Did any of the witnesses who appeared here and commented about this seek to have a Director of Information for Internal Dissemination, or whatever it is?

Mr. DEACHMAN: Well, I do not know whether they had got that far advanced with their planning, but certainly the Department had.

I want to ask you one question about healthy competition. Air Marshal, a subject which has arisen again and again is the question of whether having three services engaged in healthy competition and rivalry with each other is a desirable thing. I want to ask you: If you were putting an all-star team on the ice to compete against Russia, would you put them in their original club sweaters or would you put them in an all-star sweater and train them as one team?

Mr. HENDRICK: I have never found that the three club sweaters in any way stopped the most efficient co-operation among the services when it came to fighting a war.

Mr. DEACHMAN: That was not the question I asked you. It was not an answer to the question I asked, but it was an analogy. It was a neat piece of dodging. I want to refer to some remarks made at the very beginning of your talk here tonight. You said that you read the White Paper with amazement—I think you even said "innocent amazement"—and then you went on to ask what studies were made on which the White Paper itself was based, and I wonder whether or not you have read some of the papers of General Foulkes from 1961 and 1962 in which he discusses this whole subject thoroughly and, in fact, on which he produced a paper which is filed as one of the appendices to the reports of this Committee?

Mr. HENDRICK: No, sir, I have not seen those papers.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Had you heard nothing of discussions within the armed forces at the time you were there centring around discussions which General Foulkes and others had on the subject of integration?

Mr. HENDRICK: In what period of time was this, Mr. Deachman?

Mr. DEACHMAN: This was in 1961 and 1962. He was then out of the armed forces but he was very prominent as a writer on the subject of integration and unification. Were you familiar with those papers at all?

Mr. HENDRICK: Only very vaguely.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Have you read much with regard to McNamara's studies on integration and computerization, and so on, of organization within the armed forces of the United States?

Mr. HENDRICK: I am aware of a number of those, yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Have these not lead you to some conclusions that possibly we might be thinking in the same direction?

Mr. HENDRICK: That is true.

Mr. DEACHMAN: So really, having given some thought to it and the possibility of it, it really did not fall upon you with all that much amazement when you saw the White Paper of 1964?

Mr. HENDRICK: I did not relate the White Paper of 1964 to the studies to which you refer. There did not quite seem to be a parallel.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentleman, I asked Air Vice Marshal Hendrick if he could come back tomorrow and he said he would prefer not to. After Mr. Deachman we have three questioners, Mr. McIntosh, Mr. Churchill and Mr. Nugent. Mr. Andras said he would like to have his name taken off because his question has been answered. So now, what is—

An hon. MEMBER: I think he should come back.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, he said he would prefer not to.

Mr. FOY: Well, let us carry on with the hope that we can accommodate him.

The CHAIRMAN: Do you have a long series of questions, Mr. Nugent?

Mr. NUGENT: Like most of the questions, it depends on the answers.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall we just try it for another twenty minutes and see how it goes? It would rather depend, I suppose, on how long Mr. Deachman is going to take.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I will not be very long, Mr. Chairman. I have just a few more questions to ask.

On the subject of establishing the discussion that was going on at that period with regard to integration and unification, I wonder whether you would glance to *Hansard*; for instance, the *Hansard* of May 8, 1964, where Mr. Lambert said:

> I fully agree with the fact that there should be unification. I understand that as a logical step.

Had you studied Mr. Lambert on the subject of unification and his desire to bring it about as a logical step?

Mr. LAMBERT: That is unification of command.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Unification, period.

Mr. LAMBERT: No, no; it is unification of command; look at the context.

Mr. HENDRICK: I have read some of the *Hansards*, in particular the important ones, I believe, when the matter was before the House. In most cases I have had trouble in finding out what really was meant by unification and integration and this was one of the difficulties, I think, in making up your mind about the arguments.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Making up your mind what was meant by unification and integration?

Mr. HENDRICK: Yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I think you had left by the time the directive came out which was April 2, 1964. Is that correct?

Mr. HENDRICK: No.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Were you still there at that time?

Mr. HENDRICK: I believe so, yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Do you recall the directive to all members of the armed forces and employees of the Department of National Defence, signed by Mr. Cardin and Mr. Hellyer, in which they discussed the steps which would ensue from integration and in which they went on to note that:

> The process outlined above is not immutable,

they said

> as the lessons of the reorganization are learned, changes in the plan or in the timing may result. However, the end objective of a single Service is firm.

Do you recall that?

Mr. HENDRICK: I have read that statement a number of times.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Well, that is encouraging. We have found senior officers who have not seen it although they were in the services at the time. It certainly points up the need for that young Dr. Goebbels that I met out in the hall, does it not? The only conclusion I can come to, coming back to my original question on the subject of your amazement at the White Paper, is that integration was the subject of considerable discussion through 1961 and 1962. I certainly recall General Foulkes' article; I recall them very well. I had them in my own files to read, although I was not as interested as you would have been at that time, and I just cannot accept the idea, sir, that it came to you as a matter of amazement. I think at that time it must have been a subject of common discussion amongst people such as yourself.

Mr. HENDRICK: I am afraid not. We will have to agree to differ on that, I guess.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I am ending my questions here, but I sincerely hope we will be back to the examination of the Minister and his staff very, very shortly because you and other witnesses who have been before us in this last couple of days have opened up many questions which now need answering by the Minister before we can proceed with what we are doing here.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, I think the simplest way to answer my questions would be for the Air Marshal to repeat his introductory remarks. I was very pleased with them. In fact, I agree wholeheartedly with them, but they do raise a point which I do not think has been brought out yet and I will come to that in a moment.

First of all, I want to refer to a statement made by Mr. Deachman about the study of unification, and so on, in the American forces and he asked whether you were aware of this. Could I ask you this: If we had the forces of the United States, would our problem of unification be a problem to us in relation to the roles that we have now?

Mr. HENDRICK: If we had the forces of the United States, I do not think we would even consider unification.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Also I should refer at this time to two statements that I think Mr. Andras made. You were talking about the economics and the expenditures, and so on, of the Department of National Defence and the number of men that we have and I think he tried to get you to reach the conclusion that there was no alternative.

I have mentioned in the Committee before that France found a solution. They had a problem similar to ours. They still have as much fire power as they ever had; it is not costing them any more money. They are on a fixed budget, the same as Canada, but they increased their weapons and reduced their personnel which is what you have suggested on several occasions this evening. I think, possibly, that is something we should have gone into. Also in your opening remarks—and I go back to the key which I thought I had found this afternoon—

An hon. MEMBER: Do you mean you have lost it?

Mr. MCINTOSH: No, no; I have not lost it; I want to relate it to something that the Air Marshal said and I think it needs an explanation that has not been brought out this evening. It is the key to the puzzle or many puzzles, I would say,

and one of the puzzles and the most puzzling is the Minister's statement and I have referred to this time and time again. I still will; I cannot get his inference when he says that the system will not be changed and we will continue to have all these forces. This has been brought up by our colleagues time and time again to witnesses—we still have these forces; the Minister is not saying that; there has been no change at all; they still have their badges and so on, but he always ends:

—until the force structure within the unified force is developed,

and this is what has puzzled me all along until this afternoon. We come to that question of the role. What is the defence role of Canada? Is it an independent role based on collective defence or is it the go alone policy? Are we going to drop the interdependent role? As you said, and Mr. Andras said, a few moments ago, we must have allies.

I suggest there is one other solution and perhaps this is the solution that the Minister is looking at. We could have somebody else defend us because they are going to defend us whether we want them to or not. It is essential that Canada be defended for the sake of their own defence. You said that if you base an appreciation on a false premise, then you must reach a false conclusion. Well, my premise is based on the key that I found this afternoon, that it is the intention of the Minister to change the role from interdependence to a go-it-alone policy, and that go-it-alone policy is the only thing that makes sense to everything that we have had put in front of us by the government and by the Minister.

You said you "read with amazement the White Paper. It was self-evident it was written backwards", or words to that effect. Now, would you explain just what you meant by that?

Mr. HENDRICK: The White Paper starts with the assumption that integration and unification have been proven to be right, and then proceeds to lay down how they are going to be achieved. Usually the services are taught to appreciate the arguments, and lead up at the end of the argument to the conclusion that we will have to do something to solve the problem, but what I get out of the White Paper is that we are going to do something without any evidence as to why. It seems to start with a *fait accompli* and it is supported by the December 7 statements that this assumption was the basis of the White Paper, that a unified force was the right answer. So, I read into this that we have made up our minds that the unified force is the right answer and all we are doing from now on is just dealing with the details which we have not figured out ahead of time.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I think that General Moncel said the purpose of the White Paper essentially was to produce the best defence policy for Canada; that is the purpose of the White Paper. Do you agree, then, if we have a go-it-alone policy and we have this new peacekeeping force that it will be capable of defending Canada?

Mr. HENDRICK: The peacekeeping force is not capable of defending Canada, no.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, what does it mean in the White Paper where it says under "Objectives",

> The objectives of Canadian defence policy, which cannot be disassociated from foreign policy, are to preserve the peace by supporting collective defence measures to deter military aggression;—

and so on. My interpretation of the White Paper is that we are going to support these collective defence alliances and we are not going to go into a go-it-alone policy. Is that your interpretation of the White Paper?

Mr. HENDRICK: Yes, that is what I read in it; that we were going to do all the things that we had been doing before, and create a mobile force, which is a brand new one, in addition to which we were going to save $100 million and fire 10,000 people, and I thought it was a pretty wonderful trick. That is why I was baffled.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Do you see any manner in which we can carry out this dual role with the personnel that we have at the moment?

Mr. HENDRICK: I cannot answer that unless I look at the establishments that the planners have decided are necessary at this point.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I think you said that in 1964 the recruitment figures showed 150,000 on strength; now, I understand, they are down below 100,000. Do you think we can carry out these two roles with that number of men and still live up to our commitments?

Mr. HENDRICK: I believe the establishment is alleged to be 109,000, or something of the sort at the moment, and the strength is 101,000. We are short that many men, so obviously we cannot do the job with that deficiency.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I am sorry I did not hear your programs on TV. I believe someone said you appeared on November 2. I have been in possession of that key I was looking for for so long that now I am not so sure I have the right key. But I have the right key to solve the problem with regard to the White Paper. I am quite sure I have the key to what was in the Minister's mind or perhaps someone higher than the Minister. If that is the role—a peacekeeping force—I understand it had been rejected by the United Nations. Is that not correct? I could ask a lot of questions on this that were brought up by others. General Foulkes, for example said that type of force would not be accepted by the United Nations. I wonder whether that television appearance you made with Charles Lynch prompted him to write in one his articles that:

> Many of Mr. Hellyer's arguments in support of unification have an improvised air about them, as though he had dreamed up unification first and then devised the evidence in support of it afterwards.

Is that the way unification appears to you? It does to me.

Mr. HENDRICK: I think it does to me, too.

An hon. MEMBER: Have you got the key?

Mr. MCINTOSH: Oh, I think we have the key all right, and we will show you what is in the hidden room before too long. It could be conscription; it could be compulsory military service, and maybe my friends from across the table might like to hear more about that. Maybe I should leave my questions until a little later on.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, first I would like to ask you a question. Could the other members of the Committee, in addition to Mr. Deachman, be provided with a copy of that notorious April order issued by the Minister's office? Is this document now public?

Mr. DEACHMAN: I can get it and see that Mr. Churchill is provided with one and that all his friends have one, also. I will send him two.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, perhaps, you would hand them to the Chairman and the Clerk will see they are distributed.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Surely that is not the classified document which was put out some weeks before the White Paper.

Mr. CHURCHILL: When I go out into the hall I do not meet people from the Department who recognize me and pass me any information, so I just wondered if we could get copies.

The CHAIRMAN: I am pretty sure there are very few people around this building who do not recognize you, Mr. Churchill.

Mr. CHURCHILL: But they do not give me the information; not that I want any of their questions, I can think up my own. I would like to ask the witness one or two questions. First, I would compliment him on the excellent presentation he made. I do not wonder that Mr. Deachman is anxious to get the Minister here to answer, because he is getting pretty worried with the evidence that has been brought forward. But, may I ask the witness this question: During the term that you were in command in the field, prior to your retirement, two events occurred; the issuance of the White Paper and the passage of Bill No. C-190 through the House. Were you consulted about the proposed reorganization?

Mr. HENDRICK: No, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Was your advice sought?

Mr. HENDRICK: No, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: And yet you were field commander of the air force. On any occasion during that period did you have an opportunity of meeting with the Minister or the Associate Minister of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet to discuss this proposal?

Mr. HENDRICK: No, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: May I ask you a question with regard to the White Paper? When you read the White Paper and came across that now famous sentence: "This will be the first step toward a single unified defence force for Canada", did you at that time consider that meant a single service in one uniform with everybody all put together?

Mr. HENDRICK: No sir, I did not.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Do you know of anobody who did?

Mr. HENDRICK: I do not think that was the first implication. Most military men would consider it such a novel solution, shall I say, that they would not read that into it at all.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I notice the White Paper in the same paragraph uses the word "unification" again and says this:

> Sufficient savings should accrue from unification to permit a goal of 25 per cent of the budget to be devoted to capital equipment being realized in the years ahead.

Do you foresee any savings from unification, other than the reduction of personnel that has already occurred?

Mr. HENDRICK: I do not know. By unification are you speaking of the common uniform and things like that?

Mr. CHURCHILL: The common uniform and the single service.

Mr. HENDRICK: No, I cannot. From the details, as they appear to me, now outside the service, I cannot see anything that would cause a saving. As I said earlier, I do not even believe the savings are substantial in eliminating waste. I believe the only way you can save money in substantial amount is to cut the manpower. That really is the only basic way you can save money in substantial quantities.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I judge that the writer of the White Paper was mixed up with regard to integration and unification or that sentence I just read would not have appeared in the form that it did. When you were giving evidence earlier today you said that on one occasion it had come to your attention—and you admit your information is secondhand, just like Mr. Macaluso's information with regard to combat experience is secondhand—that senior officers were at a conference with regard to policy and the order was given that there would be no questions and no discussions. You criticized this as happening in a free and democratic country with a volunteer force. Do you know whether that conference was held in Ottawa or where, and was it attended by members of the three services?

Mr. HENDRICK: I do not know enough about it. I think the Committee would have to discover that for themselves.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Could you give us any lead to how we could effect that discovery?

Mr. HENDRICK: Oh, I am sure headquarters could tell you. There were not that many conferences. I am sure if all the orders along this line were tabled with the Committee it would appear.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Yes, like the order for April, 1964, that I was just talking about. May I ask you this question: Do you consider there has been such a major change in modern warfare that the proposed reorganization of the Canadian defence set-up is required? If there has been a major change, what is it, exclusive of nuclear warfare?

Mr. HENDRICK: I am not aware of any major change which would require this reorganization at all.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Do you consider that Canada would have a more effective fighting force if the three forces were unified, or amalgamated into one?

Mr. HENDRICK: I do not see how.

Mr. CHURCHILL: This is a statement which is frequently made and I was wondering whether, from your long experience, you could see that would happen?

Mr. HENDRICK: I do not believe so.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I take from you evidence that you consider the three fighting services should retain their present identity?

Mr. HENDRICK: They should retain their present identity and they should retain their present chiefs, or what were their present chiefs—their ex-chiefs; in other words, their titular heads, their symbol of existence and their spokesmen in high places and their representative of their expertise.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Are you of the opinion that those concerned with the emphasis on integration and the reorganization that is going on have rather lost sight of the purpose of having defence forces; namely, to provide fighting forces?

Mr. HENDRICK: I think this is so. The combat forces always had the feeling we were too concerned with organization and administration and not enough with fighting. It is normal in peacetime, I think. It is very difficult to keep aggressive in peacetime.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Your judgment of the changes that are going on leads you to the conclusion—which I reached myself some time ago—that the defence department is aiming at a peacekeeping role for Canada's forces and a gradual withdrawal from our military alliances? Is that a correct statement of your feeling?

Mr. HENDRICK: Yes, this is my feeling of what is intended.

Mr. CHURCHILL: With the adoption of the CF-5 airplane, it would appear that the strike reconnaissance role in Europe would be phased out. Is that right?

Mr. HENDRICK: I believe the intention was not to replace the CF-104 and therefore it must be phased out.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Has anyone suggested, or do you foresee, the utilization of the CF-5 with the NATO forces in Europe? Would they mesh with any of the air formations under NATO command?

Mr. HENDRICK: If the airplane is designed, as I understand it to be, as a close support airplane, then it would have to be used in a close support role, which means support of the army, and it would have to depend on the other air forces of the area for its protection.

Mr. CHURCHILL: If a force is devised for United Nations purposes and is comprised of the three arms and its field of operation is some thousands of miles away from this country, how would the CF-5 be utilized under those circumstances? Would it only be by the use of a tanker refueling operation?

Mr. HENDRICK: I am led to believe that its range is such that it takes two or three refuelings to get to Europe and so either it has to stage through Greenland, Iceland and the Faroes, or something of that sort, or else it has to be refueled in the air, one or the other. If it is staged through those places, of course, you have to wait for the weather and you cannot go there right away; you have to take your time. It is practical to do it as long as you have the time to do it.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You would not get the instant response that is being talked about, then?

Mr. HENDRICK: If you had good weather you might, but it is a gamble, and in the North Atlantic it is frequently a gamble. We ferried our planes to Europe many times, as you know, and we allowed weeks to get them over.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I think I will stop at that point, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nugent—I am not looking at the clock.

Mr. NUGENT: I have 11 minutes to 10.30 and I would like to thank the Air Vice-Marshal for pointing out one thing today that people seem to have lost sight of, and that is in the search for economy—trying to cut down on administration costs when they seem to be rising—integration is not the only solution; that

there are in fact co-operative ways which were described which did have an effect this way. I gathered much comfort from your reminding us that the percentage of the common support service is really very low, and that if integration is to work it is only in such fields as common support or common training ground that it can be helpful.

Mr. HENDRICK: Right.

Mr. NUGENT: I want to apologize for rushing through this, but the Minister has done such a snow job on the public in convincing them that integration and unification are so great, that you realize this Committee must hurry through before the snow melts. I will not keep you any longer.

Mr. HENDRICK: I appreciate your courtesy in taking me off the hook on time.

The CHAIRMAN: Air Vice-Marshal Hendrick, you heard me say earlier today to Air Marshal Annis how grateful we were to him for coming here, and we are equally grateful to you, sir.

Mr. LANIEL: Mr. Chairman, in order to give Mr. McIntosh an opportunity to get his answer, perhaps we should think of asking the Minister to appear very soon.

The CHAIRMAN: We will adjourn until tomorrow afternoon at 3.30.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966-67

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. DAVID W. GROOS

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 24

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1967

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1967

Respecting

Bill C-243, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and other Acts in consequence thereof.

LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

WITNESS:

Lieutenant-General F. J. Fleury

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1967

25816—1

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. David W. Groos

Vice-Chairman: Hon. Marcel Lambert

Mr. Andras,
Mr. Brewin,
Mr. Churchill,
[1] Mr. Crossman,
Mr. Fane,
Mr. Forrestall,
Mr. Foy,
Mr. Harkness,
Mr. Hopkins,
Mr. Langlois (*Chicoutimi*),
Mr. Laniel,
Mr. Latulippe,
Mr. LeBlanc (Rimouski),
[2] Mr. Legault,
Mr. Lessard,
Mr. Loiselle,
Mr. MacRae,
Mr. McIntosh,
Mr. McNulty,
Mr. Nugent,
[2] Mr. Rochon,
Mr. Winch—(24).

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

[1] Replaced Mr. Macaluso on February 22, 1967.

[2] Replaced Messrs. Deachman and Matte on February 23, 1967.

ORDERS OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS

WEDNESDAY, February 22, 1967.

Ordered,—That the names of Messrs. Crossman and Matte be substituted for those of Messrs. Macaluso and Rochon on the Standing Committee on National Defence.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

THURSDAY, February 23, 1967.

Ordered,—That the names of Messrs. Rochon, LeBlanc (*Rimouski*), and Byrne be substituted for those of Messrs. Matte, Deachman and McNulty on the Standing Committee on National Defence.

Attest.

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

25816—1½

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

WEDNESDAY, February 22, 1967.
(44)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 3:35 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Groos, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Churchill, Crossman, Deachman, Fane, Forrestall, Foy, Groos, Harkness, Hopkins, Lambert, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laniel, Legault, Lessard, Loiselle, MacRae, Matte, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, and Mr. Winch (22).

Also present: Mr. Cameron (*High Park*).

In attendance: Lieutenant-General F. J. Fleury; *From the Department of National Defence*: Honourable Léo Cadieux, Associate Minister.

The Chairman read a telegram dated February 22, 1967, which he had received from Admiral H. S. Rayner. It was agreed to table the telegram (*Exhibit 3*).

The Chairman introduced the witness, Lieutenant-General F. J. Fleury, who described his military background and Service experience. Following his opening remarks to the Committee, Lieutenant-General Fleury answered questions from the members on a variety of defence subjects in relation to *BILL C-243*.

At 6:05 p.m., with the questioning continuing, the Committee adjourned until 10:00 a.m., Thursday, February 23, 1967.

THURSDAY, February 23, 1967.
(45)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 10:10 a.m. this day with the Chairman, Mr. Groos, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Brewin, Churchill, Crossman, Deachman, Fane, Forrestall, Foy, Groos, Harkness, Hopkins, Lambert, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laniel, Legault, Lessard, Loiselle, MacRae, Matte, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, and Mr. Winch (23).

Also present: Mr. Chatterton and Mr. Pugh.

In attendance: Lieutenant-General F. J. Fleury; *From the Department of National Defence*: Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister; Honourable Léo Cadieux, Associate Minister.

The Committee continued its questioning of the witness, Lieutenant-General F. J. Fleury, which began at the previous sitting. When the questioning was completed, the Chairman thanked General Fleury on behalf of the Committee, for his testimony in connection with *Bill C-243*.

At 1:15 p.m., the Committee adjourned until 3:30 p.m. this day, when the witness will be the Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister of National Defence.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Wednesday, February 22, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I see a quorum. I have a telegram which has been sent to me, as Chairman, from Admiral Rayner, which I will read:

> The following telegram has been sent to the Honourable Paul T. Hellyer. Quote In our conversation on evening of Friday 17th February you suggested I appear before the Standing Committee on National Defence stop the Chairman has not yet seen fit to invite me but I wish it to be placed on record that I am available and prepared at 24 hours notice unquote

As I said, this was sent to the Chairman and, with your permission, I will table it.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I presume you are going to call Admiral Rayner.

The CHAIRMAN: His name is one of a series of names that has been submitted to the steering committee but in view of what has happened I would imagine the committee itself would like to see him.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, while we have considerations under way at this time I want to return to something I said on a couple of other occasions toward the latter part of this week. We have accumulated a great many questions in our minds from what witnesses have said here over the past week or more. At some point before the echo of their words leaves us I think we should be returning to hear what the minister says and what the staff says, without prejudice to any other steps we may take. I just wonder whether or not we are giving consideration to when that can be fitted in. Perhaps there are some ideas about what we should do about recalling the minister and his staff at an appropriate time to hear what they have to say on these points.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, perhaps it would be of interest to the committee to know that I have asked the various groups represented on the steering committee if they would let me have an idea of the number of witnesses they feel should be called, and I have these replies in now. I had been intending to have a steering committee meeting in a very short time in order to arrive at the recommendations that we could place before you.

As I sense the feelings of the committee, quite apart from a wish, which I think is universal, that we should make progress, we have also three other things which are on our minds. One of them is that there have very definitely been suggestions put to me that it is time that we did see the minister, and there are a lot of questions which, I am sure the minister would like to answer. There is also the very natural suggestion that we should see some more witnesses, and we have invited one here today. There is yet another wish, that we should in some

way try to relax our schedule. These are matters which concern us all, and perhaps you would like to help me on this?

Mr. McINTOSH: Based on personal opinion, I have not heard any members on this side say that we felt we should have the minister at this time. We feel we have questioned the minister and that we have all the information we can get from him. However, if it would be of help to his own party to have him recalled again, they may have second thoughts on what he said. I do not think we would go against it, if you want to recall him.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Lambert, you are the vice chairman of this committee.

Mr. LAMBERT: I think it is a question of the relative decibel level of propaganda at the present time, and I think one has to consider this aspect. I realize that the public image is being considered, but it will be remembered that the minister repeated, I do not know many times, that there would be no obstacle placed in the way of this committee to hear witnesses, and that we could hear the witnesses we wanted.

The CHAIRMAN: This is not an obstacle. I would like to put this straight right now.

Mr. LAMBERT: I want to make it clear. There have been names suggested and other names are likely to be suggested to us some, because of the comments that have been made by witnesses on the defectiveness of integration, and others, who appeared before this committee in 1964, at the time of the consideration of Bill No. C-190, who were most enthusiastic about it. I know that some of them have not exactly changed their minds but they have observed what has happened, and I think if their evidence was of any value to the committee in 1964 it is of equal value now to assess because once we get through Bill No. C-243 there is no point of recall on integration. This is so vitally important to the whole structure of our forces that I feel we would be derogating from our duty if we did not call one or two of these men.

Mr. LANIEL: Mr Chairman, I personally believe that we have had ample opportunity to get information and hear views from witnesses, and to question them. I am wondering if at this stage there is not a danger of becoming repetitive—unless we hear the minister, which might give us a different line of questioning.

Mr. McINTOSH: I have the same fear of it becoming repetitive, too, if we have the minister back. We have heard him time and time again. He has not changed his position. He will not answer questions we want answered.

Mr. LANIEL: I would go further than ask the minister; I would want some of his senior officers, like the chief of staff, also to appear. Maybe after that it would not hurt us to call in two or more witnesses.

Mr. McINTOSH: I agree that we should have the chief of the general staff.

Mr. LANIEL: I think this should be done this week.

Mr. LAMBERT: One or two?

Mr. LANIEL: Well, I say two or more; I am not to insist on that. But there is one thing for sure, we are not interested in hearing everyone who is against and everyone who is for unification who wants to appear before the committee. I do

not think we want that. We want people who will bring something to the work of the committee.

Mr. LAMBERT: Some people who have experience with this.

Mr. LANIEL: I believe so.

Mr. LAMBERT: This has been the unfortunate part of it.

Mr. LANIEL: You mean we have not had experienced witnesses so far?

Mr. LAMBERT: You have had them; this is the unfortunate part of it.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. McIntosh, if it would help members on this side of the table and if they would raise no objection, personally; I think it would help me at this time, having listened to a good deal of discussion which has raised questions in my mind—which I do not think can be answered except by the Minister, the staff and the people who are professionally involved; in other words, by the government—if we had the Minister and his staff back in order to obtain the facts the government can present to us. Mr. Lambert suggested that this is a question of the decibel level. I am not so interested really in the decibel level. I think by that he means the degree to which supporters of the opposition and we are bringing evidence against or for it. I think we have to consider right now whether or not we are getting enough solid facts to proceed in an orderly manner with what we have to do next week. It is for this reason that I would appeal to members to take a pause, have the Minister and his staff in and spend a couple of days with him, then look at the situation and figure out where we are going to the end of the examination of this bill. Surely that would be a reasonable way to proceed, and I think Mr. McIntosh and members opposite would not disagree with that as an orderly way to proceed.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I can only speak for myself, Mr. Chairman, but I can see the need for a re-briefing of the people on the other side. There must have been many doubts raised in their minds in the last three or four days.

The CHAIRMAN: I am not quite sure how helpful that is.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, if he will call—

Mr. MCINTOSH: I am quite happy with the findings—

The CHAIRMAN: Order, order.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, I would have no objection whatever to hearing the minister and members of his staff at any time, as long as it is thoroughly understood that it is not going to end the proceedings as far as hearing witnesses are concerned. There are a considerable number of other witnesses who I think we should hear and whose evidence would be valuable and, in fact, very necessary to us. As long as these witnesses are heard and called, as far as I am concerned I do not care in the slightest at what time the minister and his staff come back to answer questions and deal with some of the matters which have been raised.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, after the expressions that have now been put forward, could I suggest that you call a meeting of the steering committee tomorrow morning to go over the views expressed and to prepare a recommendation for the next meeting of the committee on our procedures, and that we now proceed to hear the witness before us.

Mr. LOISELLE: Mr. Chairman, I join with my colleagues, Mr. Deachman and Mr. Harkness, who have proposed having the Minister and his officers appear before us.

Mr. HARKNESS: I did not propose it; I said I had no objection.

Mr. LOISELLE: You collaborate with us; you have no objections. These last two weeks we have heard some witnesses expressing their own opinions on what could happen with integration and so on. Now we should hear from the Minister and his officials in order to hear the opinions of the men who have the task of putting integration in force on some questions and answers that have been given in the last two weeks. After that the committee will be ready to decide whether they should continue with witnesses.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Should we then have the witnesses, back to answer the minister?

Mr. LOISELLE: I am entitled to my opinion; that is all.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, I raise a very serious matter in connection with this. We have not available to us the printed minutes of the meetings that we have held with the sole exception of the very first meeting. If we are going to call the minister and his staff in, I for one, would like to have the printed record of the meetings we have had, or if that is not available, photostats of the minutes that have been kept so that we are in a position to know what the questions and answers were. Otherwise there will be a conflict in the committee as to who said what and when, and we will not have the actual information.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Churchill, may I speak to this point. I have been in touch with the Clerk, who has been in touch with those responsible for producing the transcript and the printing of the evidence of this committee. The situation now is that we have four issues at the printers. It is my understanding that we have the highest priority there and that these issues should be available within the next day or so. I am told that the hold-up is not in the printing bureau but in the transcribing section. The mechanical process involves a stenographer typing what she thinks she hears from a tape recorder. When what she has typed has been compared with what has been recorded the transcript is then sent over to the printing office, where it should not really take much more than 24 hours to print. So I am left with a considerable doubt as to whether we would save anything by trying to get photostats of the transcripts. I gather this would be a precedent, which I would be unwilling to accept without being pushed into it by the committee as a whole.

Mr. LAMBERT: May I point out that for the debate on deposit insurance, the committees branch provided me with a copy of the transcript of the day's meeting immediately before on deposit insurance.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, at the moment, our transcripts are running behind. We hope to catch up some time over the week end.

Mr. MACRAE: Mr. Chairman, when you mentioned four issues, did you mean four days or four sittings?

The CHAIRMAN: They have gone out now to Tuesday, February 14.

Mr. MACRAE: February 14.

The CHAIRMAN: That would be the Minister, TRIO, Admiral Brock and Admiral Dillon.

Mr. LAMBERT: The statement we want to question the Minister about are those made by General Moncel, Air Marshal Annis and Air Vice Marshal Hendrick.

The CHAIRMAN: This, as you know, is not unusual in committees.

Mr. LAMBERT: The only thing, though, is that there have been notes taken of points by ministerial staff for preparation of replies. There is not only the one transcription service working here; there is a very efficient—almost 100 per cent perhaps—staff provided not only to assist the Minister in his replies but to inspire questioning by government members.

The CHAIRMAN: I also, on my own, have been trying to take down the points as fast as I can. If I have not looked as though I have been attentive to what has been going on in the Committee it is because I have been trying to do this myself.

Mr. LAMBERT: Not in shorthand?

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, may I speak to the point that Mr. Deachman has raised. He said that the evidence has raised certain points and now he would like to have the minister and his staff in to answer or comment on them. Certainly, the evidence has raised certain points, and the remainder of the witnesses coming will raise more points. Then, I suppose, he would want to have the minister back again after the next few witnesses. I do not really object to whenever they want to bring the minister. If they just want to answer the points that have been raised, may I say that points, will continue to be raised, which sort of takes away from his argument as to the urgency of the minister's appearance.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, there is some merit in that. As I told you, yesterday I asked the representatives on the steering committee if they would let me have a list of the names of persons they thought should yet appear. This list does not appear to be very extensive and I may say, without betraying any confidences, that there are names of senior officers of the army and navy on it. I heard Mr. Lambert just say that it would be our wish to call one or two of these men, and I am sure that the committee would want to do this. I do not want to impose any limitation on the numbers that are called, but perhaps you could help me so that we do not run into a problem in this connection. I have these other matters I have been speaking of, one of which is the effort to relax the schedule. Before I offer what you might consider an agreeable suggestion, Mr. Fane would like to say something.

Mr. FANE: I would like to ask you, Mr. Chairman, if it would be possible to have evidence from some less senior officers than we have had so far. Could we possibly arrange to have the odd major, squadron leader or the equivalent to give evidence?

The CHAIRMAN: Retired or serving?

Mr. FANE: Oh God, not serving; we had better protect them.

The CHAIRMAN: That is something we could certainly consider.

Mr. FANE: I think it would be a good thing to have some evidence from people in the lower echelons of the commissioned ranks.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, if I may interject, it seems to me that apart from the very natural political suggestions that surface from time to time, one of the functions of this committee is to provide orderly process to our main objective, which is to get as much information and as many answers as possible. I think the time is now ripe. Many questions have been posed. Many suggestions have been made—some very valid, some perhaps invalid, we do not know. I think it is very natural now and a very fair thing that we call upon the minister and the senior members of the defence staff as soon as possible. I would like to suggest that we see them here before us tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN: There has not been any great objection made to this suggestion that we do hear the minister, but I was really trying to see if the committee could help me in deciding in what order and approximately how many more witnesses should appear. At the same time there are still these other matters I mentioned earlier on.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, if we cannot get the records, it might help the committee if the minister would submit a list of the questions he is going to answer beforehand.

Mr. ANDRAS: There is no restriction on the questions that can be asked by members of the committee when he appears.

The CHAIRMAN: I think the questions are mostly in the minds of the members of the committee.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Oh, I understood he had a record of the questions he wanted to answer.

The CHAIRMAN: I did not mean to convey that. I wonder if—

Mr. WINCH: I come back to my suggestion, sir, that you call a meeting of the steering committee tomorrow to go into these problems.

The CHAIRMAN: We have a witness available.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, could we not now agree to have the minister and his staff appear tomorrow and the steering committee meet to decide what further progress should be made or what form it will take from there on. We are now committed to hear a witness this afternoon. We have heard of other witnesses suggested but the commitment right now is for one. We would like to settle this matter of the minister and the senior officials of the defence staff appearing before us tomorrow, and then we could have the steering committee meet, as Mr. Winch suggests, to deal with what happens after that.

The CHAIRMAN: Would that be agreeable to the members of the committee?

Mr. HARKNESS: I do not know if that is agreeable or not. It is now 4 o'clock and we have to adjourn today at 6 o'clock. I would be very doubtful if we would be finished hearing the evidence and questioning General Fleury by the time this meeting finishes. I think that we should complete the evidence of General Fleury before we do anything else.

Mr. MCNULTY: Mr. Chairman, if what Mr. Harkness says is true, I hope General Fleury will be available tomorrow morning. I know I would like to hear the minister and his staff. There have been a great many statements made directly concerning policy, suggesting that there should be a slowdown and that

the planning is not adequate and so on, and I would like to question the minister and the senior staff members.

Mr. LAMBERT: How about General Allard tomorrow afternoon and tomorrow night? The minister is going to be rather long, let us face it.

An hon. MEMBER: Maybe General Allard too.

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes, but I would think that it would take about the same time as the others, two sittings.

An hon. MEMBER: There is no reason to interrupt the hearing of General Fleury's testimony.

Mr. NUGENT: I have no objection if they want to bring the minister on after that, or whatever they arrange, but I do think that it is showing an unbelievable haste to suggest that we fix a time now. They can come on as soon as we have finished with General Fleury; I think that would be wiser than saying at 2 o'clock, 10 o'clock, or 8 o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN: Do I read the members of the committee correctly, that we will complete the questioning of General Fleury tomorrow and then carry on with the minister and his staff, and that we will have a steering committee meeting tomorrow to decide on the direction we should take afterward.

Mr. NUGENT: And the number of witnesses after that.

The CHAIRMAN: Could I ask General Fleury to join me at the rostrum.

General Fleury is an old friend of this committee; he appeared before us as a witness once before and we have invited him again to present a brief, if he wishes to do so, or to answer questions.

General Fleury says he has no brief. I think it would be a good thing, for the benefit of some of the newer members, if you could give us a summary of your experience and background, as has been done by other witnesses.

Lieut.-General F. J. FLEURY: Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, I took my first faltering step in the military service when I joined the Canadian Officers Training Corps in 1929. I stayed with the COTC for some five years; then I returned to it a couple of years later, early 1937, and I was still an officer in COTC when war broke out. At this point I held the rank of captain. I was adjutant of a training centre at Farnham, Quebec. I went overseas in 1941 where I took up the appointment of adjutant in a reinforcements unit. The following year I was posted to the Canadian Military Headquarters in London, where I stayed on the staff until November 1943, then I went on staff to Italy in the rank of major. I was returned to London as the Military Secretary of CMHQ in the spring of 1944. I returned from overseas after V.E. Day in 1945 with the rank of colonel.

Since the war I have been Director of Personnel, Director of Organization and Vice Quartermaster General at Army Headquarters Ottawa for various periods. I was also the Chief of Staff, Prairie Command, Winnipeg; Commander Canadian Military Mission Far East, 1950-51; Commander Eastern Quebec area 1951-56; General Officer commanding Quebec Command 1961-65. In the fall of 1965 I was ordered to Ottawa, promoted to Lieutenant-General, and appointed Comptroller General of the new integrated Canadian Forces Headquarters.

I retired a few months ago and my legal status at the moment is that of an officer on leave pending retirement.

Mr. WINCH: Do you have any statements or remarks, General, before we question you on the matter before us?

Mr. FLEURY: I do not think anything that might really forward the work of the committee, except that the Chairman and some others may know that I came here with apparent reluctance—and the reluctance was more than apparent. It was not that I expected other than a good reception. I have had good receptions from the committee before, but I think that now that I am in a position to say a word to you, gentlemen, in this field, my reluctance stems largely, if not exclusively, from the feeling that I have had for many a long year, that there was great danger in calling serving officers before any parliamentary committee. Many of you may be aware that this was not done until very recent times and although I made no mention of this when I was here last, I came here very reluctantly under orders from my chief, because I honestly feel that the questioning of serving officers by this committee, whilst it may be most helpful to the committee, is very unfair and embarrassing to the serving officer. Obviously he is like the ham in the sandwich. If he follows the party line he does not really add anything to your knowledge; if he does not follow the party line, he is bound to be in trouble when he gets back to his desk in headquarters.

Mr. WINCH: Are you prepared now, though, in your present position, Lieutenant-General to assist in the most important work of understanding, and the decision that this committee has to reach on the bill which is now before us.

Mr. FLEURY: Indeed, sir; that is why I am here.

Mr. WINCH: If you can, could I ask if you could comment on the position of integration and perhaps what you knew about it when you were in your latest position of Comptroller-General at headquarters.

Mr. FLEURY: I myself held an integrated position in headquarters for just under a year, from the fall of 1965 to the summer of 1966. There had been over the years a good deal of consideration—possibly more consideration than action—toward integration. I had always felt that the armed forces would benefit by a much greater degree of integration than was the situation in 1964. I think it would not be unfair to say that I was a supporter, maybe even an enthusiastic supporter, of the principle of integration. I have noticed, particularly in recent months, that the terms "integration" and "unification" seem to get confused and indeed, sometimes—have been treated as synonyms, which of course they are not, in my lexicon. Does that answer your question?

Mr. WINCH: It is a nice start, sir. To your latest knowledge, has integration been successful, with its faults, and should it be pursued per se?

Mr. FLEURY: I can speak from personal and more or less official knowledge only up until the 15th day of July last, when I relinquished my appointment as Quartermaster General.

Mr. HARKNESS: You mean Comptroller-General.

Mr. FLEURY: I am sorry, what did I say?

Mr. HARKNESS: Quartermaster General.

Mr. FLEURY: I meant to say Comptroller-General. Up to a point shortly before the 15th of July, I thought we were on the right road. I thought that the integration of the three services headquarters in Ottawa was a good thing be-

cause it would increase the efficiency of the armed forces, because it should save money, and because it would bring the three services closer together.

I began to have considerable misgivings about the direction and speed of integration some weeks at least, if not months, before my retirement. The integration process had been going on, in Ottawa particularly, for about a year before my arrival and I had heard stories about people burning the midnight oil several nights a week and week-ends trying to keep up with the pressure of producing the many plans and papers which would be required to integrate fully and in an orderly fashion the headquarters in Ottawa. When I arrived here in September 1965 this processs was, it seemed to me, reasonably well in hand, to the point that integration of the field commands was being planned and progressively put into practice. I came to realize, or I thought I came to realize, that things were being done under the cloak of integration which really were not part of the integration process at all. I discovered to my surprise, because this was not my first tour in Ottawa—it was my fourth—that communications were very bad within the headquarters, and between the headquarters and the commanders in the field. I found that the tried and true channels of communication which had been the warp and woof of navy, army and air force procedures in chain of command for decades had largely been discarded. I found that officers working for me knew more, or said they knew more, or thought they knew more, about what was in the mind of the Minister than I did. I found that security information as I knew it, was practically non-existent. The whole headquarters reminded me of a giant sieve. I saw evidence of disloyalty, and near disloyalty, in some people to the point literally that on one, two or three occasions a week, I would sit at my desk and feel like vomiting. I decided after all these years that this was an atmosphere, that these were conditions under which I could no longer conscientiously serve, and I asked for my retirement.

Mr. WINCH: This is my last question. When you became apprehensive about these matters, and particularly about the speed at which integration was going on, although you agreed with it in principle, did you register your views to anyone with authority to do anything about it and, if so, what was the result?

Mr. FLEURY: I did register my views on many occasions to my immediate superiors. I expressed my misgiving and I, throughout, got a courteous hearing but little, if anything, ever resulted.

Mr. WINCH: Were you ever able to meet the Minister, or did you make any endeavour to meet the Minister himself, to convey your misgivings?

Mr. FLEURY: I met the Minister on may occasions at meetings of Defence Council to which normally I was invited, although I was not a member, but until a very few days before my retirement, I had no direct personal contact with the Minister ever.

Mr. WINCH: Unfortunately, sir, I have to leave in a few minutes. May I be permitted to ask one further question because we have heard considerable about it? You know the change which is made between what used to be and what is now the Defence Council. Have you anything to say regarding the present set-up compared with the previous set-up in respect to a chain of communication and information between the military and the civilian authority?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, as you undoubtedly know, the Defence Council at the moment consists of the Minister, the Associate Minister, the Parliamentary

Secretary, if any, the Deputy Minister and the Chairman of the Defence Research Board—a total of four or five, and two military officers, the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Vice Chief of Defence Staff. In addition, other people can be, and are very frequently, called in, usually for specific items, or for specific meetings. I, myself, favour a more even balance of membership in the Defence Council as between military experts and civilians. Traditionally, until recent years, I think we had this. There was some military expertise available to the Defence Council and more then two voices, maximum, which, in my humble opinion made for better decisions.

You must remember that the two military members are not always in Ottawa for every meeting of Defence Council so Defence Council may very well end up meeting with one military man, Navy, Army or Air Force, whereas if one of the civilian members is not present there are still three or four left.

Now I am not suggesting for one minute that you must have a balance so that there is a fight to a saw-off on these matters, but I do suggest—and this brings me back, I suppose, full circle to my short opening remarks—that one of the effects, I am sure unintended, of changes that have taken place, is that there is a tendency more and more for military officers to skate pretty close to the political line which, in my opinion, is a very bad thing indeed. It is just as bad as politicians or civil servants who insist on acting as if they were military officers.

Mr. WINCH: Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nugent?

Mr. NUGENT: General, I appreciated your opening remarks about your reluctance to appear here today. I have, before in this Committee, thought that we should, in asking people to appear, make it somewhat peremptory so that officers would realize that while the request is lightly couched they are not asked to volunteer to come, and I do not suppose that you came here as a volunteer. Or, did you?

Mr. FLEURY: I was invited to come. I think that is the best construction that I can put upon it.

Mr. NUGENT: Now I am very interested in the feeling around headquarters, because I am sure that there is nothing more important that this Committee can look into than the matter of officers, like yourself, asking for early retirement. By the way, how early was your retirement?

Mr. FLEURY: I was 52 years of age when I retired and the normal retirement age is 55.

Mr. NUGENT: So that when the process was going on you were a very experienced officer in the very key position of Comptroller General, working hard, and you said "with enthusiasm" about the general idea of trying to get more integration into the forces because you felt it would aid efficiency and save money. That is the position you were in when you came to headquarters and were trying to do your work. You said that your early retirement was because of the changed conditions—and I think that you described it as those things that were going on around headquarters under the cloak of integration. Is that right?

Mr. FLEURY: Yes.

Mr. NUGENT: When you said the communications were bad between headquarters staff, I presume you meant in headquarters itself between various groups, and then between headquarters and the field commanders. These "communications" did not refer to physical equipment deteriorating?

Mr. FLEURY: No. This was excellent.

Mr. NUGENT: Was this lack or failure of communication because there were some rules laid down; was it an atmosphere created by any direction or the manner in which people were acting—just exactly what sort of cause did you detect for this lack of communication?

Mr. FLEURY: I think there were many causes, sir, the first cause—not necessarily the most important cause—was that almost everybody at headquarters was suddenly pitch-forked into a new job, and even if he retained the title that he had previously, he now had responsibilities to different people and for different things. One of the standing jokes told around headquarters for quite some time was about the colonel or navy captain—I do not know which he was—who went out of the office for a moment and said to his stenographer, "Now if my boss calls while I am away please get his name."—and there was more truth than poetry in that. People were moving so quickly into new environments with new responsibilities that there was a general feeling of people scurrying about in the headquarters trying to fit into new offices and new jobs with new telephone numbers and new stenographers, with new staffs, and so on. This in itself was a considerable upset in the headquarters.

At the same time as these people were trying to settle down themselves, they were pushed into reorganizing the field commands. This bears on the point I made earlier, of the pace with which the integration process was carried out. And then there was a feeling that grew up, faint at first, and then to near certainty, that somebody was doing a sort of strip-tease with integration; they would only let you see a bit at a time.

It was in the back of people's minds that we would integrate on a progressive basis with this headquarters, that headquarters and the other headquarters; that we were not going to worry about this, and we were not going to worry about that, and we were not going to worry about something else; nobody's rank was going to be touched; nobody's uniform was going to be touched, and in the background somewhere, unification maybe in 5, 10, 15 or 25 years. But then one started to read in the newspapers, reports by the Minister or an unnamed defence spokesman, or somebody, that we were going to unify by July 1, 1967 and then we went through a painful charade under the guise of Defence Council one day, when all senior officers in headquarters were called in and asked what they thought about unification now, and I think that this was most embarrassing all around. The Vice Chief of Defence Staff had two or three of his subordinates there; I had one of mine; the Chief of Technical Services had three or four of his subordinates there, and the Chief of Personnel had one of his subordinates, and each in turn was asked what his reaction was to unification and what needed to be done, and so on.

This brings me back to the point I made earlier, about channels of communication. I found the whole process quite painful. I said at that time that the Comptroller General would require not less than two years just to catch up with

the paper work which had resulted from the integration process to that date. In retrospect, I think my estimate was a very modest one.

Mr. NUGENT: Sir, just so we understand this change of communications, I think you said that the tried and true channels had been discarded. We have heard some mention from other witnesses here—and I want to be sure it is on the record and that we understand it—that serving officers have a great deal of loyalty. There is a feeling among the senior officers that you protect your Minister and your Minister protects you. Has this not been the traditional feeling?

Mr. FLEURY: I think something of that nature, sir. I think that most of us who have served as long as I have, have dealt with quite a succession of Ministers. I suppose I myself have had personal dealings with eight or ten of them. On the whole, we said our piece and if it were not accepted we came out of the meeting putting the best possible faith on it, and going on and doing what we were told to do. If we were not prepared to do that, of course, we had the obvious alternative of turning in our papers.

Mr. NUGENT: Would this not also go from the chiefs down through to your subordinates? If you would protect a man under you and take the responsibility for him, he in turn would make any complaints he has, which would go, through you, to higher authority. Is this not the usual tried and true channels of communications?

Mr. FLEURY: And I think, if I may say so, the tried and true channels of loyalty. Certainly, in my book loyalty has always been a two-way street. If I get loyalty from my subordinates, they certainly get protection from me.

Mr. NUGENT: You have told us that these were abandoned, that you had officers working under you who knew more about what was in the Minister's mind or, at least, they said they did, and that this feeling was general throughout headquarters. Was this the case?

We had some evidence, I think it was from Air Marshal Annis, to the effect that it happened to everybody in headquarters, that this sort of thing was going on, that those who had the responsibility for the junior officers did not know as much as the junior officers as to what was going on.

Mr. FLEURY: In some cases I think this was so.

Mr. NUGENT: Can you tell us how this came about? Where were they getting the information? Was the Minister having them all in or was the Minister's propaganda agent advising them, rather than yourself, what was going on?

Mr. FLEURY: I do not know if I can answer that as precisely as I would like to. To begin with, you must understand that this process had been going on before my arrival. It was something that I found out about after I arrived or, at least, the extent of which I found out after I arrived.

Initially I was a very busy man as Comptroller-General. I had an entirely new job with an entirely new staff and in the re-organization period, for which the Comptroller-General's branch was largely responsible, we had plenty on our plate and in the early stages I think I tended to sort of brush aside any of these little contretemps that arose and put it down to growing pains, to different procedures, policies and ideas that maybe Naval and Air Force officers had

opposed to Army officers, and the reverse, but it got to the point where the Minister was dealing directly with subordinate officers. It got to the point where the best advice that his principal advisers could give him was often not followed. I never did find out whether the decisions taken were decisions which were arrived at by the Minister himself or on the advice of others, people who were not his principal military advisers. I do not think it matters very much to me at this stage.

Mr. NUGENT: Well, sir, is it possible—

Mr. FLEURY: To give you an example, as recently as ten days or two weeks before my retirement, I was called by my chief and told to go and see the Minister at such and such a time and on such and such a date two or three days ahead, and this was the first time I had been privately closeted with the Minister since I arrived in Ottawa, apart from shaking his hand when I reported in. Not unnaturally I knew that my chief was going to be in Paris at a NATO meeting on the day in question, and not unnaturally I said, "What is this meeting all about?" My chief said, "I do not know," and he did not say any more. You can draw only one of two conclusions from this; either he was not privy to the Minister's plan or he was not telling me the truth. In either case, it was about that time that I came to the end of my rope.

Mr. NUGENT: Is it possible for any senior officer to carry on when the normal channels of communication are discarded in that manner, sir?

Mr. FLEURY: It was not possible for me, that is all I can say.

Mr. NUGENT: We have had a brief from Admiral Landymore describing some of his difficulties, and you will remember that the Minister had not been very charitable about Landymore and some of his activities. In his brief Admiral Landymore describes the unrest among his officers, I understand, because of press statements emanating from the Minister's office that he did not know anything about. Do you think it likely that this sort of communication would add to the commander's difficulties in that area?

Mr. FLEURY: I cannot state from personal knowledge of Admiral Landymore's problems but I can tell you about a problem which I had myself. I tell it not really to prove a point but to show you that there is always the lighter side to this business.

I was invited to chair a seminar on senior management some time, I think, early in June of last year, and the people who attended this seminar were generals, admirals, brigadiers, and the equivalent, some senior civil servants, an assistant secretary of war from Washington, an American three star general and various people of that ilk. I had prepared what I thought was a reasoned presentation. You will also understand that this was a closed meeting. I proved to my satisfaction that in the field of research and development we were in exactly and entirely the wrong league. I used such examples as the Arrow and the Bobcat and the Hydrofoil, so that no service would feel left out in the cold, and I pointed out that with the very limited amount of money that we had after we had paid for operations and maintenance that we could no longer under any circumstances afford to go on our own into any major research or development program.

In line with the technique which is not ususual at this sort of seminar, I expected that this would provoke quite a violent reaction and that we would probably get a lot out of a round table discussion. Rather to my surprise it fell flat as I could not work up an argument with anybody. All the people around the table, there were about eighteen or twenty of them, agreed entirely. I went on to say that, of course, this did not mean that we ought to get out of the research and development business, but what we ought to do—as we had done in the past in some instances—was to get together with the U.S. or the U.K., or others, by agreement on a research or development item of interest to both of us, pay a reasonable share of the development cost and carry out an agreed proportion of the development work compatible with our technical and financial resources.

So, I left the meeting after a few hours and went to Montreal for the weekend. When I got back to my office on Monday I found out by sheer accident that the Minister had given a speech at the commencement exercises of some college in the States, saying that obviously the Canadian armed forces were going to have to spend more and more money on research and development and get into new development programs. I am sure that what I said did not bother the Minister in the slightest because he probably never heard of it, but what he said bothered me because this was the first I had heard of it.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, I think I have spent enough time on the atmosphere. Thank you, General. I hope to get back on later, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DEACHMAN: General Fleury, when you opened your remarks you said that you did not feel it was right that serving officers should be called before the Committee and that this is a relatively recent practice. Is that a fair interpretation of your remarks?

Mr. FLEURY: That is correct.

Mr. DEACHMAN: This is a committee that looks at the biggest spending department of the government. This is a department that spends anywhere from 20 per cent to 25 per cent of the taxpayer's dollar. Incidentally, this is an area of discretionary spending; it is an area in which you can spend a lot of money or a little money. It is one of the few. It is not like the Post Office, where there is not too much you can do about it one way or the other. This is a big area of discretionary spending and consequently this committee is one of the most important committees in the house because it looks at a major area of discretionary government spending.

What I am coming to is how are we going to properly assess what goes on in the Department of National Defence and, as members of parliament, how are we to get any comprehension if we cannot have serving officers before us so that we can question them about the operation and get an illustration of their work in their departments? It would seem to me that if you are properly protected from making political declarations or security declarations surely we, as members of parliament in this committee, ought to have access to your knowledge to see whether we can interpret to the people the policies and the intentions of the government in this important field. I wonder if you would go along with me that it really does not serve the national purpose to draw a veil between this committee and the serving officers.

Mr. FLEURY: I was just voicing a personal opinion on how I felt and still feel. I was not suggesting for one minute how this committee should or should not go about its business. I thought that I ought to draw to the committee's attention the view of one officer who has been through the mill, namely myself, and what his reaction to it is.

I almost said there are, but I should say there were, up until July 15 last, no ground rules whatever laid down for the appearance of officers before this Committee. When I appeared on a couple of occasions before this Committee last June I was told to come to the Committee and give a brief and answer questions, period. Now, never having been in this position before, I could not help but wonder what would happen if I gave the wrong answer to the wrong question.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Sir, I wonder if this is not something that also crosses the minds of many civil servants that come before committees. Over the course of this last year we have had 21 standing committees of the house, and we are charged with the examination of the estimates of departments. Surely you are not very much different from any departmental officer who must be loyal to his minister and loyal to the policy of the government which he administers through his minister.

Mr. FLEURY: I think with respect, sir, the difference is a very great one.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Where does it lie?

Mr. FLEURY: To begin with, there should never be any political advice given to the Minister by any serving officer. This is the school in which I was brought up and it is the school in which everybody in my generation was brought up in the armed forces. Civil servants, and particularly the deputy minister and assistant deputy ministers, are much closer to the political scene than serving officers. Do not forget that the civil servant, by and large, spends his whole life being a senior civil servant in Ottawa, whereas serving officers such as myself, for example, find that they are away from the Ottawa scene for nine years running and then suddenly they are pitch-forked into a military job at headquarters. The last distinction I think is a very valid one. The civil service is not the authoritarian, totalitarian organization that the armed forces are, and which the armed forces must be if you are to train, maintain and improve discipline with the one end in view of instant obedience to orders in action. I think there is a very grave difference, very grave, and it is not just a question of tradition.

Mr. HARKNESS: May I just interject a question at this point.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Yes, certainly.

Mr. HARKNESS: Is there not another very great difference in that the civil servant as a whole is completely protected in his employment, and whether he gives answers which are pleasing to the government of the day or not, his employment is still completely safe and secure, whereas the serving officer is not in that position, he can be dismissed immediately, which makes a very big difference.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Well, I just wonder whether in application this difference is actually as broad as Mr. Harkness puts it. I wonder whether or not the veil must be drawn between this Committee and senior officers who are operating, let us say, and responsible for major commands. I think of the commanders of Mobile

Command, Materiel Command, Training Command, and so on, who have been given by the Minister a major area of the armed forces to administer, and to administer those in a way which reflects government policy. Now, surely if we as a Committee of 24 members drawn from all sides of the house are to intelligently assess what is being done in regard to policy we must have some access to the people who know the facts, and I ask you to assist the Committee in telling us how this can be done. Must we forever have the veil drawn between us the way they do with Crown corporations. I wonder if you understand, sir, when you come to examine, for instance, the President of the C.N.R. as far as the member of parliament is concerned you are up against a real mystery. He shows you nothing but his slippers poking out from underneath the Pullman curtain. We get little more than that when we examine him.

Mr. FLEURY: All right. I begin to regret that I expressed this view at the beginning, because I certainly did not expect to be questioned on it. However, it is my view and it remains my view. Now, how you are to go about your business is something on which I do not feel I should be asked to comment. I can only ask how these committees went about their business prior to two years ago.

Mr. DEACHMAN: We are trying to improve our organization. We are in a process of a massive re-organization of the committee structure and there has been a great deal of discussion in Parliament about it and a great deal of confusion within the committee structure, but gradually by staying with it and tussling with it we are finding new ways.

Mr. NUGENT: What he said was they have got just as bad in Parliament as they have got here.

Mr. DEACHMAN: We are making progress, too. I am finished.

Mr. MCINTOSH: General, just to add a word to what Mr. Harkness has said, I would suggest to you also that in your position as a combat officer it would be very difficult for you to get a job with some other firm or some other country in the profession that you have selected as your lifetime service. It is not as easy as it is, say, in my province of Saskatchewan where there was a change of government not too long ago and where many of the senior civil servants left or were retired and then were immediately picked up by either the federal government or one of the other provinces. The same does not apply, I do not think, to the combat officer, does it?

Mr. FLEURY: I would not like you to push this one too far, sir. You are more than kind. The fact of the matter is that I was trained as a combat officer up to the time that I acquired the rank of captain, and I used to think I was good one. That was over twenty-five years ago, and since then my appointments have varied from command staff, and the question of employment outside the armed forces is, in my case and in the case of most other officers that I know, no problem whatever. Indeed, I am gainfully and happily employed, and this I do not think is really a factor. It has certainly not been in recent years. It may be that if we did not have an unemployment rate of about 3 per cent it might be different if we went back to the "dirty 30s". But it is a fact, if it is of any interest to the Committee, that I know of no officer at any level who has retired in recent years who wanted a job that has not immediately found one, and a good one.

Mr. McINTOSH: Right. But I also realize that many of our senior officers have another profession, which is not soldiering. They may be graduate engineers, and so on, and could find employment in that field. However, I brought that up because in my opinion the analogy was not a fair one.

Mr. Deachman also mentioned something about the intention of the government. How could we find out the intention of the government if we did not bring these officers before us. What we want to find out from you as a witness, if we can, is what is the intention of the government in regard to our defence policy? I wonder, if you were writing an appreciation of this situation at the present time, how you would fill in the heading "intention"? What is the intention of the present defence policy of the government, as you know it?

Mr. FLEURY: I do not have the faintest idea how to answer that question.

Mr. McINTOSH: You realize the position that we are in. When General Moncel was before us said the following:

> I refer now to the White Paper where I feel a policy should be laid down. In fact, it is very plain here that most of the basic principles that govern Canada's defence policy are constant because they are determined by factors such as geography and history...

And it goes on. He then states:

> The principles remain constant and that is why it is desirable to keep the public informed of the nature of and the reasons for any changes. Some of us feel that has not been done.

Now, in regard to the White Paper, General Moncel said:

> The purpose of the White Paper is essentially to produce the best defence policy for Canada.

Now, is the present defence policy of this government directed to the fulfillment of the objectives as laid out in the White Paper, and I presume that you are familiar with those or would you like me to read the objectives, so that you can consider your answer?

Mr. FLEURY: No. I am reasonably familiar with the objectives. I think that they were valid objectives when the White Paper was written. You must bear in mind that the White Paper was written nearly three years ago, and it is quite an interesting exercise to read it again in 1967. I did it last night. I think that government policy obviously can be announced in many ways. If it is to be a regular thing that this should be announced through the medium of the White Paper—of course there are other ways—well then, no White Paper is likely to be valid for more than twelve months, it seems to me, because situations and commitments change and the forces themselves change. I can only say in all honesty that it has been a never-ending struggle within the armed forces since 1945 to keep up with and meet Canada's defence commitments.

I cannot think of one period in time where the armed forces and those responsible in command in the armed forces really felt that they had enough men or money to meet the government's commitments. It seemed to me that we were almost always robbing Peter to pay Paul. We almost always had to give individual units or formations more than one task and, by and large, I suspect we were lucky. It was like the old business of kiting cheques that used to be so

prevalent before the age of magnetic inks and computers. If you get caught out once you are in bad trouble. If you have a battalion, for instance, or a brigade which is earmarked for NATO and is preparing to go to NATO and you suddenly find that you have to pull all or most of that brigade out for some United Nations emergency, such as the Cyprus operation, you are in trouble. So, I think with our eyes wide open we have taken a series of risks over the years, so I suppose I have become a bit blase about whether we are in fact able to meet our commitments.

I am bound to say that I have wondered for twenty-odd years whether we really were able to meet our commitments, whether they were expressed in the White Paper or in policies enunciated in the house, or elsewhere. I think that many studies have gone on, certainly in recent years, as to what it would really cost us to meet the commitments set forth in the White Paper of March 1964, and I would think it would take considerably more men and considerably more money than we have.

Mr. McIntosh: Well, in the White Paper it says that we are to preserve the peace by supporting collective defence. I presume that you agree with that system of defence for Canada, collective defence?

Mr. Fleury: Indeed.

Mr. McIntosh: Then it goes on to say that it is to provide the protection and surveillance of our territory, our air space and our coastal waters. Did you ever have any indication while you were still serving, General, that there would be any change in these roles or that any of these roles would be dropped?

Mr. Fleury: Not during my service, no. There has been a lot of talk, speculation and suggestions about withdrawing all or part of our NATO force from Europe. I have heard this put forward on many sides, but as far as I am aware no decision has been taken to do anything along this line.

Mr. McIntosh: Could you give us any indication why so many senior officers such as yourself and others like you, with the experience that you have had and which would be very valuable to any re-organization of our forces and which may be lacking in some of the younger officers who may have to take over through no fault of their own, all left in such a short time? I know you gave your individual reason, but collectively was there anything that you disagreed with in regard to policy?

Mr. Fleury: Well, if under the heading of "policy" you would include the speed and direction of unification and the decision to jump from integration into unification, I would say this must have loomed quite large in the minds of a number of my colleagues.

Mr. McIntosh: Well, I have tried to stay away from the term "unification" because I do not understand what it means. Could you give us your definition of it?

Mr. Fleury: No, sir, I cannot. I think I know what the Minister means now. I think he means a single unified defence force, if I understood him correctly, with an integrated headquarters and staff and command structure, with a command set of ranks, a common pay structure, a common trade structure and a single walking-out uniform.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, with the explanation that you have given and if it was carried out to the fullest, in your opinion could Canada still contribute to these collective defences that we have?

Mr. FLEURY: I do not see how. If I could have seen how I do not suppose I would be here this morning.

Mr. McINTOSH: Did you ever have a discussion with the Minister or with your chief in this respect where you voiced your opinion?

Mr. FLEURY: Yes, certainly with my chief and my colleagues, the other branch heads, and I certainly voiced my misgivings to the Minister on more than one occasion.

Mr. McINTOSH: Then what would—

Mr. FLEURY: My difficulty as Comptroller-General was largely that there were so many loose ends from integration, things which had been foreseen and many things which had not been foreseen which needed tidying up, but it seemed to me that we were just going from one administrative organizational mess into a worse one.

Mr. McINTOSH: While we are talking about your chief and your Minister, I think you said in one of your previous remarks you could only arrive at two conclusions; either your chief did not know or he was not telling you the truth, or words to that effect. Could you tell us whether you had confidence in your chief at that time?

Mr. FLEURY: Yes.

Mr. McINTOSH: I did not ask the name. Would you care to give us the name of the person to whom you are referring?

Mr. FLEURY: Air Chief Marshal Frank Miller.

Mr. McINTOSH: You did not feel that he was keeping anything from you at that time?

Mr. FLEURY: No.

Mr. McINTOSH: You had a feeling that he did not understand what was taking place?

Mr. FLEURY: Correct.

Mr. McINTOSH: Did he ever voice the opinion to you directly that he could not make head or tail of it, or could not understand this program of unification or the purpose of it?

Mr. FLEURY: I really do not think I should answer that question.

Mr. McINTOSH: Right. That is fine. It has been brought out and suggested by former witnesses, General, that we now have a dual role; one is of interdependence on our allies and the other is a go-it-alone policy in regard to this peace-keeping force—I will call it that for the lack of a better name—and I believe that you said that you always had difficulty in getting recruits for your commitments in the defence of Canada?

Mr. FLEURY: No, I do not think I said that, sir.

Mr. McINTOSH: Since 1945.

Mr. FLEURY: I said that I did not think that we ever had enough men or money to carry out all the commitments which had been given to us. This did not mean to say that at various times we could not have gotten the recruits if we had had the authority to go and get them. There were times when you could have gotten all the recruits you wanted.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You had the applications?

Mr. FLEURY: Oh, yes.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Did this same situation exist just prior to your retirement, sir?

Mr. FLEURY: No.

Mr. MCINTOSH: When did it cease to exist?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, I think recruiting turned very difficult, really, in round figures, about a year and a half or two years ago.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Can you give the Committee any indication of your opinion why the situation changed about that time?

Mr. FLEURY: I could venture some suggestions. I do not know how valid they would be. To begin with, of course, the economy was in very good shape, almost everybody who was able to work could get jobs. This was certainly a factor. I am reasonably sure that a second factor was the uncertainty within the armed forces themselves as to where they were headed. I think almost anyone with experience that you talk to in the armed forces will say that the best recruiters were always our own people; the people in the infantry battalions, the artillery regiments, the tank regiments and even in the support corps. If I use Army terms it is simply that they come easier to my lips. These were the people who brought in most of your best recruits. They were sort of living and walking examples of life in the Army, the Navy or the Air Force, as the case may be, and to the extent that they were happy, satisfied and knew what they were doing, they obviously exerted some influence on their relatives, friends and acquaintances, former school chums, and so on. This is how we got a great many of our recruits.

Pay undoubtedly had a dampening effect on recruiting. In my opinion, our pay levels at no time in recent years compared favourably with unskilled labor on the civilian market, speaking in terms of unskilled recruits. There was also a heavy wastage within the armed forces, and specifically within the Army, because I had more to do with the Army at that time, in the skilled trades. There was such a demand for skilled trades outside that once we had trained a chap to any degree of proficiency in a particular trade he had no difficulty whatever in going out into civvy street and getting substantially more money for doing more or less the same job. Undoubtedly there were other factors as well.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, General, in regard to the pay level that you refer to, has that not always been a problem with the Army, that they have never at any time given equivalent pay to that which was available on civvy street, as you said, even in your own capacity?

Mr. FLEURY: I think this is true enough.

Mr. MCINTOSH: But did it become more acute in the last year and a half prior to your retirement?

Mr. FLEURY: I think it did.

Mr. MCINTOSH: In what level? Were you talking about O.R.'s or officer class?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, in numbers it showed up amongst the other ranks, but in inhibiting our plans and the carrying out of those plans it probably was worse for us at the officer level. It was pretty devastating to see youngish captains and senior lieutenants, and even a few majors and lieutenant colonels, going out before their time.

Now, why did they go out at that particular time? Why did they not go out before? Well I think that some of the security, some of the glamour, possibly, has worn off. I think there has been a tendency recently, and I do not mean to imply that this is necessarily a product of integration or unification, to try and equate more closely service personnel to civilian people for pay purposes, for purposes of providing accommodation, for purposes of providing transportation allowances and there has been a great tendency to de-glamourize the services, if this is the right term, and make them more and more like their civilian counterparts. There may be good reasons for this, you know. I do not say that there are not. The fact of the matter is that they always used to say over the years that you did not have to be crazy to be in the Army, but it helped. I am sure the same thing was said in the Navy and in the Air Force. I do not think that the average soldier or the average officer minds being considered crazy, but he does not like to be considered stupid.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, General, I would like to pursue this just a little bit further but I see that the Chairman is shaking his head at me. I hope that someone will take up this point of incentive, why the serving members of the forces do not continue to recruit their friends, and so on. I also want to go back to this go-it-alone policy of Canada's that we are apparently getting into. In fact, as I said, this is the key to the whole thing as far as I am concerned, once I came to the conclusion that this is what was in the mind of the Minister. Do you believe that Canada can go it alone? Will Canada be protected if she adopts this go-it-alone policy, and by whom?

Mr. FLEURY: I cannot see it myself. In my experience, plus my reading, it is obvious that at no time has Canada ever fielded a military force on its own completely supported by Canada. Take the most recent example with which I was concerned. We sent a brigade group to Korea in 1950. We were supported and supplied almost exclusively through British, American and Australian channels of supply. It was even more marked in World War II, where we literally tied on to British sources of supply and we provided from Canada for the Canadian forces only those items which were peculiar or particular to the Canadian armed forces and everything else, which included weapons, ammunition, tanks, all kinds of things, was provided from a common pool through British channels of communication. I am not suggesting that Canada did not contribute some of this equipment to the general pool, but the physical business of getting these things from the factory through tortuous channels up to the front line was largely a matter which the British or the Americans or the Australians, in different context, looked after. We made a token contribution in manpower to these lines of troops but we never, never came close to bearing our full share of the burden. In Korea, for example, I do not think that at any time did we have 100 people in

the supply lines, which provided all the supplies and equipment required by the Canadian brigade group over there. This must have taken, in one form or another, the efforts of thousands of people but, except for a very small number, they were not Canadians.

Now in addition to the question of supply there is also the question of training. We have training facilities in Canada, and very good ones, but we have never tried to do all the training that the Canadian troops or sailors or airmen required in Canada. We have always had substantial numbers who went to training courses of various kinds, some of them lasting for years, in the United States and in the United Kingdom and, in some cases, elsewhere, but mainly U.S. and U.K. Both the British and the Americans have welcomed us in this way over the years and in this way we have at very reasonable expense—on the cheap, if you will—gathered a great deal of knowledge, training and experience from our British and American allies. I think we have been, in all three services on a friendly, first name basis with thousands and thousands of Canadian and British servicemen. Are we going to maintain this connection in a unified force and how are we going to maintain this connection? The British have not unified, the Americans have not unified, and they show small sign of doing so. I do not see how it can work.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh, I will put you down for the second round but you have already had—

Mr. MCINTOSH: Is there going to be a second round?

The CHAIRMAN: Oh, I think so.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Thank you.

Mr. FLEURY: That comment fills me with despair!

Mr. HARKNESS: General, you made the statement—and it was made by another witness and I meant to ask about it at that time and forgot—that the normal retirement age for you as a lieutenant general is 55. Is it not a fact that at least up until recently there has been no laid down retirement age for lieutenant generals and above? Certainly there was none during the time I was minister. In fact, I think General Graham was appointed to CGS at the age of 57 and Air Marshal Slemon served until he was about 60 as Deputy Commander of NORAD. Has there been a change in this regard? Has there been a regulation made that lieutenant generals and above retire at age 55?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, I speak from memory. In the pre-integration dispensation each of the three services had its own Queen's regulations, as you know, and each of the three services was entitled to only one lieutenant general or equivalent.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes.

Mr. FLEURY: And he was the Chief of Naval Staff, the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff. In tables of retirement ages, pay tables, and all kinds of other things the Chief of Staff never appeared because there was only one of them and he was treated on a separate basis, but whether it was set out in the regulations or not, certainly even lieutenant generals before integration normally expected to retire at 55. Whether they were specifically covered by the regulation or not, I would not be prepared to say, but 55 was always the

reputed retirement age in the Army for all officers of the rank of brigadier and above. There were some variations in the Air Force for air crew, and so on.

Now, as you know, the regulations also provided that the Minister could waive the age limit at his discretion in individual cases. This was true in General Graham's case. There was a special circumstance there which a great many people knew about for twenty years or more. I do not suppose there is any secret about it. When we formed the post-war Army on October 1, 1946 there was a very small number of officers that the authorities in their wisdom—and I think they were very wise—wanted to keep on, but they were in such an age group that if they retired at age 55 they would not be eligible for a pension. Very few—I can think of a handful, including General Graham—were brought in with the distinct understanding that they would be allowed to serve long enough to qualify for pension, which meant that they might serve until 1956 or 1957 or 1958.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, the reason I asked the question was that in my recollection, as I say, there was actually nothing in the regulations or anything else in regard to the retirement of anybody above the rank of major general.

Mr. FLEURY: I think at the moment the regulations say brigadier and above, or the equivalent.

Mr. HARKNESS: This has been changed.

Mr. FLEURY: I believe so.

Mr. HARKNESS: Did your retirement have anything to do with your appearance before this Committee last summer?

Mr. FLEURY: You mean cause and effect?

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes.

Mr. FLEURY: Oh, none whatever, to my knowledge.

Mr. HARKNESS: Not as far as you are aware. Up to the time that you arrived at National Defence Headquarters as Comptroller-General, was your advice asked or were you consulted at all in regard to the proposed integration scheme and the one that was going forward?

Mr. FLEURY: There were two meetings of senior commanders in Ottawa before integration was introduced. The first one, as I recall it, took the form of a series of briefings and there was a provision for a question period. If my memory serves me correctly, we were subsequently invited to comment on certain proposals, which some of us certainly did, and then some months later there was a further similar meeting and again a series of briefings, and so on.

Mr. HARKNESS: This would all be prior to 1964, would it?

Mr. FLEURY: No. I do not think so. Subject to correction—

Mr. HARKNESS: This was subsequent to the issue of the White Paper, was it?

Mr. FLEURY: Subsequent to the issue of the White Paper but prior to the integration of Canadian Forces Headquarters, Ottawa, which I think dates from July 1, 1965. You have raised a doubt in my mind, now, but I think the start point for integration was July 1, 1965, or maybe it was July 1, 1964.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes, after the bill.

Mr. FLEURY: Yes. It would have to be July 1, 1964, I beg your pardon.

Mr. HARKNESS: Did you gain the impression that any comments which you and other commanders may have made in regard to these proposals received any serious consideration and any changes in the proposed plan were made as a result of them?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, I know that the letter which I sent in at the time was considered but, as I recall it, we were not really asked to comment qua integration but on the proposed plan to implement the decision on integration. In other words, once you decided to integrate and this decision was taken then, of course, many things flow from that, including what you are going to integrate, how you are going to integrate it and at what speed. Specifically, I think the comments that were sought were in relation to a plan to implement integration in field commands. This changed from one meeting to the next; most plans do. That in itself was in no way unusual. But I am not aware, and I was not aware up until the time I left the service, that any of the input from the senior commanders from the field had resulted in this change. I think that the planners and the people in authority in Ottawa had a second look at plan A and decided to produce plan B. In fact, as far as I am aware, plan B might have been plan C, D, E or F.

Mr. HARKNESS: Were you at any time, either when you were in command of a command or after you became Comptroller-General, asked to give your views in regard to what is stated in the White Paper as the ultimate objective, that is, a single unified force?

Mr. FLEURY: Yes, I was, on two occasions at least.

Mr. HARKNESS: Would it be in order for me to ask what your views were in regard to this and what advice did you give?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, if you would be satisfied with the answer that I was less than enthusiastic, I would be prepared to go that far.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes. Well, I think that is fine. As Comptroller-General you were of course, particularly concerned with the financial end of things, and in your view and in the light of the experience that you had in that position, do you consider that there are any financial advantages to be gained by doing away with the Navy, Army and Air Force as separate services and combining them into one single unified force?

Mr. FLEURY: I cannot see it.

Mr. HARKNESS: In other words, any financial advantages that could be gained would come entirely from the integration process which has been going forward?

Mr. FLEURY: This is the way I saw it.

Mr. HARKNESS: Do you think there are any military advantages to be gained by the formation of this single unified force?

Mr. FLEURY: Not with the defence roles being what they are now.

Mr. HARKNESS: Do you think there are military disadvantages in the formation of such a force?

Mr. FLEURY: I do indeed, and I think I have already outlined some of them. How we are going to operate in conjunction with our allies in the future is certainly one that looms very large in my mind. I do not know that this is going to have nearly the impact, in this and other areas, on the Army and the Air Force as it will on the Navy. I cannot for the life of me see how the Navy, which has traditionally and of necessity worked much more closely with allied navies than it has with either of the other Canadian services, will be greeted when they put into port A or port B or port C. I cannot help but wonder if, at the first flip remark from some officer or rating in the Royal Navy, there will not be a donnybrook on the dock at this or that place. I think that the naval union is certainly a world wide one. They have common traditions, common problems and there is a commonalty of methods of solving these problems. They all wear blue suits with brass buttons if they are officers and you can identify them as naval officers from 100 paces. You can certainly identify them much more easily as naval officers than you can what navy they belong to. I can see nothing but grief the first time a Canadian ship, post-unification, finds itself in company with a flotilla of RN or USN ships. I just hope I am not there to see what goes on at the time.

Mr. HARKNESS: I must say that I agree with you. You consider that there would be a decline in the specialized military expertise of people in the sea environment, the land environment and the air environment once you had this unified force?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, this is one of the areas I cannot see my way through at all. We have not yet recruited into the armed forces, as I see it, the calibre of genius who can command a squadron of fighter-bombers, a flotilla of destroyers and a regiment of tanks. Obviously, you are going to have to have a great deal of specialization, therefore what do you accomplish by insisting that everybody sort of looks alike and belongs to one force? Even in the army, I need hardly remind you, we never insisted that everybody be called "private". We had privates and we had drivers and we had gunners and we had sappers. They were all paid as privates and they all looked like privates, but they carried a variety of titles and names. If this works in a single service I cannot for the life of me see why it should not work with three services.

I am bound to give you examples, I think. I found to my surprise one day that there was a great to do going on in my shop, as comptroller general, about the gentleman who rejoiced in the magnificent title of the Queen's Harbour Master in Halifax. I have to admit that I am scared to death of the water, that I know nothing about the navy and that I had never heard of the Queen's Harbour Master in Halifax. It turned out that he was what we might call, in army terms, a WO1, or perhaps even a commissioned warrant officer; I am not too sure. Some misguided air force officer, who happened to be working for me at the time, was absolutely convinced that under the guise of integration this fellow's title had to go. It just would not do. It did not fit into a neat and tidy pattern.

I had to read him a small lecture when I found out how important the Queen's Harbour Master in Halifax was, and how important it was to him and to his colleagues that he continue to be called the Queen's Harbour Master, and had to tell him to just leave the poor fellow alone. For the sake of one man to abolish a title in an integrated command seemed to me to make no sense at all.

Mr. HARKNESS: I presume then that you would be quite strongly of the opinion that these corps or regimental differences, or quiffs as they are frequently called, to say nothing of the differences between the navy, army and air force as services, have served a very useful purpose. They have helped to build up morale, to increase the man's pride in his service, and in his sense of individuality and of belonging to something a little bit different from what a lot of other people belong to?

Mr. FLEURY: Unquestionably; and I would go a step further, that I do not fancy myself as a prophet but I do not mind going on record as saying that once you have completely unified the three services into a single unified defence force the first immediate step will be to bring back, in one way or another, precisely these differences and rank designations and uniforms and everything else that we have just legislated out of existence.

Mr. HARKNESS: The difficulty would be, would it not, that once you have legislated them out of existence it would be extremely difficult to restore them? To do that you would have to change the legislation again.

I have just one other question in connection with that. It has been represented to us that because of the introduction of computers, and the necessity of the same pay structure and everything else along this line, it is necessary to have a universal and common rank structure. From the management point of view, with which you are particularly familiar, is there any validity in that argument?

Mr. FLEURY: I do not pretend to be an expert in the computer field but I am on fairly sound ground, I think, when I say the computer does not speak English or French or any other language that I know of. It speaks in computer language. If you are going to call somebody a private, or a guardsman, or whatever, to get him on to a computer you have to punch a card in some way, or put a code on a card which the computer can understand. I do not think any computer yet can differentiate between an aircraftsman and a private soldier and an able seamen. There is no sense to it. We all know there is such a thing as the language of computers. The language of computers is not the language which you and I are speaking. It is our language or any other language translated into a series of punch holes or colour codes on cards. Somebody has got to do this. It would not seem to me to be beyond the genius of the lowliest computer operator to understand that aircraftsmen and privates and able seamen or ordinary seamen are all the same thing and that they punch the same hole in the same place.

Mr. HARKNESS: In other words, from the management point of view there is no necessity for this whatever.

Mr. FLEURY: Well, I have not said that, but—

Mr. HARKNESS: You have stated that things were being done under the cloud of integration which were not really integration matters at all. Could you give us some examples of those?

Mr. FLEURY: The Queen's Harbour Master in Halifax.

An hon. MEMBER: Stop picking on him, General. He is a fine fellow!

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, are there any others that you could give us to illustrate this point. This is one of the things I have complained about myself. I thought that there were many things being done merely for integration's sake,

or just for the name, or something along that line, in order to say that integration had taken place here, there or the other place.

Mr. FLEURY: Yes; I think that some people were desperately anxious, to sort of take away as quickly as possible anything that had a navy, army or air force special flavour on the grounds that it was not within the spirit of integration. If you found somebody like the Queen's Harbour Master you had surely better get rid of him because he stuck out like a sore thumb and you could not ever say that he was integrated and it was pretty obvious to everybody that he belonged to the Royal Canadian Navy.

The same was true of the so-called stone ships or frigates, the shore-based establishments. There was tremendous pressure put on, very early in the game, to do away with HMCS *Nonesuch* on the grounds that HMCS *Nonesuch* was a nonsense, you see, and it had a navy flavour. Well, if HMCS *Nonesuch* was going to continue to perform a function for the Canadian Armed Forces, or for the Royal Canadian Navy, I honestly could not for the life of me see why we could not let it continue to be called HMCS *Nonesuch* instead of insisting that it be called number "umpty-ump" Canadian Forces unit, or base.

Mr. HARKNESS: It would be much more difficult to identify, really, after the change to number 47 Canadian Forces base, or something.

Mr. FLEURY: Well, it is not only that, you see. We did eventually decide that bases, as opposed to units, would be put on a common footing and given the common name of Canadian Forces bases. Now, this was fine. The decision was taken and the comptroller general did his best to implement it.

Then the fun started. I would write a letter, or somebody would write a letter, to Colonel L.F. Trudeau, Commander, Canadian Forces Base, Valcartier, c/o Camp Valcartier, Quebec, because, if you did not do that the post office would not deliver it. After all, this is the name. This is a place. It is not just an army organization. It appears on a map. To get "Camp Valcartier" changed to "Canadian Forces Base, Valcartier" in every respect is going to take years. There is something called the Geographical Place Names Commission. Some of you may know a great deal more about it than I do. They have not changed a place name for several years, I believe, and when all this hits them and they are politely told to change the names of all these places they will be just as confused as was the post office when we started sending mail to Canadian Forces Base, Valcartier. This is the sort of fall-out that, in my opinion, you get from being pushed into something before you have really studied it and understood all the aspects and all the implications.

Mr. HARKNESS: You say that a good deal of this sort of thing is due to the desire to give a great appearance of complete integration having taken place and to give a great appearance of very tidy administration, but that the total result is a much more confused administration, from the practical point of view.

Mr. FLEURY: Well, the poor commander, Canadian Forces Base, Valcartier—I keep coming back to him because I spent so long in Quebec Command, in one way or another—having for years—he and his predecessors—commanded a nice, tidy little unit in a geographical area called "Valcartier", with three battalions of Van Doos, a detachment of signallers and sappers and army service corps and ordnance and so on, all within a stone's throw of his headquarters,

suddenly found that he had to support all the militia units in the eastern Quebec area because there was no longer a headquarters eastern Quebec area to support them. Not only that but he has to support air force stations and naval reserve divisions and all kinds of things. Well, this put a little on his shoulders, and he obviously had a few questions to ask: How do I deal with these people? What channels of communication do I use? Do they do what I tell them, or do they have a right of appeal to somebody else? Who is going to help me decipher the peculiarities of the naval pay system? —because it was still the naval pay system; who is going to provide the naval uniforms for the few navy types that I am going to have on the base? Who is going to minister to the support of the air force clerks who are posted to me? I could go on, I think, for the rest of the evening. These are all questions that had to be faced up to and answered. I think we would have obtained answers to most of them if we had had the time really to look at this in a logical way.

Mr. HARKNESS: I suppose his immediate reaction to this would be to demand a considerable increase in his staff?

Mr. FLEURY: Of course; and in rank. This is not a supposition; this is a fact. The first thing he was told to do was to produce an establishment of what he thought he would need under the new dispensation, and he quickly put in for one brigadier instead of for one colonel, and I do not blame him.

The CHAIRMAN: I will have to stop you now, Mr. Harkness, but I will put your name down again.

Mr. HARKNESS: All right.

Mr. FORRESTALL: General, I had three or four questions on one area that Mr. Harkness got into, but he has asked two of them.

You did deal, in reply to his question, with benefits that might accrue to the Canadian forces under total integration or unification, or whatever the word is. I gather from what you have said that quite possibly you would not be in total agreement with the section in the Minister's speech of December 7 at page 10,831 of *Hansard* in which he says, under the heading, "The Demands of Modern Warfare":

> The White Paper of 1964 would not have recommended integration as a first step toward a single service if we had not been certain of the improved capacity of a unified force to meet the demands of modern warfare. The pattern of warfare in which armies fought armies, navies fought navies, and air forces fought air forces is not likely to be repeated...

Do I draw the proper inference, particularly from the first part of that, that in terms of what we understand war to be today the present system is just not capable. Would you agree with that?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, what present system? That is the only immediate reply I can give. There is no doubt whatever that air forces do not fight exclusively against air forces, or armies against armies, or navies against navies. If read the quotation correctly—and I am not familiar with it—it does not follow logically that you must have unification. This situation was true in World War II and it was certainly true in Korea and we had a measure of integration even then. It

may be a good argument for integration, but not necessarily a good argument for unification.

Mr. FORRESTALL: But not necessarily a good argument for unification.

Could I ask you, general, if it is proper for you to express yourself—I understand you are still on your sabbatical—whether, from your professional background and your understanding now of the proposal which is before us, you could suggest any type of time schedule, or a rate of speed, by which you feel we might effectively achieve a useful degree of integration?

Mr. FLEURY: I must always remind you that I am several months out of date. I think I said to this Committee last June that it would take in the order of three to five years to shake down Materiel Command into an integrated posture. I have spent some time on research in coming up with this figure and still could not come up with anything sooner than from three to five years. If anything, that is conservative. I am talking only of Materiel Command.

I also am on record as saying a year ago this month that at that point in time the comptroller general had not less than two years' hard work before him just to deal with the backlog of problems which then existed as a result of integration.

Integration in the chief of technical services branch—as I said to this Committee as recently as last June—was not nearly as far advanced as it was in the other three branches, because of its size and complexity, and I think I am on record as saying that at that time that we had not even managed to get to the Minister for approval of an establishment for the chief of technical services. One would think that in the normal course of events this would be step one.

There are certain areas, of course, where integration is not being attempted at all—at least, I see no evidence of it. Air transport Command is one; the brigade group in Germany is another; and the air division in Germany is a third; and there may be others which will occur to you. It will not take very long to integrate them because there is nothing to integrate.

Mobile Command is a very special case. It is the most important operational command we will have. It started off, in effect, with all the army combat troops in Canada, with certain less-immediate responsibilities for army troops overseas; but it is to have its own air element. The timing for the real ultimate integration of mobile command is obviously dependent on how long it takes for us to get the airplanes that the government has decided to buy, work them in, train the pilots and integrate the personnel and the equipment into Mobile Command. I honestly do not know how long this will take, but even if the aircraft were available within 12 months—and I doubt very much that they would be—I do not see how Mobile Command could call itself a fully integrated organization in less than three years.

I really do not know, but I would say that anything less than three years would, in my view, be indecent haste, and it may take 10 years or 15 or 20 years because we have not uncovered—or we had not up until July 15—all the problems, let alone found solutions to them.

Mr. FORRESTALL: This concerns me very much because what we are considering, as I understand it, is not really integration but unification. We have been told that unification is the logical step, and what you are suggesting is that if it is

the logical step then this is not the time for it; that there might be some reason to look at it but not until we have ironed out these problems.

If you do not accept that proposition then you must accept the proposition that we have some cart before some horse. Would that be—

Mr. FLEURY: I would rather accept the first phrase.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I am not even sure what the horse looks like. We are looking at the cart. Now we have to see the horse. Sometimes I think we are looking at the wrong end of it.

In your reply to another question which Mr. Harkness put to you with regard to hard dollars and cents savings that might accrue from integration, did I understand you to say, General, that you could not see any additional savings accruing to the country by pursuing to its final end the proposal for unification?

Mr. FLEURY: That is what I said.

Mr. FORRESTALL: That any savings we might make—

Mr. FLEURY: —could well be made under integration.

Mr. FORRESTALL: They could be made under integration itself.

I think that is all for now, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ANDRAS: General Fleury, if time permits I would like to get to the specifics of the bill itself. Many witnesses give us a sort of attitude-feeling about this whole situation and some criticism—specific in some cases, vague in others —about the method by which this has been approached. Many witnesses in that context have indicated that they did not know what was going on. Admiral Brock indicated this the other day. You have mentioned during your testimony today that Air Marshal Miller, around the time you left—I think the expression was—"did not know what was going on".

Mr. FLEURY: In a particular context; only in the context of an appointment which he told me to keep with the Minister.

Mr. ANDRAS: I am sorry. I thought it was on the general plan. Anyhow, other witnesses have indicated that there was a lack of clarity in the end objectives, and so on.

Sir, I want to present to you certain things and then I will ask you whether or not you feel that they represent a fairly comprehensive dissemination of information. This is documentation, I might say, that I, as a layman, brand new to this Committee three weeks ago, have been able to dig out in that period of time.

I start, sir, with the White Paper, dated March of 1964. I am certainly not going to take time to read it all but on page 19 it states:

> It is the integration of the Armed Forces of Canada under a single Chief of Defence Staff and a single Defence Staff. This will he the first step toward a single unified defence force for Canada.

I have before me also a letter dated April 2, 1964, to all members of the armed forces and employees of the Department of National Defence, which goes

through a step-by-step enunciation of the stages, leading in paragraph 6 on page 2, to the following:

> 6. The third and final steps will be the unification of the three Services...It is reasonable to expect that it will be three or four years before it will be possible to take this action.

I have before me a statement purported to be made by the Chief of the General Staff to all army personnel dated March 26 which refers to the White Paper.

I have before me a signal that went out from the Chief of the Naval Staff referring to the letter from the Minister and quoting it at great length.

I have before me a statement by Vice-Admiral Rayner dated April 3, referring to the White Paper.

I have before me a statement by the Chief of the Air Staff to all RCAF personnel, referring to the White Paper; it is three pages long and it is dated April 2.

Now, sir, in addition to that there were special committee meetings—

Mr. HARKNESS: May I ask Mr. Andras where he got all those signals?

Mr. ANDRAS: I have been able to dig them up and I am quite prepared to table them, Mr. Harkness.

Mr. HARKNESS: I did not ask that. I asked where you got them from?

Mr. ANDRAS: I have been interested in the question of whether information was given to the senior officers and services personnel, so I went to the defence department and got these statements. I am quite sure any other member of this Committee would have been able to get them had they been interested in taking the same approach to it.

Mr. HARKNESS: They were given to you.

Mr. ANDRAS: Whether they were given to me or I dug them out I do not think is pertinent. The fact of the matter is you can argue whether they are valid statements or whether they are not valid statements—

Mr. HARKNESS: Is it not a fact that these were produced for you by somebody on the Minister's staff and given to you?

An hon. MEMBER: That is not what he said.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I listened to Mr. Churchill quote from that statement of April 2, 1964, and then yesterday he asked me where I got mine. I got it long after I heard Mr. Churchill talking about it.

The CHAIRMAN: Order.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, may I suggest to you that the only valid question that can be raised is whether or not these statements are, in fact, correct?

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee is more interested in hearing what your question is, Mr. Andras.

Mr. ANDRAS: I have stated my question. I want to know whether this does not, in the general's opinion, indicate that there was a fair attempt made to make quite clear what the objectives were.

I would like to carry on, if I may? The Special committee met on 30 different occasions in 1963 and heard from 28 different witnesses, some on two or three different occasions, all pertaining to this general subject that we have before us. After the publication of the White Paper in 1964, the special committee met on 36 additional occasions, made 5 reports to the House and heard 41 different witnesses.

In 1966 the Standing Committee on National Defence met on 15 different occasions and heard from 34 different witnesses. Since 1963, there have been 2,355 pages of Committee evidence and since 1963 the Committee has met 81 times and heard 103 witnesses. The Minister and the Associate Minister have met with the Committee on 63 different occasions. The Canadian Forces produce 45,000 copies in English and 4,500 copies in French monthly of an integrated magazine known as *The Sentinel*. The Canadian Forces bulletin is another monthly publication containing unclassified information of general interest, and there are 30 base station newspapers operated by the servicemen containing news of local interest to the forces at large, and so on and so on.

I also refer to the evidence given to us by Air Marshal Sharp and I go back to page 22 of his brief which was presented to this Committee, where it says:

> In determining the trade specifications and trade structure, some *6,000* people at *21* different bases were involved in the revision of the trade specifications and structure . . .
>
> In the pay *procedures* study, some 5,500 people at fourteen different locations were interviewed during the study which lasted from February to mid-August 1966 . . .
>
> Two studies were conducted on service conditions . . .
>
> The MacFadden Study in Training Command . . .
>
> In addition to these examples, the Minister's two manpower studies interviewed hundreds of personnel.

All, or most, of these communications certainly end up stating the end objective is a single unified defence force for Canada. I suggest that it must inevitably, have led, particularly to professionals, to the consideration that a single defence force for Canada would have to involve, perhaps, such things as a single uniform, a single rank structure, one name for the forces, the degree of interchangeability of common trades between the services, and so on and so forth.

I just wanted to try, in the interests of proceeding with the study of this bill, to establish that in my opinion—and I ask you if I am not justified in this opinion—in the face of all this; senior officers, retired or otherwise, could not continue to claim that they did not know what the intention was?

Mr. FLEURY: Do you really expect an answer to that question?

Mr. ANDRAS: Well, am I justified in my opinion that there was a great deal of information put out on this?

Mr. FLEURY: To begin with, obviously I cannot think as fast as you can read. I know that there was a great deal of information put about. I know that at least

the first four or five things that you quoted from were notifications that we were moving toward integration.

Mr. ANDRAS: And unification, sir?

Mr. FLEURY: This was not clear.

Mr. ANDRAS: The single defence force; the end objective is firm—a single defence force. It was stated in many of the—

Mr. FLEURY: This was not clear. It was not clear to me, and it was not clear to the vast majority of the people in the armed forces, what was meant. It is all very well to talk in terms of unification, of a single unified defence force, but what the fellow down the line wants to know, obviously, is: How is this going to affect me? This is where communication broke down and where information could not be provided.

It is pretty obvious that the private soldier does not read the White Paper, and he may or may not read a broadcast communication from the Minister of National Defence. Traditionally, and properly, the private soldier, the aircraftsman or the ordinary seaman gets the word from his corporal, sergeant or lieutenant, who in turn gets it from his company commander, and so on up the line. This is the type of communication that I am talking about.

Mr. ANDRAS: I have one final question about whether it was unification or not. May I quote from the Committee on National Defence of June 9, 1966 where you say, in reply to a question from Mr. McLean:

> I can only refer you really, sir, to the White Paper which I think stated clearly that integration was a step towards the final goal of unification—

This is General Fleury's statement as reported in the Committee proceedings.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, it is after 6 o'clock. We mentioned earlier on to Mr. McIntosh that there might be a second round of questioning, and the witness showed some reluctance.

On my list I have Mr. McIntosh, Mr. Nugent, Mr. Lambert, Mr. Churchill and Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. HARKNESS: Would you please put me down for the second round?

The CHAIRMAN: We will now adjourn.

The witness has consented to return tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order. I have many more questions, and I did not use all my time.

The CHAIRMAN: You have used only six minutes of your time.

Mr. ANDRAS: May I then continue in the morning?

The CHAIRMAN: You will be first on tomorrow morning.

The meeting is adjourned.

THURSDAY, February 23, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I see a quorum. When we adjourned at six o'clock last night, the witness, General Fleury, was present, I have asked the General if he would be kind enough to join me up here and we will continue with the questioning.

Mr. Andras was questioning the witness when we adjourned.

Mr. ANDRAS: I will pass for now, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Churchill?

Mr. CHURCHILL: General Fleury, I would like to compliment you on your presentation yesterday. You, along with General Moncel and the other gentlemen who have appeared from the air force, have clearly demonstrated that the unrest and the dissatisfaction in the Defence Department was certainly not to be found solely in the navy, which was a popular impression over a number of months. The same situation, obviously, from the testimony we have heard, has prevailed with army and air force personnel. I think you have made a real contribution to the discussion of our problem.

In answer to a question yesterday, when you were discussing the situation at headquarters, you said that there was a tendency more and more for military officers to skate close to the political line. What did you mean by that statement?

General F. J. FLEURY: I think that I was referring specifically to the program, which has been gradually introduced in recent years, of having serving officers appear before this Committee. I think it is fair to say also that since integration and, subsequently, unification, has become a very hot political issue, that it is rather difficult for serving officers in headquarters not to be drawn into the battle.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You mentioned that the Minister was dealing directly with subordinate officers at one point and that 10 days before your retirement you were called by the chief to see the Minister. I understand that was your first private conference with the Minister. What was the purpose of that meeting?

Mr. FLEURY: I do not know that I said it was 10 days before my retirement, but this is certainly not too far off the actual time. I am not at all sure, Mr. Chairman, that I should go into what was said in a private and confidential discussion with the Minister.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I will take that up with the Minister when he appears. Did you volunteer your retirement, or were you asked to retire?

Mr. FLEURY: I asked to retire.

Mr. CHURCHILL: The reason I asked that question is that on July 16, 1966, in the Toronto *Daily Star*, there was a report of a statement that the Minister made in Edmonton. The newspaper report reads as follows, and I quote:

> He said—

and this is the Minister.

> —integration policy was made clear at several commanders' conferences, and they were told that if they could not support it they could retire with the usual benefits.

Did you attend any of those conferences where that was said?

Mr. FLEURY: I did, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Is that an accurate report? Was it suggested to officers that they could retire if they could not support the program?

Mr. FLEURY: I think that this is an accurate statement.

Mr. CHURCHILL: The Minister goes on to say, and these are in quotes—they are his direct words:

> "No one did, of course, . . . Instead they chose to remain and take part in a campaign of tacit resistance. This is reprehensible conduct and I will not tolerate it."

How accurate is that statement? The information that I have is that a great many officers did not choose to remain. This is an accusation by the Minister that people remained in the service and conducted a campaign of tacit resistance. Were you any part of that?

Mr. FLEURY: I hope not, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Do you know of any officers who were?

Mr. FLEURY: No.

Mr. CHURCHILL: In *Hansard* of October 12, 1966 an answer was supplied by the department to a series of questions put forward by Mr. Harkness dealing with the retirement of senior armed forces personnel. Mr. Harkness asked that they be named with their rank and age, the title of their appointment, the length of time to normal retirement age, and the category of their release. The return occupies a page and a half. It shows that 80 officers, in the three services, retired between the dates January 1, 1965 and the date of this return, which is October 12, 1966. These officers are all the rank of brigadier and above, or the equivalent in the other services. Of those 80 officers, 22 retired from the navy, 28 from the army, and 30 from the air force, a total of 80. Of that grand total of 80, my calculation indicates that 39 of them retired by reason of age, having reached the age of 55 and 41 retired prior to reaching the age limit.

The question was this, as stated at page 8559 of *Hansard*:

> In each of the above cases indicate whether the officer retired on reaching normal retirement age, whether he put in his resignation of his own volition, or whether he was asked to retire.

The departmental return simply answers that question by what they call "category of release", which they show under headings such as 4(a), 5(c). Of course, this requires to be interpreted; it is a typical return from the ministerial office, in which the actual question is dodged.

What is the meaning of "category of release" after your name "5(c)"? It obviously is not normal retirement age because you were not at retirement age. Does it mean that you put in your resignation of your volition, or were you asked to retire?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, sir, I could only answer the general question precisely if I had a copy of the regulations before me, which I have not. As you know, the Queen's Regulations for Canada, over several pages, give many categories and subcategories under which an officer or a man can be retired from the forces.

One general category is medical grounds; one general category is having been convicted by the civil power; another is voluntary release; another, compulsory release, and so it goes through five or six categories, each of which has quite a number of sub-categories.

Under compulsory retirement there are any number of sub-categories. There is compulsory retirement by reason of age; there is compulsory retirement by reason of health or medical grounds; there is compulsory retirement which stems from reduction in establishments; there is compulsory retirement when service is no longer required, and so on. I could not begin to read the whole category.

In my particular case, I was compulsorily retired, in so far as the Queen's Regulations are concerned, I think, as honourably released, services no longer required, or some such form of words.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You are listed in the same category as Admiral Landymore, who was fired. There are 24 people listed here under that category 5(c), which we will have to have cleared up, perhaps when the Minister appears. I wanted to inquire about this tremendous alteration in the higher ranks over a very short period, from January 1, 1965 to October 12, 1966. There was a change-over of 80 senior people, and of that number it appears that 41 of them left before they had completed their length of service according to the age category.

In your opinion, was this rapid change-over of senior officers a disturbing element in the reorganization program?

Mr. FLEURY: Yes.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It caused a great deal of upset and confusion?

Mr. FLEURY: That is inevitable, I would say.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Have you any idea how many senior officers have left since the bulk of October, 1966?

Mr. FLEURY: I have no idea, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: We will have to have the record brought up to date to see where we stand.

I think that is all I will ask at the moment, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Lambert?

Mr. LAMBERT: Mr. Chairman, perhaps you could inform me whether any members of the Committee have been able to question General Fleury, in my absence, on the relationship between the Comptroller General's department or branch and that of the Deputy Minister? I think General Moncel had something to say about that. I was wondering what General Fleury's impression had been, within the framework of integration, as to whether he felt there was a modest degree or a high degree of duplication of function between the Comptroller General's branch and the Deputy Minister's branch?

The CHAIRMAN: I do not believe that has been the subject of a question to General Fleury.

Mr. FLEURY: From a practical pragmatic's point of view, I think it is fair to say that the Comptroller General's branch works very closely, literally hand in glove, with the branch and departments of the Deputy Minister. It would not be

unfair to say, I do not think, that functions overlapped. It was, therefore, only by the closest collaboration at all levels that we could get on with the business at hand. Fortunately, for me and my people, we had excellent relations with the Deputy Minister's office. By good luck, I had been doing business with Mr. Elgin Armstrong in various capacities for well over 20 years, and where the lines did not seem to be clearly drawn and where there was obvious danger of stepping on each other's toes, we very readily managed to resolve amicably, by consultation, any problems which arose in these categories.

I think that an outsider looking into the set-up, and examining it objectively, would be bound to say that there was a great deal of taking in of each other's washing; that there was duplication; that there was checking and double checking; that there was a requirement for close liaison and consultation on a day to day basis between the Deputy Minister and myself, and between a great number of my subordinates and a great number of the Deputy Minister's subordinates. It could have been a very difficult and sticky operation. That it was not, I think is a great tribute to the Deputy Minister and his people—and I mean this quite sincerely.

I thought, at several times, that it might be possible to save a substantial number of people and a good deal of money, if many of the functions—not all—could be combined either under the Deputy Minister or under the Comptroller General. Obviously, in the budgetary field, in the field of organization, in the field of manpower control, with particular emphasis on civilian manpower control, in the fields of automation, management engineering, and quite a number of our functions, there was, in my view, room for improvement.

I toyed with the idea of suggesting that many of these functions should be taken over by the Deputy Minister, and if the Deputy Minister were not of the opinion that this would be a good idea, then to let me take over his functions. The difficulty was, I think—and I was not there very long—that there were so many other things to worry about, and last, but not least, that these areas were being worked on and matters were being pushed forward, largely because of personal relationships. I do not think it is a tidy organization at all. I do not know what the Deputy Minister's feelings are, but there is room for improvement. I suppose, not unnaturally, I as a soldier was dealing with a great many things which were not in the main stream of soldiering, even soldiering from a staff officer's point of view, and I think, in retrospect, that if I had stayed very much longer, I certainly would have made some serious attempts to get the two organizations more closely integrated and I certainly would not have been unwilling to see a lot of these functions go to the Deputy Minister's office. I think I would have been less inclined to do the alternative: take over some of the functions performed by the Deputy Minister.

Mr. LAMBERT: I do not know whether you were here when General Moncel made his general comment, in reply to a question by someone. Did you have the opportunity of discussing some of these views with him at the time you succeeded him as Comptroller General?

Mr. FLEURY: Either at that time, subsequently, or both, we certainly discussed almost every aspect of our business together almost every day.

Mr. LAMBERT: Therefore, if there was any disagreement by you with what the general remarks were, they would be a matter of degree rather than of substance?

Mr. FLEURY: I believe so.

Mr. LAMBERT: How long do you think it would take to sort this out. I remember you testified here in June, and repeated again, that in many sectors of the branches integration in your mind would only be complete and working satisfactorily in a period of three to five years. What about the comptroller general's branch. Would you place the same estimate on that branch as on some of the others, in respect of it being a smoothly working integrated machine?

Mr. FLEURY: No. I think this could be done in a lesser time period, provided there was not a great backlog of work to catch up with. I think I made the point earlier that at a point in time almost exactly 12 months ago, I expressed the view that the Comptroller general at that point in time had at least two years work ahead of him to sort out and firm up on all the decisions, plans, programs, schedules and paper work generally that had been generated as a result of integration.

Let me make two other observations that might help to clarify the matter. The easiest branch at Canadian Forces Headquarters to integrate by far, in my opinion, was the comptroller general's branch, because it did not impinge directly or heavily on the fighting units and formations.

Secondly, the comptroller general's branch, as a form of organization, was unknown to the army until two, three or four years ago. Traditionally, the army worked on a different organization. Both the navy and the air force had comptroller general's organizations at the time of integration and had had, for quite a number of years. The army had too, but only as of quite recent date. Therefore, we were not sort of brought up, as it were, in an organization which included a comptroller general. Mind you, many of the functions under the comptroller general had been performed in the army under different branches, the general staff and the adjutant general branches in particular.

Mr. LAMBERT: Therefore, the easiest branch, in your estimation, to complete integration would be the comptroller general's?

Mr. FLEURY: Indeed sir.

Mr. LAMBERT: And that requires, in your estimation, a minimum of two years?

Mr. FLEURY: Not to integrate the branch. I am of the opinion that the branch was as integrated as it could ever be. When I left there was a lot of work on the desk of the comptroller general's branch and a backlog of work I am trying to distinguish, and I think it is a proper distinction, between the branch as a branch and what the branch had to do as a result of integrating other branches of the headquarters and the field command.

Mr. LAMBERT: Air Marshal Annis, in his testimony, indicated that in the supply side, which he was concerned with, that one of the chief difficulties he faced was having to detach so many key people to perform studies so that they were not available for the actual work of his branch, and that this really complicated the situation, with the net result that that branch—if I judge his remarks correctly—has had some great difficulties and, at the present time, is still functioning on a three service basis. Did you also have the difficulty in the comptroller general's branch of having to detach key people for study groups

or for studies either within the comptroller general's branch or the other branches, whatever they may be?

Mr. FLEURY: It was almost a constant problem. I think you must understand clearly that when you have put before you a policy or a goal such as integration, this is only the beginning of the problem from the working point of view. Policy has to be translated into programs, organizations and establishments. Your programs have to be scheduled; you have to look at the implications from a personnel point of view, a budgetary point of view, a staffing point of view, and you can name almost any field of endeavour, in business or in the armed forces, that this new organization, this new goal or this new policy impinges upon.

Most of this paper work—the getting out of hundreds and hundreds of new establishments, new names, new regulations and so on—fell on the comptroller general's branch, so it was a mass of dog's body work, if you will, that had to be done at different levels up and down the branch. At the same time, all kinds of studies were going on with a view to integrating the commands in the field. How should the organization of Maritime Command be set up? Integration did not give you the answer to that. You had to decide what the size and shape of this was going to be under a policy of integration. Should it be headed up by a Rear Admiral or a Vice Admiral? Should he have a deputy who was an Air Commodore or a Group Captain? Should he have four staff branches such as Canadian Forces Headquarters, or should he have three staff branches, and who should head them up? At what level? How many people should be allocated to the headquarters, and so on. This is a tedious, detailed job which had to be repeated scores of time before you could say that integration, or the outfall of integration, had really become completed staff work, with all the backup papers and so on, in the comptroller general's organization.

Mr. LAMBERT: This is my last question, Mr. Chairman. What is your opinion as to the effective unification on this already stretched machinery. Would this be an unnecessary complication at this time?

Mr. FLEURY: I would not call it unnecessary, sir. It seems to me that it is inevitable. I mean you still have to do your day to day business. The troops still have to be trained, fed, paid, clothed and so on. You still have to rotate your troops overseas and support the brigade group in Europe and the air division. All these things still have to go on, and all this outfall—as I call it for want of a better term coming to my mind—from integration, produced a lot of studies, a great many papers, many discussions and meetings, study groups, working groups and so on, but this had to come out of an organization which was being squeezed downward in so far as personnel was concerned because we were under instructions not only to integrate the headquarters, but to reduce the headquarters at the same time. I think it is no exaggeration at all to say that we were told to do a great deal more with less people, at this particular phase. Now we all accepted this, I think, as an inevitable concomitant of integration. And it was a hump in our work which would last X months or years and in due course, when things got sorted out, we could go back to some sort of normal operation, whatever that is.

Mr. LAMBERT: I have a question in respect of the next move of unification—in other words, a single service concept—being talked into the works at this time. Is that an unnecessary and uncalled for complication being imposed

upon a machinery that is still coping under grave difficulties with the normal problems of integration.

Mr. FLEURY: Well, it was too much for me, sir.

Mr. LAMBERT: I see. Thank you.

Mr. NUGENT: General, I would like to go back to the general scene again. It seems to me that one of the prime purposes of this Committee is to view this problem with a sense of perspective. I have asked this same question in the same way of other witnesses, but it seems that the public generally has been sold this bill of goods by the Minister. There seems to be a feeling that integration was a great wonderful innovation, never heard of before, was the brainchild of this Minister who has accomplished marvellous things, and now that it has proven itself so wonderful, we are now going to cap it with unification, the logical result, and this should complete the whole picture. I wonder if you would mind reviewing integration and establishing or reaffirming a few things that I believe to be the case. First, integration is not a new idea with this Minister, that for many, many years and in many ways various processes of integration have been evolved, tried or adopted in the forces. Is this question correct?

Mr. FLEURY: I think there is a good deal of truth in that. There were quite a number of steps which seemed to me logically to lead to some form of integration over a great many years and when I appeared before this Committee last June, I suggested that it could be said that the earliest step toward integration took place 20 years ago when a single Minister of National Defence was appointed, instead of three service ministers. I think I used the introduction of the chiefs of staff committee system as a step toward integration, the organization of the Canadian services colleges on a tri-service basis, the installation of the chaplain services, the medical services and so on. But again, there is the matter of perspective here. This was sort of, in my humble opinion, a nibbling around the periphery of the problem rather than really coming to grips with it as one single, all-embracing problem. Up until the time that integration was announced as a matter of government policy in the White Paper of March, 1964, in my opinion, we had not gone far enough. If integration is a good thing, and I leave the discretion of how far or how fast, and a precise definition, aside for now, well then, further measures of integration might well be warranted. If the Minister, under our system of government is going to be blamed if his particular view of integration does not work out, then it is only reasonable to give him the credit if it does work out.

Mr. NUGENT: That brings us to the next point, of course, that you have mentioned, that it had not gone far enough. There is a difference between theory and practice, as I have always found, and you were a supporter of integration when it started. I believe you told us that you had the feeling that it should go further and you were willing to do what you could to see if you could get these benefits. Was there any thought in your mind that integration, as a theory, should apply to everything, integrate every part of supply service and so on, or was it a feeling that integration was one of those things that had to be tried to see where it would be of benefit?

Mr. FLEURY: I think definitely the latter. I certainly never considered myself as a supporter or proponent of integration for integration's sake. This would be, to me, an utter nonsense. I think that the purpose of the exercise was never

integration; the purpose of the exercise was to save money and to increase the efficiency of the forces, and to the extent that integration would accomplish the purpose of the exercise I was in favour of it, wholeheartedly, and I still am.

Mr. NUGENT: Would you expect that in applying this theory, there would be some areas where you would evolve a well planned integration scheme and put it into practice? And would you expect, in some places, no matter how far ahead you had thought, that after a time you might look it all over and say this was wrong, and perhaps we have to go back again, that integration just could not fit into that spot?

Mr. FLEURY: Indeed, sir, and this was our actual experience prior to the time that I left the service. Indeed, I think I said to this Committee last June that we had an open mind in the Comptroller General's branch on the extent to which we would have to integrate. I pointed out, for instance, that in the branch of the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff at that time there were areas which, in my opinion, could never be integrated. You may recall a cyclical circular chart that I showed you at one time, with different colours in, and some of these hard colour areas were areas that we felt integration did not apply to at all, and probably never could apply to, because they commanded expertise in a particular environment of navy, army or air force. To use a very plebeian example, I come back to my poor Queen's harbour master in Halifax. I did carry out what was a normal manœuvre in minor tactics; I just left him there and went on to something else.

Mr. NUGENT: You will pardon me for labouring the point, sir, but there have been statements made in this Committee, as well as the general propaganda spread from the Minister's office, indicating that integration was one great scheme, that it was working wonderfully, and I thought that we should just take it apart a little bit.

You have already told me that integration applies one place and perhaps not in another, that there is no such thing as being able to foretell whether it will succeed or not, that the plan of integration for each place you put it in is not exactly the same. For instance, to integrate the padre service requires a different plan than the pay service.

Mr. FLEURY: We have not been able to computerize the padres yet.

Mr. NUGENT: So that instead of calling it integration, we should call it the schemes of integration, the plans of integration, the steps of integration which are still going on. Is that accurate?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, you must remember that I have had nothing to do with this since the 15th of July last year.

Mr. NUGENT: Which were still going on at the time you left?

Mr. FLEURY: That is correct.

Mr. NUGENT: Was there any thought in your mind that there might be a difference between theory and practice, that the best laid plans might go astray or might have to be abandoned? Did you have that experience?

Mr. FLEURY: Indeed. I think it is the story of my life.

Mr. NUGENT: Is there any reason that you can think of that there should be any thought in anybody's mind that integration is a *fait accompli*, that it is all finished, that it has proven itself or done the job?

Mr. FLEURY: Oh, I do not think so. I certainly never felt that way up until the 15th of July; otherwise I would never have said that I needed at least another two years to cope with all the bits and pieces. I think that the role of integration had been pretty firmly established. I think that integration had been put into practice in a great many areas rather faster than many of us expected, but having created the machine, I think it is obvious that a run-in period was required, and also, there were bits of sand that seemed to tie into some of the wheels and cogs that had to be worked out or oiled out.

Mr. NUGENT: Is it possible that this run-in period might reveal that there is more than a bit of sand in there—and that is why testing proves more than theory—and that there may be some places where you just cannot iron out the wrinkles and they have to reverse some of the process.

Mr. FLEURY: I think that whether we realized it consciously or unconsciously, yes. It was quite conceivable, I think, or is quite conceivable that we may have rushed into integration in a particular area, unit, formation, and we might find that it did not work and we would have to put on the brakes, and probably put the machine into reverse. As far as I was concerned, I was quite prepared to do this at any time.

Mr. NUGENT: General, as one of those who could be deemed, I suppose, to have been aimed at or whose reputation might have been touched by the contemptible practice, I may say, of the Minister of suggesting that it was the footdragging or the resistance within the military to his scheme, if there were any difficulties at all, would you reiterate the story about how hard the people worked, and tell me if my impression is correct, that it was the extra hours of work done by everybody, trying to put this in, that was responsible for integration making the progress that it did—and I think Air Vice Marshal Annis told us that it was surprisingly much more than they had even hoped. Would you tell us that this is the situation?

Mr. FLEURY: I do not think that there is any doubt at all that everybody at the newly integrated Canadian forces headquarters, certainly most everybody, worked very hard and very long hours to make this thing work, particularly in the first year after July 1964, when I was not at the headquarters. But even after I arrived in September, 1965 there was still a great deal of work to be done, and it was quite common for people to work overtime and on week-ends to try and keep up with the many questions and problems which arose, not only within the headquarters itself, but more particularly in the headquarters in the field because, after all, this was our real job. The headquarters is no end in itself either; its job is to support in every way the troops in the field, and as these many local problems, questions, queries, suggestions sort of welled up out of the integration process, there was a great deal of soul searching, thinking and production of orders that had to go on in headquarters. I do not want to give the impression that we were all tired and greatly over-worked. I think in the past, under other conditions, we have worked just as hard or harder, but this was a problem. There were a lot of people in the headquarters and particularly some colleagues of mine, friends of mine, if you will, who had been there right from the beginning, who literally I could see going down hill physically—and I take this as a direct result of the pressures to which they had freely subjected themselves. There is no law that says that you cannot leave the office at five o'clock or four o'clock or any time you want to, particularly if you are a senior officer.

Mr. NUGENT: I just wanted to make sure the record was clear on this, that whether they were particularly enthusiastic about the idea or not, everybody worked at it with a will, as they usually accept policy changes, policy directions, to do their best to make sure it worked.

Mr. FLEURY: I think this was generally true.

Mr. NUGENT: I hope that we will not have any more suggestions from some of my friends from the other side, that unification is the logical outcome of integration, since integration itself was a series of experiments really, which no one knows how far it should go. Perhaps we could go to this next point, that the Minister has sold the country such a bill of goods about the tremendous savings in money accomplished. Sir, as Comptroller-General, and bearing in mind that integration is only in the workings to a great extent in the limited field in which it can come in, are you in a position to tell us how much in dollars was saved by integration in the last year that you were there?

Mr. FLEURY: I have not the vaguest idea.

Mr. NUGENT: Do you think anyone could tell us whether or not, for sure, that there has been a savings at this early stage in that experiment of integration?

Mr. FLEURY: It would have been possible to produce some figures, but I do not know how meaningful they would have been. Perhaps a "for instance" would be helpful.

Mr. NUGENT: Yes.

Mr. FLEURY: The three service headquarters, pre-integration, between them had so many people. If you take a start point, say, of the 30th of June 1964. This was the strength of the three service headquarters, military and civilian. The purpose of the exercise, as inherited by me from my predecessor, was to cut the strength of these headquarters which had now become headquarters by roughly 30 per cent. Even in the military, we know how to play the numbers game. It is the easiest thing in the world to set up a new headquarters in Ottawa, close to Ottawa, or even in Vancouver, and transfer to that headquarters some of the functions previously performed by one or all of the three service headquarters, and send 30 per cent of your people out there and say, "Look, I am a good boy, I cut the headquarters strength down by 30 per cent." I do not suggest that that was done, but we did set up Materiel Command on an integrated basis; we did set up Training Command on an integrated basis; we did set up Mobile Command on an integrated basis, and we set up an integrated telecommunications system. These were all quite apart from CFHQ. The only meaningful figure that can be produced on personnel costs is by saying well, we kept 99 functions of one kind or another away from the headquarters and we parcelled them out between Materiel Command, Training Command, Mobile Command, tri-service telecommunications network, or whatever the term is, and reduce the start point of the 30th of June, 1964 by that number of people.

Another factor, again on the personnel side, is that if you are losing people anyhow because they are going out on age, voluntarily, on medical grounds or anything else and you are not getting the replacements in the bottom, you are surely reducing the headquarters but it is certainly not as a result of integration.

I would have been hard put, prior to the 15th of July, to put any sort of a

dollar value on the personnel figures. I could have said yes, we have cut down this many people and therefore, this means it is so many dollars, but this would not be the whole story and would certainly not stand up under examination. I think it is very dangerous to get yourself into any *post hoc ergo propter hoc* argument. It cost us so much prior to the first of July, 1964. It has cost us so much after the first of July 1964. Therefore, what we saved as a result of integration —you know, there are damn lies in statistics.

Mr. NUGENT: But what I was wanting to make clear is that anyone who attempts to suggest integration has saved so much money just does not have much regard for accuracy or the truth because you just cannot tell for sure yet.

Mr. FLEURY: I could not tell. Maybe somebody else can tell.

Mr. NUGENT: But only after these experiments in integration have been tried and completed, and only after they have ironed out the wrinkles and so on, would it be possible to tell whether it has been a success, whether you are achieving more efficiency and, thereby, saving money. Would that be the right way to judge it?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, let me put it this way, in the hope that it may be helpful. At the very root of the decision to integrate was a realization that we were not spending, and would not be able to spend, a sufficiently high percentage of the defence budget on new equipment, on capital budgeting, that as personnel, operating and maintenance cost were going up against a fixed or relatively fixed budget ceiling, the amount of money left over for capital was diminishing. I would not pretend to have all the facts and figures in my mind, but it seemed that we were running down, a year or so ago, to about 13 per cent or so of our budget being devoted to equipment and plant. The very root of the integration process, and I think this has been stated time and time again, was to try and get that up to somewhere in the 20 to 25 per cent range. It would seem to me, sir, that the day we spend 20 to 25 per cent of our budget on capital equipment and plant, then somebody can honestly and truthfully say integration has been a success—provided you have not cut the strength of the force by X per cent, which more than makes up for this difference in cost. For instance, if you cut the force in half, it is not too difficult to get up to 20 or 25 per cent capital cost because you have reduced your costs in respect of pay allowances, rations, quarters and so on, by a considerable margin.

Mr. NUGENT: What I was trying to seek was some way that we could effectively weigh the facts. The Minister, and I say it as bluntly as this, has been selling very hard this idea of what tremendous savings he has done. We had an unfortunate experience in this Committee regarding a chart that was purporting to show the levelling off and, in proportion, an increase in spending on equipment but, unfortunately, we were able to reveal the facts and show that there had not been. I agree that when we get up to a substantial increase in the amounts spent on equipment as compared with administrative costs with a steady size force, only then will we know whether integration is a success. This is the only real test.

Mr. FLEURY: This would be my approach to it, as a practical man.

Mr. NUGENT: Would you say, being fair to the integration process, that it is much too early yet, to judge it now, bearing in mind how long it will take for

some steps of integration to take effect or even to be completed, and that one should give it some time yet to settle down to see whether it is working or not?

Mr. FLEURY: I think I agree with that.

Mr. NUGENT: One other point has been pushed by some in this Committee: that it only makes sense, as a logical end of integration, that we push on to unification, because integration will not really work unless we do. What is your opinion of the logic of that position? Is there anything in that argument whatsoever?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, I do not know whether there is anything in it or not, sir, but if it had appealed to me, as I mentioned, I would still be serving.

Mr. NUGENT: Is there anything about integration that would fail because we did not push on to unification?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, I think it might be argued that if you allow too long a stretch-out you lose some of your drive and momentum. Not to put a too fine a point on it, I heard the remark made, half in fun and half in earnest, that if you do not press on fast with this that the rats will get at it; everybody will start to have second thoughts and people will find 69 different reasons for not pushing on with it. I make no judgment on the validity of that approach but it is understandable.

Mr. NUGENT: That is about the only one you can think of?

Mr. FLEURY: At the moment. Maybe if I had a little more time I could think of some others.

Mr. NUGENT: Would you not agree that that is the fairest approach that one who is opposed the unification could take? If, as is argued, the beneficial results of integration are the best argument in favour of unification, do you not think it would be fair to say, approaching the subject right now, that it is too early to judge?

Mr. FLEURY: In my view, it is. Perhaps I should make it perfectly clear that I was not, up to the 15th of July last year, unalterably opposed to some form of further step beyond integration, if it proved the thing to do. I could foresee circumstances. I can foresee circumstances today where unification, again depending on the definition, might be the answer to a great many military problems, but I had not reached that point by the 15th of July and I have not reached it yet.

Mr. NUGENT: We have had expressed by other witnesses here too, that they are not opposed to unification up to a certain point, but after that they just say, "I'm from Missouri. Show me." Is that generally your idea too.

Mr. FLEURY: I think so.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, do I have much time?

The CHAIRMAN: Carry on, if you will—

—unless Mr. McIntosh would like to come on now.

Mr. NUGENT: I was going to go into a different field. I can stop here.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I am in your hands, Mr. Chairman. I do not want to interrupt Mr. Nugent's line of thought at all.

Mr. PUGH: The numbers game was mentioned, and the suggestion was made that transfers might be made in the service from one area to another. In your opinion, have the steps taken as far toward integration cut down on the number of services required for an efficient tri-service?

Mr. FLEURY: I am not sure that I understand the question. Do you mean are the troops getting less or more support as a result of integration?

Mr. PUGH: In respect of integration, has any cutting down of the necessary services been made which would take away from an efficient force?

Mr. FLEURY: I do not think I can answer that honestly. I do not know.

Mr. PUGH: Why would you not be able to answer?

Mr. FLEURY: Because I think that up to the time I left, we were in a turmoil. There were so many things going on and so many things to do that you did not always know and appreciate what service was not being performed, say, in Germany, in the Gaza Strip, Cyprus, Vancouver or Oshkosh Junction. All the service backlash, if you will, of all the action which had been taken had not yet all been seriously considered—had not, as it were, welled up on the desks of those responsible at Canadian Forces Headquarters.

Mr. PUGH: This follows out what you previously said, that it is possibly too early to judge that integration, per se, must have time to work in.

Mr. FLEURY: This is my opinion.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nugent?

Mr. NUGENT: Put me on the next round, will you?

Mr. CHURCHILL: Put me on the next round too, please.

Mr. MCINTOSH: General, what I would like to do at the moment is to try to pinpoint the period when all this trouble started, or its cause, if I can possibly do so. We can call it trouble, or whatever you want to call it, but what caused all these senior officers to resign at almost the same time? It would seem from the evidence you gave yesterday that your reasons for resigning were not exactly the same reasons that other witnesses have given us that took the same action you did, and in your 37 years of experience it would seem to me that you would have run into circumstances similar to those you gave as reasons for quitting, or putting in your resignation, and had overcome them. Yesterday I think you said that there were three reasons—or I took it that you gave three reasons—for your resigning. One was that security of information was practically non-existent. The second reason was because there was evidence of disloyalty and near disloyalty in the forces. The third reason—and this may be, if we can uncover it, the main reason why you resigned—is that you came to realize that things were being done under the cloak of integration which were not part of the integration process at all. You also stated that you had a great deal of confidence in your chief, Air Chief Marshal Miller and I would like to revert to the first two causes you gave. With regard to your statement that the security of information was practically nonexistent, did you at any time discuss with your chief, Air Chief Marshal Miller, the fact that you had uncovered this thing that you cannot tolerate within the services?

Mr. FLEURY: I would not care to say that at any particular time I went into the chief's office and discussed this point specifically with him. I do not think it would have been necessary. I must believe that he was just aware of the situation as I was. I can—

Mr. MCINTOSH: Did he ever indicate that to you?

Mr. FLEURY: I can say, if I can go on, that I certainly discussed this with certain of my colleagues and associates on the same level, and I found myself in the very embarrassing position one day of having all my own senior people in to a monthly conference and reading them a lecture on security of information which, at that level—I am talking about colonels and brigadiers or equivalent—I had never before in my service found myself doing.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Was this situation ever brought to the knowledge of the Minister?

Mr. FLEURY: I could not answer that question, but I think I made the statement yesterday that the whole place reminded me of a sieve. To me it is inconceivable that anybody from the Minister down to the last joined person at headquarters could not have been aware that what was going on was a great deal more than, what some military personnel have called over the years, scuttle but—you know, this question of passing the word from person to person. There was a great deal of unnecessary talk inside the headquarters and outside the headquarters; a great deal more than, in my humble opinion, was justified by the work at hand, or was compatible with the stern directives on security which have been part and parcel of the military regulations for many years.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Did I understand you to say yesterday, that you had served, during your 36 years, under five or eight different ministers of National Defence?

Mr. FLEURY: Something like that; eight or ten.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Had you ever had problems like this before under the former ministers? Was there any evidence that such a thing was taking place before?

Mr. FLEURY: I cannot recall so. If it did happen it was not to the same extent.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You may not have been in a position to realize it.

Mr. FLEURY: That is possibly correct.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Going on to the second point, you said, "because there was evidence of disloyalty and near disloyalty". Now, would you not, as a senior officer, take action in that regard if there were near disloyalty or disloyalty? I would assume that it would be your responsibility to stop this?

Mr. FLEURY: This is a very dicy area. Loyalty is a very delicate thing—

Mr. MCINTOSH: "A two-way street" you said.

Mr. FLEURY: —and it is a two-way street in my view. One might find it even difficult to define loyalty. Perhaps an example: given a junior officer in an infantry battalion, he has taken an oath of allegiance to the Crown and that oath of allegiance says, in words of one syllable, I believe, that he will bear true and loyal allegiance to Her Majesty and will obey the lawful commands of his

superior officers. Now, to a lieutenant or captain in an infantry battalion, he gets the word, as the saying goes, from his company commander and there is no doubt whatever in this mind that his immediate loyalty is focused on his commanding officer and that this works both ways. Now, he knows quite well that his commanding officer has a formation commander who stands in the same relationship as he does to his commanding officer, and higher up the line he moves until he gets a commander-in-chief or chief of defence staff or chief of general staff. But he has to have a focus for his loyalty and that focus is the unit or the sub-unit or the formation and it is epitomized by the commanding officer or the commander.

Now, if he talks to his commanding officer today and is told something and then the brigade commander or divisional commander or chief of defence staff tells him the next day something quite different, he is in a bit of a pickle, is he not? And if that very same night he goes home and reads the newspaper and finds out that a defence spokesman or some unnamed person, or even some named person, says something which is at variance with what he has already got from the other two superiors, he is in trouble from a loyalty point of view.

Now, the same thing works downwards. To take another hypothetical example, if I pass the word on some legitimate matter of policy or procedure direction to my immediate subordinate and then I find, as it goes down the line, that it gets twisted and turned and does not come out the way I started it off, either verbally, or writing, then I have to find out whether I have expressed myself clearly in the first instance, or whether something has happened down the line that should not have happened, and this is what I am talking about in terms of loyalty, disloyalty or near disloyalty.

I found an atmosphere—you must remember that I only brought this point up because I was asked why I left the service—

Mr. McIntosh: Right.

Mr. Fleury: —and this was one of the reasons. I said the place was like a sieve, I did not like the atmosphere and I was trying to illustrate one of the ingredients of that atmosphere.

Now, you may question me, I think, until doomsday without really getting any further clarification on the point. I named no names; I do not think I pointed a finger at anybody; I described the situation which, in my view, was intolerable and which I could no longer live in.

Mr. McIntosh: I do not think we want you to name any names, but in the explanation that you have just given to me I took it that you were dealing with comparatively junior officers; officers who are in the process of learning. I would think on your staff there would be very few of these junior officers. I would think on your staff you would have very senior personnel to deal with and it seems unreasonable to me that these senior people, that had been all through the process you just described to me in the process of learning what loyalty was and how essential it was, would be involved in such a thing in a headquarters such as yours. Am I mistaken in that idea?

Mr. Fleury: I think the very nature of a headquarters tends to obscure the whole direction of loyalty. You see, first of all you have a very considerable number of people working at headquarters and unlike most units they are

working cheek by jowl with a very great number of civilians, and if you do not cross lines between branches and you do not cross lines between the military and the civilian, as I pointed out in talking about the deputy minister's organization, you very often do not get things done.

For instance, if one of my relatively junior officers—say, at the captain or major level or equivalent—has a problem, I take it as a matter of course if it impinges on something that is within the purview of the Deputy Minister that he will go and see somebody at his level in the deputy minister's office, and similarly the deputy minister would not hesitate at all to come to see somebody on his level in my shop. I have no objection to that; this is just as natural and necessary as can be, but that junior officer should know within fairly well prescribed limits what his superior in his department feels, or is likely to feel, or knows, about a certain problem. Now if, knowing that I have categorically stated this is not to be done, he then goes and tries to get somebody in the deputy minister's office to do it for him, then I would take a reasonably dim view of this, would I not? And this can be done in CBHQ in a way that it could never be done in a unit because of the size and complexity of the organization and the number of channels and people through whom one can deal.

I do not know whether this other example might be particularly valid or not but if I, for instance, as a senior officer at the headquarters wanted to get something done through the Chief of Defence Staff and could not get him to see reason, as I saw it, and then I went to the deputy minister, or the minister, or somebody in the Minister's office, or to a member of parliament, and got him to put pressure on my chief, I would think I had no business in the Canadian forces. And there was a certain amount of this going on; a great deal more than I could stomach.

Mr. McIntosh: I would ask you again, sir: Did you bring this topic up with your chief? Was he aware of your feeling that there was evidence of disloyalty or near disloyalty?

Mr. Fleury: I would not like to be specific on that. I think he knew. I am not prepared to say that I ever discussed it with him.

Mr. McIntosh: You think he knew? In other words you said, on the first two reasons you gave for resigning, that with regard to security which you said was practically non-existent you are quite sure your chief, Air Chief Marshal Miller, knew about this, and that there was evidence of disloyalty and near disloyalty within the headquarters and he has aware of this.

Mr. Fleury: I refer to politicking in the worse sense—you know, real cutting around corners; short-circuiting channels of communication; how to get the word from some other higher level to check on what one's immediate superior had told him.

Mr. McIntosh: And to your knowledge this never existed before under any other minister of National Defence? To your knowledge, I ask.

Mr. Fleury: Well, putting it that way, I do not know that—

Mr. McIntosh: Well, I am trying to pinpoint when this started. This is what I said when I started questioning you; I am trying to get the period when this trouble started.

Mr. FLEURY: I cannot pinpoint it because I arrived on September 1, 1965, and it was a condition which I found. Now, I could certainly say that it was not a condition which I found to any extent when I had previously been at Canadian Forces Headquarters.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, to your knowledge, there was never an exodus of so many senior experienced officers as there was just about the period of 1965 when they all started to resign?

Mr. FLEURY: That is so.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Now I want to get to your third reason. You said that you came to realize that things were being done under the cloak of integration, which were not part of the integration process at all.

You may not agree with me, but there is a cloak here in the Minister's speech, one that you have heard so often referred to, the one he gave on December 7 in the House. I repeat and will keep repeating what he said: The system will not be changed, but will continue to have all the navy, the air force and the army until—and these are the words that get me, because there seems to be a limitation on how long these formations will exist; he says:

. . .until the force structure within the unified force is developed.

This is what puzzles me. When is that period when it is going to be developed and what is it when it is developed. Is this what you mean when you say that you came to realize that things were being done under the cloak of integration which were not part of the integration process at all?

Mr. FLEURY: I am sorry, I am not sure that I follow you.

Mr. MCINTOSH: What I am trying to get at is, what is the policy of the present Minister of National Defence? What is he trying to do? It does not seem to me that he is following what we are led to believe in the White Paper, first of all in the objectives, where he says we have certain roles that we are committed to and must carry out; one is supporting collective defence measures and the another is protection and surveillance of the territory over our air space and our coastal waters. We have an objective there, but also in the White Paper, which has been referred to time and time again, there is a suggestion that another force will be developed, a force that some of the previous witnesses said we cannot maintain and cannot service. In the conclusion of the White Paper it says:

> Nevertheless, and regrettably, it is essential to maintain force on our side as a deterrent against attack from potential foes who are themselves heavily armed; as a means of removing the greatest temptation to an aggressor, the assurance of easy victory.

Here it seems to me—and I go back to this dual role dual policy that the Minister seems to be trying to put into force—we must maintain the collective defence, but we are also going to form another force which, with our resources, cannot be done, according to previous witnesses. I ask you: Do you think we can have this dual role and that we can provide an additional force for peacekeeping and, in so doing, do away with our army, navy and our air force?

Mr. FLEURY: I think I said yesterday afternoon that I did not think we could meet the government's commitments with any degree of assurance within the

framework of the personnel and money that was being provided. I think I went on to say that this was nothing new and that we had been, in effect, taking risks, calculated or otherwise, for many, many years and that most military people since the war were, I think, of the opinion that we never had enough to carry out the commitments that we might have been called upon to perform. It was largely by good luck that we had never been called upon to do all these things at one time.

If you are going to have a Canadian defence force, or whatever it is going to be called, for peacekeeping duties, and peacekeeping duties only, then I think perhaps you ought to have another favourable look at unification, because this might be the one circumstance that I can see where unification might be a real boon. But if you are going to do peacekeeping, NATO and NORAD and all the other things that are set forth as solemn commitments on the part of the government, then I say you cannot do it within the manpower and money that is allocated, unless you can do it seriatim. If you can do a peacekeeping job with this group this year and the NATO job with the same group next year well, you are home free, but if you get called upon to reinforce the brigade group in Germany and to provide a substantial peacekeeping force for some place unknown at the moment, and get called upon at the same time to provide forces in conjunction with the Americans for the defence of the continent—if you have to do all these things at once, in my view, you just cannot do them.

Mr. McINTOSH: Yes, but it seems to me that the Minister is trying to tell the people of Canada that all these things can be done with unification. The only trouble, if it can be done, is that he has not told the people of Canada, and has not told me, to my satisfaction, what unification is. Now, I do not know what it means and I do not think you know what it means from your answers yesterday. I am not quite sure that anyone else knows what it means. When General Moncel was on the stand—and this term "unification" is the whole cause of it, I think, when it first cropped up—he told us he was asked to write four papers, I believe it was, on unification. When he finished the four papers, he did not agree with any of them, but he fulfilled his duty and wrote them. Now were you ever asked to write a paper on unification?

Mr. FLEURY: No, sir.

Mr. McINTOSH: If you had been asked, could you have written one?

Mr. FLEURY: I might have been able to write one, but I do not think I would have liked it very much after I had finished, though.

Mr. McINTOSH: Would you have understood it?

Mr. FLEURY: Probably not.

Mr. McINTOSH: Now General Moncel said that unification may be the kiss of death for Canada's defence commitments and he also said that unification will work only if defence commitments are reduced or changed, because unification was an uncharted course with a dim destination. Do you agree with those statements?

Mr. FLEURY: I might not have used the same words, but I think I agree with them generally.

Mr. McINTOSH: He also said that unification has become unification for unifications's sake.

Mr. FLEURY: This seems to me a very present danger and to me, of course, is a very sad state of affairs. I am bound to say that I think we have reached a point where I made reference to my reluctance to appear before this Committee and I gave some reasons for it. Of course, another reason is I honestly feel that not one word I said here yesterday or today will have the slightest effect on what is ultimately carried out, because so many people have taken up such entrenched positions on the subject that it is very difficult for anyone to back away.

The things that I said yesterday and the things that I have said today, or will say today, could have been said at many opportunities by me over the past six months. I chose not to do that, for reasons which I considered good and sufficient, and I do not think that my saying them now is going to have the slightest effect on the ultimate result. I am not so naive as to believe that any answer that I will give to any question today, will make the slightest difference to the end result, and I think this is a very sad state of affairs. I really feel, in all conscience, that if all concerned in some way could have gathered around a table quietly and sorted out these matters to the general satisfaction of the country and parliament and the armed services, we would all, and our country, be much farther ahead today.

Mr. McINTOSH: General Moncel also stated wich regard to these dual roles, that it would be possible to adhere to our commitments in the collective defence and also set up this special force provided—and he referred to the White Paper and he called them flaws in the White Paper. He said one was the commitment set out in the paper which would require a force of between 148,000 and 150,000 men and an annual spending of more than $2.6 billion which apparently, under the present defence policy, was out of the question. Do you agree that these two roles could be carried out if you were given $2.5 billion and a force of 150,000 men?

Mr. FLEURY: I have never done any sums on the subject myself. All I am prepared to say is that I do not think, if we were called on tomorrow to carry out all these roles simultaneously, we could begin to cope with them all with the men and money we now have. Now, whether we would need another 50,000 men or another $500 million, I am not prepared to say.

Mr. McINTOSH: If it could have been done and if you had the right figures, and so on—we will take for granted that General Moncel's figure of 150,000 men is correct, because he said he worked on it—under what conditions and in what manner could we raise our force from the 105,000 that we now have, to a force of 150,000? Do you think it could be done by voluntary enlistment, or would we have to resort to compulsory military service?

Mr. FLEURY: I do not think, if the pattern of the last couple of years is projected into the future, that we could begin to raise 45,000 or 50,000 additional troops on a voluntary basis. They are not coming forward and have not been coming forward for some considerable time in sufficient numbers just to replace our wastage. The strength of the force, as you know, has gone down quite substantially and fairly steadily for the last 18 months or 2 years, and I think I referred to what I consider to be some of the reasons for this yesterday.

Mr. McINTOSH: Do you feel that the Minister, by outlining his policy to you and telling you to make the arrangements to follow that policy, had given you an impossible task to follow and if so, did you tell him this or tell your chief this?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, I was never given this task as Comptroller General...

Mr. McINTOSH: What part of the task were you given?

Mr. FLEURY: This would be in the field of the Chief of Defence Staff and/or the Vice Chief of Defence Staff. I think if he had told me to do this, I would probably have said: "Well sir, these are the difficulties, but I will go out and do my best," which I had done on many occasions in the past under similar circumstances. I do not think that the military ever feels that it has enough men and/or money to carry out all its commitments. It is bound, I think, in conscience to draw this to attention, but then it is also bound in conscience to go out and do the best it can with what it is given. I think this has been the whole pattern of our military history.

Mr. McINTOSH: The lack of money or lack of personnel—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh, do you have a long—

Mr. McINTOSH: I would like to pursue this point.

The CHAIRMAN: All right. I do not want to cut you off in the middle of your questioning.

Mr. McINTOSH: You can do as you wish; you can let me continue later or you can let me continue now. This lack of personnel or this lack of money, General, in no way had anything to do with the security information that was non-existent in headquarters or the evidence of disloyalty or near disloyalty in headquarters?

Mr. FLEURY: I do not think so.

Mr. McINTOSH: Did it have anything to do with your third cause? You said that you came to realize that things were being done under a cloak of integration which was not part of the integration process at all.

Mr. FLEURY: I do not think so.

Mr. McINTOSH: It had nothing to do with either of those. I want to go to this "go it alone" policy, or this third role, that was devised under the present Minister with regard to the peacekeeping force. I understand that the Defence Minister's plan was for two airborne brigades designed for world trouble shooting and General Foulkes had quite a bit to say about this. He said that he could not imagine where such a force would go or under what circumstances. He said such a force with its own attack planes could not participate in the United Nations peacekeeping operations; that the United Nations did not employ such a force. In your opinion, can Canada maintain a peacekeeping force of two airborne brigades designed for world trouble shooting?

Mr. FLEURY: Yes, I think it can.

Mr. McINTOSH: And keep up with their other commitments?

Mr. FLEURY: Maybe—I do not know.

Mr. McINTOSH: Did you read any of Air Marshal Annis' evidence in the newspapers where he said that the biggest force that Canada could maintain was a force of around battalion strength of 1,000?

Mr. FLEURY: I did not read anything that Air Marshal Annis said. I was in the Committee room for about 15 minutes at the tail end of his testimony the day before yesterday.

Mr. McINTOSH: How many men would be involved in two airborne brigades, general?

Mr. FLEURY: I would think from 6,000 to 8,000 troops. But here again you get into the numbers game. I presume an airborne brigade would be, in fact, a skeleton brigage. It would not be anything like the size and shape of the brigade group in Europe. The brigade group in Europe, to give you a basis for comparaison, is in the order of 6,000 strong. I think an airborne brigade group would probably be something in the order of half that size. But, again, I would have to know how the brigade groups were to be set up and what sort of task they were to be given; whether they were to have artillery support, tank support and engineer support, and all these types of things.

Mr. McINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, you can put me down for the next round. I want to discuss a different subject.

Mr. FORRESTALL: General, I just have one question. Mr. Chairman, I hope I will not be too long. Perhaps this could be directed to both the Chairman and the General. I am becoming concerned about the relationship between our apparent defence policy and our foreign policy. Mr. McIntosh started this line of questioning from one point of view. I am wondering if you would care to say whether or not you feel that this matter which is now before us might properly be referred to an enlargement of this Committee, or a joint committee and the committee responsible for our foreign affairs matters? Is the matter something which is now transcending in your own mind the immediate, direct responsibility to the field of defence? Is another area coming into it?

Mr. FLEURY: I would be very happy if the Chairman would field that question.

The CHAIRMAN: I would suggest that inasmuch as this is the only matter that has been referred to us by the House—this bill—this is something which will have to come up and be a directive from the House. I will have to discuss with the Clerk whether this could be a recommendation from this Committee. At the moment I do not believe it could be, inasmuch as we are expected to address ourselves to this bill.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I will pass because this is one matter that the general did not want to get involved in. May I ask if this matter can be placed on the agenda of your steering committee, as I am becoming very concerned about certain evidence we have had from two or three people concerning our capability to meet certain roles that we have undertaken. I think this should be a matter of extensive consideration by others than those directly concerned with defence.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I wanted to ask another question or two about National Defence Headquarters during the time that General Fleury was there. I was drawing attention a few minutes ago to the number of senior officers who have

left over a period of a year and a half. There is another question in *Hansard* of February 13, 1967, on page 12,938. Mr. Forrestall asked a question with regard to resignations by National Defence Headquarters officers and the answer that was given indicated that during the period of two years—from January 1, 1965 to January 1, 1967—3,000 officers served at National Defence Headquarters. As of February 13, there were 1,649 officers present there. The answer does not say how many of that 1,649 had been present throughout the two-year period. Assuming that number had been present throughout, there is a changeover of 1,351 and would guess that the 1,649 were not there throughout the two-year period. Therefore, you might assume that perhaps 2,000 officers passed through National Defence Headquarters during the two-year period.

General, you mentioned the turmoil at National Defence Headquarters and the shifting around of officers, and so on. Were you conscious, during your term there, of a very rapid coming and going, posting and reposting of officer personnel?

Mr. FLEURY: Yes.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It was a bit like Grand Central Station, then. They must have been coming and going at the rate of 30 a week on the average, or more.

Mr. FLEURY: I would not be surprised.

Mr. CHURCHILL: The answer to the same question indicates that during that period—the period of two years—264 officers submitted their resignations. This indicates—although I was talking earlier about the 80 senior officers who had disappeared from the services—that a large number of officers below the rank of brigadier or equivalent must have left. The answer goes on to say that of the 264 officers 56 had a minimum of 25 years' service and were eligible for voluntary retirement, but it does not say whether they retired voluntarily or not. I will quote this directly. It states:

> —most of the remaining 208 were in their last three years of service, a period where many officers negotiate for, and accept, civilian employment.

It is the typical answer you get from the artful dodgers in the Minister's office. Is it normal for officers, during their last three years of service, to depart from the service and sacrifice their pension rights during that period?

Mr. FLEURY: It certainly is not unknown for officers to leave within the last two or three years prior to their intended date of release on the grounds of age. I think it is very understandable. If an officer who is reaching the age of 50, for instance, and thinking about a new career receives a good offer, he asks to get out a bit early. A lot of people in the service consider, rightly or wrongly, that 50 is a sort of magic age. It is relatively easier for them to become re-established, or to become established for the first time, in civilian life if they have not passed the magic age of 50. But whether it is a trend which has accelerated considerably in recent months or not I would not be in a position to say. It did seem to me that a great many more officers were going out in the period of 1965-1966 under the circumstances that had been normal in the past.

Mr. CHURCHILL: The point that I wanted to direct attention to is that it has been not only senior officers—the rank of brigadier and equivalent and upwards —who have been leaving the service, but the junior officers in rather large

numbers. This applies only to National Defence Headquarters—264 officers in the two-year period submitted their resignations, for one reason or another, and it does not state why. While I am on this, I might just indicate to the Committee that there still rests in *Hansard* on page 8,562 of October 12, 1966, an answer to a question by Mr. Forrestall which reads as follows and I quote:

> Question No. 1,895—Mr. Forrestall: What are the forecast expenditures for capital equipment for the armed services for 1966-67 and 1967-68 as a percentage of the defence budget?
>
> Hon. Paul Hellyer (Minister of National Defence): 1966-67, 17.1 per cent.

It continues to rest there as a public statement and we had this corrected during the course of Committee hearings when a notorious chart was put in front of us. Here you have more information going out to the public that can be classed as inaccurate.

I want to ask the witness one question about the services. The statement has been made to us that in this modern world warfare has changed so remarkably that we have to alter our force structure and introduce integration and unification to keep up with developments. From your long experience in the services and during wartime, do you see such a major change, exclusive of nuclear weapons, that would necessitate eliminating the present roles of the navy, army and air force?

Mr. FLEURY: No, I do not, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: From your observations of the warfare that has gone on around the world since the close of world war II and that is taking place at present in Viet Nam, do you see any urgent reason for materially altering our fighting components—navy, army and air force?

Mr. FLEURY: Not on military grounds.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, that is the end of my questioning, but may I raise a point of order? I asked, two days ago, for the letter of April 2, 1964, which was sent out to the various commands. It is in the possession of Mr. Deachman, but could I as a member of the Committee, also have a copy of it and could other members of the Committee have copies?

The CHAIRMAN: We can deal with this right now. Some copies have been run off by the clerk and he was just seeking an opportunity to distribute them. I will ask him to do that now.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Churchill must be delighted to know that I gave a copy to the Clerk immediately so he could run off a few copies for Mr. Churchill. Is that not the same letter Mr. Churchill was quoting from a few days ago before he found out that I had a copy?

Mr. CHURCHILL: I quoted the letter. This, of course, is a complete misstatement of fact. I quoted from the evidence—the ridiculous evidence given here by Mr. Patrick who incorporated part of that document in his evidence. I had no knowledge of it before, nor had I a copy in my possession. Mr. Harkness asked yesterday for a copy of the production called "Internal Information". Could that be made available to the Committee, or should we rush down to national headquarters and ask for it?

The CHAIRMAN: No. If you will leave it to the Chairman and the Clerk, we will get hold of copies for you.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Could we not get this material within a day? Has there not been quite a commuter system operating between national headquarters and this Committee, day after day?

The CHAIRMAN: I am not too sure about the difficulty that the Clerk is experiencing in this, but I hope you will leave it to me to get hold of them as we have got hold of this last copy and we will try to get them by this afternoon.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I have a third question with regard to this. It will soon be three weeks since I asked for some other information. I am very patient, but when you are dealing with National Defence Headquarters, naturally you have to be excessively patient. But I think I asked at our second sitting for the establishment of our forces in order that we could see whether or not the present recruitment was falling far short of the establishment. I thought that information might be made readily available to the Committee; or should I go to the Russian Embassy for it?

The CHAIRMAN: Could you leave it to me to find out what the situation is with respect to this in conversation with the Clerk? I will bring it up again this afternoon.

Mr. FANE: Could you go further in what Mr. Churchill was asking for? Could we be supplied with a whole handful of the papers that Mr. Andras mentioned in his talk yesterday, as he turned them over one at a time? There were about a dozen or so of those things that we have not had access to. Could we get them?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, if they are available. I will ask Mr. Andras to produce them so we can have copies made.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Many of them are such things as the reports of the Committee over the last three years and the White Paper, and so on.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, this would be helpful to the members of the Committee. I see no reason why they should not be produced through the Clerk for everyone, and I will deal with that.

Mr. ANDRAS: I would be simply delighted, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FANE: Most of my questions already have been asked, and they did confirm the subject of disloyalty and security. Mr. McIntosh and Mr. Nugent, I think, got very full answers to those subjects this morning, for which I am very grateful. I do want to ask General Fleury whether a great deal of the difficulty in putting the programs into effect is not a direct result of a faulty or inadequate appreciation of the situation by the people who have ordered the program of integration and unification, in that it was put into effect before the appreciation was firm and, perhaps, trying to run before we could walk?

Mr. FLEURY: I think I would be inclined to agree with that.

Mr. FANE: I understand from what you said that, perhaps, was one of the biggest initial troubles. More troubles have developed through lack of information, and, as you suggested, perhaps lack of communication and intercommunication.

Mr. FLEURY: I think that is so. In all honest conscience I think one must admit that the military machine is a pretty peculiar machine. It does not really operate in the same way as a political machine or a business machine except in certain specific areas. I do not happen to know anything about motor car engines; I do not know nearly as much as I ought to and if my car stops I call a garage, if I do not want to get my fingers burnt or make the situation worse by tinkering with my automobile engine. I think that it is the nature of the beast that the military machine, in its detailed operations, has to be run by people who understand it. There is no question whatever that the machine must get its direction and its policy and its control from outside the machine, that is, from the government through the Minister. But, if you put someone without military background and experience anywhere into the military machine, and tell him to try to make it run, I think he will end up by fouling the machine and getting hurt himself.

Mr. FANE: That is exactly what I said myself. Thank you very much.

Mr. HARKNESS: You stated yesterday that communications in National Defence Headquarters had broken down, and you gave an instance of that which was quoted in the morning paper:

> "Officers working for me knew more or said they knew more or thought they knew more about what was in the mind of the Minister than I did."

Now, the effect of that, I would take it, would be a breakdown in the essential and necessary mutual trust existing in your branch or any other branch. Would another effect be duplication of effort; a lack of co-ordination in what people were doing or attempting to do?

Mr. FLEURY: I believe so.

Mr. HARKNESS: The total result, then, would be a less efficient and effective machine.

Mr. FLEURY: To put it mildly.

Mr. HARKNESS: Can you give us what to your mind were the basic reasons for this breakdown in communications?

Mr. FLEURY: No, I really cannot, because as I said before, it was a situation which I found existing on arrival. Naturally, I thought a good deal about it before and since my retirement; it is something that worried me greatly, but I cannot explain how it happened, why it happened, or anything, to be perfectly honest. I certainly would be away out in left field if I ventured into the field of trying to impute motives to anybody.

Mr. HARKNESS: Have you any suggestions to give us as to how this situation could be corrected?

Mr. FLEURY: I might try. I think that what was needed more than anything else in the period prior to July 15, 1966, was clear-cut statements of government policy, clearly translated through the Chief of the Defence Staff, to the armed forces, and I emphasize—through the Chief of the Defence Staff. Every organization has its own methods, its own language, its own *modus operandi*. If the military machine—a rather distastful term in some respects—is not run in the

way that over the years it has been built and designed to run, then you get misunderstanding and you get confusion.

It may be all quite honest. Everybody who mucked in on this may have done so from the most laudable motives. But, I do not think I have to explain to you, Mr. Harkness, that it is no use having somebody, no matter who he may be—a politician or a civil servant or anybody else—trying to go down to Camp Valcartier and teach the Van Doos how to suck eggs. It has got to be done by somebody from the Van Doos who gets his word from an area or brigade commander who, in turn, pushes it down and interprets it, because when the Chief of Defence Staff sends out a program it is for the armed forces as a whole, and obviously it has to be broken down and flesh put on it at almost every level down the way, and this has to be done in terms that the fellow on the receiving line, whoever he may be, understands unquestionably.

We used to have a rule of thumb for many years, and it was only half-joking, that anybody who wrote a letter, or directive or instruction that could not be understood by the least educated corporal in the army, did not write a good letter, or instruction or directive. You have to be understood by these people, in a way and a language that they understand. I think, I began to touch on this yesterday; when I get into a political climate, obviously I am ill at ease. This is not my dish of tea; this is not what I was trained for, for the last 30 years. But put me in an army environment and, within reason, in a military environment which is not necessarily confined to the army, and I understand the language; I understand the procedures; I think I can get my ideas across to my subordinates, and I believe and expect that they can get the ideas across to their subordinates. And so the thing goes down the line, and action is taken. It does not work otherwise, or it works badly otherwise.

Mr. HARKNESS: I take from what you have just said that probably the basic reason for this communication breakdown was that the normal channel of communications frequently was not followed as far as instructions, orders, and so on, to commands, formations and units are concerned.

Mr. FLEURY: Up and down.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes, up and down. In other words, it was being short circuited in various ways.

Mr. FLEURY: This is correct.

Mr. HARKNESS: What should have been coming from the Chief of the Defence Staff would be coming from the Minister's office or some other source.

Mr. FLEURY: I did not say that.

Mr. HARKNESS: No, but I say it. Would you agree to this?

Mr. FLEURY: No comment.

Mr. HARKNESS: You also stated that the security of information was practically non-existent. Could you give us the reasons for that?

Mr. FLEURY: I think that people were confused and that loyalties had become divided and diluted; that factions were starting to grow up in the headquarters. One heard comments around the place such as, "Whose side are you on?" This sort of approach. I think that is about all I need to say on the subject.

Mr. HARKNESS: In other words, this is another phase or example of diminution or decrease in morale?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, it certainly must have had an effect on morale. I can assure you that it had a great effect on my morale.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes. I would think there is no question about it that if there was a breakdown as fas as security of information is concerned that the basic reason for that was a breakdown in morale.

You have stated that it would take two years to catch up on the paper work in the Comptroller General's branch. We have had evidence that it would take some five years, as far as Materiel Command is concerned, to get the supply situation working really effectively, and I think you stated that in your view it would take even longer as far as the technical services were concerned. Under these circumstances do you think that further steps in regard to integration, and particularly as far as unification is concerned, can effectively be taken until there has been a period for consolidation and for getting the present organization situations whipped into shape.

Mr. FLEURY: No, I do not.

Mr. HARKNESS: In other words, you believe that at the present time a pause is essential in order to, we will say, pick up the pieces?

Mr. FLEURY: A working pause, if I may use the term. Not a period in which nothing will be done.

Mr. HARKNESS: No, no, no. A pause in order to consolidate or, as I say, pick up the pieces. I take it you would think that pause should be one of several years' duration?

Mr. FLEURY: I do not know how long it should be but it would seem to me that it could not be less than two or three years.

Mr. HARKNESS: Now, we have had the statement made by the Minister and others on various occasions that our defence forces and organization, and so forth, are more efficient and effective at the present time than has been the case at any time more or less in the past. What would be your comment on that?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, I would be the last person to downgrade or denigrate the efficiency of our armed forces. I think it is beyond question that in their size and weight class, they are second to none. The people we have in today are, by and large, the people we had in last year and five years ago and ten years ago, because we have done so relatively little recruiting in the last few years that most of the people you have are reasonably long term professionals, who have had a great deal of training in a wide variety of subjects and in my view are literally capable of doing anything in the military field.

In the midst of the early stages of integration, for example, I had a not unexpected telephone call one Friday afternoon about four o'clock to send a battalion from Camp Valcartier to Cyprus. I issued a few instructions and I went home about six o'clock. At about eleven o'clock I started to shake and shiver it was obvious I had a very bad case of the flu. The next day my temperature was up and my wife called the doctor and he wanted to send me to the hospital. I said I did not think that was really necessary; I was prepared to be a good boy and lie quietly in bed at home for a couple of days. He said, "That is fine, provided you

do what you are told", and I did. Once a day somebody called me up from the headquarters and gave me a short progress report on how the battalion was moving to Cyprus. When I got back to my office a week later the whole battalion was in Cyprus and there was not a problem which had not been properly and professionally dealt with by the staff, and it would not have mattered a damn whether it was Fleury who was G.O.C. of Quebec Command or whether it was Joe Blow. They were a lot of people who knew their business and knew what they were about and they got on with it and it was, in effect, no sweat. In that context I certainly believe that the armed forces today are as effective or efficient as they ever were, but there are fewer of them and if you are talking in terms of all our commitments, then you get into an entirely different area.

Mr. HARKNESS: This is really the point I am getting at, that with the numbers that exist at the present time and with the state of disorganization which you and other witnesses have indicated exists in the various staffs at the present time, is it possible for the forces to act as effectively as was the case, say, three years ago?

Mr. FLEURY: I really do not know and I hope they will not be put to the test.

Mr. NUGENT: General, I was a little dismayed at your comment that you had the feeling that whatever you say will not have any effect. I can understand your feeling that people have taken an entrenched position, but it is really only at this session of the Committee that I feel that officers such as yourself have been able to speak freely and that we are starting to get the unvarnished facts. I really feel it is much too pessimistic an attitude to take that we are such small men that we cannot re-assess the situation in the light of the facts. I sincerely trust that you are quite wrong in that, and I hope the feeling that you have is not so all-pervasive that it is really a dreadful bore being here, because I am quite sure that you are just a little too sanguine in appearance. However, I realize that your experience, the method of your leaving the forces, etc., must have left you quite pessimistic. I know that you would not run out on a job just because it was getting to be a tough job or even because part of it was distasteful. You must have had the feeling that the job was impossible, that you could not loyally carry it out and therefore had to leave. Was that your feeling?

Mr. FLEURY: That is roughly correct. Perhaps I should add, you know, that after all these years in the service there are literally thousands of people still in who have been colleagues of mine, and many of them have been personal friends of mine and remain personal friends of mine, and in the context of Mr. Harkness' earlier question I have the highest respect for them, for their ability and for their opinions. I think that the service is professional enough on every phase that the leaving of one or two or a dozen senior officers is of relatively little consequence, because there are always people in behind ready and able to fill in. If these people whom I respect can make the new deal work, nobody will applaud more loudly than I because I like them, I think they have all kinds of ability and experience and I think they are faced with a task which I found impossible and I hope they will not.

Mr. NUGENT: Referring to your comments, sir, on not having spoken out before until this time and your willingness to appear before the Committee, I suppose that each officer on leaving has that thought in mind and I will just ask you this. Was it really a decision that you believe each officer would have to

make on leaving, whether he would speak out now and find it distasteful, perhaps, but which he felt was necessary, as Admiral Landymore did, or run the risk of doing what you have done, wait until you are called, and in this way he may find the situation too late to be effective. You had that choice, did you?

Mr. FLEURY: Yes. I think I had that choice and I think every officer who left about the same time had that very difficult choice. I think each officer unquestionably made the choice he made because he believed in it. I would not presume to sit in judgment either on myself or on others for whatever action they took.

Mr. NUGENT: Actually, you are still in the forces and—

Mr. FLEURY: Legally but not practically.

Mr. NUGENT: —except for the fact that you are before this Committee and required to speak, and you are under the protection of parliament, if you were to make statements publicly in criticism, this could be a court martial offence, could it not?

Mr. FLEURY: I suppose that is so, although I am bound to admit that the thought never crossed my mind until this moment.

Mr. NUGENT: There was some suggestion made that somebody thought that Admiral Landymore should be courtmartialed.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It was a spokesman for the Minister.

Mr. NUGENT: I think that Admiral Landymore rather regretted that they did not take that step. He would have liked to have had such a hearing. However, I was interested and dismayed a little at the atmosphere around the headquarters; the lines of communication seemed to be gone, there was a feeling almost of disloyalty, people did not know where the information was coming from, etc. Would it be fair to describe it as a sort of Alice in Wonderland feeling after a while?

Mr. FLEURY: I do not know whether it would be fair or not, but it was so described. As a matter of fact, I had put before me at one time on a scratch pad, in the allocation of all the characters in Alice in Wonderland, the various people in the Canadian Forces Headquarters.

Mr. NUGENT: Well, Admiral Landymore gives us a description of this sort of thing on page 6 of the first brief he prepared for us. He was talking about trying to find out what was in the Minister's mind about unification, and at the bottom of the page he said:

> The Minister himself gave us a clue at a meeting held in Ottawa in June 1965. At an assembly of a very large number of senior officers who had been invited to Ottawa to learn something of the organization plans for integration, the minister in his opening remarks announced there would be a single walking out dress and a single rank structure by July 1967. I immediately asked the Chief of Personnel for more details of this as he, normally, is responsible for dress and rank structure. He told me he had had no pre-knowledge of the announcement or any knowledge of any such plan.

Now, is Admiral Landymore right that the Chief of Personnel is responsible for dress and rank structure and would normally have this knowledge?

Mr. FLEURY: Certainly the Chief of Personnel is responsible for dress.

Mr. NUGENT: Do you find it a bit incredible that a minister would announce this to such a large assembly of senior officers, and the Chief of Personnel have no pre-knowledge of it at all?

Mr. FLEURY: I do not find it incredible; I find it very unusual.

Mr. NUGENT: It is a hell of a way to run an army.

Admiral Landymore tells us about another incident that I would like you to comment on. After some of the talk about unification and finding the disruption in his command and trying to seek it out, and I am sure he must have used the proper channel of communication. He describes it this way:

> I reported conscientiously my actions and my observations on matters causing bad morale, but to no avail.

It is the duty, I suppose, of the commander of that area to report to the chief on the state of morale in his unit and to try and trace it down?

Mr. FLEURY: Yes.

Mr. NUGENT: He said:

> Then occurred a new way to destroy morale. On the 14th April of this year,

I guess it is 1966 he is talking about.

> There appeared in the Toronto *Globe and Mail* a news item concerning re-engagement rates in the three Services. At the end of this release appeared the following statement—I quote—"Another factor is the geneneraly acknowledged difference in officer man relationships in the Navy. Defence officials say that naval officers still retain to some extent an above decks, below decks mentality where personnel are concerned. They've got to realize that this is now a highly technical service, a spokesman said. Sailors don't just scrub decks and set the sails now, they're skilled men and the old attitudes of officers just don't fit. We're trying to change that.—unquote. The spokesman was Mr. Lee.

Canada's answer to Goebbels.

The CHAIRMAN: Is that in the statement?

Mr. NUGENT: No, I added it.

The CHAIRMAN: I sometimes wonder if this sort of thing is helpful to the work of the Committee.

Mr. NUGENT: I thought a little amusement now and then—you do not find it amusing?

The CHAIRMAN: It is time consuming. I might also say that mention of Joe Blow being in command down at Quebec Command might call for him attending as a witness. I do not know if you meant that.

Mr. FLEURY: We could probably find one.

Mr. NUGENT: Admiral Landymore sums it up this way:

> We had reached the stage where an influential person on the Minister's personal staff had publicly criticized the whole officer corps of the navy.

Would you agree with Admiral Landymore that this is certainly a new way to destroy morale?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, I do not really feel that Bill Landymore needs a pongo named Fleury to back him up. I read this article at the time and I was appalled.

Mr. NUGENT: Well, this sort of thing was going on, though, was it not?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, the evidence is there.

Mr. NUGENT: I just want to clear it up because I feel that Admiral Landymore has been very shabbily treated by this minister and I wanted to bring out the point and see if you, as one used to a position of command, would not agree that it was his duty, if he found and believed that morale was being badly shaken, to get rather excited about it and really try to trace it down and try to do something about it. Is that not accurate?

Mr. FLEURY: One of the first duties of any and every commander or commanding officer is to keep a very close eye on the morale in his unit or command, and if he sees signs and portends that it is not what it should be, he should correct it. If the correction is not within his capacity because of extraneous influences, then he must report higher up what he believes them to be. Now, whether he is right or not is usually a matter for higher military authority to judge. But if, in the course of my career, I found that something was being done by a higher headquarters which was adversely affecting the morale of the troops under my command, I would scream like a stuck pig, but within military channels, of course.

Mr. NUGENT: How late do you plan to sit, Mr. Chairman?

I want to start a new line of questioning.

The CHAIRMAN: I notice that after you, Mr. Nugent, there is Mr. McIntosh and Mr. Laniel and it is now just after 12.30. I got the impression from the witness yesterday that he did not have unlimited time at his disposal, but if we could persuade him to stay until one o'clock I have the feeling we might be able to conclude.

Mr. NUGENT: I thought we usually ended at 12.30.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, we have gone on until one o'clock.

Mr. NUGENT: We went on last night until 10.30, and we go on and on.

I have not had any lunch and I would prefer to go on at 3.30. I want to start a new line of questioning.

The CHAIRMAN: May I just talk to the witness for a moment. He indicates that it would suit him better if we could perhaps continue and see how it goes.

Mr. NUGENT: All right. Now, Admiral Landymore presented a brief, General, and I wonder if you would care to comment on some of the criticisms he makes about the manner in which integration is now working out. I ask this for the simple reason that I feel that whether integration generally is a good idea or not, we cannot emphasize too much the fact that, like every other scheme, it requires planning and sometimes the actual operation does not work exactly as planned, and there does not seem to be a realization in some quarters of how much time and how much work is involved. There are some faults which may or may not be corrected, and perhaps your comments would throw a little more

light on this. On page 10 of Admiral Landymore's brief, under the general heading of Untimeliness of Unification and Faults of Integration, this appears:

> First:—Materiel Command is not living up to expectations. Because fiscal control rests with the Headquarters and because manpower controls rest with the Headquarters organization, in many ways Materiel Command becomes a post office between the Headquarters and the Operational Commands. Adm. Burchell has been studying the supply organization since last August. I think he would be able to give your Committee a very clear picture of the deficiencies and the necessary corrective measures. Since this will lead ultimately to a very serious personnel upheaval and is vital to effective operations, it cannot be delayed.

Now, is Materiel Command living up to expectations or, to put it another way, were there any greater difficulties encountered in establishing Materiel Command and getting it running than you had expected?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, this is a matter of judgment, it seems to me, sir, and I do not think I am in a position to make any judgment. What were our expectatons for Materiel Command? What are our expectations for Material Command? My expectation prior to July 15 last was that it was going to take three to five years before it really would be able to perform at peak efficiency. Now, did anybody draw up a timetable as to how much more efficient it should get every month, quarter, six months or a year? I do not know. So, I am really not in a position to be helpful.

Mr. NUGENT: Perhaps this letter that went out over the Minister and Associate Minister's signature on April 2 is a timetable. This is one that we have just received and it is dated April 2, 1964, and paragraph 5 reads:

> The second step will be the reorganization of the field command structure. Planning for this will be undertaken by the National Defence Headquarters staff after it is established.

Paragraph 4 deals with the National Defence Headquarters staff reorganization:

> It is estimated that the integration of the field commands will take approximately one year.

Now, is that an estimate that would justify Admiral Landymore saying that Materiel Command is not living up to expectations? On the basis of what the Minister has said that it would take one year, would Admiral Landymore be correct?

Mr. FLEURY: I suppose one would have to distinguish between the timing when you say it is estimated that the integration of the field commands will take approximately one year. There was a point in time, I do not remember exactly when it was, I think it was on April 1, 1966, when I said over my signature that Materiel Command is hereby integrated. I just waved the wand and signed a piece of paper. This meant, in effect, that Materiel Command would be expected to undertake an integrated function from that date and that all matters of supply and material and maintenance would be controlled and channelled through Materiel Command, but surely this is just the beginning of the operation. Then some X-thousand poor characters from major general on down to a lowly clerk grade I have to start making this thing work. I suppose it is a fair statement that

the integration of field commands will take approximately one year, from an organizational point of view as looked at from the Minister's office or CFHQ but certainly not from the point of view of the people working in them. In point of fact, I would not like to pretend that I have total recall, but it seems to me that Materiel Command, Training Command and most other integrated commands really legally came into existence on April 1, 1966, or thereabouts. I know I was busy signing organization orders in March 1966. I was under no illusion that the piece of paper that I was signing was going to do anything except establish tasks to be done and channels to be followed and establishments to be worked toward.

Mr. NUGENT: And once they do get established, then there is the task of looking it over, seeing how it is working and taking any corrective measures?

Mr. FLEURY: That is right.

Mr. NUGENT: Which is the three to five years process you mentioned.

Admiral Landymore goes on to say:

> Unification added to this will seriously delay progress.

That is, corrective progress. Do you think that unification would seriously delay the corrective process in according integration steps?

Mr. FLEURY: I would not be prepared to say that it would in so far as Materiel Command is concerned because this is a support function, and there are many people who feel that integration and unification, in so far as support commands are concerned, are not too far apart in content and context and intentions. However, I distinguish very clearly, at least in my own mind, between the integration of fighting or field combat commands and supporting services such as Materiel Command. One can argue, I think that if it is possible to integrate the dentists, the doctors, the padres, the lawyers, and so on, that it might be possible to integrate the supply types, but this is a much different business from trying to integrate fighting formations, operational formations.

Mr. NUGENT: Even when you are integrating, I suppose there is a difference of opinion as to the best way to integrate, is there?

Mr. FLEURY: Oh, indeed.

Mr. NUGENT: I was interested in this remark:

> Because fiscal control rests with the Headquarters and because manpower controls rest with the Headquarters organization, in many ways Materiel Command becomes a post office between the Headquarters and the Operational Commands.

Is that something that will have to be looked at and perhaps revised?

Mr. FLEURY: I think you are touching on a very important subject. At least, I used to consider it a very important subject. On more than one occasion I said that if we were really serious in giving commands in the field the means of carrying out the responsibilities that were given them we would have to give them more financial authority. I said that was not talking about adding another $1,000 or $2,000 to the upper limits of what they could spend within their own authority, I was talking of at least an order of magnitude. In other words, if a senior commander—let us say a major general or a vice admiral, or something —out in the field was given the responsibility of X-thousands of troops and

hundreds of millions of dollars worth of equipment, and so on and so forth, that it was pretty damn ridiculous to say that you could not spend a dollar to buy a few pencils or that you could not spend more than $1,000 to build a building or that you could not spend more than $5,000 on an individual maintenance program or more than $50,000 on snow clearing, or some such thing. That if all the items—and there are thousands of them—would have to go all the way through the tortuous channels to Ottawa for approval, then we were just kidding ourselves. I said, in effect, that unless we were prepared to multiply by 10 the fiscal and financial authorities of the field commanders they would never be able to operate, in part at least, as other than post offices. Does this answer your question?

Mr. NUGENT: Yes, it does. If I have understood you correctly, then; (a), it limits the effectiveness of the field command and, (b), it increases the amount of communication back and forth and makes it more cumbersome to deal with even simple financial problems. I suppose, because fiscal control still rests with headquarters, there must have been arguments on the other side. No matter how much your present argument appeals to me, I gather that your point of view did not prevail, at least up to the time you left. Do you agree?

Mr. FLEURY: No, I guess it had not prevailed up to the time I left. I do not know what has happened since.

Mr. NUGENT: Is this a good example of the sort of difficulty one encounters in bringing about the integration process; an honest difference of opinion and then trial and error, perhaps, or put in one system and then perhaps take it out and revise it? Is it possible that this may be revised in the next year or so?

Mr. FLEURY: I think it is quite possible, and I think it is not just an honest difference of opinion, it is a question of impinging on areas which are quite outside military control. When you are talking about what I prefer to call financial authority, as compared to fiscal authority, which I understand is really a different thing, this is very closely controlled by people outside the armed forces. For example, the Treasury Board. If you decide to set up an organization which is going to require approval of a whole new set of financial rules by the Treasury Board, then obviously you cannot go any faster than the Treasury Board is prepared to go. The same thing may be true of the Department of Public Works. If you have decided to close out certain installations and go into other installations which could be controlled by the Department of Public Works, well, with all the best will in the world you have to go outside your own organization and try to bring these people along.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nugent, perhaps at this point we could move on to Mr. McIntosh.

Mr. NUGENT: I just wanted to make one observation here. Then the bringing of integration into effect in order to overcome this may not even be possible, it may not be within the capabilities of the Department of National Defence?

Mr FLEURY: You can produce a plan to integrate such and such an organization, and as a vital part of that plan you say you have to get this or that financial regulation changed. Well then, if those responsible will not change the financial regulation you have to make the plan all over again.

Mr. NUGENT: This might have to be undone, then?

Mr. FLEURY: That is right.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh?

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, I will try to make my questions as brief as possible and I will try to phrase them so that the General can answer them yes or no.

General, one newspaper editorial suggested that the Committee should bring out two points. The first point they refer to is this: "The Committee might well look into the powers of the Defence Minister under the new act and examine whether or not they are excessive." Would you care to comment on that? In your opinion are they excessive under the new act or are they not?

Mr. FLEURY: I have not really studied them, I do not know.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Right. The next point they ask be brought out is this: "One of the frustrating parts of the whole debate is that while the onus is clearly on the Minister and his planners to prove how a single service concept will save money, improve efficiency and maintain morale in the armed forces, the facts have to be squeezed out." Could you give us any more facts, in addition to those which have already been given, on how it will save money and how it will affect the morale and improve the efficiency?

Mr. FLEURY: I do not think so, sir.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Right. Now, reference has been made in previous testimony to the effect that under this new policy of the Minister there might be too much emphasis placed on tidy administration rather than on combat troops. Would you generally agree with that statement?

Mr. FLEURY: I do not know about the phrase "under the policy or direction of the Minister." There is a tendency in peacetime to look at administration as the be all and end all of the military operation. Obviously administration takes second place when the country is in danger and troops are fighting. In peacetime, when there is no war or operation going on, you tend more and more to look closer and closer at tidy administration as one indication of the efficiency of a unit or a commander. I have no doubt in my mind that the services want to latch on to and put into effect the most recent proven techniques and means of saving money. For instance, if it is more efficient and more economical to keep our pay records, inventory controls and personnel records on computers, then surely this is the way to do it. But if you start to lose sight of the main purpose of the exercise, which is to train and maintain an efficient fighting force, then you are not seeing the woods for the trees. We send people off in considerable numbers to take all kinds of management courses and techniques of this and techniques of that, and this is a good thing. These newly created experts come back and try to put their new found knowledge into practice and they even develop a vocabulary all of their own. This is fine within limits. The fact remains that a fighting force in the field, certainly from an army point of view, is largely a matter of command and leadership, not a question of modern management techniques or answers that come out of any computer which has been developed to date.

It is natural and not necessarily a bad thing that those who are charged with the responsibility for the management, as distinct from the leadership in the armed forces, should concern themselves with all these matters. But do not talk management to a private soldier in the Royal Canadian Regiment because he

does not know anything about management; he expects his commander to know something about management and he expects his commander to command him and to lead him.

Mr. McINTOSH: Do you feel under this new policy there has been a tendency to over-stress the problem of administration and in this way lose sight of the combat troops?

Mr. FLEURY: I think this is a real danger.

Mr. McINTOSH: One witness said he was amazed that there was not a single mention of combat servicemen in the brief presented to the Committee by Air Marshal E. M. Reyno, Chief of Personnel. That is the reason I brought that up.

Another witness asked this Committee how could people be unified into a submarine survice? Have you any suggestion that might help us to answer that question?

Mr. FLEURY: You could not unify me into a submarine service, I will tell you that. I would be scared to death.

Mr. McINTOSH: Another statement that we have on record is that unification was never proposed by the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Is that statement correct?

Mr. FLEURY: Unification?

Mr. McINTOSH: Yes, those were the words.

Mr. FLEURY: Well, the Chiefs of Staff Committee has not existed of course, since July 1, 1964. I was never a member of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, so I really cannot answer that question.

Mr. McINTOSH: When I first started questioning you I was trying to pinpoint the period and the cause. I hoped that perhaps your answer would help to define the time when this word "unification" came into being, or when it became a concern to these many senior officers that resigned. Do you know or would you have any idea who proposed unification to the Minister?

Mr. FLEURY: I do not have the vaguest idea.

Mr. McINTOSH: The statement was also made that unification is a political mirage which has produced astonishment among our allies and deluded our fellow countrymen. Do you agree that unification is a political mirage and has produced astonishment among our allies?

Mr. FLEURY: I am afraid I could not have even produced a phrase such as that, sir. I wish I could, even though I do not necessarily believe in it.

Mr. McINTOSH: That is the end of my questioning, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Laniel, you are next.

Mr. LANIEL: I will try to be brief.

(*Translation*)

General Fleury, some time ago you answered Mr. Harkness that you did not feel that the role of our Armed Forces should be changed. However, I do wonder why Canada should continue or perpetuate undertakings entered into some eight years ago and not provide certain modifications in this respect? Under our commitments we have become part of a nuclear deterrent force in Europe,

within NATO. We have a brigade on the spot and another in reserve, whereas our air force has a strike reconnaissance role.

Mr. FLEURY: Within NORAD?

Mr. LANIEL: No, no; in Europe. I have reference here to our Air Division in Europe. In any event we know that there will be changes in the near future.

(*English*)

The CHAIRMAN: Excuse me, Mr. Laniel, but the translation service does not appear to be operating.

Mr. LANIEL: I will carry on in English, then.

What I am concerned about is that we committed ourselves eight years ago and now we will be coming back to a renewal of our committments, or changes in our commitments, in two years and I do not see why we cannot look into the possibility of a change in these commitments. Changes have occurred since 1959 in France, as an example. The other day I quoted a newspaper article where it said that even the 50,000 men of the British army of the Rhine might be repatriated because of an economical misunderstanding between England and Germany.

Looking at all these things, I do not see why Canada could not end up in 1969 with other commitments within the deterrent force, and I do not see why our air division could not be made a tactical support air force. It might not be able to support our brigade by itself, but it could still assume that role while somebody else took the strike reconnaissance role. In the meantime we could try to reach the goal which has been put forward in the White Paper, which is to make our forces more capable of working together and more homogeneous.

Mr. FLEURY: Sir, I do not believe I said that we could not or should not change our commitments. You, as a member of parliament, can certainly say that we could or should change our commitments. I think I said—and I certainly intended to say—that this was outside the purview of anybody in the military service such as myself. Commitments are not our business in the sense of accepting or rejecting commitments; this is the government's business. When a commitment is given to us we have no alternative but to accept the commitment or to persuade our political masters that we are unable to meet the commitment with the resources we have in hand. It is quite true that the NORAD agreement is coming up for renewal, I think, in 1968 or 1969. The NATO agreements are going to be reviewed in the very near future.

There is nothing to prevent me from saying as a Canadian that we should renegotiate these commitments on a different basis or, indeed, that we should get out of the commitments completely, so that it would be quite wrong for me as a serving officer to say this prior to last July. I might privately hope one way or the other, but this is not my business.

(*Translation*)

Have I expressed myself well enough?

Mr. LANIEL: Yes, I understand that.

(*English*)

Mr. LANIEL: But what I am concerned about is whether the military are so well disciplined that they do not even try to project suggestions or recommendations to the government as far as policy is concerned.

Mr. FLEURY: Indeed, I do not think we spend too much time, in fact, doing just this thing. I think it is almost a matter of routine for the senior officers in the armed forces, either at chiefs of staff committee meetings or at defence council meetings, to say that if we could get out of this commitment we might be able to take on that commitment—to play the juggling game—or if we could cut down on our NATO contribution then we could do much more in this field. We are at this business all the time, but this is internal and this is advice to the government through the Minister. We would not be doing our job if we did not make suggestion, but we can have all kinds of differences of opinions among ourselves. If the organization is working correctly, once the chief says, "This is what I am going to recommend to the Minister", then the rest of us, by training and tradition, fall in line and say, "Yes, sir", and on we go.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I do not wish to cut you off but it is getting late.

Mr. LANIEL: I am very sorry. I had a doctor's appointment this morning.

I will try to make this question short. I do not know if you saw the article in the newspaper *La Presse* last night which commented on a speech which was given by General Allard to the Chamber of Commerce in Montreal.

Mr. FLEURY: No, I have not read that.

Mr. LANIEL: In his speech he said he did not agree with those who preach the doctrine that nuclear war is a possibility. He also added that because of this, in this atomic era in which we now live, terrorism, guerillas and semi-regular war of all different forms are the wars that we will meet. He sees, when looking at unification in Canada, a means for the contribution of our forces as a whole to closer co-operation between them. It might be impossible for use to take part in a semi-regular war and supply our tactical support or even our ordinary supplies without the aid of other people. What is wrong, actually, with trying to make our forces a more compact unit, which would be used to co-operate with other nations, because there is no longer a single service doing one job. Tomorrow the Air Force will be using intercontinental missiles. It is currently using medium range missiles and later on they may be using robot planes, or things like that. Helicopters are being used more and more and they are working closer with the Army. I am sure the Navy cannot do its job alone, whatever they may think. I believe that everything that has been said to this Committee might be good from a military standpoint, looking at our commitments as they are right now, but looking further than that, I do not think this is the answer because I believe that Canada could play the part of its choice.

Mr. FLEURY: The only comment I might make that would be helpful is this. If you are talking in terms of a guerrilla operation or a brush fire war or a small scale operation such as, for instance, Korea started out to be, I can see in a so-called peacekeeping role that a unified force for Canada would possibly make very good sense if Canada were the only contributing country. For instance, if we sent a battalion of the Van Doos to Cyprus, as we did, and if that battalion had come under attack and had to fight to defend itself, and if it were alone it might

make good sense to have integrated or unified into it its own air tactical support, landing craft and a lot of other things. The fact of the matter is that Canada has never undertaken such an operation alone and many never undertake such an operation alone. So, you have to work with the Americans or the British or the Australians or the Turks or the New Zealanders, you name them, and they are not unified. How, then, does the Canadian-projected unified force fit in with these allies? This is what I am unable to see.

Mr. LANIEL: We could give tactical support in co-operation with our allies instead of fulfilling a strike reconnaissance role in co-operation with our allies. If it is in the minds of Canadians to Canadianize our forces further, and even make them flexible enough so that they can lay the part that they choose—

The CHAIRMAN: I am sorry Mr. Laniel. I gave an undertaking to the Committee to remain here until one o'clock and they have very kindly gone along with staying a little longer. If you wish to continue this questioning much longer—

Mr. LANIEL: Mr. Chairman, I will stop. I did have another question about loyalty.

The CHAIRMAN: I would like to thank you, General Fleury, for coming before us as a witness. I am sure it is no exaggeration to say that your testimony has certainly added to the substance of our deliberations. Thank you very much for coming.

Mr. FLEURY: Thank you, sir.

The meeting is adjourned.

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